Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: US nuclear policy

  • Congressional Bills Passed Support Bush Agenda For New Nuclear Weapons

    November 2003 witnessed the passing of the Defense Authorization Bill (HR1588) and Energy and Water Appropriations Bill (HR 2754) for Fiscal Year 2004. These bills provide authorization and funding for the nuclear weapons activities of both the US Department of Energy and the US Department of Defense.

    The 2004 bills include proposals to research a new generation of “usable” nuclear weapons, construct a plutonium pit facility and shorten readiness for nuclear testing, revealing the administration’s intent to rely on its nuclear forces for many decades to come – a stark contrast to US demands that other nations should forgo their nuclear arms.

    Defense Authorization Bill
    This bill authorizes annual US defense programs, including the nuclear weapons budget which is allocated in the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization Bill includes provisions that would authorize funding for:

    • Research on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) or nuclear “bunker buster”;
    • Research on Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons or “mini-nukes”;
    • Design, building and environmental review of a new nuclear bomb plant known as the Modern Pit Facility (MPF);
    • Reduction of Enhanced Test Readiness from between 24-36 months to 18 months.

    Most significantly, Congress voted to repeal of the Spratt-Furse amendment. Adopted as part of the 1994 Defense Authorization bill, the Spratt-Furse legislation prohibits the research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons (five kilotons or less). A final vote took place in November 2003 at the Conference Committee on Defense Authorization, where the Spratt-Furse ban was repealed by a House of Representatives vote of 362-40 and a Senate vote of 95-3. The bill, allocating $401billion, was signed by President Bush on 24 November 2003.

    Energy and Water Appropriations Bill
    The Energy and Water Appropriations Bill details the Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear budget, covering funds for the development and production of US nuclear weapons. In July 2003, the House accepted Senator Dianne Feinstein’s (D-CA) amendments, which included the following modifications to the administration’s request:

    • Cut spending on the RNEP from $15 million to $5 million;
    • Eliminate $6 million on Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts for the design of “mini-nukes”;
    • Eliminate $25 million allocated for “Enhanced Test Readiness” which proposes to shorten nuclear test readiness from 24-36 to 18 months;
    • Cut spending on planning and environmental review for the MPF from $23 million to $11 million.

    Most of these proposals, however, were restored in the Senate in September 2003. The bill was reconciled at the House-Senate Conference Committee the following November, where funds totaling $27 billion were approved for water and energy programs. The House voted 387-36 to approve the final version of the bill, and the Senate later approved the bill by a unanimous voice vote. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill was signed by the President on 1 December 2003

    What the Bills Approved

    Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)/ Nuclear “Bunker Busters”
    The Bush administration claims that current US nuclear weapons are unsuitable for use against growing numbers of deeply buried bunkers or stockpiles of chemical and/or biological weapons in enemy states and calls for developing the nuclear “bunker buster.” Designed to withstand high-speed collision with the ground, the “bunker buster” is a nuclear bomb capable of boring through 20-30 feet of rock or concrete before exploding. Research and design activities are currently taking place at Livermore (California) and Los Alamos (New Mexico) nuclear weapons laboratories, both of which are managed by the University of California.

    Unlike the “mini-nuke,” the “bunker buster” is a high yield weapon of between 100 to 300 kilotons (the Hiroshima bomb which killed 140,000 people was 15 kilotons). The detonation of such a weapon would create massive collateral damage; the targeting of underground stockpiles of chemical and/or biological weapons could spread dangerous contaminants and between 10,000-50,000 people would be exposed to a fatal dose radiation within 24 hours if used in urban areas.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization bill approved the continuation of current research on the nuclear “bunker buster.” Under its guidelines, scientists at nuclear weapons labs are able to draft detailed plans of nuclear “bunker busters,” but must seek approval from Congress prior to the commencement of engineering work on its production – a term often referred to as “bending metal.” The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill approved $7.5 million in funds for the research and development (if further authorized by Congress) of the “bunker buster,” half of the $15 million that the Bush administration had requested.

    Low-yield nuclear weapons/“Mini-nukes”
    The concept of “mini-nukes” involves the development of small-scale nuclear warheads which are under five kilotons. With an explosive impact that is small and easier to control, the Pentagon argues that such weapons would be more accurate to target, thereby minimizing collateral damage and inducing only small amounts of radioactive fallout. Research of such weapons is also taking place at Livermore and Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratories.

    Since the Spratt-Furse amendment in 1994, research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons or “mini-nukes” has been prohibited. The introduction of “mini-nukes” would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weaponry, increasing the likelihood of their use in conflict.

    The passing of the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill was significant in revoking the Spratt-Furse amendment, reversing a decade of self-imposed restrictions. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill granted the full $6 million requested by the Bush administration for Advance Concept studies of “mini nukes.” $4 million of this amount will, however, be contingent on the administration’s submittal of a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile report to Congress, detailing reductions made to the US nuclear stockpile. As with the ‘bunker busters,” scientists are able to perform research on the development of “mini nukes,” but must receive Congressional approval prior to plans for production.

    Modern Pit Facility
    A plutonium pit is a steel encased ball that forms the explosive core of nuclear weapons. It serves as a trigger for the fission of atoms within a nuclear warhead, ensuring its explosion upon impact.

    The US had observed a 14-year moratorium since the 1989 closure of the Rocky Flats plutonium pit facility in Colorado. However, on 22 April 2003, Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory announced on that it had produced the first (small-scale) US plutonium pit, effectively re-establishing the nation’s capability to manufacture new plutonium cores for nuclear weapons. The DOE estimates that certification of Los Alamos produced pits will be complete by 2007, thus authorizing the laboratories to produce 10 pits annually for testing purposes.

    In addition, the DOE has also launched plans to build a Modern Pit Facility (MPF), a new nuclear bomb plant that would boost production in excess of 500 plutonium pits a year. Based on this, each year’s production would equal the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, that of China’s. The construction of the MPF could produce the next generation of nuclear weapons with the introduction of “mini-nukes” and “bunker busters” and could also facilitate the contingency held open by the Bush administration to bring old nuclear weapons out of storage and back on active duty.

    The MPF will cost between $2 to $4 billion to construct, with estimated annual operational costs of $300 million. The facility is due to be constructed by 2020 and an environmental investigation is being prepared to determine how and where the pits should be manufactured. The DOE plans to name a location for the plant by April 2004 and is considering the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina; the Pantex Plant facility in Texas; the Nevada Test Site; and sites at Los Alamos and Carlsbad in New Mexico.

    With over 10,000 intact warheads, the US has manufactured enough pits for this stockpile, with another 5,000-12,000 pits in reserve. The renewed production of plutonium pits contravenes US commitments to de-emphasize its reliance on nuclear weapons and adds to speculations regarding Bush’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Plans to launch the MPF and the development of the Los Alamos pit facility coincides with the administration’s plans to increase the US nuclear arsenal and develop a new generation of nuclear weapons.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization bill approved plans for the MPF while the 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill allocated only $11 million for the project, $12 million short of the $23 billion that the White House had originally requested.

    Enhanced Test Readiness
    Despite the current 11-year US test moratorium, the Bush administration has called for the recommencement of nuclear testing in order to prevent the “degradation” of the US nuclear arsenal.

    The last nuclear explosion at the main US nuclear testing ground, the Nevada Test Site, occurred on 23 September 1992. A US test moratorium was subsequently established in 1994, and between 24-36 months was required to prepare the site for the resumption of full-scale testing. For Fiscal Year 2004, the Bush administration has requested the shortening of this time to 18 months.

    While Bush insists that he will not end the moratorium, simultaneous plans for increased funding towards nuclear testing and enhanced readiness of the Nevada Test Site form part of a well-coordinated effort to resume production of nuclear weapons, including new and untested weapons.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization bill allocated $34 million in funds to improve the Nevada Test Site. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill approved $25 million in spending toward Enhanced Test Readiness, but restricted the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to improve its current test readiness capability to 24 months rather than the administration’s proposal of 18 months.

    Analysis: What do the Bills mean?

