Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Vietnam War

  • Vietnam Ambush

    This article was originally published by Truthout.


    David KriegerIn the 1960s, the United States of America conscripted young men into its military forces.  The head of Selective Service, which imposed conscription, was General Lewis B. Hershey.  Assisted by local Draft Boards, he gobbled up young men and put them in uniforms.  Then they were trained to kill.


    Most young men were edgy and wary about conscription, particularly after it became apparent that the military’s destination of choice was the jungles of Vietnam.  To receive a deferment and remain beyond the military’s clutches, one had to stay in college or graduate school.  Dick Cheney, one of the subsequent great warmongers of our time, successfully used college deferments to stay out of the military until he qualified for a marriage deferment and then a deferment for having a child.  He always managed to stay one step ahead of the military’s grasp.


    Other means of escaping being drafted into the military were failing one’s physical examination, claiming to be gay and conscientious objection.  All were difficult.  One rumor at the time was that if you drank enough Coke fast enough it would raise your blood pressure to the point you’d fail your physical.  This seemed more like an urban legend than fact.  Not many young men were secure enough to use homosexuality as a reason for staying out of the military, and the criteria for conscientious objection were rigid and based in traditional religious practices that objected to killing.  The truth was that most of us were naïve and hadn’t given much thought to avoiding military “service.”  That changed as the war in Vietnam heated up and expanded.


    The generation before us had fought in World War II, which seemed like a good war, pitting democracy against fascism (Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo).  More recently, there had been the war in Korea, which was touted as a fight for democracy against communism.  There was precedent for young men to go docilely into the US military and do its bidding.  And then, along came Vietnam, and Lyndon Johnson’s lies about the Tonkin Gulf incident and General William Westmoreland (“General Wastemoremen”) always seeing a light at the end of the tunnel – all he needed was more conscripts.


    The net of conscription ensnared many of us.  I was one.  Another was Daniel Seidenberg, Jr., who received his draft notice at the age of 19 in the winter of 1967.  He was just out of high school and was a surfer.  When his notice came, he thought about escaping to Canada, but, after visiting Canada, decided against it.  Instead, he joined the regular army, having been promised by the recruiter that he would not be sent to Vietnam.  Despite the promise, after being trained as an infantryman, he was sent to Vietnam.  He ended up with near-fatal head wounds that have left him disabled for life. 


    In 2010, Seidenberg published a book he wrote about his military experience in Vietnam.  The book, titled Vietnam Ambush, confirms the worst fears of those of us who didn’t go to fight in that needless, reckless and lawless war.  It is a well-written account of the war from the perspective of a soldier in the field.  It should be read by every young American who thinks war might be glorious.  In fact, it is a cautionary tale that should be read by young people throughout the world.  It takes the adventure and heroics out of war and tells it like it really is, a dirty business in which the old send the young to fight, kill and die in far-off lands – in the case of the Vietnam War, to fight in humid jungles, which US military planes were busy defoliating with the poisonous chemicals napalm and Agent Orange. 


    Here is how Seidenberg describes his dilemma as a US soldier in Vietnam on the opening page of his book:



    I was a combat infantryman in Vietnam.  We were shooting dice for our souls.  Our very spirits were on the line, if we survived.


    No one could say what we were fighting for.  The consensus was that our purpose was to simply survive it all.  I knew that merely surviving would not be enough.  I had to make sure that I survived with a clean conscience.


    What good is living, if you wind up hating yourself?  And I didn’t want to be responsible for any crimes.


    In a war fought entirely in cold blood, keeping a clean conscience was not easy.  Simply staying alive was not easy.


    Although today there is no longer conscription, there is instead a “poverty draft,” which makes the military an economically-attractive option for escaping poverty.  Being put into a killing zone makes it difficult to not become a killer, if only to stay alive oneself.  Should we allow ourselves to be used as tools in war?  Should we not fight against militarism and those who, like Dick Cheney, promote it?  Should we not refuse to subordinate our consciences to leaders who lie us into war? 


