Tag: war

  • Fable of the Emperor and the Grieving Mother

    Once upon a time there was an Emperor who thought that the war he had started was exciting, albeit troublesome. He thought that running a war was “hard work,” and thinking always made him tired. So, he decided to take another vacation and visit his castle in the provinces, where he could relax with his vassals and nobles seeking his favor and not have to think.

    Nearly all of the vassals and nobles, like the Emperor himself, liked war very much, although they didn’t like to personally participate. Many had cleverly avoided their own involvement in wars when they were young. For instance, the Emperor’s chief vassal, Sir Dick, loved war nearly as much as life itself, but had been a champion at getting deferments from participating in war as a young man. In this way, he could live to grow old and send new generations of young people to war.

    A problem arose in the Emperor’s realm when a grieving woman whose son had died in the Emperor’s war decided to visit the Emperor and ask him what purpose her son’s death had served. She traveled to the Emperor’s castle in the provinces where he was relaxing from the “hard work” of war. She sent a message to him, which said, “I have lost a son who was most precious to me and I wish to know from you that his death was not in vain, that he died for some greater purpose. Please come out from behind the walls of your castle and let me know how my son’s death has been for a noble cause.”

    One of the Emperor’s vassals approached him, and told the Emperor that he had a message from a grieving mother of one of the Emperor’s fallen soldiers. After reading the message, the Emperor turned to the vassal and asked, “Why do you bother me with this, the words of a simple woman, when I have an empire to run and am relaxing from the hard work of war? As you know, tonight we have more riches to gather, and I must be in a mood for gaiety.”

    The vassal bowed low and backed away, apologizing, “I’m sorry,” he said, “I thought that her encampment before the castle might stir up trouble among the people of the realm.”

    “Leave me,” said the Emperor imperiously, “My loyal subjects know better than to speak ill of me.” The Emperor was supremely confident in the knowledge that his subjects, and especially the scribes, would not speak ill of him.

    But the woman’s message had put the Emperor in a bad mood. He thought it impertinent of this woman to send such a message. He had an empire to run, and no time for explaining to a grieving mother why her son had died. It should be obvious to her that her son died because that’s what soldiers do. They die in battle. If they cannot avoid the military, like Sir Dick had done, or at least stay out of war as the Emperor himself had done, then they die in battle if they are unlucky and then are replaced by other soldiers.

    The walls of the Emperor’s castle were high, and the Emperor knew he was safe from this grieving mother and her kind behind them. He and Sir Dick knew best what the empire needed, and he knew that now was the time to relax so that after some weeks he could return to the “hard work” of war.

    But while the message of the grieving mother encamped in front of the Emperor’s castle did not move the hard heart of the Emperor, it did indeed miraculously resound through the empire, and the populace did indeed begin to question with her whether her son had died in vain and whether the Emperor’s war had been no more than tragic folly.

    All fables have a moral, and the moral of this one is: If your son or daughter has died in war and you are a grieving mother, know that while your words may not move the Emperor to come out from behind the safety of his castle walls, your pain and courage may still stir a revolt across the empire and save other mothers’ sons and daughters as well as the innocent citizens of far-off lands.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the author of a recent book of anti-war poetry, Today Is Not a Good Day for War.

  • Seeing Our Way Out of Iraq

    During the past two weeks more than 30 American servicemen died in Iraq, and this month is shaping up to be the deadliest month of the entire war. The casualties add to a dismal reckoning that now exceeds 2,000 Coalition dead and 15-20,000 wounded. The unofficial count, by knowledgeable people who say the Government is not telling it like it is, amounts to more than twice that number of American dead and wounded, and more than ten times those numbers of Iraqi dead and wounded, who are not included in any official tally. That is to say nothing of the thousands on both sides who already are or will become psychological basket cases from this experience.

    The statistics for Gulf War I, tabulated by the Veterans Administration in 2002, suggest that, while initial casualties were light, the casualties of that War ultimately exceeded 30%. Gulf War II is and has been a far more hairy experience. Fighting has been heavier and much more prolonged. Many tons more of depleted uranium weapons have been use, along with other toxic devices. Thus, a long term casualty rate for American forces of 40-50% appears realistic.

    Has the engagement been worth it? Should we stick around to see how it finally turns out? In the end, will we be able to say that the outcome was worth 60-70,000 damaged, distorted or destroyed American lives, to say nothing of the effects on their families and communities?

    Available facts today are against a positive answer to that question. Based on everything we have learned from real experience with the invasion and occupation–from the Downing Street Memo and following publications and admissions–neither the Bush team nor the British leadership either could or chose to see clearly into Iraq on the first day.

    Are they able to see the way out? The view at this moment suggests they cannot.

    Start with the global security situation. The most blatant indications of failure to see that situation is the thought, expressed by Tony Blair on the day of July 7 London bombings, and echoed by George W. Bush, that we are under attack because of our way of life. That is true only in the grimmest form of the observation: What we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, tolerating in Palestine, and perpetrating in Guantanamo and numerous other prison locations looks like our way of life, and that way of life is deeply resented and opposed by millions of people. We are fortunate only that so few of them choose to react violently. The attackers are not trying to wreck our home life. They want us to stop destroying theirs.

    Will the situation improve quickly? So long as there is a shooting war going in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so long as the human rights and dignity of thousands of men and women are abused by the United States as they now are, the prospects of peace are virtually nil. And the chance that some of the people who are now angry enough to try to kill some of us will cease and desist is zero. Having created a new generation of terrorists, we will experience more terrorism.

    We won’t necessarily know who some of those people are until it is too late, but the disturbing truth may be that there is now no turning back for some of them, no matter what we do. We will pay, and no war on terrorism can prevent that from happening, somewhere, somehow, sometime.

    Can we do something about it? There are many things that would help. For example, several members of Congress, including John McCain and other Republicans, are pushing legislation to restore American observance of international law and our own military regulations on the treatment of prisoners. Ominously, the regulations are said to be in the process of being rewritten in the Pentagon. Provisions to restore US observance of international law and our own well-established practices have been added to a major spending bill that Bush has threatened to veto if they remain in the bill. Supporters of the President on this say basically that he is above the law, anybody’s law. That announces to the world that the failures reported at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and elsewhere were not due to a few bad apples, but were brought on by the highest levels of American policy, and US leadership remains unreconstructed on this issue.

    Is presidential prerogative really at issue here? There is nothing in the Constitution or the United States Code that says the President is above the law. As the Chief Executive of the United States, one of the leading responsibilities of the President is to see that the law of the land is carried out. His oath of office says he faithfully will do that. In effect, the President’s position on observing established US laws and treaties on torture says he willfully abdicates his responsibility as President of the United States in order to be the nation’s chief advocate of cruel and unusual punishment for people who have not even been brought to trial. The President’s attitude on this and that of his supporters makes a moral and legal travesty of the American presidency. It simply cannot be a prerogative of the President to ignore established laws.

