Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Wall Street Journal

  • Nuclear Deterrence: Impeding Nuclear Disarmament

    David KriegerIn an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, published on March 7, 2011, four former high-level US policy makers – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn – focused their attention on nuclear deterrence.  They concurred that deterrence based on nuclear weapons is precarious, could destroy civilized life and raises enormous inhibitions against employing nuclear weapons.  They concluded that the US and Russia were “lucky” that nuclear weapons were not used during the Cold War, and asked: “Does the world want to continue to bet its survival on continued good fortune with a growing number of nuclear nations and adversaries globally?” 


    The four former policy makers argued that “nations should move forward together with a series of conceptual and practical steps toward deterrence that do not rely primarily on nuclear weapons or nuclear threats to maintain international peace and security.”  Their first step is to recognize that “there is a daunting new spectrum of global security threats” and that an “effective strategy to deal with these dangers must be developed.”  Their second step is to realize that reliance on nuclear weapons encourages or excuses nuclear proliferation.  Their third step is to cease the deployment of US and Russian nuclear arsenals in ways that “increase the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon, or even a deliberate exchange based on a false warning.” 


    So far, so good.  Their fourth step, however, seems to be a non sequitur: “[A]s long as nuclear weapons exist, America must retain a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile primarily to deter a nuclear attack and to reassure our allies through extended deterrence.”  The former policy makers had just reviewed the great dangers of relying upon nuclear deterrence, and then followed this by indicating the need for America to rely upon nuclear weapons for deterrence, including nuclear deterrence “extended” to US allies.  They also left unstated what uses the US nuclear stockpile might have other than deterring a nuclear attack.  It appears the former policy makers have chosen a “safe, secure and reliable” nuclear arsenal over a safe and secure citizenry.  Nuclear weapons undermine the possibility of a safe and secure citizenry.  As conceived, the modernization of US nuclear forces would also be expensive and provocative and would limit the possibilities for nuclear disarmament.  I’ve often wondered what is meant by a reliable nuclear arsenal: One with sufficient capacity to annihilate a potential enemy down to the last child?


    The four former policy makers do say that the US and Russia “must continue to lead the “build-down” and “must begin moving away from threatening force postures and deployments.”  But such leadership is needed not only for the “build-down,” but also to envision a world with zero nuclear weapons and to commit to doing what is necessary to achieve that vision. 


    In their fifth step, the group of four recognizes that “nuclear weapons may continue to appear relevant” to some nations.  They thus see the need to “redouble efforts” to resolve regional confrontations and conflicts.  Insightfully, they find, “A world without nuclear weapons will not simply be today’s world minus nuclear weapons.”  They demonstrate a lack of urgency, though, in suggesting that “over time” the US and its allies can work together to make changes to extended deterrence.


    The group of four concludes, “Moving from mutual assured destruction toward a new and more stable form of deterrence with decreasing nuclear risks and an increasing measure of assured security for all nations could prevent our worst nightmare from becoming a reality, and it could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations.”


    Just a few weeks before the publication of this Wall Street Journal article on nuclear deterrence by George Shultz and his colleagues, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation convened a conference in Santa Barbara on “The Dangers of Nuclear Deterrence.”  The conference concluded with a Santa Barbara Declaration: “Reject Nuclear Deterrence: An Urgent Call to Action.”  The Declaration states, “Nuclear deterrence is discriminatory, anti-democratic and unsustainable.  This doctrine must be discredited and replaced with an urgent commitment to achieve global nuclear disarmament.  We must change the discourse by speaking truth to power and speaking truth to each other.”  In other words, we cannot find nuclear deterrence “precarious” on the one hand, and seek to modernize America’s nuclear forces under the guise of keeping them “safe, secure and reliable” on the other hand. 


    The Santa Barbara Declaration concluded, “Before another nuclear weapon is used, nuclear deterrence must be replaced by humane, legal and moral security strategies.  We call upon people everywhere to join us in demanding that the nuclear weapon states and their allies reject nuclear deterrence and negotiate without delay a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons.”  The goal must be a world without nuclear weapons, and reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence remains a major impediment to achieving that goal.

  • The Moral Challenge of a Nuclear-Free World

    This article was originally published by the Wall Street Journal.

    This May, delegations from more than 180 countries gathered in New York, at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to discuss how to free the world from nuclear weapons. Despite the positive momentum that flowed from President Barack Obama’s 2009 speech on the issue in Prague, there was enormous pressure on the conference. With a spirit of cooperation and flexibility from all delegates, however, the conference lived up to its expectations.

