Below is a link to the full text of the working draft of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
Tag: UNGA
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Non-Proliferation Treaty
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,
Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
Article IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Article V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Article VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
Article VII
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.
Article VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
Article IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1
Article XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
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Non-Proliferation Treaty Stays Alive – for now
With the exception of a few cloistered academics, almost no one would seriously argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a safer place. Most individuals, including policy makers, understand that it is essential to future security to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. Based on this understanding, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was put forward and signed by the US, UK and USSR (three countries with nuclear weapons) in 1968. The Treaty entered into force in 1970. Since then the Non-Proliferation Treaty has become the centerpiece of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Currently there are only four countries in the world that have not signed and ratified the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba. The first three of these have nuclear weapons.
At the heart of the NPT is a basic bargain: the countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire or otherwise develop these weapons in exchange for the nuclear weapons states agreeing to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate their arsenals. This bargain is found in Article VI of the Treaty, which calls for “good faith” negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Many of the non-nuclear weapons states have complained over the years that the nuclear weapons states have not upheld their end of the bargain.
In 1995, when the Treaty was extended indefinitely after powerful lobbying by the nuclear weapons states, these states promised the “determined pursuit” of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of their elimination. Over the next five years, however, these countries continued to rely upon their nuclear arsenals to the dismay of many countries without nuclear weapons.
When the five-year Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was held in April and May 2000, the parties to the Treaty, including the nuclear weapons states, agreed to take a number of “practical steps” to implement promises under Article VI of the Treaty. Thirteen steps were listed. I would like to highlight just two. The first of these is an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals….” The second is “early entry into force and full implementation of START II [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II] and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons….”
The “unequivocal undertaking” is language that the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa) has been pressing for, along with practical steps to achieve “the total elimination” of nuclear weapons. In essence this commitment is a reaffirmation of what the nuclear weapons states promised many years ago when they first signed the Treaty in 1968.
Moving forward with START II and START III are also in the offing. After many years, the Russian Duma finally ratified START II, and President Putin has indicated that he is prepared to proceed with reductions to 1,000 to 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads in START III. The US has responded for inexplicable reasons that it is only prepared to discuss reductions to the 2,500 level at this point, a response hardly in keeping with its promises to pursue good faith efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons globally.
An even greater problem, however, lies in US determination to deploy a National Missile Defense. It can hardly do this and keep its promise of “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US has been trying unsuccessfully to convince the Russians that the ABM Treaty should be amended to allow the US to deploy a National Missile Defense. However, this is exactly what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent, based on the reasoning that a strong defense would lead to further offensive arms races, and the Russians want nothing to do with altering the ABM Treaty.
US officials have told the Russians that the National Missile Defense that the US seeks to deploy is aimed not at them, but at “states of concern” (the new US name for states they formerly referred to as “rogue states”). These officials have actually encouraged the Russians to keep their nuclear armed missiles on hair-trigger alert and not reduce the size of their arsenal below START III levels in order to be able to successfully overcome a US National Missile Defense. In their eagerness to promote the National Missile Defense, these officials are actually encouraging Russian policies that will make an accidental or unintended nuclear war more likely. Russia is not buying this, and has made clear that if the US proceeds with deployment of a National Missile Defense, thereby abrogating the ABM Treaty, Russia will withdraw from START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
US insistence on proceeding with a National Missile Defense will be even more destabilizing in Asia. The Chinese have made clear that their response to US deployment of a National Missile Defense will require them to further develop their nuclear forces (at present the Chinese have only 20 nuclear armed missiles capable of reaching US territory). Should China increase its nuclear capabilities, India is likely to follow suit and Pakistan would likely follow India. How Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan would respond remain large question marks.
At the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference the US committed itself to “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. US plans to move forward with a National Missile Defense are incompatible with this promise. If the US wants to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevent the disintegration of this Treaty, it must act in good faith. This means finding another way to deal with potentially dangerous states than building an unworkable, provocative and hugely expensive missile defense system.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference offered some promise of progress on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the fine words Final Document of the Conference notwithstanding, this promise will be dashed if the US continues in its foolhardy and quixotic attempt to put a shield over its head. Such a course will lead only to a leaky umbrella and global nuclear chaos. A far safer course for the US would be to carry out its promise of seeking “the total elimination” of the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without US leadership this will not happen. With US leadership a nuclear weapons free world could become a reality in fairly short order. It is past time for this issue to enter the public arena and move up on the public agenda. The American people deserve to become part of this decision which will so dramatically affect their future and the future of the planet.
