Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: US

  • Bolton Should Step Aside

    President Bush’s nomination of John Bolton to become United Nations ambassador began as an embarrassment and is ending as a disgrace. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was right to delay a scheduled vote and resist being railroaded by the administration into approving him.

    Bolton’s infantile crack that it would make no difference if the U.N. lost its top 10 floors already testified to his unfitness to serve as the United States’ diplomat to the world. It may have been Bush’s right to appoint someone provocative yet capable. But the revelations that have emerged over the past weeks in the Senate call into question Bolton’s basic ability to do the job.

    On issue after issue, whether North Korea or Iraq, Bolton has wielded a wrecking ball. It might be possible to wave off one allegation of the misuse of intelligence — infighting always takes place in the government bureaucracy — but Bolton appears to have willfully and systematically suppressed and misused classified information, including bullying civil service officials who dared to challenge his apocalyptic assessments of North Korean, Iraqi and Cuban weapons programs. Former CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin apparently had to intervene to protect a Latin American analyst from Bolton’s wrath; Carl W. Ford Jr., the State Department’s former assistant secretary of intelligence and research — the only government bureau to get it right on Iraq — describes him as a “serial abuser.” And Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) is rightly inquiring about Bolton’s unusual request to look at National Security Administration intercepts and why he asked for the identities of analysts. Why indeed?

    The best case that can be made for Bolton is that he’s no worse than other neoconservative officials in the Pentagon who manipulated intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But Bolton also appears to have a mean streak, a pattern of arrogant recklessness that bodes ill for this assignment. If there is anyone in the U.S. government who needs to be infinitely patient, it’s the ambassador at the U.N., who must constantly engage representatives of dozens of nations — diplomats Bolton would no doubt find infinitely annoying. Not only does he lack the temperament for the job, it’s hard to imagine why he’d want it.

    Bolton surely can’t want the job now, with the world on notice that even the Republican Senate has its misgivings about his nomination. Bush may find it hard to back down, so Bolton should do him and his country a favor and step aside. Maybe there is a consolation prize the White House could offer him. How about ambassador to France?

  • Bush Administration Eliminating 19-year-old International Terrorism Report

    WASHINGTON – The State Department decided to stop publishing an annual report on international terrorism after the government’s top terrorism center concluded that there were more terrorist attacks in 2004 than in any year since 1985, the first year the publication covered.

    Several U.S. officials defended the abrupt decision, saying the methodology the National Counterterrorism Center used to generate statistics for the report may have been faulty, such as the inclusion of incidents that may not have been terrorism.

    Last year, the number of incidents in 2003 was undercounted, forcing a revision of the report, “Patterns of Global Terrorism.”

    But other current and former officials charged that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s office ordered “Patterns of Global Terrorism” eliminated several weeks ago because the 2004 statistics raised disturbing questions about the Bush’s administration’s frequent claims of progress in the war against terrorism.

    “Instead of dealing with the facts and dealing with them in an intelligent fashion, they try to hide their facts from the American public,” charged Larry C. Johnson, a former CIA analyst and State Department terrorism expert who first disclosed the decision to eliminate the report in The Counterterrorism Blog, an online journal.

    Rep. Henry Waxman (news, bio, voting record), D-Calif., who was among the leading critics of last year’s mix-up, reacted angrily to the decision.

    “This is the definitive report on the incidence of terrorism around the world. It should be unthinkable that there would be an effort to withhold it – or any of the key data – from the public. The Bush administration should stop playing politics with this critical report.”

    A senior State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, confirmed that the publication was being eliminated, but said the allegation that it was being done for political reasons was “categorically untrue.”

    According to Johnson and U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the issue, statistics that the National Counterterrorism Center provided to the State Department reported 625 “significant” terrorist attacks in 2004.

    That compared with 175 such incidents in 2003, the highest number in two decades.

    The statistics didn’t include attacks on American troops in Iraq, which President Bush as recently as Tuesday called “a central front in the war on terror.”

    The intelligence officials requested anonymity because the information is classified and because, they said, they feared White House retribution. Johnson declined to say how he obtained the figures.

    Another U.S. official, who also requested anonymity, said analysts from the counterterrorism center were especially careful in amassing and reviewing the data because of the political turmoil created by last year’s errors.

    Last June, the administration was forced to issue a revised version of the report for 2003 that showed a higher number of significant terrorist attacks and more than twice the number of fatalities than had been presented in the original report two months earlier.

    The snafu was embarrassing for the White House, which had used the original version to bolster President Bush’s election-campaign claim that the war in Iraq had advanced the fight against terrorism.

    U.S. officials blamed last year’s mix-up on bureaucratic mistakes involving the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the forerunner of the National Counterterrorism Center.

    Created last year on the recommendation of the independent commission that investigated the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the center is the government’s primary organization for analyzing and integrating all U.S. government intelligence on terrorism.

    The State Department published “Patterns of Global Terrorism” under a law that requires it to submit to the House of Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a country-by-country terrorism assessment by April 30 each year.

    A declassified version of the report has been made public since 1986 in the form of a glossy booklet, even though there was no legal requirement to produce one.

    The senior State Department official said a report on global terrorism would be sent this year to lawmakers and made available to the public in place of “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” but that it wouldn’t contain statistical data.

    He said that decision was taken because the State Department believed that the National Counterterrorism Center “is now the authoritative government agency for the analysis of global terrorism. We believe that the NCTC should compile and publish the relevant data on that subject.”

    He didn’t answer questions about whether the data would be made available to the public, saying, “We will be consulting (with Congress) … on who should publish and in what form.”

    Another U.S. official said Rice’s office was leery of the methodology the National Counterterrorism Center used to generate the data for 2004, believing that analysts anxious to avoid a repetition of last year’s undercount included incidents that may not have been terrorist attacks.

    But the U.S. intelligence officials said Rice’s office decided to eliminate “Patterns of Global Terrorism” when the counterterrorism center declined to use alternative methodology that would have reported fewer significant attacks.

    The officials said they interpreted Rice’s action as an attempt to avoid releasing statistics that would contradict the administration’s claims that it’s winning the war against terrorism.

    To read past “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports online, go to www.mipt.org/Patterns-of-Global-Terrorism.asp

  • Saving Nonproliferation

    Renewal talks for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are scheduled for May, yet the United States and other nuclear powers seem indifferent to its fate. This is remarkable, considering the addition of Iran and North Korea as states that either possess or seek nuclear weapons programs. A recent United Nations report warned starkly: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

    A group of “Middle States” has a simple goal: “To exert leverage on the nuclear powers to take some minimum steps to save the non-proliferation treaty in 2005.” Last year this coalition of nuclear-capable states — including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and eight NATO members — voted for a new agenda resolution calling for implementing NPT commitments already made. Tragically, the United States, Britain and France voted against this resolution.

    So far the preparatory committee for the forthcoming NPT talks has failed even to achieve an agenda because of the deep divisions between nuclear powers that refuse to meet their own disarmament commitments and the nonnuclear movement, whose demands include honoring these pledges and considering the Israeli arsenal.

    Until recently all American presidents since Dwight Eisenhower had striven to restrict and reduce nuclear arsenals — some more than others. So far as I know, there are no present efforts by any of the nuclear powers to accomplish these crucial goals.

    The United States is the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT. While claiming to be protecting the world from proliferation threats in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, American leaders not only have abandoned existing treaty restraints but also have asserted plans to test and develop new weapons, including anti-ballistic missiles, the earth-penetrating “bunker buster” and perhaps some new “small” bombs. They also have abandoned past pledges and now threaten first use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states.

    Some corrective actions are obvious:

    • The United States needs to address remaining nuclear issues with Russia, demanding the same standards of transparency and verification of past arms control agreements and dismantling and disposal of decommissioned weapons. With massive arsenals still on hair-trigger alert status, a global holocaust is just as possible now, through mistakes or misjudgments, as it was during the depths of the Cold War. We could address perhaps the world’s greatest proliferation threat by fully securing Russia’s stockpiles.

    • While all nuclear weapons states should agree to non-first use, the United States, as the sole superpower, should take the lead on this issue.

    • NATO needs to de-emphasize the role of its nuclear weapons and consider an end to their deployment in Western Europe. Despite its eastward expansion, NATO is keeping the same stockpiles and policies as when the Iron Curtain divided the continent.

    • The comprehensive test ban treaty should be honored, but the United States is moving in the opposite direction. The administration’s 2005 budget refers for the first time to a list of test scenarios, and other nations are waiting to take the same action.

    • The United States should support a fissile materials treaty to prevent the creation and transport of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

    • Curtail U.S. development of the infeasible missile defense shield, which is wasting huge resources, while breaking our commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty without a working substitute.

    • Act on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, an increasing source of instability in that region. Iran has repeatedly hidden its intentions to enrich uranium while claiming that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. This explanation has been given before, by India, Pakistan and North Korea, and has led to weapons programs in all three states. Iran must be called to account and held to its promises under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge how Israel’s nuclear status entices Iran, Syria, Egypt and other states to join the community of nuclear weapons states.