    How does that bear on getting us out of Iraq? One of the hardest things about making peace is persuading the protagonists that the time for battle is over. People do remember that they were mauled, their homes and towns destroyed, their family members confined, tortured, and denied human rights. The longer that goes on, the more vivid is the recall. And if some die, others tend to remember for them. The peace, if it comes, is always troubled by such recollections, and the people who recall are seldom ever able to go after the real perpetrators. Thus, they go for softer targets. Communities, families, individual victims pay for the failures of leadership. The resultant instability makes it appear to leaders who are otherwise disposed anyway that they have no choice but to “stay the course” to “maintain the peace.” They refuse to concede that they may be the reason peace does not prevail. That illusion sustains enduring occupation, which feeds enduring conflict.

    Bush reiterated that position this week. Faced by a growing, but only morally armed group of Cindy Sheehan supporters outside his gate at Crawford, Texas, and surrounded by his war cabinet, Bush called the growing mayhem in Iraq “a grim reminder of the brutal enemies we face in the war on terror.” And he pleaded with an increasingly skeptical America to support his “stay the course” strategy.

    But what is the Iraq reality? Both President Bush and Britain’s Prime Minister Tony Blair keep pushing their basic theme that there is no connection between chaos in Iraq and attacks or risks of terrorist attacks in the west. We went into Iraq allegedly to liberate a people who would be grateful for the freedom from Saddam Hussein. From the beginning, our people on the ground found that few Iraqis approved of the invasion. That disapproval gradually morphed into an insurgency in and around Baghdad that now covers the bulk of northwestern Iraq and breaks out sporadically in both the south (Shi’a territory) and the north (mainly Kurdish territory). A certain number of outsiders also disapproved and went to Iraq to fight with the insurgents, perhaps in some instances to make their own mayhem.

    The effort to liberate Iraq bogged down. More Iraqis joined the fray, by some reports, creating not one but several insurgencies. The US set out to train Iraqi forces to take over the task of defeating the insurgencies and maintaining public order. The US lead in this effort, however, never diminished because the Iraqis did not seem capable or, for that matter, willing to fight their own people, unless the situation turned to outright communal violence. Now the US has more than a mythical tar baby to deal with. Because the US remains in the lead, the Iraqis being trained, as well as officials who are running the interim government and drafting a new constitution, are widely if not uniformly tainted by the US connection. The insurgents attack them as well as the Coalition–mainly the American–forces. US efforts are then strengthened to train more Iraqis to take over, and in the meantime, American forces are stuck there, under siege.

    A US promised democracy has become Iraqi against Iraqi. The US is training Iraqi forces to defeat Iraqis who do not want the American or other Coalition forces there. What this does is deepen and reinforce divisions among Iraqis that, in the Iraqi ethnic triad, were already simmering, and in some locations appear to be coming to a boil. In effect, people the US injured, tortured, killed or insulted by occupation increase in number every day, and the objectors, including the living victims and the relatives of the dead, take out their anger and frustration on Americans and Iraqis who are visibly affiliated with Americans. The Bush team is now saying the US can see itself withdrawing—at least partially—from Iraq when and if the Iraqis are able to contain the insurgency that is fueled by the US presence. That is a classic oxymoron.

    The chances that such an outcome will occur while the US remains in Iraq are nil. It is hard to see your way out of a situation if you will not face the real nature of the situation. Bush and Blair have thoroughly confused the issues in their own minds, and they are increasingly at odds with the people of their countries. But the tragedy of it is that training Iraqis to kill or punish, i.e., imprison other Iraqis, or Afghans to kill or confine other Afghans is merely setting these societies against themselves.

    The situation needs to be turned as quickly as possible into one in which the US is not fighting the Iraqis, and neither are Iraqis. Expecting the Iraqis to bludgeon themselves into a democratic society is preposterous. The present conflict can only be resolved by turning the whole matter over to a UN peacekeeping force that does not contain any Americans, and that does not continue to set the Iraqi people against each other.

    The writer is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer and former Chairman of the Department of International Studies of the National War College. He is a regular columnist on rense.com. He will welcome comments at wecanstopit@charter.net

  • Occupied Territories: Iraq, America

    It has quickly become clear that Iraq is not a liberated country, but an occupied country. We became familiar with that term during the second world war. We talked of German-occupied France, German-occupied Europe. And after the war we spoke of Soviet-occupied Hungary, Czechoslovakia, eastern Europe. It was the Nazis, the Soviets, who occupied countries. The United States liberated them from occupation.

    Now we are the occupiers. True, we liberated Iraq from Saddam Hussein, but not from us. Just as in 1898 we liberated Cuba from Spain, but not from us. Spanish tyranny was overthrown, but the US established a military base in Cuba, as we are doing in Iraq. US corporations moved into Cuba, just as Bechtel and Halliburton and the oil corporations are moving into Iraq. The US framed and imposed, with support from local accomplices, the constitution that would govern Cuba, just as it has drawn up, with help from local political groups, a constitution for Iraq. Not a liberation. An occupation.

    And it is an ugly occupation. On August 7 2003 the New York Times reported that General Sanchez in Baghdad was worried about the Iraqi reaction to occupation. Pro-US Iraqi leaders were giving him a message, as he put it: “When you take a father in front of his family and put a bag over his head and put him on the ground, you have had a significant adverse effect on his dignity and respect in the eyes of his family.” (That’s very perceptive.)

    We know that fighting during the US offensive in November 2004 destroyed three-quarters of the town of Falluja (population 360,000), killing hundreds of its inhabitants. The objective of the operation was to cleanse the town of the terrorist bands acting as part of a “Ba’athist conspiracy”.

    But we should recall that on June 16 2003, barely six weeks after President Bush had claimed victory in Iraq, two reporters for the Knight Ridder newspaper group wrote this about the Falluja area: “In dozens of interviews during the past five days, most residents across the area said there was no Ba’athist or Sunni conspiracy against US soldiers, there were only people ready to fight because their relatives had been hurt or killed, or they themselves had been humiliated by home searches and road stops … One woman said, after her husband was taken from their home because of empty wooden crates which they had bought for firewood, that the US is guilty of terrorism.”

    Soldiers who are set down in a country where they were told they would be welcomed as liberators and find they are surrounded by a hostile population become fearful and trigger-happy. On March 4 nervous, frightened GIs manning a roadblock fired on the Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena, just released by kidnappers, and an intelligence service officer, Nicola Calipari, whom they killed.