    As foreign ministers, we draw two conclusions from this. First, it is remarkable that all delegates agreed on the conference’s action plan, which includes various new and important commitments on nuclear disarmament as well as concrete measures to implement the 1995 Middle East Resolution, which called for the a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the region. We should do everything possible to implement this agreement.

    Our second conclusion is that the agreement is extremely fragile.

    Without an intensive concerted effort, states will not honor it. The irreconcilable views expressed throughout the conference-on such issues as the Iranian nuclear program and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s rules for how signatories withdraw-will not fade away.

    ØPrior to the conference, major nuclear-weapons states took some remarkable steps. The U.S. and Russia agreed to further cut their strategic nuclear weapons. The U.S. also presented a new approach in its Nuclear Posture Review, published in April, which provided strong negative security assurances (that is, assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states).

    We welcome and support the Obama administration’s commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons and strengthening nuclear security. Together with nuclear-weapons states, including the U.S., we are ready to discuss how to reduce the role of nuclear weapons-by, for example, committing to possess them only for the purpose of deterring others from using them. Even if nuclear states cannot immediately agree to abandon their nuclear weapons, they can take practical measures to reduce clear and present risks.

    It is also necessary to make the possession of nuclear weapons unattractive. North Korea and Iran must understand that acquiring nuclear weapons in contradiction of their nonproliferation obligations would never be tolerated and would not elevate their status in the international community.

    Like climate change, nuclear disarmament raises the question of whether mankind can feel a sense of responsibility across national borders and generations. Nuclear disarmament asks whether mankind can act to reduce the risks of self-destruction posed by “God’s fire.” We should never forget how human beings and buildings vanished in the tremendous flash of light and heat in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 65 years ago. This is a global issue that tests our sense of responsibility and morality.

    Morality has recently played an important role in bringing about the success of treaties on land mines and cluster munitions. It is thus no coincidence that the Final Document of May’s conference cited the need for states to comply with international humanitarian law.

    Some may ask themselves why Japan and Germany are seeking to pursue nuclear disarmament with such vigor when both countries rely on the United States for nuclear deterrence. Our countries have long been advocates of disarmament. Since re-emerging from total devastation in the second world war, both countries have pursued a peaceful and stable world and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is in such a shared conviction that we find a common role. And we believe that pursuing nuclear disarmament is the path that will most reliably minimize nuclear risks and enhance international security.

    The 21st century will be about managing our planet. History will remember favorably those countries that respond with a sense of global responsibility. Let us set upon the realistic and responsible path towards a world without nuclear weapons. It is a moral responsibility.

  • How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent

    This article was originally published by the Wall Street Journal

    The four of us have come together, now joined by many others, to
    support a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to
    prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to
    end them as a threat to the world. We do so in recognition of a clear
    and threatening development.

    The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how, and
    nuclear material has brought us to a tipping point. We face a very real
    possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into
    dangerous hands.

    But as we work to reduce nuclear weaponry and to realize the vision
    of a world without nuclear weapons, we recognize the necessity to
    maintain the safety, security and reliability of our own weapons. They
    need to be safe so they do not detonate unintentionally; secure so they
    cannot be used by an unauthorized party; and reliable so they can
    continue to provide the deterrent we need so long as other countries
    have these weapons. This is a solemn responsibility, given the extreme
    consequences of potential failure on any one of these counts.

    For the past 15 years these tasks have
    been successfully performed by the engineers and scientists at the
    nation’s nuclear-weapons production plants and at the three national
    laboratories (Lawrence Livermore in California, Los Alamos in New
    Mexico, and Sandia in New Mexico and California). Teams of gifted
    people, using increasingly powerful and sophisticated equipment, have
    produced methods of certifying that the stockpile meets the required
    high standards. The work of these scientists has enabled the secretary
    of defense and the secretary of energy to certify the safety, security
    and the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile every year since the
    certification program was initiated in 1995.

    The three labs in particular should be applauded for the success they
    have achieved in extending the life of existing weapons. Their work has
    led to important advances in the scientific understanding of nuclear
    explosions and obviated the need for underground nuclear explosive
    tests.

    Yet there are potential problems ahead, as identified by the
    Strategic Posture Commission led by former Defense Secretaries Perry and
    James R. Schlesinger. This commission, which submitted its report to
    Congress last year, calls for significant investments in a repaired and
    modernized nuclear weapons infrastructure and added resources for the
    three national laboratories.