    Vietnam Ambush is a short book.  It is written in simple prose.  It tells the truth.  It reminds us that our society has corrupted its youth with war.  It reminds us that war steals from the young – their youth and their conscience.  It reminds us about the importance of having political leadership that is decent and truthful, not deceitful and dishonest.  It reminds us that war is not a game played on a field of battle; it has consequences that last for lifetimes.  War traumatizes young men and women.  It kills and maims soldiers and civilians alike.  It reminds us to choose peace.

  • Why the Pentagon Papers Matter Now

    Daniel Ellsberg


    This article was originally published by Reader Supported News.


    The declassification and online release Monday of the full original version of the Pentagon Papers – the 7,000-page top secret Pentagon study of US decision-making in Vietnam 1945-67 – comes 40 years after I gave it to 19 newspapers and to Senator Mike Gravel (minus volumes on negotiations, which I had given only to the Senate foreign relations committee). Gravel entered what I had given him in the congressional record and later published nearly all of it with Beacon Press. Together with the newspaper coverage and a government printing office (GPO) edition that was heavily redacted but overlapped the Senator Gravel edition, most of the material has been available to the public and scholars since 1971. (The negotiation volumes were declassified some years ago; the Senate, if not the Pentagon, should have released them no later than the end of the war in 1975.)


    In other words, today’s declassification of the whole study comes 36 to 40 years overdue. Yet, unfortunately, it happens to be peculiarly timely that this study gets attention and goes online just now. That’s because we’re mired again in wars – especially in Afghanistan – remarkably similar to the 30-year conflict in Vietnam, and we don’t have comparable documentation and insider analysis to enlighten us on how we got here and where it’s likely to go.


    What we need released this month are the Pentagon Papers of Iraq and Afghanistan (and Pakistan, Yemen and Libya). We’re not likely to get them; they probably don’t yet exist, at least in the useful form of the earlier ones. But the original studies on Vietnam are a surprisingly not-bad substitute, definitely worth learning from.


    Yes, the languages and ethnicities that we don’t understand are different in the Middle East from those in Vietnam; the climate, terrain and types of ambushes are very different. But as the accounts in the Pentagon Papers explain, we face the same futile effort in Afghanistan to find and destroy nationalist guerrillas or to get them to quit fighting foreign invaders (now us) and the corrupt, ill-motivated, dope-dealing despots we support. As in Vietnam, the more troops we deploy and the more adversaries we kill (along with civilians), the quicker their losses are made good and the more their ranks grow, since it’s our very presence, our operations and our support of a regime without legitimacy that is the prime basis for their recruiting.


    As for Washington, the accounts of recurrent decisions to escalate in the Pentagon Papers read like an extended prequel to Bob Woodward’s book, Obama’s War, on the prolonged internal controversies that preceded the president’s decisions to triple the size of our forces in Afghanistan. (Woodward’s book, too, is based on top secret leaks. Unfortunately, these came out after the decisions had been made, and without accompanying documentation: which it is still not too late for Woodward or his sources to give to WikiLeaks.)


    In accounts of wars 40 years and half a world apart, we read of the same irresponsible, self-serving presidential and congressional objectives in prolonging and escalating an unwinnable conflict: namely, the need not to be charged with weakness by political rivals, or with losing a war that a few feckless or ambitious generals foolishly claim can be won. Putting the policy-making and the field realities together, we see the same prospect of endless, bloody stalemate – unless and until, under public pressure, Congress threatens to cut off the money (as in 1972-73), forcing the executive into a negotiated withdrawal.


    To motivate voters and Congress to extricate us from these presidential wars, we need the Pentagon Papers of the Middle East wars right now. Not 40 years in the future. Not after even two or three more years of further commitment to stalemated and unjustifiable wars.