    We have all read reports of US soldiers angry at being kept in Iraq. Such sentiments are becoming known to the US public, as are the feelings of many deserters who are refusing to return to Iraq after home leave. In May 2003 a Gallup poll reported that only 13% of the US public thought the war was going badly. According to a poll published by the New York Times and CBS News on June 17, 51% now think the US should not have invaded Iraq or become involved in the war. Some 59% disapprove of Bush’s handling of the situation.

    But more ominous, perhaps, than the occupation of Iraq is the occupation of the US. I wake up in the morning, read the newspaper, and feel that we are an occupied country, that some alien group has taken over. I wake up thinking: the US is in the grip of a president surrounded by thugs in suits who care nothing about human life abroad or here, who care nothing about freedom abroad or here, who care nothing about what happens to the earth, the water or the air, or what kind of world will be inherited by our children and grandchildren.

    More Americans are beginning to feel, like the soldiers in Iraq, that something is terribly wrong. More and more every day the lies are being exposed. And then there is the largest lie, that everything the US does is to be pardoned because we are engaged in a “war on terrorism”, ignoring the fact that war is itself terrorism, that barging into homes and taking away people and subjecting them to torture is terrorism, that invading and bombing other countries does not give us more security but less.

    The Bush administration, unable to capture the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, invaded Afghanistan, killing thousands of people and driving hundreds of thousands from their homes. Yet it still does not know where the criminals are. Not knowing what weapons Saddam Hussein was hiding, it invaded and bombed Iraq in March 2003, disregarding the UN, killing thousands of civilians and soldiers and terrorising the population; and not knowing who was and was not a terrorist, the US government confined hundreds of people in Guantánamo under such conditions that 18 have tried to commit suicide.

    The Amnesty International Report 2005 notes: ” Guantánamo Bay has become the gulag of our times … When the most powerful country in the world thumbs its nose at the rule of law and human rights, it grants a licence to others to commit abuse with impunity”.

    The “war on terrorism” is not only a war on innocent people in other countries; it is a war on the people of the US: on our liberties, on our standard of living. The country’s wealth is being stolen from the people and handed over to the super-rich. The lives of the young are being stolen.

    The Iraq war will undoubtedly claim many more victims, not only abroad but also on US territory. The Bush administration maintains that, unlike the Vietnam war, this conflict is not causing many casualties. True enough, fewer than 2,000 service men and women have lost their lives in the fighting. But when the war finally ends, the number of its indirect victims, through disease or mental disorders, will increase steadily. After the Vietnam war, veterans reported congenital malformations in their children, caused by Agent Orange.

    Officially there were only a few hundred losses in the Gulf war of 1991, but the US Gulf War Veterans Association has reported 8,000 deaths in the past 10 years. Some 200,000 veterans, out of 600,000 who took part, have registered a range of complaints due to the weapons and munitions used in combat. We have yet to see the long-term effects of depleted uranium on those currently stationed in Iraq.

    Our faith is that human beings only support violence and terror when they have been lied to. And when they learn the truth, as happened in the course of the Vietnam war, they will turn against the government. We have the support of the rest of the world. The US cannot indefinitely ignore the 10 million people who protested around the world on February 15 2003.

    There is no act too small, no act too bold. The history of social change is the history of millions of actions, small and large, coming together at points in history and creating a power that governments cannot suppress.

    Howard Zinn is professor emeritus of political science at Boston University; his books include A People’s History of the United States.

    Originally published by The Guardian.

  • The Soldier as Sacrificial Victim: Awakening from the Nightmare of History

    “BLOOD SACRIFICE PRESERVES THE NATION”

    In Violence and the Sacred and other books, Rene Girard theorizes that sacrificial scapegoating is the fundamental mechanism supporting and sustaining religion and civilized communities. The maintenance of group unity, according to Girard—prevention of discord between members of the community—requires that violence be deflected outward. Society identifies a “scapegoat”—toward which members of the group safely may displace violence. By virtue of the scapegoat mechanism, divisions in the community are reduced to but one division: the division of all against one common victim or minority group.

    Prime candidates for scapegoating, Girard says, are the “marginal and the weak,” a minority group, or those isolated by their very prominence. In this paper, building on my own research and that of Carolyn Marvin, I wish to extend and expand upon Girard’s analysis by focusing on what Marvin calls “insider violence:” the desire to sacrifice members of one’s own group. Specifically, I shall focus on the institution of warfare and to show how the soldier functions as a sacrificial victim.

    Summarizing Girard’s theory in an online article entitled “Visible Victim,” S. Mark Heim states that the scapegoating process does not just accept innocent victims, but prefers them—outsiders who are not closely linked to established groups in society. “The sad good thing that happens as a result of this bad thing,” Heim states, “is that scapegoating actually works.” In the wake of murdering the victim or victims, communities find that the “sudden war of all against one has delivered them from the war of each against all.”

    Girardian scholar Duncan Ragsdale states that “All the kingdoms of the world are based on the scapegoat mechanism.” This mechanism, Ragsdale says, depends on a “collective unknowing” for it to work. The title of one of Girard’s books, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, alludes to this idea of a concealed dynamic that has worked to maintain civilizations from their beginnings. People perform scapegoating, but are not aware of what they are doing, or why. Girard suggests there is profound resistance—in the psychoanalytic sense of the term—toward becoming aware of the victimage mechanism; what amounts to a taboo against knowing.

    In her groundbreaking Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, Carolyn Marvin states that we “misunderstand the genuinely religious character of patriotism.” The power to compel believers to die in the West, she says, has passed from Christianity to the nation-state. Willingness to sacrifice oneself for the community, according to Marvin, constitutes the “ultimate sign of faith in social existence.” Whereas Girard theorizes that preserving the unity of the community requires violence toward an outsider or marginal group, Marvin proposes a more radical hypothesis: that preservation of the nation-state requires sacrificing members of one’s own group.

    The sacrifice of members of one’s own group, Marvin proposes, is the fundamental purpose of the institution of warfare. In our conventional way of thinking, nations go to war to defend the homeland, defeat the enemy, achieve “victory,” etc. Marvin suggests that beneath these declared motives lies the real purpose of warfare, namely the desire or need to sacrifice members of one’s own community. “Blood sacrifice,” Marvin declares, “Preserves the nation.”

    It is the task of the soldier to perform acts of self-sacrifice in the name of the nation. General Douglas MacArthur told graduating West Pointers in 1962 that they as soldiers “above all other men” were required to practice “the greatest act of religious training—sacrifice.” Marvin calls soldiers the “sacrificial class.” Soldiers are that group of people within a nation who are required to “die for their country” when asked to do so. They are the designated sacrificial victims.

