Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: UN

  • The Non-Proliferation Treaty Crisis

    The global nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty is in jeopardy due to the continued failure of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty.

    Background

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed on July 1, 1968 and remains the foundation of the post-World War II global nuclear nonproliferation. 187 nations signed the treaty; four did not — Cuba, Israel, India and Pakistan. The signers agreed to convene a special conference in 25 years to decide on whether or not to continue the treaty. And in 1997 at the UN headquarters in New York, 174 nations agreed to strengthen the treaty’s review process, i.e., to continue to hold more review conferences in the years to come.

    The latest treaty review conference — the year 2000 NPT Review Conference — will be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000. The central issue for that conference is if this treaty will continue to be the centerpiece for global efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or if the Treaty will begin to unravel.

    The upcoming Review Conference has crucial implications not only for NPT member states, but also for non-member states, especially India, Pakistan and Israel. The upcoming conference presents a tremendous opportunity to make substantive progress towards nuclear disarmament. Crucial to the outcome of this Review Conference will be the extent to which the nuclear weapon states are able to demonstrate any progress made toward fulfilling obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which states:

    “Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

    In its 1996 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that:

    “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’

    While the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear weapon states has decreased, the status of Article VI obligations is in a state of impasse. Parties of the NPT must take nuclear responsibility and avoid further attempts to weaken non-proliferation efforts.

    Challenges to the NPT

    The following developments represent the growing peril that challenges international and human security:

    Though the Cold War ended more than ten years ago, more than 30,000 nuclear weapons remain worldwide.

    Since the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, two additional countries, India and Pakistan, have tested nuclear weapons.

    US and Russian nuclear arsenals remain in permanent, 24 hour, “launch on warning” status in spite of recommendations to de-alert nuclear weapons made by the Canberra Commission (1996), two resolutions passed by massive majorities in the UN General Assembly in 1998, another two in 1999, and a unanimous resolution of the European Parliament (1999).

    The US Senate has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in spite of nearly unanimous endorsement of the treaty by the international community and massive US public support for nuclear disarmament. In addition, the US and Russia, continue to conduct “subcritical” nuclear tests, undermining the spirit and purpose of the CTBT. The clear aim of the CTBT is to restrain weapons development, yet the US, Russia, and other weapons states proceed to develop new nuclear weapons in computer-simulated “virtual reality”, with the aid of subcritical underground nuclear testing.

    NATO has jeopardized the NPT by declaring in April 1999 that nuclear weapons are “essential” to its security.

    US efforts to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system and circumvent the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, have increased tensions with Russia and China and threaten a new arms race.

    The irresponsibility of the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Failure to make progress on Article VI obligations provides incentive for non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the nuclear danger.

    Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have undermined the international norm of nonproliferation established by the treaty.

    medium range missile tests in India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea have undermined the NPT

    Iraq’s defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions requiring it to complete its disclosure of efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction have threatened the stability of the NPT

    Nuclear weapons states are not strongly supporting the treaty’s review process. For example, the US Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 sending a message to the world that nuclear nonproliferation was not a critical issue according to the US Senate.

    Sharing peaceful uses of nuclear energy has become a contentious issue

    “Additional threats to the regime’s [NPT’s] stability came in 1999 from the erosion of American relations with both China and Russia resulting from NATO’s 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia — with additional harm to relations with China resulting from US accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage and Taiwan’s announcement that it was a state separate from China despite its earlier acceptance of a US-Chinese ‘one China’ agreement. Major threats to the regime also came from the continued stalemate on arms control treaties in the Russian Duma and the US Senate, from a change in US policy to favor building a national missile defense against missile attack and from a Russian decision to develop a new generation of small nuclear weapons for defense against conventional attack.” Ambassador George Bunn, former US Ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and a negotiator of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

  • European Parliament Resolution on the New Agenda Coalition on nuclear disarmament

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on nuclear disarmament, testing and non-proliferation,

    A. welcoming the joint statement of 9 June 1998 by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, entitled, ‘Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the needs for a new agenda’, a group also known as the New Agenda Coalition (NAC),

    B. welcoming the broad diversity of this coalition of countries, crossing as it does traditional lines of co-operation, and also welcoming the eight countries’ initiating a multilateral debate at the highest level of government on such an important and urgent issue,

