Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: US

  • Concerned Student Writes to President Bush

    Dear President Bush,

    My Name is Nelly Martinez. I am a student at Mount San Antonio College. Right now I am researching nuclear arms. Recently, a disturbing article came out about this particular subject in the Los Angeles Times. After researching and learning about the power of our nuclear arsenal, I was shocked and amazed at why we need such disastrous weapons. Maybe someone can help explain my misconceptions.

    In my mind, I believe the issue of having the most weapons is an issue of who has the bigger toy, or the bigger muscles. What about the opinions of the ordinary American citizens who do not have knowledge about nuclear issues? What about those who decide to just ignore the subject and place this issue in the back of their heads? It was a relief to hear that there is a treaty banning the testing of nuclear weapons. If one Trident submarine has enough firepower to wipe out the Northern Hemisphere and cause devastating effects, why do we need any more of such submarines? How can anyone want to destroy the life of other innocent human beings?

    There is no doubt that my life, the life of my family (whom I love and cherish with all my heart) and the life of future generations will be affected by a nuclear war. The fact is no one would survive a nuclear war. Isn’t that enough to get through the minds of the people in charge of these weapons? In my opinion, whoever decides to make more nuclear weapons is worse than Hitler. Such actions could result in a World Holocaust and it is doubtful that mankind could survive a nuclear winter.

    Please do not forget about the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But also, do not forget about the past in general so that we can learn from our mistakes. I know that the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are nothing in comparison to the capability we have now. I also know that if another country should strike the US with a nuclear weapon, we would without a doubt retaliate. This process of striking and reciprocating a nuclear attack could continue until mankind itself would be wiped out. I do support the Constitution’s “Right to Bear Arms,” but how far must we go?

    Here is a hypothetical example: We the Americans are up against the “enemy” standing in a pool of gas, representing our world, one side has 16,000 matches ready to ignite the other side has 30,000 matches. Who will win? One match alone (The firepower in one Trident sub) will do the job.

    I am here to plea for some kind of answer to my questions because I love my life, my country, my people and other people as well. I truly want my children’s children to live after I am gone from this earth. My dream is to live until I am old and not be vaporized by a nuclear bomb. Please Mr. President, help us keep peace with other countries and obey the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Once we violate this Treaty the United States has made with Russia, both countries will start making more unnecessary nuclear weapons.

    Sincerely,

    Nelly Martinez A Concerned Student and Citizen

  • U.S. and Russian Nuclear Defense Strategies are Fatally Flawed – They Can’t be Used Without Self-Destruction

    Nuclear Defense Strategies – The nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, left-over from the Cold War, present the world with its greatest danger. These two arsenals have 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. The nuclear defense strategies for Russia and the U.S. are similar. Within minutes upon receiving instruction to fire, either one or both countries can launch thousands of missiles. These strategies are fatally flawed because launching thousands of nuclear weapons could destroy all countries including themselves.

     

    Global Danger – In a study made by the World Health Organization, they found that a nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia could kill one billion people outright. In addition, it could produce a Nuclear Winter that would probably kill an additional one billion people. It is possible that more than two billion people, one-third of all the humans on Earth, would be destroyed almost immediately in the aftermath of a global thermonuclear war. The rest of humanity would be reduced to prolonged agony and barbarism. These findings are from a study chaired by Sune K. Bergstrom (the 1982 Nobel laureate in Physiology and Medicine) nearly 20 years ago. (1)

     

    Subsequent studies have had similar findings. Professor Alan Robock says, “Everything from purely mathematical models to forest fire studies shows that even a small nuclear war would devastate the earth. (2)

     

    Rich Small’s work, financed by the Defense Nuclear Agency, suggests that burning cities would produce a particularly troublesome variety of smoke. The smoke of forest fires is bad enough. But the industrial targets of cities are likely to produce a rolling, black smoke, a denser shield against incoming sunlight.(3)

     

    The late Dr. Carl Sagan and his associates in their studies found that a nuclear explosive force equal to 100 million tons of dynamite could create a global nuclear winter. (4) The U.S. and Russia each have on alert a nuclear explosive power more than 10 times greater than that needed to create a nuclear winter.

     

    Nuclear explosions with temperatures of 3,000 to 4,000 degrees centigrade at ground zero could start giant flash fires leaving large cities and forests burning with no one to fight them. Nuclear explosions can also lift an enormous quantity of fine soil particles into the atmosphere, creating more than l00,000 tons of fine, dense, dust for every megaton exploded on a surface. (5) This dust would add to the darkness and cold.

     

    Explosive Power Compared – Nuclear weapons are far more powerful than is generally realized.

     

    *The terrorist bomb that was detonated outside an office building in Oklahoma City in 1995 killed 168 people. This fertilizer and fuel bomb weighted 3 and 1/2 tons. (6)

     

    * A small nuclear warhead, that one person can lift can have an explosive power equal to 40,000 tons of dynamite, or 8,000 trucks each carrying 5 tons of dynamite, or 3 Hiroshima size bombs

     

    *One average size U.S. strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive force equal to 50,000 trucks each carrying 5 tons of dynamite.

     

    *If 1,000 of the average size 0U.S. warheads were used they could produce an explosive force equal to 50 million trucks each carrying 5 tons of dynamite.

     

    *One average size Russian strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 40,000 trucks each carrying 5 tons of dynamite. (7)

     

    Leader’s Concern – General Lee Butler (USAF), former head of the US Strategic Command, said, “… twenty nuclear weapons would suffice to destroy the twelve largest Russian cities with a total population of twenty-five million people and therefore that arsenals in the hundreds, much less in the thousands, can serve no meaningful strategic objective.” (8) Twenty nuclear warheads is less than one percent of the nuclear weapons that the U.S. has set for hair-trigger release.

     

    Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, says there was no long-range war plan. Neither Russia nor the U.S. wanted to get behind. Each side strove to build the greatest number of nuclear weapons. More importantly, he said, the totals far exceeded the requirements of any conceivable war plan. (9)

     

    Accidental Nuclear War – There have been at least three times in the past that the U.S. and Russia almost launched to false warnings. Each time they came within less than 10 minutes of launching before learning the warnings were false.

     

    * In l979, a U.S. training tape showing a massive attack was accidentally played.

     

    * In l983, a Soviet satellite mistakenly signaled the launch of a U.S. missile.