    THE FIRST WORLD WAR AS A SACRIFICIAL RITUAL

    My understanding of the sacrificial dynamic of warfare grows out of research on the First World War. This war (1914-1918) is famous for the way in which battles were fought. Soldiers hunkered down in trenches on opposing sides on the Western front: France and Great Britain on one side; Germany on the other. Battles or attacks occurred when a line of soldiers got out of a trench— often several miles in length—and advanced en masse toward the enemy line, where there was a probability that the soldier would be hit by an artillery shell or mowed down by machine-gun fire as he moved forward.

    Historian Modris Eksteins describes the typical pattern of “battle” that characterized the First World War:

    The victimized crowd of attackers in no man’s land has become one of the supreme images of this war. Attackers moved forward usually without seeking cover and were mowed down in rows, with the mechanical efficiency of a scythe, like so many blades of grass. “We were very surprised to see them walking,” wrote a German machine gunner of his experience of a British attack at the Somme. “The officers went in front. I noticed one of them walking calmly, carrying a walking stick. When we started firing we just had to load and reload. They went down in the hundreds. You didn’t have to aim, we just fired into them.”

    In spite of the absurdity, futility and massive casualties that resulted from this strategy, this way of fighting continued throughout the war’s duration. Most historians agree that the endless battles produced insignificant results, apart from the monumental wastage of lives. Writing about the first two years of the war, Eksteins says that the belligerents on the Western front “hammered at each other in battles that cost millions of men their lives but moved the front line at most a mile or so in either direction.”

    At the Battle of the Somme that began on July 1, 1916, 60,000 men were killed or injured on the first day of the 110,000 on the British front who got out of trenches and began to walk forward along a thirteen-mile front. One would imagine that the British would have received the message and abandoned this disastrous strategy shortly thereafter, but they did not. Day after day, week after week, month after month, soldiers got out of trenches, advanced toward the German line, and were slaughtered. Over 416,000 Britons were killed at the Somme, but the battle lines did not change.

    Even the best historians are mystified, struggling to explain what was going on—the perpetual, senseless carnage. The problem is that their thinking is too conventional. They continue to assume that nations were trying to “win” the war; that it was a question of “victory or defeat.” When pressed to explain the suicidal battle-strategies, commentators say that Generals were held in thrall by an antiquated battle strategy or that they underestimated the power of the machine-gun. Frequently, people throw up their hands in despair and declare that the Generals simply were “stupid.”

    In our conventional way of thinking, we say that a soldier has died because the enemy has killed him. When French and British soldiers got out of trenches to attack and were mowed down by machine gun fire, we say that they were killed by Germans. Likewise, when German soldiers moved forward en masse and were slaughtered by the opposing forces, we say that the French or British killed them. Wouldn’t it be more parsimonious to say that nations and leaders—by putting their soldiers into such an impossible situation—were killing their own men?

    Wouldn’t it be more accurate to say that France was killing Frenchmen, that Germany was killing Germans, and that Great Britain killed British soldiers? We disguise the sacrificial meaning of war by delegating their execution to the other nation. The nation, Marvin says, sends its soldiers to die, but is not their visible executioner: “The enemy executes the members of the sacrificial class.”

    Significant political figures of the time seem to have been edified by the spectacle of mass slaughter that occurred during the First World War. Here is what P. H. Pearse, founder of the Irish revolutionary movement, had said upon observing the daily carnage in France:

    The last sixteen months have been the most glorious in the history of Europe. Heroism has come back to the earth. It is good for the world that such things should be done. The old heart of the earth needed to be warmed with the red wine of the battlefield. Such august homage was never before offered to God as this, the homage of millions of lives given gladly for love of country.

    Pearse describes the First World War in the language of mythic sacrifice, proclaiming that the heart of the earth needed to be “warmed with the red wine of the battlefield.” He declares that the war is “glorious” and is pleased to observe that “heroism” has come back to the earth. He characterizes slaughter as an offering to God, a form of august homage taking the form of “millions of lives given gladly for love of country.”

    Observing the war as it took its course, French nationalist Maurice Barres wrote that nothing was “more beautiful yet more difficult to understand than these boys, today cold in their graves, who gave themselves for France.” Barres called the early years of war—during which thousands of French soldiers were slaughtered on a daily basis—“marvelous times, in which one may again find himself, times in which the splendor of our profound unity is revealed.” While the young soldiers had been learning the lessons of war through sledgehammer blows and in the furnace of fire, Barres said, the “differences and the divisions, which yesterday seemed insurmountable have today completely disappeared.”

    Like Pearse, it would appear that Barres was thrilled and exhilarated by the death of young men. Barres links the achievement of unity within the French nation—disappearance of “differences and divisions”—directly to the fact that soldiers have been willing to sacrifice their lives. How does the soldier’s death function to produce national unity? Perhaps sacrificial death in warfare is the means by which a people demonstrate that it is devoted to and united behind its sacred ideals. Willingness to send young men to die is the way a nation “puts its money where its mouth is.”

    According to Marvin, “The community celebrates and reveres its insiders turned outsiders. From within the boundaries, the community fears and worships these outsiders it consumes to preserve its life.” Soldiers are celebrated, revered and worshipped because they (like Christ) take the sacrificial burden upon themselves. They are the designated victims who are required to suffer—and perhaps to die—for other members of the group. The soldier is an “insider turned outsider,” member of the community who has been thrust outward from within the nation’s boundaries in order to do battle over there—on foreign soil.

    The task of political and military leaders is to persuade young men of the virtue of sacrifice. This is accomplished by appealing to their narcissism and idealism through the use of words like “honor,” “glory” and “heroism.” In a lecture that formed an important part of the training of British Officers in the First World War, Colonel Shirley stated that his objective was to convince the soldier who had entered the service of his Country to proceed to serve her “with all your heart and with all your soul.” If you have done your best and yet must fall, Colonel Shirley explained to his Officers, you may take comfort in the thought that you will have “suffered for a cause greater and more noble than that for which any man has ever yet sacrificed his all.”

    One million volunteers joined the British army the first year of World War I, 1914. War Office recruiting stands were inundated with men persuaded of their duty to fight. On September 9, 1915 Basil Hart asked his parents not to wear mourning clothes in the event he died. “I do not wish you to regard my death as an occasion for grief,” he said, “but of one for thanksgiving. For no man could desire a nobler end than to die for his country and the cause of civilization.” Frenchman Robert Dubarle wrote similarly, shortly before his death, of the “glorious privilege of sacrificing oneself, voluntarily. Let us try, without complaining too much, to offer our sacrifice to our country and to place the love of fatherland above our own grief.”

    HIDING THE VICTIM

    We’ve noted that Girard believes that in order for it to be effective, the sacrificial mechanism must be disguised or hidden; we avoid knowing what is going on by averting our eyes from the victim. S. Mark Heims states that the working of mythical sacrifice in society requires that people “know not what they do.” He says that the scapegoating mechanism is “most virulent when it is most invisible” and that the effectiveness of the mechanism of sacrificial killing depends on “blindness to its workings.” To “avert one’s eyes from the sight of the real victims,” Heims says, is that “characteristically human act” that lies at the essence of scapegoating.