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A Nuclear Crisis
This article appeared in the Washington Post, Editorials and Opinions Section.
Every five years, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) comes up for reassessment by the countries that have signed it. This is the treaty that provides for international restraints (and inspections) on nuclear programs. It covers not only the nuclear nations but 180 other countries as well, including Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya. An end to the NPT could terminate many of these inspections and open a Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation in states that already present serious terrorist threats to others.
Now it is time for the 30-year-old NPT to be reviewed (in April, by an international assembly at the United Nations), and, sad to say, the current state of affairs with regard to nuclear proliferation is not good. In fact, I think it can be said that the world is facing a nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, U.S. policy has had a good deal to do with creating it.
At the last reassessment session, in 1995, a large group of non-nuclear nations with the financial resources and technology to develop weapons–including Egypt, Brazil and Argentina–agreed to extend the NPT, but with the proviso that the five nuclear powers take certain specific steps to defuse the nuclear issue: adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996; conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and “determined pursuit” of efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them.
It is almost universally conceded that none of these commitments has been honored. India and Pakistan have used this failure to justify their joining Israel as nations with recognized nuclear capability that are refusing to comply with NPT restraints. And there has been a disturbing pattern of other provocative developments:
- For the first time I can remember, no series of summit meetings is underway or in preparation to seek further cuts in nuclear arsenals. The START II treaty concluded seven years ago by presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin has not been seriously considered for ratification by the Russian parliament.
- Instead of moving away from reliance on nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and NATO have sent disturbing signals to other nations by declaring that these weapons are still the cornerstone of Western security policy, and both have re-emphasized that they will not comply with a “no first use” policy. Russia has reacted to this U.S. and NATO policy by rejecting its previous “no first use” commitment; strapped for funds and unable to maintain its conventional forces of submarines, tanks, artillery, and troops, it is now much more likely to rely on its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States, NATO and others still maintain arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, including up to 200 nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
- Despite the efforts of Gens. Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster, Adm. Stansfield Turner and other military experts, American and Russian nuclear missiles are still maintained in a “hair-trigger alert” status, susceptible to being launched in a spur-of-the-moment crisis or even by accident.
- After years of intense negotiation, recent rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a serious blow to global nuclear control efforts and to confidence in American leadership.
- There is a notable lack of enforcement of the excessively weak international agreements against transfer of fissile materials.
- The prospective adoption by the United States of a limited “Star Wars” missile defense system has already led Russia, China and other nations to declare that this would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which has prevailed since 1972. This could destroy the fabric of existing international agreements among the major powers.
- There is no public effort or comment in the United States or Europe calling for Israel to comply with the NPT or submit to any other restraints. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge what a powerful incentive this is to Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt to join the nuclear community.
- The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has been recently abolished, removing an often weak but at least identifiable entity to explore arms issues.
I believe that the general public would be extremely concerned if these facts were widely known, but so far such issues have not been on the agenda in presidential debates.
A number of responsible non-nuclear nations, including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden have expressed their disillusionment with the lack of progress toward disarmament. The non-proliferation system may not survive unless the major powers give convincing evidence of compliance with previous commitments.
In April, it is imperative that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty be reconfirmed and subsequently honored by leaders who are inspired to act wisely and courageously by an informed public. This treaty has been a key deterrent to the proliferation of weapons, and its unraveling would exert powerful pressures even on peace-loving nations to develop a nuclear capability.
All nuclear states must renew efforts to achieve worldwide reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it requires no further negotiations for leaders of nuclear nations to honor existing nuclear security agreements, including the test ban and anti-ballistic missile treaties, and to remove nuclear weapons from their present hair-trigger alert status.
Just as American policy is to blame for many of the problems, so can our influence help resolve the nuclear dilemma that faces the world.
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The Non-Proliferation Treaty Crisis
The global nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty is in jeopardy due to the continued failure of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty.
Background
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed on July 1, 1968 and remains the foundation of the post-World War II global nuclear nonproliferation. 187 nations signed the treaty; four did not — Cuba, Israel, India and Pakistan. The signers agreed to convene a special conference in 25 years to decide on whether or not to continue the treaty. And in 1997 at the UN headquarters in New York, 174 nations agreed to strengthen the treaty’s review process, i.e., to continue to hold more review conferences in the years to come.
The latest treaty review conference — the year 2000 NPT Review Conference — will be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000. The central issue for that conference is if this treaty will continue to be the centerpiece for global efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or if the Treaty will begin to unravel.