    In the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that the US nuclear infrastructure had “atrophied,” and emphasized the importance of revitalizing it “to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons and mitigate the risks of technological surprise.” Furthermore, the Pentagon report, “Future Strategic Strike Force” asserts its aims “to transform the nation’s forces to meet the demands placed on them by a changing world order.” The report advocates a new role for nuclear weapons in US strategy, making them “relevant to the threat environment” in the “war on terror.”

    The Bush administration’s view is that US must obtain the technology and skills needed to counter threats of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In April 2003, Linton Brooks, administrator at the NNSA and the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security told a Congressional hearing, “We are seeking to free ourselves from intellectual prohibitions against exploring a full range of technical options.”

    Despite restrictions of certain funds, the approval of the Defense Authorization and Energy and Water Appropriation bills for 2004 shows strong support for most requests sought by the Bush administration. To critics this indicates moving a step closer to realizing the administration’s aggressive nuclear doctrine. The authorization of the bills further confirms to the world that nuclear weapons constitute a central component of the US defense strategy, prompting other countries to redouble their own efforts to acquire nuclear arms and begin nuclear testing.

    The Bush administration’s “vertical proliferation” plans contravene US commitments to de-emphasize reliance on nuclear weapons as well as disregard pledges made under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in taking steps towards disarmament. While the Bush administration demands that North Korea, Iran and other countries renounce their nuclear ambitions and submit to inspections in accordance with the NPT, the US does not engage in a process of transparent and irreversible reduction and elimination of its own arsenal.

    As Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, recently stated, “Double standards are being used here. The US government insists that other countries do not possess nuclear weapons.” He adds, “On the other hand they are perfecting their own arsenal. I do not think that corresponds with the treaty they signed.”

    By assigning a new, more “usable” role for nuclear weapons, the US is increasing the probability of nuclear weapons use, either by a nation or terrorist group. This would make it more likely, not less, that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would be used against the US. Unless effective measures are enforced to curb the current administration, the US will be guilty of leading the world down the slippery slope of an emerging global nuclear arms race.

    Opportunities are still available to prevent Bush’s aggressive nuclear plans from materializing. The future deployment of the administration’s new nuclear strategy will depend upon the outcome of the next presidential election, as well as congressional debates over the next few years. These, in turn, will depend upon US and international citizens engaging in a debate on future nuclear policies, and calling on Congress and presidential candidates to take a principled stance against the dangerous Bush nuclear policies.

    *Justine Wang is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Armageddon Back on the Table

    U.S. ratchets up debate on `usable’ nuclear weapons
    Critics fear fallout from Bush cadre’s pro-nuke strategy

    Originally Published by the Toronto Star

    Since nuclear bombs exploded on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the possibility of an atomic Armageddon has made the use of such cataclysmic weapons unthinkable.

    But after the election of President George W. Bush, and the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the word “nuclear” has been creeping back into the vocabulary of American policy, reaching for a respectability that until recently was thought gone for good.

    Lobbying Congress for funds to research and develop new nuclear weapons, Bush has opened the back door to the doctrine of a “fightable” nuclear war, one in which the use of small or limited nuclear weapons would be possible or even desirable to defeat ruthless and unconventional enemies.

    “Nuclear programs are a cornerstone of U.S. national security posture,” said Congress’ Armed Services Committee, which recently backed the allocation of $400 billion (all figures U.S.) for national defence in the coming year.

    Both critics and supporters of developing “usable” nuclear weapons agree that the path from the laboratory to the launching pad is a long and difficult one.

    But since the Bush administration presented its radical “Nuclear Posture Review” in March, 2002, pro-nuclear officials have been pushing steadily ahead toward developing weapons that will cross the line that separates conventional from unconventional warfare, threatening half a century of disarmament negotiations, treaties and taboos.

    This month, the Senate endorsed an Energy and Water Appropriations Bill allocating $7.5 million to research on nuclear “bunker-buster” bombs and $10.8 million to plans for nuclear “pit” facilities to produce triggers for new nuclear bombs. Both sums were reduced from totals originally requested by Bush officials.

    A final environmental study is being prepared to determine how and where the pits should be manufactured.

    Crucial to the administration’s hopes for developing a new generation of nukes was the repeal in May of a 1993 ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons — those with a force of less than 5 kilotons, or 5,000 tonnes of TNT.

    The bomb dropped on Hiroshima, by comparison, was approximately 15 kilotons.

    “A one-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 20 to 50 feet underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and eject one million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air,” says California Senator Diane Feinstein, an opponent of usable nuclear weapons.

    The development of any new nuclear arms would require testing. And as early as June, 2001, Bush also signalled that he might consider ending an 11-year moratorium on underground nuclear blasts.

    He called for a scientific review of the Nevada test site that resulted in shortening the time it would take to restart nuclear test explosions from 36 months to no more than 18 months from the time an order to resume nuclear testing is given.

    And although the Bush administration has so far made little progress in promoting the development of “mini nukes” that could be used against enemy forces, the influential Defence Science Board that advises the Pentagon has thrown its weight behind them.

    In a leaked report, due to be tabled in the next few months, the board urges the development of lower-yield weapons that would have more battlefield “credibility” than the more powerful current nuclear bombs.

    The rationale of the pro-nuclear supporters is clear: After Sept. 11, America is fighting an unpredictable enemy that must be attacked and eradicated by any possible means.

    “As seen in Afghanistan, conventional weapons are not always able to destroy underground targets,” said the Armed Services Committee, which backed the new nuclear policy.

    “The United States may need nuclear earth penetrators (bunker-busters) to destroy underground facilities where rogue nations have stored chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.”

    Keith Payne, the Pentagon’s civilian liaison with the U.S. Strategic Command, which plans how a nuclear war could be fought, has for a decade promoted the idea of usable nukes.

    Payne believes the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War included the discovery that Scud missiles might elude attack. In a 1999 paper on the future of American nuclear weapons, he wrote: “If the locations of dispersed mobile launchers cannot be determined with enough precision to permit pinpoint strikes, suspected deployment areas might be subjected to multiple nuclear strikes.”

    Other pro-nuclear theorists say a new generation of fightable nukes might have a deterrent effect on the kind of enemies America now faces: guerrilla groups and unpredictable terrorists.

    “All we have left is nuclear use and pre-emption, so that something a little bigger, with a little more bite, does not emerge as the next threat against our security and values,” says Barry Zellen, publisher of the electronic security bulletin, SecureFrontiers.com.

    “Our willingness to go beyond deterrence to a more pro-active strategy of nuclear use might just end up achieving what we wanted in the beginning: successful deterrence of further aggression and terror against us, now and in the future.”

    Opponents of nuclear weapons fiercely disagree. They shudder at the thought of crossing the line between fighting a conventional and nuclear war, once considered unthinkable. And they argue that such a move would promote, rather than deter terrorism.

    One of the most troubling aspects, critics say, is the “creeping respectability” of arms that have been considered beyond the pale of defence policy.

    “It creates the image of `clean’ nuclear weapons,” says Brice Smith of the Maryland-based Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.

    “We can use them without all the old Cold War anxieties about total destruction. A lot of psychology is involved here and it includes the very powerful idea of being able to defeat attempts to use chemical and biological weapons against us.”

    However, experts say, usable nukes would be far from environmentally safe. Bunker-busting bombs would explode close to the surface of their targets, spreading radioactivity through an explosion of dust and causing the death of tens of thousands of people if dropped on urban areas.

    It is also likely, says Smith, that the explosions would spread deadly chemicals or bioagents, rather than destroying them.

    And, critics argue, the political fallout from threatening to use, let alone using, such weapons would be dangerous to the United States and its Western allies.

    Apart from inciting terrorism, such a policy would create deeper cynicism about Washington’s disregard for international treaties on nuclear weapons, convincing countries like Iran and North Korea that Washington is applying double standards when it insists they halt efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

    The Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists, which monitors nuclear peril worldwide, last year moved its Doomsday Clock forward two minutes, to seven minutes to midnight, citing the Bush administration’s failure to change its Cold War nuclear-alert practices while authorizing its weapons labs to work on the design of new nuclear arms.

    “Terrorist efforts to acquire and use nuclear and biological weapons present a great danger,” concluded George Lopez, the Bulletin’s board chairman.