    Perhaps a similar dynamic is operative in the case of warfare. War as a unifier of the national community works best when people are able to avert their eyes from the sight of the victims; when they don’t have to look closely at what happens to the bodies of soldiers. People enjoy the idea of war, but would prefer to participate at a distance. They would rather not see the maimed bodies. Sight of a soldier’s mutilated body drains warfare of its glory.

    The son of Douglas Haig, the British Commander-in-Chief responsible for the disastrous Battle of the Somme, reports that the General “felt that it was his duty to refrain from visiting the casualty stations because these visits made him physically ill.” The French Commander Joffre, after pinning a military decoration on a blinded soldier, said to his Staff: “I mustn’t be shown any more such spectacles. I would no longer have the courage to give the order to attack.” In war, the body of the soldier is given over to slaughter in the name of the sacred ideal. We want the “beautiful” ideal, but don’t want to look too closely at what happens to the body of the soldier.

    Hypocrisy lies at the heart of the institution of warfare. People plug into the spectacle and relish the fantasy of their nation’s power and glory. They embrace war as a righteous struggle between good and evil. However, most people themselves do not wish to be put in harm’s way. War is enjoyable to the extent that killing, suffering and dying are delegated to someone else. Further, people would rather that the carnage take place somewhere else, at a distance from the homeland.

    George M. Cohan was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal for his World War I song, Over There. Even now it is difficult to resist this fervent appeal to our idealism and sense of moral responsibility.

    Johnnie, get your gun, get your gun, get your gun, Take it on the run, on the run, on the run, Hear them calling you and me, ev’ry son of liberty Hurry right away, no delay, go today Over there, over there! Send the word; send the word, over there! That the Yanks are coming, the Yanks are coming, And we won’t come back ‘til it’s over, Over There!

    What actually was occurring “over there?” John Ellis writes about the sights that stretcher-bearers had to endure as they attempted to recover the bodies lying in “no man’s land.” Some soldiers might be found alive, even semi-conscious, with the lower half of their face sliced off or the top of their head and their brains clearly visible. Men arrived still breathing at the regimental aid posts with holes the size of a football between their shoulder blades. Doctors might gently prise apart the hands of a man clutching his midriff and recoil, sickened, as his intestines spilled out over his trousers. Horrific events such as this occurred a million times over during the First World War.

    Insofar as approximately 53,000 Americans were killed and 204,000 wounded in the First World War, we may assume that tens-of-thousands of American soldiers experienced horrors precisely like the ones described above. What astonishing incongruity between the joyful, optimistic song that emboldened men to become soldiers and the nauseating results of battle. How sad to realize that societies play upon the idealism and good will of young men in order to send them “over there,” where they may become sacrificial victims.

    “BODY-BAGS” AND THE EVOLUTION OF A COUNTER-SACRIFICIAL CULTURE

    Is there no escape from the victimage mechanism; the need to sacrifice human beings in the name of maintaining the sacred community? Girard suggests that just as societies have created the scapegoat mechanism, so powerful forces have evolved that operate in opposition to perpetuating this mechanism. Girard’s writings focus specifically upon historical events and trends acting to generate greater awareness of the victim, and of the victim’s innocence. To the extent that attention is brought to bear upon the victim and his innocence, Girard believes, so does the efficacy of the scapegoating mechanism diminish.

    I theorize that precisely such a mechanism working to bring about greater awareness of the victimage mechanism arose in the United States in relationship to the institution of warfare. I’m referring to the custom (let us use this term for the time being) that developed during the past thirty-five years showing body-bags containing dead American soldiers returning from the field of battle. Televised reports of the body-bags functioned to make it more difficult for people to “avert their eyes.”

    The return of dead soldiers in body bags correlated with the development of a profoundly counter-sacrificial culture in American society. For a long period of time after the Viet Nam war (up until September 11, 2001), there was virtually no international situation that was considered to be worthy of American intervention if it meant that even a single soldier might die in battle. Americans had developed a zero tolerance for casualties. In an October, 1994 article in Newsweek written while the invasion of Haiti was being considered, Jacob Weisberg noted that only about 400 U. S. soldiers had been killed in action in the twenty years since the end of the Vietnam war. This meant that serving in the armed forces was a relatively safe job. Driving a truck was three times riskier than being in the military, driving a taxi six times riskier.

    On the eve of an invasion that did not happen, Richard Cheney appeared on Meet the Press and stated that Haiti was “not worth American lives.” Senator John Glenn suggested that the case for intervention could not pass the “Dover Test,” the televised return of body bags from Port-au-Prince to the Air Force base in Dover, Delaware. Writing in the New York Times on July 16, 1995, Roger Cohen suggested that unwillingness to intervene in Bosnia spelled the “death of Western honor.” Eric Gans noted on June 26, 1999 that the “model of heroism constituted by the sacrifice of the individual life for the sake of the collectivity is rapidly losing its viability.”

    Another milestone in the American experience of war was the movie Saving Private Ryan, depicting the landing of American soldiers on Omaha Beach in Normandy on June 6, 1944. This was the first time in fifty-four years, according to military authority David M. Hart, that the viciousness and brutality of this amphibious assault had been shown in such graphic detail. For me—and I’m sure for many others—this was the first time that I’d seen battle portrayed as a form of unrelenting slaughter.

    While most movies about the Second World War depict the soldier as an individual possessing a substantial degree of agency—capable of shaping the course of battle—what we see in the famous first half-hour of Saving Private Ryan is how helpless soldiers were; how narrow was their capacity for choice or agency. What occurred essentially was that soldiers jumped off boats into the ocean, where they faced a barrage of machine-guns and artillery shelling. Many soldiers drowned, while others immediately were massacred.

    Luckier soldiers made it to the beach intact, although at this point they continued to be subject to attack and often were killed. Among other horrors, the movie shows body parts floating in the ocean and strewn upon the beach. Carolyn Marvin states that many who participated in the D-Day invasion sensed that they were being sacrificed. “We knew that we were considered to be expendable,” recalled a participant who survived the D-Day invasion. “That was the price of doing it.”

    AWAKENING

    What would it mean to “awaken from the nightmare of history?” In the first place, the ability to awaken means recognizing that we already exist as if in the midst of a bad dream, one however that is occurring within the space of reality or waking life. Many aspects of political history possess the characteristics of a nightmare. One need only turn on the television set or read today’s newspaper to apprehend the “waking nightmare” to which I refer.

