Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

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  • Depleted Uranium Weapons – A Threat to Human Health?

    The use of Depleted Uranium (DU) Weapons in the Gulf War, and more recently in the Balkan Wars, has drawn a lot of attention.

    This short review will explain what is DU, for what purpose DU weapons have been manufactured, and how many of them were used, first in the Gulf War and then later on in the Balkan Wars in Herzegovina and Kosovo.

    Widespread leukemia and other ailments have been claimed in the media. They were mostly attributed to the radioactivity of DU and partially to the chemical effects of the heavy metal. A critical analysis of these claims needs a brief review of basic physics and relevant radiation regulations as well as legal limits on toxic chemicals. How is DU ammunition dispersed on impact, and how can minute particles find their way into the human body. Possible health risks will be put in perspective and compared with other risks in war and in daily life. The question is raised, if DU weapons can be called still conventional or if they fit better the definition of radiological and chemical weapons. DU weapons and their “efficiency” have to be seen also in the context of treaties on so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which are signed and even ratified, but do not yet have an implementation procedure or the political will to enact.

    1. What is Depleted Uranium (DU)?

    1.1 Activity of Uranium Ore Before and After Extraction

    Uranium is a chemical element that is more abundant than silver, gold, mercury and cadmium and is contained by 2 to 4 millionths in the Earth’s crust. It can be found on surface and in ore mines in many countries, among them Zaire, South Africa, and Canada and also in the Czech Republic. One ton of ore contains on the average about 3 kg of uranium.

    Uranium comes essentially in three isotopic forms. Isotopes are any of two or more forms of an element having the same atomic number (i.e. the same chemical property) but different atomic weights due to a different number of neutrons in the nucleus. Natural uranium contains 99.274% of 238U, 0.720% of 235U, and 0.0055% of 234U, they all have 92 protons in the nucleus, but 146, 143 and 142 neutrons, respectively. The half-life of 238U, 235U, and 234U is 4.49·109, 7.10·108, and 2.48·105 years, respectively, ranging from billion to million years. The longer the half-life the less radioactive decay products appear in a given time interval and could effect human health. When uranium is dug out of the Earth its radioactive decay products come along. However, in the chemical process of uranium extraction of the three isotopes from the ore, all radioactive daughter products in the radioactive decay series’ 238U and 235U are eliminated, with the exception of the radiogenic isotope 234U.

    In short, radiation background in mines and in extraction facilities is different and so are the health risks. There is an extensive evidence of excess lung cancers in underground uranium miners caused by the decay products of the radioactive gas radon (222Rn). But uranium mill workers have not shown increased mortality or excess lung cancers despite their increased exposure to uranium dust and radon decay products. There is no obvious explanation for this difference.

    1.2 Enriched and Depleted Uranium

    The extraction of energy from uranium for peaceful or military purposes asks for well-defined ratios of the two isotopes. In order to sustain the chain reaction of nuclear fission, uranium has to be enriched by the fissible isotope 235U to a reactor grade of 3.2 – 3.6% or weapon grade (90%+) uranium. This process not only produces the enriched product, but also a waste stream depleted in 235U, typically to less than 0.3%, which is often called the tail. The 235U content in the depleted uranium in the U.S. are lowered to 28% of its content in natural uranium.

    Depleted uranium is a byproduct of uranium enrichment process, with a relatively small contribution from reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel. In addition to the 3 natural isotopes 238U, 235U, and 234U, depleted uranium from this latter source also contains a minute quantity (0.003%) of a man-made isotope 236U. The specific activity of DU is 15,902 Bq/gram (for definitions of radioactive units see annex). Traces of 236U were found in Kosovo after the war and gave rise to – unjustifiable – concern in various press reports.

    Based on the measured isotopic composition of depleted uranium, the total activity (a-particles = helium nuclei, b-particles = electrons, g-rays) can be calculated as 22% less and the a-activity as 43% less compared to natural uranium.

    The gaseous diffusion process for enrichment of the fissible isotope 235U is used in the United States. This process requires uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), primarily because the compound can be used in the gas form for processing, in the liquid form for filling containers, and in the solid form for storage. At atmospheric pressure, UF6 is solid at temperatures below 57°C and a gas above this temperature.

    Workers in metal processing plants, including those who make DU penetrators, do not exhibit increased mortality or excess cancers.

    2. Application of DU

    Depleted Uranium is a low cost material that is readily available, since it was produced during the separation of weapon grade uranium. The Department of Energy in the U.S., as of June 1998, is in possession of almost 3/4 of a million metric tons (725·103 tons) stockpile of depleted uranium hexafluoride. This corresponds to a total activity of 527,000 Ci and a-activity 193,000 Ci. The a-activity per mass amounts to 0.389 mCi/kg.

    Depleted uranium’s high density (19.05 g/cm3, 1.7 times more than 11.35 g/cm3 for lead) and its high atomic number Z = 92 also provide useful solution for g-radiation shielding. It has been used at various occasions at particle accelerators, e.g. at CERN in the UA2 detector.

    Control surfaces on wide body aircraft require heavy counterweights. Tungsten (with density 19.3 g/cm3) or DU is ideal materials for this application where volume constraints prohibit the use of less dense metals. An airplane such as Boeing 747 needs 1,500 kg of counterweight. However, DU for this purpose gets out of fashion due to a few accidents and problems with surface embrittlement.

    2.1 DU Ammunition

    The US Army considered high-density materials such as tungsten and DU as metal in kinetic energy penetrators and tank armor already in the early 1970’s. DU was ultimately selected due to its availability and pyrophoricity. While 50% of tungsten has to be imported, mainly from China (US$ 150/kg in 1980), DU is provided for free to arms manufacturers. Tungsten also has much higher melting point than uranium and lacks pyrophoricity. DU penetrators contain no explosives; they act only by impact and immediate ignition of the dust (500°C). Conventional ammunition does not penetrate DU armor, however DU projectiles are capable of piercing it.

    2.2 Proliferation of DU Weapons

    The United States is no longer the only country with DU munitions. 17 countries including Britain, France, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries have acquired depleted uranium weapons. Probably NATO countries will follow soon. These weapons were extensively tested on at least 14 sites in the U.S. and also in Britain.

    As of early 1994 already more than 1.6 million tank penetrators and 55 million small caliber penetrators had been manufactured in the U.S. and another 200 million rounds (some part made out of tungsten) had been ordered by 1998. The approximate cost per shell of a 120-mm tank round is US$ 3,300, implying that handling of DU and manufacturing of ammunition takes the lion’s share, whereas the material itself comes almost for free.