    “But the U.S. preference for the use of pre-emptive force rather than diplomacy could be equally dangerous.”

    Historian and Kennedy-era political adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr., put it more flamboyantly.

    “Looking back over the 40 years of the Cold War,” he wrote in The New York Review Of Books, “we can be everlastingly grateful that the loonies on both sides were powerless. In 2003, however, they run the Pentagon, and preventive war — the Bush doctrine — is now official policy.”

    Those who follow the progress of the new nuclear doctrine say its resurgence signals the comeback of its backers, a pro-nuclear cadre that has for years urged a more aggressive approach to both domestic and military nuclear policy.

    The cadre includes Vice-President Dick Cheney, who urged planning for nuclear strikes against Third World “enemy” countries as secretary of defence in the first Bush administration; Payne, who wrote a doctrine of fightable nuclear war; and Pentagon threat-reduction chief Stephen Younger, a director of the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory and one of the first scientists to promote the use of low-yield nuclear weapons.

    With an influential group of lobbyists working closely with the White House, it appears highly likely that plans to produce a new generation of nuclear weapons would go forward if Bush wins a second term.

    However, there is trepidation in the ranks of both Republican and Democratic parties about such a development.

    Congress has so far made sure that funding is limited to the exploratory stages of the project and that millions rather than billions of dollars have been allocated

    “By seeking to develop new nuclear weapons,” says Senator Feinstein, “the United States sends the message that nuclear weapons have a future battlefield role and utility. That is the wrong direction and, in my view, will only cause America to be placed in greater jeopardy in the future.”

    The opposition is unlikely to weaken the pro-nuclear cadre’s resolve, however.

    “What you’re seeing is a thoughtless strategy being pursued under cover of the war on terrorism, by people who always wanted to do this,” says arms-control expert William Arkin of Johns Hopkins University’s Institute of Advanced International Studies.

    “Now, they’re in a position to seize their chance.”

    Critics say a new arms race is on the horizon and they predict the effect on global security to be gloomy, as resentment escalates toward the United States for its double standard of developing nuclear weapons, while insisting that others desist.

    In the United States, says Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, “there is a creeping respectability of nuclear weapons.”What Bush has done is emphasize that there are not only bad weapons out there, but bad people with bad weapons.

    “Then, the line becomes blurred, because he’s implying that responsible states are entitled to possess and even use the same kinds of weapons.

    “In fact, these are all weapons of mass terror, and we should never forget that.”

    Copyright 1996-2003. Toronto Star Newspapers Limited

  • Fueling the Nuclear Fire: Nuclear Policies of the Bush Administration

    Fueling the Nuclear Fire: Nuclear Policies of the Bush Administration

    The George W. Bush administration came into office with the clear intention to strengthen US global military dominance, including its nuclear dominance, and it has been true to this major policy goal. Under this administration, military expenditures have increased by some $100 billion to approximately $400 billion annually, and nuclear weapons have assumed a far more central role in US security policy.

    The administration’s blatant disregard for the United Nations Security Council and for long-standing arms control and disarmament efforts are clear signs that it is prepared to chart a unilateral course with regard to security issues. The US has signaled its desire to overhaul its nuclear arsenal by developing smaller and more usable nuclear weapons, which could be used as part of the new “Bush doctrine” of preemption. The administration has developed contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven other countries and against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) stockpiles of what it considers to be “rogue” states.

    In its dramatic shift towards increasingly aggressive nuclear and military policies, the Bush administration has opened a new era of increased likelihood of US nuclear weapons use. In turn, the administration has provoked the initiation of a new nuclear arms race as other states attempt to develop or increase their nuclear arsenals to counter-balance US military dominance and the threat of US willingness to employ the Bush doctrine of preemptive warfare.
    Bush Policy Goals

    Nuclear “Reduction”
    As a candidate for president in 2000, Mr. Bush announced that he wanted to reduce the level of strategic nuclear weapons in the US arsenal to the lowest number compatible with US security. Based on military studies, that number was placed at between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. According to the Nuclear Posture Review, a classified document released to Congress on December 31, 2001, “Based on current projections, an operationally deployed force of 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012…will support US deterrence policy to hold at risk what opponents value, including their instruments of political control and military power, and to deny opponents their war aims.”

    This “reduction” of deployed warheads will be accomplished by transferring warheads from active delivery vehicles to either a “responsive force” or to “inactive reserve.” This should be seen more as a de-alerting measure rather than a disarmament measure, as nuclear weapons are merely shifted to non-deployed status and not dismantled.

    Missile Defense
    While campaigning, Bush also promoted the development and deployment of a National Missile Defense to protect the United States against nuclear attacks by so-called rogue states, a proposal that would have been prohibited under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Upon assuming the presidency, Bush dealt with the impediment of the ABM Treaty by withdrawing from it. He gave the six months notice required by the Treaty for withdrawal on December 13, 2001, and US withdrawal became effective on June 13, 2002. Since then, Bush had announced plans to deploy the first twenty interceptor missiles in Alaska and California by 2004.
    The US Nuclear Posture Review

    The clearest indication of a shift of US nuclear policy can be found in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), marking a major change in the US nuclear strategy beyond the Cold War doctrines of deterrence. This document lays out a “New Triad,” composed of offensive strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (active and passive), and a revitalized defense infrastructure (providing new capabilities) to meet emerging threats.

    The Review states, “Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.” This is an extraordinary assertion of the benefits that US leaders attribute to nuclear weapons in US defense policy, benefits that they are clearly reserving for themselves and a small group of other nuclear weapons states while seeking to deny them to other nations. Salient points of the report are summarized below:

    Nuclear strikes against WMD 
    In proposing the use of nuclear weapons to deter against WMD, the NPR embraces the option of using nuclear weapons not only against countries with nuclear weapons but also those in possession of chemical and biological weapons. The document states, “U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to security partners, particularly in the presence of known or suspected threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of surprising military developments.”

    New nuclear capabilities 
    The report makes a discernible move towards making nuclear weapons “usable” on the battleground. The NPR talks of credible nuclear policies “over the coming decades” that include “new generations of weapon systems.” These have been conceived as “low-yield deep earth penetration nuclear weapons,” popularly described as “bunker-busters”, to defeat hard and deeply buried targets such as underground bunkers and bio-weapon facilities, and “mini-nukes” (with yields less than 5 kilotons). These are weapons that proponents believe will cause limited civilian casualties and collateral damage, and opponents view as making nuclear weapons more usable and more likely to be used. The Bush administration is seeking $70 million to advance these nuclear weapons programs.

    Shortening nuclear test readiness
    The report calls for strengthening the “U.S. Nuclear Warhead Infrastructure.” It states, “The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will: …be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required.”

    Consequently, the Bush administration has sought funds to “enhance” test readiness and shorten the time required to prepare for the resumption of full-scale test explosions – decreasing the current time from 24-36 months to approximately 18 months.

    Contingency plans
    The report further calls for development of contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven countries: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia and China. As five of these countries are non-nuclear weapons states, the US threat to use nuclear weapons against them violates the negative security assurances that it gave to the non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the time of that NPT’s Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

    In sum, the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review is a strategy for indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons with plans to improve the capabilities of the existing arsenal and to revitalize the infrastructure for improving US nuclear forces in the future. The NPR promotes an expanded nuclear strategy as opposed to measures for irreversible nuclear disarmament as agreed to at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.
    Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

    In May 2002, President Bush reached an agreement with President Putin on a Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). In the treaty, the two governments agreed to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to Bush’s preferred numbers, as set forth in the US NPR, of between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012. The treaty made no provisions for interim reductions, and thus, despite SORT, it remains possible for either or both sides to actually increase the size of their arsenal between the inception of the treaty and 2012, so long as the reductions to the agreed numbers are accomplished by 2012. The treaty, however, does not provide verification measures to assure that the reductions are made. The treaty is also set to terminate, unless extended, in 2012.