     

    * In 1995, Russia almost launched its missiles because a Norwegian rocket studying the northern lights was mistakenly taken as the start of a nuclear attack. (10)

     

    False warnings are a fact of life. For example, during an 18-month period in 1979-80 the U.S. had 147 false alarms in its strategic warning system. (11)

     

    Casper Weinberger, when he was President Reagan’s Defense Secretary, said that since an anti-ballistic missile defense could require decisions within seconds there would be no time for White House approval. Hitting a missile having a head start and going thousands of miles per hour does not allow much time to assess whether a warning is false or not. (12) Do we want computers determining our fate?

     

    Action – All countries with nuclear weapons need to assess what would be the consequences of their use, including possibility of self-destruction. Reporting these findings to the public could help build a better understanding of the need to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

     

    General Butler has said the world can immediately and inexpensively improve security by taking nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert. (13)

     

    Reference and Notes

     

    1. Sagan, Carl. The Nuclear Winter, Council for a Livable World Education, Boston, MA, 1983.

     

    2. Robock, Alan. “New models confirm nuclear winter,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, September 1989, pp.32-35.. .

     

    3. Blum, Deborah, Scientists try to predict nuclear future from forest fires, The Sacramento Bee. Nov. 28, 1987.

     

    4. Sagan, Op. Cit.

     

    5. Ibid.

     

    6. Hamilton, Arnold. “McVeigh forgoes 2 final appeals,“ Contra Coast Times, June 8, 2001.

     

    7. Norris, Robert S. and Arkin, William. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,”’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/Aug. 96.

     

    8. Butler, Lee. Talk at the University of Pittsburgh , May13, 1999.

     

    9. McNamara, Robert. Blundering Into Disaster, Pantheon Books, New, York, 1986.

     

    10. Babst, Dean. “Preventing An Accidental Armageddon,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Feb., 2000.

     

    11. Hart, Senator Gary and Goldwater, Senator Barry, Recent False Alerts from the Nation’s Missile Attack Warning System, a report to the Senate Armed Forces, 9 October, 1980, pp. 4 & 5.

     

    12. Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons, hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 25, 1984, pp. 69-74.

     

    13. Schell, Jonathan, “The Gift Of Time,” The Nation, Feb. 8, 1998, p. 58.

  • National Missile Defense Jeopardizes Foreign Relations

    Arguably the most important issue regarding US foreign policy is the decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system (NMD). There is a general bipartisan agreement to engage a system of some kind, although when and to what extent (meaning size and complexity), are issues of continuing debate.

    Depending on the Bush administration’s decision, the consequences could be dire, ranging from a mere increase in anti-American sentiment to a full-blown arms race like that of the Cold War years. Thus, the most critical factor to be considered is the extent to which this decision will affect US international relations. In particular, the US has come a long way in improving relations with Russia. To upset this progress would jeopardize years of diplomatic efforts. Additionally, China and France have voiced strong opposition to NMD deployment.

    The current administration has proposed a massive NMD with land, sea, and space-based components. The possibility of an internationally accepted US defense system of this type is unfortunately very unlikely. Furthermore, as a world superpower, the United States also has a responsibility to lead by example. But the willingness of the present administration to advocate deployment of a NMD and thereby risk violation of international obligations sends the wrong message to the rest of the world.

    Continued U.S. commitments to arms reduction is of critical importance to maintaining positive international relations. The deployment of a NMD system could significantly affect the status of two of the most important treaties signed by both the United States and Russia ? the USSR at the time the treaties were signed ? in the history of nuclear disarmament: the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The disregard for these treaties is inconsistent with our responsibilities, and will not allow us to legitimately hold other countries to their obligations.

    The sole purpose of the ABM Treaty is to limit missile defense deployment. Some argue that provisions of the 29-year-old document are outdated and, as Henry A. Kissinger claims, do not address the “new national security environment, one that was not even considered, let alone anticipated when the ABM treaty was signed.” By that same logic, one could dispute the validity of the 225-year-old United States Constitution, a concept unthinkable to those who ironically share Kissinger’s view.

    While the ABM Treaty would be altogether disregarded in the case of a comprehensive missile defense, the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be undermined by a failure of the U.S. to consider the potential results of NMD deployment. The focus of this treaty is on the reduction of nuclear weapons, but a large-scale defense system would result in other nuclear powers feeling threatened in their capabilities of deterrence, thus triggering further weapons proliferation.

    Unfortunately, adherence to the commitments outlined in the ABM and NPT treaties is apparently not of utmost concern to US policy makers. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen has gone so far as to suggest complete withdrawal from the ABM Treaty if agreements between the US and Russia on its modification cannot be attained. This kid of attitude is not only reckless, it does not contribute to improving post-Cold War relations with our former adversaries.

    While some Third World countries have access to nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, the threat of attack is not significant enough to risk the deterioration of our relations with the rest of the world. In addition, diplomacy has been shown to have desirable outcomes when applied to arms reduction. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program between the US and Russia has helped Russia disable more than 4,900 nuclear warheads at cost of $3.2 billion to the US from 1992 to 2000.

    Without a doubt, the most serious current threat is that of individual rather than state-sponsored terrorist attacks. No missile defense system of any kind could protect American citizens from terrorists using delivery systems other than ballistic missiles. The recent attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and closer to home, the World Trade Center bombing are grim reminders of that possibility.

    On the international level, a policy of non-deployment of a NMD could help preserve years of improving relations with Russia achieved since the end of the Cold War. Regression to previous tensions and animosities could create much more of a threat than that which currently exists.

    Russia warned that during the Reagan years it had developed “programs to counteract asymmetrically” US missile defense systems, and should we continue to insist on deployment, Russia could “take them up again.” China has threatened to increase its arsenal at any cost to counter our defenses and urges the US to cease NMD plans. Otherwise, Chinese officials warn, “we’ll be ready.”

    By discontinuing NMD testing and development, we will avoid anti-American sentiment that could potentially spark future conflicts posing a much greater threat to US security than that which is currently perceived.

    As much as we have a responsibility to defend our nation, we also have a responsibility to stand by the promises we made under international treaties. In this age of globalization, we cannot afford the isolationist attitude that would be the result of ignoring international obligations and the concerns of those in the global community.

    In conclusion, the Bush administration should consider the impacts of the proposed National Missile Defense system and question whether it is worth the risk of jeopardizing US foreign relations and possibly the future security of our nation.

    *John Ginder is a senior at UCSB majoring in global studies with an emphasis in socioeconomics and politics. This piece appeared in the Voices section of the Santa Barbara News-Press, Sunday, April 29, 2001.