    3. Combat and Accidents

    The US military used depleted uranium ammunition on the battlefield for the first time during the Gulf War in 1991. The amount of DU munitions released in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq during the Operation Desert Storm totals to 860,550 rounds and corresponds to 294,500 kg DU, for a total activity of 312 Ci and a-activity of 115 Ci. In addition, 9,720 DU aircraft rounds and 660 DU tank rounds (6,430 kg of DU) burned as a result of a monstrous fire in the ammunition storage area and motor pool at the US Army base in Kuwait.

    Data on the use of DU ammunition are still less well known for the war in Bosnia in 1994-1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. They are estimated to 11,000 and 31,000 rounds, corresponding to a total of 10,000 kg of DU.

    4. Effects of Depleted Uranium

    4.1 Effects of DU Penetrator Impact

    When a depleted uranium penetrator impacts armor, 18 – 70% of the penetrator rod will burn and oxidize into dust. The DU oxide aerosol formed during the impact has 50 – 96% of respirable size particles (with diameter less than 10 mm, conditions very similar to “desirable” particle size for efficiency in chemical or biological warfare), and 17 – 48% of those particles are soluble in water. Particles generated from impact of a hard target are virtually all respirable. While the heavier non-respirable particles settle down rapidly, the respirable DU aerosol remains airborne for hours.

    The solubility of the uranium particles determines the rate at which the uranium moves from the site of internalization (lungs for inhalation, gastrointestinal tract for ingestion, or the injury site for wound contamination) into the blood stream. About 70% of the soluble uranium in the blood stream are excreted in urine within 24 hours without being deposited in any organ and the remainder primarily depositing in the kidneys and bones. The kidney is the organ most sensitive to depleted uranium toxicity. When DU particles of respirable size are inhaled, roughly 25% of the particles become trapped in the lungs, where the insoluble particles can remain for years. Approximately 25% of the inhaled DU is exhaled (particle diameters between 1 and 5 mm) and the remaining 50% is subsequently swallowed.

    4.2 Radiological effects

    4.2.1 The Regulations

    The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the US (NRC) mandates an occupational annual dose equivalent for the whole body no more than 5 rem/year and no more than 10 rem in 5 years. No short-term health effects are detectable at this dose equivalent.

    The non-occupational annual dose equivalent limit for the general public is selected as 100 mrem/year, which is comparable to the average background of 363 mrem/year.

    There are well-defined legal limits for inhalation and digestion of DU.

    4.2.2 Calculated and measured doses

    The impact of one 120-mm tank round with the 5.35 kg DU penetrator on an armored target, with 18 – 70% of the penetrator rod oxidizing into aerosol, is taken as an example. The initial contaminated area from the impact of one DU tank round inaccessible to general public (50 m radius circle) is about 0.8 hectares. If contamination spreads with weather elements up to 38 hectares become inaccessible to general public, with 0.9 nCi/m2 the allowed surface contamination for general public.

    The air contamination after the impact and before the DU dust settles can be estimated to maximum of soluble uranium 16 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers and 3,500 times higher than the allowed air concentration for general public. The maximum air concentration of insoluble uranium is 800 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers and 180,000 times higher than the allowed air concentration for general public.

    The residual contamination in Iraq 8 years after the end of the Golf War in the oil fields north of Kuwait was measured. It showed radiation levels 35 times above the background over parts of the battlefield and 50 times above the background over the rusting tanks hit by DU ammunition.

    The accumulated dose equivalent becomes significant when spent but unexploded DU penetrators are worn by army personnel as war souvenirs in direct contact with the skin (1,800 rem/year) or when used by children as toys. The skin dose equivalent limit of 50 mrem/year for radiation workers would be reached in about 10 days.

    4.3 Chemical Toxicity

    4.3.1 Uranium Effects on Kidney

    The RAND review on radiological and toxic effects of uranium puts the overall maximum permissible concentration, i.e. concentration of metal in the kidney associated with no significant increase in the frequency of kidney malfunction, at 3 mg/kg of kidney for uranium and calls it a de facto standard.

    Soluble uranium, which is absorbed in the blood circulation within the body, is eliminated rapidly through the kidney in urine. About 67% are excreted within the first day without being deposited in any organ. Approximately 11% is initially deposited in the kidney and excreted with a 15-day half-life. Most of the remaining 22% is initially deposited in the bone (up to 20%), which is the principle storage site in the body, and the rest is distributed to other organs and tissues.

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) established occupational limits for inhalation of heavy metals. The values for tungsten, lead, uranium in soluble form are 1, 0.05, and 0.05 mg/m3, for insoluble form 5, 0.10, and 0.25 mg/m3, respectively. Current Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards set the values at 44 mg/l for groundwater and 20 mg/l for drinking water.

    4.4.2 Gulf War Illness

    An estimate for exposure of a veteran from the Gulf War is difficult to make and studies on the illness came not yet to a final conclusion. More than 10,000 veterans (out of a total of 695,000) reported mysterious illnesses, like muscle and joint pain, chronic fatigue, depressed immune systems, neurological disorders, memory loss, chemical sensitivities, rashes. They may have exceeded the OSHA limit for inhalation of DU by a factor of 3 and the ATSDR minimal risk level intake for general public by 17 times.

    Many factors may have contributed to the ailments, such as·

    • Multiple vaccinations against anthrax and botulinum toxoid
    • Medical treatment with pyridostigmine bromide to counter effects of potential chemical exposure
    • Petroleum from oil fire
    • Pesticide and insect repellants
    • Tropical parasites such as leishmaniasis
    • Depleted uranium dust and shrapnel from DU ammunition and armor.

    It is not clear to which extend DU contributed to the reported illnesses.

    However, there is ample evidence to show that contact with DU ammunition had consequences, especially for children, among them an increase of childhood leukemia in southern Iraqi provinces by a factor of 3 between 1989 – 93, while in the Central Provinces the incidence remained normal. Local concentrations of DU may have been exceedingly high producing this high incidence of leukemia.

    It appears premature to attribute reported illnesses of military personnel to effects of DU ammunition in Kosovo. In Kosovo, similar to Iraq, many parameters may have played a role in producing symptoms, that could be also attributed to the release of chemicals after bombing of factories.

    A study of possible health effects has been made [2], assuming that 100 tons of DU were distributed uniformly over a one-kilometer-wide strip along 100 kilometers on the “Highway of Death” between Kuwait City and Basra, a city in southern Iraq [2]. Under this assumption average dose for someone who lived in the area for a year would be about one millirem – or about 10 percent of the dose from uranium and its decay products already naturally occurring in the soil. The authors came to the conclusion that an individual’s estimated added risk of dying from cancer from such a dose would be about one in 20,000. The doses for heavy metal effects are probably also far below the exposure limits set by OSHA. However, since no exposure and urine tests had been done for two years after the war, it is now too late to draw any conclusions.

