Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: US

  • Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal and the Task for the International Peace Movement

    The US Congress has passed legislation enabling the 2005 US-India nuclear deal to go forward. This deal may accelerate the nuclear arms in South Asia.

    The US Congress explicitly rejected proposals that the deal be conditional on India halting its production of fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons. This is despite the fact that the United Nations Security Council had unanimously demanded that India and Pakistan stop such production (Resolution 1172, 6 June, 1998).

    The U.S.-India deal will allow India access to the international uranium market. This will enable it to free up more of its domestic uranium for its nuclear weapons program. India could, for example, build a third weapon plutonium reactor and begin enriching uranium for weapons, as well as supply enriched uranium to fuel the nuclear submarine it has been trying to build for several decades. India could also convert one of its unsafeguarded nuclear power reactors to weapons-grade plutonium production, and generate an additional 200 kg/year of weapons-grade plutonium. This would allow India to produce an additional 40-50 weapons worth a year of weapon-grade plutonium — up from perhaps seven weapons worth a year today.

    As part of the nuclear deal, the United States also agreed to let Indian keep its nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and plutonium breeder reactor program outside safeguards. The plutonium breeder reactor that India expects to complete in 2010 would produce about 25-30 weapons worth a year of weapon-grade plutonium in its blankets. India expects to build another four such reactors in coming years.

    Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which is chaired by President Pervez Musharraf and has responsibility for its nuclear weapons policy and production, declared that “In view of the fact the [U.S.-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met.”

    Our task

    The international peace movement can still try to prevent this deal from triggering a major escalation in the South Asian nuclear arms race.

    For the deal to come into force, it has to be accepted unanimously by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The debate may be drawn out – the deal is supported by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia, while several members (including Austria, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and New Zealand) are opposed, and other countries (among them Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Finland) are divided. China has proposed that instead of an India-specific exemption from NSG rules, a criteria based approach be adopted. This presumably would open the door for the NSG to eventually consider lifting restrictions on nuclear trade with Pakistan — whose nuclear weapon and nuclear power program China has supported.

    The countries who are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group must be urged to abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1172. They should promote an end to the production of fissile materials for weapons in South Asia as a condition for any international nuclear trade with India or Pakistan.

    A moratorium on such production could also be important in fostering negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China have all suspended production of fissile materials for weapons. India and Pakistan (along with Israel and North Korea) are continuing their production however. A complete halt to all production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons is a necessary step for nuclear disarmament.

    For more information on the US-India nuclear deal:

    Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana, “Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs: Behind the U.S. Nuclear Deal with India,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IndiaFeature.asp

    Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal,” http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf

    Zia Mian is a research scientist with the programme on science and global security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. He is the co-editor of Out of the Nuclear Shadow: Pakistan’s Atomic Bomb & the Search for Security (Zed Books, 2001).

  • Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis at Fifty

    David KriegerFifty years ago this month, the world teetered on the precipice of a nuclear war between the US and Soviet Union during the 13-day Cuban Missile Crisis.  We were fortunate to have survived that crisis, thanks largely to the restraint shown by President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev. 


    Now, fifty years later, there is no immediate crisis such as that in 1962 over Soviet nuclear-armed missiles being placed in Cuba. There are, however, still some 19,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nine nuclear-armed nations: the US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea.  Approximately 95 percent of these weapons are in the arsenals of the US and Russia.  Some 2,000 of them are kept in a state of high alert, ready to be immediately launched upon an order to do so at any moment of any day or night. 


    Although the Cold War ended more than 20 years ago, the possibilities for crisis are still with us.  NATO has expanded to the Russian borders, despite US promises not to do so, and has begun placing missile defense installations near the Russian borders.  Despite US and NATO assurances to Russia that these installations are to protect against an Iranian missile launch, Russian leaders view these installations as undermining their strategic deterrent force by making them vulnerable to a first-strike attack.  They have said that they will target these US missile defense installations.


    In another US-Russian confrontation over Georgia, such as occurred in 2008, or some other regional dispute, it is possible that tensions could rise to the point of nuclear crisis between US and Russian military forces.  Of course, this would be crazy, but it is far from impossible.  What would make the world safer?  What might we expect from national leaders who should have learned from how close the world came to nuclear catastrophe during the Cuban Missile Crisis?


    First, for the US and NATO to make Russia a partner in any missile defense plans focused on Iranian missiles.  Second, for the US to remove its approximately 180 remaining tactical nuclear weapons located in five European countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey).  Third, for the US and Russia to take seriously their legal obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith for an end to the nuclear arms race at an early date, for nuclear disarmament in all its aspects and for a treaty on general and complete disarmament.


    We know now that a regional nuclear war would have global consequences.  Atmospheric scientists have modeled a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each side used 50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons on the other side’s cities.  Such a war would put enough soot from burning cities into the upper stratosphere to reduce warming sunlight for a decade, lowering surface temperatures on earth to the lowest levels in 1,000 years.  This would result in shortened growing seasons, crop failures and famine that would kill hundreds of millions of people, perhaps a billion, throughout the world. 


    The scientific modeling showed that there would be a Nuclear Famine, and it would be triggered by using less than half of one percent of the world’s nuclear explosive power.  Such a famine could be initiated not only by India and Pakistan, two countries that have been to war over Kashmir on several occasions, but by any of the Nuclear Nine.  The US and Russia could each trigger a far more devastating Nuclear Famine by a nuclear attack on the other side’s cities, an attack which would be suicidal even if the other side did not respond in kind.


