Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: US

  • Lurching Toward Regional War in the Middle East

    Israeli moves toward all out war in Gaza and Lebanon seem linked to wider dangers of a regional war with severe global consequences. By interpreting these wider dangers it is not meant to minimize the human suffering and regressive political effects of current carnage in these two long tormented war zones. Looking at this bigger picture is crucial for its own sake, but also helps us understand the immediate crises more fully than if as officially presented by Israel, and unfortunately echoed by many governments around the world.

    Whatever else, this outbreak of major two-front violence is not about Israel’s right to defend it against an enemy that is seriously threatening its territorial integrity or political independence, the only grounds for justifiable war. To treat border incidents, involving a few casualties from rockets and the abduction of a single Israeli soldier by a Gazan militia and two by Hezbollah in south Lebanon, as if it were an occasion of war is a gross distortion of well-accepted international law and state practice. To justify legally a claim of self-defense requires a full-scale armed attack across Israeli borders. If every violent border incident or terrorist provocation were to be so regarded as an act of war, the world would be aflame. If India had responded to the recent Mumbai train explosions that killed some 200 Indian civilians as a Pakistani act of war, the result would have been a devastating regional war, quite possibly fought with nuclear weapons. There are many other flashpoints around the world that might justify police methods in reaction to provocations, and in extreme instances, specific military responses across borders. If such occasions were viewed as acts of war the consistent result would be catastrophe. Recent Hamas/Hezbollah provocations, even if interpreted through a self-serving Israeli lens, were not of a scale or threat that warranted large-scale military actions that are directed at a wide array of targets unrelated to the specific incidents and causing severe damage to civilians and the entire civilian infrastructure of society (water, electricity, roads, bridges).

    The exaggerated Israeli response, together with circumstantial evidence, suggests that Israel used the Hamas/Hezbollah incidents as pretexts to pursue a much wider and long-planned security agenda directed at Palestine and Lebanon and, beyond this, as an opportunity for a political restructuring of the entire region in partnership with the United States. In this regard, as George W. Bush’s comments at the St. Petersburg G-8 summit emphasized, the real responsibility for the anti-Israeli incidents should be associated with Syria and Iran given their support of Hamas and Hezbollah. It does require a deep reading of international relations to recall that both right wing Israeli opinion and the neoconservative worldview that has dominated American foreign policy during the Bush presidency advances a vision of world order based upon a comprehensive political restructuring of the Middle East, starting with “regime change” in Iraq.

    What Israel is undertaking is a change of tactics with respect to the pursuit of this regional vision. The initial plan seems to have been based on a decisive military and political victory in Iraq followed by an essentially diplomatic campaign to exert major pressure on other problematic governments in the region, relying on The Greater Middle East Project of “democratization” to do the heavy lifting without further military action. Instead, what has occurred has been failure and frustration in Iraq, which has turned into an American quagmire, but more seriously, a consistent set of electoral outcomes throughout the region that have discredited a political approach to the regional vision embraced by Washington and Tel Aviv with the goal of achieving compliant Arab governments that are passive with respect to Palestinian aspirations and accepting of American hegemony. These geopolitical disappointments began to be revealed in the Iraqi sequence of elections, which even under conditions of the American occupation and a hostile resistance, produced clear victories for Islamic political forces and stinging repudiations of the sort of compliant secularists that Washington backed. Similar outcomes, with less dramatic results, were evident in elections held in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which together with the election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad as President of Iran, apparently sent a clear message that the more democratic the political process, the more likely it was to produce an anti-American, anti-Israeli leadership. The Hamas victory in the January elections in the Palestinian Territories culminated this disillusionment with the democratic path to security, as envisioned by Israel and the United States, for the region.

    But rather than abandon geopolitical ambitions, it appears from recent developments that Israel is testing the waters for all out regional war, either with covert encouragement from the US Government, or at the very least, a green light from Washington to ignite a bonfire. Of course, there are other factors at work. The Israeli leadership, especially its military commanders, never accepted being pushed out of southern Lebanon by Hezbollah, and the politicians appear to hold the Palestinian people responsible for the election of a “terrorist” leadership and, thus, deserving of punishment. Furthermore, the anti-Syrian Lebanese response to the assassination of Hariri on February 14, 2005 was hoped to result in a more robust Lebanese political leadership that would effectively disarm Hezbollah and, thereby, enhance Israeli security. When this did not happen, but rather Hezbollah acquired more potent weaponry, as well as a place in the Lebanese cabinet, it was obvious that the soft Israeli option had failed. Even such a prominent mainstream supporter of Israel as Shlomo Aveneri observes that the real objective of the Israeli attacks on Lebanon is to install a Quisling government in Beirut, which was after all the main objective of the 1982 Sharon-led invasion of the country.

    In relation to the Palestinian conflict, Israel has set for itself a unilateralist course ever since the collapse of the Camp David process in 2000. The Sharon approach, based on Gaza disengagement, the illegal security wall, and the annexation of substantial Palestinian territories to incorporate the main Israeli settlements was always based on moving toward a “solution” without the agreement of the Palestinian leadership. But to move in such a direction in a politically palatable manner required the absence of a Palestinian negotiating partner. First, Arafat was humiliated by direct military attacks on his headquarters and confined as to virtual house arrest; then Abbas was marginalized as too weak to carry weight; and now Hamas has been repudiated as unfit to govern the Palestinians or represent their interests. Against this background, Sharon/Olmert unilateralism appears to be the only option, a worrisome conclusion as it is sure to keep the conflict at boiling point for the indefinite future.

    A further factor is the confrontation with Iran over its nuclear program. Here again Israel and the United States are at the forefront of an insistence that Iran not pursue its legal right to possess a complete nuclear fuel cycle under its sovereign control, although subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that enriched uranium and plutonium are not diverted for military purposes. Whether this unfolding crisis, abetted by the inflammatory language of Ahmedinejad, is part of a deliberate strategy of regional tension devised by Washington and Tel Aviv cannot be determined at this point. What is clear is the selective enforcement of the nonproliferation regime. Several parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Germany, Japan) have complete nuclear fuel cycles under national control; India is being assisted in developing its nuclear technology despite its nuclear weapons program and refusal to become a party to the treaty; Israel itself disallows a nuclear weapons option to other states in the region while maintaining and developing its own arsenal of these weapons; and, of course, the United States throws its nuclear weight around, including developing new categories of nuclear weapons (“bunker-busters” and “mini-nukes”) that are apparently being integrated into battle plans for possible future use.

    This adds up to a confusing picture, but with clear threats of a regional war spiraling out of the present situation, given the Israeli/American vision of security, and the degree to which the control of this region is vital for the energy future of the world as well as decisive in the struggle to withstand the challenge of political Islam.

    There are some factors that are working against such a dismal future: the political/military failure in Iraq, the devastating economic effects of engaging Iran in a war, the rising oil prices, and the opposition of European and Arab countries. But can we be reassured at this point? I think not. Israel tends to view its security ambitions in unconditional terms that are oblivious to wider detrimental consequences. The United States leadership remains wedded to its grand strategy of regional restructuring, and is not encountering political opposition at home or even media criticism as a result of either its support of the Israeli offensives in Gaza and Lebanon or of its efforts to widen the arc of conflict by pulling Syria and Iran into the fray. I fear that what we are witnessing is an extremely risky set of moves to shift the joint Israeli/American regional game plan in an overtly military direction. It always had a military centerpiece associated with the Iraq War, but the basic strategy was based on an easy show of force against a weakened Iraq followed by falling political dominoes elsewhere in the Middle East. Neither the UN, world public opinion, nor regional opposition seem likely to halt this slide toward regional war. We can only hope that prudence somehow remains a restraining force, at least in Washington.

    In concluding, it is obvious that there are wider implications for other countries in the region, especially those faced with ethnic conflict and transnational armed struggle. As tempting as it might be to follow Israel’s lead, the prudent course, especially in light of these dangers of regional war, is to be extremely cautious about undertaking cross-border military operations. The Israeli policies have already backfired to a significant extent, strengthening the political stature of Hezbollah with Lebanon and causing Lebanese public opinion to unite around criticism of Israel’s behavior.