    These investments are urgently needed to undo the adverse
    consequences of deep reductions over the past five years in the
    laboratories’ budgets for the science, technology and engineering
    programs that support and underwrite the nation’s nuclear deterrent. The
    United States must continue to attract, develop and retain the
    outstanding scientists, engineers, designers and technicians we will
    need to maintain our nuclear arsenal, whatever its size, for as long as
    the nation’s security requires it.

    This scientific capability is equally important to the long-term goal
    of achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons—with all
    the attendant expertise on verification, detection, prevention and
    enforcement that is required.

    Our recommendations for maintaining a safe, secure and reliable
    nuclear arsenal are consistent with the findings of a recently completed
    technical study commissioned by the National Nuclear Security
    Administration in the Department of Energy. This study was performed by
    JASON, an independent defense advisory group of senior scientists who
    had full access to the pertinent classified information.

    The JASON study found that the
    “[l]ifetimes of today’s nuclear warheads could be extended for decades,
    with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to
    those employed in Life Extension Programs to date.” But the JASON
    scientists also expressed concern that “[a]ll options for extending the
    life of the nuclear weapons stockpile rely on the continuing maintenance
    and renewal of expertise and capabilities in science, technology,
    engineering, and production unique to the nuclear weapons program.” The
    study team said it was “concerned that this expertise is threatened by
    lack of program stability, perceived lack of mission importance, and
    degradation of the work environment.”

    These concerns can and must be addressed by providing adequate and
    stable funding for the program. Maintaining high confidence in our
    nuclear arsenal is critical as the number of these weapons goes down. It
    is also consistent with and necessary for U.S. leadership in
    nonproliferation, risk reduction, and arms reduction goals.

    By providing for the long-term investments required, we also
    strengthen trust and confidence in our technical capabilities to take
    the essential steps needed to reduce nuclear dangers throughout the
    globe. These steps include preventing proliferation and preventing
    nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material from getting into dangerous
    hands.

    If we are to succeed in avoiding these
    dangers, increased international cooperation is vital. As we work to
    build this cooperation, our friends and allies, as well as our
    adversaries, will take note of our own actions in the nuclear arena.
    Providing for this nation’s defense will always take precedence over all
    other priorities.

    Departures from our existing
    stewardship strategies should be taken when they are essential to
    maintain a safe, secure and effective deterrent. But as our colleague
    Bill Perry noted in his preface to America’s Strategic Posture report,
    we must “move in two parallel paths—one path which reduces nuclear
    dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other which reduces
    nuclear dangers through arms control and international programs to
    prevent proliferation.” Given today’s threats of nuclear proliferation
    and nuclear terrorism, these are not mutually exclusive imperatives. To
    protect our nation’s security, we must succeed in both.

    Beyond our concern about our own stockpile, we have a deep security
    interest in ensuring that all nuclear weapons everywhere are resistant
    to accidental detonation and to detonation by terrorists or other
    unauthorized users. We should seek a dialogue with other states that
    possess nuclear weapons and share our safety and security concepts and
    technologies consistent with our own national security.

  • Let’s Commit to a Nuclear-Free World

    This article was originally published in the Wall Street Journal

    When Barack Obama becomes America’s 44th president on Jan. 20, he should embrace the vision of a predecessor who declared: “We seek the total elimination one day of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth.”

    That president was Ronald Reagan, and he expressed this ambitious vision in his second inaugural address on Jan. 21, 1985. It was a remarkable statement from a president who had deployed tactical nuclear missiles in Europe to counter the Soviet Union’s fearsome SS-20 missile fleet.

    President Reagan knew the grave threat nuclear weapons pose to humanity. He never achieved his goal, but President Obama should pick up where he left off.

    The Cold War is over, but there remain thousands of nuclear missiles in the world’s arsenals — most maintained by the U.S. and Russia. Most are targeted at cities and are far more powerful than the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    Today, the threat is ever more complex. As more nations pursue nuclear ambitions, the world becomes less secure, with growing odds of terrorists obtaining a nuclear weapon.

    The nuclear aspirations of North Korea and Iran threaten a “cascade” of nuclear proliferation, according to a bipartisan panel led by former U.S. Defense Secretaries William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger.

    Another bipartisan panel has warned that the world can expect a nuclear or biological terror attack by 2013 — unless urgent action is taken.

    Nuclear weapons pose grave dangers to all nations. Seeking new weapons and maintaining massive arsenals makes no sense. It is vital that we seek a world free of nuclear weapons. The United States should lead the way, and a President Obama should challenge Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to join us.

    Many of the world’s leading statesmen favor such an effort. They include former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, former Defense Secretary Perry, former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, and former Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn.