    These are vital questions, and the world will know the answers during the NPT conference in May.

    Former president Carter is founder of the Carter Center in Atlanta.

  • The War on Iraq as Illegal and Illegitimate

    “The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons.”

    George W. Bush, October 7, 2002

    “I think unless the United Nations shows some backbone and courage, it could render the Security Council irrelevant.”

    George W. Bush, February 17, 2003

    We now know that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, as repeatedly alleged by Mr. Bush and other members of his administration. And contrary to Mr. Bush’s allegation that the United Nations showed no backbone and courage, the Security Council did, in fact, stand up to the Bush administration’s pressure and did resist authorizing war prior to the UN weapons inspectors completing their task. It was the Bush administration’s impatience with the Security Council process and unwillingness to abide by it that led them to initiate an unauthorized attack on Iraq in violation of international law. Although the war in Iraq is widely regarded throughout the world as illegal under international law, few consequences seem to be flowing from this in holding to account the perpetrators of the war, including leading figures in the Bush administration.

    At issue is a view often articulated by detractors of the war, such as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, describing the war in Iraq as a “war of choice,” rather than a war of necessity.1 This would suggest that those with sufficient power have choices in matters of war and peace in which they can initiate war without being held accountable; or, at best, be held accountable only by the democratic process of defeat in the next election. The implication is that an illegal war of aggression, while it may be neither wise nor necessary, is a prerogative of power.

    The two main justifications offered by the Bush administration for the war against Iraq prior to its inception have by now been completely discredited. First, administration spokespersons repeatedly pointed to an imminent threat that Iraq would use weapons of mass destruction against the US or its allies, or would transfer these weapons to terrorist organizations. UN weapons inspectors in Iraq prior to the war reported that they were not finding weapons of mass destruction and needed more time to complete their inspections. The Bush administration, however, continued to assert that Iraq had such weapons, despite a lack of credible corroboration, and finally warned the UN inspectors to leave Iraq before the US initiated what they called a “preemptive” war. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his presentation to the United Nations Security Council, asserted without question that the US had knowledge of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and proceeded to produce intelligence photographs of the sites where they were being manufactured and stored.2 His assertions turned out to be false.

    In the aftermath of the war, no weapons of mass destruction were located in Iraq, despite extensive efforts on the part of UN inspectors and US military personnel. This wholly discredited the numerous pronouncements by members of the Bush administration that they not only knew there were such weapons but even knew where they were located within Iraq.

    The second justification for the war made by the Bush administration prior to initiating the war was that there was a link between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist organization. The evidence establishing this link has also proven to be false or, at best, extremely tenuous. This led the US to come up with new post hoc justifications for the war, such as the assertion that Saddam Hussein was a bad man and evil dictator, even though the US supported Hussein despite his poor human rights record when it believed that it served its interests to do so. While the latter, after-the-fact justifications may be true, they do not make an effective case for legality, or even legitimacy, of an aggressive war initiated without UN authorization.

    If allowed to stand unchallenged, the US initiation of war on Iraq and the rationale that permitted it could set an extremely dangerous precedent. Such actions could also undermine the legal and normative system to prevent wars of aggression, centered in the United Nations and enunciated in the Nuremberg Principles, which were the basis for the trials of Axis leaders in the aftermath of World War II. The Nuremberg Principles list “Crimes against peace” as first among the crimes punishable under international law and define Crimes against peace as: “(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation of a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).”

    The words of the US chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials, Justice Robert Jackson, are relevant. Jackson was adamant that the true test of what was done at Nuremberg would be the extent to which the Allied victors, including the US, applied these principles to themselves in future years. In his opening statement to the Court, Jackson placed the issue of “victor’s justice” in context: “We must never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our lips as well. We must summon such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this Trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity’s aspirations to do justice.”3 Such “aspirations to do justice” included for Jackson applying the law equally and fairly to all. “If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes,” he stated, “they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us.”4

    The Illegality of the Iraq War

    The UN Charter is clear that wars of aggression are prohibited. Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”5 This prohibition on the use of force finds an exception in Article 51 of the Charter, which allows for the possibility of self-defense.6

    Article 51 states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”7 It should be emphasized that this exception to the general prohibition against the use of force is only valid in the event of “an armed attack” and only “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

    In the case of the US war against Iraq, there was no armed attack against the US by Iraq, nor any substantiated threat of armed attack. There was no credible evidence that Iraq had any relationship to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US. There was, therefore, no appropriate justification for the invocation of the self-defense exception to the UN Charter’s prohibition against the use of force. If the US could proceed to war against Iraq on the basis of a claim of potential future attack, it would open the door to a broad range of assertions of potential future attacks by one country against another that would justify unilateral initiation of warfare, whether or not based on factual foundations, paranoia or simple expediency. It would throw the international order into a state of chaos.

    Further, the matter of Iraq’s failure to complete the disarmament obligations imposed upon it by the Security Council following the 1991 Gulf War was actually placed before the Security Council by the US for action, and the Security Council resisted US pressure to provide the US with an authorization to use force. The Bush administration, at the urging of Secretary of State Colin Powell and over objections of other administration officials, sought a Security Council mandate to initiate what the US called a “preemptive war” (but was actually a “preventive war” since it involved no imminent threat of attack but only sought to prevent the imagined possibility of a future attack) against Iraq.

    The Security Council did agree to one resolution, UNSC Resolution 1441, that called on Iraq to disarm its weapons of mass destruction and cooperate with UN inspectors, but did not include an authorization for the use of force against Iraq.8 In Resolution 1441, the Security Council indicated that it would remain “seized” of the matter, meaning that it continued to assert its authority as the final international arbiter of the use of force in the matter. When the US went back to the Security Council for a second and follow-up resolution to 1441, this one to provide authorization to proceed to war against Iraq, the Security Council refused to comply with the US demand for such authorization on the grounds that it wanted to give the UN inspectors more time to finish their work.

    Rather than awaiting authorization from the Security Council or abiding by the Council’s unwillingness to provide such authorization, the US, under the Bush administration, which had been gradually repositioning its military forces into the Middle East in preparation for war with Iraq, abandoned its quest for UN authorization and proceeded to attack and invade Iraq. The Bush administration sought to justify its illegal actions on the basis of Security Council Resolution 678, a 1990 resolution that authorized “all necessary means” to uphold previous resolutions related to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area.9 The resolution authorized the use of force unless Iraq fully complied with previous Council resolutions by January 15, 1991. This resolution was used as legal justification for the attack against Iraq on that date by the US-led coalition and also by the Bush II administration for its attack in March 2003. While the justification is relevant, at least legally, to the 1991 Gulf War, it is basically used as sophistry in relation to the 2003 attack.

    Following the first Gulf War, Iraq accepted a cease-fire contained in Security Council Resolution 687.10 This resolution imposed certain conditions on them, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disarmament obligations. In justifying the 2003 war on Iraq, Bush administration officials continued to rely upon the Security Council resolutions preceding and immediately following the 199l Gulf War. State Department Legal Advisers, for example, argued, “As a legal matter, a material breach of the conditions that had been essential to the establishment of the cease-fire left the responsibility to member states to enforce those conditions, operating consistently with Resolution 678 to use all necessary means to restore international peace and security in the area.”11

    These officials further argued that the provision in Resolution 1441 indicating that Iraq was in “material breach of its obligations” to cooperate with UN inspectors on WMD inspections under previous resolutions, including resolutions 678 and 687, allowed them to legally initiate their attack on Iraq.12 In fact, however, Resolution 1441 offered Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with disarmament obligations,”13 and Iraq was doing so. Iraq was cooperating with UN inspectors on these issues, and the arguments to the contrary, by Colin Powell and others in the Bush administration, have since been exposed as misrepresentations.14 Most important, though, Security Council Resolution 1441 stated that the Security Council would remain seized of the matter, thus indicating that without further Council authorization there was not legal justification for the US and its allies to proceed to war against Iraq.15

    The US-led attack against Iraq constitutes a clear undermining of established Security Council authority in the realm of war and peace. The attack and initiation of the Iraq War would later be described by President Bush in terms of the US not needing a “permission slip,” presumably from the United Nations, when US security interests were threatened.16 As was subsequently revealed, however, US security interests were not threatened, as had been alleged by the Bush administration, and the war therefore had no legal basis. It was considered by the opposition party in the US to be at best a “war of choice.” More realistically, it was understood by large majorities of the populations of nearly all countries in the world to be an aggressive and illegal war of the type for which Axis leaders were held to account by the Allied powers after World War II. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said unequivocally that the war was illegal. Referring to the war, he stated, “I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN Charter. From our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal.”17

    The Security Council could have chosen to act under Article 39 of the UN Charter to authorize the use of force against Iraq if it determined that there had been a breach of the peace or act of aggression. Article 39 states,18“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”19 Article 41 refers to actions the Security Council can take that do not involve the use of force. Article 42 refers to acts of force the Security Council can take if it finds the measures under Article 41 to be inadequate. These include “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”20 No such actions were authorized by the Security Council in relation to the Iraq War initiated by Mr. Bush and other US and coalition leaders in March 2003.