    5. Comparison of DU with other risks

    DU is a dangerous material when used as ammunition in war fighting. Obviously, the driver of an armored tank or vehicle, that is hit by a DU penetrator, has a high chance to die from the blast and/or the heat immediately, and he is no longer subject to the consequences of inhaling or digesting DU.

    The spread of DU weighs on the environment and the population, civil or military, in the vicinity of the impact as a long-term consequence. For DU, and likewise for chemical, biological or radiological weapons, the local concentration and time constants of the dispersed material play the important role.

    The legal limit for exposure to chemicals and radioactivity is set such, that values just beyond are not detrimental to human health or the environment. Only an excess value by order(s) of magnitude should give rise to serious concern.

    The consequences of the use of DU ammunition pale in comparison with the other direct and indirect effects of war. As an example may serve the estimated 30,000 unexploded fragmentation bomblets lying on Kosovo’s ground, adding substantial danger to the not yet cleared land mines.

    In order to put the danger from radioactive exposure into perspective the following example may be instructive.

    The risks associated with radioactivity and irradiation in general are, usually, measured in Sieverts. For most people, even scientists, this unit has no real meaning. Therefore, following a suggestion [3], a comparison is made with the risk with similar consequence of producing cancer. Cigarette smoking is such a case. The data are based on the following dose-effect relations: 0.04 lethal cancers per Sievert, 1 lethal cancer per eighty thousand cigarette packs.

    Comparison between effects of some irradiation exposures and cigarette smoking
    Annual dose in millisieverts Equivalent number of annual cigarette packs
    Natural total irradiation
    3
    9
    Radon
    2
    6
    Cosmic Rays
    0.3
    0.9
    Medical X-rays
    0.4
    1.2

     

    Comparison of allowed doses of irradiation to effects of cigarette smoking
    Maximum allowed dose in millisieverts/year Equivalent in cigarette packs/year
    Professionals 20 60
    Public 1 3

     

    6. Conclusions

    Depleted uranium produced as a by-product of uranium enrichment is classified as radioactive and toxic waste and it is subjected to numerous regulations for handling and disposal. Yet the US regulatory limits for general public exposure are exceeded – at least locally and temporarily – up to five orders of magnitude for airborne radioactive emissions and up to 3 orders of magnitude for residual radioactive contamination when DU ammunition has been used in battlefield. The use of DU ammunition, perhaps the most effective new weapon, was not publicly revealed until a year after the Gulf War. These weapons have an indiscriminate character and can have adverse health effects not only on combatants but also on the population at large. Precautions could have been taken to limit possible health effects for the combatants and the civil population, and immediate medical tests could have removed a lot of ambiguities of the effects of DU ammunition.

    Cancer can be the expected long-term consequence of both the radiological and toxic effects of depleted uranium exposure, albeit with an extremely low probability.

    In 1996 the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed a resolution in which they “urged all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb production and spread of weapons of mass destruction or with indiscriminate effect, in particular nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological weaponry, and weaponry containing depleted uranium”.

    If nothing else, the double standard for DU in radiation protection and handling of low radioactive waste in the civilian sector on one hand and by the military on the battlefield on the other is morally and legally untenable.

    The manufacturing and use of DU weapons is a new man-made problem that should be addressed by the international community on an appropriate level. However, it pales compared to major, other unsolved problems in arms control. There is not yet an implementation program for the biological weapons convention (BWC, ratified in 1972!)! The elimination of enormous stockpiles of chemical weapons may take decades, but there is at least a working implementation body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The number of nuclear warheads does not shrink, only some of their delivery vehicles are being discarded, slowly approaching the limit set in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) is in danger to be discarded, the Test-Ban Treaty (TBT) is not yet ratified by all Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs), and major possessors of land mines have not signed up to the Ottawa Treaty.

     

    7. Some Selected References

    [1] Review of Radioactivity, Military Use, and Health Effects of Depleted Uranium Compiled by Vladimir S. Zajik, July 1999 http://members.tripod.com/vzajic/

    [2] After the dust settles Steve Fetter & Frank von Hippel The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, pp. 42-45

    [3] Global warming or nuclear waste – which do we want? H. Nifenecker and E. Huffer europhysics news March/April 2001, pp. 52- 55

    Some radiation units:

    1 Curie = 1 [Ci] = 37·109 decays/second or = 37·109 Becquerel = 37·109 [Bq] 1 milliCurie-of-intensity-hour = 1 Sievert = 1 [Sv] 1 Sievert corresponds approximately to 8.38 Roentgen

    1 rem = roentgen equivalent man
    The dose equivalents for the uranium isotopes 238U, 235U, and 234U and their decay products uniformly distributed in the whole body are 1.28, 1.30, 1.32 [(mrem/year)/(pCi/kg)].

  • Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Cuts Are Not Enough

    Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Cuts Are Not Enough

    Presidents Bush and Putin announced jointly that their countries “have overcome the legacy of the Cold War.” While the new cooperative relationship between the US and Russia is to be applauded, what their Presidents said and what was left unsaid about nuclear arms reductions still resonated with Cold War logic.

    President Bush announced that he would be reducing the US arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons by two-thirds from some 7,000 weapons to somewhere between 2,200 and 1,700 over a ten-year period. President Putin said, “we will try to respond in kind.” These cuts, which need to be viewed in the context of the post Cold War world, will not make us two-thirds safer.

    It was Presidents Bush Sr. and Yeltsin that agreed back in 1993 in the START II agreements to cut long-range nuclear arsenals to 3,500 each by the beginning of 2003. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin moved this date back to the end of 2007, but also agreed in principle to go beyond this in a next step to 2,500 long-range nuclear weapons in START III negotiations.

    Since entering office, President Putin has let it be known that he is prepared to reduce the long-range nuclear arsenals of the two sides to 1,500 or less. Some of his aides have said privately that President Putin was prepared to go down to 1,000 or less. Chances are he still is prepared to move to lower levels.

    Still lower levels of nuclear armaments would be consistent with leaving behind the legacy of the Cold War, while improving the security of both countries. If the US and Russia are no longer using these weapons to deter each other from attacking (since there is no reason to do so), for what reason do they need these weapons at all? It is widely understood that nuclear weapons have no military utility other than deterrence, and even this was shown to be ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks on September 11th.