    Unfortunately, for eight years the Bush administration moved in another direction, pushing aggressive policies and new weapons programs, threatening to reopen the nuclear door and spark the very proliferation we seek to prevent.

    President Bush made it the policy of the United States to contemplate first use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attack — even against nonnuclear states.

    He changed the “strategic triad” — which put nuclear weapons in a special category by themselves — by lumping them with conventional weapons in the same package of battlefield capabilities. This blurred the distinction between the two, making nuclear weapons easier to use.

    And he advocated new types of weapons that could be used in a variety of circumstances against a range of targets, advancing the notion that nuclear weapons have utility beyond deterrence.

    Mr. Bush then sought funding for new weapons programs, including:

    – A 100-kiloton “bunker buster” that scientists say would not destroy enemy bunkers as advertised, but would have spewed enough radiation to kill one million people.

    – The Advanced Concepts Initiative, including developing a low-yield nuclear weapon for tactical battlefield use.

    – The Modern Pit Facility, a factory that could produce up to 450 plutonium triggers a year — even though scientists say America’s nuclear triggers will be good for years.

    – Pushing to reduce time-to-test readiness at the Nevada Test Site in half — to 18 months — signaling intent to resume testing, which would have broken a test moratorium in place since 1992.

    – A new nuclear warhead, called the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which could spark a new global arms race.

    I opposed these programs, and Congress slashed or eliminated funding for them.

    But President Bush had sent dangerous signals world-wide. Allies could conclude if the United States sought new nuclear weapons, they should too. Adversaries could conclude acquiring nuclear weapons would be insurance against pre-emptive U.S. attack.

    Here’s how President-elect Obama can change course. By law he must set forth his views on nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, in his Nuclear Posture Review, by 2010. In it, he should commit the U.S. to working with Russia to lower each nation’s arsenal of deployed nuclear warheads below the 1,700-2,200 the Moscow Treaty already calls for by 2013.

    It would be a strong step toward reducing our bloated arsenals, and signal the world that we have changed course.

    I was 12 when atomic bombs flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing more than 200,000 people. The horrific images that went around the world have stayed with me all my life.

    Today, there are enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world hundreds of times. And we now face the chilling prospect of nuclear terrorism.

    The bottom line: We must recognize nuclear weapons for what they are — not a deterrent, but a grave and gathering threat to humanity. As president, Barack Obama should dedicate himself to their world-wide elimination.

    Dianne Feinstein is a Democratic Senator from California.

  • A Response to Brown and Deutch

    A Response to Brown and Deutch

    On November 19, 2007, Harold Brown, a former Secretary of Defense in the Carter administration, and John Deutch, a former CIA Director in the Clinton administration, published an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal. The title of their piece was “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy.” Their article began by pointing out that the end of the Cold War has led “several former senior foreign policy officials who wrote on this page [that is, the Wall Street Journal opinion page]…to make the complete elimination of nuclear weapons a principal U.S. foreign policy goal….”

    Brown and Deutch were referring to an article published in the Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007, co-authored by Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn. The article was entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” and the authors made the case for US leadership for a nuclear weapons-free world. They argued, “Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. US leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage – to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”

    Disturbingly, Brown and Deutch were dismissive of even the aspirational goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. They quoted Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which obligates parties to good faith negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons, but dismissed it, stating “hope is not a policy.”

    According to Brown and Deutch, “Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated.” But if these weapons are not “empty symbols,” what is it that they symbolize? A power beyond our ability to control? Human folly? A pinnacle of destructive achievement? They based their arguments on “the important deterrent role” of nuclear weapons, but never bother to mention who exactly is being deterred by the current US arsenal of 10,000 nuclear weapons.

    Rather than looking for a new direction for US nuclear policy more than 15 years after the Cold War, Brown and Deutch seem convinced that nuclear weapons are here to stay, and with their approach they will make this outcome inevitable. Without US leadership, there will be no possibility of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. With US leadership, it is a possibility.

    No country would benefit more from a world free of nuclear weapons than the United States. These are the only weapons that could destroy this country, and perhaps will if we continue to rely upon them for phantom deterrence. Nuclear weapons are really weapons of the weak, giving great asymmetrical advantage to smaller, less powerful nations or to extremists. If the US continues to rely upon these weapons, they will eventually proliferate to extremists who cannot be deterred, and they will be used against us.

    Brown and Deutch’s vision looks directly into a rearview mirror toward the 20th century. Their vision will sustain a future of nuclear threat and make nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war more likely. We desperately need a new vision in our country – a vision that we can lead the world in a more positive direction based upon human security and encompasses ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity.

    To view the Brown/Deutch article and see other responses to it, click here.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).