Tag: UN

  • Leveraging the Anti-Nuclear Majority: How to Create a Serious Nuclear Disarmament Coalition (NDC)

    When Dryden penned the phrase “War is the trade of kings,”1he was simply coining a tragic truism of his day. Kingship was hereditary in 1691, and the king’s subjects did his bidding, in particular the waging of war. By 1961, with the growth of democracies and human rights, things were supposed to be different. Yet the “kings” of the modern era—the victors of WWII— were, and still are “trading in war,” still producing and profiting from all manner of weaponry designed to wound, dismember, blind, burn and kill enemy populations. And the trump card in their deck for the last sixty years has been nuclear weapons.

    Given how drastically the nature of war has changed, it is time question the lofty assumptions conveyed in Dryden’s dictum. Who still believes that modern war is capable of being honorably conducted by virtuous leaders? Is it not rather time to talk of a new kind of “trade,” based on peace? Robust foreign trade in a climate of peace may be, in fact, the “trade of the just,” as opposed to the trade of kings. And that very commerce, if wisely managed to further the goals of world peace and nuclear disarmament, could have a decisive effect in convincing the current “kings” of this world and their citizens that nuclear arms are no longer a useful asset.

    Today there are nine nation-states capable of “trading” in nuclear war. God help us if they ever do! They polish and prime their arsenals in the vain belief that such weapons will make them more secure, more prestigious, more “kingly” if you will. They fail to realize that nobody wins if there is even a single nuclear exchange. They seem unwilling to “lock down” and eventually give up their thermonuclear bombs—even under the strictest of controls.

    The possession of a nuclear arsenal, alas, has been seen as conferring special status within the United Nations on the oldest of the nuclearized states (the P5 in the Security Council: China, France, the Russian Federation, the U.K. and the USA). Their undeserved status has had the unfortunate effect of encouraging imitator-states, so that now there are four more in that club of dubious distinction (India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea). Other countries may be planning to join. The aim of this paper is to suggest strategies and methods that could be effective in convincing the nuclear-weaponized states, and any others that aspire to be such, that they would lose more than they gain by developing and/or maintaining their arsenals.

    In 1943, the year I was born, the world was at war; but at that time at least there were no nuclear weapons. Incendiary bombs were bad enough; yet there was still a limit to how much death and destruction a single bomb could visit on mankind. Ever since 1945, however, when I was two years old, I and my generation, and eventually my children’s and grandchildren’s generation— we have all been subject to a threat of almost Biblical proportion and resonance. We have been living—and still live—just minutes away from either inflicting or suffering the worst blasphemy, the worst insult to God’s creation, the most horrendous and indiscriminate waste of human life, and the most lethal and persistent poisoning of the environment that the world has ever known.

    The dream that I am sharing with you today is that we who are over 60 should be able to leave this world as free of nuclear weapons as it was when we entered it, so that those who are born in 2013, 2023, or 2033, will be able to look back over their lives and say:

    “Yes, I was born into a world with many problems, but nuclear war was not one of them. Thanks to a coalition of non-violent, visionary states back in the early 21 st century, with the ability to see thermonuclear weapons for what they really were, and the courage to stand up for sanity and our common humanity, the nuclear-armed states were persuaded to give up their reliance on those terrible weapons. Planet earth, our lifeboat in the vastness of empty, cold, and lifeless space, still faces many problems, but anti-population warfare with environmentally catastrophic weapons. thank God, is not one of them.”

    Some recent history—high notes and low notes

    The United Nations charter was already signed in San Francisco, on June 26, 1945, weeks before we entered the nuclear age by exploding the first atomic bomb, July 16, 1945. A few months after the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, the very first resolution of the UN General Assembly, meeting in London on January 24, 1946, called for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” It was passed unanimously… and nothing happened. Au contraire, within fifty years, the number of nuclear weapons in the superpowers’ arsenals had grown to more than 60,000. There still remain more than 30,000 today – equivalent in destructive force to some 200,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs.

    General Assembly resolutions

    The UN General Assembly has continued, year after year, to pass a wide variety of passionate resolutions on the subject of nuclear weapons: how to limit their development, testing, and use; and how to achieve disarmament. A search that I conducted in September 2005 of the information system at the Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the UN, seeking General Assembly resolutions involving the keyword-phrase “nuclear weapons,” found 158 such documents online. They date mostly from 1983 forward. Given these results within just a twenty-year period, I would estimate that the member states of the UN have passed resolutions in the General Assembly to limit, reduce, or eliminate nuclear weapons on more than 200 occasions already, usually with a wide majority bordering on unanimity. (Later we shall review the pattern of voting.) But still no real progress toward a serious Nuclear Weapons Convention has been made at the UN. Alas, the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the UN in May 2005 was deeply disappointing, in that it “did little to tighten control over the spread of nuclear arms.”2

    UN Security Council resolutions

    Along with the 200-plus UN General Assembly resolutions, eloquent if weak, there have been at least seven Security Council resolutions on the subject of nuclear weapons (see Appendix A). They have generally dealt with specific issues of concern to the nuclear superpowers, like the behavior of India or Iraq. But none has hit home. None has resulted in the abandonment of thermonuclear weapons by any state that already had them. And none has prevented other states who were determined to acquire them from getting them. So much for the best efforts of UN diplomats. They can certainly sing the high notes, but they haven’t shattered any glass yet. The record shows that even the most sincere diplomatic efforts made at the UN, given its power structures and forums favoring the nuclear-armed states, have met with no significant nuclear disarmament successes.

    Non-governmental voices

    At the other end of the political gamut, we are hearing today more and more a chorus of “low notes,” that is, voices from grass-roots organizations like the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,, Abolition 2000, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, and Mayors for Peace. They are part of a worldwide network of over thirty professional, civic, and non-governmental organizations – all with links to and from the wagingpeace.org Web site. They are doing great work to keep alive the conversation about the sacredness of human life and the utter waste and moral bankruptcy that building, storing, deploying, arming, and targeting nuclear weapons represents. But still, these groups are at best only raising awareness of a continuing problem and threat. By using words alone, even by speaking (as St. Paul says) with “the tongues of men and angels,” those of us who sing the “low notes” will probably never be able to persuade the nuclear-weaponized states, no matter how eloquently we speak, to collectively relinquish their supposedly sovereign right to stockpile and use weapons of mass destruction. So what will put those countries on a path to nuclear disarmament? How can we use appropriate leverage to make this dream a reality?

    A new kind of chorus

    The answer, I believe, lies neither in the “high notes” of UN diplomacy (always hampered by Security Council vetoes and the resistance of nuclear-armed states to any change in the status quo), nor in the “low notes” of grass roots mobilization alone. Rather, what we need to do is mobilize the already extant majority of nation-states, those 180-odd that are non-nuclear, in particular the 110 to 150 who consistently vote in favor of nuclear limitation and disarmament at the General Assembly. We need to encourage them to create their own worldwide coalition, celebrating and favoring their fraternal humanity and their restraint in “the trade of kings” in every conceivable peaceful way, and in like measure shunning and disfavoring for cause the nuclear-weapons-bearing states, their governments, and their business delegations, until they reform.

    If the anti-nuclear majority could be brought together to form an effective coalition—perhaps called the Nuclear Disarmament Coalition (NDC)—its member states could provide the crucial leverage needed to achieve real progress toward disarmament. They could create the necessary conditions worldwide (not just rhetorically, in the halls of the UN) that would make it manifestly less advantageous, less convenient, less acceptable, more troublesome, and patently more costly for the nuclear states to cling to their warheads than to get rid of them. Somehow the nuclear-weapons-free governments need to get organized, and to start seeing themselves in a new light: as the “most favored nations” of planet earth… as “the new common market” of planet earth.

    • They need to be encouraged to use every non-violent means at their disposal to confront any states that are out of line.
    • They need to be encouraged to dream up the most colorful, most provocative, most imaginative of non-violent means to discourage the nuclear-weapons-club states from renewing their membership in that club.
    • Keeping a nuclear weapons arsenal must come to be understood as:
      • no longer fashionable (imagine how the entertainment industry could help here!),
      • no longer economically advantageous (imagine having to pay more for everything if your country is not part of the NDC),
      • no longer the way to get ahead in the world (imagine your delegations and cultural and industrial exports being shunned),
      • no longer even socially acceptable (imagine not being invited to World conferences, fairs, and festivals!)

    Real progress in nuclear disarmament, I am suggesting, will only come quickly if the nuclear-weaponized states are persuaded, in the face of resounding worldwide public opinion, that it is in their own best interest to disarm and rejoin the rest of the world. The NDC states will need to make a convincing case of how serious they are about obtaining a safer world, and clearly outline the geopolitical and commercial realignments and consequences that will result if nothing is done.

    When I say “the rest of the world,” I’m talking about the true world majority in terms of:

    • sovereign states (182 vs. 9), and even
    • population (3.3 billion vs. 3.1 billion)(see Appendix B);
    • potential developing markets, and even access to
    • raw materials and essential commodities

    These are the very factors that will be most important for the stimulation of growing economies and for improving the standard of living of the world’s citizens in the years to come.

    On the subject of population: One should neither be unduly impressed nor discouraged over the coincidence of high-population countries and large nuclear weapons arsenals. It really has nothing to do with population. Nuclear weapons are usually a by-product of an overdeveloped military-industrial complex, coupled with a leadership living in fear, or needing to instill fear in order to be reckoned with. This is as true for tiny Israel and N. Korea as it is for giant Pakistan and India. It is possible, however, that the large populations of many nuclear countries currently assumed to be quietly favoring nuclear weapons will turn out to be the very vocal masses demanding disarmament from within. The more the merrier! This will be especially true if their imaginations can be fired by the dramatic steps the rest of the world might soon be taking to shun and disfavor nuclear-weapons-armed states.

    Economic Leverage

    One persuasive way to get the attention of rich nuclear countries may, in fact, be via their pocket books. When it comes to raw materials, the stuff that keeps the first world happy, the anti-nuclear majority of countries just might have a few cards to play.

    Petroleum and Natural Gas

    Only about a quarter of the world’s states, 46 of some 200-odd oil-producing states and protectorates, produce petroleum in quantities over 100,000 barrels a day. The top 46 producers (which include the 11 OPEC countries) account for nearly 75 million of the 76 million barrels produced daily. Saudi Arabia leads the world with 9 million bbl./day. Four of the nuclear-armed states—Pakistan (61,000 bbl), France (35,000 bbl), Israel (just 80 bbl) and North Korea (0)—are not in the league of major producers. Only the remaining five of nine nuclear-armed states are in that league: Russia, the U.S., China, the U.K., and India; but none is among OPEC’s eleven members. The five in question only produce collectively 22 million barrels/day—far from enough to meet their own needs. (See Appendix C)

    The point of this discussion is to make clear that leverage for serious progress towards nuclear disarmament in fact is in the hands of about 40 major, nuclear-weapons-free, oil-producing states at this time, and will continue to be for the next twenty years. A polite, principled, and firm confrontation of the few (the 9 nuclear-armed, oil-consuming states) by the many—the 40 major oil producing states, with the promise of graduated price hikes for any states that refuse to adhere to an NDC-approved nuclear disarmament timetable, would certainly get the attention of the nuclear-armed states and their citizens. It would become a tremendous internal political issue. (See also Appendix C for similar figures regarding natural gas supply and demand worldwide.)

    Coffee – 55 of the 56 countries that produce coffee worldwide are in the nuclear-weapons-free camp. The only exception is India,3 whose coffee production amounts to less than 4% of world production, and is largely consumed domestically. Imagine how the American, French, and British public would react if they woke up one morning to learn that the NDC states, which may include virtually every coffee producing country in the world, were instituting a new, dramatically higher price structure for coffee beans going to non-NDC states. Could Americans swallow that? How would they vote, if they had the ability to vote, on the one issue potentially keeping them from affordable and plentiful coffee every day?

    Critical and Strategic Minerals — Although the nuclear-armed states recycle varying proportions of chromium, cobalt, manganese and platinum group metals, they are almost completely dependent on imports for new supplies. World production of these metals is dominated by a few countries, including South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo, none of which is part of the nuclear-armed camp. Here is an interesting table about rare metals used in jet fighter engines. It was produced by Doug Davidson, a scientist with the Biosphere 2000 project. I think the implications are clear enough.4

    Amount of Strategic Minerals Used in One Jet-Fighter Engine and Percentage Supplied by Imports
    Mineral Amount Used (in tons) Percent Imported
    Titanium 2.7 35
    Nickel 2.6 73
    Chromium 0.8 91
    Cobalt 0.5 93
    Aluminum 0.4 94
    Columbium 0.1 100
    Tantalum 3 pounds 90

    Commodities — According to figures published in the current CIA Factbook online,5 US commodity imports account for the following percentages of our consumption: agricultural products 4.9%, industrial supplies 32.9% (crude oil 8.2%), capital goods 30.4% (computers, telecommunications equipment, motor vehicle parts, office machines, electric power machinery), and consumer goods account for 31.8% (automobiles, clothing, medicines, furniture, toys).

    It would not be unreasonable to suggest that Nuclear Disarmament Coalition countries could decide to favor other NDC member states dramatically with their exports and pricing structures, and to do just the opposite in dealing with the nuclear-armed states that continue to hold out. The message to the few remaining states in the nuclear-armed club would be clear enough: Keeping nuclear weapons, besides being wholly unacceptable to the majority of your own country’s informed citizens, to the majority of the world’s citizens, and to the political leaders of the NDC, is bad for business, bad for trade, and will be detrimental to your supply of basic commodities.

    How might the Nuclear Disarmament Coalition get started?

    If it’s going to happen, I believe that it’s going to happen directly and multilaterally among interested states. We may continue for several more years to hear the “high notes” of UN resolutions, and the “low notes” of grassroots movements, but we probably won’t hear or see at the outset the “middle voices”—the quiet diplomacy that gets this movement started. As I have suggested in the attached one-page summary (Appendix E): “Imagine a non-nuclear host country inviting the foreign ministers of nearly all 180 other non-nuclear states to a meeting to create and celebrate a new alliance of countries fully committed to nuclear sanity and non-military dispute resolution.” Realistically the host country could be Ireland, Canada, Australia, Spain, Japan, or a Nordic country. It could even be France, the U.K., or India if one of them would kindly surprise the world soon by unilaterally ridding itself of its WMDs—a stunning possibility not to be ruled out!

    I see the job of those who may be moved to action by this scenario, if indeed we are able to make common cause on this strategy, to be one of quietly and credibly pitching this plan to a series of most-likely host countries, one at a time, until we find one who will take the ball and run with it. We could even raise money for the initial founding conference of the NDC. I’ll bet that quite a few private foundations and businesses would contribute significant sums to help launch this humanity-saving initiative.6 After all, a peaceful world will be much better for business than one that remains on the brink of nuclear desolation, with the Doomsday Clock teetering at a mere seven minutes to midnight.

    What about unanticipated consequences?