    The Illegitimacy of the Iraq War

    Despite the nearly universal understanding of the illegality of the war, it might be asked under what conditions it might nonetheless be considered legitimate, even if not legal. This line of inquiry takes into account the argument that the threat of a possible attack with weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, would allow for some bending of international law to fit the extreme dangers associated with such weapons. In response to this line of inquiry, it seems reasonable to suggest that evidence of the development of weapons of mass destruction, when combined with further evidence of imminent intent to use such weapons, could constitute a sufficient threat to justify preemptive war in an attempt to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction. (Query: Would the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review,21 which calls for developing contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven countries, suggest imminent threat, and constitute sufficient grounds for a preemptive attack by one of these states against the US?)

    Hans Blix, the former chief UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq, analyzed the pre-war situation in Iraq in this way: “Any government learning that a 9/11, perhaps with weapons of mass destruction, is about to happen cannot sit and wait, but will seek to prevent it. However, such preventive action, if undertaken without the authorization of the Security Council, would have to rely critically upon solid intelligence if it were to be internationally accepted. The case of Iraq cannot be said to have strengthened faith in national intelligence as a basis for preemptive military action without Security Council authorization. Saddam Hussein did not have any weapons of mass destruction in March 2003, and the evidence invoked of the existence of such weapons had begun to fall apart even before the invasion started.”22 Based on this analysis, Blix concluded: “Saddam Hussein was not a valid object for counter-proliferation. He was not an imminent or even remote threat to the United States or to Iraq’s neighbors.”23

    It should be understood that even if there had been weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, this alone would not have been a sufficient justification for preemptive war. The mere presence of weapons of mass destruction, absent evidence of imminent intent to use them, would be insufficient to justify a preemptive war, let alone a preventive war. If the mere presence of weapons of mass destruction were sufficient, it would mean that any country possessing weapons of mass destruction would be a legitimate target of preventive attack by a potential enemy of that country. Such logic would push all states in the direction of preventive warfare and would substantially increase both the likelihood and danger of such wars. It would allow for attacks against Israel on the basis of its secret but widely recognized nuclear weapons program, for attacks by either India or Pakistan against the other, and for attacks by any of the nuclear weapons states against one another. This is, in part, why the International Court of Justice, in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons, stated: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”24

    Following further this line of inquiry, a distinction needs to be drawn between a state possessing weapons of mass destruction and non-state extremist groups possessing the same weapons. In the former case, a country has a fixed location and is therefore far more likely to be deterred by threat of retaliation from using such weapons. On the other hand, the same weapons in the hands of extremists who are not easily locatable and who may be suicidal as well, and therefore are not subject to being deterred by threats of retaliation, present a far more dangerous threat. In the case of both states of concern – such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea – and of extremist groups, however, the best remedy is surely policies to prevent nuclear proliferation and achieve nuclear disarmament rather than a preemptive war. An aggressive war could only stand as a final barrier and one that is unacceptable and illegal unless under the mandate of the international community through authorization by the United Nations Security Council.

    Given the after-the-fact findings in Iraq that there were neither weapons of mass destruction nor links to extremist organizations, there was no reasonable justification, either in legality or in legitimacy, for the US-led war against that country. US leaders continue to make the claim that previous Security Council resolutions provide the necessary justification, but this is a poor argument that is not borne out by scrutiny of the earlier resolutions and, in any event, is overridden by the fact that the Security Council had decided in Resolution 1441 to remain seized of the matter.

    Costs of the War

    Defenders of the Iraq War claim that the removal of Saddam Hussein by the rapidly diminishing “Coalition of the Willing” will make it possible for democracy to eventually take root in the country, and that a new Iraq will serve as a model to other countries in the region, transforming a troublesome, but oil rich, part of the world into one that is stable, peaceful and democratic. This is an unlikely scenario, given the realities that have ensued as a result of the war.

    While many Iraqi citizens are pleased to see Saddam Hussein dislodged from power, the result of the Iraq War has been the deaths of some 100,000 innocent civilians, severe injury to tens of thousands more, and enormous destruction to the infrastructure of the country.25 Iraqi society has been devastated by warfare and its citizens subjected to death, injury, torture and humiliating abuses such as were revealed at Abu Ghraib prison. The price for regime change has been very high in terms of death and destruction. Iraq will now have to struggle with reestablishing itself as a sovereign state, finding its own means of governance in a post-Saddam and post-US occupation country. As part of this struggle, it will have to come to terms with its relationship to the US, which undoubtedly seeks to assure special privileges with Iraq with regard to Iraqi oil supplies and the continued presence of US troops in the region, particularly on newly established US military bases in Iraq itself.

    Of course, the US has also paid a price for the war in terms of its financial costs, currently estimated at over $200 billion, the deaths and injuries of its soldiers, the spreading thin of its armed forces to levels considered dangerous by leading US military figures, and the loss of respect for and credibility of the US in the world community.

    A second area of equally severe costs of the war against Iraq is its unfortunate implications for world order in the 21 st century. If the US precedent of aggressive war under false pretenses against Iraq is allowed to stand as a fait accompli without some form of international sanction against the US and its leaders, it bodes ill for the continuation of the world order system established after World War II to prevent “the scourge of war.”26 Clearly, the US is a key actor in the international system and, with its overwhelming military and economic power, it is not easy for the international community to stand up for principles of international law against US actions that violate the UN Charter. Yet, the continued viability of the Charter demands principled action by the members of the UN even in the face of US pressure. One extremely important principle of law is that no person or nation stands above the law. Law can only be respected and ultimately enforced when it applies to all, equally and alike. The US-led invasion of Iraq, under false pretenses and without UN Security Council approval, is a direct challenge to the principle of prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter. Had the Security Council actually authorized the US attack on Iraq, it would have undermined the credibility of the United Nations itself, including its commitment to the basic principles of its own Charter.

    The Need for Accountability

    Throughout the world, there have been an ongoing series of inquiries into international crimes committed by US and Coalition leaders in initiating and conducting the war against Iraq in the form of international people’s tribunals.27 These tribunals, in the spirit of the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunals during the Vietnam War, are amassing evidence of international crimes and will be reporting these to the public throughout the world. This is an important initiative of civil society, and it promises to help educate people and governments about the dangers and criminal nature of wars of aggression as well as crimes committed in the conduct of the war. Something more is needed, however, than leaving this matter to be dealt with only by civil society. The UN, for the health and integrity of the organization, also needs to initiate its own inquiry into the nature of the US war against Iraq. This could be done either in the General Assembly or by a committee of selected representative members of the UN and brought back to the General Assembly and, through it, to the people of the world. If the facts bear out the circumvention of the UN Charter by the US in direct defiance of the Security Council, at a minimum, the US should be censured for its actions. Further recommendations by the General Assembly could include a call for reparations to the Iraqi people, prohibitions on the US profiting from its aggression, the disgorgement of profits already obtained, and the trial and punishment of responsible US and coalition leaders for their actions.

    An early act of the Bush administration was to “unsign” the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC).28 Under the Bush administration, the US has been hostile to the ICC, arguing that it did not want to subject US military personnel to the dictates of this international court. In light of the US circumvention of international law in its initiation of an aggressive war against Iraq, it becomes clearer that US leaders were seeking to give themselves greater degrees of freedom to commit serious violations of international criminal law without being subjected to the jurisdiction of the court.

    No country, even the most powerful, should be immune from international law. The United Nations owes it to itself and the principles for which the organization stands not to allow the law to be violated without, at a minimum, drawing public attention to the violations. While a report by the UN on illegal actions by a member state might upset the government of that state, it would also help to draw the attention of the people of that country to illegal acts being committed in their name. This would bear some resemblance at the international level to the truth aspect of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was successfully used in South Africa after apartheid ended and Nelson Mandela was released from prison to become president of that country.29 It would be useful for a UN committee examining the violations of international law in the US-led war against Iraq to also look carefully into the more than a decade of sanctions imposed upon Iraq and the results of those sanctions in terms of human life and suffering of innocent parties.

    The Iraq War and Weapons of Mass Destruction

    At the heart of world conditions that provided the ostensible reason that the US went into Iraq are the extreme threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. Many countries are now concerned about the incendiary mix that lies at the intersection of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The need is greater today than ever before to bring weapons of mass destruction under effective international control, and many countries have voiced their concern that more must be done to keep weapons of mass destruction from proliferating to states of concern and non-state extremist organizations. Mr. Bush has spoken out on the importance of preventing nuclear terrorism. His plans involve attempting to keep what he refers to as the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous states and extremist organizations. Mr. Bush has organized a Proliferation Security Initiative that seeks to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction to other states and to terrorist groups.30 To accomplish this, cooperating countries are tightening export controls, criminalizing transfers of weapons of mass destruction and the materials to create them, and making arrangements to board and inspect ships at sea suspected of transporting contraband materials.