    C. noting that the United Nations’ First Committee passed the NAC resolution on 13 November 1998, with 97 votes in favour, 19 against and 32 abstentions,

    D. concerned by both the continued retention of nuclear weapons by a few and the nuclear aspirations of others, and reasserting its call for a nuclear-weapon-free world,

    E. noting that this timely initiative, which includes two EU Member States and one associate member, reflects the post-Cold War redefined security environment and sets a path towards constructive engagement discussions on the subject of nuclear disarmament,

    F. emphasising that the UN resolution does not propose actions that contradict any existing EU, NATO or national policies, and supports existing policies regarding inter alia the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the US-Russia START process and nuclear-weapon-free zones,

    1. Calls upon the EU Member States to support the NAC initiative and to vote in favour of it in the General Assembly in December;

    2. Calls on those countries that possess nuclear weapons to fulfil their commitment to disarm by virtue of Article VI of the NPT;

    3. Calls also on the non-nuclear weapon members of the NPT to fulfil their treaty commitments i.e. not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

    4. Calls on states outside of the NPT to immediately, and unconditionally, accede to the treaty and to place all fissionable materials under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards;

    5. Underlines the importance and the necessity of further improving existing verification procedures with a view to ensuring effective compliance by all states concerned, including the allocation of appropriate funding;

    6. Requests that those countries opposing the UN resolution make clear their objections by specifically naming the paragraphs in question;

    7. Calls upon all Member States of the EU to undertake discussions on the subject of taking nuclear forces off their current high-sensitivity alert procedures, also known as de-alerting, as highlighted in the Canberra Commission report of 1996;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Foreign Ministers of the NAC and the United Nations Secretary General.

  • UN General Assembly First Committee Resolution Towards a Nuclear Weapon-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda

    Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zambia:
    Revised Draft Resolution

    The General Assembly,

    Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

    Concerned at the prospect of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons,

    Concerned at the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),

    Believing that the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used accidentally or by decision – defies credibility, and that the only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again,

    Concerned that the Nuclear-Weapon States have not fulfilled speedily and totally their commitment to the elimination of their nuclear weapons,

    Concerned also that those three States that are nuclear-weapons capable and that have not acceded to the NPT have failed to renounce their nuclear-weapons option,

    Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally-binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that these undertakings have been made in the context of the corresponding legally-binding commitments by the nuclear-weapons States to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament,

    Recalling the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control,

    Stressing that the international community must not enter the third millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future and convinced that the present juncture provides a unique opportunity to proceed to prohibit and eradicate them for all time,

    Recognizing that the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require measures to be taken firstly by those nuclear-weapon States that have the largest arsenals, and Stressing that these States must be joined in a seamless process by those nuclear-weapon States with lesser arsenals in the near future,

    Welcoming the achievements to date and the future promise of the START process and the possibility it offers for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments undertaken in pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons,

    Believing that there are a number of practical steps that the nuclear-weapon States can and should take immediately before the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals and the development of requisite verification regimes take place, and in this connection noting certain recent unilateral and other steps,

    Welcoming the agreement recently reached in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee under Item 1 of its agenda entitled ‘Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament’ to negotiate, on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and considering that such a treaty must further underpin the process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

    Emphasising that for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be achieved, effective international cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons is vital and must be enhanced through, inter alia, the extension of international controls over all fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

    Emphasising the importance of existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaties and of the signature and ratification of the relevant protocols to these treaties,

    Noting the Joint Ministerial Declaration of 9 June 1998 and its call for a new international agenda to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world, through the pursuit, in parallel, of a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels,

    1. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);

    2. Calls upon the United States and the Russian Federation to bring START II into force without further delay and immediately thereafter to proceed with negotiations on START III with a view to its early conclusion;

    3. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five Nuclear-Weapon States into the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

    4. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States to pursue vigorously the reduction of reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons and negotiations on their elimination as an integral part of their overall nuclear disarmament activities;

    5. Calls upon the Nuclear-Weapon States, as an interim measure, to proceed to the de-alerting of their nuclear weapons and in turn to the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles;

    6. Urges the Nuclear-Weapon States to examine further interim measures, including the measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines;

    7. Calls upon those three States that are nuclear weapons-capable and that have not yet acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to clearly and urgently reverse the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or deployment and to refrain from any actions which could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