    Yet, we’re not likely to get these ever within the time frame they’re needed. The WikiLeaks’ unauthorised disclosures of the last year are the first in 40 years to approach the scale of the Pentagon Papers (and even surpass them in quantity and timeliness). But unfortunately, the courageous source of these secret, field-level reports – Private Bradley Manning is the one accused, though that remains to be proven in court – did not have access to top secret, high-level recommendations, estimates and decisions.


    Very, very few of those who do have such access are willing to risk their clearances and careers – and the growing possibility (under President Obama) of prosecution – by documenting to Congress and the public even policies that they personally believe are disastrous and wrongly kept secret and lied about. I was one – and far from alone – with such access and such views, as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of defence for international security affairs in the Pentagon in 1964-65. (My immediate boss John T McNaughton, Robert McNamara’s primary assistant on Vietnam, was another; as documented in the recent publication of his personal diary.)


    I’ve long regretted that it didn’t even occur to me, in August 1964, to release the documents in my Pentagon safe giving the lie to claims of an “unequivocal, unprovoked” (unreal) attack on our destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf: precursors of the “evidence beyond any doubt” of nonexistent WMDs in Iraq, which manipulated Congress, once again, to pass the exact counterpart of the Tonkin Gulf resolution.


    Senator Morse – one of the two senators who had voted against that unconstitutional, undated blank cheque for presidential war in 1964 – told me that if I had provided him with that evidence at the time (instead of 1969, when I finally provided it to the senate foreign relations committee, on which he had served): “The Tonkin Gulf resolution would never have gotten out of committee; and if it had been brought to the floor, it would have been voted down.”


    That’s a heavy burden for me to bear: especially when I reflect that, by September, I had a drawer-full of the top secret documents (again, regrettably, not published until 1971) proving the fraudulence of Johnson’s promises of “no wider war” in his election campaign, and his actual determination to escalate a war that he privately and realistically regarded as unwinnable.


    Had I or one of the scores of other officials who had the same high-level information acted then on our oath of office – which was not an oath to obey the president, nor to keep the secret that he was violating his own sworn obligations, but solely an oath “to support and defend the constitution of the United States” – that terrible war might well have been averted altogether. But to hope to have that effect, we would have needed to disclose the documents when they were current, before the escalation – not five or seven, or even two, years after the fateful commitments had been made.


    A lesson to be drawn from reading the Pentagon Papers, knowing all that followed or has come out in the years since, is this. To those in the Pentagon, state department, the White House, CIA (and their counterparts in Britain and other Nato countries) who have similar access to mine then and foreknowledge of disastrous escalations in our wars in the Middle East, I would say:


    Don’t make my mistake. Don’t do what I did. Don’t wait until a new war has started in Iran, until more bombs have fallen in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, Libya, Iraq or Yemen. Don’t wait until thousands more have died, before you go to the press and to Congress to tell the truth with documents that reveal lies or crimes or internal projections of costs and dangers. Don’t wait 40 years for it to be declassified, or seven years as I did for you or someone else to leak it.


    The personal risks are great. But a war’s worth of lives might be saved.

  • On Seeing Chick Streetman’s Play: Touch the Names

    I didn’t think that I would cry, or even That I could, but the words of mothers,

    Fathers, friends and lovers penetrated deep.

    Each name on that polished black granite Wall Is still connected to our lives.

    The saddest messages of all were those From the children that the dead men

    Never knew.

    I sat there thinking about those who lied To send these young men off to face their deaths.

    I thought about the politicians who are doing It again, as though they’d learned nothing,

    Less than nothing, from the Wall.

    Different places, Vietnam and now Iraq, But the outcomes are the same.

    Some died in jungles, some in arid deserts, Some from roadside bombs.

    In the end, what’s left are memories and names, And some slim hope we shall not fail

    Our children yet again.

  • Vietnam and Iraq Have More Similarities Than Differences

    CHICAGO — To my immense surprise, I recently ran into the American scholar who, for many correspondents in Vietnam, offered the most fair-minded analysis of the war.