    China has a minimal deterrent force of only some 500 weapons with only some 20 missiles capable of reaching the United States. India and Pakistan also have small nuclear arsenals, but surely they pose no threat to the US or Russia. The UK, France and Israel also have small nuclear arsenals, but pose no threat to either the US or Russia.

    North Korea, Iran and Iraq have neither nuclear weapons nor missiles with which to attack the US or Russia, and they would certainly be foolish to do so, given the conventional military power alone of these two countries.

    The greatest danger posed to both countries is not from each other or any other country. It is from terrorists, but terrorists cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. Certainly this was one crucial lesson of September 11th.

    The US and Russia need to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists. The best way to do this is to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in all states to a level that can be controlled with certainty and to institute controls on weapons-grade fissile materials.

    To achieve such controls, which are truly in the security interests of both countries, will require even deeper cuts made with far more sense of urgency. Such cuts are necessary to keep Russian “loose nukes” out of the hands of terrorists and to demonstrate to the world the US and Russia are truly committed to achieving the nuclear disarmament they promised when they signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty more than three decades ago.

    Presidents Bush and Putin have also left some important things unsaid in regard to nuclear arms. They have made no mention of the continued high alert status of their nuclear weapons. Currently each country has some 2,250 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched within moments of an order to do so. This tempts fate unnecessarily, and could lead to an accidental nuclear war.

    Neither have the two Presidents made reference to tactical nuclear weapons, the smaller battlefield nuclear weapons that would be most likely to be used and that could most easily fall into the hands of terrorists. Nor has President Bush made mention of the serious implications for global stability if the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is amended or abrogated, as the US is seeking, to allow for the testing of space based weaponry.

    President Bush has said that he is prepared to reduce the US nuclear arsenal unilaterally, but this means that it is also possible to reverse this decision unilaterally. Several thousand US and Russian nuclear warheads will be dismantled in the coming ten years, but their nuclear cores will presumably be stored and available for reassembly on short notice. The decision to reduce nuclear arsenals should be committed to writing and made irreversible, such that the nuclear cores are unavailable for future use and subsequent administrations in both countries will be bound by the commitment.

    In the year 2000, the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed that the principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament. The US and Russia also agreed, along with the UK, France and China, to an “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    If the US and Russia truly want to prevent future nuclear terrorism, this is the time for leadership to accomplish the “total elimination” that has been promised. The US and Russia are the only countries capable of providing this leadership, but it is unlikely that they will do so unless pressed by the American and Russian people. And this will only happen if our peoples grasp the extent of the nuclear dangers that still confront us.

    We should not be lulled into thinking that reductions of long-range nuclear weapons to 2,200 to 1,700 in ten years time are sufficient. Such arsenals will continue to place at risk our cities as well as civilization and most of life.

    *David Krieger, an attorney and political scientist, is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • The Crawford Summit

    Presidents Bush and Putin will be meeting at the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas from November 13-15 at what has been billed as the Crawford Summit. One major purpose of this summit is to discuss reductions in nuclear arsenals. For a few years the Russians have been calling for reducing US and Russian nuclear arsenals to 1,500 or less strategic nuclear weapons. The US has said that it needs to evaluate its nuclear posture, and is now in the process of doing so.

    President Bush has said that he wants to move forward with reductions in nuclear arsenals, but he has tried to tie these reductions to Russian agreement on amending the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow the US to conduct missile defense tests that are currently banned by the ABM Treaty. In other words, President Bush has been using reductions in nuclear arsenals as a bargaining chip to gain Russian assent to amending the ABM Treaty.

    Perhaps it is not yet clear to President Bush that significant reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal will make the US safer. In fact, leadership by the US and Russia to eliminate all nuclear weapons, as they are obligated to do in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, would be strongly in the interests of both countries as well as the world at large.

    Why is the US so eager to amend the ABM Treaty? I would suggest that there are three major reasons. First, the US wants to use theater missile defenses to protect its forward based forces throughout the world. This will give the United States greater degrees of freedom to use its military troops anywhere in the world without concern that US bases and troops will be vulnerable to missile attacks in response.

    Second, the US wants to weaponize outer space and wants to be rid of Article V, Section 1 of the ABM Treaty in which each party to the treaty “undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.” The US views missile defenses as a way to develop and test space based weaponry.

    Third, amending the ABM Treaty will allow the US to transfer billions of taxpayer dollars to defense industries to develop, test and deploy missile defenses — defenses that have little potential for actually protecting Americans from either major threats such as terrorism or virtually non-existent threats such as missile attacks from so-called rogue states.

    If the Russians do not go along with an amendment to the ABM Treaty, the Bush administration has already announced that it plans to withdraw from the treaty a treaty that Vladimir Putin as well as most of our allies throughout the world consider the cornerstone of strategic stability.

    US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be viewed throughout the world as a symbol of US arrogance and unilateralism. It would certainly have negative effects on our ability to hold together a coalition against terrorism, on future cooperative efforts with Russia and China, and on the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Letter to President Vladimir Putin

    Letter to President Vladimir Putin

    Dear President Putin,

    Please stand firm on your position on upholding the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. You are correct in stating that it remains the cornerstone of global stability, and many knowledgeable Americans understand this.

    The Bush administration wants to eliminate Article V, Section 1 of the Treaty in order to develop a comprehensive ABM system, but with particular emphasis on space-based weaponry that will lead to a new arms race in space. This would be yet another disaster for the prospects of life on our fragile planet.

    If September 11th has taught us anything, it is that even the most powerful nations are vulnerable to those who hate and are wedded to violence. September 11th provides yet another warning that human beings and nuclear weapons cannot co exist.

    Please use the occasion of the Crawford Summit with President Bush to call for implementation of a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons from Earth in accord with existing obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, beginning with immediate major reductions of nuclear weapons into the hundreds rather than thousands. I also urge you to propose that all nuclear weapons be removed from hair-trigger alert. Finally, I urge you to put forward immediately a World Treaty Banning Space-Based Weapons.

    This is a time that calls for bold proposals. Never has global leadership been more important. History has presented you with an opportunity to speak for humanity. Please speak to the world’s people in a clear and unambiguous voice for ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity and for preserving outer space as a zone free of all weaponization.

    I am certain that you have the courage and commitment to succeed in accomplishing these goals.