    Furthermore, the treaty has no provisions for the nuclear warheads to be removed from active deployment. The US has announced its intentions to put many or most of these warheads into storage in “reserve” status, where they will remain available to be reintroduced to active deployment should this decision be taken in the future. Russia is likely to follow the US approach, and the treaty may exacerbate a new threat of theft and transfer of nuclear weapons and materials from Russia to other nations or terrorist groups

    SORT was announced with considerable fanfare. It gave the public a sense of progress toward nuclear disarmament, when in fact it was far more of a public relations effort than an actual arms reduction treaty. Although it did provide for removing several thousand nuclear weapons on both sides from deployment, and in this sense it was a de-alerting measure, it did not make these reductions irreversible (i.e., by dismantlement) or accountable to verification as agreed to by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    US National Security Strategy

    In September 2002, the Bush administration released a document entitled “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” In a letter introducing the document, Mr. Bush stated, “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed…. [A]s a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” [Emphasis added.]

    This statement underlined Mr. Bush’s intention and willingness to engage in preemptive war, including the possibility of a nuclear first strike. A few months earlier, on June 1, 2002, when Mr. Bush spoke at the graduation ceremony of the United States Military Academy, he introduced the idea of preemptive war by stating, “[O]ur security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.”
    US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction

    In December 2002, the Bush administration released a new document, entitled “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The document recognized the dangers of the “massive harm” that weapons of mass destruction could inflict upon the United States, its military forces, and its friends and allies. “We will not permit,” it stated, “the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”

    The document is premised on the administration’s strategy for the US to possess and possibly use nuclear weapons, while denying, preventing, and responding to the possession and possible use of weapons of mass destruction by other countries or terrorists.

    In setting forth its plan to retaliate with a nuclear strike in response to a nuclear, biological and chemical weapon attack, the document stated clearly that the US would counter such weapons with “overwhelming force – including through resort to all of our options.” The Washington Times reported on January 31, 2003 that the classified version of the document, National Security Presidential Directive 17, signed by President Bush in September 2002, stated the issue in this way: “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including potentially nuclear weapons – to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.” [Emphasis added.]

    In vowing that the US will seek capabilities enabling it to “detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used,” the strategy boldly forewarns states seeking WMD that the US could strike first.

    Failure to Lead toward Nuclear Disarmament

    In sum, Bush’s aggressive nuclear policy has shown scant concern for US treaty obligations, rendering many international arms control measures meaningless.

    • Most prominently, the Bush administration has withdrawn from the ABM Treaty to pursue missile defenses and test space-based weapons.
    • The Bush administration is not taking seriously, nor attempting to fulfill, US obligations for nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, nor has it shown good faith in fulfilling the 2000 NPT Review Conference’s 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament – including pursuing the promised “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals….”
    • Washington has made clear that it does not intend to send the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) back to the Senate for ratification. The Bush administration has indicated plans to shorten the time needed to resume underground nuclear testing, and is developing more usable nuclear weapons and contingency plans for their use.

    Current nuclear policies by the Bush administration must be viewed as highly provocative to other countries. They suggest that the US reserves to itself the right to use its own weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as it deems appropriate, while, at the same time, seeking to deny that possibility to other countries.

    Early in his presidency, Mr. Bush labeled Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.” Based upon his doctrine of preemption, Mr. Bush has already led the US to wage a preventive war on Iraq without sanction by the United Nations. The other two countries singled out by Mr. Bush have not been unresponsive to the aggressiveness of the Bush administration. In January 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and announced that it is reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to develop a nuclear arsenal. Iran, which is still a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has attracted international suspicion in recent months due to its ambitious plans to extend its nuclear facilities, showing signs of moving forward with developing its own nuclear arsenal. In both cases, US policies and provocations have helped drive the reactions.

    The Bush administration, by withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and proceeding with deployment of regional and national missile defenses, has provoked China to further develop its offensive nuclear arsenal in order to maintain a minimally effective deterrent force. China’s plans to further its nuclear program may in turn spark further developments in the South Asia nuclear impasse.

    Under the military and nuclear policies of the Bush administration, the United States is leading the world into an even more dangerous era, with the effect of pouring fuel on the nuclear fire. Current Bush administration nuclear policies pose an enormous threat to US and global security. These policies must be reversed and brought into line with US obligations to international non-proliferation and disarmament agreements. Since the Bush administration is unlikely to initiate such change, the challenge to reverse these policies and bring the US into compliance with international commitments lies with the US public and the international community.
    –David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). His recent books include Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age (Middleway Press, 2002) and Hope in a Dark Time, Reflections on Humanity’s Future (Capra Press, 2003).

  • Bush Nuclear Policy A Recipe for National Insecurity: Time to Change Course

    This August, during the very same week that the world commemorated the 58th anniversary of the only use of nuclear weapons—an act which obliterated the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki– more than 150 military contractors, scientists from the weapons labs, and other government officials gathered at the headquarters of the US Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska to plot and plan for the possibility of “full-scale nuclear war” calling for the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons—more “usable” so-called “mini-nukes and earth penetrating “bunker busters” armed with atomic warheads. Plans are afoot to start a new bomb factory to replace the one closed at Rocky Flats, now one of the most polluted spots on earth thanks to earlier production of plutonium triggers for the US hydrogen bomb arsenal, halted after the end of the Cold War. And there is a move to shorten the time to restart nuclear testing at the Nevada test site as well as to lift the restrictions that were placed on the production of “mini-nukes” by Congress.

    How did we get to this awful state, with North Korea and Iran threatening nuclear break-out and even Japan now talking about developing nuclear weapons of its own? What action can ordinary citizens take to end the nuclear madness and provide for real national security?

    President Eisenhower, in his farewell address to the nation, is often remembered for warning us to guard against dangers to our “liberties and democratic processes” from the “military-industrial” complex. But equally telling, and not as well-known, he also warned us against the “danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific technological elite”, noting that the “prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present and is gravely to be regarded. “

    The fact is, our Doctor Strangeloves have been driving this nuclear arms race in partnership with military contractors engaged in pork barrel politics with a corrupt Congress, spreading nuclear production contracts around the country to the great detriment of our national health, and security. From the first time we thought we were able to put some limits on nuclear development, when the Limited Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in 1963 because of the shock and horror at the amount of radioactive strontium-90 in our baby’s teeth, the labs made sure there was continued funding to enable testing to go underground. And when Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 to cut off nuclear testing, he bought off the labs with a $4.6 billion annual program—the so-called “stockpile stewardship “ program– in which nuclear testing was now done in computer simulated virtual reality with the help of so-called “sub-critical tests”, 1,000 feet below the desert floor, where plutonium is blown up with chemicals without causing a chain reaction. This program created a vast loophole in the not-so-comprehensive Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is the fruits of this Faustian bargain that produced the research for the new nukes Bush is now prepared to put into production.

    What’s to be done?

    Although the majority of the Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, and most of the media keep stirring the pot with scare stories about nuclear proliferation from so called “rogue” states, we hardly hear about the essential bargain of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1970, which has kept the lid on the spread of nuclear weapons until very recently. The NPT is a two-way street. It was a deal, not only for non-nuclear weapon states not to acquire nuclear weapons, but also for the nuclear weapons states to give them up in return. India and Pakistan never signed the treaty, as it elevated the privileges of the then five existing nuclear weapons states—US, USSR, UK, France and China. And while India had tested in 1974 for its own nuclear arsenal, it wasn’t until 1998, after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was signed over its objections, that India broke out of the pack, swiftly followed by Pakistan. Under Bush, annual funding for the weapons labs went from $4.6 billion under Clinton to $6.4 billion—an obvious recipe for proliferation. Because we cling to our nuclear weapons despite our treaty obligations to eliminate them, other nations attempt to acquire them. Furthermore, our determination to “dominate and control the military use of space”, threatening the whole world from the heavens, is another incentive to less powerful nations to make sure they have the only equalizer that can hold us at bay—nukes of their own. In August, Russia, for the first time joined China at the UN disarmament talks in Geneva, calling for a treaty to prevent the weaponization of space. To eliminate the nuclear threat, we need to close down our military space program, close the Nevada test site, put the weapons designers out to pasture and begin negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear arms.

  • Nuclear Age Amnesia

    Memorials in Hiroshima and Nagasaki eloquently testify that nuclear weapons are not simply a bigger, better version of conventional explosives. Yet the haze of passing time seems to have dulled congressional understanding of the ghastly difference.