    Bush has noted the “loophole” in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that allows states to develop peaceful nuclear programs that could be converted to nuclear weapons programs.31 He has called for closing this “loophole,” although the treaty itself calls the peaceful uses of nuclear energy an “inalienable right.”32 Additionally, he has called for tighter controls on nuclear materials by the International Atomic Energy Agency and particularly international controls on the technologies to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium. Bush has not raised, however, the key obligation of the nuclear weapons states in the treaty, the Article VI obligation to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, which, more than any other single act, could limit the possibilities of nuclear weapons or the materials to make them falling into the hands of terrorists.33

    A major problem in the international system related to preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the double standard on nuclear weapons that the permanent members of the UN Security Council continue attempting to uphold individually and collectively. While these states continue to maintain nuclear arsenals, all seek also to prevent other states from developing these weapons. In the end, such double standards cannot be maintained. It is not likely, for example, that the US would have initiated its aggressive war against Iraq if it truly believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that it was prepared to use. A consequence of the Iraq War is that it demonstrated to non-nuclear weapon states that there are advantages to possessing these weapons if only to deter a stronger power, such as the US, from an unprovoked and illegal attack. This message does not seem to be lost on either North Korea, which announced that it has developed nuclear weapons, or on Iran, a country that appears to be pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

    The initiation of warfare to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a state possessing weapons of mass destruction reflects the ultimate double standard in the current international system. It is a standard that ultimately cannot hold, and in the end will bring the current international order tumbling down. In a sense, the nuclear weapons states are holding the world hostage to this double standard by failing to fulfill their obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Projecting into the future a continuation of the effort to maintain these double standards, despite long-standing obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, suggests the possibility that aggressive “wars of choice” may increase and become a regular occurrence in relations among countries. Such a future will also increase the likelihood of the use of weapons of mass destruction, either preemptively by a nuclear weapons state, or by extremist organizations intent on inflicting maximum damage on powerful states in the only way they are capable of damaging them, that is, by attacks on innocent civilians.

    Need for Action by the United Nations

    The world continues to stand at a crossroads. In one direction is a continuation of the status quo based on double standards related to weapons of mass destruction; in the other direction is a world in which international law applies to all countries, even the most powerful. The world’s countries, acting through the United Nations, must find a way to end double standards relating to weapons of mass destruction and, at the same time, to fulfill the promise of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve total nuclear disarmament through the phased elimination of all nuclear arsenals. Prohibitions already exist on chemical and biological weapons, but the international community must find a way to assure the viability of these prohibitions through robust inspection and verification mechanisms.

    In the short run, the war against Iraq has alerted the world to the dangers of a breakdown of accepted international norms and prohibitions against aggressive war. In the longer run, however, the resolution of this problem will require the strengthening of the UN itself and the ending of current double standards applied to the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The starting point for addressing this problem is for the UN to take responsibility for reviewing and evaluating what happened leading to the war against Iraq and to draw attention to violations of the UN Charter that occurred when the US and its coalition partners proceeded to invade and occupy Iraq without authorization by the Security Council. In doing so, it is likely that the conclusion will be inescapable that the US-led war was neither legal nor legitimate.

    Some Final Questions

    Finally, let us consider some remaining questions that might be raised about the Iraq War. Was it a defining moment for international law? If it was a defining moment, it was so only in calling for a clear response from the international community that no state, including the most powerful, stands above the law. Otherwise, the Iraq War represents aggressive warfare of a type that has occurred throughout history. Nonetheless, we might inquire about the right of states, individually or collectively, to remove from power a dictator that has a long record of violating international law and committing crimes against his own people. Certainly the international community has some responsibility in such a case, but it is a responsibility that must be exercised with proper authorization of the UN Security Council. Absent such authorization, there is no right under the law for a state to proceed to forcefully intervene in the internal affairs of another sovereign state.

    Was the Security Council’s refusal to authorize war a triumphant moment for it, as some would argue, or was it an abdication of responsibility as others, particularly the US, would argue? If it was a triumphant moment, it was certainly a hollow one, for although the Security Council, to its credit, did not authorize the use of force in violation of the UN Charter, it was unable to prevent its most powerful member from acting without its authorization. Thus, although the Security Council may have been right, its authority was weakened by the noncompliance of the United States in acting without UN authority, and thereby illegally, in a spirit of exceptionalism.

    Should the legal norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states be abandoned? This norm deserves review by the Security Council in an attempt to better delineate under what circumstances this norm should be set aside by the Security Council. Examples of overriding circumstances could include when genocides or crimes against humanity are occurring or are believed, based on sufficient evidence, to be imminent. A strong case can be made for establishing a UN Emergency Peace Service, a well-trained force composed of international volunteers, which would be available for rapid deployment upon authorization of the Security Council to prevent genocide or crimes against humanity.34 In relation to genocide and crimes against humanity, it would be appropriate to place limits on the veto power of the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

    Does the Iraq War provide a model for future instances of controlling weapons of mass destruction? It is a very poor model for this purpose. Wars to control weapons of mass destruction are costly in terms of life and treasure, and sometimes, as in the case of Iraq, the wars may be based on faulty information, manipulated intelligence, false premises, misrepresentations and deceptions. The control of weapons of mass destruction can only be achieved in the end by doing away with double standards and placing all weapons of mass destruction and the materials to make them under verifiable international control while they are being dismantled and destroyed. This will require strengthening the chemical, biological and nuclear non-proliferation regimes; and this, in turn, will require a much higher level of political will by the states currently possessing such weapons of mass destruction.

    A Step Backward for International Law

    The Iraq War has been a step backward for international law, has harmed the authority of the UN Security Council and has undermined the credibility of the United States in the eyes of the world. The United Nations is faced with the dilemma of reasserting the post-World War II emphasis on ending the “scourge of war” in the face of a disturbing pattern of unilateralism, exceptionalism and disregard for international law displayed by the United States. The international community, acting through the United Nations, needs to establish effective limitations on unilateral action by all states and censure and apply sanctions to any country, including the most powerful, that defies the dictates of international law. At a minimum, the UN General Assembly should conduct a thorough review of the circumstances leading to the initiation of war against Iraq, and determine authoritatively whether that war was conducted legally with reference to international law.

    This matter cannot be left in the hands of the UN Security Council since the US, as a permanent member, would exercise its veto power to prevent such a review from going forward. If the General Assembly deems it appropriate, it can turn to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the matter. The UN report or advisory opinion of the Court should be made public and widely disseminated. Proposals should be made by the General Assembly on preventing aggressive wars in the future and on the circumstances under which humanitarian interventions are appropriate. Were the United Nations to thoroughly review the matter and issue a strong report, it is possible that the international community could learn from what has happened and attempt to more effectively control such unauthorized and costly interventions in the future.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons and is the author of many studies of peace in the Nuclear Age, including Nuclear Weapons and the World Court.

    *This paper has been submitted for inclusion in the book The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural and Normative Challenges, Ramesh Thakur and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, editors, to be published by United Nations University Press, Tokyo (www.unu.edu/unupress).