    Would a serious, proactive NDC provoke unacceptable or dangerous consequences?This is an interesting question, because aside from economic blockades at various times, there has never been the use of principled, consciously non-violent confrontation tactics on the world stage before, especially in support of something which is manifestly in the interest of all humankind. Here are some random thoughts on this subject:

    1. There could be nuclear isolationism. Isolationist elements in the nuclear-armed states could end up cheering that finally the rest of the world is separating itself from them. But when they began to encounter a divided and indignant world in which they themselves were in the decided minority, facing rationed coffee, heating oil and gasoline, I wonder if they wouldn’t reconsider their relative position, and ask themselves what they are really afraid of.

    2. There could be trade wars. The nuclear-armed states could arguably launch trade sanctions of their own against particular NDC states, including the freezing of assets, military threats, and outright seizure of terrain and resources in those states. I would never minimize the economic damage that the world’s largest economies could wreak. But I do not think that world public opinion and domestic public opinion will stand for selfish gunboat diplomacy in the 21 st century. The bitterness and the human cost of American adventurism in Vietnam and Iraq will not soon be forgotten.

    3. There could be accusations of blackmail. The nuclear-armed states could condemn NDC actions and threats as a form of blackmail, and “refuse to give in to blackmail” on principle, the merits of nuclear disarmament aside. It would be incumbent on the NDC states, therefore, to use the clearest possible language and the most persuasive communication models in waging its public relations campaign. It would need to make the world’s governments, media, and populations understand clearly its motives (the sacredness of life, human survival), and its methods: use of the very best models of non-violent resistance, as given to the world by none other than two current nuclear powers: India (Gandhi) and the USA (M. L. King).

    4. The UN could be undermined. In fact, an effective Nuclear Disarmament Coalition could certainly be well represented in the present UN General Assembly. It could use that forum to great advantage. But NDC-introduced resolutions would be non-binding, and would probably never fly in the Security Council. Whether a strong NDC would undermine the UN, sidestep the UN, or cause its transformation for the better is an open question.

    • It would not be the first time that the countries of the world acted multilaterally outside the UN, if it came to that. Many landmark international treaties and settlements have been made, in fact, bilaterally or multilaterally without UN auspices, and only later ratified by most other states with little or no direct UN involvement. The creation of Israel (1945), the crafting of the Antarctic Treaty (1956), the creation of Bangladesh (1971), and the Oslo Accords (1993) are cases in point.
    • The empowering of up to 180 non-nuclear nations to make the most of their common agenda for humanity by embarking on an ambitious program of foreign trade, cultural exchanges, joint scientific ventures, and international development could well lead them to create their own successor UN-like forum. It might be called the United Non-Nuclear Nations (UN2) or United Non-nuclear States (UNS). And UN2/UNS Headquarters could spring up in a nuclear-weapon-free host country. I would especially love to see the successor host country be France or the UK, after either one unilaterally disarmed, breaking with the “gang of nine.” Only then could it, in fact, take the lead in creating and hosting the NDC.

    The major nuclear-weapon-armed state that is first to rid itself of its arsenal would send a shock-wave of possibility-thinking and a challenge to geopolitical inherited widsom echoing ‘round the world. Its government would richly deserve the moral-leadership status among the nations that it would acquire. And if it capitalized on its leadership to create and host a genuinely proactive Nuclear Disarmament Coalition, it would reap enormous rewards in terms of international trade and good will. As the probable host to a new and reformed United Nations, it could well usurp the place of the United States as leader of the peace-loving world—a position to which the United States can no longer lay claim, considering its leadership in the conduct of overseas wars since the 1960s.

    Which countries would probably make up the NDC?

    On average there are about 110 to 150 countries whose UN representatives actually vote consistently in favor of most any resolution to limit, ban, or dismantle nuclear weapons. Appendix D conveys a sense of the voting records of those countries, showing how often they agree on this important matter. It also suggests which nuclear-armed states usually oppose the GA’s non-binding resolutions… if they bother to vote at all.

    Sample votes in G. A.:

    Resolution 55/33 R (2000), A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, sponsored by Australia and Japan, was adopted 155-1 (India opposed), with 12 abstentions.

    Resolution 55/33 C (2000), Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda, sponsored by 63 States, was adopted 154-3 (opposed by India, Israel, Pakistan), with 8 abstentions.

    Resolution 56/413 (2001), United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament, was adopted 115-7 (4 nuclear powers opposed, including USA, Israel, France, and the UK), with 37 abstentions.

    Resolution 59/76 (2004), A path to general and complete disarmament, was adopted 165-3 (UK and Russian Federation in favor! India & USA, against), with 16 abstentions (including China and Israel)

    Again, which countries would probably make up the NDC? No doubt all of the countries which regularly vote in favor of nuclear-weapons control and disarmament. These would be the core NDC member states.

    Have other international coalitions been working to eliminate nuclear weapons?

    There have been a few limited attempts in recent memory to organize both states and NGOs with a view to persuading the major nuclear-armed countries to work seriously toward disarmament. Perhaps the most significant of these on the geopolitical landscape has been The New Agenda Coalition, launched in Dublin in June 1998, with a Joint Declaration by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden (alas, Slovenia later withdrew in order to position itself for NATO membership). Its efforts have been endorsed by the European Parliament; a copy of that statement is available on the www.wagingpeace.org web site.

    In the NGO arena there have been two significant recent developments, each with impressive memberships, agendas, and Web presences:

    1. The Middle Powers Initiative. Through the Middle Powers Initiative, eight international non-governmental organizations (Global Security Institute, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, State of the World Forum, and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) have been able to work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility. The campaign is guided by an International Steering Committee, chaired by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador.7

    2. The Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND) is dedicated to providing parliamentarians worldwide with up-to-date information on nuclear weapons policies and to helping parliamentarians become engaged in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives. PNND is a non-partisan forum for parliamentarians, nationally and internationally, to share resources and information, develop cooperative strategies and engage in nuclear disarmament issues, initiatives and arenas. It is a program of the Global Security Institute and is guided by the steering committee of the Middle Powers Initiative.8

    Have they made any significant progress in furthering nuclear disarmament? Certainly the awareness of the gravity of the situation among the general public has been raised by these efforts. Yet for all their wisdom, creativity, and passion, these coalitions (to my way of thinking) have still lacked the leverage necessary to move their crucial agenda forward. It is likely that they would align themselves with and support in a heartbeat any country that took the lead in organizing a Nuclear Disarmament Coalition.

    In Conclusion

    Strong medicine is desperately needed. A gesture to capture the world’s imagination is desperately needed, coupled with a new experiment in geopolitics: non-violent resistance among nation-states, on the international stage. That is what this paper is urging. Whether it begin with unilateral disarmament by one of the P5 states, or with an unprecedented organizing conference by the nuclear-weapons-free states, or with a carefully staged walkout by 190 states at the UN—something that is both dramatic and principled must be done to move our planet beyond its fatal complacency in the face of these awful weapons.

    Every single nuclear weapons on earth today was created by flawed human beings—men with strong minds and strong patriotic emotions, but utterly lacking in what Norman Cousins called “moral imagination.” We reject their legacy. The time has finally come to do away with it. A serious Nuclear Disarmament Coalition using strong, non-violent confrontation tactics will provide the leverage needed to accomplish this goal within a decade.

    Let me end by quoting what Joseph Rotblat said on this subject:

    “Morality,” he wrote, “is at the core of the nuclear issue: are we going to base our world on a culture of peace or on a culture of war? Nuclear weapons are fundamentally immoral: their action is indiscriminate, affecting civilians as well as military, innocents and aggressors alike, killing people alive now and generations as yet unborn. And the consequence of their use could bring the human race to an end.” He ended his appeal with his oft-repeated plea, “Remember your humanity.”

    Humanity should be proud to have had a dissenting nuclear scientist like Rotblat. David Krieger’s recent tribute to his passing states, “When he learned in late 1944 that Germany would not succeed in developing an atomic bomb, he believed there was no longer reason to continue work on creating a US bomb. For him, there was only one reason to create an atomic weapon, and that was to deter the German use of such a weapon during World War II. If the Germans would not have an atomic weapon, then there was no reason for the Allies to have one. Joseph was the only scientist to leave the Manhattan Project on moral grounds.”9

    What the world now needs is a dissenting nuclear state to take a moral stand like Rotblat: to disarm unilaterally, and to start a chain reaction of a whole new sort: a Nuclear Disarmament Coalition that will finally provide the practical leverage needed to persuade the few remaining nuclear powers to put down their nuclear swords and shields, convert them to plowshares, stop threatening humanity, and study war no more!

    Appendix A

    UN Security Council Resolutions on Nuclear Weapons (in reverse chronoloical order)

    7. Title: Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) [on non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons] UN Resolution Symbol: S/RES/1540(2004) Vote Date: 20040428. Voting Summary: Yes: 015, No: 000

    6. Title: Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) [on nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998] UN Resolution Symbol: S/RES/1172(1998) Vote Date: 19980606 Voting Summary: Yes: 015, No: 000

    5. Title: Security Council resolution 984 (1995) [on security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States that are Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] UN Resolution Symbol: S/RES/984(1995) Vote Date: 19950411 Voting Summary: Yes: 015, No: 000

    4. Title: Security Council resolution 825 (1993) [on the decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] UN Resolution Symbol: S/RES/825(1993) Vote Date: 19930511 Voting Summary: Yes: 013, No: 000, Abstentions: 002

    3. Title: Security Council resolution 707 (1991) [on Iraqi violation of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) with regard to inspection of its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons capabilities] UN Resolution Symbol: S/RES/707(1991) Vote Date: 19910815 Voting Summary: Yes: 015, No: 000

    2. Title: Security Council resolution 487 (1981) [on the Israeli military attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities]. UN Resolution Symbol: S/RES/487(1981) Vote Date: 19810619 Voting Summary: Yes: 015, No: 0

    1. Title: Security Council resolution 255 (1968) [on measures to safeguard non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] UN Resolution Symbol: S/RES/255(1968) Vote Date: 19680619 Voting Summary: Yes: 010, No: 0, Abstentions: 005

    Source: Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the UN, UBISNET Bibliographic Information System. Search terms were “Security Council” and “Nuclear.” Date was Sept. 2005.

    Appendix B

    Populations in Nuclear-Armed Countries vs. Populations in Nuclear-Weapon-Free (potential NDC) Countries

    With China, India, and Pakistan currently in the nuclear-armed camp, one could well wonder whether the citizens of those states might actually outnumber citizens in the nuclear-free countries today. In fact they do not, but they come close. Here are the latest (9 August 2005) population figures from the online CIA Factbook. With a current world population of 6.4 billion, the nuclear cloud overshadows 3.1 billion; while 3.3 billion of earth’s inhabitants still live happily without the “protection” that such weapons afford.

    Nuclear-armed countries Population Nuclear-free countries

    China

    India

    United States

    Pakistan

    Russia

    France

    UK

    North Korea

    Israel

    1,306,313,812

    1,080,264,388

    295,734,134

    162,419,946

    143,420,309

    60,656,178

    60,441,457

    22,912,177

    6,276,883

    3,138,439,284

    180-odd

    nuclear-weapons-

    free

    countries account for a population of:

    3,308,026,699

    World population (Aug. 2005) = 6,446,465,983

    Appendix C

    The Growing Petroleum and Natural Gas Dependency of the United States

    The USA alone consumes nearly 20 million barrels of oil per day, so we depend on imports from OPEC. But we’ve got competition. While only 46 countries are producing more than 100,000 bbl/day, 70 countries are already consuming more than that each day… and China’s demand seems to be growing the fastest (see chart below). Those 70 countries’ economies require 74 million bbl/day every day, just to keep steady, with no increase in GDP. The eight most developed nuclear-armed powers (not counting N. Korea) together consume 33.4 million bbl/day of petroleum. As previously noted, they only produce 22 million bbl/day among themselves, and are not very good about sharing it.

    The projected dependence on external oil markets in the Asia-Pacific world alone should give us all pause as we contemplate a consumption vs. production table like this one, published in the Energy Information Adminis­tration’s International Energy Outlook 2005:

    Natural Gas

    Five of the states currently in the nuclear-weapons club are even less well endowed with natural gas than they are with petroleum. China, Pakistan, India, N. Korea, and Israel export zero natural gas, but collectively consume 75 billion cu. m. annually. Russia leads the world in the production and sale of this resource, exporting 171 billion cu m annually, followed by Canada, exporting nearly 92 billion. The United States by comparison, with its huge production and domestic consumption of gas (640 billion cu m. annually), only manages to export 11 billion cu m. One can already envision the U.S. developing a natural-gas dependency on foreign imports in the next few years,. Once again the suppliers could well be countries having a decided preference to trade with other nuclear-weapons-free states.

    Appendix D

    Select UN General Assembly Votes since 1998 on Nuclear Disarmament: How do the Votes Tally?

    [For]-[Against]-[Abstentions] Non-voters are not recorded.

    • Resolution 53/77 X (1998), Nuclear disarmament, sponsored by Myanmar on behalf of the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement), was adopted, 110-41-18
    • Resolution 53/77 U (1998), Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, sponsored by Japan, was adopted, 160-0-11
    • Resolution 53/77 Q (1998), Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, introduced by Brazil, was adopted 154-3 (France, USA, UK)-10
    • Resolution 53/77 W (1998), Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, introduced by Malaysia, was adopted 123-25-25
    • The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) , launched in June 1998, consists of seven States, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, Mexico, South Africa, and Sweden. At the 54th Session of the UN General Assembly, on 1 December 1999, a resolution (54/54 G) put forward by the NAC, “Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda,” was adopted by 111 votes to 13 with 39 abstentions.
    • Resolution 54/54 D (1999), Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, spons. by Belgium, Japan, etc., was adopted 153-0-12
    • Resolution 54/57 (1999), on The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, was adopted 149-3 (opposed by Israel, USA, and Micronesia)-with 9 abstentions.
    • Resolution 54/63 (1999), for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, sponsored by 63 States, was adopted 158-0-6
    • Resolution 55/31 (2000), for the Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, was adopted 111-0, with 54 abstentions.
    • Resolution 55/33 C (2000), Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda, sponsored by 63 States, was adopted 154-3 (India, Israel, Pakistan), with 8 abstentions. (Favorable votes were way up from 111 in 1999.)
    • Resolution 55/33 N (2000), Reducing nuclear danger, was adopted 110-45, with 14 abstentions.
    • Resolution 55/33 R (2000), A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, sponsored by Australia and Japan, was adopted 155-1 (India), with 12 abstentions.
    • Resolution 55/36 (2000), aimed at averting the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, was adopted 157-3, with 8 abstentions. (Up from 149-3 in 1999!)
    • Resolution 55/41 (2000), for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, sponsored by 74 nations, was adopted 161-0 with 6 abstentions.
    • Resolution 56/24 N (2001), A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, was adopted 139-3 (India, the USA, Micronesia against), with 19 abstentions.
    • Resolution 56/24 O (2001), supporting preparatory work on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 2005 Review Conference, was adopted 156-1 (India) with 3 abstentions.
    • Resolution 56/24 R (2001), calling for Nuclear Disarmament, sponsored by 48 nations, was adopted 149-3 with 6 abstentions.
    • Resolution 56/413 (2001), United Nations conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament, was adopted 115-7 (4 nuclear powers opposed, including USA, Israel, France, and the UK), with 37 abstentions.
    • Resolution 57/59 (2002), Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda, with its stronger language condemning nuclear weapons, was adopted 125-6 with 36 abstentions.
    • Resolution 57/78 (2002), A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, was adopted 156-2 (India and the USA against), with 13 abstentions.
    • Resolution 58/35 (2003), to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, with its stronger language condemning nuclear weapons, was adopted 119-0 with 58 abstentions.
    • Resolution 58/50 (2003), for the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, was adopted 128-4 (France, Russia, UK, and USA against), with 43 abstentions.
    • Resolution 59/64 (2004), Assuring non-nuclear-weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, sponsored by Pakistan and 20 other countries, adopted 118-0 with 63 abstentions.
    • Resolution 59/65 (2004), Verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons , was adopted 179-2 (Palau and the USA against), with 2 abstentions (Israel and UK).
    • Resolution 59/85 (2004), Calling for a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas, sponsored by New Zealand, Costa Rica, and 34 other countries, adopted 171-4 (USA, UK, France, Palau) with 7 abstentions.
    • Resolution 59/76 (2004), a path to general and complete disarmament, was adopted 165-3 (UK and Russian Federation in favor! India & USA, against), with 16 abstentions (including China and Israel).