     

    Richard Falk is the Board Chair of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and professor emeritus of Princeton University.

  • Much Ado about Something: North Korea’s Missile Tests

    North Korea’s missile tests triggered condemnations from capitals worldwide and may soon be taken up by the UN Security Council. But do these launches really represent an escalation of North Korea’s threat to global security? The answer is both yes and no.

    First the facts. The launch of the long-range Taepodong missile had been anticipated for weeks; the United States and Japan had already threatened dire consequences if North Korea followed through. While its estimated range includes Alaska, the rocket had never been tested, and Tuesday’s failure early in its flight offers no evidence it’s ready for prime time. The 1998 test of an earlier Taepodong version was more successful, overflying Japan before failing in its third stage. North Korea has successfully developed and deployed the shorter-range Nodong (Rodong) missile, several of which were also launched on Tuesday. But the accuracy and reliability of these missiles is mediocre.

    North Korea almost certainly has enough fissile material for six to ten nuclear weapons and has probably fashioned at least one explosive device. The 1994 agreement with the United States freezing North Korea’s nuclear program (the “Agreed Framework”) collapsed at the end of 2002, freeing North Korea to expand these capabilities. But North Korea is not known to have conducted a nuclear test and is not likely to have yet fashioned a nuclear warhead small, light and durable enough to ride any of its missiles.

    In short, a credible North Korean nuclear threat to North America is a long way off. Vancouver is safe. So why all the fuss?

    First, if left unchecked, North Korea is on course to develop these capabilities eventually. While this prospect may be at least a decade away, uncertainty over North Korea’s technological prowess shortens the “worst-case” time estimates.

    Second, North Korea’s missiles can now reach Japan, a core Western ally; and North Korea continues to sustain considerable conventional capabilities, including thousands of artillery tubes at the demilitarized zone that could devastate Seoul, South Korea’s capital. North Korea has little rational reason to unleash these forces offensively; but their existence is threatening nonetheless.

    Most importantly, though, the missile tests are a demonstration of Pyongyang’s sustained will and current mood. While the North Korean regime does not respond predictably to either confrontation or overtures, its one consistent behavior over the past fifteen years has been to act provocatively whenever engagement is stalled and US interests are focused elsewhere. Such has been the circumstance this spring.

    Pyongyang’s diplomatic brinkmanship has born fruit in the past. The 1998 missile test deepened short-term tensions but got Washington’s attention: resuscitated engagement led to North Korea’s 1999 unilateral moratorium on missile tests, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in 2000, and negotiations (not concluded) to eliminate North Korea’s missile program entirely. In 2002-3, with such engagement shunned by the more hostile Bush Administration, Pyongyang exercised a more aggressive brinkmanship, breaking out of the nuclear freeze agreement just as Washington was gearing up for war with Iraq, thereby maximizing prospects for minimal US response. The Bush Administration blinked, and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have been expanding since.

    Similar conditions prevail now. A renewed engagement effort in 2005 through the so-called “Six-Party Talks” led to a statement of agreed principles in September, but when that consensus proved fleeting the Bush administration retreated to a posture of slow siege, applying economic and political pressure where it could (such as on counterfeiting operations) but resisting direct engagement. Meanwhile, the Pyongyang regime has undoubtedly noticed how Iran, skillfully following North Korea’s own playbook, has parlayed a far less advanced nuclear program into increasing attention and sweetened offers – now including the prospect of light-water reactors similar to those promised to North Korea under the Agreed Framework but terminated when that deal collapsed. A new provocation from Pyongyang was almost inevitable.

    What’s the best response? North Korea’s frantic gesticulations do demand attention – ignoring them would simply encourage Pyongyang to escalate down the road. The question is not how seriously to take the missile tests, but rather how to take them seriously. Knee-jerk counter-threats and aggressive posturing hardly answer the need. Indeed, the compounding failure of the recent policies of the United States and its allies must be a principal focal point.

    Many Bush officials came to power highly critical of their predecessors’ 1994 deal with North Korea, convinced it was giving up too much for too little, and were at best ambivalent to that deal’s subsequent collapse. But they have now presided over North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), expelling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring, recommencing nuclear fuel reprocessing, declaring itself to be nuclear armed, and breaching its moratorium on missile tests – in effect giving up much more for much less.

    The call by ex-Clinton defense officials Ashton Carter and William Perry for a pre-emptive US attack on the Taepodong expressed a frustration with the ineffectualness of current US policy as much as with North Korea itself. This restiveness is increasingly shared by knowledgeable Republicans in both houses of the US Congress, some of whom have renounced the Bush Administration’s refusal to meet North Korea directly. But what would a fresh approach entail?

    A first step is to recognize clearly that the collapse of the 1994 nuclear freeze agreement allowed North Korea to cross key thresholds in its ambitions: what had been a national proliferation problem has metastasized into a regional security problem with important economic, energy and social dimensions. Previously, solving the North Korean nuclear issue has been seen as a way to catalyze greater East Asian regional security cooperation; now, such cooperation is a prerequisite. Abating North Korea’s nuclear ambitions requires, more than ever, grappling with the “hermit kingdom’s” long-term regional role.

    From a human security perspective, this also means facing honestly the difficult dilemmas posed by the poverty and oppression millions endure just because they happen to live on the northern portion of the Korean Peninsula. Neither human rights resolutions nor unqualified food aid are long-term answers – the human security imperative compels a comprehensive solution.

    An immediate need is for the United States and China to find an enduring common ground. And, indeed, the missile tests may make China more amenable to US calls for more coercive pressures. Decision-makers in Beijing are no doubt frustrated and angry, not least because Tuesday’s launches (as in 1998) will bolster support for US-Japan missile defense cooperation many Chinese regard as really aimed at them. The tests were also a slap in the face, coming on the heels of the announcement that China and North Korea would soon exchange top-level visits.

    But US and Chinese concerns in Korea are far from convergent; in particular, Beijing won’t support actions aimed at “regime change” in Pyongyang. In Washington, though, the missile tests are likely to reinforce hardline positions that view regime change – through either pressure or patience – as a necessary prerequisite to a final solution. Many of this persuasion are also most vocal in concerns over a “rising China.” Hence, the further ascendance of this approach will tend to push China farther from, rather than closer to, US positions on North Korea, neutralizing the effect of the missile tests themselves. Less directly involved states, such as Canada, can play important roles to smooth these frictions in US-China coordination.

    Another pressing need is to find a way to sustain meaningful engagement between North Korea and the United States even when public diplomacy is stymied. When circumstances prevent engagement through the front door, it should be pursued around the back. Canada, with both diplomatic ties to Pyongyang and a trusted voice in Washington, is uniquely situated to facilitate such private contacts.

    What is not needed are more grandiose overstatements of the threat North Korea currently poses or more chest-pounding warnings of further dire consequences to follow. That’s North Korea’s game. It’s time to change the rules.

     

    Wade L. Huntley, Ph.D. is Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia.

  • Gandhi, Bush, and the Bomb

    On February 24, at a press briefing, White House National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley announced that, when U.S. President George W. Bush travels to India, he will lay a wreath in honor of Mohandas Gandhi.

    For those familiar with the cynical gestures of government officials, it might come as no surprise that an American President would attempt to derive whatever public relations benefits he can by linking himself to one of the most revered figures in Indian and world history.

    But the level of hypocrisy is heightened when one recalls that Bush is currently one of the world’s leading warmakers and that Gandhi was one of the world’s leading advocates of nonviolence. Furthermore, the American President’s major purpose for traveling to India is to clinch a deal that will provide that nation with additional nuclear technology, thus enabling it to accelerate its development of nuclear weapons.

    Gandhi, it should be noted, was not only a keen supporter of substituting nonviolent resistance for war, but a sharp critic of the Bomb. In 1946, he remarked: “I regard the employment of the atom bomb for the wholesale destruction of men, women, and children as the most diabolical use of science.” When he first learned of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Gandhi recalled, he said to himself: “Unless now the world adopts non-violence, it will spell certain suicide.” In 1947, Gandhi argued that “he who invented the atom bomb has committed the gravest sin in the world of science,” concluding once more: “The only weapon that can save the world is non-violence.” The Bomb, he said, “will not be destroyed by counter-bombs.” Indeed, “hatred can be overcome only by love.”