    The fact that one is present within “reality” or awake does not mean, however, that one is not dreaming. It is a mistake to equate “reality” with that which is real. War, I suggest, may be conceived as a shared or collective fantasy, like a bad dream that many people are having at the same time. What is the nature of the shared fantasy that is the source of the ideology of war?

    The ideology of war is generated based on the fantasy that nations are real entities— bodies politics—that substantially exist. This fantasy of the nation as an actual body politic is complemented by another one, namely the fantasy that these bodies will continue to exist to the extent that we feed them with sacrificial victims. It is this grotesque fantasy—of sacrificing human bodies for the body politic—that is the source of collective acts of mass-murder manifesting as war and genocide.

    Awakening from the nightmare of history means that we become aware of this sacrificial fantasy and how it functions. Becoming aware of the sacrificial fantasy means perceiving how the “victimage mechanism” operates within human communities (Girard); involves revealing the “totem secret” (Marvin); and implies “making conscious the unconscious on the stage of social reality” (N. O. Brown).

    If the ideology of sacrificial violence depends on “collective unknowing” in order to be effective, perhaps our capacity to know—to become aware of how human beings act to generate this violence—will lead to abandoning this ideology. On the other hand, perhaps it will not. Perhaps the human attachment to the fantasy of society or nation or body politic is so profound that we are unable to live in separation from the idea of these entities.

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  • Dragon’s Teeth

    A headless man is running down the street

    He is carrying his head in his hands

    A woman runs after him

    She has his heart in her hands

    The bombs keep falling sowing hate

    And they keep running down the streets

    Not the same two people but thousands of others & brothers

    All running from the bombs that keep falling sowing pure hate

    And for every bomb that’s dropped up spring a thousand Bin Ladens a thousand new terrorists

    Like dragon’s teeth sown

    From which armed warriors sprang up

    Crying for blood

    As the smart bombs sowing hate

    Keep falling and falling and falling

  • If America were Iraq, What would it be Like?

    President Bush said Tuesday that the Iraqis are refuting the pessimists and implied that things are improving in that country.

    What would America look like if it were in Iraq ‘s current situation? The population of the US is over 11 times that of Iraq, so a lot of statistics would have to be multiplied by that number.

    Thus, violence killed 300 Iraqis last week, the equivalent proportionately of 3,300 Americans. What if 3,300 Americans had died in car bombings, grenade and rocket attacks, machine gun spray, and aerial bombardment in the last week? That is a number greater than the deaths on September 11, and if America were Iraq, it would be an ongoing, weekly or monthly toll.

    And what if those deaths occurred all over the country, including in the capital of Washington, DC, but mainly above the Mason Dixon line, in Boston, Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, and San Francisco?

    What if the grounds of the White House and the government buildings near the Mall were constantly taking mortar fire? What if almost nobody in the State Department at Foggy Bottom, the White House, or the Pentagon dared venture out of their buildings, and considered it dangerous to go over to Crystal City or Alexandria?

    What if all the reporters for all the major television and print media were trapped in five-star hotels in Washington, DC and New York, unable to move more than a few blocks safely, and dependent on stringers to know what was happening in Oklahoma City and St. Louis? What if the only time they ventured into the Midwest was if they could be embedded in Army or National Guard units?

    There are estimated to be some 25,000 guerrillas in Iraq engaged in concerted acts of violence. What if there were private armies totalling 275,000 men, armed with machine guns, assault rifles (legal again!), rocket-propelled grenades, and mortar launchers, hiding out in dangerous urban areas of cities all over the country? What if they completely controlled Seattle , Portland , San Francisco , Salt Lake City , Las Vegas , Denver and Omaha , such that local police and Federal troops could not go into those cities?

    What if, during the past year, the Secretary of State (Aqilah Hashemi), the President (Izzedine Salim), and the Attorney General (Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim) had all been assassinated?

    What if all the cities in the US were wracked by a crime wave, with thousands of murders, kidnappings, burglaries, and carjackings in every major city every year?

    What if the Air Force routinely (I mean daily or weekly) bombed Billings, Montana, Flint, Michigan, Watts in Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Anacostia in Washington, DC, and other urban areas, attempting to target “safe houses” of “criminal gangs”, but inevitably killing a lot of children and little old ladies?

    What if, from time to time, the US Army besieged Virginia Beach , killing hundreds of armed members of the Christian Soldiers? What if entire platoons of the Christian Soldiers militia holed up in Arlington National Cemetery , and were bombarded by US Air Force warplanes daily, destroying thousands of graves and even pulverizing the Vietnam Memorial over on the Mall? What if the National Council of Churches had to call for a popular march of thousands of believers to converge on the National Cathedral to stop the US Army from demolishing it to get at a rogue band of the Timothy McVeigh Memorial Brigades?

    What if there were virtually no commercial air traffic in the country? What if many roads were highly dangerous, especially Interstate 95 from Richmond to Washington, DC, and I-95 and I-91 up to Boston? If you got on I-95 anywhere along that over 500-mile stretch, you would risk being carjacked, kidnapped, or having your car sprayed with machine gun fire.

    What if no one had electricity for much more than 10 hours a day, and often less? What if it went off at unpredictable times, causing factories to grind to a halt and air conditioning to fail in the middle of the summer in Houston and Miami? What if the Alaska pipeline were bombed and disabled at least monthly? What if unemployment hovered around 40%?

    What if veterans of militia actions at Ruby Ridge and the Oklahoma City bombing were brought in to run the government on the theory that you need a tough guy in these times of crisis?

    What if municipal elections were cancelled and cliques close to the new “president” quietly installed in the statehouses as “governors?” What if several of these governors (especially of Montana and Wyoming ) were assassinated soon after taking office or resigned when their children were taken hostage by guerrillas?

    What if the leader of the European Union maintained that the citizens of the United States are, under these conditions, refuting pessimism and that freedom and democracy are just around the corner?

    Juan Cole is Professor of History at the University of Michigan.

  • … Unless It’s All Greek to Him

    During a lull in the war between Athens and Sparta , the Athenians decided to invade and occupy Sicily . Thucydides tells us in “The Peloponnesian War” that “they were, for the most part, ignorant of the size of the island and the numbers of its inhabitants . and they did not realize that they were taking on a war of almost the same magnitude as their war against the Peloponnesians.”

    According to Thucydides, the digression into Sicily in 416 BC – a sideshow that involved lying exiles, hopeful contractors, politicized intelligence, a doctrine of preemption – ultimately cost Athens everything, including its democracy.

    Nicias, the most experienced Athenian general, had not wanted to be chosen for the command. “His view was that the city was making a mistake and, on a slight pretext which looked reasonable, was in fact aiming at conquering the whole of Sicily – a considerable undertaking indeed,” wrote Thucydides.