    Anti-nuclear votes at the UN General Assembly continue, with similar margins in favor (and patterns of opposition from the USA, Israel, India, China, etc.)

    Appendix E

    ONE-PAGE SUMMARY

    LEVERAGING THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MAJORITY: HOW TO CREATE A SERIOUS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT COALITION (NDC)

    Imagine most of the 180-odd non-nuclear [10] states of the world, on their own, without the permission of the superpowers, being invited to create a serious coalition of progressive nations, proud to reject nuclear weapons, and committed to the worldwide elimination of all WMDs.

    Imagine a non-nuclear host country ( Ireland? Canada? Australia? Spain? Japan? a Nordic country?) [11] inviting the foreign ministers of nearly all 180 other non-nuclear states to a meeting to create and celebrate this new alliance of countries fully committed to nuclear sanity and non-military dispute resolution. This new, nonviolent diplomatic initiative might call itself something like the “Nuclear Disarmament Coalition” (NDC).

    Representing the majority of UN member states, the NDC could raise the stakes for nuclear disarmament at the UN dramatically. Acting both within the present UN and independently, from headquarters in a non-nuclear host country, the NDC states could take strong actions like the following to achieve their objectives:

    a. establish favorable trading agreements with other NDC states, and use their collective weight in international trade, markets, and raw materials to pressure nuclear states to abandon their WMDs;

    b. work collectively by all available economic, diplomatic, and cultural means (including grassroots mobilizing, and media blitzes) to isolate nuclear states, conceivably even using trade and air travel embargoes;

    c. in general force the issues of nuclear and other WMD disarmament and nonviolent dispute resolution in the interest of the world’s children and grandchildren—indeed, all humankind—by actively marginalizing the minority of states which still cling to these abominable relics of anti-population warfare.

    If the nuclear minority at the UN blocked serious efforts to accomplish nuclear lockdown and a timetable for the elimination of nuclear weapons by a given date, NDC states could abandon the UN and create a successor diplomatic forum (perhaps called UN2, United Non-nuclear Nations). Full membership in the NDC and any successor forum would be offered only to nuclear weapons-free states, although nuclear-armed states could have observer status until they disarmed or began a NDC-monitored disarmament process. If successful, this initiative will lead the nuclear states to see the wisdom, indeed the urgency, of dismantling and destroying all nuclear weapons. It will ultimately induce them to join a new, more humane, more egalitarian world order, represented by the NDC (or UN2) charter—a diplomatic framework worthy of the 21 st century.

    Creative nonviolence is at the heart of this proposal. Direct diplomatic, trade, and cultural confrontation of the minority (eight, including Israel, India, and Pakistan—perhaps nine or ten if N. Korea and Iran go nuclear) by the majority (180) could be our best and last hope for leveraging world nuclear disarmament. Carefully orchestrated, strong, non-violent words and actions, such as boycotts and media blitzes, trade embargoes, and other forms of confrontation on the international arena could create conditions of intolerable isolation for any and all nuclear nations, including aspiring ones. But time is of the essence!

    Creating a new Nuclear Disarmament Coalition could send the necessary message to all actual and potential nuclear states: “Arm at your peril. You will lose more than you gain. The nations of the world will reject your goods, your services, and your leadership.” Were this all to occur, verifiable nuclear disarmament might be accomplished within five to ten years.

    Thomas Heck, Emeritus Professor Ohio State University Phone: (805) 692-1969

    1. King Arthur, act 2, sc. 2 (1691).

    2. See the UN Press release of 27 May 2005 at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/dc2969.doc.htm>

    3. Coffee production in the USA is negligible. According to the USDA, the US produced 170,000 bags of beans last year. Source: <http://www.fas.usda.gov/psd/complete_tables/HTP-table5-193.htm>

    4. Davidson’s paper is entitled “Critical and Strategic Minerals,” and is published online at <http://www.environmentaleducationohio.org/Biosphere/Case%20Studies/minerals.html>

    5. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>

    6. One can think not only of well-funded American charities, like the Gates Foundation, the Google Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trust, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, but also major international businesses and funds like Rotary International, OPEC, the Gulbenkian Foundation, and many UN-associated NGOs.

    7. Source: <http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/archives/000122.shtml>

    8. Source: <http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/about.html>

    9. David Krieger, “Sir Joseph Rotblat: A Legacy of Peace (1908-2005),” at <https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/articles/2005/09/01_krieger_sir-joseph-rotblat.htm> (September 2005).

    10. Non-nuclear in this document refers only to nuclear weapons, not to nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

    11. The eventual host country could even be France, the U.K., or India if one of them would kindly surprise the world soon by unilaterally ridding itself of WMDs. (Imagine the consequences in terms of good will, media attention, and moral authority!)

  • A Declaration Of War

    The Bush administration has declared war on the world.

    The 450 changes that Washington is demanding to the action agenda that will culminate at the September 2005 United Nations summit don’t represent U.N. reform. They are a clear onslaught against any move that could strengthen the United Nations or international law.

    The upcoming summit was supposed to focus on strengthening and reforming the U.N. and address issues of aid and development, with a particular emphasis on implementing the U.N.’s five-year-old Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Most assumed this would be a forum for dialogue and debate, involving civil society activists from around the world challenging governments from the impoverished South and the wealthy North and the United Nations to create a viable global campaign against poverty and for internationalism.

    But now, there’s a different and even greater challenge. This is a declaration of U.S. unilateralism, uncompromising and ascendant. The United States has issued an open threat to the 190 other U.N. member states, the social movements and peoples of the entire world, and the United Nations itself. And it will take a quick and unofficially collaborative effort between all three of those elements to challenge the Bush administration juggernaut.

    The General Assembly’s package of proposed reforms, emerging after nine months of negotiations ahead of the summit, begins with new commitments to implement the Millennium Development Goals—established in 2000 as a set of international commitments aimed at reducing poverty by 2015. They were always insufficient, yet as weak as they are, they have yet to be implemented. The 2005 Millennium Plus Five summit intended to shore up the unmet commitments to those goals. In his reform proposals of March 2005, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called on governments north and south to see the implementation of the MDGs as a minimum requirement. Without at least that minimal level of poverty alleviation, he said, conflicts within and between states could spiral so far out of control that even a strengthened and reformed United Nations of the future would not be able to control the threats to international peace and security.

    When John Bolton, Bush’s hotly contested but newly appointed ambassador to the United Nations announced the U.S. proposed response, it was easy to assume this was just John Bolton running amok. After all, Bolton, a longtime U.N.-basher, has said: “There is no United Nations.” He has written in The Wall Street Journal that the United States has no legal obligation to abide by international treaties, even when they are signed and ratified. So it was no surprise when Bolton showed up three weeks before the summit, demanding a package of 450 changes in the document that had been painstakingly negotiated for almost a year.

    But, in fact, this isn’t about Bolton. This Bush administration’s position was vetted and approved in what the U.S. Mission to the U.N. bragged was a “thorough interagency process”—meaning the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and many more agencies all signed off. This is a clear statement of official U.S. policy—not the wish- ist of some marginalized extremist faction of neocon ideologues who will soon be reined in by the realists in charge. This time the extremist faction is in charge.

    The U.S. proposal package is designed to force the world to accept as its own the U.S. strategy of abandoning impoverished nations and peoples, rejecting international law, privileging ruthless market forces over any attempted regulation, sidelining the role of international institutions except for the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, and weakening, perhaps fatally, the United Nations itself.

    It begins by systematically deleting every one of the 35 specific references to the Millennium Development Goals. Every reference to concrete obligations for implementation of commitments is deleted. Setting a target figure of just 0.7 percent of GNP for wealthy countries to spend on aid? Deleted. Increasing aid for agriculture and trade opportunities in poor countries? Deleted. Helping the poorest countries, especially those in Africa, to deal with the impact of climate change? Deleted.

    The proposal puts at great risk treaties to which the United States is already a party, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The U.N. Summit draft referred to the NPT’s “three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” That means that states without nukes would agree never to build or obtain them, but in return they would be guaranteed the right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful use. In return recognized nuclear weapons states—the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia—would commit, in Article VI of the NPT, to move toward “nuclear disarmament with the objective of eliminating all such weapons.” The proposed U.S. changes deleted all references to the three pillars and to Article VI.

    The U.S. deleted the statement that: “The use of force should be considered as an instrument of last resort.” That’s also not surprising given the Bush administration’s “invade first, choose your justifications later” mode of crisis resolution.

    Throughout the document, the United States demands changes that redefine and narrow what should be universal and binding rights and obligations. In the clearest reference to Iraq and Palestine, Washington narrowed the definition of the “right of self-determination of peoples” to eliminate those who “remain under colonial domination and foreign occupation.”

    Much of the U.S. effort aims to undermine the power of the U.N. in favor of absolute national sovereignty. On migration, for instance, the original language focused on enhancing international cooperation, linking migrant worker issues and development, and the human rights of migrants. The U.S. wants to scrap it all, replacing it with “the sovereign right of states to formulate and enforce national migration policies,” with international cooperation only to facilitate national laws. Human rights were deleted altogether.

    In the document’s section on strengthening the United Nations, the U.S. deleted all mention of enhancing the U.N.’s authority, focusing instead only on U.N. efficiency. Regarding the General Assembly the most democratic organ of the U.N. system—the United States deleted references to the Assembly’s centrality, its role in codifying international law, and, ultimately its authority, relegating it to a toothless talking shop. It even deleted reference to the Assembly’s role in Washington’s own pet project—management oversight of the U.N. secretariat—leaving the U.S.-dominated and undemocratic Security Council, along with the U.S. itself (in the person of a State Department official recently appointed head of management in Kofi Annan’s office) to play watchdog.

    The Bush administration has given the United Nations what it believes to be a stark choice: adopt the U.S. changes and acquiesce to becoming an adjunct of Washington and a tool of empire, or reject the changes and be consigned to insignificance.

    But the United Nations could choose a third option. It should not be forgotten that the U.N. itself has some practice in dealing with U.S. threats. President George W. Bush gave the U.N. these same two choices once before—in September 2002, when he threatened the global body with “irrelevance” if the U.N. did not embrace his call for war in Iraq. On that occasion, the United Nations made the third choice—the choice to grow a backbone, to reclaim its charter, and to join with people and governments around the world who were mobilized to say no to war. It was the beginning of eight months of triumph, in which governments and peoples and the U.N. stood together to defy the U.S. drive toward war and empire, and in doing so created what The New York Times called “the second super-power.”

    This time, as before, the United States has threatened and declared war on the United Nations and the world. As before, it’s time for that three-part superpower to rise again, to defend the U.N., and to say no to empire.

    Phyllis Bennis, a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, is the author of the forthcoming Challenging Empire: How People, Governments, and the U.N. Defy U.S. Power (Interlink Publishing, Northampton MA, October 2005)

  • Bolton Should Step Aside

    President Bush’s nomination of John Bolton to become United Nations ambassador began as an embarrassment and is ending as a disgrace. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was right to delay a scheduled vote and resist being railroaded by the administration into approving him.

    Bolton’s infantile crack that it would make no difference if the U.N. lost its top 10 floors already testified to his unfitness to serve as the United States’ diplomat to the world. It may have been Bush’s right to appoint someone provocative yet capable. But the revelations that have emerged over the past weeks in the Senate call into question Bolton’s basic ability to do the job.

    On issue after issue, whether North Korea or Iraq, Bolton has wielded a wrecking ball. It might be possible to wave off one allegation of the misuse of intelligence — infighting always takes place in the government bureaucracy — but Bolton appears to have willfully and systematically suppressed and misused classified information, including bullying civil service officials who dared to challenge his apocalyptic assessments of North Korean, Iraqi and Cuban weapons programs. Former CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin apparently had to intervene to protect a Latin American analyst from Bolton’s wrath; Carl W. Ford Jr., the State Department’s former assistant secretary of intelligence and research — the only government bureau to get it right on Iraq — describes him as a “serial abuser.” And Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) is rightly inquiring about Bolton’s unusual request to look at National Security Administration intercepts and why he asked for the identities of analysts. Why indeed?

    The best case that can be made for Bolton is that he’s no worse than other neoconservative officials in the Pentagon who manipulated intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But Bolton also appears to have a mean streak, a pattern of arrogant recklessness that bodes ill for this assignment. If there is anyone in the U.S. government who needs to be infinitely patient, it’s the ambassador at the U.N., who must constantly engage representatives of dozens of nations — diplomats Bolton would no doubt find infinitely annoying. Not only does he lack the temperament for the job, it’s hard to imagine why he’d want it.

    Bolton surely can’t want the job now, with the world on notice that even the Republican Senate has its misgivings about his nomination. Bush may find it hard to back down, so Bolton should do him and his country a favor and step aside. Maybe there is a consolation prize the White House could offer him. How about ambassador to France?

  • Bush Administration Eliminating 19-year-old International Terrorism Report

    WASHINGTON – The State Department decided to stop publishing an annual report on international terrorism after the government’s top terrorism center concluded that there were more terrorist attacks in 2004 than in any year since 1985, the first year the publication covered.

    Several U.S. officials defended the abrupt decision, saying the methodology the National Counterterrorism Center used to generate statistics for the report may have been faulty, such as the inclusion of incidents that may not have been terrorism.

    Last year, the number of incidents in 2003 was undercounted, forcing a revision of the report, “Patterns of Global Terrorism.”

    But other current and former officials charged that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s office ordered “Patterns of Global Terrorism” eliminated several weeks ago because the 2004 statistics raised disturbing questions about the Bush’s administration’s frequent claims of progress in the war against terrorism.

    “Instead of dealing with the facts and dealing with them in an intelligent fashion, they try to hide their facts from the American public,” charged Larry C. Johnson, a former CIA analyst and State Department terrorism expert who first disclosed the decision to eliminate the report in The Counterterrorism Blog, an online journal.