    1. See, for example, Albright, Madeleine, “Medallion Speaker Address” (Commonwealth Club), 12 February 2004, http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/04/04-02albright-speech.html. Albright states, “Because although the war in Iraq was a war of choice, not necessity, winning the peace is a necessity, not a choice.”
    2. “ US Secretary of State Colin Powell Addresses UN Security Council,” 5 February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html.
    3. General Assembly Resolution 95(1), 11 December 1946.
    4. Quoted in Taylor, Telford, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials. New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1992, p. 168.
    5. Quoted in Tusa, Ann and John Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial. New York: The Notable Trials Library, 1990, p. 81.
    6. United Nations Charter, entered into force 24 October 1945, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
    7. . bid.
    8. Ibid.
    9. Security Council Resolution 1441, 8 November 2002, 42 ILM 250 (2003).
    10. Security Council Resolution 678, 29 November 1990, 29 ILM 1565 (1990).
    11. Security Council Resolution 687, 3 April 1991, 30 ILM 846 (1991).
    12. Taft IV, William H. and Todd F. Buchwald, “Preemption, Iraq and International Law,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, p. 559. (The authors work for the US State Department. Mr. Taft is Legal Adviser to the US State Department, and Mr. Buchwald is Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Affairs.)
    13. Taft and Buchwald, op.cit., pp. 560-561.
    14. Security Council Resolution 1441, operative paragraph 2 states: “Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council.”
    15. “US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s Address to the UN Security Council,” 5 February 2003, can be found on the White House website under the heading, “Iraq, Denial and Deception,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html. Powell was later reported to have “told The Washington Post that he doesn’t know whether he would have recommended the invasion of Iraq if he had been told at the time that there were no stockpiles of banned weapons.” See “The Man Who Knew,” 4 February 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/14/60II/main577975.shtml.
    16. Security Council Resolution 1441, operative paragraph 14 states: “”Decides to remain seized of the matter.”
    17. Bush, George W., “State of the Union Address,” 20 January 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html.
    18. See MacAskill, Ewen and Julian Borger, “Iraq War was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan,” Guardian, 16 September 2004, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0916-01.htm.
    19. United Nations Charter, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
    20. Ibid.
    21. Excerpts from the classified Nuclear Posture Review, submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001, can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
    22. Blix, Hans, “The Importance of Inspections.” Proliferation Brief (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Vol. 7, No. 11, 2004, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1591.
    23. Ibid.
    24. “Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” General Assembly document A/51/218, 15 October 1996, p. 37.
    25. Rosenthal, Elisabeth, “Study puts civilian toll in Iraq at over 100,000,” International Herald Tribune, 30 October 2004.
    26. United Nations Charter, http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
    27. See, for example, “World Tribunal on Iraq, Platform Document, 29 October 2003, http://www.brusselstribunal.org/wti_platform_text.htm.
    28. The Treaty Establishing an International Criminal Court, entered into force on July 1, 2002. The treaty was signed by President Clinton on December 31, 2000. President Bush took the unprecedented step of “unsigning” the treaty in May 2002.
    29. See Tutu, Desmond, No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday, 1999.
    30. On the Proliferation Security Initiative see: Bolton, John, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Vision Becomes a Reality,” 31 May 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33046.htm. For a more critical perspective, see “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Naval Interception Bush-Style,” Center for Defense Information, 25 August 2003, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=1667.
    31. See Milbank, Dana and Peter Slevin, “Bush Details Plans to Curb Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, 12 February 2004.
    32. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, entered into force on March 5, 1970, http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt.asp. Article IV(1) of the Treaty states: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.” This clause may be viewed as an obstacle to achieving the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament goals of the Treaty.
    33. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/npt.asp. Article VI of the Treaty states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” This critical element of the nuclear non-proliferation/disarmament bargain has been largely ignored by the nuclear weapons states.
    34. See Wang, Justine, “A Symposium on Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The Challenge of Prevention and Enforcement,” 8 January 2004, https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/articles/2004/01/08_wang_symposium.htm.

  • Our Greatest Threat: The Coming Nuclear Crisis

    When the first atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could hardly have been imagined that nearly sixty years later 34,145 nuclear weapons would be in existence. In a long career as a parliamentarian, diplomat, and educator, I have come to the conclusion that the abolition of nuclear weapons is the indispensable condition for peace in the twenty-first century. Yet progress toward that goal has been halted.

    In May a conference of the 188 signatory nations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will be held in New York City to put a spotlight on this problem. A huge march is planned for May 1. Advocates of nonproliferation will once again try to draw attention to the immorality and illegality of such weapons. But will the eight nations that possess nuclear weapons-the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel-actually take steps toward eliminating their arsenals?

    The prognosis is not good. The preparatory meetings for the May conference ended in failure, with nonnuclear nations objecting to the intransigence of the nuclear-weapons states, noting how a world of nuclear haves and have-nots is becoming a permanent feature of the global landscape. The United States insists that the problem is not with those who possess nuclear weapons, but with states, such as Iran and other nations, trying to acquire them. To which Brazil responded: “One cannot worship at the altar of nuclear weapons and raise heresy charges against those who want to join the sect.” Faced with this stalemate, the NPT is eroding, and an expansion of the number of states with nuclear weapons, a fear which produced the NPT in 1970, is looming once more.

    Any discussion of the elimination of nuclear weapons inevitably raises questions of the feasibility of such action. How is an architecture of security to be built without nuclear weapons? How can states be prevented from cheating and how can such weapons be kept out of the hands of terrorists? A wide range of military, scientific, and diplomatic experts, notably the Canberra Commission established in 1996, have tried to provide answers to these urgent questions.

    First, the case for a nuclear weapons-free world is based on the commonsensical claim that the destructiveness of these weapons is so great they have no military utility against a comparably equipped opponent. Historically, nuclear weapons have been used as a deterrent. But even as a deterrent they pose too great a risk. Few doubt that the longer weapons are maintained, the greater the risk of use, or that possession by some states causes other nations to acquire them, reducing the security of all.

    Second, the elimination of such weapons will not be possible without a new architecture of security based on an adequate verification system. The components of a reliable verification system are coming into place, beginning with the inspection system maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the monitoring system maintained by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, which has the capacity to detect the most minute nuclear test explosions. On-site inspections of suspect materials will have to be part of the disarmament process (the United States and Russia already do this in the case of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987).

    “Trust but verify,” President Ronald Reagan famously said. Verification is essential, but the demand for a perfect verification regime is little more than an excuse for not seeking a reduction in nuclear weapons. Perfect security is not possible. Inevitably, some risk will have to be accepted if the wider benefits of a nuclear weapon-free world are to be realized. Not the elimination of risk but an evaluation of comparative risks is the rational approach to take. It is much more dangerous for the world to stay on its present path. Compared to the risks inherent in a world bristling with nuclear weapons, the risks associated with whatever threat a cheating state could assemble before it was exposed are far more acceptable.

    No one is advocating unilateral disarmament; that would be an unthinkable policy for the United States. Rather it is in the interests of the United States-and all other nations-to heed the directive of the International Court of Justice and pursue comprehensive negotiations leading to the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a program would take many years to implement. Many confidence-building measures would be needed. How long disarmament takes is not the most important thing; what is critical is that the major states show the rest of the world they are heading in that direction. Otherwise, the NPT, which entails a legal obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith, will become a mockery. This is the nub of the present dilemma.

    In 1995, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, the NPT (virtually every country in the world except India, Pakistan, and Israel has signed the treaty) was indefinitely extended. In agreeing to that extension, the nuclear powers made three promises: a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be achieved; negotiations to ban the production of fissile material would be concluded; “systematic and progressive efforts globally” to eliminate nuclear weapons would be made. None of these promises has been kept.

    When the NPT was reviewed in 2000, all the states were again able to find common ground and, by consensus, made an “unequivocal” commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons through a program of “Thirteen Practical Steps.” Subsequently, the nuclear powers faltered again and bitterness set in.

    The United States is in the forefront of the current stalemate. Its commitment to the consensus of 2000 was made under the Clinton administration. When President George W. Bush was elected, the United States position regressed: the ABM Treaty was abandoned and the administration turned its back on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), two of the thirteen steps agreed to in 2000. Moreover, in 2001 the administration conducted a nuclear posture review, which made clear that nuclear weapons remain a cornerstone of U.S. national-security policy. The review outlines expansive plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear forces, and all the elements that support them.

    The Bush administration has also speculated about specific scenarios where the use of nuclear weapons may be justified: an Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict with China over Taiwan, a North Korean attack on South Korea, and an attack on Israel by Iraq or another neighbor. This new policy, in contradiction of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, means that for the first time the United States will threaten the use of nuclear weapons against countries that do not themselves possess such weapons. Under President Bush, the United States is actually widening the role of nuclear weapons in defense policy far beyond deterrence. The administration is promulgating a policy that would retain a stockpile of active and reserve nuclear weapons and weapons components for at least the next fifty years.

    Among the current nuclear powers, the U.S. position is particularly aggressive, but it is by no means alone in its determination to hold onto nuclear weapons or to expand their strategic role in military policy. On November 17, 2004, President Vladimir Putin of Russia confirmed that his country is “carrying out research and missile tests of state-of-the-art nuclear missile systems” and that Russia would “continue to build up firmly and insistently our armed forces, including the nuclear component.” The United Kingdom, France, and China are all busy modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Similarly, NATO adheres to its stated policies that such weapons are “essential.”

    More and more states now treat nuclear weapons as part of a war-fighting strategy, not strictly as a deterrent. Nuclear weapons have become embedded in nations’ military doctrines. This shift in the rationale for keeping nuclear weapons is what characterizes our deepening crisis.

    Another aspect of this crisis is the specter of nuclear terrorism. “Nothing could be simpler,” was the assessment of the eminent physicist Frank von Hippel, on the capacity of terrorists to obtain highly enriched uranium and improvise an explosive device with power equal to the Hiroshima bomb. If the 9/11 terrorists had used a nuclear bomb, hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers would have perished. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that at least forty countries have the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and criticizes the failure of export control systems to prevent an extensive illicit market in nuclear items. The disappearance, by theft or otherwise, of nuclear materials from Russia is well established. The threat of nuclear terrorism is on the mind of every official I know. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, says the margin of security today is “thin and worrisome.”