    When thinking about nuclear weapons and their dangers, we would do well to remember the words of General George Lee Butler, former commander-in-chief of the United States Strategic Command, responsible for all US strategic nuclear weapons: “Nuclear weapons give no quarter.  Their effects transcend time and space, poisoning the Earth and deforming its inhabitants for generation upon generation.  They leave us wholly without defense, expunge all hope for survival.  They hold in their sway not just the fate of nations but of civilization.”


    Nuclear weapons do not protect us.  Rather, they make us vulnerable to annihilation.  It is relatively easy to put them out of our minds, but to do so is to evade our responsibility as citizens of the world and of nuclear-armed countries.  Nuclear weapons imperil our common future – they imperil our children and their children and all children of the future. They imperil all we hold dear.   We must speak out for a world without nuclear weapons.  It is a moral and legal imperative and we would be well advised to act now before we are confronted with the equivalent of another Cuban Missile Crisis.

  • United Nations General Assembly: Resolutions on Nuclear Weapons Issues Adopted from 2001-2011

    2012_zaitsu_unga_votes.pdf

  • Isn’t the Cold War Over?

    Martin HellmanThis article was originally published on Defusing the Nuclear Threat.


    Most people justify their complacency about the world’s 20,000 nuclear weapons by noting that the Cold War is over. But, the more I study Russian-American relations, the more potential I see for a misunderstanding to escalate into a crisis, and the more concerned I become about the world’s nuclear complacency. I sometimes feel like a German Jew in the early 1930′s who has read Mein Kampf and vainly tries to alert his countrymen to the need to take action before it’s too late.


    Just from its title – “Russia and the United States: Pushing Tensions to the Limit?” – you can tell that a recent Stratfor article challenges that complacency. Stratfor – short for Strategic Forecasting, Inc. – is a highly respected, private intelligence company that has been referred to as “the shadow CIA,” so hopefully their concern will be taken seriously. Here are some key excerpts:



    Moscow and Washington have been in a standoff over myriad issues ever since Russia began to roll back Western influence in its periphery and assert its own power. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States got involved in the region intending to create a cordon around Russia to prevent it from ever becoming a global threat again. … Moscow’s ultimate goal is not to recreate the Soviet Union – that entity eventually failed. Instead, Russia wants to limit the influence of external powers in the former Soviet Union and be recognized as the dominant player there. …


    Tensions between Moscow and Washington can be attributed to one primary issue: ballistic missile defense (BMD). … Russia offered to integrate its BMD system with NATO’s system. … However, Washington rejected the offer, thereby confirming Moscow’s suspicions that the BMD system is more about Russia than the Iranian threat.


    While we see Russia’s attempts to exercise influence in its “near abroad” as meddling in other nations’ affairs, our own efforts to impose our will throughout the world are seen in a totally benign light. That double standard threatens our very existence because Russia is capable of standing up to us if its vital national interests are threatened, but only by playing its nuclear card. And that’s a game we shouldn’t want to play.

  • Open Letter on NATO Missile Defense Plans and Increased Risk of Nuclear War

    To President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev:


    Recent U.S. decisions to deploy an integrated missile defense system in Western, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, coupled with the continued expansion of NATO and its military activities, have created increasingly sharp divisions and distrust between the Russian Federation and the United States.[i] This process now threatens to destroy the New START agreement and reverse previous progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Further deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations could result in a return to the perilous nuclear postures of the Cold War.


    Although the “Phased Adaptive Approach” missile defense system is being installed under the auspices of NATO, it is perceived by Russia to be “a U.S. system on European soil.”[ii] This system is regarded with apprehension by Russia, particularly since later phases include plans to deploy very advanced-stage Standard Missile-3 land-based interceptors, which have the potential to effectively target Russian strategic nuclear missiles. Russia consequently regards the proposed and ongoing deployments as no more than “an interim step toward building a full-scale missile defense system to provide guaranteed protection of U.S. territory against any missile attack.”[iii]
     
    The official U.S. political rationale for these deployments is that they are necessary to defend against yet-to-be-developed Iranian long-range ballistic missiles. Yet American scientists have stated that forward-based European radar systems give the U.S. the ability to track Russian ICBMs very early after a launch and to guide interceptors against them.[iv] Russian leaders have expressed specific concerns that the U.S./NATO missile defense system could be used for such a purpose and continue to question at whom the system is directed.
     
    Fundamental mutual distrust stems from the fact that both the U.S. and Russia still maintain strategic war plans that include large nuclear strike options, with hundreds of preplanned targets that clearly include cities in each other’s nation.[v] Both nations keep a total of at least 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons mounted on launch-ready ballistic missiles, which can carry out these strike options with only a few minutes’ warning.
     
    Thus, many in Russia believe the final stages of deployment of the U.S./NATO missile defense system are designed to have the capability of greatly reducing or eliminating Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Continued technological advances in hypersonic missiles,[vi] which would greatly enhance interceptor missile capabilities, combined with the possibility that nuclear warheads could be installed in missile interceptors, will only serve to exacerbate Russian fears about U.S./NATO European missile defense.[vii]


    Mutual suspicion has prevented true cooperation in joint missile defense, just as it has with the still defunct U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center, which was supposed to share information about U.S. and Russian missile launches.[viii] The failure to include Russia in a joint missile defense also reflects the fact that NATO has not made Russia a full partner in the alliance, despite the end of the Cold War.
     