    Suddenly, there was Gerald “Gerry” Hickey at the Chicago Public Library, a little grayer after 35 years, but still much the same, with a big smile on his face and a welcome “Hello!”

    I remembered well how Gerry, then the Rand Corp.’s top man in Vietnam, had meticulously explained for us the cultures and behavior of highland tribes such as the Montagnards, but also the Viet Cong and the “pro-American” Saigon government.

    “And now we’re doing the same thing all over again,” he said as we talked about Iraq. “First, we suffer from the same invincible ignorance about Iraq that we suffered over Vietnamese culture. Second, in Vietnam we set the military impact with no concern about our effect on South Vietnamese culture. By the time we left in 1975, they were just exhausted. They were just tired out — and so was I.

    “It is so sad now that I can see the same mistakes being made in Iraq. The GIs busting down the doors, breaking into homes, doing everything wrong. But, you know something,” he went on, sadness outlining his voice, “I’m shocked at much of what we are seeing in Iraq: The Americans are much crueler than they were in Vietnam. Remember, when American correspondents found American troops burning down houses — that was remarkable then; today it’s the norm.”

    Gerry and I talked a long time that day, mulling over our common experiences, wondering primarily why the United States can’t ever pause to analyze a country correctly, and above all comparing the two conflicts.

    Despite the myriad voices in the press insisting, “Iraq is not a Vietnam!” the indisputable fact is that, if you consider the passions and principles applied there, it really IS another Vietnam. Among the causes for the war are obscurantist theories about foreign threats that have little basis in reality; civilians at the top who play with the soldiers they have never been; and the underlying lies that give credence to special interests (the Bay of Tonkin pretense in Vietnam, the supposed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq).
    In Vietnam, we were following the bizarre notion of the “domino theory,” the idea that a communist Vietnam would mean that all of Southeast Asia would fall to communism. The Johnson administration refused to realize that it was a colonial war, and that in colonial wars, people fight forever.

    With Iraq, the second Bush administration accepted the idea, perfervidly pushed by civilian neoconservatives, that Iraq was the center of terrorism, the cause of 9/11 and an immediate threat, ignoring the Greek chorus of voices warning against such intellectual, military and moral folly.

    Curiosly, in both cases it was civilian ideological fanatics in the Pentagon, enamored of American technology and with no knowledge of history or culture, and not the U.S. military, who pressed for the wars. (It was Robert McNamara and his “whiz kids” then; now it’s Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle and others.)

    Perhaps the old American maxim of civilian control of the military might be changed, with what we are seeing, to military control of the civilians.

    Other comparisons of the two wars:

    Today, one hears a doublespeak that almost echoes the communists of the old days. In Vietnam, it was, “We had to destroy the village to save it.” With Iraq, it is President Bush’s statement of last week that “the more successful we are on the ground, the more these killers will react!”

    Today, it’s called “Iraqization.” In Vietnam, it was called “Vietnamization” — late-hour attempts to make everything look as though it’s working. As military historian William Lind wryly remarked to me of Iraqization, “It presumes that because you pay someone, he’s yours.”

    In 1967 in Vietnam, I spent a lot of time interviewing officers and troops all over the country, and I wrote a series of articles that my paper, the Chicago Daily News, headlined with: “The GI Who Asks ‘Why?’” Today’s GIs are beginning to ask that same question.

    America needs to look seriously at these two wars and analyze why it repeatedly gets involved in painful and costly faraway conflicts. Why, when we could with little effort be a great example for mankind, do we allow the driven and arrogant technocrats of the Vietnam era and the cynical and extremist Jacobins today to carry us to war after useless war?

  • Mistakes of Vietnam repeated with Iraq

    “Welcome to Vietnam, Mr. President. Sorry you didn’t go when you had the chance.”

    The president of the United States decides to go to war against a nation led by a brutal dictator supported by one-party rule. That dictator has made war on his neighbors. The president decides this is a threat to the United States.