    In 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, requiring all states to take measures to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Similarly, the Proliferation Security Initiative of the United States seeks to interdict on the high seas the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials. And the G8 countries have allocated $20 billion over ten years to eliminate some stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Russia.

    These steps are by no means sufficient. The fact remains that the proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped as long as the most powerful nations in the world maintain that nuclear weapons are essential for their own security.

    Of course, Iran and any other hostile state must be stopped from acquiring such weapons, and inspection and verification processes must be stepped up with more funding and personnel. But a one-dimensional approach that attempts to stop proliferation while ignoring meaningful disarmament will never work.

    The New Agenda Coalition, a group of states (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) pressing the nuclear-weapons states to fulfill their disarmament obligations, offers some hope. The coalition has been gathering political momentum. A recent UN resolution proposed by the group was supported by eight NATO states, including Germany and Canada. That resolution, calling on the nuclear powers to cease activities leading to “a new nuclear arms race,” identifies priorities for action: universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the early implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and ending development of new types of weapons; negotiation of an effectively verifiable fissile-material treaty; establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament; and compliance with principles of transparency and verification.

    Even though this resolution was mild compared to the regular demands of groups such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France voted against it. China voted for the resolution and Russia abstained.

    Can the NPT be saved? Will civil society groups, whose protests have been rather mild compared to the vigorous activities of the 1980s, now start clamoring for government action? Will those who maintain that nuclear weapons are deeply immoral and a blot on God’s creation now be heard?

    These are questions posed by the present crisis. Another key question is how religious leaders will react to the realization that nuclear weapons are-apparently-here to stay.

    In 1982, Pope John Paul II sent a message to the Second Special Session on Disarmament:

    In current conditions, “deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with the minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion.

    In short, deterrence as a permanent policy is not morally acceptable. The American bishops’ 1983 Pastoral Letter on War and Peace took up this theme. It argued for a strong “no” to nuclear war, declaring that a nuclear response to a conventional attack is “morally unjustifiable.” Moreover, the bishops expressed skepticism that any nuclear war could avoid the massive killing of civilians. Only a “strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence” is possible. The nuclear weapons states have ignored the bishops’ admonitions as well as those of many other religious groups.

    A well-considered moral argument must be heard once again that the circle of fear perpetuated by those with a vested interest in maintaining nuclear weapons is a trap from which humanity must escape. The alternative does not bear thinking about.

    Copyright © 2004 Commonweal Foundation

  • Heavily Armed Duo in No Position to Lay down Law on Proliferation

    Thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions would be easier if the US and Israel kept their side of the bargain, writes Richard Butler.

    In recent months the US President, George Bush, and senior members of his Administration have asserted that Iran is involved in the clandestine development of nuclear weapons.

    Last week Bush turned up the temperature during his visit to Europe, when he declared, on one public occasion punching the air with his fist, Iran “must not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon”.

    A month earlier The New Yorker published a disturbing report by Seymour Hersch that US forces had already entered Iran from Iraq to scope out prospective targets related to Iran’s nuclear activities.

    The Pentagon expressed anger at Hersch’s report and attacked him personally, but did not directly deny its substance. Last week Bush chose to comment publicly on this matter saying that reports the US was planning to attack Iran were wrong, but all options were on the table.

    There is good reason for concern about the directions of Iran’s nuclear program. In a manner similar to Bush’s remarks on his future intentions, Iran has also given contradictory signals, claiming that it was not making a nuclear weapon but had a right to do so if it chose to.

    As a member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty Iran is obliged to accept inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify that it is pursuing no activities leading to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability. Last week, the agency’s director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, appealed to Iran to improve its work with the inspectors.

    But Bush’s strident insistence on Iran’s treaty obligation glaringly omits the other side of the bargain made in the treaty, that the nuclear weapons states must progressively eliminate their armaments. Bush repeatedly and blatantly misrepresents the treaty, which is a two-way – not one-way – street. It provides that states which do not have nuclear weapons must never acquire them and that those which do have them must progressively get rid of them.

    The treaty is reviewed every five years. At the last review conference, in 2000, the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states responded to the grave concern that they were not fulfilling their part of the bargain. They made a new promise that they would increase the tempo of their action to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

    The Bush Administration has not only refused to adhere to its obligations under the treaty and the additional promise of 2000, but has now embarked on what is anathema under the treaty – the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons. These are the new, more compact, nukes the Administration says it needs for the so-called war on terrorism.

    It beggars belief that the Administration appears to believe it can succeed in restraining Iran while it proceeds to violate its obligations. The New York Times recently editorialised to this effect, saying that in the contemporary world, nuclear weapons had become virtually useless. The main danger they now posed was of them falling into the hands of terrorist groups.

    The US is not alone in seeking to maintain a world of nuclear “haves” and “have nots”. Three weeks ago Israel’s Defence Minister said it would be unconscionable for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. This was more than a modicum of chutzpah from a country which, for more than 25 years, has had a clandestine nuclear weapons program producing about 200 devices.

    The existence of the Israeli nuclear weapons capability has been a major stimulus to attempts first by Saddam Hussein (whose reactor the Israelis bombed in 1983) and then others in the region, including Iran, to acquire the same capacity.

    There is, in fact, an axiom of proliferation. It states that as long as any state holds nuclear weapons, others will seek to acquire them. Those others now include terrorist groups and nation states. In making this latter point I would not want to give any assent to the sleight of hand used so successfully to justify the invasion of Iraq, namely that it was made necessary by September 11, 2001. Nonsense: the Republicans had planned the invasion of Iraq as early as 1998 and it has now been thoroughly demonstrated that Saddam had nothing to do with September 11 and that the largest intelligence “error” was the assertion about his nuclear weapons program.

    The axiom of proliferation contains far more truth than the “axis of evil”. It rests on a gut human instinct – fairness. Simply, states are unprepared to believe that their security is less important than that of others. This was put to me repeatedly in more than 25 years of involvement in the treaty.

    It is not acceptable to others for the US, for example, to claim that its security is so important that it is justified in holding nuclear weapons but this is not the case for other states, such as India and now Iran.

    The axiom also means that the basic compact of the treaty is sound and that the only way ahead, whether in the context of Iran or any other potential proliferator, is for the treaty to be implemented. Those who hold nuclear weapons, including countries outside the treaty – India, Pakistan and Israel – should urgently devise safe means for their elimination and for collective action to prevent any future proliferation of new nuclear weapons states.

    Richard Butler was Australia’s ambassador for disarmament 1983-88, ambassador to the UN 1992-97 and head of the UN Special Commission to Disarm Iraq 1997-99.

    Copyright © 2005. The Sydney Morning Herald

  • Missile Counter-Attack Open Letter to US Secretary of State Condolezza Rice

    Dear Condi,

    I’m glad you’ve decided to get over your fit of pique and venture north to visit your closest neighbour. It’s a chance to learn a thing or two. Maybe more.

    I know it seems improbable to your divinely guided master in the White House that mere mortals might disagree with participating in a missile-defence system that has failed in its last three tests, even though the tests themselves were carefully rigged to show results.

    But, gosh, we folks above the 49th parallel are somewhat cautious types who can’t quite see laying down billions of dollars in a three-dud poker game.

    As our erstwhile Prairie-born and bred (and therefore prudent) finance minister pointed out in presenting his recent budget, we’ve had eight years of balanced or surplus financial accounts. If we’re going to spend money, Mr. Goodale added, it will be on day-care and health programs, and even on more foreign aid and improved defence.

    Sure, that doesn’t match the gargantuan, multi-billion-dollar deficits that your government blithely runs up fighting a “liberation war” in Iraq, laying out more than half of all weapons expenditures in the world, and giving massive tax breaks to the top one per cent of your population while cutting food programs for poor children.

    Just chalk that up to a different sense of priorities about what a national government’s role should be when there isn’t a prevailing mood of manifest destiny.

    Coming to Ottawa might also expose you to a parliamentary system that has a thing called question period every day, where those in the executive are held accountable by an opposition for their actions, and where demands for public debate on important topics such as missile defence can be made openly.

    You might also notice that it’s a system in which the governing party’s caucus members are not afraid to tell their leader that their constituents don’t want to follow the ideological, perhaps teleological, fantasies of Canada’s continental co-inhabitant. And that this leader actually listens to such representations.

    Your boss did not avail himself of a similar opportunity to visit our House of Commons during his visit, fearing, it seems, that there might be some signs of dissent. He preferred to issue his diktat on missile defence in front of a highly controlled, pre-selected audience.

    Such control-freak antics may work in the virtual one- party state that now prevails in Washington. But in Canada we have a residual belief that politicians should be subject to a few checks and balances, an idea that your country once espoused before the days of empire.

    If you want to have us consider your proposals and positions, present them in a proper way, through serious discussion across the table in our cabinet room, as your previous president did when he visited Ottawa. And don’t embarrass our prime minister by lobbing a verbal missile at him while he sits on a public stage, with no chance to respond.