    It is only natural that Russia should consider NATO a potential threat, particularly since NATO has greatly expanded eastward, has actively recruited and included former members of the Warsaw Pact and has engaged in extensive military campaigns in Europe, Africa and South Asia.  The combination of NATO expansion with the deployment of a massive missile defense system that surrounds Russia has triggered a strong political reaction in Russia.  From a Russian perspective, a U.S./NATO missile defense system in Europe undermines their perceived nuclear deterrent, decreases U.S. vulnerability and increases Russian vulnerability to a U.S. nuclear first-strike attack.
     
    In November, President Medvedev made his most forceful political statement against the U.S. and NATO to date.[ix]  Included in the speech was a specific warning that Russia would withdraw from the New START agreement should the U.S./NATO missile defense system continue to move forward.  This is not new information—the Russian Federation issued an unambiguous statement in April 2010 when New START was signed, making clear that both quantitative and qualitative limitations on the U.S. missile defense program were so essential that Russia would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty if these limitations were not honored.[x]
     
    A Russian withdrawal from New START would likely precipitate a fully-renewed nuclear arms race and thus completely reverse movement toward a world without nuclear weapons. Many of the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would also regard the collapse of the New START process as an explicit violation of the NPT; this could lead to the collapse of the NPT and extensive nuclear proliferation.
     
    In his November speech, President Medvedev also issued a number of explicit instructions to his military forces that essentially amounted to military threats against the U.S. and NATO.  He stated, “I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data and guidance systems, if need be ….  [I]f the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe.”[xi]
     
    Although many political analysts in the West have discounted this warning as merely a way to put pressure on the U.S. and NATO to change course, this statement by President Medvedev must be taken seriously. Russia will certainly carry out the directives of its President.
     
    The leaders of the U.S., NATO and Russia must seriously consider the possibility that the current course of political events is pushing them towards an eventual military confrontation and conflict.  Further expansion of NATO, its “nuclear umbrella” and missile defense system to the very borders of Russia increase the odds that any conventional military confrontation would quickly escalate into nuclear war.


    If Russia decided “to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe,” as threatened by President Medvedev, would not such an action be likely to lead to nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia?  According to recent peer-reviewed studies, the detonation of the launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals could leave the Earth virtually uninhabitable for more than a decade.[xii]  Such a war would lead to global famine and starvation of most of the human race.[xiii]


    We suggest the following steps, both as a way out of the immediate crisis and to advance the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free-world. These are not the only steps that could be helpful, but we are hopeful that leaders on both sides might be willing to act upon them:



    1. There should be a freeze on U.S./NATO deployment of missile defenses in Europe pending an open, joint U.S.-Russian quantitative assessment of the threats that missile defense is supposed to counter, and of the threats posed by U.S. and Russian tactical and strategic nuclear forces.[xiv] The threats posed by missile defense and its effectiveness should be studied and integrated into the previously-mentioned assessment. It is essential that this analysis include a thorough scientific evaluation of the long-term effects of nuclear conflict upon the global environment, climate and human agriculture.[xv]
    2. It is essential, not only for the creation of a peaceful and secure Europe but for the continuation of civilization and the human species itself, that launch-ready nuclear arsenals be immediately stood-down, that nuclear war be avoided, and that nuclear arsenals be eliminated. This is a priority that must trump all other priorities, including what are seen as the most pressing security priorities of major world powers.

    We reiterate strongly that differences of opinion over missile defense must not be allowed to de-rail progress to zero nuclear weapons, or worse, to put that progress into reverse and instead reinstate Cold War security postures, as would be precipitated by the collapse of New START.


    In pursuing a solution, it is vital that both sides feel their concerns are being respected and that their security interests have been properly taken into account. An outcome that advantages one side only, or that is perceived as doing so, is no solution at all.


    The elimination of nuclear weapons must take place not in some far-off utopian future, but at an early date, as demanded by the vast majority of the world’s governments in resolution after resolution at the United Nations.  It is quite clear that the ordinary citizens of every nation no longer wish to live under the shadow of imminent nuclear destruction and see no reason why massive nuclear arsenals should continue to exist when they clearly represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race.


    Signed:


    Organizations


    Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (France)
    Artistes pour la Paix (Canada)
    Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition (Australia)
    Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Canadian Pugwash Group (Canada)
    Daisy Alliance (USA)
    Footprints for Peace (Australia)
    Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space (USA)
    International Association of Peace Messenger Cities
    International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War – Kenya (Kenya)
    Just Peace Queensland (Australia)
    Los Alamos Study Group (USA)
    Medact (UK)
    Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)
    No2nuclearweapons (Canada)
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA)
    Pax Christi Metro New York (USA)
    Pax Christi Montreal (Canada)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament NSW (Australia)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament WA (Australia)
    Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)
    Physicians for Social Responsibility (USA)
    Project Ploughshares (Canada)
    Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire (France)
    Science for Peace (Canada)
    Scientists for Global Responsibility (UK)
    Swedish Peace Council (Sweden)
    Transnational Foundation (Sweden)
    Tri-Valley CAREs (USA)
    US Peace Council (USA)
    Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (Canada)
    West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – U.S. Section (USA)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – Vancouver (Canada)


    Individuals (Organizational affiliation for identification purposes only)