    Rep. Henry Waxman (news, bio, voting record), D-Calif., who was among the leading critics of last year’s mix-up, reacted angrily to the decision.

    “This is the definitive report on the incidence of terrorism around the world. It should be unthinkable that there would be an effort to withhold it – or any of the key data – from the public. The Bush administration should stop playing politics with this critical report.”

    A senior State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue, confirmed that the publication was being eliminated, but said the allegation that it was being done for political reasons was “categorically untrue.”

    According to Johnson and U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the issue, statistics that the National Counterterrorism Center provided to the State Department reported 625 “significant” terrorist attacks in 2004.

    That compared with 175 such incidents in 2003, the highest number in two decades.

    The statistics didn’t include attacks on American troops in Iraq, which President Bush as recently as Tuesday called “a central front in the war on terror.”

    The intelligence officials requested anonymity because the information is classified and because, they said, they feared White House retribution. Johnson declined to say how he obtained the figures.

    Another U.S. official, who also requested anonymity, said analysts from the counterterrorism center were especially careful in amassing and reviewing the data because of the political turmoil created by last year’s errors.

    Last June, the administration was forced to issue a revised version of the report for 2003 that showed a higher number of significant terrorist attacks and more than twice the number of fatalities than had been presented in the original report two months earlier.

    The snafu was embarrassing for the White House, which had used the original version to bolster President Bush’s election-campaign claim that the war in Iraq had advanced the fight against terrorism.

    U.S. officials blamed last year’s mix-up on bureaucratic mistakes involving the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the forerunner of the National Counterterrorism Center.

    Created last year on the recommendation of the independent commission that investigated the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the center is the government’s primary organization for analyzing and integrating all U.S. government intelligence on terrorism.

    The State Department published “Patterns of Global Terrorism” under a law that requires it to submit to the House of Representatives and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a country-by-country terrorism assessment by April 30 each year.

    A declassified version of the report has been made public since 1986 in the form of a glossy booklet, even though there was no legal requirement to produce one.

    The senior State Department official said a report on global terrorism would be sent this year to lawmakers and made available to the public in place of “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” but that it wouldn’t contain statistical data.

    He said that decision was taken because the State Department believed that the National Counterterrorism Center “is now the authoritative government agency for the analysis of global terrorism. We believe that the NCTC should compile and publish the relevant data on that subject.”

    He didn’t answer questions about whether the data would be made available to the public, saying, “We will be consulting (with Congress) … on who should publish and in what form.”

    Another U.S. official said Rice’s office was leery of the methodology the National Counterterrorism Center used to generate the data for 2004, believing that analysts anxious to avoid a repetition of last year’s undercount included incidents that may not have been terrorist attacks.

    But the U.S. intelligence officials said Rice’s office decided to eliminate “Patterns of Global Terrorism” when the counterterrorism center declined to use alternative methodology that would have reported fewer significant attacks.

    The officials said they interpreted Rice’s action as an attempt to avoid releasing statistics that would contradict the administration’s claims that it’s winning the war against terrorism.

    To read past “Patterns of Global Terrorism” reports online, go to www.mipt.org/Patterns-of-Global-Terrorism.asp

  • Saving Nonproliferation

    Renewal talks for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are scheduled for May, yet the United States and other nuclear powers seem indifferent to its fate. This is remarkable, considering the addition of Iran and North Korea as states that either possess or seek nuclear weapons programs. A recent United Nations report warned starkly: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

    A group of “Middle States” has a simple goal: “To exert leverage on the nuclear powers to take some minimum steps to save the non-proliferation treaty in 2005.” Last year this coalition of nuclear-capable states — including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and eight NATO members — voted for a new agenda resolution calling for implementing NPT commitments already made. Tragically, the United States, Britain and France voted against this resolution.

    So far the preparatory committee for the forthcoming NPT talks has failed even to achieve an agenda because of the deep divisions between nuclear powers that refuse to meet their own disarmament commitments and the nonnuclear movement, whose demands include honoring these pledges and considering the Israeli arsenal.

    Until recently all American presidents since Dwight Eisenhower had striven to restrict and reduce nuclear arsenals — some more than others. So far as I know, there are no present efforts by any of the nuclear powers to accomplish these crucial goals.

    The United States is the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT. While claiming to be protecting the world from proliferation threats in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, American leaders not only have abandoned existing treaty restraints but also have asserted plans to test and develop new weapons, including anti-ballistic missiles, the earth-penetrating “bunker buster” and perhaps some new “small” bombs. They also have abandoned past pledges and now threaten first use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states.

    Some corrective actions are obvious:

    • The United States needs to address remaining nuclear issues with Russia, demanding the same standards of transparency and verification of past arms control agreements and dismantling and disposal of decommissioned weapons. With massive arsenals still on hair-trigger alert status, a global holocaust is just as possible now, through mistakes or misjudgments, as it was during the depths of the Cold War. We could address perhaps the world’s greatest proliferation threat by fully securing Russia’s stockpiles.

    • While all nuclear weapons states should agree to non-first use, the United States, as the sole superpower, should take the lead on this issue.

    • NATO needs to de-emphasize the role of its nuclear weapons and consider an end to their deployment in Western Europe. Despite its eastward expansion, NATO is keeping the same stockpiles and policies as when the Iron Curtain divided the continent.

    • The comprehensive test ban treaty should be honored, but the United States is moving in the opposite direction. The administration’s 2005 budget refers for the first time to a list of test scenarios, and other nations are waiting to take the same action.

    • The United States should support a fissile materials treaty to prevent the creation and transport of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

    • Curtail U.S. development of the infeasible missile defense shield, which is wasting huge resources, while breaking our commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty without a working substitute.

    • Act on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, an increasing source of instability in that region. Iran has repeatedly hidden its intentions to enrich uranium while claiming that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. This explanation has been given before, by India, Pakistan and North Korea, and has led to weapons programs in all three states. Iran must be called to account and held to its promises under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge how Israel’s nuclear status entices Iran, Syria, Egypt and other states to join the community of nuclear weapons states.

    These are vital questions, and the world will know the answers during the NPT conference in May.

    Former president Carter is founder of the Carter Center in Atlanta.

  • Our Greatest Threat: The Coming Nuclear Crisis

    When the first atomic bombs destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could hardly have been imagined that nearly sixty years later 34,145 nuclear weapons would be in existence. In a long career as a parliamentarian, diplomat, and educator, I have come to the conclusion that the abolition of nuclear weapons is the indispensable condition for peace in the twenty-first century. Yet progress toward that goal has been halted.

    In May a conference of the 188 signatory nations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will be held in New York City to put a spotlight on this problem. A huge march is planned for May 1. Advocates of nonproliferation will once again try to draw attention to the immorality and illegality of such weapons. But will the eight nations that possess nuclear weapons-the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel-actually take steps toward eliminating their arsenals?

    The prognosis is not good. The preparatory meetings for the May conference ended in failure, with nonnuclear nations objecting to the intransigence of the nuclear-weapons states, noting how a world of nuclear haves and have-nots is becoming a permanent feature of the global landscape. The United States insists that the problem is not with those who possess nuclear weapons, but with states, such as Iran and other nations, trying to acquire them. To which Brazil responded: “One cannot worship at the altar of nuclear weapons and raise heresy charges against those who want to join the sect.” Faced with this stalemate, the NPT is eroding, and an expansion of the number of states with nuclear weapons, a fear which produced the NPT in 1970, is looming once more.

    Any discussion of the elimination of nuclear weapons inevitably raises questions of the feasibility of such action. How is an architecture of security to be built without nuclear weapons? How can states be prevented from cheating and how can such weapons be kept out of the hands of terrorists? A wide range of military, scientific, and diplomatic experts, notably the Canberra Commission established in 1996, have tried to provide answers to these urgent questions.

    First, the case for a nuclear weapons-free world is based on the commonsensical claim that the destructiveness of these weapons is so great they have no military utility against a comparably equipped opponent. Historically, nuclear weapons have been used as a deterrent. But even as a deterrent they pose too great a risk. Few doubt that the longer weapons are maintained, the greater the risk of use, or that possession by some states causes other nations to acquire them, reducing the security of all.

    Second, the elimination of such weapons will not be possible without a new architecture of security based on an adequate verification system. The components of a reliable verification system are coming into place, beginning with the inspection system maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the monitoring system maintained by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, which has the capacity to detect the most minute nuclear test explosions. On-site inspections of suspect materials will have to be part of the disarmament process (the United States and Russia already do this in the case of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987).

    “Trust but verify,” President Ronald Reagan famously said. Verification is essential, but the demand for a perfect verification regime is little more than an excuse for not seeking a reduction in nuclear weapons. Perfect security is not possible. Inevitably, some risk will have to be accepted if the wider benefits of a nuclear weapon-free world are to be realized. Not the elimination of risk but an evaluation of comparative risks is the rational approach to take. It is much more dangerous for the world to stay on its present path. Compared to the risks inherent in a world bristling with nuclear weapons, the risks associated with whatever threat a cheating state could assemble before it was exposed are far more acceptable.

    No one is advocating unilateral disarmament; that would be an unthinkable policy for the United States. Rather it is in the interests of the United States-and all other nations-to heed the directive of the International Court of Justice and pursue comprehensive negotiations leading to the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons. Such a program would take many years to implement. Many confidence-building measures would be needed. How long disarmament takes is not the most important thing; what is critical is that the major states show the rest of the world they are heading in that direction. Otherwise, the NPT, which entails a legal obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith, will become a mockery. This is the nub of the present dilemma.

    In 1995, on its twenty-fifth anniversary, the NPT (virtually every country in the world except India, Pakistan, and Israel has signed the treaty) was indefinitely extended. In agreeing to that extension, the nuclear powers made three promises: a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would be achieved; negotiations to ban the production of fissile material would be concluded; “systematic and progressive efforts globally” to eliminate nuclear weapons would be made. None of these promises has been kept.

    When the NPT was reviewed in 2000, all the states were again able to find common ground and, by consensus, made an “unequivocal” commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons through a program of “Thirteen Practical Steps.” Subsequently, the nuclear powers faltered again and bitterness set in.

    The United States is in the forefront of the current stalemate. Its commitment to the consensus of 2000 was made under the Clinton administration. When President George W. Bush was elected, the United States position regressed: the ABM Treaty was abandoned and the administration turned its back on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), two of the thirteen steps agreed to in 2000. Moreover, in 2001 the administration conducted a nuclear posture review, which made clear that nuclear weapons remain a cornerstone of U.S. national-security policy. The review outlines expansive plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear forces, and all the elements that support them.

    The Bush administration has also speculated about specific scenarios where the use of nuclear weapons may be justified: an Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict with China over Taiwan, a North Korean attack on South Korea, and an attack on Israel by Iraq or another neighbor. This new policy, in contradiction of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, means that for the first time the United States will threaten the use of nuclear weapons against countries that do not themselves possess such weapons. Under President Bush, the United States is actually widening the role of nuclear weapons in defense policy far beyond deterrence. The administration is promulgating a policy that would retain a stockpile of active and reserve nuclear weapons and weapons components for at least the next fifty years.

    Among the current nuclear powers, the U.S. position is particularly aggressive, but it is by no means alone in its determination to hold onto nuclear weapons or to expand their strategic role in military policy. On November 17, 2004, President Vladimir Putin of Russia confirmed that his country is “carrying out research and missile tests of state-of-the-art nuclear missile systems” and that Russia would “continue to build up firmly and insistently our armed forces, including the nuclear component.” The United Kingdom, France, and China are all busy modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Similarly, NATO adheres to its stated policies that such weapons are “essential.”

    More and more states now treat nuclear weapons as part of a war-fighting strategy, not strictly as a deterrent. Nuclear weapons have become embedded in nations’ military doctrines. This shift in the rationale for keeping nuclear weapons is what characterizes our deepening crisis.

    Another aspect of this crisis is the specter of nuclear terrorism. “Nothing could be simpler,” was the assessment of the eminent physicist Frank von Hippel, on the capacity of terrorists to obtain highly enriched uranium and improvise an explosive device with power equal to the Hiroshima bomb. If the 9/11 terrorists had used a nuclear bomb, hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers would have perished. The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that at least forty countries have the capability to produce nuclear weapons, and criticizes the failure of export control systems to prevent an extensive illicit market in nuclear items. The disappearance, by theft or otherwise, of nuclear materials from Russia is well established. The threat of nuclear terrorism is on the mind of every official I know. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, says the margin of security today is “thin and worrisome.”

    In 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, requiring all states to take measures to prevent nonstate actors from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Similarly, the Proliferation Security Initiative of the United States seeks to interdict on the high seas the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials. And the G8 countries have allocated $20 billion over ten years to eliminate some stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Russia.

    These steps are by no means sufficient. The fact remains that the proliferation of nuclear weapons cannot be stopped as long as the most powerful nations in the world maintain that nuclear weapons are essential for their own security.

    Of course, Iran and any other hostile state must be stopped from acquiring such weapons, and inspection and verification processes must be stepped up with more funding and personnel. But a one-dimensional approach that attempts to stop proliferation while ignoring meaningful disarmament will never work.

    The New Agenda Coalition, a group of states (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) pressing the nuclear-weapons states to fulfill their disarmament obligations, offers some hope. The coalition has been gathering political momentum. A recent UN resolution proposed by the group was supported by eight NATO states, including Germany and Canada. That resolution, calling on the nuclear powers to cease activities leading to “a new nuclear arms race,” identifies priorities for action: universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the early implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and ending development of new types of weapons; negotiation of an effectively verifiable fissile-material treaty; establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament; and compliance with principles of transparency and verification.

    Even though this resolution was mild compared to the regular demands of groups such as the Non-Aligned Movement, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France voted against it. China voted for the resolution and Russia abstained.

    Can the NPT be saved? Will civil society groups, whose protests have been rather mild compared to the vigorous activities of the 1980s, now start clamoring for government action? Will those who maintain that nuclear weapons are deeply immoral and a blot on God’s creation now be heard?

    These are questions posed by the present crisis. Another key question is how religious leaders will react to the realization that nuclear weapons are-apparently-here to stay.

    In 1982, Pope John Paul II sent a message to the Second Special Session on Disarmament:

    In current conditions, “deterrence” based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with the minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion.

    In short, deterrence as a permanent policy is not morally acceptable. The American bishops’ 1983 Pastoral Letter on War and Peace took up this theme. It argued for a strong “no” to nuclear war, declaring that a nuclear response to a conventional attack is “morally unjustifiable.” Moreover, the bishops expressed skepticism that any nuclear war could avoid the massive killing of civilians. Only a “strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence” is possible. The nuclear weapons states have ignored the bishops’ admonitions as well as those of many other religious groups.

    A well-considered moral argument must be heard once again that the circle of fear perpetuated by those with a vested interest in maintaining nuclear weapons is a trap from which humanity must escape. The alternative does not bear thinking about.