    Now, I understand that there may have been some miscalculations in Washington based on faulty advice from your resident governor of the “northern territories,” Ambassador Cellucci. But you should know by now that he hasn’t really won the hearts and minds of most Canadians through his attempts to browbeat and command our allegiance to U.S. policies.

    Sadly, Mr. Cellucci has been far too closeted with exclusive groups of ‘experts’ from Calgary think-tanks and neo-con lobbyists at cross-border conferences to remotely grasp a cross-section of Canadian attitudes (nor American ones, for that matter).

    I invite you to expand the narrow perspective that seems to inform your opinions of Canada by ranging far wider in your reach of contacts and discussions. You would find that what is rising in Canada is not so much anti- Americanism, as claimed by your and our right-wing commentators, but fundamental disagreements with certain policies of your government. You would see that rather than just reacting to events by drawing on old conventional wisdoms, many Canadians are trying to think our way through to some ideas that can be helpful in building a more secure world.

    These Canadians believe that security can be achieved through well-modulated efforts to protect the rights of people, not just nation-states.

    To encourage and advance international co-operation on managing the risk of climate change, they believe that we need agreements like Kyoto.

    To protect people against international crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing, they support new institutions like the International Criminal Court — which, by the way, you might strongly consider using to hold accountable those committing atrocities today in Darfur, Sudan.

    And these Canadians believe that the United Nations should indeed be reformed — beginning with an agreement to get rid of the veto held by the major powers over humanitarian interventions to stop violence and predatory practices.

    On this score, you might want to explore the concept of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ while you’re in Ottawa. It’s a Canadian idea born out of the recent experience of Kosovo and informed by the many horrific examples of inhumanity over the last half-century. Many Canadians feel it has a lot more relevance to providing real human security in the world than missile defence ever will.

    This is not just some quirky notion concocted in our long winter nights, by the way. It seems to have appeal for many in your own country, if not the editorialists at the Wall Street Journal or Rush Limbaugh. As I discovered recently while giving a series of lectures in southern California, there is keen interest in how the U.S. can offer real leadership in managing global challenges of disease, natural calamities and conflict, other than by military means.

    There is also a very strong awareness on both sides of the border of how vital Canada is to the U.S. as a partner in North America. We supply copious amounts of oil and natural gas to your country, our respective trade is the world’s largest in volume, and we are increasingly bound together by common concerns over depletion of resources, especially very scarce fresh water.

    Why not discuss these issues with Canadians who understand them, and seek out ways to better cooperate in areas where we agree — and agree to respect each other’s views when we disagree.

    Above all, ignore the Cassandras who deride the state of our relations because of one missile-defence decision. Accept that, as a friend on your border, we will offer a different, independent point of view. And that there are times when truth must speak to power.

    In friendship, Lloyd Axworthy

    Lloyd Axworthy is president of the University of Winnipeg and a former Canadian foreign minister.

    (c) 2005 Winnipeg Free Press. All Rights Reserved.

  • US Won’t Rule Out Waging War in Space, General Says

    A top U.S. space commander says the United States can’t rule out attacking the satellites and other spacecraft of enemy nations in the future.

    But Lt.-Gen. Daniel Leaf, vice-commander of the American air force space command, says at this point the U.S. is focused on protecting its own space capabilities, although it has to keep an eye on the potential that weapons will be developed by other nations to target U.S. satellites and spacecraft. And even if it does decide to directly counter such moves, that doesn’t mean it will resort to putting weapons into orbit, according to the officer.

    The issue of turning space into a battleground has become a hot-button topic in the U.S. and Canada. Some defence analysts have voiced concern the Pentagon is preparing to fight a war in orbit and worry that Prime Minister Paul Martin’s government is being drawn into those plans. Analysts also cite a report issued last August by the U.S. air force, which, they note, acknowledged that satellites of enemy or neutral countries could be destroyed if necessary.

    “Our active plans right now are not along those lines,” Lt.-Gen. Leaf said in an interview with the Citizen. “They’re along the lines of denying access to space capabilities, protecting our own access, and having space situational awareness to know what’s going on.”

    “We don’t have the luxury of dismissing the fact that it may come to that point some day,” he added.

    “It is not in our interest or in our policy to make that day come sooner. But our thinking has to consider an adversary might do it.”

    Lt.-Gen. Leaf said countering efforts by other nations to strike at American space systems does not automatically mean the U.S. would respond by building space weapons. He cited an example of Iraqi forces trying to jam U.S. military navigation satellites, noting the response was to use aircraft to bomb the Iraqi jamming sites.

    But Washington-based defence analyst Theresa Hitchens said last year’s report lays out for air force commanders the procedures they would follow for launching attacks in space. It also signals the air force’s acceptance of space as a battle zone, said Ms. Hitchens, vice-president of the Center for Defense Information.

    She noted the study outlines the option of a pre-emptive attack on the satellites of other countries, including those operated by neutral nations that may be used by the Americans’ adversaries. “That doctrine does not rule out the use of destructive measures,” said Ms. Hitchens.

    She noted the Pentagon has become increasingly uneasy about the response from U.S. lawmakers concerned about a potential push to make space a battlefield. As a result, the U.S. military has increased its public relations efforts to downplay future space plans and to cast them as appearing to be defensive in nature, she added.

    “The air force talks about pre-emptive action against a satellite so isn’t that by definition an offensive technique?” asked Ms. Hitchens. “I don’t see how that is defensive.”

    Lt.-Gen. Leaf acknowledged the air force’s report discusses the potential to stop enemy nations from using satellites being operated by another nation, but said the answer to that is not in destroying those spacecraft.

    “When you ask how do we deny an enemy access to space capabilities that might come from a third country or a satellite that is used by others, the answer is clearly not through brute force,” he explained. “It is going to have to be a precise, refined, sophisticated approach to denying those capabilities. And those are the kind of tough issues we are grappling with.”

    Canada has several military space programs on the go, all designed to gather information for the Canadian Forces, but also to feed that data to the U.S. Included among those are Projects Sapphire and Polar Star as well as the ultra-secret program dubbed Polar Ice.

    Lt.-Gen. Leaf noted he can’t speak for Canada on those programs but responded: “Can they contribute to what our nations do as partners? Yes.”

    © The Ottawa Citizen 2005

  • Nuclear Folly

    According to recent news reports and as hinted in the president’s State of the Union Address, the neocons who dominate the Bush administration are gearing up for another pre-emptive military attack, this time upon Iran. The ostensible reason for such an attack is that the Iranian government is developing nuclear weapons.

    In fact, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which regularly inspects Iran’s nuclear operations, has not found any signs of nuclear weapons. Although the IAEA has reported that Iran has produced enriched uranium–which can be used for either civilian or military purposes–such production has been halted thanks to a November 2004 Iranian agreement with France, Germany, and Britain. Thus, although it is possible that Iran might produce nuclear weapons some time in the future, this is hardly a certainty. Nor is it clear that the Iranian government has ever planned to produce them.

    Ironically, in the midst of this delicate situation, the Bush administration is busy dismantling the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty, signed in 1968 by officials of the United States and of almost all other countries, obligates non-nuclear nations to forgo development of nuclear weapons and nuclear nations to take steps toward nuclear disarmament. The Bush administration reveres the first obligation and wants to scrap the second.

    In late December 2004, news accounts quoted an administration official as saying that the final agreement at the NPT review conference in 2000–which commits the declared nuclear weapons states to an “unequivocal undertaking” to abolish nuclear weapons–is a “simply historical document,” which does not reflect the drastic changes in the world since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Thus, he said, the Bush administration “no longer supports” all of the thirteen steps toward disarmament outlined in the 2000 agreement and does not view it as “being a road map or binding guideline or anything like that.”

    For those who have followed the Bush administration’s nuclear policy, this position should come as no great surprise. The administration has not only abandoned efforts toward negotiating nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements with other nations, but has withdrawn the United States from the ABM treaty (signed by President Nixon) and refused to support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (signed by President Clinton).

    It has also championed a program of building new U.S. nuclear weapons, including so-called “bunker busters” and “mini-nukes,” and of facilitating the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing. Only an unexpected revolt in Congress–led by Representatives David Hobson and Pete Viclosky, the Republican chair and ranking Democrat of the House Energy and Water Appropriations Committee–blocked funding for the Bush administration’s proposed new nuclear weapons in 2004. Political analysts expect the administration to make another effort to secure the funding this year.

    For the Bush administration and its fans, this evasion of U.S. obligations under the NPT makes perfect sense. The United States, they believe, is a supremely virtuous nation, and nations with whom it has bad relations–such as Iran–are “evil.” In line with this belief, the U.S. government has the right to build and use nuclear weapons, while nations it places on its “enemies” list do not.