    Lynn Adamson (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Janis Alton (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Marcus Atkinson (International Coordinator, Footprints for Peace, Australia)
    Rosalie Bertell (Regent, International Physicians for Humanitarian Medicine, Switzerland)
    Amanda Bresnan (Member, Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, Australia)
    Adele Buckley (Executive Committee, Canadian Pugwash Group, Canada)
    Yousaf Butt (Federation of American Scientists, USA)
    Helen Caldicott (Co-Founder, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Australia)
    Lisa Clark (Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Italy)
    Gill Cox (West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Phyllis Creighton (Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, Canada)
    Wilfred Dcosta (Indian Social Action Forum, India)
    Roberto Della Seta (Member, Senate of the Republic, Italy)
    Dale Dewar (Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival, Canada)
    Kate Dewes (Disarmament & Security Centre, New Zealand)
    Jayantha Dhanapala (Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, 1998-2003, Sri Lanka)
    Gabriele Dietrich (National Alliance of People’s Movements, India)
    Dennis Doherty (Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, Australia)
    Gordon Edwards (President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Canada)
    George Farebrother (Secretary, World Court Project, UK)
    Gregor Gable (Shundahai Network, USA)
    Bruce K. Gagnon (Coordinator, Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, USA)
    Joseph Gerson (American Friends Service Committee, USA)
    Bob Gould (President, Physicians for Social Responsibility – San Francisco, USA)
    Jonathan Granoff (President, Global Security Institute, USA)
    Ulla Grant (Hall Green Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Commander Robert Green (Royal Navy, ret., New Zealand)
    Jenny Grounds (President, Medical Association for Prevention of War, Australia)
    Mark Gubrud (University of North Carolina, USA)
    Luis Gutierrez-Esparza (Latin American Circle of International Studies, Mexico)
    Regina Hagen (Darmstädter Friedensforum, Germany)
    John Hallam (People for Nuclear Disarmament, Australia)
    David Hartsough (PEACEWORKERS, USA)
    John Hinchcliff (President, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Herbert J. Hoffman (Vice President, Maine Veterans for Peace Chapter 001, USA)
    Inge Höger (Member of Parliament, Germany)
    Kate Hudson (General Secretary, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Cesar Jaramillo (Program Officer, Project Ploughshares, Canada)
    Pierre Jasmin (President, Artistes pour la Paix, Canada)
    Birgitta Jónsdóttir (Member of Icelandic Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Iceland)
    Martin Kalinowski (Chairman, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research, Germany)
    Sergei Kolesnikov (Member of Russian Parliament and President of the Russian affiliate of IPPNW, Russia)
    David Krieger (President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Harry Kroto (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Steve Leeper (Chairman, Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, Japan)
    Mairead Maguire (Nobel Peace Laureate, Peace People, N. Ireland)
    Ak Malten (Pro Peaceful Energy Use, Netherlands)
    Willem Malten (Director, Los Alamos Study Group, USA)
    Alfred Marder (International Association of Peace Messenger Cities, USA)
    Bronwyn Marks (Hiroshima Day Committee, Australia)
    Jean-Marie Matagne (President, Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire, France)
    Ibrahim Matola (Member of Parliament, Malawi)
    Lisle Merriman (Palestine-Israel Network, USA)
    Natalia Mironova (President, Movement for Nuclear Safety, Russia)
    Sophie Morel (Board member, Réseau Sortir du Nucleaire, France)
    Peter Murphy (Coordinator, SEARCH Foundation, Australia)
    Abdul Nayyar (President, Pakistan Peace Coalition, Pakistan)
    David Norris (Senator, Ireland)
    Rosemarie Pace (Director, Pax Christi Metro New York, USA)
    Sergei Plekhanov (Professor, York University, Canada)
    Pavel Podvig (Russian Nuclear Forces Project, Russia)
    John Polanyi (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Ernie Regehr (Research Fellow, University of Waterloo, Canada)
    Barney Richards (New Zealand Peace Council, New Zealand)
    Bob Rigg (Former Chair, New Zealand National Consultative Committee on Peace and Disarmament, New Zealand)
    Bruce A. Roth (Daisy Alliance, USA)
    Joan Russow (Global Compliance Research Project, Canada)
    Kathy Wanpovi Sanchez (Tewa Women United, USA)
    Mamadou Falilou Sarr (African Center for Global Peace and Development, Senegal)
    Wolfgang Schlupp-Hauck (Chairman, Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen, Germany)
    Jürgen Schneider (Professor, Universität Göttingen, Germany)
    Sukla Sen (Committee for Communal Amity, India)
    Steven Starr (Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility and Associate, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Kathleen Sullivan (Program Director, Hibakusha Stories, USA)
    P K Sundaram (DiaNuke.org, India)
    Terumi Tanaka (Secretary General, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations, Japan)
    Desmond Tutu (Nobel Peace Laureate, Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, South Africa)
    Hiro Umebayashi (Special Advisor, Peace Depot, Japan)
    Jo Vallentine (Chairperson, Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia, Australia)
    Dirk Van der Maelen (Member of Parliament, Belgium)
    Achin Vanaik (University of Delhi, India)
    Alyn Ware (International Representative, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Elizabeth Waterston (International Councilor, Medact, UK)
    Rick Wayman (Director of Programs, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Dave Webb (Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Tim Wright (Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia)
    Col. Valery Yarynich (Soviet Missile Forces – ret., Russia)
    Uta Zapf (Member of the Bundestag, Germany)