    David Krieger, President Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

  • Stop the Bombing and Bring In the UN

    The US military action in Afghanistan is failing. Many innocent Afghans are being killed, and the US is no closer to finding or defeating the terrorists responsible for perpetrating the September 11th crimes against humanity. The United Nations and other relief organizations are warning that millions of Afghans could die of starvation this winter unless the bombing is halted soon. In other words, the bombing of Afghanistan is leading to a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. We, therefore, call on the US and British forces to halt the bombing to allow relief organizations to do their job of getting food to the Afghan people.

    Terrorism is a global problem that can only be solved globally. Every country on Earth, every person on the planet, has a stake in ending the threat of terrorism. This matter must go back to the United Nations Security Council and must be handled by the United Nations as a matter of priority. If the US and UK continue their bombing, killing more innocent people, they will simply be adding fuel to the fire of terrorism. Some have suggested that they are providing the spark to ignite a global conflagration.

    On the other hand, if the international community joins together in a serious effort to combat terrorism, it could lead to unprecedented cooperation between national police and intelligence services. Such efforts could leave terrorists with no place to hide, and are essential to preventing terrorism.

    A global action through the United Nations will also demonstrate that this is not simply retaliation or vengeance on the part of the United States. To make a United Nations effort effective will require leadership and support by the United States, but it must be an effort that is truly directed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

    The United Nations should also set up a special International Tribunal for terrorists until the International Criminal Court is established, which will probably be next year. A trial before an impartial International Tribunal will help educate the world on the need to put an end to all terrorism. Such a trial will also be acceptable to virtually all countries throughout the world, whereas a trial of terrorists in the US would be viewed as biased in many countries.

    In sum, step one on the path to ending terrorism is to stop the bombing of Afghanistan now; step two is to turn over to the United Nations Security Council the job of preventing terrorism and bringing terrorists to justice.

    Military force is deepening the crisis without producing significant results. The vulnerability of civilization to determined and suicidal terrorists makes prevention the key to victory. Our future security, and that of the rest of the world, will be dependent on multilateral and cooperative efforts under an internationally accepted legal framework.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • The Geopolitics of War

    There are many ways to view the conflict between the United States and Osama bin Laden’s terror network: as a contest between Western liberalism and Eastern fanaticism, as suggested by many pundits in the United States; as a struggle between the defenders and the enemies of authentic Islam, as suggested by many in the Muslim world; and as a predictable backlash against American villainy abroad, as suggested by some on the left. But while useful in assessing some dimensions of the conflict, these cultural and political analyses obscure a fundamental reality: that this war, like most of the wars that preceded it, is firmly rooted in geopolitical competition.

    The geopolitical dimensions of the war are somewhat hard to discern because the initial fighting is taking place in Afghanistan, a place of little intrinsic interest to the United States, and because our principal adversary, bin Laden, has no apparent interest in material concerns. But this is deceptive, because the true center of the conflict is Saudi Arabia, not Afghanistan (or Palestine), and because bin Laden’s ultimate objectives include the imposition of a new Saudi government, which in turn would control the single most valuable geopolitical prize on the face of the earth: Saudi Arabia’s vast oil deposits, representing one-fourth of the world’s known petroleum reserves. To fully appreciate the roots of the current conflict, it is necessary to travel back in time–specifically, to the final years of World War II, when the US government began to formulate plans for the world it would dominate in the postwar era. As the war drew to a close, the State Department was enjoined by President Roosevelt to devise the policies and institutions that would guarantee US security and prosperity in the coming epoch. This entailed the design and formation of the United Nations, the construction of the Bretton Woods world financial institutions and, most significant in the current context, the procurement of adequate oil supplies.

    American strategists considered access to oil to be especially important because it was an essential factor in the Allied victory over the Axis powers. Although the nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the war, it was oil that fueled the armies that brought Germany and Japan to their knees. Oil powered the vast numbers of ships, tanks and aircraft that endowed Allied forces with a decisive edge over their adversaries, which lacked access to reliable sources of petroleum. It was widely assumed, therefore, that access to large supplies of oil would be critical to US success in any future conflicts.

    Where would this oil come from? During World Wars I and II, the United States was able to obtain sufficient oil for its own and its allies’ needs from deposits in the American Southwest and from Mexico and Venezuela. But most US analysts believed that these supplies would be insufficient to meet American and European requirements in the postwar era. As a result, the State Department initiated an intensive study to identify other sources of petroleum. This effort, led by the department’s economic adviser, Herbert Feis, concluded that only one location could provide the needed petroleum. “In all surveys of the situation,” Feis noted (in a statement quoted by Daniel Yergin in The Prize), “the pencil came to an awed pause at one point and place–the Middle East.”

    To be more specific, Feis and his associates concluded that the world’s most prolific supply of untapped oil was to be found in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. But how to get at this oil? At first, the State Department proposed the formation of a government-owned oil firm to acquire concessions in Saudi Arabia and extract the kingdom’s reserves. This plan was considered too unwieldy, however, and instead US officials turned this task over to the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), an alliance of major US oil corporations. But these officials were also worried about the kingdom’s long-term stability, so they concluded that the United States would have to assume responsibility for the defense of Saudi Arabia. In one of the most extraordinary occurrences in modern American history, President Roosevelt met with King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi regime, on a US warship in the Suez Canal following the February 1945 conference in Yalta. Although details of the meeting have never been made public, it is widely believed that Roosevelt gave the King a promise of US protection in return for privileged American access to Saudi oil–an arrangement that remains in full effect today and constitutes the essential core of the US-Saudi relationship.

    This relationship has provided enormous benefits to both sides. The United States has enjoyed preferred access to Saudi petroleum reserves, obtaining about one-sixth of its crude-oil imports from the kingdom. ARAMCO and its US partners have reaped immense profits from their operations in Saudi Arabia and from the distribution of Saudi oil worldwide. (Although ARAMCO’s Saudi holdings were nationalized by the Saudi government in 1976, the company continues to manage Saudi oil production and to market its petroleum products abroad.) Saudi Arabia also buys about $6-10 billion worth of goods per year from US companies. The Saudi royal family, for its part, has become immensely wealthy and, because of continued US protection, has remained safe from external and internal attack.

    But this extraordinary partnership has also produced a number of unintended consequences, and it is these effects that concern us here. To protect the Saudi regime against its external enemies, the United States has steadily expanded its military presence in the region, eventually deploying thousands of troops in the kingdom. Similarly, to protect the royal family against its internal enemies, US personnel have become deeply involved in the regime’s internal security apparatus. At the same time, the vast and highly conspicuous accumulation of wealth by the royal family has alienated it from the larger Saudi population and led to charges of systemic corruption. In response, the regime has outlawed all forms of political debate in the kingdom (there is no parliament, no free speech, no political party, no right of assembly) and used its US-trained security forces to quash overt expressions of dissent. All these effects have generated covert opposition to the regime and occasional acts of violence–and it is from this undergroundmilieu that Osama bin Laden has drawn his inspiration and many of his top lieutenants.