    Nicias warned that it was the wrong war against the wrong enemy and that the Athenians were ignoring their real enemies – the Spartans – while creating new enemies elsewhere. “It is senseless to go against people who, even if conquered, could not be controlled,” he argued.

    Occupying Sicily would require many soldiers, Nicias insisted, because it meant establishing a new government among enemies. “Those who do this [must] either become masters of the country on the very first day they land in it, or be prepared to recognize that, if they fail to do so, they will find hostility on every side.”

    The case for war, meanwhile, was made by the young general Alcibiades, who was hoping for a quick victory in Sicily so he could move on to conquer Carthage . Alcibiades, who’d led a dissolute youth (and who happened to own a horse ranch, raising Olympic racers) was a battle-tested soldier, a brilliant diplomat and a good speaker. (So much for superficial similarities.)

    Alcibiades intended to rely on dazzling technology – the Athenian armada – instead of traditional foot soldiers. He told the Assembly he wasn’t worried about Sicilian resistance because the island’s cities were filled with people of so many different groups. “Such a crowd as this is scarcely likely either to pay attention to one consistent policy or to join together in concerted action.. The chances are that they will make separate agreements with us as soon as we come forward with attractive suggestions.”

    Another argument for the war was that it would pay for itself. A committee of Sicilian exiles and Athenian experts told the Assembly that there was enough wealth in Sicily to pay the costs of the war and occupation. “The report was encouraging but untrue,” wrote Thucydides.

    Though war was constant in ancient Greece , it was still usually justified by a threat, an insult or an incident. But the excursion against Sicily was different, and Alcibiades announced a new, or at least normally unstated, doctrine.

    “One does not only defend oneself against a superior power when one is attacked: One takes measures in advance to prevent the attack materializing,” he said.

    When and where should this preemption doctrine be applied? Alcibiades gave an answer of a sort. “It is not possible for us to calculate, like housekeepers [perhaps a better translation would be “girlie men”], exactly how much empire we want to have. The fact is that we have reached a state where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we have got because there is danger that we ourselves may fall under the power of others unless others are in our power.”

    Alcibiades’ argument carried the day, but before the invasion, the Athenian fleet sailed around seeking allies among the Hellenic colonies near Sicily . Despite the expedition’s “great preponderance of strength over those against whom it set out,” only a couple of cities joined the coalition.

    At home, few spoke out against the Sicilian operation. “There was a passion for the enterprise which affected everyone alike,” Thucydides reports. “The result of this excessive enthusiasm of the majority was that the few who actually were opposed to the expedition were afraid of being thought unpatriotic if they voted against it, and therefore kept quiet.”

    In the face of aggressive posturing, Nicias appealed to the Assembly members to show true courage.

    “If any of you is sitting next to one of [Alcibiades’] supporters,” Nicias said, “do not allow yourself to be browbeaten or to be frightened of being called a coward if you do not vote for war.. Our country is on the verge of the greatest danger she has ever known. Think of her, hold up your hands against this proposal and vote in favor of leaving the Sicilians alone.”

    We don’t know how many Athenians had secret reservations, but few hands went up against the war.

    In the end, the Athenians lost everything in Sicily . Their army was defeated and their navy destroyed. Alcibiades was recalled early on; Nicias was formally executed while thousands of Athenian prisoners were left in an open pit, where most died.

    The Sicilians didn’t follow up by invading Attica; they just wanted Athens out. But with the leader of the democracies crippled, allies left the Athenian League. Then the real enemy, Sparta , ever patient and cautious, closed in over the next few years. But not before Athens descended, on its own, into a morass of oligarchic coups and self-imposed tyranny.

    Originally published by the Los Angeles Times

  • A Cloud over Civilization

    At the end of the second world war, I was the director for overall effects of the United States strategic bombing survey – Usbus, as it was known. I led a large professional economic staff in assessment of the industrial and military effects of the bombing of Germany. The strategic bombing of German industry, transportation and cities, was gravely disappointing. Attacks on factories that made such seemingly crucial components as ball bearings, and even attacks on aircraft plants, were sadly useless. With plant and machinery relocation and more determined management, fighter aircraft production actually increased in early 1944 after major bombing. In the cities, the random cruelty and death inflicted from the sky had no appreciable effect on war production or the war.

    These findings were vigorously resisted by the Allied armed services – especially, needless to say, the air command, even though they were the work of the most capable scholars and were supported by German industry officials and impeccable German statistics, as well as by the director of German arms production, Albert Speer. All our conclusions were cast aside. The air command’s public and academic allies united to arrest my appointment to a Harvard professorship and succeeded in doing so for a year.

    Nor is this all. The greatest military misadventure in American history until Iraq was the war in Vietnam. When I was sent there on a fact-finding mission in the early 60s, I had a full view of the military dominance of foreign policy, a dominance that has now extended to the replacement of the presumed civilian authority. In India, where I was ambassador, in Washington, where I had access to President Kennedy, and in Saigon, I developed a strongly negative view of the conflict. Later, I encouraged the anti-war campaign of Eugene McCarthy in 1968. His candidacy was first announced in our house in Cambridge.

    At this time the military establishment in Washington was in support of the war. Indeed, it was taken for granted that both the armed services and the weapons industries should accept and endorse hostilities – Dwight Eisenhower’s “military-industrial complex”.

    In 2003, close to half the total US government discretionary expenditure was used for military purposes. A large part was for weapons procurement or development. Nuclear-powered submarines run to billions of dollars, individual planes to tens of millions each.

    Such expenditure is not the result of detached analysis. From the relevant industrial firms come proposed designs for new weapons, and to them are awarded production and profit. In an impressive flow of influence and command, the weapons industry accords valued employment, management pay and profit in its political constituency, and indirectly it is a treasured source of political funds. The gratitude and the promise of political help go to Washington and to the defence budget. And to foreign policy or, as in Vietnam and Iraq, to war. That the private sector moves to a dominant public-sector role is apparent.

    None will doubt that the modern corporation is a dominant force in the present-day economy. Once in the US there were capitalists. Steel by Carnegie, oil by Rockefeller, tobacco by Duke, railroads variously and often incompetently controlled by the moneyed few. In its market position and political influence, modern corporate management, unlike the capitalist, has public acceptance. A dominant role in the military establishment, in public finance and the environment is assumed. Other public authority is also taken for granted. Adverse social flaws and their effect do, however, require attention.

    One, as just observed, is the way the corporate power has shaped the public purpose to its own needs. It ordains that social success is more automobiles, more television sets, a greater volume of all other consumer goods – and more lethal weaponry. Negative social effects – pollution, destruction of the landscape, the unprotected health of the citizenry, the threat of military action and death – do not count as such.