    As might be expected, this assumption does not play nearly as well among government officials in Iran, who seem unlikely to fulfill their part of the NPT agreement if U.S. officials flagrantly renege on theirs. At the very least, the Bush administration is offering them a convenient justification for a policy of building Iranian nuclear weapons.

    Other nations have drawn this same conclusion. In the fall of 2004, Helen Clark, the prime minister of New Zealand, warned: “First and foremost we need to keep before us the essential bargain that the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty represents. While we will willingly contribute to non-proliferation and counter-proliferation initiatives, those initiatives should be promoted alongside initiatives to secure binding commitments from those who have nuclear weapons which move us further towards the longer-term goal of nuclear disarmament.”

    Much the same point was made in early January 2005 by Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the IAEA. Calling upon all countries to commit themselves to forgo building facilities for uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing for the next five years, ElBaradei added: “We should not forget the commitment by the weapons states to move toward nuclear disarmament.”

    In fact, ElBaradei’s evenhanded approach to nuclear issues has angered the Bush administration, which is now working to deny him reappointment as IAEA director.

    The responsibility of all nations under the NPT will undoubtedly receive a good deal of discussion at the NPT review conference that will convene at the United Nations this May. Certainly it will be interesting to see how the Bush administration explains the inconsistencies in its nuclear policy.

    Unfortunately, by then we may well have another bloody military confrontation on our hands. Like the war in Iraq, it will be sold to us on the basis of the potential threat from a nation possessing weapons of mass destruction. And, also like the war in Iraq, it will be unnecessary–brought on by the arrogance and foolishness of the Bush administration.

    Dr. Wittner is Professor of History at the State University of New York, Albany. His latest book is Toward Nuclear Abolition (Stanford University Press).

    Originally published by the History News Network.

  • Us Redesigning Atomic Weapons

    Worried that the nation’s aging nuclear arsenal is increasingly fragile, American scientists have begun designing a new generation of nuclear arms meant to be sturdier and more reliable and to have longer lives, federal officials and private experts say.

    The officials say the program could help shrink the arsenal and the high cost of its maintenance. But critics say it could needlessly resuscitate the complex of factories and laboratories that make nuclear weapons and could possibly ignite a new arms race.

    So far, the quiet effort involves only $9 million for warhead designers at the nation’s three nuclear weapon laboratories, Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia. Federal bomb experts at these heavily guarded facilities are now scrutinizing secret arms data gathered over a half century for clues about how to achieve the new reliability goals.

    The relatively small initial program, involving fewer than 100 people, is expected to grow and produce finished designs in the next 5 to 10 years, culminating, if approval is sought and won, in prototype warheads. Most important, officials say, the effort marks a fundamental shift in design philosophy.

    For decades, the bomb makers sought to use the latest technologies and most innovative methods. The resulting warheads were lightweight, very powerful and in some cases so small that a dozen could fit atop a slender missile. The American style was distinctive. Most other nuclear powers, years behind the atomic curve and often lacking top skills and materials, settled for less. Their nuclear arms tended to be ponderous if dependable, more like Chevys than racecars.

    Now, American designers are studying how to reverse course and make arms that are more robust, in some ways emulating their rivals in an effort to avoid the uncertainties and deteriorations of nuclear old age. Federal experts worry that critical parts of the arsenal, if ever needed, may fail.

    Originally, the roughly 10,000 warheads in the American arsenal had an expected lifetime of about 15 years, officials say. The average age is now about 20 years, and some are much older. Experts say a costly federal program to assess and maintain their health cannot ultimately confirm their reliability because a global test ban forbids underground test detonations.

    In late November, Congress approved a small, largely unnoticed budget item that started the new design effort, known as the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Federal officials say the designs could eventually help recast the nuclear arsenal with warheads that are more rugged and have much longer lifetimes.

    “It’s important,” said John R. Harvey, director of policy planning at the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the arsenal. In an interview, he said the goal of the new program was to create arms that are not only “inherently reliable” but also easier to make and certify as potent.

    “Our labs have been thinking about this problem off and on for 20 years,” Dr. Harvey said. “The goal is to see if we can make smarter, cheaper and more easily manufactured designs that we can readily certify as safe and reliable for the indefinite future – and do so without nuclear testing.”

    Representative David L. Hobson, an Ohio Republican and chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, praised the program in a speech on Thursday and said it could lead to an opportunity for drastic cuts in the nation’s nuclear arsenal.

    “A more robust replacement warhead, from a reliability standpoint,” Mr. Hobson said, “will provide a hedge that is currently provided by retaining thousands of unnecessary warheads.”

    But arms control advocates said the program was probably unneeded and dangerous. They said that it could start a new arms race if it revived underground testing and that its invigoration of the nuclear complex might aid the design of warheads with new military capabilities, possibly making them more tempting to use in a war.

    “The existing stockpile is safe and reliable by all standards,” Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, said in an interview. “So to design a new warhead that is even more robust is a redundant activity that could be a pretext for designing a weapon that has a new military mission.”

    The reliability issue goes back to the earliest days of the nuclear era. At first, the bombs were huge and trustworthy. The first one, dropped in 1945, weighed five tons. The first deliverable hydrogen bomb, which made its debut in 1954, weighed four times as much and had hundreds of times the destructive power. It measured nearly 25 feet long from nose to tailfins.

    Over the decades, American designers worked hard to trim the dimensions.

    Small size was prized for many reasons. It meant that warheads could fit into cramped, narrow missile nose cones, which streaked to earth faster than blunter shapes and were less buffeted by winds during the fiery plunge, making them more accurate. It also meant that ships, bombers and submarines could carry more nuclear arms.

    By the 1970’s, warheads for missiles weighed a few hundred pounds and packed the power of dozens of Hiroshima-sized bombs. The arms continued to shrink and grow more powerful. The last one for the nation’s arsenal was built around 1990.

    Designers had few doubts about reliability because they frequently exploded arms in Nevada at an underground test site. But in 1992, after the cold war, the United States joined a global moratorium on nuclear tests, ending such reassurances.

    In response, the federal government switched from developing nuclear arms to maintaining them. It had its designers work on computer simulations and other advanced techniques to check potency and understand flaws that might arise.

    The cost of the nuclear program began at $4 billion a year. It is now more than $6 billion and includes a growing number of efforts to refurbish and extend the life of aging warheads.

    By the late 1990’s, top officials and experts began to openly question whether such maintenance could continue to stave off deterioration and ensure the arsenal’s reliability. As a solution, some called for a new generation of sturdier designs.

    The new program involves fewer than 100 full- and part-time designers and other experts and support staff, said Dr. Harvey, of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

    “There’s not a lot of hardware,” he added. “It’s mostly concept and feasibility studies that don’t require much fieldwork.”

    Dr. Harvey emphasized that the effort centered on research and not arms production. But he said the culminating stages of the program would include “the full-scale engineering development” of new prototype warheads. Both Congress and a future administration would have to approve the costly, advanced work, and an official said no decision had been made to seek such approval.

    The current goal of the program, Dr. Harvey said, is to “relax some of the design constraints imposed on the cold war systems.” He added that a possible area of investigation was using more uranium than plutonium, a finicky metal that is chemically reactive.

    He said the new designs would also stress easier manufacturing techniques and avoid hazardous and hard-to-find materials.

    “Our goal is to carry out this program without the need for nuclear testing,” Dr. Harvey said. “But there’s no guarantees in this business, and I can’t prove to you that I can do that right now.” Another official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the topic is politically delicate, said that such testing would come only as a last resort and that the Bush administration’s policy was to maintain the moratorium.

    The program, Dr. Harvey said, should produce a wide variety of designs. The Defense Department, which is participating in the effort, will help decide which weapons will be replaced, he said.

    “What we’re looking at now is a long-term vision,” Dr. Harvey said. “We’re tying to flesh this out and understand the path we need to be on, and to work with Congress to get a consensus.”

    Some critics say checking the reliability of the new designs is likely to require underground testing, violating the ban and inviting other nations to do the same, thereby endangering American security.

    Dr. P. Leonardo Mascheroni, a former Los Alamos scientist who is critical of the new program, said that it would require not only testing but also changes in delivery systems costing “trillions of dollars” because of its large, heavy warheads. Federal officials deny both assertions, saying the goal is to have new designs fit existing bombers and missiles.

    Dr. Mascheroni has proposed that federal designers make lighter, robust warheads and confirm their reliability with an innovative system of tiny nuclear blasts. That would still require a revision of the test ban treaty, he said in an interview, but it would save a great deal of money and avoid the political firestorm that would probably accompany any effort to resume full-scale testing.

    Robert S. Norris, a senior nuclear expert at the Natural Resources Defense Council, a private group in Washington that advocates arms control and monitors nuclear trends, said too little was known publicly about the initiative to adequately weigh its risks and benefits, and that for now it raised more questions than it answered.

    “These are big decisions,” Mr. Norris said. “They could backfire and come back to haunt us.”

    Originally published by the New York Times