    8. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to take all the necessary measures which flow from adherence to this instrument;

    9. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol approved by the IAEA Board of Governors on 15 May 1997;

    10. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify, unconditionally and without delay, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and, pending the Treaty’s entry into force, to observe a moratorium on nuclear tests;

    11. Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to work towards its further strengthening;

    12. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to pursue its negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee established under Item 1 of its agenda entitled ‘Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament’ on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein, of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives, and to conclude these negotiations without delay; and pending the entry into force of the treaty, urges States to observe a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

    13. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to pursue as a matter of priority its intensive consultations on appropriate methods and approaches with a view to reaching such a decision without delay;

    14. Considers that an international conference on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, which would effectively complement efforts being undertaken in other settings, could facilitate the consolidation of a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free- world.

    15. Recalls the importance of the Decisions and Resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and underlines the importance of implementing fully the “Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty” Decision;

    16. Affirms that the development of verification arrangements will be necessary for the maintenance of a world free from nuclear weapons and requests the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), together with any other relevant international organisations and bodies, to explore the elements of such a system;

    17. Calls for the conclusion of an internationally legally-binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

    18. Stresses that the pursuit, extension and establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia, represent a significant contribution to the goal of a nuclear- weapon-free world;

    19. Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

    20. Requests the Secretary General, within existing resources, to compile a report on the implementation of the resolution;

    21. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-fourth session the item entitled “Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free-World: The Need for a New Agenda”, and to review the implementation of this resolution.
    ADOPTED

    YES 97

    NO 19

    ABSTAIN 32

  • UN Committee Passes Nuclear Disarmament Resolution

    The United Nations First Committee (Disarmament and International Security), by a vote of 100 in favour, 25 against and 23 abstentions, today adopted resolution A/C.1/53/L.45, entitled “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

    The resolution welcomes the conclusion of the ICJ “that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects” and calls for “all states to immediately fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1999 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention…”

    A separate vote on operative paragraph paragraph one, which welcomes the ICJ’s conclusion, was supported by 133 states, with 5 opposing and 5 abstaining.

    Among the nuclear weapons states, China, India and Pakistan supported the resolution, while the others opposed. The UK did however abstain on operative paragraph 1.

    Explanations of vote were given by Luxembourg (on behalf of themselves, Netherlands and Belgium), Chile, the UK, USA, Japan, Aotearoa-New Zealand, South Korea and Germany.

    Germany’s statement explaining its opposition, emphasised that it could only move forward on nuclear disarmament initiatives in cooperation with its NATO partners. There was thus no indication that the new government, a Green Social Democrat coalition, would implement its agreed policy on disarmament which supports unilateral disarmament initiatives including a reduction of alert status and renunciation of the first-use policy. Unlike Germany, the NATO states of Norway, Denmark and Iceland abstained.

    Statements of Japan, USA, UK, and Luxembourg were similar to those they made when the resolution was before the United Nations last year.

    Aotearoa-New Zealand noted that while they supported the call for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and that a nuclear weapons convention could be the instrument to complete the task, they also believed that the final goal may be a different agreement or framework of agreements. Thus resolution L.48 (Towards a nuclear-weapon- free world: the need for a new agenda) more accurately reflected their position.

    Chile expressed shock that countries could vote against operative paragraph 1 which was an expression of international law. They reminded the assembly of the elements of international law which led to the unanimous conclusion regarding the disarmament obligation. They noted the other unanimous conclusions of the ICJ regarding the application of international humanitarian law to any threat or use of nuclear weapons, and the lack of any specific authorization for any threat or use of nuclear weapons in international law. Finally, Chile noted that any possession of nuclear weapons in a region of conflict would constitute a threat of their use and thus be in violation of international law.

    The resolution will be forwarded to the plenary of the General Assembly for a final vote in early December.

  • United Nations Considering Two Resolutions That Would Advance the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; Support Needed for New Agenda Coalition and Malaysian Resolutions

    The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and Malaysia have submitted two resolutions in the United Nations which will advance the goals of Abolition 2000. The NAC Resolution, organized by the Eight Nation Intitiative of Ireland, Sweden, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, Egypt, New Zealand, and Slovenia, calls on the nuclear weapons states ” to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to the speedy and total elimination of their respective nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the elimination of these weapons, thereby fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).”