    Endnotes:


    [i] To date, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands, Poland and the Czech Republic have agreed to participate in this deployment. Patriot missiles have been deployed in Poland on the border of the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad and X-band radar is also likely to be deployed in Turkey. Medium- and intermediate-range interceptor missiles are scheduled to be deployed on U.S. warships in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.
    [ii] Tom Collina, “NATO Set to Back Expanded Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today, retrieved from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_11/NATOMissileDefense.
    [iii] Rusian Pukhov, “Medvedev’s Missile Threats are only his Plan B,” The Moscow Times, December 1, 2011, retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/medvedevs-missile-threats-are-his-plan-b/448992.html.
    [iv] Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol, “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defense” (2011), FAS Special Report No. 1, Federation of American Scientists, September 2011, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf.
    [v] U.S. strategic targets include Russian military forces, war supporting and WMD infrastructure, and both military and national leadership. Hans Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of American Scientists Brief, February 2010, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/WarPlanIssueBrief2010.pdf.
    [vi] The U.S. has successfully tested non-ballistic missiles which have traveled at speeds up to mach-20 (16,700 mph or 27,000 km per hour). See http://www.examiner.com/military-technology-in-washington-dc/the-usaf-x51-a-and-the-u-s-army-ahw-both-test-november-2011.
    [vii] “Hypersonic missile: who is the target?” Voice of Russia, November 28, 2011, retrieved from http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/11/28/61168605.html.
    [viii] JDEC was agreed on and ratified by both the U.S. and Russia, with the purpose of preventing accidental nuclear war between them as a result of a false warning of attack. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/jdec/text/000604-warn-wh3.htm. However, neither side appeared willing to share the “raw” or unfiltered data from their early warning systems because of concerns it would reveal too much to the other side about its warning system capabilities. Thus, the facility was never opened; an empty building in Moscow where the center was supposed to be stands as a testament to the continued failure to cooperate.
    [ix] Text of Medvedev’s November 23, 2011 speech translated from the Russian version, retrieved from http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3115:
       First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning station in Kaliningrad on combat alert.
       Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences.
       Third, the new strategic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advance missile penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads.
       Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems, if need be.
       These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost.
       Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defence system in Europe.
       One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region.
       Other measures to counter the European missile defence system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
       Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures.
    Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for the withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty.
       But let me stress this point, we are not closing the door on continued dialogue with the USA and NATO on missile defence, and on practical cooperation in this area. We are ready for that.  However, this can only be achieved by establishing a clear, legal basis for cooperation that would guarantee our legitimate interests and concerns are taken into account.  We are open to dialogue and hope for a reasonable and constructive approach from our Western partners.
    [x] Missile defense is explicitly discussed in the preamble and in Article 5 of New START. The preamble recognizes the “relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” and stipulates that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” Thus, the ongoing deployment of U.S./NATO missile defense systems is, in the eyes of Russia, at least a violation of the spirit of New START.
    [xi] Ibid.
    [xii] Steven Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict,” The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, December 2009, retrieved from http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Starr_Nuclear_Winter_Oct_09.pdf.
    [xiii] Steven Starr, “U.S .and Russian Launch-Ready Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to All Peoples and Nations,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, October 2011, retrieved from /wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011_06_24_starr.pdf.
    [xiv] Specific proposals for such assessments have already been published. See B. Blair, V. Esin, M. McKinzie, V. Yarynich, P. Zolotarev, “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science & Global Security, 2011, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 167-194, and H. Kristensen, R. Norris, and I. Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper, April 2009, p. 15, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf.
    [xv] O. B. Toon and A. Robock, “Local nuclear war, global suffering,” Scientific American, 302, 74-81 (2010), retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf.

  • De-Alerting and the Nuclear Weapons Convention

    Dominique LalanneSignatories to the NPT took a small but significant step toward the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world in May 2010 when they agreed that: “All States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.”. The most significant step was in December 2010 at the General Assembly, 65th plenary meeting, 8 December 2010, 133 yes, 28 no, 23 abstain for the vote of the Convention:  ” The General Assembly Calls once again upon all States immediately to fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination”.


    Results for nuclear weapon States : China (yes), France (no), Russia (no), UK (no), US (no), India (yes), Pakistan (yes), Israel (no).


    The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) also committed in the 2010 NPT Final Document to “Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security.”. And most significant is the vote on de-alerting at the UN General Assembly with only 3 votes “no” by France the UK and the US.


    So the NWS have resisted any commitment to go further in either area – i.e. to immediately de-alert and remove all nuclear weapons from high operational readiness or to commence negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention in the near or intermediate future. This resistance is linked to their continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence, and a mistaken belief that nuclear deterrence would be jeopardized by de-alerting existing nuclear weapons systems.


    Progress on de-alerting and NWC negotiations could be enhanced by promoting them not as the immediate end to nuclear deterrence, but as processes which lower the role of nuclear weapons gradually while simultaneously strengthening strategic stability.


    In this context, progress on de-alerting will make NWC negotiations more feasible. Equally, the initial exploration by NWS of the legal, technical and political elements of a nuclear-weapons-free regime (achieved through a NWC) will generate greater confidence in the possibility of security without nuclear deterrence, making the immediate de-alerting of nuclear weapons more palatable.


    There are many reasons to focus on de-alerting in the short term while simultaneously considering and promoting NWC negotiations.