    Last week, the Senate bowed to Bush administration wishes and voted to repeal a 10-year-old congressional ban on the development of small nuclear weapons for tactical use on battlefields. The Senate also gave preliminary approval to $15 million for further research on a nuclear “bunker-buster” that would explode underground with yields far greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It allocated more millions for nuclear testing, in case the Pentagon decides to resume the program suspended by President Clinton. That authorization vote, to be confirmed in later appropriations bills, puts the United States on a backward path.

    The Pentagon says research is not the same as development, testing, deployment or use. All true. But once a new weapon is developed, pressure to test it and then to verify that it actually works in battle becomes great.

    The military’s trumpeted success with existing precision weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq undercuts arguments that more nuclear arms are needed. Consider what the reaction of Iraqis and the world would have been if one of the precision bombs aimed at Saddam Hussein had been a small nuke.

    Washington should not be showing the way to new atomic weapons that are easier to use. Anything that spurs nuclear competition will increase the number of bombs — and bomb developers — that can fall into the hands of an Al Qaeda. Beyond that, the world should fear an arms race that produces more nuclear weapons in perennial enemy states like India and Pakistan and unpredictable nations like North Korea.

    The United States has disposed of most of its smaller, tactical nuclear weapons and has agreed with Russia to destroy many larger strategic ones as well. Pledging support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as the administration does, is inconsistent with developing new weapons.

    The administration’s Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 was decried for reviving possible U.S. use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries and raising the possibility of preemptive attacks on any nation developing weapons of mass destruction. The review, a periodic updating of U.S. nuclear strategy, and the Pentagon’s weapons request make the world more dangerous, not less. The nuclear genie has been out of the bottle since 1945. Continued control of its spread should be a hallmark of U.S. policy.

  • North Korea Incites More US Nuclear Hypocrisy

    David KriegerOn January 10th, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). US Secretary of State Colin Powell responded by stating, “North Korea has thumbed its nose at the international community. This kind of disrespect for such an agreement cannot go undealt with.” Dick Cheney opined that North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT “could undermine decades of non-proliferation efforts.”

    Yet, those who have read and understand the NPT appreciate that the treaty intertwines the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The one is dependent on the other. Since the US and the other declared nuclear weapons states have failed in their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, they should expect, sooner or later, that one result will be a breakdown of the NPT regime.

    The NPT was created in 1968 by the US, UK and Russia as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and, in return, the nuclear weapons states agreed to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

    In the years since 1970 when the treaty entered into force, 187 countries have signed and ratified the treaty. All of these countries are non-nuclear except for the five declared nuclear weapons states (US, UK, France, Russia and China). The only four states that are not parties to the treaty are India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba, and Cuba has indicated its intention to join the treaty.

    India, Pakistan and Israel have all developed nuclear arsenals outside the framework of the treaty. India made clear for many years that it was willing to forego its nuclear option if the five declared nuclear weapons states would take seriously their obligations for nuclear disarmament. After years of waiting in vain for the implementation of serious nuclear disarmament efforts by the nuclear weapons states, India went nuclear in 1998 and Pakistan followed suit.

    In 1995 when the NPT was extended indefinitely, the declared nuclear weapons states promised “[t]he determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons….”

    In 2000, when the parties to the NPT held their sixth review conference, the nuclear weapons states again promised “[a]n unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament….” In addition to violating this obligation, the US has also withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty after promising in 2000 that it would preserve and strengthen this treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability.”

    The US also agreed to apply the “principle of irreversibility” to nuclear disarmament, meaning that deactivated warheads would be destroyed. Instead of following this principle, however, the US pushed the Russians to agree to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that is based upon the opposite principle, that of reversibility. The US announced that at its discretion the strategic nuclear weapons taken off active deployment pursuant to the agreement would be kept in storage for potential future redeployment.

    After the US promised “the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” in 2000, the Bush administration has refused to re-send this treaty to the Senate for ratification (the Senate failed to ratify in 1999). The Bush administration has also sought to reduce the time needed to resume nuclear testing.

    Bush spokesperson Ari Fleischer commented on North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, “There is a light at the end of the tunnel, and that begins with North Korea’s immediately dismantling its nuclear weapons programs and coming into compliance with its obligations around the world.” The light at the end of the tunnel could also begin with the United States coming into compliance with its obligations around the world, starting with its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

    To defuse the current crisis with North Korea, the US should pursue a policy of engagement. It should accept North Korea’s offer to enter into negotiations for a non-aggression pact. The US should also offer to provide North Korea with additional development assistance to help them in building their economy and eliminating starvation.

    Assurances of peace and non-aggression on the Korean Peninsula would make all of North Korea’s neighbors more comfortable. Such assurances would also be an acceptable trade-off for North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program and to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency back into the country to verify the termination and dismantlement of any nuclear weapons program. These assurances would allow North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He is the co-author of Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age.

  • 75 U.S. Catholic Bishops Condemn Policy of Nuclear Deterrence

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
    Contact: Dave Robinson
    814-453-4955 Ext. 235

    Erie, PA — Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it’s the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of nuclear weapons, say 73 U.S. Catholic bishops in a report issued today by Pax Christi USA, the national Catholic peace and justice organization. The report, “The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States,” critiques current U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Catholic Church’s 1983 pastoral statement, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” which allowed for the morality of nuclear deterrence on the condition that it only be an interim measure tied to progressive disarmament. Further Catholic Church teaching has since called for a concrete policy of nuclear elimination. “With the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, we feel our statement is both timely and prophetic,” says Walter F. Sullivan, Bishop of Richmond, Va. and president of Pax Christi USA. “We hope it will help generate further discussions both within the Catholic community and in the policy-making circles of our government.”

    The report recognizes the dramatic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and offers a warning. “Because of the horrendous results if these weapons were to be used, and what we see as a greater liklihood of their use, we feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence,” the report states. Coming in the wake of the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the report calls for the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process that will lead to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban nuclear weapons the way that the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions have banned those weapons.

    “What the Indian and Pakistani tests make clear is that the discriminatory nature of current nonproliferation efforts will not free the world of the threat posed by these weapons,” says Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, Mich., and a leading expert on nuclear deterrence in the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. “The choice today is clear. Either all nations must give up the right to possess these weapons or all nations will claim that right. The events in India and Pakistan must be recognized as a sign of what is inevitable. We must act now to avoid a future where the nuclear threat becomes the currency of international security.”

    Citing the $60 billion Department of Energy program known as Stockpile Stewardship and Management, as well as current administration policies, the bishops conclude that the United States plans to rely on nuclear weapons indefinitely. “Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test, and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States (and the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new design and testing capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with ‘progressive disarmament’ and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely,” state the bishops.

    -30-

    The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence
    An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States

    Issued on the 15th Anniversary of Challenge of Peace,
    God’s Promise and Our Response

    June 1998

    Dear Sisters and Brothers,

    We, the undersigned Catholic bishops of the United States and members of Pax Christi USA, write to you on a matter of grave moral concern: the continued possession, development and plans for the use of nuclear weapons by our country. For the past fifteen years, and particularly in the context of the Cold War, we, the Catholic bishops of the United States, have reluctantly acknowledged the possibility that nuclear weapons could have some moral legitimacy, but only if the goal was nuclear disarmament. It is our present, prayerful judgment that this legitimacy is now lacking.

    In 1983 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in our Pastoral Letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, grappled with the unique moral challenge posed by nuclear weapons. Fifteen years ago we stated that, because of the massive and indiscriminate destruction that nuclear weapons would inflict, their use would not be morally justified.i We spoke in harmony with the conscience of the world in that judgment. We reaffirm that judgment now. Nuclear weapons must never be used, no matter what the provocation, no matter what the military objective.

    Deterrence
    Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in acknowledging that, given the context of that time, possession of these weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally acceptable, but acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with clear steps toward progressive disarmament.

    Ours was a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence. It depended on three criteria:

    a) a reliance on deterrent strategies must be an interim policy only. As we stated then, “We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace;”

    b) the purpose of maintaining nuclear weapons in the interim was only “to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others;” and

    c) a reliance on deterrence must be used “not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament.”