    Copyright © 2004 Commonweal Foundation

  • Resisting the Global Domination Project: An interview with Prof. Richard Falk

    For over three decades, Richard Falk has shared, with fellow Americans Noam Chomsky and Edward Said, a reputation of fearless intellectual and political commitment to the building of a just and humane world. He recently retired as Professor of International Law and Practice, at Princeton University and is currently a Visiting Distinguished Professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has been a prolific writer, speaker and activist of world affairs and the author or co-author of more than 20 books.

    The following are excerpts from a discussion that Falk had with Zia Mian and Smitu Kothari about the US war on Iraq, the role and future of the United Nations and the need to rethink democratic institutions and practices.

    Kothari/ Mian: Before the war, there were unprecedented protests in the U.S and around the world. It was evident that a significant proportion of world opinion was opposed to the US plans to attack Iraq. Additionally, if the second Resolution had come to the UN, the US would have faced a veto in the Security Council, and yet they went ahead with the war. What are your thoughts on the legality and illegality of the war, and what are its implications for both the present period of engagement and the post-war situation?

    Richard Falk: Before one gets to the issue of legality or morality there is the issue of a war by the US Government that violated fundamental rights of its own citizenry in a country that proclaims itself the world’s leading democracy. This war against Iraq is very questionable constitutionally, as well as dubious under international law. There was no urgency from the perspective of American national security that might have justified a defensive recourse to a non-UN war, which is further suspect because the war was initiated without a formal and proper authorization from Congress. So this war against Iraq is constitutionally unacceptable and anti-democratic even if account is taken only of the domestic legal framework in the United States.

    Aside from that, there was no basis for a UN mandate for this war, either on some principle of humanitarian emergency or urgency of the sort that arguably existed in Kosovo (1999) or in some of the sub-Saharan African countries that were sites for controversial claims of humanitarian intervention during the 1990’s. There was also no evidence of a defensive necessity in relation to Iraq that had provided some justification for the unilateral American recourse to war against Afghanistan in 2001. In the Afghanistan War there was at least a meaningful linkage to the September 11th attacks and the persistence of the al Qaeda threat. A defensive necessity existed, although recourse to war stretched the general understanding of the right of self-defense under the UN Charter and international law. In contrast, recourse to war against Iraq represents a flagrant departure from the fundamental norms of the UN Charter that require war to be waged in self-defense only in response to prior armed attack, or arguably in some exceptional circumstance of imminent necessity — that is, where there is a clearly demonstrable threat of major war or major attack, making it unreasonable to expect a country to wait to be attacked. International law is not a prison. It allows a measure of discretion beyond the literal language of its rules and standards that permit adaptation to the changing circumstances of world politics. From such a standpoint, as many people have argued in recent years, it is reasonable to bend the Charter rules to the extent of allowing some limited exceptions to the strict prohibition of the use of force that is core undertaking of the UN and its Charter, and is enshrined in contemporary international law. This analysis leads to the inevitable conclusion that in the context of Iraq recourse to force and war was impermissible: there was neither a justification under international law, nor was there a mandate from the United Nations Security Council (and if there had been such a mandate it would have provided dubious authority for war, being more accurately understood as an American appropriation of the Security Council for the pursuit of its geopolitical goals). Furthermore, there were no factual conditions pertaining to Iraq to support an argument for stretching the normal rules of international law because there were credible dangers of Iraqi aggression in the near future. If such reasoning is persuasive, then it seems to me inescapable that an objective observer would reach the conclusion that this Iraq War is a war of aggression, and as such, that is amounts to a Crime against Peace of the sort for which surviving German leaders were indicted, prosecuted, and punished at the Nuremberg trials conducted shortly after World War II.

    Kothari/ Mian: Is there a case or any effort to legally challenge the U.S.? Given the international relations of power and evolving geopolitics what kind of space exists for any intervention of that kind?

    Richard Falk: It is necessary to understand that the available global political space available for such a legal challenge was severely constrained by U.S. geopolitical influence throughout the entire Iraq crisis, dating back to the first Gulf War in 1991. It is instructive to consider the framing of the recent debate in the United Nations Security Council around the famous resolution 1441, incorporating a position that unconvincingly accepted 80% of the U.S. allegations against Iraq. It is important to realize that even France and Germany, credited with taking an anti-American position, were arguing for an avoidance of war within the essential framework insisted upon by the U.S., and the U.K. The UN debate took it as established that the punitive resolutions passed after the Gulf War more than a decade earlier needed to be implemented by force to the extent that Iraq resisted. The debate was thus limited to the narrow question of whether these demands should be implemented by reliance on inspection or by war, and even here the inspection option was conditioned on Iraq’s willingness to cooperate with unprecedented intrusions on its sovereignty in the ultra-sensitive area of national security. It is helpful to realize that France and Germany were only arguing that inspection was doing the job of implementing the 1991 resolutions, especially SC Res. 687.

    Nowhere did the proponents of the inspection path insist that Security Council resolutions calling for the immediate end to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza be implemented. Nowhere was the question raised as to whether the 1991 ceasefire conditions imposed on Iraq continued to be justified, or whether American threats against Iraq (open advocacy of “regime change”) warranted lifting UN sanctions and other restrictions on Iraqi sovereignty, or did not create a duty by the UN to protect Iraq against severe threats directed by the US at its political independence and territorial integrity as promised by Article 2 of the Charter. In fact, the U.S. made it rather clear that it hoped that it preferred for the resolutions not to be enforced. Washington sought a pretext for war against Iraq. The White House was reluctant for this reason to seek authorization from the UN, and was persuaded to seek a Security Council mandate so as to enhance the legitimacy of the war and to get more countries to share the burden.

    All along Washington viewed this inspection path at the UN as an alternate route leading to war, at most an annoying delay, but under no conditions providing grounds for abandoning the resolve to embark on war. The US could not exert full control over the Security Council, given Iraqi compliance with the inspection process, and so recourse to war was undertaken by the US in defiance of the UN. Even then the UN lacked the autonomy to condemn such an unacceptable recourse to war. It needs to be remembered that if Washington had been more patient the inspection path might itself have produced a UN authorization of war, either if the inspection uncovered weapons of mass destruction, or if the Iraqis resisted some of the more extravagant demands of the inspectors. Although opponents of the Iraq War can take satisfaction from the refusal of UNSC to acquiesce in the US war policy, there are still many reasons to take note of the weakness of the UN in upholding the genuine security needs of the peoples of the world, or to fulfill the Charter vision of saving “succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”

    Kothari/ Mian: So what you are arguing is that the entire framework of debate in the UN was itself severely constrained?

    Richard Falk: Yes, the whole framework of debate was distorted and deformed from the beginning. The real question before the Security should have been, were there grounds for the use of force against Iraq under any circumstances. The argument that Iraq had not complied with these resolutions in 1991 expresses a concern about the extent of UN authority in this sort of setting. But it also raises the important question about whether the 1991 ceasefire arrangements did not involve the kind of punitive peace that had been so disastrously imposed on Germany after WWI. The Versailles treaty has to be seen as one of the colossal blunders of the 20th century contributing to virulent German nationalism, to the militarisation of Germany, to the rise of Nazism and political extremism, generating a series of developments that led to WWII, to upwards of 50 million deaths and to the use of atomic bombs against the Japanese civilian population. In my judgment, this punitive peace imposed on Iraq, was from Day One an illegitimate way of normalising the relationship between Iraq and the international community after the Gulf War. We also need to recall that the Gulf War was itself a legally, politically, and morally dubious war, which might have been averted by a greater reliance on diplomacy and sanctions to achieve the internationally acceptable goal of reversing Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait.

    From a more progressive perspective, and with an eye on global reform, it is crucial to realize the degree to which the United Nations framework has itself been substantially co-opted by geopolitical forces concentrated in Washington. Even this degree of co-optation, which is less than 100%, frustrated the US Government in this instance. The Iraq debate in the UNSC was about the remaining 20% of the global political space that has so far eluded becoming geopolitically subordinated to the goals of U.S. foreign policy and US grand strategy aiming at global domination. What made the U.S. radical right leadership so furious was its inability to twist enough arms to gain control over this last 20%, an inability that resulted because the US was proposing a course of action that so plainly defied the UN Charter, international law and the elemental sense of international prudence. If you take note of the debate in the United States, some of the most vocal and influential opponents of the war were academic realists, individuals who have over the years generally favored the use of force in American foreign policy. But in this instance, from a prudential national interest perspective, they opposed the war. Such realist opposition is confirmation of the extremism that is generating American global policy. The Bush administration has adopted a post- realist orientation toward geopolitics that is partly religiously motivated and justified, and seems intent on projecting American power globally no matter what the norms, the breadth and depth of opposition, and the risks involved. It is these elements that make American leadership so dangerous for itself, and in the short run, even more menacing for the rest of the world.

    Kothari/ Mian: Is this proclivity to violence in the Bush administration a response to its failure to secure control of the remaining 20% of the UN as it seeks to globally dominate the institutions and places where the U.S. writ did not run? In fact, Immanuel Wallerstein has argued recently, that this is a response to America’s relative decline and that this is actually a restoration project rather than an expansionist project.

    Richard Falk: These are important issues. With regard to the remaining 20% of independent global space, the present leadership in the White House seems likely to abandon the pursuit of that objective, at least within the framework of the UN. The Bush policymakers have been taught a lesson that more ideological members of the Bush team had warned about anyway. It is useful to remember that the U.S. was only persuaded some months back to seek authorization from the UN after some Republican stalwarts like Brent Scowcroft (former National Security Advisor), James Baker, and more quietly, the senior George Bush, insisted that the Bush administration needed this collective mandate from the UN, that without it the war lacked sufficient political backing. This challenged the White House. George W. Bush’s original impulse was to act the way they did in Afghanistan without bothering with the UN, claiming its own sovereign prerogatives to use force as it thought necessary. For the White House/Pentagon hard line their mistake was to heed the advice of the Republican old guard. Instead, the new Bush reactionaries are convinced that if you cannot control that last 20%, then it should be ignored, preferring unilateralism to inaction. The new statecraft in Washington is to go ahead with their global dominance project, acting outside the UN and international law, claiming support on the basis of so-called “coalitions of the willing,” which include weak and submissive participants, making the operation appear to be the work of “a coalition of the coerced.”

    As far as the Wallerstein argument is concerned, it offers instructive historical insights but I don’t find it convincing overall. It is not attentive to a set of global conditions that have never existed before. The United States is a global state that is not deterred by any countervailing power that exists within the state system, and is driven by a visionary geopolitics aspiring to global domination. To the extent that the United States is deterred, it is by non-state centers of resistance that have shown the will and capability to inflict severe harm. The scary credibility of this American global dominance project rests on this idea that when one no longer has to worry about deterrence, then the preeminent actor can achieve the total control over the entire system. Such a grand strategy animates this leadership. These goals were explicated long before the Bush administration came to Washington. It is important to read what Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, and the other Bush ideologues were advocating during the 1990s when they were watching from the sidelines throughout the Clinton presidency. Theirs’ was a view that America shouldn’t misinterpret the end of the Cold War, that it was not the time to disarm or a moment to declare “peace dividends.” On the contrary, it was the time to seize the great opportunity provided by the Soviet collapse to establish a global security system presided over by the United States. Such ambitions could only be satisfied, however, if the US Government was willing to invest sufficiently in military capabilities, including taking full advantage of “the revolution in military affairs” that required doctrinal innovations and drastic changes in weapons procurements .

    Kothari/ Mian: With the UN effectively demobilized and the emerging spectre of the US exerting its political and economic hegemony in wider and deeper arenas globally, what are the possibilities and sources of potential resistance?

    Richard Falk: At the present, I do not see the sources of effective resistance to this American undertaking in the short run. What I do see, and that’s why I refer to global fascism, is sufficient resistance, including here in the U.S., that it will lead the American leadership to pursue by all means a consolidation of economic and military power and a willingness to repress wherever necessary. The outcome seems increasingly likely to be a global oppressive order with a significant domestic spillover, which is already manifest. Given an attorney general like John Ashcroft the domestic face of the American global design is revealed as a kind of proto-fascist mentality that is prepared to use extreme methods to reach its goals. Without being paranoid, this is the sort of mentality that is capable of fabricating a Reichstag fire as a pretext so as to achieve more and more control by the state over supposed islands of resistance. At present, the US Government manipulates terrorist alerts as a way of scaring the American people into a submission that is at once abject and incoherent. The combination of the September 11th shock effect and the constant official warnings that there will be a repetition of such attacks has so far disabled Americans from mounting an effective opposition.

    Kothari/ Mian: There is a lot of studied speculation on the American regime’s motivations in going to war, ranging from the need to expand its sphere of power, consolidating its military-industrial, economic and geopolitical interests globally to appropriating to itself the role of unilateral global policeman. What in your assessment are the real motivations of the present regime?

    Richard Falk: Of course, the true motivations for a controversial undertaking like the Iraq War are concealed by American elites. Far more than elsewhere, American leaders operate within a frame of reference that takes for granted American innocence — what some diplomatic historians have identified as America’s moral exceptionalism, the claim that American foreign policy embodies uplifting values, contrasting with other states that are driven by crass interests. Such a contrast is sometimes expressed by contending that the US is a Lockean nation in a Hobbesian world. In the important speech that Bush gave at West Point in June 2002, he went out of his way to say, despite all the evidence to the contrary, that America is not seeking either imperial goals or a new utopia. Bush tried to put American behavior within the framework of a moral undertaking that was a response to the evil forces responsible for the September 11th attacks. He argues that a wider, necessary and justified, response to September 11th was based on a recognition that the so-called rogue nations, re-christened “axis of evil” states, now possess the leverage by way of the global terrorist networks to be able to inflect severe harm on the U.S., thereby validating American reliance on preemptive war as a defensive measure. The Iraq War is the first test of this new American doctrine, which has so alarmed the peoples, and many of the governments, of the world.

    It is helpful to realize that the roots of this thinking antedate the present American leadership and the post-September 11 context. Well before the Bush administration came to Washington, the American policy making community had developed a broad consensus supportive of the idea of global domination, although avoiding such language in public discourse. This national goal goes to the Clinton years, and before that, to the end of the cold war. The global reach is phrased euphemistically, but such thinking was responsible for a series of provocative moves: the militarisation of space, the preoccupation with “rogue” states, the projection of American power everywhere in the world, the maintenance of the alliances and foreign military bases in the aftermath of the cold war with no plausible strategic threat. So in the background of the present policymaking leadership was this bipartisan, strong consensus that suggested that the end of the cold war provided the U.S. with this novel opportunity to dominate the world and, at the same time, to provide stable security for both the world economy and to make the world safe for the market state committed to a neo-liberal IMF worldview. This pre-Bush dominance project became more explicit and more militarized in the aftermath of September 11th. Earlier American leadership couldn’t acknowledge its commitment to such a grand strategy, but so long as it was proceeding under the banner of anti terrorism, everything was validated, however imprudent, immoral, and illegal. Anti-terrorism. provided a welcome blanket of geopolitical disguise.

    Kothari/ Mian: But weren’t other interests – oil, the control of markets, Israel, etc. — also manifest in America’s geopolitical designs?