  • U.S. Missile Defense Compromises Global Security

    BEIJING- Every state has the right to security and each government has the obligation to protect its nationals. But how to exercise this right and acquire security in its real sense is a question worth serious deliberation.

    As globalization progresses, countries are becoming increasingly interdependent. This is as true in the security area as it is economically.

    Security is mutual and indivisible. No country can exist in isolation, nor can it resolve all the security issues it faces single-handedly. True security is based on global security and on the extensivecooperation of the international community.

    A military edge cannot guarantee security. Unilateralism will only lead to greater insecurity.

    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a complex problem that can be tackled only through global cooperation. Setting up a national missile defense system would not contribute to solving this problem, but only further aggravate it.

    Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has made considerable progress in nonproliferation. It is therefore neither wise nor advisable to build a so-called missile defense system, whose effect is questionable, at the expense of the international arms control and nonproliferation system after so many years’ efforts, including those of the United States.

    Some people describe the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as part of the “Cold War mentality” and hold that it should be discarded. This view is neither fair nor just. Like all the other arms control treaties, the ABM treaty reflects the interdependent relationship among contracting parties in security matters. This relationship did not disappear with the end of the Cold War, but rather is becoming even stronger in the era of globalization. The ABM treaty is effective. It is not outdated.

    Just as the ABM Treaty cannot be viewed in isolation, neither can a U.S. missile defense program. Offense and defense are always indivisible. Enhanced defensive capabilities, to a large degree, mean improved offensive capabilities as well.

    This is particularly true for the United States, the only superpower. The United States possesses the biggest nuclear arsenal and the most sophisticated conventional weapons in the world, and it pursues a deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons. A missile defense will severely impede the nuclear disarmament process and render any U.S. initiative on the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons meaningless.

    People cannot but ask what on earth is the real intention behind U.S. insistence on developing a missile defense system in defiance of the international community. Is it really to defend against the missile threat from the few so-called “problem states,” or for greater military advantage over other big countries?

    Recently there has been relaxation of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. All parties should cherish this hard-won state of affairs and create conditions for continued relaxation. Theater missile defense would only add complex and confrontational factors to the detriment of regional stability.

    Some in the United States clamorously advocate incorporating Taiwan into the U.S. theater missile defense system or providing anti-missile weapons or technologies to Taiwan. This is a most dangerous tendency. If the United States chose to do so, it would put Taiwan under the American umbrella of military protection and restore, de facto, the U.S.-Taiwan military alliance. It would surely inflate the arrogance of the forces for Taiwan’s independence, jeopardize stability in the Taiwan Straits, endanger the peaceful reunification of China and lead to serious regression in China-U.S. relations.

    China has no intention of threatening U.S. security, nor does it seek such capabilities. China has always exercised great restraint in the development of nuclear arms. China has always pursued a policy of no first use, and keeps a small but effective nuclear force only for the purpose of containing other countries’ possible nuclear attacks. This policy will remain unchanged.

    China and the United States shoulder common responsibility for maintaining world peace and security. A cooperative and constructive relationship between China and the United States will have a crucial impact on world stability.

    China and the United States have long engaged in fruitful cooperation over nonproliferation. China is ready to continue on this path. But we also look forward to serious and pragmatic dialogue with the Bush administration on missile defense and related issues.

    *Tang Jiaxuan is the Foreign Minister of China. He contributed this comment to the Los Angeles Times Syndicate, Friday, March 30, 2001

  • Preserving the ABM Treaty and Promoting International Security

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    It gives me great pleasure to attend this conference in the beautiful city of Ottawa, to exchange views with our Canadian friends on some important issues related to international security and arms control. To my knowledge, this is one of a series of seminars on National Missile Defense (NMD) Canada has organized in recent months. I hope, and I am convinced, that these open discussions will help deepen people’s understanding on this issue. Now, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some of my personal observations.

    I. Negative Consequences of NMD for International Peace and Security

    The relentless development of an NMD system by the United States is, undoubtedly, a major event in today’s international politics, which will have far-reaching negative impacts on international security environment. Recently, some key members of the Bush administration have reiterated on different occasions that they will, as promised during the election campaign, intensify this program. This is very disturbing.

    Firstly, the development and deployment of NMD by the United States will jeopardize global strategic balance and stability, and undermine mutual trust and cooperation among major powers. To develop and deploy NMD, the United States has to first overcome a legal “barrier”, namely, the ABM treaty concluded between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union in 1972, which explicitly prohibits the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system. For the past decades, this treaty has served as a corner stone of global strategic balance and stability. The compliance of this treaty has been the prerequisite for the strategic nuclear weapons reductions as claimed by the two nuclear superpowers. During the Cold War, it played a pivotal role in preventing the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union from getting out of control. As a matter of fact, in the post-Cold War era today, the treaty still provides a security framework for multilateral nuclear disarmament, and for further bilateral reductions of nuclear arsenals by the U.S. and Russia. Though bilateral in nature, the strategic significance of the treaty goes far beyond the scope of the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship. It has been universally recognized as playing an indispensable role in maintaining global strategic stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing international security. If, however, the treaty is amended, as requested by the U.S., it would certainly lose all its significance, and the global strategic balance and stability would be the victim.

    Over the years, the international situation has undergone drastic changes, but the basic international strategic configuration has remained relatively unchanged in one important aspect, i.e. the strategic balance and mutual deterrence between major powers. This is due, in no small measure, to the existence of the ABM treaty. It must be pointed out that “strategic balance” and “strategic parity” are two different concepts. A strategic balance can exist between a small nuclear-weapon state and a nuclear superpower, so long as the former possesses a second strike capability, that is, the capability to inflict unbearable damage on the latter after sustaining the first nuclear attack. The significance of the ABM treaty lies in the fact that, by prohibiting the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system, it has maintained the strategic balance between the two nuclear superpowers, by extension, has maintained to a lesser degree the strategic balance among all the nuclear-weapon states, including small nuclear powers vis-a-vis the nuclear superpowers. No matter the U.S. like it or not, the fact is that, it is precisely because of this global strategic balance that the major powers have felt compelled to address global and regional security issues through peaceful means and avoid direct confrontation with each other. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the preservation of the global strategic balance is a prerequisite for the maintenance of international peace and security. The U.S. development and possible deployment of NMD poses a serious challenge to the already fragile global strategic balance. Such a move will disrupt the existing strategic equilibrium among major powers, and jeopardize the security interest of other countries. This will undoubtedly arouse suspicion and mistrust among major powers, hampering their coordination and cooperation in international security affairs.