    The Malaysian government has called for the commencement of “multilateral negotiations in 1999 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention.” The two resolutions are complementary, and both work to further the Abolition 2000 agenda.

    IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE GAIN THE SUPPORT OF OUR GOVERNMENTS FOR THESE IMPORTANT INITIATIVES!

    The co-sponsors of the NAC resolution are Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ireland, Lesotho, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, New Zealand-Aotearoa, Nigeria, Peru, Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

    The co-sponsors of the Malaysian resolution are Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei, Darussalam, Burundi, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Losotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Mynamar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

    If your government is NOT listed on both of the resolutions above, please activate your grassroots networks to send letters urging your government to vote in favor of the resolutions. (If they are on the list of sponsors, thank them for their efforts.)

    Time is short! Voting on all the NAC resolution may occur between November 6-13.

  • Statement of His Excellency Archbishop Renato R. Martino Apostolic Nuncio, Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the United Nations on Landmines

    Before the First Committee of the 53rd Session Of the United Nations
    General Assembly

    General and Complete Disarmament
    New York City

    Mr. Chairman,

    The international community has, in recent times, witnessed some positive-albeit modest-trends in disarmament. An anti-personnel landmines treaty has come into existence and all who worked to make this a reality, deserve congratulations. Unknown numbers of innocent civilians, particularly children, will be spared the cruel maiming and death caused by these evil instruments. The Holy See, which expeditiously ratified the treaty, calls on all nations to do the same.

    The Holy See notes another recent gain in the new momentum given to the small arms issue. Small arms cause the violent death, injury and psychological trauma of hundreds of thousands of people each year. These simple and comparably inexpensive weapons of death find their way into areas of conflict and instability and, shockingly, even into the hands of children, who are locked into a culture of violence. Casualties often occur in the context of religious, ethnic, political and national conflicts. These conflicts are the cause for the existence of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons. The weaponization of society fuels cycles of violence, despair and ultimately state collapse. Thus, the establishment of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, alongside the work of the Vienna Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, are a positive step forward.

    In the recent meeting, which took place in Oslo, government officials agreed that governments have primary responsibility to reduce the flow and accumulation of small arms. A study of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace noted the anomaly by which certain States have stringent controls on the international transfer of heavy arms, but few if any regarding the sale of small arms and handguns. The supplying of small arms must be regulated at its source, at the same time as efforts are being made to lessen the demand and to choke off access to illicit supplies. In certain areas there is an urgent need to ensure a more effective control of stockpiles. Furthermore, the sale of excess supplies of small arms and light weapons, rendered redundant either through modernization or reduction in the size of military forces, can lead, in a cascading effect, to an ongoing flow of sophisticated arms from developed to developing countries.

    Civil society also has an important role to play, for the human cost of small arms casualties is a societal issue. Reducing arms expenditures and heightened health care costs could enable more resources to be directed to sustainable development programs. The strain on public health care facilities in affected areas would be relieved and the physical and mental health of individuals and families improved. The new efforts to bring together the communities of international arms control and disarmament, humanitarian law, peace and security, public health, gun control, international development and conflict resolution, are hopeful signs of a new global awareness.

    The Holy See appeals, in particular, for increased measures to be taken to effectively identify those individuals and groups who traffic in small arms outside all bounds of legal control, and who, through their activity, unscrupulously contribute to violence and instability. More decisive international police and intelligence cooperation is required. A reliable system of marking small arms would make tracking more effective. All governments must ensure maximum transparency and absolute respect for their own norms and the norms of the international community concerning arms transfers, especially to conflict areas.

    Turning to the nuclear weapons field, the worthy initiative by eight states from different areas of the world which have formed the New Agenda Coalition, is a welcome advance. They have called on the governments of the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally to the elimination of nuclear weapons and to agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement

    In this context, the development of the Middle Powers Initiative, a coalition of prominent international nongovernmental organizations, is also welcomed. It aims at encouraging the governments of the nuclear weapons states and the nuclear weapons-capable states to move rapidly to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

    A measure of progress was made this year in the tentative agreement at the Conference on Disarmament to establish committee discussions on a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty. This work would be enhanced by a general recognition that steps toward non-proliferation must go hand-in-hand with steps to disarmament.

    The upgrading of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs signals a higher priority that the UN itself will give to disarmament activities.