    Richard Falk:Yes. In the background of the global domination project, was always the more specific preoccupation with the geopolitics of energy for its own sake and to implement the global domination project. To keep the oil flowing at an optimal price, the U.S. needed to control Central Asian and Persian Gulf oil and gas reserves, and supply routes and pipelines. The wars against both Afghanistan and Iraq were partly motivated by these energy objectives. Just as oil and gas are an integral, if undisclosed component of American geopolitics, so is the strategic influence of Israel. The Israelis offer the US a positive security model, especially how to operate in a hostile setting of popular resentment. Israel helps Washington fashion a response to such questions as “how does a government that is opposed by various political forces go about establishing its security without granting any political concessions towards its opposition?” And “how does a government impose its will in effect on resisting elements? Israel has also exerted its back channels influence to convince the U.S. that it is essential to eliminate Iraq as an independent regional actor. Tel-Aviv was worried about Iraq as a potential source of opposition to Israeli hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East. Israel provided guidance as to how to fight the kind of borderless war that has been waged against al Qaeda in recent months. As Marwan Bishara has suggested, we are witnessing the Israelization of American foreign policy. I would add that we are also experiencing the Palestinisation of resistance tactics. Political assassinations of Palestinian opponents in foreign countries has long been a practice of Mossad – the Israeli Secret Service — and the justification for projecting force against hostile regimes that are seen as giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States is also part of this logic. In response, the tactics of urban warfare, including suicide bombings, has emerged as the most effective aspect of Iraqi resistance. Such is the dynamics of learning with respect to the methodology of political violence for both the strong and the weak.

    Also, part of the motivational structure operative in the White House and Pentagon is the widely shared perception that the locus of conflict in the post cold war world has shifted from Europe to the Middle East. This is a crucial shift that has many policy implications. It helps to explain the significance attached to the goal of making Iraq into a safe base area for American and Israeli hegemonic aims. A pacified and subordinated Iraq will give these actors much more leverage over Saudi Arabia and the Gulf generally. It is a very important part of a policy based on controlling the world by controlling the Middle East. If the Middle East is the pivot of geopolitics at this point, then the further idea behind the Iraq policy was to deepen the alliance between the United States, as the dominant state, and Israel and Turkey as regional partners, junior but still beneficiaries. Now Turkey has temporarily, and partly, withdrawn from that arrangement, under pressure from its public that overwhelming opposed waging this war against a Muslim neighbor. Whether Turkey sustains this level of independence is uncertain at this point. All these considerations explain why the policymakers in Washington were willing to embark on such a risky and unpopular course of action as initiating “a war of choice” in defiance of the United Nations. For the American leadership the risks were worth it because they regard the stakes high, and the hoped for gains great.

    Kothari/ Mian: It is clear, however, that the strategic interests are different now. The US will also reconfigure its relationship with the UN. What are your thoughts on this?

    Richard Falk: The prospects in Iraq are increasingly likely to resemble a modified Afghanistan approach taken — modified because Washington is keenly aware that there exist major economic rewards for the administrators of post-war Iraq. The reconstruction of the country will be worth billions. Contracts are likely to be given to very influential American companies, such as Bechtel, Parsons, Halliburton, for example, that have close ties to Pentagon officials, as well as to leaders spread around the American governmental structure, and its infra-structure of closely linked think tanks. Richard Perle’s economic machinations have been recently disclosed, showing that despite his lack of an official post, his access to the policy elite is a valuable economic asset.

    The strategic objectives are very different in Iraq than they were in Afghanistan and the emphasis placed on retaining and asserting regional control will lead to a much stronger American presence even though it may yet be given a cosmetic UN façade. The American strategy is likely to be to use the UN to achieve a modicum of legitimacy. but to maintain the actualities of control. This control will shape the reconstruction of Iraq and the realization of regional strategic goals. The full extent of these goals is not yet clear. It seems that the more extreme elements of the Bush administration, certainly including Wolfowitz, Feith, and John Bolton, but also probably Cheney and Rumsfeld, have a post-Iraq plan to alter the political landscape of the region in a series of other countries including Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Its rather difficult to predict or anticipate how this plan will be actualized. It depends on a series of uncertainties, including the degree to which opposition to the American presence becomes formidable, and threatening. Despite these American imperial expectations, there are structural factors that may induce even the Bush-led government to make a major effort to reconcile its strategic objectives with the appearance of quasi-legitimacy. Such a reconciliation, if possible, would seem likely to mitigate the intensity of anti-imperial resistance around the world and in the United States. Others also have an interest in reconciliation.

    France and Germany will undoubtedly for historical and economic reasons be eager to reach a new accommodation with the U.S. It is quite likely that the UN will be selectively used to the extent its helpful for improving the atmospherics of the global setting without undermining the achievement of American strategic objectives. But in future occasions where the U.S. seeks the use of force, it is unlikely to repeat the mistake of accepting advice that it needs first to obtain the collective authorization of the international community. As long as this present leadership is in control of the US Government, the UN will be bypassed when it comes to war-peace issues.

    Kothari/ Mian: We are now rapidly approaching the 50th anniversary of the overthrow of the Prime Minister Mossadegh in June, 1953. What are your reflections about what the U.S. political process has learned about its legitimacy given what has happened in previous attempts to intervene and exercise what it considers its legitimate authority?

    Richard Falk: The learning curve about legitimacy is very modest, if not outright regressive. The American elite has always had a rather barren historical memory. American leaders abstract one or two very simplistic and self-serving lessons from the past, thinly disguised rationalizations for the use of force as necessary if America is to reach its goals. It is remarkable how much weight has been give to the fatuous reasoning of Bernard Lewis to the effect that the September 11th events occurred because the United States had projected an image of weakness and ineffectuality in the Arab world.

    Such ideas were dominant in any event with the current elite, but the scholarly mantle of Lewis supposedly gives such shopworn thinking additional weight. The Bush entourage are much less overtly economistic than the Clinton era elite, although they are equally enthusiastic free marketeers. But more than Clinton, they believe that you need military force to police the markets and to attain an advantageous world economic system. They further believe that this use of force by the US needs to be discretionary, without paying heed to international law or worrying about public opinion. It is in this sense that the new American configuration of power and objectives contains the danger of establishing global fascism, a loathsome political reality that has never before credibly aspired to global dominance.

    There seems to be very little awareness among the American leadership as to what went wrong in Iran after the CIA’s overthrow of Muhammed Mossadegh in 1953 or the Guatemala intervention the next year that led directly to a savage period of unrestrained ethnocide in Guatemala that lasted more than four decades. The only relevant lesson that arose from American interventionary behavior that this American elite acknowledges is the failure of Vietnam, which is generally blamed on the American peace movement or the liberal media or a lack of will. Vietnam is an active experience within the memories of the current leadership. But they see the present stakes and risks as far different and they believe that they have the support of the citizenry, being mobilized around the anti-terrorist campaign, manipulating, as needed, the fear of the public and stirring from time to time the toxic mixture of fear and anger. Such a public mood is being treated as a kind of wall that insulates this leadership from any obligation to respond to criticism and to show respect to grassroots opposition. Helpful to the government is an exceedingly compliant media—especially TV–that has been vigorously orchestrating society to support this dominance project. Influential arenas of public conjecture like the Wall Street Journal have also been enthusiastically cheerleading the ideas behind the global dominance project. The passivity of the Democratic Party is also part of this picture of fallen democracy. So far the centers of formal authority in the United States have faced very little meaningful opposition. They feel no need to acknowledge “the American street.”

    Kothari/ Mian: Don’t you think that there are still vast spaces that are not amenable to this kind of domination? What are the impulses or sources of hope, how does it really look in the short run or does it really look hopeless? How significant is the public resentment in Europe?

    Richard Falk: The most hopeful development of this character has been the emergence of a global movement of opposition and resistance initially to the Iraq war, but more basically to the reality and prospect of global domination by the U.S. This movement has an enormous potential to deepen and sustain itself as the first peace movement of truly global scope. Just as there is this first global fascist danger, there is also this exciting global democratic possibility that is focused on anti-war issues. If this movement could creatively fuse with the anti-globalization movement it could become a powerful and inspiring source of an alternate future. I would expect this movement to have its own political project of counter-domination. The very credibility and visionary hopes of the resistance — it will deepen and grow here in this country as well — will undoubtedly scare those on top, giving rise to more vicious methods of response. Such an interaction is almost inevitable. Also, depending on whether the US leadership is successful in reviving the global economy, there are large parts of the world that are increasingly likely to reject the clarion calls of imperial geopolitics, even if they are not yet inclined to engage the United States openly by forming defensive alliances and the like. These states inhabit, more or less, a geopolitical purgatory that is situated between acquiescence and co-option. At present, such governmental ambivalence is not a source of significant resistance. Even China at this stage is more or less playing this role, mainly acquiescing rather than trying to mount a meaningful resistance.

    Public resentment directed at American militarism and geopolitical hubris in western Europe is widespread and pervasive. But its not accompanied by a progressive political project that offers the prospect of an alternative elite structure. It is ironic that an arch conservative such as Chirac should be now playing the role of being the leader of mainstream diplomatic opposition to the U.S. The weakness of socialism and democratic socialist tendencies in Europe is a dismal part of this picture, limiting the opportunities for collaboration between the popular movement and sympathetic governments. The organized political parties in most of the parts of the world do not seem politically relevant for the purposes of resisting the onset of global fascism. It is the popular movement that gives by far the most hope, and the question posed by this reality is whether this popular movement can generate vehicles for political action that are more than symbolic. Can the peace and global democracy movement transform its symbolic role of mass opposition and resistance into substantive political results? I do not at the moment see how to achieve such global agency, but all progressive forces need to identify with this struggle and hope that enough creative capacity is present to generate those new institutions and vehicles for restructuring geopolitics-from-above. In some dramatic sense what is needed is a new surge of democratic empowerment, an emergent geopolitics-from-below.

    Kothari/ Mian: Does it not seem important then to significantly rethink and democratize the relationship between society, political parties, and the state? Additionally, the vast if dispersed unrest, assertion and mobilization – some of it manifest in the significant cultural and political gatherings at the World Social Forum – would also be the ground for the construction not just of dissenting imaginations but also of alternative political institutions and processes. Communities, even local governments in many places in the world have already begun to conceptualise and implement radically different people-centred economic, cultural and political systems. What are your thoughts on this?

    Richard Falk: Even before this current crisis became so manifest there was a sense that representative democracy through traditional political parties were not serving the well-being of the peoples in nominally democratic societies. There existed a widely felt need to reinvent democracy and to activate the creative roles of civil society to generate innovative ideas, to raise hopes, and to unlock the moral and political imagination of humanity.

    How does one goes about moving toward a new relationship between the state and society? Is it possible to restructure the state, to recapture it for a more populist agenda, remove it from control by the private sector and the military control? Can political action make the state into an instrument for more progressive social change? The global civil society movement was coming toward such an understanding in the late 1990’s. Despite its grassroots base of support, activists were not overall abandoning the state, but participating in a politics that aimed prudently to create a new equilibrium between capital and society. This equilibrium, never altogether satisfactory, had been lost in this early phase of globalization when the private sector successfully appropriated the mechanisms of the state for pursuing its goals of neo-liberal economics on the global stage. Now the populist and democratic agenda has been enlarged and altered to accord priority to anti-militarism, an adjustment to American geopolitical intoxication that is now being treated as the number one menace.

    This is a challenge to the extraordinary annual gatherings at Porto Allegre – which is itself a very encouraging invention of new policymaking arenas The challenge for these new political arenas is to incorporate anti-militarism with anti neo-liberalism and create the ideological climate for the emergence of a progressive politics that neither foregoes the sovereign state, nor limits its sense of institutional problem-solving to statist action. This new progressivism could emerge in forms that we cannot fully anticipate at the moment, but many of the elements are there already. This development is the main source of hope that we can have for a positive human future. We cannot count on just drifting within this present political landscape and think it possible to avoid catastrophe. How are we to arrest this drifting toward catastrophe without summoning the energies that have been evolving out of civil society and transnational social movements. I believe firmly that grassroots politics has the creative potential to produce an alternate vision that can mobilize people sufficiently.

    Kothari/ Mian: What happens to the entire process of deepening the international normative framework, the human rights system where some significant progress has been made? What are the threats and the possibilities of the survival and strengthening of the entire UN system and the progress in international law?

    Richard Falk: It is urgent that democratic forces do their best to safeguard the UN system. It is possible to believe that as the U.S. grows disillusioned with its capacity to control the UN, an institutional vacuum will emerge, and that it could be filled by civic forces leading the UN to flourish as never before. If the geopolitical managers treat the UN as unimportant, it may become more available for moderate states and their allies in global civil society. To the extent that the U.S abandons the UN, it will be a challenge for the rest of the world to strengthen its commitment both by adding resources and enlarging capacities, and psychologically endowing the organization and such kindred initiatives as the International Criminal Court with renewed vigor. The UN can revive our hopes for the future even if it is largely immobilized in relation to peace and security as it was throughout most of the cold war. It was really irrelevant to the way in which cold war violent conflicts were negotiated in Asia and elsewhere. This experience of the fifty years following World War II is probably an image of what is likely to happen at least during the next decade when the UN will almost certainly be marginalized with respect to the resolution of major geopolitical issues. At the same time the UN may enhance its contributions by providing an enlarged space for normative deepening in relation to human rights, environmental protection, and global justice issues. It is also possible that in reaction to this growing fear of global domination there will be developed a series of regional spaces for normative development of the sort that in the most optimistic sense seem to be occurring in Europe through the development of the European human rights framework, especially the European Court of Human Rights. I can envision other regional developments – Asian and African leaders have been talking more and more about constructing new institutions. Perhaps, a robust framework of resistance and creativity, the evolution of regional institutions, regional norms, regional political consciousness, will surprise us positively, both as resistance to the global project and as a positive sort of normative development.

  • A Leading Role for the Security Council

    In the past month, the world has witnessed something previously unknown: a common stand taken by America, Russia, Europe, India, China, Cuba, most of the Islamic world and numerous other regions and countries. Despite many serious differences between them, they united to save civilization.

    It is now the responsibility of the world community to transform the coalition against terrorism into a coalition for a peaceful world order. Let us not, as we did in the 1990’s, miss the chance to build such an order.

    Concepts like solidarity and helping third world countries to fight poverty and backwardness have disappeared from the political vocabulary. But if these concepts are not revived politically, the worst scenarios of a clash of civilizations could become reality.

    I believe the United Nations Security Council should take the lead in fighting terrorism and in dealing with other global problems. All the main issues considered by the United Nations affect mankind’s security. It is time to stop reviling the United Nations and get on with the work of adapting the institution to new tasks.

    Concrete steps should include accelerated nuclear and chemical disarmament and control over the remaining stocks of dangerous substances, including chemical and biological agents. No amount of money is too much for that. I hope the United States will support the verification protocol of the convention banning biological weapons and ratify the treaty to prohibit all nuclear tests ‹ though both steps would reverse the Bush administration’s current positions.

    We should also heed those who have pointed out the negative consequences of globalization for hundreds of millions of people. Globalization cannot be stopped, but it can be made more humane and more balanced for those it affects.