    Secondly, the U.S. NMD program will severely hinder the international arms control and disarmament process and even trigger a new round of arms race. The balance of power among major countries, and the global strategic balance based thereon, constitutes the prerequisite for progress in the international arms control and disarmament process. Once this strategic equilibrium is disrupted, the arms control and disarmament process will inevitably become stagnated and even reversed. If the ABM treaty is amended as insisted by the U.S. and the deployment of NMD legitimated, the basis of global strategic stability will be removed. This will bring about fundamental changes to the international security environment. Against this background, who can be sure the existing arms control treaties will continue to be complied with? And who can guarantee that the new arms control negotiations will go smoothly?

    The reductions of their nuclear arsenals by the U.S. and Russia through bilateral agreements and/or unilateral initiatives are welcome and should be encouraged. However, we should also recognize that reduction of surplus nuclear weapons with “overkill” capabilities, is little more than the rationalization of their nuclear force structure, and is a far cry from nuclear disarmament in its real sense. As the only superpower, the U.S. already possesses the strongest military force and most advanced nuclear arsenal, and pursues a nuclear deterrence policy based on the first use of nuclear weapons. On top of all this, this country is trying to break the taboo that has been maintained for the last 30 years in the strategic field by building a nationwide missile defense system. In this sense, NMD will become a multiplier of the U.S. strategic offensive force. And the NMD program is in essence an U.S. program of unilateral nuclear expansion, which contains the inherent danger of triggering an arms race at a higher level. In specific terms, it may start off an arms race in outer space, and may also extend the arms race from offensive weapons to defensive weapons. It is true that, at current stage, the U.S. enjoys military and technological superiority, and other countries are not in a position to compete with it. From a long-term perspective, however, it will be unrealistic to expect other countries sit on their hands while the U.S. develops NMD. They will certainly take all sorts of counter measures to safeguard their national security.

    Thirdly, the U.S. NMD program will undermine the international non-proliferation regime and efforts. The U.S. claims that its development of missile defense systems is intended to counter the increasing threats posed by missile proliferation. I for one, and I don’t think I am alone here, do not share the U.S. assessment of the missile threats it is faced with. To say the least, the U.S. has over-exaggerated the missile threats from so-called “countries of concern”. Judging from their economic and technological strength, it is difficult to conclude that these countries will be able to develop, much less to deploy, missiles capable of reaching the U.S. territory in the foreseeable future. Even if, a very big “if”, these countries were capable of acquiring such capabilities, they would certainly not lose sight of the massive retaliatory capabilities from the U.S., both nuclear and conventional, not to mention the inevitable strong reactions from the international community. With all this and the fact that chemical and biological weapons have been banned by international treaties, and moreover, the NPT has been extended indefinitely, there is virtually no possibility that these countries may launch a first strikes against the U.S. In addition, the U.S. relations with these countries are not immutable. We all know that, the missile threat that the U.S. was faced with during the Cold War was many times greater than that today. If the U.S. did not find it necessary to amend and scrap the ABM treaty, there is, in my view, certainly less reason to do so today. Even if we conclude there is a danger of missile proliferation, NMD is not a solution to this problem. On the contrary, it can only aggravate it. Now, an international regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has by and large been established and proven. With regard to the prevention of missile proliferation, MTCR has played a certain role. With MTCR and a series of other initiatives and proposals in this field, one may say that this issue has been half-resolved. If major powers can work together, and in collaboration with the whole international community, the issue of missile proliferation can be resolved, step by step, through political and diplomatic means. The development of NMD is tantamount to “drinking poison to quench thirst”. It cannot solve the problem. Instead, it will undercut the very foundation of the international non-proliferation regime, and even stimulate further proliferation of missile.

    Fourthly, the development and deployment of NMD by the U.S. will increase the weight of the military factor in international relation in detriment to international peace and security. In essence, the international debate on the NMD issue is about what kind of international order should be established, and a choice between unipolar and multipolar world. This is also a debate between two security concepts: seeking one’s own absolute security at the expense of others’ security, or seeking universal security based on international cooperation. In fact, more and more people in the world have come to realize that, the real motive behind the U.S. NMD program is to seek its own absolute military superiority and absolute security. Once NMD is deployed, no matter whether it is really effective or not, it would further strengthen the U.S. tendency toward unilateralism and the tendency to use or threaten to use force. People can imagine, after the deployment of NMD, the U.S. would not sit idly in this impregnable “Fortress America”, enjoying the clear and peaceful sky above. Its omnipresent “national interests” and its zealous “sense of mission”, will drive this NMD-shielded superpower, to embark on a crusade to seek and strike at “countries of concern” all around the world with even higher enthusiasm and adventurism. This will create more instability in the world.

    History has shown that security is both mutual and relative. Real security can only be achieved if a country builds its own security on the basis of common security for all. It is a truly effective way to seek security within a framework of collective security through dialogue and cooperation on the basis of equality. Any attempt to build its own security to the detriment of the security of others, will only undermine global strategic balance and stability, thus resulting in the loss of sense of security for all. In a world where all countries feel insecure, they would seek every means to protect themselves. As a result, military factor will play a bigger role in international relations, and huge amount of financial resources and materials that would otherwise be devoted to economic development will be diverted to arms buildup. Under such circumstances, how can a country truly enjoy real security? How can the world remain stable? As a matter of fact, today and in the foreseeable future, the U.S. has and will continue to enjoy more security than any other countries.

    II. NMD is not conductive to peace and security in Asia and the Pacific

    Both Canada and China are located in the Pacific region, and thus are naturally more concerned about the security situation in the region. With the end of the Cold War, the situation of the region on the whole has been moving towards relaxation. Most countries in the region take the development of national economy and the improvement of living standard of people as their priority task. To that end, they have made great efforts in building a peaceful and stable regional environment. Thanks to joint efforts of countries concerted, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the “Shanghai Five” and other mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation on regional security are in the steady process of development. They have played an active role in promoting mutual understanding and trust among countries concerned and in safeguarding regional peace and stability. Meanwhile, bilateral exchanges and consultations between countries of the region have also gradually increased. It has become the main trend of the region to strengthen dialogue, promote understanding, build mutual trust, and resolve issues through bilateral and multilateral coordination and cooperation. In particular, with the relaxation of tension in the Korean Peninsula, the situation in this region is further evolving toward peace.