    That is certainly an interesting backdrop against which to place President Bush’s plan to provide India with nuclear technology. India is one of only four countries that have refused to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—a treaty endorsed by 188 nations. Thumbing its nose at the world, India has conducted nuclear tests and has developed what experts believe to be 50 to 100 nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the NPT, the export of nuclear technology is banned to nations that don’t accept international inspections of their nuclear programs. In addition, U.S. law prohibits the transfer of nuclear technology to a country that rejects full international safeguards. U.S. law also bans such technology transfer to a non-NPT country that has conducted nuclear test explosions.

    Thus, if the President were to give any weight to Gandhi’s ideas, international treaty obligations, or U.S. law, he would not be working to provide India with the same nuclear-capable technology that he so vigorously condemns in Iran—a country, by the way, that has signed the NPT, has undergone inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and has not conducted any nuclear weapons tests.

    There are other reasons to oppose this deal, as well. Although India’s relations with Pakistan are relatively stable at the moment, they might well be very adversely affected by any perception that the Indian government was racing ahead with a buildup of its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, Pakistan might demand the same nuclear assistance as India. Indeed, if India can simply ignore the NPT and, then, receive nuclear technology from the United States, why should other countries observe its provisions? The Iranians, certainly, will make this point.

    At home, the Bush administration’s double standard has not gone unnoticed. In Congress, Representatives Ed Markey (D-MA) and Fred Upton (R-MI) have introduced a bipartisan resolution—H.Con.Res. 318–expressing strong concern about the proposed U.S.-India nuclear deal. Although this resolution affirms humanitarian and scientific support for India, it contends that full civil nuclear cooperation between the two nations poses serious dangers. For example, it points to the possibility that the supply of nuclear fuel to India could free up India’s existing fissile material production, thereby enabling it to be used to expand India’s nuclear weapons arsenal. The resolution also opposes transfer of nuclear technology to any country that is not a party to the NPT and has not accepted full safeguards.

    Whatever happens to this resolution, if the Bush administration were to implement its nuclear agreement with the Indian government, it would have to convince Congress to amend U.S. law. And arms control and disarmament groups are determined to prevent that from happening.

    Thus, the Bush administration might genuflect to Gandhi in its efforts to arrange a nuclear pact with India, but it is going to have to convince a lot of very skeptical observers before it implements this agreement.

    Dr. Wittner, a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Associate, is Professor of History at the State University of New York, Albany. His latest book is Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford University Press).

    Originally published by the History News Network.

  • A High-Stakes Nuclear Gamble

    Imagine a world with 20 or more nuclear weapons states. This was President Kennedy’s dark vision in 1963. Were it to come to pass, the risk that terrorists could buy or steal nuclear bombs would rise significantly. Yet President Bush’s recent proposal to provide nuclear energy assistance to India is a dangerous gamble that makes such an outcome more likely.

    It could unravel the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which, though imperfect, has helped limit the number of countries able to make nuclear weapons. Congress should reject the proposal and require renegotiation to limit the Indian nuclear weapons program.

    India’s nuclear history reveals why the proposed deal would weaken U.S. national security.

    In 1974, India exploded a secret nuclear device using plutonium from a Canadian-supplied reactor containing U.S. heavy water. Both the reactor and the heavy water were sold to India under agreements with a “peaceful use” requirement, which India violated.

    In 1978, Congress enacted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. That required countries such as India who were not among the five nations recognized as nuclear weapons states under the nonproliferation treaty, and that wanted American nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, to submit to “safeguards,” meaning inspections of all their nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency. India refused, and the United States ended all nuclear assistance to the country from that day forward.

    Now, Bush has put forward a proposal that caves in utterly to India. It would not only allow India to keep its bombs, it would permit it to use all its own nuclear material for bomb making, while using nuclear fuel the United States would supply for its civilian power program. If India receives this favor, can Israel and Pakistan be far behind?

    Such a radical proposal should be viewed within the context of the current negotiations with Iran and North Korea, two countries that signed the nonproliferation treaty but have been caught violating safeguards. Failure to stop them from producing nuclear weapons would be a serious blow to global stability.

    Iran and North Korea are being offered reactors and guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies for peaceful uses in return for a permanent shutdown of facilities for enriching uranium or separating plutonium, both of which have peaceful applications but enable the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Whether either will ultimately accept is unclear.

    So let’s compare the deals offered India and Iran:

    India: Can build as many nuclear weapons as it wishes with its own nuclear supplies. Iran: Cannot build any nuclear weapons with its own or anyone else’s supplies.

    India: Can build and operate un-safeguarded facilities for producing and stockpiling unlimited amounts of fissile material for its weapons program. Iran: Cannot build enrichment or plutonium separation facilities, even if safeguarded and even though the nonproliferation treaty does not prohibit such activities.

    India: Is asked to maintain a voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing. Iran: Cannot make or explode nuclear devices under any circumstances.

    India: Must divide its nuclear facilities into “civilian” and “military,” with voluntary IAEA safeguards applying only to its civilian program. Iran: Must have the most stringent safeguards on all its nuclear facilities.

    This double standard favoring India is an example of America’s willingness to wash away the nuclear sins of its “friends” to achieve other foreign policy goals. Pakistan is another example; it has received F-16s, which can deliver its nuclear weapons, despite having violated U.S. nonproliferation laws and spread nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea via the Abdul Qadeer Khan network.

    What is the message we’re sending? How will these double standards persuade the Iranians to give up their right to produce advanced nuclear materials? How could signatories of the nonproliferation treaty not conclude that it has been seriously devalued when India — which refused to sign it in the first place, broke its contracts with the United States and Canada and developed nuclear weapons — is to be given virtually unconditional nuclear assistance?

    Some nations may decide that if they withdraw from the treaty, build nuclear weapons and wait long enough while avoiding antagonizing the United States, they will eventually get all the nuclear help they want.

    Why then is the Bush administration risking undermining the treaty?

    It is no secret that it views China as a growing strategic rival and sees India as a counterweight. It is therefore interested in helping India build up its economic and military capability. If the deal goes through, Pentagon officials reportedly expect India to purchase as much as $5 billion in U.S. conventional military equipment, some of which would be helpful in monitoring Chinese military movements and submarines.

    During the 2004 presidential race, both Bush and Sen. John Kerry stated that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was the most serious threat to U.S. national security. But giving nuclear assistance to India undercuts the rationale for telling other nations not to supply suspected proliferators such as Iran.

    Moreover, both China and Pakistan will be motivated to accelerate their own weapons programs and their mutual nuclear cooperation. Pakistani officials will not be more cooperative in the stalled investigation of Khan’s activities. Adding the risk to the nonproliferation treaty to this poisonous mix makes the president’s proposal a marked retreat from half a century of American leadership in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

    LEONARD WEISS was the chief architect of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

    Originally published by the Los Angeles Times.

  • This is Not the Country That I Once Knew

    Former President Jimmy Carter believes that a warring America is abandoning its fundamental values.

    In recent years, I have become increasingly concerned by a host of radical government policies that now threaten many basic principles espoused by all previous administrations, Democratic and Republican.

    These include the rudimentary American commitment to peace, economic and social justice, civil liberties, our environment and human rights.

    Also endangered are our historic commitments to providing citizens with truthful information, treating dissenting voices and beliefs with respect, state and local autonomy and fiscal responsibility.

    At the same time, our political leaders have declared independence from the restraints of international organisations and have disavowed long-standing global agreements, including agreements on nuclear arms, control of biological weapons and the international system of justice.

    Instead of our tradition of espousing peace as a national priority unless our security is directly threatened, we have proclaimed a policy of ‘pre-emptive war’, an unabridged right to attack other nations unilaterally to change an unsavoury regime or for other purposes. When there are serious differences with other nations, we brand them as international pariahs and refuse to permit direct discussions to resolve disputes.