    The U.S. and Russia, with 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons, still maintain high-alert postures which permit each of their Presidents to order the launch of more than 1000 strategic nuclear warheads in a matter of a few minutes. Both nations remain frozen in their Cold War nuclear confrontation, constantly poised to unleash massive nuclear forces in response to a perceived nuclear attack from the other side.


    Fear of a surprise nuclear attack is what causes leaders in the nuclear weapon states to keep their nuclear forces ready to “Launch On Warning” of attack. Although both the US and Russia deny that they would employ a “Launch On Warning” strategy, it is clear that they retain the capability and option to do so.


    The maintenance of launch-ready, high-alert nuclear weapons allow these two states to almost instantly initiate an accidental nuclear war though technical or human error, miscalculation, madness or stupidity. This is true, because a false warning of attack – believed to be true – has the potential to trigger a nuclear “retaliation” which in fact would be a nuclear first-strike.


    High-alert nuclear postures create a universal fear of impending nuclear incineration, and thereby prevent any fundamental change in the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.  As long as nuclear forces remain on high-alert, the elimination of nuclear weapons remains impossible and accidental nuclear war remains possible.


    The Nuclear Weapon States must accept that an instant nuclear strike is not a fundamental component of deterrence. Such a change in mindset would open the way to a variety of practical steps which would prevent a nuclear launch.


    The current high-alert postures in the US and Russia, which  in reality are supported by an unofficial policy of Launch On Warning, could be changed, without any risk, to an official policy of No Launch Before Detonation (NLBD).  Under NLBD, the launch of nuclear forces in response to a warning of nuclear attack, comprised only of electronic data from Early Warning Systems, would be prohibited.  The launch of nuclear forces could not then be triggered by a false warning generated by cyberwarfare, a failure of technical systems, computer hackers, or the launch of non-nuclear warheads carried by strategic missiles.


    NLBD could be almost immediately instituted via Presidential decree (without negotiation, legislation, and minimal expense) and should be used as a confidence building measure as part of a de-alerting process.  Accidental, unauthorized or unintended nuclear war caused by a false warning of nuclear attack would become impossible through this simple change in policy. 


    The actual elimination of high-alert forces would make it physically impossible to launch upon electronic warning of attack. There are many possible ways to de-alert nuclear weaponry in a verifiable, stepwise manner, which are on record and require only sufficient political will to implement.


    While the U.S. and Russia  choose to maintain high-alert postures (and the Launch-On-Warning capabilities that high-alert weapons confer), none of the other NWS (whose nuclear arsenals number in the hundreds of weapons) maintain states of high operational readiness. China has never had high-alert weapons, France and England have each made conscious decisions not to maintain ground-based launch-ready nuclear forces. Furthermore, it has been reported that U.K nuclear forces require days to launch, and French nuclear forces require some hours to fire. Such a change, if made to US and Russian nuclear arsenals, would do much to remove the threat of an accidental apocalypse from the global agenda. The French and UK militaries should be encouraged to talk to their US and Russian counterparts with the aim of persuading them of the merits of a similar change in posture.


    For France and the UK, missiles could be removed from submarines without altering a policy of minimal deterrence. The international context does not need a possibility of rapid nuclear strike from either of these two Nuclear States. In case of terrorist attack (generally considered to constitute the most likely danger of producing a nuclear detonation), a nuclear retaliation from a submarine is absolutely not appropriate. No nuclear strike is appropriate for a non-state sponsored terrorist attack.


    The real change required here is a change of mindset, of imagination and spirit. Nuclear war should no longer be held up as the instant solution for “national security”, especially when our best scientists warn that nuclear war can end human existence. Our “security” depends primarily upon our ability to understand the problems we face in common; we are a single species threatened with imminent nuclear extinction.


    De-alerting is the first step of the Convention. Without de-alerting the Convention is impossible to be accepted. The change of mindset is the first step for the abolition of nuclear weapons. De-alerting makes this change.

  • Beyond START

    Alice SlaterThe Obama Administration will pay a heavy price to ratify the modest New START treaty should it receive the required 67 Senate votes this week to enact it into law. The President originally promised the weapons labs $80 billion over ten years for building three new bomb factories in Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, and Kansas City to modernize our nuclear arsenals as well as an additional $100 billion for new delivery systems—missiles, bombers, and submarines. He then sweetened the pot with an offer of another $4 billion to the nuclear weapons establishment to buy the support of Senator Kyl. Additionally, he is assuring the Senate hawks that missile development in the US will proceed full speed ahead, even though Russia and China have proposed negotiations on a draft treaty they submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban space weaponization. Every country at that conference voted in favor of preventing an arms race in outer space except the United States, still caught in the grip of the military-industrial-academic-congressional complex which President Eisenhower took great pains to warn us against in his farewell address to the nation.


    There are 23,000 nuclear weapons on the planet with 22,000 of them in the US and Russia.  The other 1,000 are in the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. In order to honor our promise in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to negotiate in good faith for nuclear disarmament in return for a promise by non-nuclear weapons states not to acquire nuclear weapons, it is essential that the US and Russia continue to make large reductions in their arsenals to create the conditions for the other nuclear weapons states to come to the table to negotiate a treaty to ban the bomb, just as we have banned chemical and biological weapons. 