    If the battle against terrorism is limited to military operations, the world could be the loser. But if it becomes an integral part of common efforts to build a more just world order, everyone will win ‹ including those who now do not support American actions or the antiterrorism coalition. Those people, and they are many, should not all be branded as enemies.

    Russia has shown its solidarity with America. President Vladimir Putin immediately sent a telegram to President Bush on Sept. 11 condemning the “inhuman act” of that day. Russia has been sharing information, coordinating positions with the West and with its neighbors, opening its air space, and providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people and weapons to the Northern Alliance.

    This has been good policy. But we should bear in mind that both in the Russian establishment and among the people, reaction to it has been mixed. Some people are still prone to old ways of understanding the world and Russia’s place in it. Others sincerely wonder whether the world’s most powerful country should be bombing impoverished Afghanistan. Still others ask: We have supported America in its hour of need, but will it meet us halfway on issues important to us?

    I am sure Russia will be a serious partner in fighting international terrorism. But equally, it is important that its voice be heard in building a new international order. If not, Russians could conclude that they have merely been used.

    Irritants in American-Russian relations ‹ issues like missile defense and the admission of new members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ‹ will be addressed in due course, but they will be easier to solve once we have moved toward a new global agenda and a deeper partnership between our two countries.

    Finally, it would be wrong to use the battle against terrorism to establish control over countries or regions. This would discredit the coalition and close off the prospect of transforming it into a powerful mechanism for building a peaceful world.

    Turning the coalition against terror into an alliance that works to achieve a just international order would be a lasting memorial to the thousands of victims of the Sept. 11 tragedy.

  • A Matter of National Priorities: National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) as Violations of International Law and a Threat to Human Survival

    Introduction: Legal, Economic, Strategic and Political Issues Involving NMD Investment and Deployment

    The technology for building a comprehensive national missile defense (NMD), in the true sense of the word “defense” is not available. The technology for the deployment of NMD currently does not exist. Reoccurring test failures indicate that it is likely that the technology will not exist in the future. Rather, the technology that does exist is for offensive purposes in outer space. What is currently available for deployment in outer space is a weapons technology capable of uniting the military, economic, and political components of a U.S. strategy for the hegemonic dominance of the globe.

    The proposed investment in national missile defense (NMD) and theatre missile defense (TMD) dramatically alters the strategic balance between nations. Not only are major powers such as Russia and China affected, but also U.S. allies and the geopolitical terrain of the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, East and Central Asia. Taken in combination, these realities also impinge upon the very integrity of the international law environment which regulates not only relations between states but affects the integrity of the treaty system, the future direction of the military industrial complexes of the world, and the way in which humanity views “crimes against peace” through the lens of the 1945-Nuremberg Principles. Further, the economic costs of NMD, not only in its research, production, and deployment aspects, but also in the wider global context, raises serious questions about the leadership of the international financial system and the growing gulf between haves- and have-nots.

    The processes of globalization, as exemplified by the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, have effectively reinforced worldwide economic disparities through its structural adjustment programs (SAP). Increasingly, most nations on the planet, as acknowledged by the United Nations Millennium Summit, are unable to enjoy the benefits of international trade and the related benefits of a global economy. Globalization is a combination of political, economic, social, military, and cultural elements. In combination, globalization represents a fundamental historical shift for humanity. It has reframed the entire context in which governments, corporations, NGOs, and global civil society thinks and acts. It is in this context that U.S dominated NMD investment and deployment strategies must be viewed.

    Insofar as the growing gulf between haves- and have-nots is exponentially expanding, those individuals and nations with the greatest stake in the status quo increasingly rely on military solutions to what are predominantly political problems. According to the World Bank’s report, World Development Report 2001/2002: Attacking Poverty, the gulf between the haves- and the have-nots already leaves 2.8 billion people living on less than $2 a day. The social, economic, and political consequences of this disparity leads to growing conflicts between nation-states and regions. Unless these problems of global governance are addressed by providing concrete solutions both conflict and terrorism will escalate. In this new environment, a planned deployment of NMD technology can only be viewed by billions of human beings as a repressive and oppressive device to maintain the injustices and deprivations of the status quo.

    The militarization of space, as proposed by the advocates of NMD, represents a radical departure from established international laws and customs, which historically have guided international relations on earth. Because of the problems associated with maintaining economic and political hegemony, over large geographical regions and billions of people, the complexity of global governance has expanded. The U.S. military- industrial complex and certain corporate and financial interests, which guide many aspects of U.S. government decision making, have decided that planning and preparation for aggressive war is going to be the most effective way to govern the planet. As expressed by U.S. Space Command’s book, Vision for 2020, the goal of dominating the space dimension of military operations is ” to protect U.S. interests and investment” [EXHIBIT 6].

    The goal of achieving the domination of the space dimension of military operations, with its central purpose of protecting U.S. interests and investments, is not a “defensive” posture or purpose. Rather, the stated plan involves the militarization of space for aggressive purposes, aimed at rivals, anticipated revolts, and opposition to U.S. hegemony around the globe. As such, in violation of the 1945-Nuremberg Principles, the vision of U.S. Space Command, as well as its governmental and industrial supporters, constitutes “planning and preparation for war”. In the language of the Nuremberg Principles, it constitutes “a crime against peace”.

    Insofar as the year of 2001 is the first year in which formal funding requests for NMD are being renewed in the United States Congress, it may be alleged that the four major companies who seek this funding (Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, TRW, Boeing), in conjunction with the Pentagon/CIA, are currently engaged in what the Nuremberg Principles call a “conspiracy to engage in planning and preparation for aggressive war”. As such, this is an indictable offense/violation of international law. It should be opposed within the United States and submitted to the World Court (The Hague), and the United Nations, for legal action and condemnation. For while each nation has the right to “defend” itself, no nation has a protected right, under international law, to engage in a “conspiracy” to promote “planning and preparation for aggressive war”. Should such a course be funded or endorsed, then, by definition, it will constitute a sanctioning and legitimation of a “crime against peace”. To move in this direction will also allow for the abrogation of treaties, such as the 1972-ABM Treaty.

    (A) The Abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty

    The Bush administration, in its efforts to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, has demonstrated its commitment to establishing an offensive military capability. It has also expressed such an intention in terms of the planned production and deployment of various space-based weapons systems [EXHIBITS 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, E]. The U.S. Space Commands’ position, as recently expressed in its book, Vision For 2020, makes clear its intention to embark upon the militarization of space in conjunction with a variety of war fighting capabilities [EXHIBIT 6]. In response to this threat, Russian leaders have repeatedly and consistently declared their strong opposition to even limited NMD and to amending the ABM Treaty. Russian concerns about U.S. efforts to install even a limited NMD capacity fall into six categories:

    First, the Russian leadership fears that even a limited NMD would only serve to undermine confidence in the retaliatory capability of its current forces;

    Second, Russia assesses its nuclear capabilities by a more demanding standard than the one the U.S. has used, so even a limited NMD system would appear still more threatening;

    Third, Russia fears that the planned limited deployment would provide the United States with the infrastructure and experience to field a larger and more advanced NMD system in the future;

    Fourth, even if the Bush administration had favored amending, rather than abandoning the ABM Treaty, Russia would remain worried that amending the ABM Treaty to allow limited NMD would set a precedent that would support the eventual elimination of negotiated limits on NMD. Because the real value of the treaty is premised on the belief that the parties will abide by its terms, U.S. insistence upon amending the ABM Treaty would reduce the value that Russia would place on an amended treaty;

    Fifth, Russia is most likely concerned about the symbolic implications of the deployment of an NMD system;

    Sixth and finally, responding to the U.S. deployment of a NMD system would require Russia to increase spending on strategic nuclear forces at a time when resources are scarce and much of the Russian nuclear force is nearing the end of its useful lifetime [EXHIBIT P].

    In light of these concerns, the United States should take Russia’s position and its perceptions much more seriously. To fail to do so, leaves the U.S. in an international stance of moving toward a unilateral direction, separating it from both allies and potential adversaries. In this formulation, the adoption of NMD represents a revived American isolationism for the 21st century. It is supportive of exclusionary governance, the search of geopolitical dominance, and the endorsement of an imperial hegemony. Such an approach is divorced from traditional American values of democratic deliberation, inclusionary forms of governance, and inclusionary decision-making at the national and international levels.

    As the International Tribunal at Nuremberg put the matter in its judgment: “…individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state”. The judgment at Nuremberg relates to those individuals in government, industry, and the military-industrial complex of the United States, who advocate the abrogation of the 1972-ABM Treaty. The imposition of NMD, on the international stage, constitutes an offensive, aggressive, and hostile intent by seeking to undertake the domination of the space dimension of military operations to “protect U.S. interests and investment” by “integrating space forces into war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict” [EXHIBIT 6].

    (B) The 1945 Nuremberg Principles

    With the inauguration of the Bush administration in 2001, the executive branch of the U.S. government has sought to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty [EXHIBITS 9, M, P], has refused to reintroduce in the U.S. Senate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) [EXHIBITS F, G], has chosen to ignore the terms of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and has intentionally violated the Nuremberg principle which maintains that the laws of war and some other rules of international law are superior to domestic law. In this context, the Nuremberg Principles assert the proposition that individuals may be held accountable to them.

    In pertinent part, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg, August 8, 1945, outlines in the section on “Jurisdiction And General Principles” (Article 6), the means by which to identify acts and crimes coming “within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility: (a) Crimes Against Peace: Namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing” [EXHIBIT 3, pp. 19-20 (Italics are mine)]. It is legitimate to contend that the proposed withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, when combined with the continued and renewed corporate lobbying of Congress by: (1) Boeing; (2) Lockheed-Martin; (3) Raytheon; (4) TRW, constitutes “planning” and “preparation” for aggressive war by the Bush administration and U.S. Space Command, in conjunction with corporate collusion with U.S. governmental agencies by “participation in a common plan or conspiracy” to fund the industrial component of the American National Security State. Under this analysis, taken together, both individually and collectively, members of the Bush administration may be legally indicted, under international law, for their “conspiracy” with elements of the military-industrial-complex to engage in “planning and preparation for aggressive war” in violation of the 1945 Nuremberg Principles [EXHIBIT 3].

    (C) The Legal Basis for an Indictment of the United States’ Military-Industrial Complex Regarding NMD/TMD Funding

    In combination, the Bush administration’s refusal to comply with the rules and norms of international law represents a grave danger to both world peace and the control of weapons of mass destruction through: (1) the abrogation of treaties; (2) numerous violations of international law; (3) the lack of fidelity to the maintenance of peace through the commission of crimes against peace by undertaking policy, spending, research, and deployment measures designed to advance the process of planning and preparation for waging aggressive war. The dominant reason for this unlawful trend, as acknowledged by the U.S. Space Command, is “to protect U.S. national interests and investment” and to provide the means to begin the process of “integrating space forces into war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.”

    The Charter of the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg, August 8, 1945, also set forth definitions for “leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in the execution of such plan”. In Article III, section (B), a militarist is defined as: “(1) Anyone who sought to bring the life of the German people into line with a policy of militaristic force; (2) Anyone who advocated or is responsible for the domination of foreign peoples, their exploitation or displacement; or (3) Anyone who, for these purposes, promoted armament”. Further, in Article III, section (C), “(I) A profiteer is: Anyone who, by use of his political position or connections, gained personal or economic advantages for himself or others from the national socialistic tyranny, the rearmament, or the war. (II) Profiteers are in particular the following persons, insofar as they are not major offenders…anyone who made disproportionately high profits in armament or war transactions”.

    In the case of the United States, it may be argued that, since the 1950s to the present, there has been a continuous effort by a variety of persons and corporations who sought to bring the life of the American people into line with a policy of militaristic force (the Korean War, Vietnam, Star Wars). Since the early 1950s, the country has spent over $100 billion on ballistic missile defense, $70 billion of it since Reagan’s SDI proposal, with little to show for it. By the year 2000, the Congressional Budget Office had estimated the cost of the Star Wars plan at around $60-billion dollars. Yet, a more comprehensive land-, sea-, and space-based scheme, as favored by many Republicans, would cost more on the order of $240-billion dollars. This price tag precedes any further calculations that would take into account the inevitable delays and cost overruns [EXHIBIT X].

    Viewed in this light, following the 1945-Nuremberg Principles, it may be argued that: (1) militarists in the Pentagon/CIA, throughout a string of administrations since the 1950s, have sought to increasingly divert U.S. government funding into planning and preparation for aggressive war by giving the United States a “nuclear first-strike” capability; (2) this capacity/capability for a military “first-strike”, whether from land-, sea-, or space-based stations would be provided for by civilian profiteers who have made “disproportionately high profits” in the name of ballistic missile defense; (3) this expenditure has taken place despite the warning of President John F. Kennedy, in 1961, that “unconditional war can no longer lead to unconditional victory. It can no longer concern the great powers alone. For a nuclear disaster, spread by wind and water and fear, could well engulf the great and the small, the rich and the poor, the committed and the uncommitted alike. Mankind must put an end to war-or war will put an end to mankind” [EXHIBIT Z].

    (D) Funding for the Military-Industrial Complex

    From 1999 to 2000, just four U.S. corporations have accounted for 60% of all missile defense contracts. These four corporations are: Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, and TRW. These four corporations are in a unique position to provide the Bush administration with the technological means to use the resources of the United States government to fund research and development for the planning and preparation for aggressive war. This is not a “defensive” process or task for a variety of key reasons. According to U.S. Space Command, the capabilities of NMD will comply with four central operational concepts: (1) control of space; (2) global engagement; (3) full force integration; (4) global partnerships. It has been asserted, by U.S. Space Command, that these operational concepts provide the new conceptual framework to transform the Vision For 2020 into war fighting capabilities [EXHIBITS 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, E, L, N]. The role of the aforementioned corporations will include the enjoyment of virtually unlimited access to permanent funding by the military industrial complex [EXHIBITS I, J, O, P, T, V, X, Y].

    As early as 1988, the Council on Economic Priorities completed a study which predicated that the potential economic impact of the NMD program (referred to as “Star Wars” at that time), would result in a cost to every American household of as much as $12,000 for a fully funded $1 trillion dollar NMD system. In fact, the council found that research funds alone would dwarf all other military programs and the needs of all other domestic programs. Further, it would engage the energies and talents of up to 180,000 scientific and engineering specialists if the program moved into production. Production of such a system impacts many interrelated areas of the economy. For example, “Whatever the final costs of an SDI system, it will clearly cost the average American household a total of $5,000 to $12,000, spread over eight to twenty years. For the average family earning between $30,000 and $50,000 a year, SDI could increase the annual tax bill by $570.” Such a massive shift of economic priorities, if implemented, would “seriously weaken the nation’s ability to meet the challenges of unemployment, export market loss, dwindling technological leadership, and antiquated industrial plants”. Now, at the dawn of the 21st century, the United States finds itself in precisely this exact position [EXHIBITS H, I, J, O].