    Mr. Chairman, the review of positive developments I have just given should fill us with encouragement for the future. A distinct mark of our time, however, is that the work of disarmament is proceeding slowly. But an offsetting trend of negative developments is slowing us down further. These negative trend lines must be identified in order for us to take action.

    Foremost is the breakdown in the preparatory process for the 2000 Review of the NPT. During two sessions over two years, the NPT Preparatory Committee has struggled to find an acceptable format for deliberations on nuclear disarmament. The debates over terminology, subsidiary bodies and time schedules are but a surrogate for the real debate over a comprehensive program to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    It is not just the NPT that is in trouble. The impasse in the ratification process of both START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty bespeak the lingering resistance to disarmament. Further progress is inhibited by the failure to consolidate hard-earned gains.

    The testing of nuclear weapons by States which stand outside the NPT exacerbates the dangers caused by a weak nonproliferation regime. Nuclear testing by any nation is to be deplored. Criticism of those who test, however, does not deal adequately with the central problem. This is the determination of the nuclear weapons states to carry their nuclear weapons into the 21st Century, despite their obligation under the NPT to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

    The continued existence of 30,000 nuclear weapons almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, poses a grave danger to humanity. This is further worsened by the fact that 5,000 of these weapons are on alert status, meaning they are capable of being fired on thirty minutes’ notice. The danger of nuclear catastrophe through accident or terrorism is an unacceptable risk.

    Mr. Chairman, nothing so reveals the negative trend lines in disarmament as the continued insistence that nuclear weapons are essential to national security. The exaggerated claim that nuclear weapons are an aid to peace can only provoke other states to do the same. At this point, I would like to recall the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, that states have an obligation to conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

    More over, what is deeply troubling is the prospect of a new nuclear arms race. The modernization programs of those who already have nuclear weapons, combined with the acquiring of nuclear weapons by other states, and research now going on in still others, plunge the world into more danger than existed during the Cold War. The longer this situation continues, the more a growing number of states will falsely claim that nuclear weapons are legitimate.

    The Holy See has stated before and states again: “Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition.” (Statement of the Holy See before the First Committee of the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 15 October 1997.)

    My delegation believes that the world must move more and more toward the abolition of nuclear weapons through a universal, non-discriminatory ban with intensive inspection by a universal authority. This process would begin by the nuclear weapons states committing themselves unequivocally to the elimination of their nuclear weapons and without delay to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations to this end. Practical steps to move this process forward should be taken immediately, such as de-alerting and de-activating nuclear weapons. A pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons should be made, as an interim step, by every State possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it would be a constructive step to hold an international conference on nuclear disarmament in which both governments and civil society could unite their strengths to develop the political will to take the courageous steps necessary for abolition.

    Mr. Chairman, the great task ahead for the Twenty-first Century is to move the world from a culture of violence and war to a culture of peace. UNESCO has already taken a lead in promoting a culture of peace. This consists in promoting values, attitudes and behaviors reflecting and inspiring social interaction and sharing, based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, human rights, tolerance and solidarity. Rather than intervening in violent conflicts after they have erupted and then engaging in post-conflict peace building, it is more human and more efficient to prevent such violence in the first place by addressing its roots.

    Let it not be said that the promotion of a culture of peace, the rooting out of the causes of violence, the abolition of nuclear weapons, are unreachable goals. The world has rid itself of the evils of legalized slavery, legalized colonialism and legalized apartheid. These were eliminated as the result of rising global awareness and political determination. So, also, the growing momentum to delegitimize and eliminate nuclear weapons must now be accompanied by political action by all States. Humanity deserves no less from us.

    Thank you Mr. Chairman.

     

  • Article 26

    In considering the need to reform and strengthen the United Nations to better meet its obligations to provide for international peace and security, special attention should be given to Article 26 of the U.N. Charter. There are probably very few people in the world today familiar with this article. Consequently, the Security Council has been able to ignore one of its most important responsibilities for more than 50 years.

    Article 26 states:

    In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

    The language of Article 26 is simple and straight forward. It is not possible to mistake the intent of its directive. The Security Council is given the responsibility for “formulating…a system for the regulation of armaments.”