    At the NPT conference this spring, for the first time the possibility of negotiating a nuclear weapons convention was adopted by consensus in the final document. Civil society and friendly governments are now exploring opportunities for starting an “Ottawa Process” for a nuclear weapons ban, just as was done for landmines. China, India and Pakistan have already voted on a UN Resolution to open such negotiations. Perhaps Asia will lead the way. But if the US persists in developing its nuclear infrastructure with new bomb factories while threatening Russia with proliferating missiles, it’s unlikely that this modest New START will help us down the path to peace.

  • Answering Bolton and Yoo: New START Will Strengthen U.S. National Security

    Two staunch ideologues who served in the George W. Bush administration, John Bolton and John Yoo, ask rhetorically in a New York Times opinion piece, “Why Rush to Cut Nukes?”  Bolton, a recess appointment as United Nations Ambassador under Bush II, never met an arms limitation agreement that he supported.  Yoo, the lawyer who wrote memos supporting the legality of water boarding under international law (not a very favorable prospect for captured U.S. soldiers), worked in Bush II’s Justice Department.  Bolton and Yoo can find no good reason to support the New START agreement with the Russians, arguing that without amendments it will weaken “our national defense.”  

    Let me answer the question posed in the title of their article.  The Senate should support and ratify this treaty because it will strengthen U.S. national security by:

    • reducing the size of the bloated nuclear arsenals in both countries, creating a new lower level from which to make further reductions;
    • reinstating verification procedures that ended with the expiration of the first START agreement in December 2009;
    • building confidence in the Russians that we stand behind our agreements; and
    • sending a signal to the rest of the world that we are taking steps to fulfill our legal commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    The downsides of failing to ratify the treaty would be to remove restraints on the size of the Russian arsenal, forego inspection and verification of the Russian arsenal, undermine Russian confidence in U.S. commitments, and encourage further nuclear proliferation by other countries thereby increasing the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. Further, if the treaty is not ratified before the new Congress is seated in January 2011, its future ratification will be far more difficult.

    What do Bolton and Yoo say they want?  First, to remove language in the treaty’s preamble, which is not legally binding, that says there is an “interrelationship” between nuclear weapons and defensive systems.  That language only recognizes a reality.  Of course, there is a relationship between missiles and missile defenses.  Second, they don’t want the U.S. to be limited in putting conventional weapons on formerly nuclear launch systems.  But that is a price, and a fair one, that each side will pay for lowering the other side’s nuclear capabilities.  Third, they want a Congressional act for the financing, testing and development of new U.S. warhead designs before the treaty is ratified.  In other words, they want guarantees that the U.S. nuclear arsenal will be modernized.  They seek long-term reliance on the U.S. nuclear threat, but this means that U.S. citizens will also remain under nuclear threat for the long-term.

    Bolton and Yoo are an interesting pair.  The first would lop ten floors off the United Nations, the second do away with the laws of war when they aren’t convenient.  Do they deserve their own opinions?  Of course.  Do their opinions make any sense?  Only in the context of the American exceptionalism and militarism that were the trademarks of the Bush II administration and have done so much to weaken the spirit, values and resources of the country while continuing to haunt us in our aggressive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

    One must wonder what possessed the New York Times to publish their rantings.  Additionally, using the word “Nukes” in the title suggests somehow that nuclear weapons are cute enough to have nicknames and not a serious threat to the very existence of civilization.  That Bolton and Yoo could rise to high positions in our country is a sad commentary on the country, but perhaps understandable in the context of the Bush II administration’s persistent flouting of international law.  That the New York Times would find sufficient merit in their discredited opinions to publish their article is an even sadder commentary on the editorial integrity of one of the country’s most respected newspapers.

  • Stoking an Asian Cold War?

    This article was originally published by In Depth News.

    Proxy wars between countries was one of the more tragic features of the Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR. Both super-powers fuelled the conflicts supplying military materiel and political support while they piously claimed that nuclear deterrence worked so that they themselves never went to war. The U.S. in particular claimed that the George Kennan doctrine of the “containment” of the USSR worked and ere long the Communist giant imploded obligingly.

    Fast forward two decades, and a declining U.S. super power, trapped in economic woes of its own making, is groping for ways to contain a rising China. Proxy wars are no longer possible especially for a super power mired in the morass of Iraq and Afghanistan and encumbered by the unending and ubiquitous “war against terrorism” fighting an unseen enemy.

    What better then than to outsource the task of the containment of China to ambitious India and reluctant Japan? That, essentially, is the subtext of the unusually lengthy Joint Statement that came out at the conclusion of President Obama’s recent visit to India and the rationale for his Asian tour. Unsurprisingly both Japan and now India are the chosen candidates of the U.S. for permanent member status in the UN Security Council.

    The scenario has been a long time in gestation and operation and spans the presidencies of Bush the Son and of Barak Obama giving it the bipartisan support it needs as national security policy. For India — the world’s most populous democracy unable to match China’s poverty alleviation record and bedevilled by home-grown terrorism — the opportunity to escape the stigma of ostracism following the 1998 nuclear blasts was too good to be true.

    The Nehruvian vision of Non-alignment and moral superiority as the key to Great Power status had failed to unlock the door. Now it was self-built economic muscle (and a clever manipulation of the U.S. political system by the wealthy Indian lobby) and a replay of the old “Yellow Peril” cry replayed as a “string of pearls” theory that secured a place at the high table.

    The sophistication of Indian diplomacy will ensure that the new game will be played with finesse and without any of the crudity of the earlier proxy wars. It will garner huge bilateral trade and technology-transfer benefits for itself while maintaining normal relations with China competing at the same time for economic payoffs and political influence with China in Asia and Africa with U.S. support.