The upcoming Review Conference has crucial implications not only for NPT member states, but also for non-member states, especially India, Pakistan and Israel. The upcoming conference presents a tremendous opportunity to make substantive progress towards nuclear disarmament. Crucial to the outcome of this Review Conference will be the extent to which the nuclear weapon states are able to demonstrate any progress made toward fulfilling obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which states:
“Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
In its 1996 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that:
“There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’
While the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear weapon states has decreased, the status of Article VI obligations is in a state of impasse. Parties of the NPT must take nuclear responsibility and avoid further attempts to weaken non-proliferation efforts.
Challenges to the NPT
The following developments represent the growing peril that challenges international and human security:
Though the Cold War ended more than ten years ago, more than 30,000 nuclear weapons remain worldwide.
Since the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, two additional countries, India and Pakistan, have tested nuclear weapons.
US and Russian nuclear arsenals remain in permanent, 24 hour, “launch on warning” status in spite of recommendations to de-alert nuclear weapons made by the Canberra Commission (1996), two resolutions passed by massive majorities in the UN General Assembly in 1998, another two in 1999, and a unanimous resolution of the European Parliament (1999).
The US Senate has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in spite of nearly unanimous endorsement of the treaty by the international community and massive US public support for nuclear disarmament. In addition, the US and Russia, continue to conduct “subcritical” nuclear tests, undermining the spirit and purpose of the CTBT. The clear aim of the CTBT is to restrain weapons development, yet the US, Russia, and other weapons states proceed to develop new nuclear weapons in computer-simulated “virtual reality”, with the aid of subcritical underground nuclear testing.
NATO has jeopardized the NPT by declaring in April 1999 that nuclear weapons are “essential” to its security.
US efforts to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system and circumvent the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, have increased tensions with Russia and China and threaten a new arms race.
The irresponsibility of the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Failure to make progress on Article VI obligations provides incentive for non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the nuclear danger.
Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have undermined the international norm of nonproliferation established by the treaty.
medium range missile tests in India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea have undermined the NPT
Iraq’s defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions requiring it to complete its disclosure of efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction have threatened the stability of the NPT
Nuclear weapons states are not strongly supporting the treaty’s review process. For example, the US Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 sending a message to the world that nuclear nonproliferation was not a critical issue according to the US Senate.
Sharing peaceful uses of nuclear energy has become a contentious issue
“Additional threats to the regime’s [NPT’s] stability came in 1999 from the erosion of American relations with both China and Russia resulting from NATO’s 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia — with additional harm to relations with China resulting from US accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage and Taiwan’s announcement that it was a state separate from China despite its earlier acceptance of a US-Chinese ‘one China’ agreement. Major threats to the regime also came from the continued stalemate on arms control treaties in the Russian Duma and the US Senate, from a change in US policy to favor building a national missile defense against missile attack and from a Russian decision to develop a new generation of small nuclear weapons for defense against conventional attack.” Ambassador George Bunn, former US Ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and a negotiator of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
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UN General Assembly First Committee Resolution Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda
Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia:
Revised Draft ResolutionThe General Assembly,
Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,
Concerned at the prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons,
Concerned at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
Believing that the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used accidentally or by decision – defies credibility, and that the only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again,
Concerned that the Nuclear-Weapon States have not fulfilled speedily and totally their commitment to the elimination of their nuclear weapons,
Concerned also that those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the NPT have failed to renounce their nuclear-weapons option,
Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally-binding commitments by the nuclear-weapons States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,
Recalling the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,
Stressing that the international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future and convinced that the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to proceed to prohibit and eradicate them for all time,
Recognizing that the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require measures to be taken firstly by those nuclear-weapon States that have the largest arsenals, and Stressing that these States must be joined in a seamless process by those nuclear-weapon States with lesser arsenals in the near future,
Welcoming the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons,
Believing that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place, and in this connection noting certain recent unilateral and other steps,
Welcoming the agreement recently reached in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee under Item 1 of its agenda entitled ‘Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament’ to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and considering that such a treaty must further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,
Emphasising that for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved, effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of international controls over all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
Emphasising the importance of existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties and of the signature and ratification of the relevant protocols to these treaties,
Noting the Joint Ministerial Declaration of 9 June 1998 and its call for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels,
1. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
2. Calls upon the United States and the Russian Federation to bring START II into force without further delay and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion;
3. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five Nuclear-Weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;
4. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities;
5. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States, as an interim measure, to proceed to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and in turn to the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles;
6. Urges the Nuclear-Weapon States to examine further interim measures, including the measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines;
7. Calls upon those three States that are nuclear weapons-capable and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any actions which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;
8. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument;
9. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 15 May 1997;
10. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and, pending the Treaty’s entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests;
11. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to work towards its further strengthening;
12. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to pursue its negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee established under Item 1 of its agenda entitled ‘Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament’ on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, and to conclude these negotiations without delay; and pending the entry into force of the treaty, urges States to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
13. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a view to reaching such a decision without delay;
14. Considers that an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which would effectively complement efforts being undertaken in other settings, could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free- world.