    At the same time, however, factors detrimental to peace and development in Asia and the Pacific still exist. As an important component of global security structure, security in this region is closely related to the overall international security situation. The implementation of NMD program by the U.S. will not only undermine global strategic balance and stability, but also disrupt efforts for security in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, the U.S. also intends to deploy Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) in the region. Research and development of TMD per se may not necessarily constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. But, the crucial question is how large is the scale and what are the nature and function of TMD that the U.S. is prepared to deploy in Asia. If this TMD can be used as part of NMD and constitute the front deployment of NMD in the region, then its adverse impact on regional security and stability will be no less than the NMD itself.

    It is obvious that countries in Asia and the Pacific have many common or similar views on the issue of missile defense and have much at stake. It is the aspiration of most countries in the region that global and regional strategic balance and stability should be maintained; that mutual trust and cooperation among major powers will be enhanced; that common security for all countries will be ensured; that individual country should not seek absolute security for itself at the expense of others; that existing arms control achievements will be consolidated and cooperation in this area will be strengthened; that the U.S.-Russia bilateral nuclear disarmament process will not be reversed; that non-proliferation issue will be resolved through political and diplomatic means; and that the tendency towards unilateralism in international relations should be held at bay.

    III. China’s position on Missile Defense

    China needs peace and is eager to see the maintenance of global and regional peace and security. For that reason, China is firmly opposed to the proposed NMD

    What I want to emphasize here is that China does not want to see a confrontation between China and U.S. on the NMD issue nor an arms race between two countries. We oppose the NMD because we hope that the existing mutual deterrence between the two countries can be preserved. This does not in any way imply that we intend to threaten the security of the U.S. with our nuclear weapons. But, on the other hand, China should have the necessary and sufficient means of self-defense, so that we will not be bullied and blackmailed by any other countries again. China will not allow its legitimate means of self-defense to be weakened or even taken away by anyone in anyway. This is one of the most important aspects China’s national security.

    Since the 1960’s, China has been forced to develop its own limited nuclear force due to the repeated nuclear blackmails it has encountered. During the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958 and the border conflict between China and the Soviet Union in 1969, the U.S. and the Soviet Union respectively threatened for several times to strike China with nuclear weapons. To survive, China had no other choice. Because China developed its own nuclear weapons against such a special historical backdrop, China has never intended to threaten other countries with nuclear weapons. For that reason, on the very first day when China came into possession of nuclear weapons, China solemnly declared that under no circumstance would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. As is known to all, though China’s nuclear arsenal is the smallest and least advanced among the five nuclear powers, China is the first to pursue the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we have been pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, consistently developed good relationship with its neighbors and followed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in handling its relations with other nations. History has demonstrated that China’s possession of nuclear weapons has not changed its peaceful foreign policy.

    In the past two years, the UN General Assembly has twice adopted the resolution on “Preservation of and Compliance with the ABM Treaty” with an overwhelming majority. This fully demonstrates the international community’s political will against the deployment of NMD and the amendment of the ABM treaty. It is particularly regrettable that, despite the widespread international and domestic opposition, the new U.S. administration would still stick to the NMD program. We sincerely hope that the U.S. government could heed the appeal of the international community, abandon the NMD program, return to the framework of collective security and join the international efforts to maintain the global strategic balance and stability as well as the system of international arms control treaties.

    Thank you.

    *Sha Zukang is Director-General of the Department of Arms Control & Disarmament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.

  • The Battle Lines Are Being Drawn over the International Criminal Court

    The battle lines are being drawn between those who believe in the rule of law and those who do not. A powerful and respected American voice that has been raised to support the establishment of the International Criminal Court. It rebuts the ill-informed and misguided views of those who denounce the proposed court as a threat to American interests and military personnel. It deserves the widest possible dissemination by those who support the ICC.

    Monroe Leigh has been Legal Adviser to both the State and Defense Departments. He is a past President of the American Bar Association and the American Society for International Law and is an outstanding authority. On Feb. 21, 2001, he wrote to Chairman Hyde, of the House Committee on International Relations, that the Bill introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (The American Service Member’s Protection Act S.2726, June 14, 2000) as a preemptive strike against the ICC, (and opposed by the State and Defense departments) was replete with misconceptions . Nonetheless, the Senator had managed to obtain signatures from, a dozen distinguished American leaders, including ex- Secretaries of State, CIA and National Security Advisers, in opposition to the ICC. Leigh, ever the gentleman, said the signatories were simply misinformed. In fact, assured Leigh, the ICC would offer greater protection to Americans in military service than now exits at home or abroad.

    Leigh warned that persistent efforts by U.S. negotiators to exempt American military personnel from legal restraints that other nations were being asked to accept could only exacerbate relations with our allies. To rebut the signatories assembled by Helms, ten former Presidents of the America Society of International Law, including its Honorary President Stephen Schwebel, added their names to the Leigh memo. These very distinguished American jurists – in their personal capacities – concluded that the U.S. should accept the Treaty for an ICC “without change in the text.”

    To top it off, Monroe Leigh wrote a COMMENT that will appear in the next issue of the prestigious American Journal of International Law (Vol.95.No.1, A. 2001). He analyzes the arguments put forward by those who would reject the ICC – described by Leigh as “the most important international juridical institution that has been proposed since the San Francisco Conference of 1945.” He notes that under existing international law the sovereign of the territory where a crime is committed has jurisdiction to try the captured offender. The notion that U.S. nationals cannot be tried for war crimes if their government is not a party to the ICC treaty is not supported by existing international law as recognized by the highest U.S. courts. Strident demands for exceptionalism can only reinforce suspicions about American hegemonic ambitions. Leigh notes ICC provisions that give national courts absolute priority to try the accused in a fair trial. He ridicules “the specter of the politically motivated Prosecutor” and spells out the many safeguards that will prevent abuse and protect the rights of the accused. He dismisses the criticism that the ICC might deny due process to U.S. service personnel as “totally misplaced.” His conclusion: “In sum, the United States can most effectively protect its national-security interests, as well as the individual interests of U.S. nationals, by accepting the Statute of Rome – better sooner than later.”

    Many others, of course, have spoken out in favor of the Court, including the excellent survey of legal experts by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.. The conclusion of that comprehensive study, articulated by Harvard Law Professors Abram Chayes and Anne-Marie Slaughter: “The United states should be taking the lead in shaping these new institutions. It is not too late.” Opponents of the ICC do not speak for the United States. Leigh, a conservative “establishment” man of impeccable credentials, has raised a respected voice in opposition to unsound harangues coming from uninformed adversaries.. (I am grateful to Heather Hamilton of the World Federalist Association for drawing my attention to the Leigh correspondence.)