    Japan was settling into a low-key role after brief episode of assertiveness under Koizumi and a succession of bland Prime Ministers with little impact on the international political and economic scene. But China’s ill-conceived saber-rattling over the Diaoyu Tai or Senkaku islands plus Medvedev’s ill-timed visit to the Kuril Islands has made her ready to question China on its intentions in the East and South China Seas, recall its Ambassador from Moscow and play hard ball in the Six Nation Talks over North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme.

    It is a dangerous game to play especially since China is able to revive old animosities against the Japanese with its domestic audience and apply economic pressures as well. For the U.S. the revitalization of its old alliance with Japan on the eastern flank of China was long overdue and the rebuff over Okinawa was a sign that Japan had to fall back in line.

    While the speculation over the shift of the global centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific goes on, the Atlantic powers — the U.S. and NATO militarily and the U.S. and the EU economically — are not ready to abdicate their role in global affairs. The logical — and inexpensive — way to continue to exert influence in the Pacific and the Indian Oceans is through allies justifying their selection as a natural alliance among “democracies” with a common allegiance to human rights, anti-terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation (giving the Obama slogan of “a nuclear weapon free world” a rest).

    The side benefits are to break Non-aligned and G77 solidarity in the UN and other forums like the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round of negotiations and the upcoming Climate Change talks in Cancun isolating China at the same time. Possible irritants in the newly forged U.S.-EU-Japan-India axis will continue to be India’s stance regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, China’s human rights record and Myanmar or Burma’s military junta. The adroit management of this will be a small price to pay rather than giving the Republicans the satisfaction of shredding Obama’s foreign policy as they have done with his domestic policies.

  • Japan Ready for “No Nukes”

    As the Obama administration contemplates major reductions to its nuclear arsenal, Japan’s commitment to nuclear disarmament is being tested as never before.

    In his Prague speech on April 5, President Barack Obama said, “We will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urge others to do the same.” He went on to say, “we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.”

    But in between these two landmark pledges he said, “as long as these weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.”

    The goal that Obama articulated of “a world without nuclear weapons” was overwhelmingly supported by the Japanese public. Yet, the way the Japanese government views U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, otherwise referred to as the “nuclear umbrella,” is turning out to be a key sticking point, which may end up blocking progress on nuclear disarmament.

    Reportedly, the specific reduction in the role of nuclear weapons that is being contemplated is that they would be retained for only one purpose. Their sole purpose would be to deter the use of other people’s nuclear weapons. This is sometimes referred to as a policy of “No First Use” (NFU).

    The Japanese government has long taken a different undeclared view that the U.S. nuclear umbrella should also cover potential threats from biological weapons, chemical weapons and even conventional weapons.

    At a press conference Aug. 9, on the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Prime Minister Taro Aso criticized demands for nuclear powers, including the United States, to pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. He said, “I wonder if that’s a realistic way to ensure Japan’s safety.” Likewise, Foreign Ministry officials have repeatedly made unofficial comments opposing NFU.

    The key test for the vision spelled out by Obama in Prague is the Nuclear Posture Review, now being prepared. We understand that a substantial reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategy is being considered.

    It is distressing to note that Japan is being used as an excuse to prevent Washington from making an important policy change that would be a step forward toward a world without nuclear weapons. Some argue that a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons would weaken the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

    Others, for example former U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, even suggest that Japan might choose to acquire its own nuclear weapons.

    In fact, there are signs of greater flexibility than these people acknowledge. It is widely predicted that there will be a change of government after the Aug. 30 elections and that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), currently the largest opposition party, will win. The attitude to NFU by the DPJ and its potential coalition partners is likely to be quite different from the LDP.

    DPJ secretary general Katsuya Okada has suggested that Japan work with Washington to achieve a NFU policy. In response to a questionnaire sent recently to Japanese political parties by disarmament nongovernment organizations, the DPJ said that NFU was an issue that should be discussed with the U.S. government.

    The Social Democratic Party, a potential coalition party in a new government, and the Japanese Communist Party also supported an NFU policy. Even New Komeito, which is a member of the current government, supported an NFU policy if there is an international consensus.

    Opposition to NFU within the LDP is by no means universal. So the picture of monolithic Japanese opposition to NFU, presented by some U.S. commentators, is really quite misleading.

    As for the argument that Japan will go nuclear if Washington reduces the number and missions of U.S. nuclear forces, this is nonsense. Japanese political leaders are intelligent enough to know that going nuclear would have huge ramifications that would not be in Japan’s national interest. No political party in Japan supports acquiring nuclear weapons.

    Sixty-four years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the anti- nuclear sentiment in Japan remains strong. Over 1,400 local authorities (about 80 percent) have made nuclear-free pledges. These local authorities represent the spirit of nuclear abolition in Japanese society far better than the LDP-led central government.

    If the Obama administration moves decisively to get rid of “the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War.” the joy of the vast majority of the Japanese people will overwhelm the reservations of an unrepresentative clique in the Japanese bureaucratic system. So, Mr. Obama, act boldly. Grasp the opportunity that is before you. Japan is ready.

    This article was originally published by the Japan Times

    Shingo Fukuyama is secretary general of the Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs (Gensuikin). Hiromichi Umebayashi is special adviser to Peace Depot, a nonprofit organization.