    In our 10th Anniversary Statement, The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, we further specified that “progressive disarmament” must mean a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, not simply as an ideal, but as a concrete policy goal

    A New Moment
    In 1998 the global context is significantly different from what it was a few years ago. Throughout the Cold War the nuclear arsenal was developed and maintained as the ultimate defense in an ideological conflict that pitted what were considered two historical forces against each other — capitalism in the West and communism in the East. The magnitude of that conflict was defined by the mutual exclusivity of each other’s ideology. Nuclear weapons and the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction were accepted as the inescapable context of that particular struggle. Today the Soviet Union no longer exists. The United States is now aiding its democratic successor, the Russian Federation, in dismantling the very nuclear weapons that a short time ago were poised to destroy us. Yet, the Cold War weapons amassed throughout that struggle have survived the struggle itself and are today in search of new justifications and new missions to fulfill.

    But, with the end of the Cold War came new hope. World opinion has coalesced around the concrete effort to outlaw nuclear weapons, as it has with biological and chemical weapons and most recently with anti-personnel landmines. As examples of this opinion we note the dramatic public statement of December 1996 in which 61 retired Generals and Admirals, many of whom held the highest level positions in the nuclear establishment of this country, said that these weapons are unnecessary, destabilizing and must be outlawed.vi We also note the historic International Court of Justice opinion of July 1996 that, “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” The Court went on to say, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Additionally, the Holy See has become more explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons and has urged their abolition. We recognize this new moment and are in accord with the Holy See, which has stated, “If biological weapons, chemical weapons and now landmines can be done away with, so too can nuclear weapons. No weapon so threatens the longed-for peace of the 21st century as the nuclear [weapon]. Let not the immensity of this task dissuade us from the efforts needed to free humanity from such a scourge.

    Unfortunately the monumental political changes that have occurred in the wake of the Cold War have not been accompanied by similar far reaching changes in the military planning for development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is absolutely clear to us that the present US policy does not include a decisive commitment to progressive nuclear disarmament. Rather, nuclear weapons policy has been expanded in the post-Cold War period to include new missions well beyond their previous role as a deterrent to nuclear attack. The United States today maintains a commitment to use nuclear weapons first, including pre-emptive nuclear attacks on nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. “Flexible targeting strategies” are aimed at Third World nations, and a new commitment exists to use nuclear weapons either preemptively or in response to chemical and biological weapons or other threats to US national interests.ix This expanded role of the US nuclear deterrent is unacceptable.

    A New Arms Race
    In order to maintain the necessary credibility required by a continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the United States is today embarking on an expansion of its nuclear weapons complex. The Department of Energy, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, has developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a vast and multi-faceted effort at modernizing the nuclear weapons complex to provide for the continued research, development and testing of nuclear weapons well into the next century. The program will eventually lead to creating computer-simulated nuclear weapons tests that will allow the United States to continue to test nuclear weapons in the event that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (which will ban full-scale underground nuclear testing) enters into force. The cost of this Stockpile Stewardship program is currently estimated at $60 billion over the next dozen years. Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States, (as well as the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new testing and design capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with “progressive disarmament” and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely.

    Instead of progressive nuclear disarmament, we are witnessing the institutionalization of nuclear deterrence. The recent Presidential Decision Directive on nuclear weapons policy, partially made known to the public in December 1997, makes this point clear. The Directive indicates that the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of the nation’s strategic defense, that the role of these weapons has been increased to include deterring Third World non-nuclear weapons states and deterring chemical and biological weapons, as well as other undefined vital US interests abroad.xii Does not this policy, coupled with the huge investments under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, represent a renewed commitment to nuclear deterrence that will affect generations to come? The Department of Energy’s own timetable for the Stockpile Stewardship Program indicates that the United States will continue to develop, test and rely upon a nuclear deterrent through the year 2065. This is clearly not the interim policy to which we grudgingly gave our moral approval in 1983. Rather, it is the manifestation of the very reliance on nuclear nproliferation Treaty.

    In Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace we addressed the growing concerns that nuclear weapons might be used against other than nuclear threats: “The United States should commit itself never to use nuclear weapons first, should unequivocally reject proposals to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear threats, and should reinforce the fragile barrier against the use of these weapons.”xv Nuclear deterrence policy, as developed over the past decade, stands in clear contradiction to these goals.

    Inherent Dangers
    The policy of nuclear deterrence has always included the intention to use the weapons if deterrence should fail. Since the end of the Cold War this deterrent has been expanded to include any number of potential aggressors, proliferators and so-called “rogue nations.” The inherent instability in a world unconstrained by the great-power standoff present throughout the Cold War leads us to conclude that the danger of deterrence failing has been increased. That danger can become manifest if but one so-called “rogue state” calls the deterrent bluff. In such a case the requirements of deterrence policy would be the actual use of nuclear weapons. This must not be allowed. Because of the horrendous results if these weapons should be used, and what we see as a greater likelihood of their use, we now feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.

    Moral Conclusions
    Sadly, it is clear to us that our strict conditions for the moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence are not being met. Specifically, a) the policy of nuclear deterrence is being institutionalized. It is no longer considered an interim policy but rather has become the very “long-term basis for peace” that we rejected in 1983.

    b) the role of nuclear deterrence has been expanded in the post Cold War era well beyond the narrow role of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. The role to be played now by nuclear weapons includes a whole range of contingencies on a global scale including countering biological and chemical weapons and the protection of vital national interests abroad.

    c) although the United States and the republics that made up the former Soviet Union have in recent years eliminated some of their huge, superfluous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our country, at least, has no intention, or policy position of eliminating these weapons entirely. Rather, the US intends to retain its nuclear deterrent into the indefinite future.

    Gospel Call of Love
    As bishops of the Church in the United States, it is incumbent on us to speak directly to the policies and actions of our nation. We speak now out of love not only for those who would suffer and die as victims of nuclear violence, but also for those who would bear the terrible responsibility of unleashing these horrendous weapons. We speak out of love for those suffering because of the medical effects in communities where these weapons are produced and are being tested. We speak out of love for those deprived of the barest necessities because of the huge amount of available resources committed to the continued development and ongoing maintenance of nuclear weapons. We recall the words of another Vatican message to the United Nations, that these weapons, “by their cost alone, kill the poor by causing them to starve.”xvi We speak out of love for both victims and the executioners, believing that “the whole law is fulfilled in one statement, namely, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’” (Gal. 5-14).

    It is out of this love that we raise up our voices with those around the world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and instead call upon the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to the complete elimination of these morally offensive weapons. Indeed, in taking his position we are answering the call of Pope John Paul II, whose Permanent Representative to the United Nations stated in October 1997:

    “The work that this committee (1st Committee of the United Nations) has done in calling for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention must be increased. Those nuclear weapons states resisting such negotiations must be challenged, for in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear deterrence they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion of the highest legal authority in the world. The gravest consequences for humankind lie ahead if the world is to be ruled by the militarism represented by nuclear weapons rather than the humanitarian law espoused by the International Court of Justice. “Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition. “This is a moral challenge, a legal challenge and a political challenge. That multi-based challenge must be met by the application of our humanity.”

    We recognize the opposition that our message will meet. We are painfully aware that many of our policymakers sincerely believe that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for our national security. We are convinced though, that it is not. Instead, they make the world a more dangerous place. They provide a rationale for other nations to build a nuclear arsenal, thereby increasing the possibility that they will be used by someone.

    Not only are they not vital for national security, but we believe they actually contribute to national insecurity. No nation can be truly secure until the community of nations is secure. We are mindful of Pope John Paul II’s warning that “violence of whatever form cannot decide conflicts between individuals or between nations, because violence generates more violence.”

    On this, the 15th anniversary of The Challenge of Peace the time has come for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the Third Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and the constant threat they pose. We cannot delay any longer. Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of these horrendous weapons. We urge all to join in taking up the challenge to begin the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons now, rather than relying on them indefinitely.

    May the grace and peace of the risen Jesus Christ be with us all.
    Anthony S. Apuron, OFM, Cap.
    Archbishop of Agana, Guam

    Victor Balke
    Bishop of Crookston, MN

    William D. Borders
    Archbishop of Baltimore, MD (ret.)