    Despite the organized and vocal opposition to the ICC, President Clinton directed Ambassador Scheffer (who represented the U.S. at the U.N. with distinction) to sign the Treaty at the last moment. It was an important symbolic act – showing that the outgoing Administration favored the goals of the ICC, despite need for improvements. Opponents of the ICC howled with anger and threatened to erase the signature – a rather bizarre suggestion. The U.S. now sits silent at the U.N. deliberations. The new Republican Administration will have to be persuaded that the ICC is in our national interest. Let the voice of the informed public now be heard

  • Missile Defense and the Maginot Line

    Following World War I, the French decided to build a line of defense that would make them invulnerable to future attack by Germany. They created a 400-mile stretch of defensive installations known as the Maginot Line. It was considered quite high-tech for the time, and the French took great pride in it. When the Germans invaded and quickly defeated France in World War II, they simply went around the Maginot Line. One wonders if there is a lesson here that might apply to the current US plans to develop and deploy a missile defense system to protect against ballistic missiles launched by small hostile nations.

    Imagine this scenario. The United States proceeds with its plans to create a National Missile Defense system. The system employs the latest technology considered capable of shooting and destroying a ballistic missile launched at the United States. The system costs some $100 to $200 billion that might have been used to provide health care and education for America’s youth. Nonetheless, proponents of the system are proud of their accomplishment. They have built a defensive system that will protect the United States against missile attacks by countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq — should these countries ever acquire nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States.

    Let’s further imagine that a decade into the future Saddam Hussein succeeds in obtaining a few nuclear warheads and a ballistic missile delivery system capable of reaching the US. The proponents of the National Missile Defense system feel justified in their vision because their system will protect the US from a nuclear-armed missile attack by Saddam Hussein. Now, Hussein may be belligerent, aggressive and hostile to the United States, but he is not suicidal. He decides against attacking an American city by means of a missile attack, which could be traced back to him. Instead he arranges for a nuclear weapon to be smuggled into the US by ship, truck or plane. Of course, only a few trusted accomplices know that it is him who has made these arrangements. In this modern-day Maginot Line-type scenario, a determined enemy would simply go around the defense or, in this case, under it.

    In a different scenario, incoming missiles from a potential enemy might go right through the missile shield. Many experts believe that it will not be difficult to develop offensive measures to overcome the defensive shield. MIT scientists Theodore Postol and George Lewis write: “The Pentagon claims that the warhead and the ineffective large balloon decoy it is testing against are representative of the missile threat from an idealized imagined adversary an adversary presumed to be capable of building intercontinental range ballistic missiles, and nuclear warheads that are sufficiently light and compact to be mounted on such missiles, but at the same time so bungling as to be unable to hide the warhead inside a Mylar balloon decoy released along with empty balloons or to build warhead-shaped cone decoys.” In other words, it is quite possible that after spending upwards of $100 billion to create a missile defense, the shield will prove to be ineffective against an adversary sophisticated enough to develop decoys along with ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads.

    Unfortunately, the fact that the planned National Missile Defense is likely to be wasteful and ineffective is not the worst of it. The truly dangerous aspect of moving forward with deployment of missile defenses is what it will do to our relations with Russia and China. Both countries are strongly opposed to a US defensive shield because of their fear that it will create a US first-strike potential. From the Russian and Chinese point of view, the shield would allow the US to attack them in a surprise first-strike, and then use the shield to destroy any of their remaining missiles that might be launched at the US in response. Their planners, like ours, must think in terms of worst-case scenarios.

    In 1972 the US and the former Soviet Union entered into a treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, prohibiting the development of a national missile defense. Both countries understood that the development of defensive systems would further spur offensive arms races, and that limitations on defense would create the conditions necessary to reduce offensive nuclear arsenals. The ABM Treaty has provided the basis for progress on nuclear disarmament through the START I and II treaties.

    The new US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has been dismissive of the ABM Treaty referring to it as “ancient history,” and publicly suggesting that the treaty is no longer relevant because the Soviet Union no longer exists. At a recent meeting on European security policy in Munich, Rumsfeld, referring to the ABM Treaty, stated: “It was a long time ago that that treaty was fashioned. Technologies were noticeably different. The Soviet Union, our partner in that agreement, doesn’t exist any more.”

    The Russians, however, continue to view this treaty as the foundation of all current and future arms control agreements. The Russian security chief, Sergei Ivanov, responded at the same meeting, “Destruction of the ABM treaty, we are quite confident, will result in the annihilation of the whole structure of strategic stability and create prerequisites for a new arms race including one in space.” Jacques Chirac, the President of France, agrees, having stated that a US missile defense “cannot fail to re-launch an arms race in the world.” This eventuality stands in dramatic contrast to the Russian proposal by President Putin to reduce nuclear arsenals to 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons or below in START III negotiations.

    Sha Zukang, the Director of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, has described the Chinese position on US missile defenses in this way: “To defeat your defenses we’ll have to spend a lot of money, and we don’t want to do this. But otherwise, the United States will feel it can attack anyone at any time, and that isn’t tolerable. We hope [America] will give this up. If not, we’ll be ready.”

    Thus, US plans for missile defenses are a high-stakes game. While they aim at providing security against an improbable future attack by a small nation, they antagonize the other major nuclear powers in the world and are likely to lead to new arms races. While this may be beneficial for weapons producers, it is likely to undermine rather than enhance the security of people everywhere, including Americans.

    The United States agreed with more than 185 other nations at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that it was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.” We also agreed, along with the other declared nuclear weapons states to an “unequivocal undertaking” to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. By proceeding with plans to deploy a National Missile Defense system, the US is turning these promises made in the context of preventing nuclear proliferation into empty rhetoric.

    If the US is serious about keeping these promises and achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons from the world, it should take the following steps:

    • Reaffirm its commitment to the 1972 ABM Treaty;
    • Provide leadership in developing an effective ballistic missile control regime to prevent the spread of this technology;
    • Continue negotiations with states of concern such as North Korea in an effort to find solutions to outstanding problems;
    • Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement;
    • Take steps to diminish the political importance of nuclear weapons such as de-alerting nuclear weapons, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, adopting clear policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons, and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    Security from nuclear threat does not reside in building a Maginot Line in the Sky. Rather, it lies in making the good faith efforts promised long ago to seek the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the world. There is only one way to assure that nuclear weapons will not be used again, and that is to abolish them.