    In his campaign for president he gives no indication of wanting to go to war. In fact, he decries the overextension of American military might and says other nations must do more. However, unbeknownst to the American public, the president’s own Pentagon advisers have already cooked up a plan to go to war. All they are looking for is an excuse.

    Based on faulty intelligence, cherry-picked information is fed to Congress and the American people. The president goes on national television to make the case for war, using as part of the rationale an incident that never happened. Congress buys the bait — hook, line and sinker — and passes a resolution giving the president the authority to use “all necessary means” to prosecute the war.

    The war is started with an air and ground attack. Initially there is optimism. The president says we are winning. The cocky, self-assured secretary of defense says we are winning. As a matter of fact, the secretary of defense promises the troops will be home soon.

    However, the truth on the ground that the soldiers face in the war is different than the political policy that sent them there. They face increased opposition from a determined enemy. They are surprised by terrorist attacks, village assassinations, increasing casualties and growing anti-American sentiment. They find themselves bogged down in a guerrilla land war, unable to move forward and unable to disengage because there are no allies to turn the war over to.

    There is no plan B. There is no exit strategy. Military morale declines. The president’s popularity sinks and the American people are increasingly frustrated by the cost of blood and treasure poured into a never-ending war.

    Sound familiar? It does to me.

    The president was Lyndon Johnson. The cocky, self-assured secretary of defense was Robert McNamara. The congressional resolution was the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The war was the war that I, U.S. Sens. John Kerry, Chuck Hagel and John McCain and 3 1/2 million other Americans of our generation were caught up in. It was the scene of America’s longest war. It was also the locale of the most frustrating outcome of any war this nation has ever fought.

    Unfortunately, the people who drove the engine to get into the war in Iraq never served in Vietnam. Not the president. Not the vice president. Not the secretary of defense. Not the deputy secretary of defense. Too bad. They could have learned some lessons:

    Don’t underestimate the enemy. The enemy always has one option you cannot control. He always has the option to die. This is especially true if you are dealing with true believers and guerillas fighting for their version of reality, whether political or religious. They are what Tom Friedman of The New York Times calls the “non-deterrables.” If those non-deterrables are already in their country, they will be able to wait you out until you go home.

    If the enemy adopts a “hit-and-run” strategy designed to inflict maximum casualties on you, you may win every battle, but (as Walter Lippman once said about Vietnam) you can’t win the war.

    If you adopt a strategy of not just pre-emptive strike but also pre-emptive war, you own the aftermath. You better plan for it. You better have an exit strategy because you cannot stay there indefinitely unless you make it the 51st state.

    If you do stay an extended period of time, you then become an occupier, not a liberator. That feeds the enemy against you.

    . If you adopt the strategy of pre-emptive war, your intelligence must be not just “darn good,” as the president has said; it must be “bulletproof,” as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claimed the administration’s was against Saddam Hussein. Anything short of that saps credibility.

    If you want to know what is really going on in the war, ask the troops on the ground, not the policy-makers in Washington.

    In a democracy, instead of truth being the first casualty in war, it should be the first cause of war. It is the only way the Congress and the American people can cope with getting through it. As credibility is strained, support for the war and support for the troops go downhill. Continued loss of credibility drains troop morale, the media become more suspicious, the public becomes more incredulous and Congress is reduced to hearings and investigations.

    Instead of learning the lessons of Vietnam, where all of the above happened, the president, the vice president, the secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of defense have gotten this country into a disaster in the desert.

    They attacked a country that had not attacked us. They did so on intelligence that was faulty, misrepresented and highly questionable.

    A key piece of that intelligence was an outright lie that the White House put into the president’s State of the Union speech. These officials have overextended the American military, including the National Guard and the Reserve, and have expanded the U.S. Army to the breaking point.