    Joseph M. Breitenbeck
    Bishop of Grand Rapids, MI (ret.)

    Charles A. Buswell
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO (ret.)

    Matthew H. Clark
    Bishop of Rochester, NY

    Thomas J. Connolly
    Bishop of Baker, OR

    Patrick R. Cooney
    Bishop of Gaylord, MI

    Thomas V. Daily
    Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    James J. Daly
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY (ret.)

    Nicholas D’Antonio, OFM
    Bishop of New Orleans, LA (ret.)

    Joseph P. Delaney
    Bishop of Fort Worth, TX

    Norbert L. Dorsey, C.P
    Bishop of Orlando, FL

    Joseph A. Ferrario
    Bishop of Honolulu, HI (ret.)

    John J. Fitzpatrick
    Bishop of Brownsville, TX (ret.)

    Patrick F. Flores
    Archbishop of San Antonio, TX

    Joseph A. Fiorenza
    Bishop of Galveston-Houston, TX

    Raphael M. Fliss
    Bishop of Superior, WI

    Marion F. Forst
    Bishop of Dodge City, KS (ret.)

    Benedict C. Franzetta
    Auxiliary Bishop of Youngstown, OH (ret.)

    Raymond E. Goedert
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    John R. Gorman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

    F. Joseph Gossman
    Bishop of Raleigh, NC

    Thomas J. Gumbleton
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI

    Richard C. Hanifen
    Bishop of Colorado Springs, CO

    Edward D. Head
    Bishop of Buffalo, NY (ret.)

    Joseph L. Howze
    Bishop of Biloxi, MS

    Howard J. Hubbard
    Bishop of Albany, NY

    William A. Hughes
    Bishop of Covington, KY (ret.)

    Raymond G. Hunthausen
    Archbishop of Seattle, WA (ret.)

    Joseph L. Imesch
    Bishop of Joliet, IL

    Michael J. Kaniecki, S.J.
    Bishop of Fairbanks, AK

    Raymond A. Lucker
    Bishop of New Ulm, MN

    Dominic A. Marconi
    Auxiliary Bishop of Newark, NJ

    Joseph F. Maguire
    Bishop of Springfield, MA (ret.)

    Leroy T. Matthiesen
    Bishop of Amarillo, TX (ret.)

    Edward A. McCarthy
    Archbishop of Miami, FL (ret.)

    John E. McCarthy
    Bishop of Austin, TX

    Lawrence J. McNamara
    Bishop of Grand Island, NE

    John J. McRaith
    Bishop of Owensboro, KY

    Dale J. Melczek
    Bishop of Gary, IN

    Donald W. Montrose
    Bishop of Stockton, CA

    Robert M. Moskal
    Bishop of St. Josaphat in Parma, OH

    Michael J. Murphy
    Bishop of Erie, PA (ret.)

    P. Francis Murphy
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    William C. Newman
    Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

    James D. Niedergeses
    Bishop of Nashville, TN (ret.)

    Edward. J. O’Donnell
    Bishop of Lafayette, LA

    Albert H. Ottenweller
    Bishop of Steubenville, OH (ret.)

    Donald E. Pelotte, S.S.S.
    Bishop of Gallup, NM

    A. Edward Pevec
    Auxiliary Bishop of Cleveland, OH

    Michael D. Pfeifer, O.M.I.
    Bishop of San Angelo, TX

    Kenneth J. Povish
    Bishop of Lansing, MI (ret.)

    Francis A. Quinn
    Bishop of Sacramento, CA (ret.)

    John R. Roach
    Archbishop of St. Paul /Minneapolis, MN (ret.)

    Frank J. Rodimer
    Bishop of Paterson, NJ

    Peter A. Rosazza
    Auxiliary Bishop of Hartford, CT

    Joseph M. Sartoris
    Auxiliary Bishop of Los Angeles, CA

    Walter J. Schoenherr
    Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI (ret.)

    Roger L. Schwietz, OMI
    Bishop of Duluth, MN

    Daniel E. Sheehan
    Archbishop of Omaha, NE (ret.)

    Richard J. Sklba
    Auxiliary Bishop of Milwaukee, WI

    John J. Snyder
    Bishop of St. Augustine, FL

    George H. Speltz
    Bishop of St. Cloud, MN (ret.)

    Kenneth D. Steiner
    Auxiliary Bishop of Portland, OR

    Joseph M. Sullivan
    Auxiliary Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

    Walter F. Sullivan
    Bishop of Richmond, VA

    Arthur N. Tafoya
    Bishop of Pueblo, CO

    Elliot G. Thomas
    Bishop of St. Thomas, VI

    David B. Thompson
    Bishop of Charleston, SC

    Kenneth E. Untener
    Bishop of Saginaw, MI

    Loras J. Watters
    Bishop of Winona, CA (ret.)

    Emil A. Wcela
    Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY

    __________________________________

    1 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, NCCB, 1983, No. 150. 
    2 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 186 
    3 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 185 & 188 (1) 
    4John Paul II, “Message to the United Nations Special Session On Disarmament, 1982,” #8 
    5 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    6 New York Times, December 6, 1996, Statement on Nuclear Weapons by 61 International Generals and Admirals. 
    7 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the (Il)legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996. 
    8 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    9 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.10 
    10 President William J. Clinton, Letter of Transmittal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the United States Senate, Sept. 22, 1997. 
    11 Western States Legal Foundation, A Faustian Bargain: Why “Stockpile Stewardship” is Incompatible with the Process of Nuclear Disarmament, March 1998. 
    12 Reported in the Washington Post, December 7, 1997, p. 1. 13 Information shared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Senior NIF Scientist, William J. Hogan with Pax Christi USA Delegation to LLNL, October 7, 1997. 
    14 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.9. 
    15 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13. 
    16 Giovanni Cheli, Permanent Representative for the Holy See Observer Mission to the United Nations, United Nations 1st Special Session on Disarmament, 1976. 
    17 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997. 
    18 Pope John Paul II, Address to Pax Christi International, May 29, 1995.

  • United States Policy and Nuclear Abolition

    An address to the Olaf Palme Institute in Stockholm, Sweden

    You are certainly aware that the United States is committed under Article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty to work in good faith for nuclear disarmament. You are probably also aware that last year President Clinton approved a policy that nuclear weapons would remain the cornerstone of U.S. security for the indefinite future. It is very difficult to reconcile these conflicting positions. Disarm or maintain a massive nuclear war fighting capability? It is impossible to do both. My purpose here is to explain why President Clinton made his decision, what it means to prospects for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and what can be done to promote progress toward a non-nuclear world.

    First, let me tell you why I am here to advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have been personally involved with these engines of destruction since the beginning of the nuclear era. 42 years ago I was a pilot prepared to destroy a European target with a bomb that would have killed 600,000 people. 20 years ago, as the Director of U.S. Military Operations in Europe, I was the officer responsible for the security, readiness and employment of 7,000 nuclear weapons against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and Russia, weapons which could never defend anything – only destroy everything. My knowledge of nuclear weapons has convinced me that they can never be used for any rational military or political purpose. Their use would only create barbaric, indiscriminate destruction. In the words of the Canberra. Commission, “Nuclear weapons create an intolerable threat to all humanity…”

    Now, to address the reasons for President Clinton’s decision concerning the U.S. nuclear posture. When the nuclear era opened in the U.S. the atom bomb was seen as a source of immense national power and as an essential contribution to efforts to thwart any expansionist efforts by Stalin’s Soviet Union. It was also seen by the United States Army, Navy and Air Force- as the key to service supremacy. The newly autonomous Air Force under General Curtis LeMay saw atomic warfare as its primary raison d’etre and fought fiercely for the dominant role in U.S. atomic plans. The Army and Navy feared that without atomic weapons in their arsenals they would become irrelevant adjuncts to strategic air power.

    This interservice rivalry led to the rapid proliferation of nuclear missions. Without going into needless detail, each service acquired its own arsenal of nuclear weapons for every conceivable military mission: strategic bombardment, tactical warfare, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank rockets and landmines, anti-submarine rockets, torpedoes and depth charges, artillery shells, intermediate range missiles and ultimately intercontinental range land and sea-launched ballistic missiles armed with multiple, thermo-nuclear warheads.