    Regardless of the costs, there are determined efforts by US leaders to exert American imperial dominance throughout the world. These revolutionary policies have been orchestrated by those who believe that our nation’s tremendous power and influence should not be internationally constrained. Even with our troops involved in combat and America facing the threat of additional terrorist attacks, our declaration of ‘you are either with us or against us’ has replaced the forming of alliances based on a clear comprehension of mutual interests, including the threat of terrorism.

    Another disturbing realisation is that, unlike during other times of national crisis, the burden of conflict is now concentrated exclusively on the heroic men and women sent back repeatedly to fight in the quagmire of Iraq. The rest of our nation has not been asked to make any sacrifice, and every effort has been made to conceal or minimise public awareness of casualties.

    Instead of cherishing our role as the great champion of human rights, we now find civil liberties and personal privacy grossly violated under some extreme provisions of the Patriot Act.

    Of even greater concern is that the US has repudiated the Geneva accords and supported the use of torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo, and secretly through proxy regimes elsewhere with the so-called extraordinary rendition programme. It is embarrassing to see the President and Vice President insisting that the CIA should be free to perpetrate ‘cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment’ on people in US custody.

    Instead of reducing America’s reliance on nuclear weapons and their further proliferation, we have insisted on our right (and that of others) to retain our arsenals, expand them and, therefore, abrogate or derogate almost all nuclear arms-control agreements negotiated during the last 50 years. We have now become a prime culprit in global nuclear proliferation. America also has abandoned the prohibition of ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations and is contemplating the previously condemned deployment of weapons in space.

    Protection of the environment has fallen by the wayside because of government subservience to political pressure from the oil industry and other powerful lobbying groups. The last five years have brought continued lowering of pollution standards at home and almost universal condemnation of our nation’s global environmental policies.

    Our government has abandoned fiscal responsibility by unprecedented favours to the rich, while neglecting America’s working families. Members of Congress have increased their own pay by $30,000 per year since freezing the minimum wage at $5.15 per hour (the lowest among industrialised nations).

    I am extremely concerned by a fundamentalist shift in many houses of worship and in government, as church and state have become increasingly intertwined in ways previously thought unimaginable.

    As the world’s only superpower, America should be seen as the unswerving champion of peace, freedom and human rights. Our country should be the focal point around which other nations can gather to combat threats to international security and to enhance the quality of our common environment. We should be in the forefront of providing human assistance to people in need.

    It is time for the deep and disturbing political divisions within our country to be substantially healed, with Americans united in a common commitment to revive and nourish the historic political and moral values that we have promoted during the last 230 years.

    Jimmy Carter was the 39th President of the United States. His latest book, Our Endangered Values: America’s Moral Crisis, is published this month by Simon & Schuster.

    This article first appeared in the Los Angeles Times.

  • Avoiding a Russian Arms Disaster

    Hurricane Katrina drove home the staggering devastation that disasters — natural or man-made –can inflict. Meanwhile, July’s attacks on the London Underground reminded us terrorists can still strike major world cities. Now imagine the two joined together: terrorists, armed with weapons of mass destruction, unleashing Katrina-scale chaos and death in the heart of a U.S. city.

    Such attacks are hardly unthinkable. Roughly half of Russia’s weapons-grade nuclear materials are poorly protected. In the small Russian town of Shchuch’ye, nearly 2 million shells of VX and sarin nerve gas — each lethal enough to kill 85,000 people — lay stacked in chicken cooplike structures. The September 11 commission said al Qaeda has pursued getting and using these weapons as a “religious obligation” for more than a decade.

    Fortunately, unlike hurricanes, much can be done to prevent this nightmare from becoming real. One of our first and best lines of defense is the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, created by former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat, and Sen. Richard Lugar, Indiana Republican. Since 1992, the program has eliminated thousands of Russian nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and bombers.

    But in recent years, a set of burdensome congressional restrictions has marred the program and led to a series of disruptive stop-and-start cycles. Key projects vital to America’s security have ground to a halt for months on end because, for example, Russian human-rights obligations were not met or the paperwork to waive them was not completed.

    Congress now has the chance to end such dangerous disruptions once and for all. Mr. Lugar, decrying those misplaced priorities, introduced language to repeal all the restrictions, which the Senate embraced by an overwhelming, bipartisan 78-19 vote in July. But until the full Congress approves it, CTR’s vital efforts remain in danger, from both a national security and a business perspective.

    Danger of delay: Current restrictions carry real costs on the ground. In mid-2002, all new CTR projects — including security upgrades at 10 nuclear weapons storage sites — stalled for four months because the conditions could not be certified. Destruction of the Shchuch’ye stockpile was delayed some 15 months from 2001 to 2003 for similar red-tape reasons.

    Such stoppages not only prolong threats to America, they also endanger the hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars already invested in Shchuch’ye and other projects. So long as the conditions remain, these dangerous disruptions are inevitable.

    Wasted resources: In a yearly drama, defense staffers and intelligence analysts must spend thousands of hours assessing Russian compliance with CTR restrictions — even when it is immediately clear Russia cannot meet them. Nor can the president simply waive the conditions without first submitting to this annual exercise in foregone conclusions.

    Abetting such delays or allowing concerns like human rights, however important, to threaten human existence massively is the height of folly. We not only agree with Mr. Lugar that, during a war on terror, these artificial barriers “are destructive to our national security”; we see them undermining one of the best investments our country can make.

    CTR, simply is good security on the cheap. At an annual cost of as little as one-tenth of 1 percent (0.001) of the Pentagon budget, the program has deactivated and helped guard 6,760 Russian nuclear warheads. It has upgraded security to the Shchuch’ye depot and similar sites. It also helped remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

    Today, CTR continues upgrading security and aiding accounting of nuclear weapons transportation and storage. It also works to destroy biological weapons production facilities and lock down pathogen collections in Russia and the former Soviet republics.

    CTR’s largest current project, eliminating the Shchuch’ye stockpile, will rid us of all 2 million of those weapons — and cost each American roughly the same as a large latte.

    Nor is this money “foreign aid”: More than 80 percent of CTR funds go to five U.S. prime contractors that dismantle and destroy these weapons.

    The risk of a Katrina-scale terrorist attack with Russian weapons is too critical to tolerate any delays to these crucial efforts. Congress must act and free us to meet what President Bush calls “the greatest threat before humanity today.”

    Ted Turner is chairman of Turner Enterprises in Atlanta. Stanley A. Weiss is chairman of Business Executives for National Security, of which Mr. Turner is a member.

  • Two Retired Generals Call for Prompt Withdrawal from Iraq: Support Murtha Position

    “What is worse than soldiers dying in vain is even more soldiers dying in vain.”

    The continued conflict in the Gulf War, and the massive reconstruction necessary on the Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, require a reevaluation of American policy in Iraq. Much of the partisan, emotional rhetoric in the current public debate does little to focus on the problem.

    As patriotic Americans who have dedicated our professional lives to public service, we acknowledge that the situation in Iraq is complex and that people of good will can disagree. We acknowledge that a vigorous public debate has risks in wartime; but in a democracy, that is a risk we must accept. “Staying the course” is a greater risk. Absent a genuine collaboration between the White House and Congress, which obviously has not happened, the only way to influence a policy in a democracy is to have a public debate.

    Therefore, we feel it is vital at this time to weigh the risks of withdrawing our troops with the risks of keeping them there indefinitely.

    —

    Those who argue that the United States should not leave Iraq any time soon, nor set a deadline for beginning to withdraw, point to potential disasters if the United States pulls out before Iraqi forces demonstrate the ability to maintain adequate security. This would be an open-ended commitment, since most experts believe it will take decades to end the insurgency.

    In point of fact, the situation in Iraq already is a disaster, both for the American military and for Iraqi civilians. It therefore would be useful to examine what seems likely to, or may, happen if the United States continues on its present course of keeping our troops in Iraq indefinitely. A careful balancing of the risks of leaving compared to the risks of staying could provide a basis for making an informed choice regarding this critical issue.

    —

    The risks of leaving

    Those who argue that the United States needs to continue to maintain substantial numbers of U.S. troops in Iraq suggest several dangers that are possible, although not inevitable, if the U.S. draws down our troops before Iraqi forces can demonstrate the capability to maintain security while confronted with the current level of insurgency.