    The corporate appropriation of public initiative and authority is unpleasantly visible in its effect on the environment, and dangerous as regards military and foreign policy. Wars are a major threat to civilised existence, and a corporate commitment to weapons procurement and use nurtures this threat. It accords legitimacy, and even heroic virtue, to devastation and death.

    Power in the modern great corporation belongs to the management. The board of directors is an amiable entity, meeting with self-approval but fully subordinate to the real power of the managers. The relationship resembles that of an honorary degree recipient to a member of a university faculty.

    The myths of investor authority, the ritual meetings of directors and the annual stockholder meeting persist, but no mentally viable observer of the modern corporation can escape the reality. Corporate power lies with management – a bureaucracy in control of its task and its compensation. Rewards can verge on larceny. On frequent recent occasions, it has been referred to as the corporate scandal.

    As the corporate interest moves to power in what was the public sector, it serves the corporate interest. It is most clearly evident in the largest such movement, that of nominally private firms into the defence establishment. From this comes a primary influence on the military budget, on foreign policy, military commitment and, ultimately, military action. War. Although this is a normal and expected use of money and its power, the full effect is disguised by almost all conventional expression.

    Given its authority in the modern corporation it was natural that management would extend its role to politics and to government. Once there was the public reach of capitalism; now it is that of corporate management. In the US, corporate managers are in close alliance with the president, the vice-president and the secretary of defence. Major corporate figures are also in senior positions elsewhere in the federal government; one came from the bankrupt and thieving Enron to preside over the army.

    Defence and weapons development are motivating forces in foreign policy. For some years, there has also been recognised corporate control of the Treasury. And of environmental policy.

    We cherish the progress in civilisation since biblical times and long before. But there is a needed and, indeed, accepted qualification. The US and Britain are in the bitter aftermath of a war in Iraq. We are accepting programmed death for the young and random slaughter for men and women of all ages. So it was in the first and second world wars, and is still so in Iraq. Civilised life, as it is called, is a great white tower celebrating human achievements, but at the top there is permanently a large black cloud. Human progress dominated by unimaginable cruelty and death.

    Civilisation has made great strides over the centuries in science, healthcare, the arts and most, if not all, economic well-being. But it has also given a privileged position to the development of weapons and the threat and reality of war. Mass slaughter has become the ultimate civilised achievement.

    The facts of war are inescapable – death and random cruelty, suspension of civilised values, a disordered aftermath. Thus the human condition and prospect as now supremely evident. The economic and social problems here described can, with thought and action, be addressed. So they have already been. War remains the decisive human failure.

    Originally published in The Guardian on July 15, 2004

    This is an edited extract from The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time, by JK Galbraith, published by Allen Lane. To order a copy for £8 (RRP £10) plus p&p, call the Guardian Book Service on 0870 836 0875

  • Worse than the War

    Worse than the War

    Worse than the war, the endless, senseless war,
    Worse than the lies leading to the war,
    Worse than the countless deaths and injuries,
    Worse than hiding the coffins and not attending funerals,
    Worse than the flouting of international law,
    Worse than the torture at Abu Ghraib prison,
    Worse than the corruption of young soldiers,
    Worse than undermining our collective sense of decency,
    Worse than the arrogance, smugness and swagger,
    Worse than our loss of credibility in the world,
    Worse than the loss of our liberties,
    Worse than learning nothing from the past,
    Worse than destroying the future,
    Worse than the incredible stupidity of it all,
    Worse than all of these,
    As if they were not enough for one war or country or lifetime,
    Is the silence, the resounding silence, of good Americans.

  • War Memorials Only Honor Failure

    We don’t need a National World War II Memorial. War memorials are only markers of failure. You disagree? Then, read on.

    My credentials: I speak for the voiceless millions of brave warriors killed in battle, many of whom are buried in far-away graves. I have seen many of these brave men killed and wounded on the beachheads and battlefields from Sicily to Salerno, to Anzio, to Isle of Elba, to France.

    I watched the litter bearers carry blood-stained bodies down to the beach where they were buried in shallow graves. Their rifles, with hanging dog tags capped by a helmet, served as a burial marker. There was no time for a graveside service. I thought of their families and their future shock and grief. These grim scenes will forever haunt me.

    I saw an ammunition ship hit by German dive bombers explode, leaving only a scene that looked like a nuclear mushroom cloud. I watched as my own ship was bombed. I accompanied the ship’s doctor as he dispensed morphine to the wounded lying on stretchers that covered both the main deck and the tank deck.

    Two of my high school classmates were killed: one over Germany and the other in the Mediterranean when his LCI (landing craft, infantry) hit a mine. On my return home I met with the latter’s family to grieve his death and celebrate his life.

    If we allow the Defense Department to chart our future safety, we are foolhardy. Let’s face it. The military extablishment is, at times, without a moral compass.

    Here’s a case in point. In WWII the United States and Britain felt the need to rehabilitate France after its crushing defeat by the Germans. In the Mediterranean the Germans used Elba to attack allied ships, so the Allied Command elected to “take out” Elba. The plan was for the United States to supply the ships, the British their commandos, the French their colonial troops (from Africa) with French officers.

    Before the launching of the invasion, the American land forces broke through the German lines and proceeded well beyond Elba, which made it no longer strategic. Instead of canceling the invasion, the Allied Command went ahead with the invasion causing the slaughter of hundreds of French colonial troops and French officers. This was totally immoral. A simple blockade would have sufficed.

    We should stop building memorials celebrating failure. It is obvious that we lack the tools for peace. The souls of our fallen warriors must be saying: “They’ve got it all wrong. Let them erect peace memorials in the form of a Peace Department and a Peace Academy to counterbalance the Defense (War) Department and the military academies.”

    These brave souls would also advise our leaders to stop shouting remarks such as “Bring it on,” “We’ll chase you down and kill you” and “We don’t need a permission slip from the United Nations.”

    A Peace Department and a Peace Academy can study the art and science of peacemaking and the causes of war, something a cold, hard granite memorial fails to do. What do we have to lose? If the “greatest generation” is to leave a meaningful legacy, then we must follow up by establishing a Peace Department and erecting a Peace Academy so that our fallen brothers will not have died in vain.

    Otherwise, we will continue building war memorials and will run out of space on the Mall in Washington. I firmly believe that if Congress had created a Peace Department after WWII, we would not be in Iraq today. We wouldn’t be looking fearfully for mushroom clouds and wouldn’t have had to create a Department of Homeland Security. We have been reacting rather than acting.

    U.S. Rep. Dennis Kucinich has filed a bill to create a Peace Department. So, I say to our senators and represenatives, we, the “greatest generation,” have done our job. Please do yours by supporting this bill and making a Peace Department a reality.

    Coleman P. Gorham of Cape Elizabeth, Maine is a retired U.S. Navy officer.