    The US military presence in Saudi Arabia has steadily increased over the years. Initially, from 1945 to 1972, Washington delegated the primary defense responsibility to Britain, long the dominant power in the region. When Britain withdrew its forces from “East of Suez” in 1971, the United States assumed a more direct role, deploying military advisers in the kingdom and providing Saudi Arabia with a vast arsenal of US weapons. Some of these arms and advisory programs were aimed at external defense, but the Defense Department also played a central role in organizing, equipping, training and managing the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), the regime’s internal security force.

    American military involvement in the kingdom reached a new level in 1979, when three things happened: The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the Shah of Iran was overthrown by antigovernment forces and Islamic militants staged a brief rebellion in Mecca. In response, President Jimmy Carter issued a new formulation of US policy: Any move by a hostile power to gain control of the Persian Gulf area would be regarded “as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America” and would be resisted “by any means necessary, including military force.” This statement, now known as the “Carter Doctrine,” has governed US strategy in the gulf ever since. To implement the new doctrine, Carter established the Rapid Deployment Force, a collection of combat forces based in the United States but available for deployment to the Persian Gulf. (The RDF was later folded into the US Central Command, which now conducts all US military operations in the region.) Carter also deployed US warships in the gulf and arranged for the periodic utilization by American forces of military bases in Bahrain, Diego Garcia (a British-controlled island in the Indian Ocean), Oman and Saudi Arabia–all of which were employed during the 1990-91 Gulf War and are again being used today. Believing, moreover, that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan represented a threat to US dominance in the gulf, Carter authorized the initiation of covert operations to undermine the Soviet-backed regime there. (It is important to note that the Saudi regime was deeply involved in this effort, providing much of the funding for the anti-Soviet rebellion and allowing its citizens, including Osama bin Laden, to participate in the war effort as combatants and fundraisers.) And to protect the Saudi royal family, Carter increased US involvement in the kingdom’s internal security operations.

    President Reagan accelerated Carter’s overt military moves and greatly increased covert US support for the anti-Soviet mujahedeen in Afghanistan. (Eventually, some $3 billion worth of arms were given to the mujahedeen.) Reagan also issued an important codicil to the Carter Doctrine: The United States would not allow the Saudi regime to be overthrown by internal dissidents, as occurred in Iran. “We will not permit [Saudi Arabia] to be an Iran,” he told reporters in 1981.

    Then came the Persian Gulf War. When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, President Bush the elder was principally concerned about the threat to Saudi Arabia, not Kuwait. At a meeting at Camp David on August 4, he determined that the United States must take immediate military action to defend the Saudi kingdom against possible Iraqi attack. To allow for a successful defense of the kingdom, Bush sent his Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, to Riyadh to persuade the royal family to allow the deployment of US ground forces on Saudi soil and the use of Saudi bases for airstrikes against Iraq.

    The subsequent unfolding of Operation Desert Storm does not need to be retold here. What is important to note is that the large US military presence in Saudi Arabia was never fully withdrawn after the end of the fighting in Kuwait. American aircraft continue to fly from bases in Saudi Arabia as part of the enforcement mechanism of the “no-fly zone” over southern Iraq (intended to prevent the Iraqis from using this airspace to attack Shiite rebels in the Basra area or to support a new invasion of Kuwait). American aircraft also participate in the multinational effort to enforce the continuing economic sanctions on Iraq.

    President Clinton further strengthened the US position in the gulf, expanding American basing facilities there and enhancing the ability to rapidly move US-based forces to the region.Clinton also sought to expand US influence in the Caspian Sea basin, an energy-rich area just to the north of the Persian Gulf.

    Many consequences have flowed from all this. The sanctions on Iraq have caused immense suffering for the Iraqi population, while the regular bombing of military facilities produces a mounting toll of Iraqi civilian deaths. Meanwhile, the United States has failed to take any action to curb Israeli violence against the Palestinians. It is these concerns that have prompted many young Muslims to join bin Laden’s forces. Bin Laden himself, however, is most concerned about Saudi Arabia. Ever since the end of the Gulf War, he has focused his efforts on achieving two overarching goals: the expulsion of the American “infidels” from Saudi Arabia (the heart of the Muslim holy land) and the overthrow of the current Saudi regime and its replacement with one more attuned to his fundamentalist Islamic beliefs.

    Both of these goals put bin Laden in direct conflict with the United States. It is this reality, more than any other, that explains the terrorist strikes on US military personnel and facilities in the Middle East, and key symbols of American power in New York and Washington.

    The current war did not begin on September 11. As far as we can tell, it began in 1993 with the first attack on the World Trade Center. This was succeeded in 1995 with an attack on the SANG headquarters in Riyadh, and in 1996 with the explosion at the Khobar Towers outside of Dhahran. Then followed the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the more recent attack on the USS Cole. All these events, like the World Trade Center/Pentagon assaults, are consistent with a long-term strategy to erode US determination to maintain its alliance with the Saudi regime- and thus, in the final analysis, to destroy the 1945 compact forged by President Roosevelt and King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud.

    In fighting against these efforts, the United States is acting, in the first instance, to protect itself, its citizens and its military personnel from terrorist violence. At the same time, however, Washington is also shoring up its strategic position in the Persian Gulf. With bin Laden out of the way, Iran suffering from internal political turmoil and Saddam Hussein immobilized by unrelenting American airstrikes, the dominant US position in the gulf will be assured for some time to come. (Washington’s one big worry is that the Saudi monarchy will face increasing internal opposition because of its close association with the United States; it is for this reason that the Bush Administration has not leaned too hard on the regime to permit US forces to use Saudi bases for attacks on Afghanistan and to freeze the funds of Saudi charities linked to Osama bin Laden.)

    For both sides, then, this conflict has important geopolitical dimensions. A Saudi regime controlled by Osama bin Laden could be expected to sever all ties with US oil companies and to adopt new policies regarding the production of oil and the distribution of the country’s oil wealth–moves that would have potentially devastating consequences for the US, and indeed the world, economy. The United States, of course, is fighting to prevent this from happening.