    Charge #1: There could be a civil war. Only the presence of U.S. forces is keeping some stability in Iraq and precluding a religious war and increased civilian casualties.

    Response: There already is a civil war, even if the Administration doesn’t use that term. It is beside the point that one side doesn’t wear uniforms, a common occurrence in today’s warfare. With conservative estimates of 12,000 – 25,000 civilian deaths and many more thousands wounded since the fall of Baghdad, the high level of civil violence is indisputable.

    While U.S. troops do provide security in certain locations like the Green Zone, the reality is that daily life in Baghdad is still miserable, journalists can’t leave their hotels, congressional visitors can’t drive from the airport into Baghdad, and suicide bombers continue to kill on a daily basis. The presence of U.S. forces, the collateral damage they cause and the casualties they inflict on Iraqi civilians are major incentives for the recruitment of insurgents. The visible presence of our troops may actually be more of a cause of civil conflict than a solution to it.

    Charge #2: Iraq could become a failed state that is a haven for terrorists.

    Response: Iraq became a haven for terrorists as a direct result of the U.S. invasion. It is quite possible that ending the occupation would decrease, not increase, terrorist activity; but the larger question is how to deal with the multi-headed monster that Al Qaeda and its supporters have become. We are failing to accord sufficient priority to this threat, due in large part to our preoccupation with the ongoing war in Iraq.

    Charge # 3: If the U.S. “cuts and runs,” we will lose prestige and credibility across the globe.

    Response: Accusations that arguments for policy change constitute a “cut and run” surrender is an emotional ploy that obfuscates the issue. It is precisely the U.S. intervention in Iraq that has squandered the positive image of, and world sympathy that was felt for, the U.S. immediately after 9/11. According to authoritative polling, after two years of an aggressive U.S. campaign to promote democracy in the Middle East, the Iraq war has made millions suspicious of U.S. intentions; and the polls reveal that most now believe the war has made the world more, not less, dangerous.

    Not only do most Europeans view us in a negative light, but our image in the Muslim world is even worse: only about one fifth of Turks, Pakistanis or Jordanians — to name three U.S. allies — view us positively. It is true that American military power is respected and prestigious because it is the strongest in the world; but being regarded as a stubborn bully focused exclusively on our own interests as seen by the Administration does not give our nation the kind of image or credibility we desire and need. It is significant that polls show 80% of Iraqis want the American military to depart. At a recent conference, Iraqi leaders called for the departure of American troops and even suggested that insurgents are justified in killing coalition troops.

    The war against extremists cannot be won primarily through the use of force—it is foremost a war of ideas. We are losing that war and our Iraqi policy is one of the contributors to that condition.

    The U.S. cannot rebuild its credibility by extending the occupation, but rather by reforming the botched reconstruction program to restore a consistent supply of water, electricity and gasoline to Iraq’s civilian population, and by talking with all parties in the country and region to help rebuild its political structure.

    Charge #4: U.S. soldiers will have died in vain.

    Response: Soldiers die in vain when we, citizens and leaders alike, do not honor and reflect on their sacrifices, and when we fail to learn from our mistakes as we face the future. We believe that in national security decisions, as well as in the business world and politics, there are times to acknowledge mistakes in policy and cut losses.

    • After a terrorist attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. military personnel, President Ronald Reagan decided to eliminate the provocation of U.S. military presence, prevent additional casualties and withdraw our troops. The United States recovered from the setback without serious harm to our national interests.
    • After a long insurgency, Charles de Gaulle withdrew French forces from Algeria because the costs of continuing outweighed the possible benefits for France. Algeria became independent, and France became stronger as a result of its withdrawal.
    • Despite predictions of a resultant disaster for U.S. Cold War interests, the United States completed the withdrawal of our troops from Vietnam after suffering more than 58,000 killed. Even though South Vietnam subsequently fell to the communist north, this country ultimately became much stronger following withdrawal from that quagmire; and U.S. vital interests were not compromised.

    What is worse than soldiers dying in vain is even more soldiers dying in vain.

    —

    The risks of staying

    Any assessment of the impact of withdrawal from Iraq must be balanced against the consequences — and there could be many — of staying indefinitely.

    The insurgency could continue to intensify and expand: Using the U.S. military occupation as its clarion call, Al Qaeda has successfully appealed to foreign religious terrorists, Sunnis, and other nationalist elements within Iraq, all bent on ridding the Middle East of American military presence and influence. Even Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has conceded the tension between foreign forces needed for protection and their image as occupiers.

    Just as the insurgency in Iraq has intensified in the last two years, it is likely to continue to expand its recruitment of foot-soldiers and martyrs, as well as its training and development of new leaders and its mastery of new tactics, many of which will be applicable in other venues. Indeed, the CIA already has warned that Iraq, as a living laboratory of urban combat, could be a more effective training ground for terrorists than was Afghanistan.

    With Al Qaeda’s use of Internet web sites now emerging as a primary vehicle to coordinate acts of terrorism, it seems likely that continued western military occupation in Iraq will become an increasingly potent incentive to inspire radicals and their young and avid followers; and it will play a major part in leading to attacks on Americans and other members of the coalition at times and in places least expected. The occupation also will continue to put at risk the lives of Iraqi security forces and moderate Iraqi politicians, perceived as puppets of the U.S.

    U.S. casualties will increase: The U.S. has lost over 2,100 killed and over 15,500 wounded or injured in Iraq. In early August 2005, 20 Marines were killed in two days. Retaining a large number of American troops in Iraq subjects them to a growing variety of hostile attacks from what all experts agree is an insurgency that is growing considerably more sophisticated.

    International cooperation will be undermined: The number of countries assisting the U.S. in Iraq, most of which provide few troops, has already fallen by a quarter, from 34 last year to 25 today; and five more are due to leave by year’s end. Recently South Korea announced the reduction of its commitment. Furthermore, the international cooperation necessary to confront terrorism may deteriorate further by the continued suspicion of, and hostility toward, the United States in most other countries.

    A recent Pew Center international poll shows that the United States is held in low esteem across the globe, particularly in the Muslim world, largely as a result of the U.S. Administration’s foreign policies; and the war in Iraq continues to be deeply unpopular internationally, including with the populaces of our allies. Most countries believe that the invasion and occupation of Iraq has made the world a less safe place. Many are also suspicious that the United States intends to establish permanent bases in Iraq to secure the flow of oil from the region, a charge the Administration has not denied.

    U.S. attention will continue to be diverted from other critical security issues: Waging a full-time, unpopular war in Iraq, combined with the recent hurricane disasters, consumes the attention of the Administration’s national security team, resulting in too little consideration of other critical threats to the security of the United States. These include terrorist organizations, unsecured nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea and loose nuclear materials around the globe available to terrorists. It also detracts attention and funds from protection of our borders, our ports, our nuclear and chemical plants, our food and water supplies, and our domestic transportation system.

    The U.S. military will be stretched to the breaking point: In January 2004, Lieutenant General John Riggs said: “I have been in the Army 39 years, and I’ve never seen it as stretched in that 39 years as I have today;” and it is more stretched now. Despite increased incentives and lowered standards, the Army is unable to meet its recruitment goals.

    If the U.S. maintains troops in Iraq indefinitely at or near current levels, the ability of our armed forces to protect our national security interests in the rest of the world, including in Afghanistan where the Taliban has mounted a reinvigorated insurgency, will continue to decline.

    It is evident that many junior and mid-grade officers, discouraged by the prospect of repeated tours in Iraq, are resigning their commissions after fulfilling their mandatory service obligations, rather than opting for careers in the military. The difficulties faced by the armed forces today will lead to a deterioration of the quality of the Army from which it will take many years to recover.

    The Army National Guard and Reserve will be depleted further. Lieutenant General James Helmley, Chief of the Army Reserve, warned at the end of 2004: the Army Reserve “is rapidly degenerating into a broken force” and is “in grave danger of being unable to meet other operational requirements.” The Army National Guard has been similarly affected.

    Military families, beset by long and too frequent separations, will continue to suffer. The divorce rate in the active-duty military has increased 40 percent since 2000.