    The United Nations Charter was signed 50 years ago. In the intervening period of time, the Security Council has failed to carry out this responsibility to the members of the United Nations and through them to the people of the world. In 50 years the Security Council has done exactly nothing to fulfill its Article 26 obligation.

    Under Article 26, the regulation of armaments is not optional for the Security Council. The Article says unambiguously that the Security Council “shall” formulate such a plan. The members of the Security Council have thus breached a solemn duty to the people of the world. Since the non-permanent members of the Security Council rotate at two year intervals, they cannot be held primarily responsible for failing to meet this obligation. It is the five permanent members of the Council — the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China — that have been in violation of their Article 26 obligation for 50 years.

    The reason that the permanent members of the Security Council have been remiss in fulfilling their obligation under Article 26 is not difficult to identify. After all, these states have been the greatest developers, producers, promoters, and sellers of arms. They have profited enormously by the sale of arms throughout the world, and they continue to do so. To fulfill their Article 26 obligation by formulating plans for the regulation of armaments would disadvantage them economically. Their behavior provides clear evidence that they would prefer to promote rather than regulate armaments.

    The Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 26 is described in Article 47 as being composed of “the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives.” The purpose of the Military Staff Committee is “to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulations of armaments, and possible disarmament.”

    The Military Staff Committee is also in breach of its obligation to “advise and assist” the Security Council in carrying out its Article 26 responsibility for formulating plans for the regulation of armaments. Since the Military Staff Committee is composed of representatives of the military forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council, their breach of duty is a further violation of the duty of the five permanent members.

    The United Nations Charter lists as its first purpose to “maintain international peace and security,” and it gives the primary responsibility for carrying out this purpose to the Security Council. When the Security Council fails in meeting its responsibilities, including its responsibility under Article 26, it is the people of the world who suffer. The Councils failure to formulate plans for the regulation of arms under Article 26 has left the world awash in dangerous arms that take their toll daily against opposing military forces as well as innocent civilians and the environment.

    When a nation signs the United Nations Charter it enters into a solemn treaty obligation. In essence, it makes a contract by which it agrees to be bound. While the five permanent members of the Security Council do have special privileges under the Charter, they do not have the privilege of violating the Charter with impunity. When they ignore the provisions of the Charter, as they have done by failing to meet their obligations under Article 26, they are in violation of international law. In simple terms, they have broken the law. Each day that passes without the formulation of plans by the Security Council for the regulation of armaments is an additional day of illegality for the permanent members.

    For 50 years the permanent members of the Security Council have flaunted their illegality with respect to Article 26. They continue to develop, manufacture, promote, and sell armaments of all levels of sophistication throughout the world. They daily demonstrate by their actions and omissions their lack of respect for the law and for their solemn obligations. Day in and day out they place economic benefit and military power ahead of their legal obligations.

    Article 26 stands in silent testimony to the lawlessness of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Article 26 reminds those of us who know of its existence of the disgraceful behavior of the most powerful nations on Earth in failing to meet their legal obligations under the Charter and, in doing so, setting themselves above the law.

    Under the United States Constitution, treaty law is the law of the land. When the United States government signs and ratifies a treaty, it becomes bound by its provisions, and the obligations become part of the United States law. Thus, in its continuing failure to meet its obligations under Article 26, the United States government is in violation not only of the United Nations Charter but U.S. law as well. The buck stops with the president of the United States and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By their failure to even attempt to formulate a plan with the other members of the Security Council, they demonstrate daily contempt for the law, both international and domestic.

    For those who attack the United Nations for its short-comings, of which there are all too many, Article 26 should be a powerful reminder that the United Nations can succeed only if the nations that are its members live up to their legal duties under the Charter. When nations fail to do so and threaten international peace and security, it is the Security Council, with the advice and assistance of the Military Staff Committee, that is charged with preserving the peace.When the Security Council fails to fulfill its obligation to regulate armaments, it is called upon to remedy the consequences of its inaction.

    When the permanent members of the Security Council fail to meet their obligations to the United Nations, it is the General Assembly that must call them to account. If the General Assembly fails to act, it is the people of the world who must step forward and demand that the permanent members of the Security Council fulfill their obligations. A particular responsibility rests with the people of the nations that have permanent seats on the Security Council to call their governments to account and demand that they fulfill their legal obligations to formulate a system for the regulation of armaments under Article 26.