    As the conflict unfolds, we are unlikely to hear any of this from the key figures involved. In seeking to mobilize public support for his campaign against the terrorists, President Bush will never acknowledge that conventional geopolitics plays a role in US policy. Osama bin Laden, for his part, is equally reluctant to speak in such terms. But the fact remains that this war, like the Gulf War before it, derives from a powerful geopolitical contest. It will be very difficult, in the current political environment, to probe too deeply into these matters. Bin Laden and his associates have caused massive injury to the United States, and the prevention of further such attacks is, understandably, the nation’s top priority. When conditions permit, however, a serious review of US policy in the Persian Gulf will be in order. Among the many questions that might legitimately be asked at this point is whether long-term US interests would not best be served by encouraging the democratization of Saudi Arabia. Surely, if more Saudi citizens are permitted to participate in open political dialogue, fewer will be attracted to the violent, anti-American dogma of Osama bin Laden.

  • Statement on the Bombing of Afghanistan

    (The following statement was made at a Press Conference of Prominent Canadians Calling for a Halt to the Bombing of Afghanistan in Toronto)

    The relentless bombing of Afghanistan, now in its 18th day, goes beyond the intent of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368. When the Security Council gave its assent “to take all necessary steps” to respond to the September 11 attacks, it did not approve a bombing campaign that would kill innocent civilians in their Afghan villages, drive 70 percent of the people in Herat (population 800,000) out of their homes, kill 10 civilians yesterday on a bus at the city gates of Kandahar, and destroy a Red Cross warehouse among other unfortunate acts of what is drily called “collateral damage.”

    It may seem comforting to say that civilians are not targeted, but it is not “collateral damage” when thousands of refugees fleeing the bombs are jammed along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in unspeakable conditions. UNICEF warns that the crisis “is threatening the lives of millions of women and children” and that “1.5 million children may not make it through the winter.” Christian Aid, which reported that 600 people have already died in the Dar-e-Suf region of northern Afghanistan due to starvation and related diseases, says needy people are being put at risk by government spin-doctors who are showing a callous disregard for life.

    The bombing of Afghanistan, one of the most desperate and vulnerable regions of the world, is producing an international catastrophe. The bombing is immoral, unproductive and only by the most dubious logic can it be said to possess even a shred of legality.

    As Article 51 of the U.N. Charter makes clear, it is the Security Council that has the authority and responsibility to maintain or restore international peace and security. Let me emphasize: the bombing coalition, in exceeding the exercise of the right of self-defence, which gave a legal cover to the bombing, has sidelined the legitimate authority of the Security Council to manage this crisis.

    It is said that the invocation for the first time of Article 5 of the NATO Charter provides the legal grounds for Canada to give its support to the military campaign. The Article provides the solidarity that an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all and thus NATO will take the responsive actions it deems necessary. But where has it been proven that the government of Afghanistan, despotic as it is, engineered or carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon? It has yet to be confirmed that any of the 19 suspected hijackers comes from Afghanistan. Is the belief that Osama bin Laden, the terrorist leader, is in Afghanistan justification for imposing catastrophe on the whole populace?

    Continued bombing is not what the United Nations intended. The bombing must stop now – and Canada, to be faithful to its own values, must press the United States and its coalition partners to call a halt so that humanitarian aid can reach the desperate people of Afghanistan.

  • A Leading Role for the Security Council

    In the past month, the world has witnessed something previously unknown: a common stand taken by America, Russia, Europe, India, China, Cuba, most of the Islamic world and numerous other regions and countries. Despite many serious differences between them, they united to save civilization.

    It is now the responsibility of the world community to transform the coalition against terrorism into a coalition for a peaceful world order. Let us not, as we did in the 1990’s, miss the chance to build such an order.

    Concepts like solidarity and helping third world countries to fight poverty and backwardness have disappeared from the political vocabulary. But if these concepts are not revived politically, the worst scenarios of a clash of civilizations could become reality.

    I believe the United Nations Security Council should take the lead in fighting terrorism and in dealing with other global problems. All the main issues considered by the United Nations affect mankind’s security. It is time to stop reviling the United Nations and get on with the work of adapting the institution to new tasks.

    Concrete steps should include accelerated nuclear and chemical disarmament and control over the remaining stocks of dangerous substances, including chemical and biological agents. No amount of money is too much for that. I hope the United States will support the verification protocol of the convention banning biological weapons and ratify the treaty to prohibit all nuclear tests ‹ though both steps would reverse the Bush administration’s current positions.

    We should also heed those who have pointed out the negative consequences of globalization for hundreds of millions of people. Globalization cannot be stopped, but it can be made more humane and more balanced for those it affects.

    If the battle against terrorism is limited to military operations, the world could be the loser. But if it becomes an integral part of common efforts to build a more just world order, everyone will win ‹ including those who now do not support American actions or the antiterrorism coalition. Those people, and they are many, should not all be branded as enemies.

    Russia has shown its solidarity with America. President Vladimir Putin immediately sent a telegram to President Bush on Sept. 11 condemning the “inhuman act” of that day. Russia has been sharing information, coordinating positions with the West and with its neighbors, opening its air space, and providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people and weapons to the Northern Alliance.

    This has been good policy. But we should bear in mind that both in the Russian establishment and among the people, reaction to it has been mixed. Some people are still prone to old ways of understanding the world and Russia’s place in it. Others sincerely wonder whether the world’s most powerful country should be bombing impoverished Afghanistan. Still others ask: We have supported America in its hour of need, but will it meet us halfway on issues important to us?

    I am sure Russia will be a serious partner in fighting international terrorism. But equally, it is important that its voice be heard in building a new international order. If not, Russians could conclude that they have merely been used.

    Irritants in American-Russian relations ‹ issues like missile defense and the admission of new members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ‹ will be addressed in due course, but they will be easier to solve once we have moved toward a new global agenda and a deeper partnership between our two countries.

    Finally, it would be wrong to use the battle against terrorism to establish control over countries or regions. This would discredit the coalition and close off the prospect of transforming it into a powerful mechanism for building a peaceful world.

    Turning the coalition against terror into an alliance that works to achieve a just international order would be a lasting memorial to the thousands of victims of the Sept. 11 tragedy.

  • Canadians Are Ready to Fight, But Want Some Answers

    Orginally Published in the Globe and Mail Metro**

    Thanksgiving weekend brought Canadians face to face with the harsh reality of living in a post-Sept. 11 world. At a time traditionally set aside to join family and friends in quiet celebration of our blessings, we found ourselves as a charter member of a military operation against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the terrorist network of Osama bin Laden.

    There is no more difficult decision for a government to make and people to accept than the commitment to fight. It calls for a clear declaration of support for our military personnel who are asked to do the fighting. That’s why it is strange that Parliament will not meet until next week.