    The number of service personnel returning from Iraq and Afghanistan seeking medical treatment from the Department of Veterans Affairs has dramatically increased, far beyond Administration’s predictions earlier this year. VA budget documents had projected 23,553 such veterans, but the total is likely to reach 103,000 for the fiscal year that ended 30 September. Veterans’ health care programs could be short more than $2 billion next year without an emergency infusion of funds.

    The costly quagmire will continue: Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told Fox News this summer that “Insurgencies tend to go on five, six, eight, 10, 12 years.” The President has said that U.S. troops will be withdrawn when Iraqi forces are capable of maintaining security on their own; but meeting this criterion is unlikely in the foreseeable future, in part due to the complete lack of Iraqi combat support and combat service support units.

    Notification of our troop withdrawal would energize the Iraqi government to assume responsibility to organize and train the forces it deems necessary for security.

    We already have spent well over $200 billion on the war in Iraq, and it currently is costing us more than $5 billion a month. Hurricane relief is expected to cost at least $200 billion. The resulting deficits are simply not sustainable.

    The “credibility gap” will intensify: Once again, after many years, we see the return of an ominous credibility gap in the middle of a war. The majority of the American public is coming to reject the Vice President’s prediction that the insurgency is “in its last throes,” concluding instead that the war in Iraq, even if the original rationale justified the invasion, is not making Americans safer from terrorism.

    American government credibility will continue to be undermined by optimistic forecasts of success. Already, public opinion polls indicate a widening gap. A November Washington Post poll found that approval of Bush’s Iraq policy has fallen to 36% with 64% disapproving. Only 39% in the same poll agreed that the war was worth fighting. A number of polls show increasing numbers of American agreeing that some or all U.S. troops should be brought home. As we learned from the Vietnam experience, we cannot sustain a military campaign over the long term without public support.

    —

    U.S. strategy in Iraq has been based on faulty premises. Moreover, the decision simply to “stay the course” reflects an ideological rigidity that can be disastrous for our national security. It is time to cut our losses. We should begin to disengage early in 2006, after the Iraqi elections scheduled for this December. The withdrawal of U.S. troops should be orderly and phased, but prompt, and coordinated in advance with our allies and Iraqi officials.

    The United States should announce unequivocally that we have no intention of establishing permanent bases for a long-term military presence in Iraq. And we should continue to assist both rebuilding efforts in Iraq and efforts to spread democracy in the region.

    There may well be some negative consequences as a result of withdrawing of U.S. troops, but fewer, we believe, than if we continue on the present course. Ultimately, the United States will be stronger if we leave the quagmire that is Iraq to resolution by its own citizens.

    Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr. (USA-ret.) served in the Korean and Vietnam wars, retiring from the U.S. Army in 1981 following almost five years as president of the National Defense University. He subsequently directed the Johns Hopkins University Center in Bologna, Italy, for five years, and was president of the Monterey institute of International Studies for almost eleven years.

    Brigadier General John Johns (USA-ret.) was a combat arms officer in the U.S. Army for 26 years, including service in Vietnam. Following retirement from the U.S. Army in 1978, he served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense for four years. He then joined the faculty of the National Defense University, where he taught ethics, political science and strategic decision-making before being appointed academic dean of one of the University’s senior colleges.

  • What’s Wrong With Cutting and Running?

    If I were a journalist, I would list all the arguments that you hear against pulling U.S. troops out of Iraq, the horrible things that people say would happen, and then ask: Aren’t they happening already? Would a pullout really make things worse? Maybe it would make things better.

    Here are some of the arguments against pulling out:

    1. We would leave behind a civil war.
    2. We would lose credibility on the world stage.
    3. It would embolden the insurgency and cripple the move toward democracy.
    4. Iraq would become a haven for terrorists.
    5. Iranian influence in Iraq would increase.
    6. Unrest might spread in the region and/or draw in Iraq’s neighbors.
    7. Shi’ite-Sunni clashes would worsen.
    8. We haven’t fully trained the Iraqi military and police forces yet.
    9. Talk of deadlines would undercut the morale of our troops.

    But consider this:

    1. On civil war. Iraqis are already fighting Iraqis. Insurgents have killed far more Iraqis than Americans. That’s civil war. We created the civil war when we invaded; we can’t prevent a civil war by staying.

    For those who really worry about destabilizing the region, the sensible policy is not to stay the course in Iraq. It is rapid withdrawal, reestablishing strong relations with our allies in Europe, showing confidence in the UN Security Council, and trying to knit together a large coalition including the major states of Europe, Japan, South Korea, China, and India to back a strategy for stabilizing the area from the eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until the United States withdraws from Iraq and admits its strategic error, no such coalition can be formed.

    Thus, those who fear leaving a mess are actually helping make things worse while preventing a new strategic approach with some promise of success.

    2. On credibility. If we were Russia or some other insecure nation, we might have to worry about credibility. A hyperpower need not worry about credibility. That’s one of the great advantages of being a hyperpower: When we have made a big strategic mistake, we can reverse it. And it may even enhance our credibility. Staying there damages our credibility more than leaving.

    Ask the president if he really worries about U.S. credibility. Or, what will happen to our credibility if the course he is pursuing proves to be a major strategic disaster? Would it not be better for our long-term credibility to withdraw earlier than later in this event?

    3. On the insurgency and democracy. There is no question the insurgents and other anti-American parties will take over the government once we leave. But that will happen no matter how long we stay. Any government capable of holding power in Iraq will be anti-American because the Iraqi people are increasingly becoming anti-American.

    Also, the U.S. will not leave behind a liberal, constitutional democracy in Iraq no matter how long it stays. Holding elections is easy. It is impossible to make it a constitutional democracy in a hurry.

    President Bush’s statements about progress in Iraq are increasingly resembling LBJ’s statements during the Vietnam War. For instance, Johnson’s comments about the 1968 election are very similar to what Bush said in February 2005 after the election of a provisional parliament.

    Ask the president: Why should we expect a different outcome in Iraq than in Vietnam?

    Ask the president if he intends to leave a pro-American liberal regime in place. Because that’s just impossible. Postwar Germany and Japan are not models for Iraq. Each had mature (at least a full generation old) constitutional orders by the end of the 19th century. They both endured as constitutional orders until the 1930s. Thus, General Clay and General MacArthur were merely reversing a decade and a half of totalitarianism – returning to nearly a century of liberal political change in Japan and a much longer period in Germany.

    Imposing a liberal constitutional order in Iraq would be to accomplish something that has never been done before. Of all the world’s political cultures, an Arab-Muslim one may be the most resistant to such a change of any in the world. Even the Muslim society in Turkey (an anti-Arab society) stands out for being the only example of a constitutional order in an Islamic society, and even it backslides occasionally.

    4. On terrorists. Iraq is already a training ground for terrorists. In fact, the CIA has pointed out to the administration and Congress that Iraq is spawning so many terrorists that they are returning home to many other countries to further practice their skills there. The quicker a new dictator wins political power in Iraq and imposes order, the sooner the country will stop producing experienced terrorists.

    Why not ask: “Mr. President, since you and the vice president insisted that Saddam’s Iraq supported al-Qaeda – which we now know it did not – isn’t your policy in Iraq today strengthening al-Qaeda’s position in that country?”

    5. On Iranian influence. Iranian leaders see U.S. policy in Iraq as being so much in Tehran’s interests that they have been advising Iraqi Shi’ite leaders to do exactly what the Americans ask them to do. Elections will allow the Shi’ites to take power legally. Once in charge, they can settle scores with the Ba’athists and Sunnis. If U.S. policy in Iraq begins to undercut Iran’s interests, then Tehran can use its growing influence among Iraqi Shi’ites to stir up trouble, possibly committing Shi’ite militias to an insurgency against U.S. forces there. The U.S. invasion has vastly increased Iran’s influence in Iraq, not sealed it out.

    Questions for the administration: “Why do the Iranians support our presence in Iraq today? Why do they tell the Shi’ite leaders to avoid a sectarian clash between Sunnis and Shi’ites? Given all the money and weapons they provide Shi’ite groups, why are they not stirring up more trouble for the U.S.? Will Iranian policy change once a Shi’ite majority has the reins of government? Would it not be better to pull out now rather than to continue our present course of weakening the Sunnis and Ba’athists, opening the way for a Shi’ite dictatorship?”