    A quarter of a million troops are committed to the Iraq war theater, most of them bogged down in Baghdad. Morale is declining and casualties continue to increase. In addition to the human cost, the war in dollars costs $1 billion a week, adding to the additional burden of an already depressed economy.

    The president has declared “major combat over” and sent a message to every terrorist, “Bring them on.” As a result, he has lost more people in his war than his father did in his and there is no end in sight.

    Military commanders are left with extended tours of duty for servicemen and women who were told long ago they were going home. We are keeping American forces on the ground, where they have become sitting ducks in a shooting gallery for every terrorist in the Middle East.

    –Max Cleland, former U.S. senator, was head of the Veterans Administration in the Carter administration. He teaches at American University in Washington.

  • The Specter Of Vietnam

    The war in Iraq is different in so many ways from the war waged by the United States in Vietnam that we wonder why, like the telltale heart beating behind the murderer’s wall in Edgar Allan Poe’s story, the drumbeat of Vietnam can still be heard.

    The Vietnam war lasted eight years, the Iraq war three weeks. In Vietnam there were 58,000 U.S. combat casualties, in Iraq a few hundred. Our enemy in Vietnam was a popular national figure — Ho Chin Minh. Our enemy in Iraq, Saddam Hussein, was hated by most of his people. One war was fought in jungles and mountains with a largely draftee army, the other in a sandy desert with volunteer soldiers. The United States was defeated in Vietnam. It was victorious in Iraq.

    The elder President Bush in 1991, after the first war against Iraq, announced proudly: “The specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula.”

    But is the “Vietnam syndrome” really gone from the national consciousness? Is there not a fundamental similarity — that in both instances we see the most powerful country in the world sending its armies, ships and planes halfway around the world to invade and bomb a small country for reasons which become harder and harder to justify?

    The justifications were created, in both situations, by lying to the American public. Congress gave Lyndon Johnson the power to make war in Vietnam after his administration announced that U.S. ships, on “routine patrol” had been attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin. Every element of this claim was later shown to be false.

    Similarly, the reason initially given for going to war in Iraq — that Saddam Hussein had “weapons of mass destruction,” turns out to be a fabrication. None have been found, either by a small army of U.N. inspectors, or a large American army searching the entire country.

    White House spokesman Ari Fleischer had told the nation: “We know for a fact that there are weapons there.” Astonishingly, after the war Bush said on Polish TV, “We’ve found the weapons of mass destruction.”

    The “documents” Bush cited in his State of the Union address to “prove” that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction turned out to be forged. The so-called “drones of death” turned out to be model airplanes. What Colin Powell called “decontamination trucks” were found to be fire trucks. What U.S. leaders called “mobile germ labs” were found by an official British inspection team to be used for inflating artillery balloons.

    Furthermore, the Bush administration deceived the American public into believing, as a majority still do, that there was a connection between Saddam Hussein and the Al Qaeda terrorists who planned the attack on 9/11. Not an iota of evidence has been produced to support that.

    Both a Communist Vietnam and an Iraq ruled by Saddam Hussein were presented as imminent threats to American national security. There was no solid basis for this fear in either case; indeed Iraq was a country devastated by two wars and 10 years of sanctions, but the claim was useful for an administration bringing its people into a deadly war.

    What was not talked about publicly at the time of the Vietnam War was something said secretly in intra-governmental memoranda — that the interest of the United States in Southeast Asia was not the establishment of democracy, but the protection of access to the oil, tin and rubber of that region. In the Iraqi case, the obvious crucial role of oil in U.S. policy has been whisked out of sight, lest it reveal less than noble motives in the drive to war.

    In the Vietnam case, the truth gradually came through to the American public, and the government was forced to bring the war to a halt. Today, the question remains whether the American people will at some point see behind the deceptions, and join in a great citizens movement to stop what seems to be a relentless drive to war and empire, at the expense of human rights here and abroad.

    On the answer to this question hangs the future of the nation.
    *Howard Zinn is an historian and author of A People’s History of the United States.