    *David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • An Alternate Approach to US and Global Security

    Missile Defense Aimed at Potential Threats

    The stated security concerns underlying current US interests in developing and deploying a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system focus on a small number of states with future potential to launch ballistic missile attacks against the US. These states (North Korea, Iran and Iraq) are described by the US as “states of concern” (formerly “rogue states”). The Rumsfeld Commission unanimously concluded in 1998: “Concerted efforts by a number of overtly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies.”

    The US claims to restrict its targets of missile defense to these states of concern, and has stated that its missile defense efforts are not meant to prevent missile attacks by Russia or China. These assurances have not been convincing to either Russia or China, and both countries have expressed strong concerns about US BMD plans. The US has focused its concerns on relatively weak states that currently present no ballistic missile threat to the US but may in the future. By moving forward with a missile defense system to protect against these states, the US is antagonizing much more powerful potential adversaries. US leaders have even expressed a willingness to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia, a treaty widely considered to be a foundation of strategic stability in allowing the possibility of continued major reductions in nuclear armaments.

    Categories of Deterrence

    The US plan to proceed with a BMD system is an admission that deterrence cannot be trusted for security. The US is in effect stating that deterrence is insufficient to assure security – at least against these states of concern. The US is, therefore, creating deterrence categories. One category includes states that the US believes can be deterred by nuclear threat (Russia and China), and one category that the US believes cannot be deterred by such means (North Korea, Iran and Iraq). This categorization of deterrence into those who might or might not be deterred should raise fundamental questions about the value and reliability of all deterrence.

    The US plan to build a BMD system may be viewed as a secondary line of defense. If deterrence fails (but only against a small power), the US would be prepared to shoot down the attacking missiles. This would offer the US the benefit of greater degrees of freedom in its relations with the potentially offending states. If, for example, North Korea had ballistic missiles capable of threatening US territory, troops or allies, the US might be reluctant to initiate an attack against North Korea for fear of retaliation. This threat of retaliation by a smaller power would be nullified, or at least perceived to be nullified, by a BMD system. Thus, the deployment of a BMD system would provide the US with a wider range of options in dealing with a smaller hostile nation armed with a small number of ballistic missiles.

    Problems with BMD Deployment

    There are many problems related to the deployment of a US BMD system. These include:

    • it will be plagued with uncertainties as to its reliability;
    • it will undermine arms control in general and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in particular;
    • it will in all likelihood stimulate new nuclear arms races with Russia and China by undermining their deterrence capabilities;
    • it will not prevent the possibility of hostile countries delivering weapons of mass destruction by means other than ballistic missiles;
    • it will be divisive among US allies;
    • it will be a major diversion of monetary and scientific resources from other security and social priorities; and
    • it will undermine adherence to the promises made at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference to an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    Alternative Means of Dealing with Security Risks

    Realistic and credible means of dealing with the security risks posed by North Korea, Iran, Iraq and other potentially hostile nations include:

    1. US leadership in developing an effective ballistic missile control regime to prevent the spread of this technology. This would require concessions by the nuclear weapons states to the phased dismantlement of their current arsenals of ballistic missiles.

    2. Cooperative agreements between the US and the states of concern. Negotiations have already had positive results in the relationship between the US and North Korea. Negotiations with the other states of concern can begin by simply opening discussions on problem areas. Mediation by neutral states or by the UN may be needed.

    3. The US and other nuclear weapons states must take steps to diminish the political importance of their nuclear arsenals. Such steps should include de-alerting all nuclear weapons, adopting clear policies of No First Use of these weapons, withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, and the opening of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

    US plans to develop and deploy a ballistic missile defense system are rooted in fear. It is worth noting that the US, the most militarily and economically powerful nation on Earth, fears from far smaller nations what it itself threatens to do to others. If the US would make a firm commitment to leadership in a global effort to eliminate nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction, it could forego the limited system of ballistic missile defense that it has been pursuing. This course of action would also have risks, but on balance it would be a more meaningful and decent course of action, one that could inspire its own people and people everywhere and one that could free up important resources to build a more solid future for all humanity.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Mr. Bush, The World Doesn’t Want to be American

    MOSCOW -Dear Mr. Bush:

    I am writing to you as a citizen of our planet and someone who beholds the last remaining superpower. Can there be any doubt that the United States plays a major role in guiding our world? Only a fool could disregard that fact. To acknowledge this is a given, even though American spokesmen are perhaps somewhat overly inclined to press the point home to the rest of the world.

    For while America’s role is acknowledged throughout the world, her claim to hegemony, not to say domination, is not similarly recognized. For this reason, I hope, Mr. Bush, as the new American president, that you will give up any illusion that the 21st century can, or even should, be the “American Century.” Globalization is a given – but “American globalization” would be a mistake. In fact, it would be something devoid of meaning and even dangerous.

    I would go even further and say it is time for America’s electorate to be told the blunt truth: that the present situation of the United States, with a part of its population able to enjoy a life of extraordinary comfort and privilege, is not tenable as long as an enormous portion of the world lives in abject poverty, degradation and backwardness.

    For 10 years, U.S. foreign policy has been formulated as if it were the policy of a victor in war, the Cold War. But at the highest reaches of U.S. policy-making no one has grasped the fact that this could not be the basis for formulating post-Cold War policy.

    In fact, there has been no “pacification.” On the contrary, there has been a heightening of inequalities, tension and hostility, with most of the last directed toward the United States.

    Instead of seeing an increase in U.S. security, the end of the Cold War has seen a decline. It is not hard to imagine that, should the United States persist in its policies, the international situation will continue to deteriorate.

    It is also difficult to believe that, under present circumstances, relations between the United States, on the one hand, and China, India and all the rest of the earth that lives in abject poverty, on the other, could develop in a positive direction. Nor is it possible, on the basis of its present posture, for the United States to establish effective, long-term cooperation with its traditional allies, Europe first and foremost.

    Already we see numerous trade disputes, evidence of the conflicting interests separating the United States and the European Union. At the recent conference in The Hague, where the participants were supposed to come up with a common policy on limiting greenhouse effects, U.S. positions were far removed from those of all others. As a result, no decision was taken. This is clearly an example of a failure of “world governance.”