    6. On Iraq’s neighbors. The civil war we leave behind may well draw in Syria, Turkey, and Iran. But already today each of those states is deeply involved in support for or opposition to factions in the ongoing Iraqi civil war. The very act of invading Iraq almost ensured that violence would involve the larger region. And so it has and will continue, with or without U.S. forces in Iraq.

    7. On Shi’ite-Sunni conflict. The U.S. presence is not preventing Shi’ite-Sunni conflict; it merely delays it. Iran is preventing it today, and it will probably encourage it once the Shi’ites dominate the new government, an outcome U.S. policy virtually ensures.

    8. On training the Iraq military and police. The insurgents are fighting very effectively without U.S. or European military advisers to train them. Why don’t the soldiers and police in the present Iraqi regime’s service do their duty as well? Because they are uncertain about committing their lives to this regime. They are being asked to take a political stand, just as the insurgents are. Political consolidation, not military-technical consolidation, is the issue.

    The issue is not military training; it is institutional loyalty. We trained the Vietnamese military effectively. Its generals took power and proved to be lousy politicians and poor fighters in the final showdown. In many battles over a decade or more, South Vietnamese military units fought very well, defeating VC and NVA units. But South Vietnam’s political leaders lost the war.

    Even if we were able to successfully train an Iraqi military and police force, the likely result, after all that, would be another military dictatorship. Experience around the world teaches us that military dictatorships arise when the military’s institutional modernization gets ahead of political consolidation.

    9. On not supporting our troops by debating an early pullout. Many U.S. officers in Iraq, especially at company and field grade levels, know that while they are winning every tactical battle, they are losing strategically. And according to the New York Times, they are beginning to voice complaints about Americans at home bearing none of the pains of the war. One can only guess about the enlisted ranks, but those on a second tour – probably the majority today – are probably anxious for an early pullout. It is also noteworthy that U.S. generals in Iraq are not bubbling over with optimistic reports the way they were during the first few years of the war in Vietnam. Their careful statements and caution probably reflect serious doubts that they do not, and should not, express publicly. The more important question is whether or not the repressive and vindictive behavior by the secretary of defense and his deputy against the senior military – especially the Army leadership, which is the critical component in the war – has made it impossible for field commanders to make the political leaders see the facts.

    Most surprising to me is that no American political leader today has tried to unmask the absurdity of the administration’s case that to question the strategic wisdom of the war is unpatriotic and a failure to support our troops. Most officers and probably most troops don’t see it that way. They are angry at the deficiencies in materiel support they get from the Department of Defense, and especially about the irresponsibly long deployments they must now endure because Mr. Rumsfeld and his staff have refused to enlarge the ground forces to provide shorter tours. In the meantime, they know that the defense budget shovels money out the door to maritime forces, SDI, etc., while refusing to increase dramatically the size of the Army.

    As I wrote several years ago, “the Pentagon’s post-Cold War force structure is so maritime heavy and land force weak that it is firmly in charge of the porpoises and whales while leaving the land to tyrants.” The Army, some of the Air Force, the National Guard, and the reserves are now the victims of this gross mismatch between military missions and force structure. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton administration has properly “supported the troops.” The media could ask the president why he fails to support our troops by not firing his secretary of defense.

    —

    So why is almost nobody advocating a pullout? I can only speculate. We face a strange situation today where few if any voices among Democrats in Congress will mention early withdrawal from Iraq, and even the one or two who do will not make a comprehensive case for withdrawal now. Why are the Democrats failing the public on this issue today? The biggest reason is because they weren’t willing to raise that issue during the campaign. Howard Dean alone took a clear and consistent stand on Iraq, and the rest of the Democratic Party trashed him for it. Most of those in Congress voted for the war and let that vote shackle them later on. Now they are scared to death that the White House will smear them with lack of patriotism if they suggest pulling out.

    Journalists can ask all the questions they like, but none will prompt a more serious debate as long as no political leaders create the context and force the issues into the open.

    I don’t believe anyone will be able to sustain a strong case in the short run without going back to the fundamental misjudgment of invading Iraq in the first place. Once the enormity of that error is grasped, the case for pulling out becomes easy to see.

    Look at John Kerry’s utterly absurd position during the presidential campaign. He said, “It’s the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time,” but then went on to explain how he expected to win it anyway. Even the voter with no interest in foreign affairs was able to recognize it as an absurdity. If it was the wrong war at the wrong place and time, then it was never in our interests to fight. If that is true, what has changed to make it in our interests? Nothing, absolutely nothing.

    The U.S. invasion of Iraq only serves the interests of:

    1. Osama bin Laden (it made Iraq safe for al-Qaeda, positioned U.S. military personnel in places where al-Qaeda operatives can kill them occasionally, helps radicalize youth throughout the Arab and Muslim world, alienates America’s most important and strongest allies – the Europeans – and squanders U.S. military resources that otherwise might be finishing off al-Qaeda in Pakistan.);

    2. The Iranians (who were invaded by Saddam and who suffered massive casualties in an eight-year war with Iraq.);

    3. And the extremists in both Palestinian and Israeli political circles (who don’t really want a peace settlement without the utter destruction of the other side, and probably believe that bogging the United States down in a war in Iraq that will surely become a war with the rest of Arab world gives them the time and cover to wipe out the other side.)

    The wisest course for journalists might be to begin sustained investigations of why leading Democrats have failed so miserably to challenge the U.S. occupation of Iraq. The first step, of course, is to establish as conventional wisdom the fact that the war was never in the U.S.’ interests and has not become so. It is such an obvious case to make that I find it difficult to believe many pundits and political leaders have not already made it repeatedly.

    Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow with Hudson Institute and a professor at Yale University. He was Director of the National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988. From 1981 to 1985, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Army’s senior intelligence officer. From 1977 to 1981, he was Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

    Originally published by Nieman Watchdog

  • Why I Don’t Trust Them or Sleeping With the Enemy

    When G8 finance ministers announced last month a £40bn debt relief package for some of the world’s poorest countries, Bob Geldof praised it as “a victory for the millions of people in the campaign around the world”. Bono called it “a little piece of history”. Forget the immoral condition of enforced liberalisation and privatisation that it contained. That was not all. Bono went on to hail George W Bush as the saviour of Africa. “I think he has done an incredible job”, he pronounced, adding: “Bush deserves a place in history for turning the fate of the continent around.” He came across as serious. Does Bono know that the US is the lowest aid donor in the industrialised world, giving only 0.16 per cent of GNP? Does he not care about climate change and about Bush’s role as serial environmental abuser? Maybe he has forgotten.

    The mutual admiration club between Bono, Geldof, Blair and Bush – rock stars and men who would love to be them – has been the abiding symbol of the G8. It is deeply disturbing. It has nothing to do with the commitment and the passionate argument of the 225,000 people who took to the streets of Edinburgh on 2 July encircling the centre of Scotland’s capital to protest against global injustice. This demonstration – at which I was a speaker – provided the real backdrop, the real pressure for change. Not that many people, particularly those south of the border, would have known. Saturation television that day from Live8 in Hyde Park beamed pictures from as far away as Philadelphia, Berlin and Tokyo – cities united in superficial soundbites about desperately serious issues. The newspapers fared little better.

    Edinburgh was nowhere to be seen. Was it inadvertent, or did our celebrity musicians conspire to allow the biggest demonstration of people power in Scotland’s history and the biggest march against poverty the UK has seen to be erased from the public’s consciousness? When Gordon Brown announced his intention to take part in the Edinburgh March I was appalled. I finally understood the Machiavellian plan by prime minister and chancellor to neutralise and co-opt the efforts of hundreds of NGOs, grassroots organisations and people throughout the world united in their desire to see poverty eradicated. They achieved their aims with the help of Geldof and Bono. I know that we need to persuade politicians, but do we really need to sleep with the enemy?