    Four of the five permanent members of the Security council make claim to being democracies, and in these societies ultimate responsibility for government logically rests with the citizenry. Citizens in these states must be educated about Article 26 and must pressure their governments to act legally and responsibily to develop a plan for the worldwide regulation of armaments as called for in Article 26.

    At the same time, other states must also demand that the Security Council fulfill its obligation under Article 26. The failure to regulate armaments has resultedin the escalation of death and destruction in warfare and made the world far more dangerous and deadly.

    It is past time for the Security Council to act decisively on Article 26.

  • Resolution 715 (1991) on Iraq

    Adopted by the Security Council at its 3012th meeting

    The Security Council,

    Recalling its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and its other resolutions on this matter,

    Recalling in particular that under resolution 687 (1991) the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were requested to develop plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, and to submit them to the Security Council for approval,

    Taking note of the report and note of the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1), transmitting the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

    Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

    1. Approves, in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and the present resolution, the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1);

    2. Decides that the Special Commission shall carry out the plan submitted by the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev.1), as well as continuing to discharge its other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991) and performing such other functions as are conferred upon it under the present resolution;

    3. Requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, the plan submitted by him (S/22872/Rev.1) and to continue to discharge his other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991);

    4. Decides that the Special Commission, in the exercise of its responsibilities as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, shall:

    (a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating additional locations for inspection and overflights;

    (b) Continue to render assistance and cooperation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary special expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the plan submitted by him;

    (c) Perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, including making use of commonly available services and information to the fullest extent possible, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources;

    5. Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved by the present resolution and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the plans;

    6. Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, from all Member States to support the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out their activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, without prejudice to Iraq’s liability for the full costs of such activities;

    7. Requests the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop in cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder;

    8. Requests the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the plans approved by the present resolution, when requested by the Security Council and in any event at least every six months after the adoption of this resolution;

    9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

  • Resolution 687 (1991)

    Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting

    The Security Council,

    Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,

    Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,

    Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),

    Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

    Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991),

    Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,

    Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,

    Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

    Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

    Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,

    Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,

    Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

    Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

    Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

    Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

    Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear- weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

    Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

    Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,

    Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,

    Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,

    Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,

    Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

    Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,

    Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,

    Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,

    Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

    1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire:

    A
    2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;

    3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;

    4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

    B
    5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters” of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;

    6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

    C
    7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

    8. Decides that shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

    1. All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
    2. All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

    9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

    1. Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;
    2. The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:
      1. The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;
      2. The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;
      3. The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

    10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with this paragraph. to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;

    11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;

    12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

    13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency’s verification and inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency to confirm that the Agency’s safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;

    14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons:

    D
    15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

    E
    16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

    17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;

    18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;

    19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq’s contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq’s payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq’s liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above.

    F
    20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated “no-objection” procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 19919, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;

    21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;

    22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;

    23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;

    24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the scale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

    1. Arms and related matérial of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;
    2. Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;
    3. Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
    4. Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

    25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licenses of any other arrangements;

    26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;

    27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;

    28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22,23,24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq’s compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;

    29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;

    G
    30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;

    31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

    H
    32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;

    I
    33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

    34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.

     

  • Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace

    Approved by General Assembly resolution 39/11

    The General Assembly,

    Reaffirming that the principal aim of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security,

    Bearing in mind the fundamental principles of international law set forth in the Charter of the United Nations,

    Expressing the will and the aspirations of all peoples to eradicate war from the life of mankind and, above all, to avert a world-wide nuclear catastrophe,

    Convinced that life without war serves as the primary international prerequisite for the material well-being, development and progress of countries, and for the full implementation of the rights and fundamental human freedoms proclaimed by the United Nations,

    Aware that in the nuclear age the establishment of a lasting peace on Earth represents the primary condition for the preservation of human civilization and the survival of mankind,

    Recognizing that the maintenance of a peaceful life for peoples is the sacred duty of each State,

    1. Solemnly proclaims that the peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace;

    2. Solemnly declares that the preservation of the right of peoples to peace and the promotion of its implementation constitute a fundamental obligation of each State;

    3. Emphasizes that ensuring the exercise of the right of peoples to peace demands that the policies of States be directed towards the elimination of the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations;

    4. Appeals to all States and international organizations to do their utmost to assist in implementing the right of peoples to peace through the adoption of appropriate measures at both the national and the international level.