    From the standpoint of the Old World, the post-Cold War period ushered in hopes that now are faded. Over the past decade, the United States has continued to operate along an ideological track identical to the one it followed during the Cold War.

    Need an example? The expansion of NATO eastward, the handling of the Yugoslav crisis, the theory and practice of U.S. rearmament – including the utterly extravagant national missile defense system, which, in turn, is based on the bizarre notion of “rogue states.”

    Isn’t it amazing that disarmament moved further during the last phase of the Cold War than during the period after its end? And isn’t that because U.S. leadership has been unable to adjust to the new European reality? Europe is now a new, independent and powerful player on the world scene. To continue to regard it as a junior partner would be a mistake.

    Europe’s experience must serve as a lesson for future relations, but it can do so only if America and Europe build a genuine, equal partnership.

    Finally, it is hardly a secret that relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated over recent years. Responsibility for this must be shared between Russia and America. The present leadership of Russia appears ready to cooperate with the United States in framing a new agenda for relations. But it is unclear what your orientation will be.

    What we heard during the electoral campaign did not sound encouraging. If we truly want to build a new world order and further European unity, we have to recognize that this will not be possible without an active role for Russia. This recognition is the necessary basis for setting future Russian-American relations on the right path.

    The world is complicated, it contains and expresses a variety of interests and cultures. Sooner or later, international policy, including that of the United States, will have to come to terms with that variety. ‘

    *Mikhail Gorbachev was the last president of the former Soviet Union.

  • Senate Vote Leaves the World a More Dangerous Place

    In failing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the US Senate played partisan politics with an issue of utmost importance to the security of the US and the world. In observing the debates in the Senate on this issue, I was once again left with the impression that our Senators do not fully understand and do not particularly care that the rest of the world pays attention to what they say and do. Much of the world looks to the United States for leadership, but there is little to be found these days in the highest offices of our government.

    In 1995 I attended the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was and remains clearly in the interests of the United States and all other countries in the world to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. At that Treaty Conference the US was fighting for the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Many other countries were questioning, however, whether the Treaty should be extended indefinitely since the US and other nuclear weapons states had not kept their promise for good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament during the first 25 years of the Treaty’s existence.

    In the end, the NPT was extended indefinitely. To achieve this result the US and the other nuclear weapons states agreed to a set of Principles and Objectives that included “a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996.” This Treaty was, in fact, negotiated and opened for signatures in September 1996. The first country to sign was the United States.

    The Comprehensive Test Ban is a treaty that is very much in our interests. After all, we have already conducted some 1,050 atmospheric and underground nuclear test explosions, more than any other nation. The Treaty allows conducting laboratory tests by computer simulation. The US has also been conducting sub-critical nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site, although these violate the spirit if not the letter of the treaty. We are currently spending some $4.5 billion annually on our Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to maintain our nuclear arsenal.

    When the Senate defeated the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty we were saying to the world that we have little interest in providing leadership toward a nuclear weapons free world. Rather, we want to hold open the option of further testing of our nuclear weapons. This means, of course, that other nations may well decide to do the same.

    Prior to the Senate vote, leaders of our key allies in Europe –President Jacques Chirac of France, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, and Chancellor Gerhard Schroder of Germany, wrote: “Rejection of the treaty in the Senate would remove the pressure from other states still hesitating about whether to ratify it. Rejection would give great encouragement to proliferators. Rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence within NATO.”

    But the Senate was not to be swayed by either friends or logic. They chose instead to place their bets on continued reliance on nuclear weapons. They have also, along with the Members of the House of Representatives, voted to deploy a National Missile Defense System “as soon as technologically feasible.” This would mean undermining the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an arms control measure that came into force under the Nixon administration. Despite assurances by the Defense Department that the planned missile defense system is aimed at so-called “rogue” nations and not at the Russians, the Russians have indicated that such a system could mean the end of further reductions in nuclear armaments and possibly the beginning of a new offensive nuclear arms race.

    Neither we nor the Russians want to return to the days of the Cold War. We know the price that was extracted in terms of risk to humanity and in terms of resources (more than $5.5 trillion spent by the U.S. alone). We live in a dangerous world. But, as many top US military leaders have pointed out, there is no problem that nuclear weapons would not make worse.

    Lest we forget, here is what nuclear weapons can do. One nuclear weapon could destroy a city. Two small nuclear weapons destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ten nuclear weapons could destroy a country. Imagine the US with New York, Washington, DC, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Dallas, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle destroyed by nuclear blasts.

    One hundred nuclear weapons could destroy civilization. One thousand nuclear weapons could destroy the human species and most life on Earth. And yet, there remain some 35,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Some 5,000 of these are on hair-trigger alert despite the fact that the Cold War ended ten years ago.

    The Congress is displaying an ostrich-like mentality, believing that we can threaten others with our nuclear weapons while putting up a “shield” to protect ourselves. What is most disturbing about this worldview is that while we keep our collective heads in the sand, we are missing the opportunity to show real leadership in moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. This opportunity may not come again.

    In April 1999 the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation presented its Distinguished Peace Leadership Award to General Lee Butler, a former Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command. General Butler was once in charge of all US strategic nuclear weapons. He was the man responsible for advising the President of the United States on whether or not to use nuclear weapons in a crisis situation. While he held this position, General Butler could never be more than three rings from his telephone. He is now an ardent advocate of abolishing all nuclear weapons.

    While with us in Santa Barbara, General Butler recalled: “When I retired in 1994, I was persuaded that we were on a path that was miraculous, that was irreversible, and that gave us the opportunity to actually pursue a set of initiatives, acquire a new mindset, and re-embrace a set of principles having to do with the sanctity of life and the miracle of existence that would take us on the path to zero. I was dismayed, mortified, and ultimately radicalized by the fact that within a period of a year that momentum again was slowed. A process that I have called the creeping re-rationalization of nuclear weapons was introduced….”

    The Senate vote on the CTBT is reflective of this “creeping re-rationalization of nuclear weapons.” It will undoubtedly be a major subject of concern when the Review Conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty is held in the year 2000. Representatives of many countries will note that the US and other nuclear weapons states have not ratified the CTBT, and they will wonder why. They will wonder whether they should not hold open their own options for developing nuclear arsenals. They will ask: “If the world’s most powerful nation chooses to base its security on nuclear weapons and keeps open its options to continue testing these weapons, shouldn’t we consider doing so as well?”

    In the end, the Senate’s vote was arrogant and shortsighted. It leaves the world a more dangerous place, and the future in greater doubt.

    * David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.