    For years thousands of people have campaigned to draw the public’s attention to the harm globalisation has done to the developing world and to expose the unjust policies of the unholy Trinity – the World Bank, IMF and the World Trade Organisation. All of a sudden Brown wanted to march hand in hand with us. Was he going to protest against the policies the UK government was imposing on the poorest countries in the developing world? Was he aware the UK government has been instrumental in pushing an aggressive “free trade” agenda at the WTO, disregarding developing countries’ pleas that they should be allowed to defend their infant industries from predatory EU and US multinationals?

    Was he not aware that the UK also stands behind the damaging Economic Partnership Agreements designed to open markets, in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, exposing small scale producers to overwhelming competition from powerful multinationals? Is he aware that the UK has taken the lead in promoting privatisation of public services in developing countries, despite the increase in poverty this has brought to million of peoples in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere? Does he not know that the department for International Development has channelled millions from the aid budget to privatisation consultants such as KPMG, Price WaterhouseCoopers and the Adam Smith Institute, engaged to “advise” developing country governments on the privatisation of their public services? What about the UK government’s efforts to undermine international calls to hold multinational corporations to account for their activities overseas, championing the voluntary alternative of “corporate social responsibility” rather than corporate regulation? Then come the arms industry, and Britain’s seemingly unquenchable thirst to sell to the poorest and most volatile of dictatorships.

    After all the excitement of the Live8 crowd, and the self-congratulation of the organisers for what we should acknowledge was perhaps the greatest rock music spectacle the world has seen, what will have been achieved? Beside the thrill of seeing some of the greatest artist alive perform, has Blair, the same politician who misled the world over WMD in Iraq, managed to reinvent his legacy as the prophet of the social justice movement? Has the consciousness of the world really been raised, or have the consciences of the political leaders simply been soothed?

    In Scotland, we were making concrete demands from the G8 leaders, to stop imposing the neoliberal policies that have contributed to exacerbating poverty in the developing world; perhaps our aims were a little too unsettling, and a little too unpalatable, for Bono and Bob. By ignoring the real issues in the Make Poverty History Campaign and by embracing politicians with uncritical enthusiasm, they have undermined the real movement for change, helping to preserve the cycle that keeps the developing world subjugated to the financial institutions that are making poverty inevitable.

    You may wonder why I feel so deeply about these issues, I was born in one of the 18 countries in the debt relief package; Nicaragua, the second poorest country in the southern Hemisphere. Throughout my life I have seen first hand the devastating effect that poverty has on children’s lives. For me, witnessing the death of a child is not just a dramatic click of a finger, it is a terrible tragedy. Bono and Bob Geldof’s blind ambition has led them to legitimise and praise George W. Bush and Tony Blair, perpetrators of the objectionable policies that are causing the demise of millions of innocent people throughout the developing world. Although, one cannot deny they have succeeded in bringing attention to Africa, one feels betrayed by their moral ambiguity and sound bite propaganda which have obscured and watered down the real issues that are at stake in the debate.

    Originally published in the New Statesman

  • America’s Broken Nuclear Promises Endanger Us All

    Not a day goes by without a member of team Bush lecturing us on the threat from weapons of mass destruction and assuring us of the absolute primacy they give to halting proliferation. How odd then that the review conference on the non-proliferation treaty will break up this evening, barring an 11th-hour miracle, with no agreed conclusions. And how strange that no delegation should have worked harder to frustrate agreement on what needs to be done than the representatives of George Bush.

    The tragedy is that, for all its faults, the non-proliferation treaty has hitherto been the best barrier put up by the international community against the spread of nuclear weapons. With the support of all but a handful of nations, the treaty provided a robust declaration that the development of nuclear weapons is taboo. That peer-group pressure has since resulted in more countries abandoning nuclear weapons than acquiring them.

    South Africa disowned and dismantled its nuclear weapons after the collapse of the apartheid regime. New states to emerge from the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine, renounced the nuclear systems they inherited on their territory. Argentina and Brazil dropped the nuclear capability they were developing after negotiating a non-nuclear pact between themselves. Even Iraq turned out to have abandoned its nuclear weapons programme, although in that particular case the success of the non-proliferation regime was more of an embarrassment to George Bush.

    Previous review conferences, which come round every five years, have been used as an important opportunity to regenerate support for the treaty. Not this time. The full weight of Washington diplomacy was focused on preventing any reference in the agenda to the commitments the Clinton administration gave to the last review conference. As a result, the first two weeks of negotiation were taken up with arguing over the agenda, leaving barely one week for substantive talks. Robert McNamara, the former US defence secretary and no peacenik, has observed that if the people of the world knew “they would not tolerate what’s going on in the NPT conference”.

    Observance of the non-proliferation treaty rested on a bargain between those states without nuclear weapons, who agreed to renounce any ambition to acquire them, and the nuclear-weapon powers, who undertook in return to proceed in good faith to disarmament. It suits the Bush administration now to present the purpose of the treaty as halting proliferation, but its original intention was the much broader ambition of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The acrimonious exchanges inside the present review conference reflect the frustration of the vast majority of states, who believe they have kept their side of the deal by not developing nuclear weapons but have seen no sign that the privileged elite with nuclear weapons have any intention of giving them up.

    It was to bridge the growing gulf between the two sides that the British delegation, led by Peter Hain, at the last review conference in 2000 helped broker agreement to 13 specific steps that the nuclear-weapon powers could take towards disarming themselves. Labour scores reasonably well against those benchmarks. Britain has taken out of service all non-strategic nuclear weapons and as a result has disarmed 70% of its total nuclear explosive power. It has also halted production of weapons-grade material and placed all fissile material not actually in warheads under international safeguards. This positive progress will be comprehensively reversed if Tony Blair does proceed as threatened to authorise construction of a new weapons system to replace Trident, but until then Britain has a good story to tell.

    Not that it gets heard in the negotiating chambers, where it is obscured by our close identification with the Bush administration and our willingness in the review conference to lobby for understanding of their position. Their position is simply stated: obligations under the non-proliferation treaty are mandatory on other nations and voluntary on the US. Even while the review conference was sitting, the White House asked Congress for funds to research a bunker-busting nuclear bomb, although to develop new nuclear weapons, especially ones designed not to deter but to wage war, is to travel in the opposite direction to the undertakings the US gave to the last review conference.

    The rationale for the bunker-buster is revealing. Its objective is to penetrate and destroy deeply buried arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. Perversely, the current regime in Washington does not perceive its development of nuclear weapons as an obstacle to multilateral agreement on proliferation but as the unilateral means of stopping proliferation. Whatever may be said for this muscular approach to proliferation, there is for sure no prospect of negotiating an agreed text with the rest of the world legitimating it.

    Any progress within the non-proliferation treaty is therefore likely to be on hold until George Bush is replaced by a president willing to return to multilateral diplomacy. This is worrying as there are other pressing problems that should not be left waiting.

    One of the design flaws of the treaty dates from its negotiation in the pre-Chernobyl era of rosy optimism about nuclear energy. As a result it turned on a deal in which the nuclear powers undertook to transfer peaceful nuclear know-how in return for other nations forswearing the military applications of nuclear technology. At the time many of us warned that it was inconsistent to enshrine the spread of nuclear energy in a treaty trying to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

    It therefore is no surprise that we now have a crisis over the advanced nuclear ambitions of Iran. One of the weaknesses in the west’s negotiating position is that there is nothing in the non-proliferation treaty to prohibit Iran from acquiring a declared nuclear energy programme, although it seems implausible that the country has any urgent need for one, as it practically floats on a lake of oil.

    The desirable solution is for an addition to the treaty banning countries without nuclear weapons from developing a closed fuel cycle for nuclear energy, which would stop them acquiring the fissile material for bombs. But this would deepen the present asymmetry between the nuclear powers and everyone else, and is only going to be negotiable if there is some evidence that we are serious about disarmament.

    If the review conference breaks up in failure to agree, I suspect there will be some in Washington celebrating tonight, perhaps not in anything as foreign as French champagne but in the Napa Valley imitation. Within their own narrow terms they will have succeeded. They will have stopped another multilateral agreement and will have escaped criticism for not fulfilling their commitments under the last one. But in the process they will have weakened the non-proliferation regime and made the world a more dangerous place. The next time they lecture us on their worries about weapons of mass destruction, they do not deserve to be taken seriously.

    Originally published by the Guardian