    The Soviet Union, starting more than 4 years behind America, watched this rapid expansion of our war fighting weapons with shock and fear and set out to match every U.S. capability. Despite the obvious fact that the USSR lagged far behind, alarmists in the Pentagon pointed at Soviet efforts as proof of the need for ever more nuclear forces and weapons and the arms race continued unabated for 40 years. During this wasteful dangerous competition the United States built 70,000 nuclear weapons plus air, land and sea-based delivery vehicles at a total cost of $4.000 billion dollars.

    As the Soviets’ arsenal grew, Mutual Assured Destruction became a fact and the two nations finally began tenuous arms control efforts in the 1960’s to restrain their competition. This effort was accelerated in the mid-1980 as a result of world-wide fears of nuclear war when President Reagan spoke of the Soviet

    Union as the “evil empire” and doubled U.S. military spending. Unfortunately, the excesses of the nuclear arms race had created an extremely powerful pro-nuclear weapons establishment in the United States. This alliance of laboratories, weapon builders, aircraft industries and missile producers wielded immense political power in opposition to nuclear disarmament proposals. Abetted by Generals and Admirals in the Pentagon this establishment was able to turn arms control efforts into a talk-test-build process in which talks went slowly and ineffectually while testing and building went on with great dispatch. This same establishment remains extremely powerful today and explains why the United States’ continues to spend more than $28,000 million dollars each year to sustain its nuclear war fighting forces and enhance its weapons despite the formal commitment in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to take effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament. Pressure from the establishment is the primary reason why in November, 1997, President Clinton decreed in Presidential Decision Directive #60 that nuclear weapons will continue to form the cornerstone of American security indefinitely. This directive also set forth a number of other policies that are directly contrary to the goals of non-proliferation and nuclear abolition. He reaffirmed America’s right to make first use of nuclear weapons and intentionally left open the option to conduct nuclear retaliation against any nation, which employs chemical or biological agents in attacks against the United States or its allies. He went on to direct the maintenance of the triad of U.S. strategic forces (long range bombers, land-based ICBM’s and submarine-based SLBMs) at a high state of alert which would permit launch-on-warning of any impending nuclear attack on the U.S. This is the dangerous doctrine, which puts thousands of warheads on a hair trigger, thereby creating the risk of starting a nuclear war through misinformation and fear as well as through human error or system malfunction.

    Finally, his directive specifically authorized the continued targeting of numerous sites in Russia and China as well as planning for strikes against so-called rogue states in connection with regional conflicts or crises. In short, U.S. nuclear posture and planning remain essentially unchanged seven years after the end of the Cold War. The numbers of weapons are lower but the power to annihilate remains in place with 7,000 strategic and 5,000 tactical weapons.

    This doctrine would be bad enough alone but it is reinforced by continued efforts to extend and enhance the capabilities of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. A major element of this process is benignly labeled the Stockpile Stewardship Program costing more than $4, 100 million per year to maintain weapons security as well as test and replace weapon components to insure full wartime readiness of approximately 12,000 strategic and tactical bombs and warheads. In March the U.S. Air Force dropped two B61-11 bombs from a B-2 bomber on a target in Alaska to complete certification of a new design for earth penetrating weapons, clear proof of U.S. intentions to improve its nuclear war fighting capabilities.

    Furthermore, the Los Alamos National Laboratory recently resumed the manufacture of plutonium triggers for thermo-nuclear weapons while the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is preparing a new capability called the National Ignition Facility where conditions within an exploding nuclear device can be simulated Supplemented with continuing sub-critical explosive tests in Nevada and extremely sophisticated computer modeling experiments, this new facility will give the U.S. means not available to other signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to develop and validate new nuclear weapons designs.

    To give even more evidence of the power of the pro-nuclear establishment, the U.S. will decide this year -on how and when to resume the production and stockpiling of tritium, the indispensable fuel for thermo-nuclear explosions. The fact is that the military has enough tritium on hand today for all of its weapons until the year 2006 and enough for 1,000 warheads and bombs at least until the year 2024. To invest thousands of millions of dollars for unneeded tritium is a waste of precious resources undertaken solely to placate and reward the nuclear establishment. It is particularly alarming and discouraging to see the United States investing heavily to perpetuate and increase its nuclear war fighting capabilities when only three years ago it was the dominant force promoting indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To encourage support for extension the U.S. led in the formulation of the important declaration of “Principles and Objectives For Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” More clearly than Article VI of the NPT itself, this statement reaffirmed commitment to: “The determined pursuit by the nuclear weapons states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons…” This renewed and strengthened pledge to reduce nuclear capabilities offered as an inducement for non-nuclear states to agree to extension of the NPT makes the current U.S. nuclear program an affront to all of the signatories. It is not only a direct violation of both the letter and spirit of the NPT; it is a provocation, which jeopardizes the goal of non-proliferation. The clear message is that the foremost nuclear power regards its weapons as key elements of security and military strength, a signal, which can only stimulate other nations to consider the need to create similar capabilities.

    What must those who favor nuclear abolition do to counter this threat to non-proliferation? First, as individuals and as organizations, we must redouble our efforts at home to publicize the dangers created by as many as 35,000 weapons still ready for use in the world. A broadly based global demand by all non-nuclear states that the nuclear powers must live up to the letter and spirit of the NPT extension agreement should precede the first review conference in the year 2000. A call for worldwide public demonstrations on the order and magnitude of those, which supported the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980’s, should be made. The nuclear powers must not be permitted to dictate the results of the review conference in the same manner the United States dominated the 1995 extension conference.

    The message to be stressed is that it is illogical and unrealistic to expect that five nations can legally possess and threaten to use nuclear weapons indefinitely while all other nations are forbidden to create a nuclear capability. Pressure to break-out of the Non Proliferation Treaty is further intensified because one of the nuclear powers is actively developing new, more threatening weapons and pronouncing them essential to its future security.

    A good strategy is to follow the lead of the 62 Generals and Admirals who signed an appeal for nuclear abolition in December of 1996. We stated that we could not foresee the conditions, which would ultimately permit the final elimination of all weapons, but we did recognize many steps, which could be safely begun now to start and accelerate progress toward the ultimate goal.

    As a first step toward nuclear disarmament, all nuclear powers should positively commit themselves to unqualified no-first use guarantees for both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Their guarantees should be incorporated in a protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the review conference in 2000.

    Concurrently, the process of actual reduction of weapons should begin with the United States and Russia. They should proceed immediately with START III negotiations, particularly since the implementation of START II has been delayed for four years. Even with the delay Russia cannot afford all of the changes required under that Treaty and has suggested willingness to proceed with additional reductions because far deeper reductions by both sides would be less costly.

    At the same time, both nations should agree to take thousands of nuclear warheads off of alert status. This action would reduce the possibility of a nuclear exchange initiated by accident or human error. Once fully de-alerted, warhead removal (de-mating) should commence and the warheads stored remotely from missile sites and submarine bases. Verification measures should include international participation to build confidence between the parties.

    Disassembly of warheads under international supervision should begin in the U.S. and Russia. When a level of 1,000 warheads is reached in each nation, Great Britain, France and China should join the process under a rigorous verification regime. De facto nuclear states, including Israel, should join the process as movement continued toward the complete and irreversible elimination of all nuclear weapons. Finally, an international convention should be adopted to prohibit the manufacture, possession or use of nuclear explosive devices just as current conventions proscribe chemical and biological weapons. All fissile material should be safely and securely stored under international control.

    Verification of this entire process could best be accomplished by U.N. teams formed and operating in accordance with principles developed by UNSCOM teams operating in Iraq today. This model provides a precedent already accepted by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the nuclear powers.

    None of these progressive steps will happen until the community of nations comes together to make the United States understand that non-proliferation will ultimately fail unless the U.S. abandons its delusion that nuclear superiority provides long term security. Even when the dangers of this delusion are understood, progress toward the complete, final abolition of nuclear weapons will be painfully slow. Nevertheless, the effort must be made to move toward the day that all nations live together in a world without nuclear weapons because it is clear that our children cannot hope to live safely in a world with them.