15. Recalls the importance of the Decisions and Resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and underlines the importance of implementing fully the “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” Decision;
16. Affirms that the development of verification arrangements will be necessary for the maintenance of a world free from nuclear weapons and requests the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), together with any other relevant international organisations and bodies, to explore the elements of such a system;
17. Calls for the conclusion of an internationally legally-binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
18. Stresses that the pursuit, extension and establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represent a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear- weapon-free world;
19. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;
20. Requests the Secretary General, within existing resources, to compile a report on the implementation of the resolution;
21. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled “Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free-World: The Need for a New Agenda”, and to review the implementation of this resolution.
ADOPTEDYES 97
NO 19
ABSTAIN 32
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U.S. Blocking Progress on Nuclear Disarmament
The Cold War may be long over, but the United States and other declared nuclear powers still cling to their nuclear weapons. An estimated 36,000 nuclear weapons remain in the world’s nuclear arsenals, thousands of them ready to launch on a moment’s notice, and the nuclear powers continue to squander billions of dollars on nuclear weapons research and development. Meanwhile an ever growing list of countries are lining up to join the nuclear club, raising the specter of a new, more deadly chapter in the arms race and the danger of a nuclear strike somewhere in the world.
A New Arms Race or a New Agenda?
The United Nations General Assembly is about to vote on two important nuclear disarmament resolutions. One, sponsored by Ireland and seven other nations calls for a New Agenda for nuclear disarmament. These governments (Ireland, Brazil, South Africa, Slovenia, Mexico, Sweden, Egypt, and New Zealand) have recognized that without a serious new approach, the dangerous legacy of the Cold War will live on. Their New Agenda includes a call for negotiations on a treaty that would eliminate nuclear weapons. Malaysia has introduced a resolution calling on nations to honor the 1996 International Court of Justice opinion that a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons is required by law.
The United States, preferring the nuclear status quo, has strongly rejected these resolutions and is intensively lobbying other nations to vote them down. The US delegation needs to hear from you! A vote is expected by November 13.
Take Action to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Contact US Ambassador to the United Nations Robert Grey Jr., United States Mission to the United Nations, 799 UN Plaza, New York NY 10017, Fax 212-415-4119 cc: President William Jefferson Clinton, The White House, Washington DC 20500, Fax 202-456-2883
Tell the Ambassador
* The United States should be leading the world toward the abolition of nuclear weapons instead of blocking good faith efforts to jumpstart the stalled disarmament process.
* Support the Malaysian and New Agenda resolutions submitted to the United Nations.
* Contrary to your statement at the UN, the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons IS a clear and present danger to life on the planet.
* Past reductions in the world’s nuclear arsenals are welcome but insufficient.
* The United States should support and advance verifiable measures to immediately reduce the nuclear danger.
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Canada Defies U.S. and Lobbies UN for Passage of NAC Resolution
In response to US pressure to vote against the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) resolution in the General Assembly, THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT is sending representations at the ambassadorial level to the following capitals to ask them to support the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) resolution: Tokyo, The Hague, Bonn, Oslo, Rome, Vienna, Canberra, Madrid and Copenhagen.
The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) is urgently asking NGOs in all of these capitals to contact their governments in support of the NAC resolution in the General Assembly calling on the nuclear weapons states to honor their NPT promises for nuclear disarmament.
While the capitals above are of key importance, don’t forget to write to your government, even if it is not scheduled to receive a visit from the Canadian government.
THIS COULD BE A BREAKTHROUGH FOR ABOLITION IF WE ALL DO OUR PART!! OUR GOVERNMENTS NEED TO HEAR FROM US!!
In the US, letters should be written to Clinton and Albright, asking them to stop strong-arming other countries which are trying to do the right thing by voting for the NAC resolution to put us on the path to nuclear abolition.
PLEASE POST YOUR LETTERS TO THE CAUCUS AS AN INSPIRATION TO OTHERS!!
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel: (212) 726-9161
fax: (212) 726-9160
aslater@gracelinks.organd:
Sue Broidy
Coordinator, Abolition 2000
Phone (805) 965 3443 FAX (805) 568 0466; a2000@silcom.com