    The House of Commons should be convened immediately, not only as the forum through which Canadians can express their solidarity, but as a place where tough questions can be asked about the conduct and objectives of this military operation.

    We all knew this battle was coming, but little clue was given as to the nature of Canadian involvement. Now that it is upon us, and promises to be a long-term engagement of a particularly tricky and complex kind, it is vital that there be a much better understanding of how this use of force will reduce the terrorist threat, what the consequences will be for the broader goal of instituting an international legal order, and whether Canada will do more than offer troops.

    Both Prime Minister Jean Chretien and President George W. Bush spoke of a grand strategy involving diplomatic, humanitarian and financial efforts. But little is known about what this means and who will call the shots. The “coalition” members — including Canada — have yet to meet, other than through a series of bilateral telephone calls and visits to the White House. This strikes me as a hub-and-spoke arrangement, where direction comes from the centre with little input from the outside members. This is not a foundation for building an international partnership based on collective responsibility and contribution, nor one in which Canada can play an active creative role.

    To use one example: This country has been at the forefront of establishing an international legal system to hold accountable those who commit crimes against humanity, including acts of terrorism. The construction of such a criminal system should be one of the prime goals of an anti-terrorist coalition. But the Bush administration has just endorsed a bill submitted by Senator Jesse Helms that would deny U.S. aid to any country that ratified the statute setting up the international criminal court. Hardly a position Canada should be supporting.

    Then there is the problem of the humanitarian consequences of an attack against Afghanistan, where there is already a refugee disaster in the making. It is shrewdly recognized by the Bush administration that the military action will exacerbate the situation, so it is dropping food and medicine and trying to persuade the people to stay put. While an important gesture, it is not an effective response. The refugee needs go far beyond airlifted supplies. These people, reeling from two decades of civil war, need sanitation, water, medical treatment, shelter and security, just for starters.

    The matter of Afghan refugees is a priority, requiring an international effort preferably through the United Nations, as suggested by Kofi Annan. Will Canada take the lead in mobilizing this kind of multilateral exercise? Can we take the lead in this kind of initiative now that we have been singled out by the U.S. President as a prime member of the military team attacking the Taliban? Or has our value as an independent player been compromised? Closer to home is the question of Canadians’ own security now that we are identified as front-line participants. Most analysts expect a retaliation to this attack. Osama bin Laden has promised a holy war. The probability of our being in the front line of that retaliation has increased commensurate with our role in the coalition. That means added responsibility to provide protection for Canadians here and abroad. This is especially crucial in enhancing security for our embassies and other visible overseas organizations such as cultural centres, aid projects and large Canadian business operations. We are about to learn the hard price to pay in fighting the war against a hidden, dedicated, merciless, covert enemy.

    The aftershock of the Sept. 11 attacks is now being felt. How Canadians will muster their resources to help restore a sense of security for people around the world is the issue of our day. We have just begun to ask the pertinent questions.

    * Lloyd Axworthy, foreign affairs minister from 1996 to 2000, is director and CEO of the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues at UBC.

  • Bombing Unworthy of US: Senator Says Militarism is Not the Answer to Terrorism

    Is the relentless bombing of Afghanistan justified? My answer is no.

    I must immediately couple that answer with my belief that the criminals who committed the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 must be apprehended and brought to justice. But that goal does not justify killing innocent people and destroying the infrastructure of a country that already has a million refugees.

    The alternative to bombing is to send in ground troops to comb the countryside and all the caves to find Osama bin Laden and his fellow-plotters. This is not done because the U.S.-led coalition fears that troops would be killed by the mines planted throughout Afghanistan.

    Thus, air attacks have been chosen as the response to terrorism. The response is unworthy of nations that pride themselves on upholding international human rights. For, as the Kosovo bombing of only two years ago showed, even “smart” bombs cannot distinguish between military targets and civilians. The human misery left in the wake of a bombing campaign is horrendous.

    The world must move beyond the tears, grief and anger of Sept. 11 and finally establish a just and stable foundation for international peace and security.

    Let it not be said that I am insensitive to the thousands of lives lost in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. I went to New York a week ago, took the subway down to the financial district and saw the World Trade wreckage with my own eyes. The devastation was overpowering. Mounds of debris, six stories high, assaulted the eyes. People were stunned, just looking at such a grotesque sight.

    I then went to the United Nations and talked with Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, who said that, bad as this tragedy was, it could have been worse.

    “Consider if weapons of mass destruction had been used by these terrorists. We need urgently to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction because they could fall into the hands of terrorists.”

    The UN leadership wants rapid progress on eliminating nuclear weapons and is preparing to debate a draft convention suppressing nuclear terrorism. But unless Canada comes out four-square opposing all nuclear weapons — which will offend the U.S. — our words about keeping nuclear weapons from terrorists will be empty.

    I am concerned that the path of militarism is leading the world to even greater dangers. Nuclear terrorism is only a matter of time.

    We have been attacked. Our first response is to attack back. Public sentiment, driven by a culture that still sees war as the means to peace, seeks retaliation. In this climate, militarism expands constantly.

    But Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, sees the needs of peace and fighting terrorism differently. While the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution expressing “its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks,” that is not carte blanche to bomb at will.

    The bombing has gone beyond the intent of the resolution, but Annan cannot stop the use of such military might once unleashed. What he has done — and what Canada must insist upon — is to include in the implementation of this resolution other means to combat terrorism. This includes political, legal, diplomatic and financial means.

    Another Security Council resolution spelled out a host of actions ranging from police work to cutting off funding to new communications technologies that must be taken. Rather than assenting to a bombing campaign, it would be better to concentrate Canada’s resources on security and anti-terrorism measures. The extra $250 million announced yesterday by Foreign Minister John Manley announced should be only the beginning. These steps will be far more effective in rooting out the terrorist cells in many countries than bombing in the hope of cutting off the head of a terrorism that has tentacles spread around the world.

    It is both ironic and disingenuous to couple the bombing with dropping food and medicine. This is a chaotic and ineffectual way of meeting humanitarian needs that are mounting by the hour. Rather, the international community should be mounting — with the same vigour displayed in the bombing campaign — a massive assault on poverty. It is the inhuman conditions that so many millions of people are subjected to that breed the conditions that terrorists exploit.

    Also, as Annan has urged, there must be a “redoubling” of international efforts to implement treaties to cut off the development of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction before terrorists get them.

    Militarism is not the answer to terrorism. The building of an international legal system that promotes social justice is.

    *Douglas Roche is an Independent Senator from Alberta and the author of “Bread Not Bombs: A Political Agenda for Social Justice.” Senator Roche also serves as an advisor for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.