    Throughout the Third World, from Latin America to South Asia, and from Sub-Saharan Africa to the countries of Europe and Central Asia, there resides a deepening poverty amid plenty. According to the World Bank’s report, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, “of the world’s 6-billion people, 2.8 billion-almost half- live on less that $2 a day, and 1.2-billion–a fifth– live on less than $1 a day, with 44% living in South Asia.” The cited statistics are indicative of the fact that funding for the military industrial complexes of the world, as well as an unrestrained trade in global armaments, not only fuels violent conflicts but also contributes directly to enduring and deepening poverty. The correlation between the trade and purchase of weapons, on the one hand, and rising levels of poverty on the other, provides clear and convincing evidence that humanity cannot sustain this trend. This relationship is well documented throughout the scholarly literature on the subjects of war and peace in the nuclear age.

    With the deployment of NMD, an international reaction will most likely result in a new arms race. With the continuation of these trends, the tragic consequences of the Cold War, which ended in 1990, will only worsen with a second Cold War at the dawn of the 21st century [EXHIBIT R]. If continued spending on weapons increases and expands under NMD and TMD, nationally and internationally, there will be a corresponding depletion of human capital, as social programs and investments in health, education, and welfare, are cut even deeper. This, in turn, will result in the inevitable widening of circles of poverty and a growing gap between the haves- and the have-nots. Such an outcome will probably produce revolts, revolutions, and rising levels of terrorism around the globe.

    (E) International Relations and Security Concerns

    On the international scene, the proposed NMD system and TMD system has the potential to dramatically destabilize an already precarious series of international relationships [EXHIBITS Q, S, T, U]. According to the Center For Defense Information (CDI), ” to pull out a keystone of arms control by abrogation of the ABM Treaty could weaken stability world wide, particularly sensitive areas of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani programs”. The Bush administration’s desire to remove the U.S. from its obligations under the 1972 ABM Treaty reflects the tragic course of policy makers who dismiss the linkage of disarmament, proliferation, and unproliferation as softheaded. The tendency to dismiss the linkage between these various courses of action reflects a genuine contempt for the aspiration for equity between states. With the dismissal of policy choices that support equity between states, the primary emphasis in strategic planning returns to a calculation of how to factor the balance of armored divisions or missiles between states.

    History is a record of the downplaying of the equity dynamic of nuclear politics. The downplaying of the equity dynamic presents a double irony, insofar as American policy makers promote democracy precisely because equity is seen as a worthwhile objective. According to the “democratic peace thesis”, it is believed that states that achieve relative equity will be more stable and peace loving. In this sense, democracy is perceived as a means to equity. Yet, when policy makers confront the challenge of global nuclear policy, American (and other) officials devalue equity as a necessary element in their planning and decision-making. In this context, NMD/TMD expands the scope of global instability with respect to global nuclear policy. If this trend is to be reversed, a more forthright acknowledgment of the balance of power mentality versus concerns with equity must be addressed. A better U.S. strategy toward the developing world as a whole and East Asia, in particular, will require a complete overhaul of the structures and processes of policy making, to bring them into accord with genuine equity, social justice considerations, human rights norms, United Nations covenants and conventions, and a nuclear weapons regime which promotes demilitarization within a specified timeline that can be consummated with the abolition of nuclear weapons through global disarmament. Such a course will benefit all states involved and will be more suitable to take into account, the non-military threats to international stability, such as terrorism.

    To remove the keystone of arms control through the abrogation of the 1972 ABM Treaty would be especially tragic insofar as, in future years, the ABM Treaty could serve as the bridge to a new era in which further reductions in offensive missiles could be accompanied by the testing and building of more limited defensive systems [EXHIBIT W]. In this critical regard, as a practical matter, “no one will be reliably defended unless everyone is. The most objectionable feature of the current NMD effort is that it is being conducted as a unilateral initiative for the United States alone in defiance of legitimate opposing security concerns.”

    The ramifications of ignoring the legitimate security concerns of other nations leaves the United States permanently trapped in a position of making unilateral policy decisions. The high diplomatic costs of taking a unilateral path have taken already their toll with regard to America’s NATO allies throughout Europe. Britain, Italy, Germany, and France have already voiced wide disapproval of President Bush’ conduct of foreign policy with regard to the administration intent to withdraw from the ABM treaty [EXHIBIT G].

    In the East Asian context, North Korea has known, since the mid-1980s, that it was no match for South Korea-let alone a South Korea with U.S. military support, insofar as North Korea could no longer rely on Russia for its security and could expect assistance from China if attacked. The efforts of the late 1990s to defuse the DMZ and efforts to open negotiations for the normalization of the relationship between the North and South, as undertaken by the “sunshine policy”, represented new steps toward peace. However, by August 2001, the Bush Administration had undertaken efforts to sabotage these negotiations. If North Korea were to remain as a hostile state, it would allow the United States to continue to characterize it as a rogue nation. As a rogue nation, it would also allow the United States to raise the possibility that China would become a threat to American security interests in the region, and thereby justify NMD/TMD deployment [EXHIBITS Q, S].

    The introduction of Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) [EXHIBIT 12, L, Q] also contributes to a sense of insecurity for China. The TMD concept originated in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), forged during the Reagan administration. Following the end of the Cold War, the Bush (Sr.) administration revised the SDI into a program called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). By 1993, the Clinton administration declared the termination of the SDI era. The new focus was to be placed upon missile defense systems, such as NMD. By 2001, these trends have resulted in major shifts in perceptions in policies among Japan, Taiwan, China, North and South Korea. The greatest negative impact on these nations has been to damage efforts at confidence building among big powers, by bringing about new complications and problems for Sino-U.S. relations, Russian-U.S. relations, Sino-Japanese relations, Russian-Japanese relations and U.S-Japanese relations. In summary, the NMD/TMD program has harmed gradual progress toward cooperation and security in the region by deepening suspicion and confrontational sentiments among them [EXHIBIT L, Q].

    (F) Planning and Preparation for Aggressive War

    Beginning in 1957, the United States military prepared plans for a preemptive nuclear strike against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), based on America’s growing lead in land-based missiles [EXHIBIT 4]. Top military and intelligence leaders presented an assessment of those plans to President John F. Kennedy in July of 1961. At that point in time, a portion of high-ranking Air Force and CIA leadership “apparently believed that a window of outright ballistic missile superiority, perhaps sufficient for a successful first strike, would be open in late 1963”. Kennedy’s response indicates his personal determination, shared by his civilian advisors, that a first strike capability never be implemented or become U.S. policy. However, “the fact that first strike planning got as far as it did raises questions about the history of the Cold War. Much more needs to be known: about nuclear decision-making under Eisenhower and Nixon, about the events of late 1963, about later technical developments such as MIRV and Star Wars”.

    At the dawn of the 21st century, with strong governmental and corporate support for NMD/TMD, placed at the center of U.S. strategic thinking and planning, research and investment, offensive capabilities, and geopolitical implications from military strategy to international relationships, the need to re-examine Star Wars, National Missile Defense (NMD), and Theatre Missile Defense (TMD), is more vital than ever. For advances in technological capabilities, both military and civilian, have reached a new stage of maturation, placing the fate of humanity at a critical juncture. The dynamics of war and peace are now, even more, left hanging in the balance. For example, Donald Rumsfeld before assuming the position of Secretary of Defense headed a 13 member “Space Commission” which included 2 former commanders in chief of the United States Space Command and an ex-commander of the Air Force Space command. The commission’s finding restored enthusiasm among NMD advocates to launch a new battle in congress for funding [EXHIBITS C,D,H,S,V,Y]. Contrary to NMD advocates, the critics of this recently endorsed proposal for a space weaponization plan, contend that its purpose is primarily offensive in nature. By removing the mythology of a defensive capability, the critics of NMD have reconfigured the debate and the dynamics of the “dog-fight” for dollars to be allotted NMD. [EXHIBIT J]

    Specifically, with regard to the militarization of outer space, history reveals a continuing struggle within the highest echelons of the United States Government from 1963 through 2001. Speaking to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, September 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy stated: “To destroy arms…is not enough. We must create even as we destroy-creating worldwide law and law enforcement as we outlaw worldwide war and weapons…For peace is not solely a matter of military or technical problems-it is primarily a problem of politics and people. And unless man can match his strides in weaponry and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control-and like the dinosaur, vanish from the earth. As we extend the rule of law on earth, so must we also extend it to man’s new domain-outer space…The new horizons of outer space must not be driven by the old bitter concepts of imperialism and sovereign claims. The cold reaches of the universe must not become the new arena of an even colder war”.

    Kennedy’s prophetic analysis of 1961 remains at the heart and center of debates on NMD in the year of 2001. His analysis will probably persist as a constant reminder that the search for peace is usually juxtaposed to unrestrained technological advances that are united with the military mind and its search, not so much for defensive capabilities as for offensive capabilities [EXHIBIT Z]. In this regard, the argument of the advocates of missile defense, to the extent they articulate their general strategic purpose, “tend to emphasize the moral superiority of the defensive mission. It is better, they say, to defend against attack than to threaten retaliation. They implicitly acknowledge, however, no feasible elaboration of defensive technology would make it a reliable substitute for the threat of retaliation, and they do not propose to accompany a more robust NMD deployment with the very drastic restrictions on US offensive capability that would be necessary to make it plausibly acceptable to the principal potential opponents. In fact, most of the assertive NMD advocates also aggressively support the development of advanced conventional offensive capability that is the principle concern of such opponents”. Both NMD and TMD have strong U.S. offensive capability built into them. In fact, the U.S. Space Command’s own book, Vision For 2020, constantly repeats terminology such as: “dominating the space dimension of military operations”, “integrating space forces into war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict” [EXHIBIT 6].

    By 1999, leading American experts argued that both NATO and the cause of peace would gain from ” a no-first-use” policy. Thomas Graham Jr., Robert McNamara and Jack Mendelsohn, argued that, “it is critical for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reconsider its nuclear policy and agree to a no-first-use provision on nuclear weapons. Such a policy would be a signal to the international community that the most powerful nations in the world are prepared to accept that nuclear weapons have no utility other than to deter a nuclear-armed opponent from their use”. The emphasis upon deterrence must be underscored as the most essential place to begin analysis of nuclear policy, whether it be a “no-first-strike” or NMD/TMD. U.S security is still influenced by how other major powers understand Washington’s goals. In the context of NMD, Space Command’s publication, Vision For 2020, places emphasis not so much on defense as upon war fighting capabilities “across the full spectrum of conflict”. This is significant because the distinction between defense per se and planning and preparation for aggressive war, allows us to bifurcate the ideological arguments of advocates for NMD from the critique of opponents. The publication, Vision For 2020, is clearly a blueprint for the implementation of a first-use-strike capability.

    The recognition by Russia and China that NMD constitutes the basis for planning and preparation for aggressive war understandably gives rise to anxiety about how, where, and when the U.S will employ its newly acquired military capabilities in space, as it proceeds in the pursuit of advancing its vital interests. The advance of U.S military power in space increases an entire spectrum of considerations that could be augmented by a destructive force without parallel in the nuclear age. In this regard, “because Russia and China are not confident that the United States will respect their vital interests, U.S security policy, while pursuing its other requirements, should avoid fueling their fears and triggering reactions that ultimately would decrease U.S security.” In this regard, the dangers of miscalculation are enormous [EXHIBITS 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, A, B, O, P, Q, R, S, T, Y, Z].

    As with World War I, the greatest danger of NMD, may be that it could actually make the U.S more vulnerable, because of the dangers of miscalculation. Miscalculation can be registered in rising levels of global insecurity since it would exacerbate strategic, psychological, and geopolitical tensions between the U.S, Russia, and China. Senator Tom Daschle (D-South Dakota), summed up the danger in articulate terms when he stated on May 2, 2001, “many in the administration… argue that deploying an ineffective defense can still be an effective system simply because it would cause uncertainty in the minds of our adversaries. That position is based on the flawed assumption that the president would be willing to gamble our nations security on a bluff, and that no adversary would be willing to call such a bluff. Instead of increasing our security, pursuing a strategy that cannot achieve its goal could leave our nation less secure and our world less stable.” Senator Daschle’s assessment closely corresponds to the interpretation of historians with respect to the start of World War I. The combination of flawed assumptions, bluffs, and an unexplored and previously unused military technology was responsible for the worst carnage the world had yet experienced in war. Similarly, the NMD plans, as proposed in, Vision For 2020, comprise an analogous set of flawed assumptions.

    In the context of international law, even before the introduction of NMD/TMD technologies, scholars have argued that, “the effects produced by nuclear weapons have forced the need for a fundamental reevaluation of the nature and objectives of war in the ‘nuclear age’.” The necessity for this reevaluation is even more pertinent in the NMD context, because NMD exponentially expands the capacity of an NMD state to fundamentally alter the balance of terror through the destruction of international law, in its totality, by abrogating treaties and principles which have provided an effective restraint and deterrent effect [EXHIBITS K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, T, U, W, Y, Z]. To maintain the integrity of international law it will be necessary to uphold treaties that have enduring significance and principles that embody enduring guidelines [EXHIBITS U, W]. In conjunction with the 1945 Nuremberg Principles, the International Court of Justice ruling on the threat or use of nuclear weapons has direct bearing on NMD funding, research, and ultimate deployment. With this in mind, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, on July 8, 1996, provides the basis on which to critique many of the flawed assumptions behind the advocacy of NMD.

    (G) The Opinion of the International Court of Justice

    On July 8, 1996, the International Court Of Justice (hereinafter referred to as, ICJ) responded to requests by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) for an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The case divided the judges jurisprudentially and doctrinally in fundamental ways, with a narrow majority (that depended on a second casting vote by the President of the Court, Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui of Algeria, See-International Court of Justice Statute Article 55 [2]) forging a consensus that lends strong, yet partial and somewhat ambiguous, support to the view that nuclear weapons are of dubious legality. According to Professor Richard Falk, “the most critical aspect of the dispositif on the core issue of legality reach a result that surprised those who anticipated an either/or outcome, the court having created some new doctrinal terrain by deciding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited by international law, subject to a possible exception for legal reliance on such weapons, but only in extreme circumstances in self-defense in which the survival of a state is at stake”.

    Professor Falk’s interpretation of the ICJ advisory opinion brings to the foreground of legal analysis an emphasis upon the defensive role of nuclear weapons. The fact that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is strictly prohibited by international law, with only one extreme exception, the self-defense of a nation, underscores the defensive aspect. This point is extremely relevant in the case of NMD. The impact of NMD on Russia and its nuclear security is significant. Russia today, according to The Center For Defense Information, “can barely cope with U.S offensive power, let alone a combination of offensive and defensive” [National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?-A CDI Issue Brief, (enclosed with the attached EXHIBITS as the APPENDIX to Volume-I)]. The report also emphasizes the fact that, “if Russia wants to overwhelm an NMD shield it must plan to launch massively and quickly in a crisis”. If the U.S decides to follow Space Command’s language in carrying out U.S policy by “dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S interests and investments” through its ability to integrate space forces “into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict”, then the aggressive side of U.S force capabilities will be unleashed in violation of the ICJ ruling and the understandings contained in the 1972 ABM Treaty. The offensive nature of NMD engages the U.S in a historically new project by embarking upon the militarization of space. The militarization of space, for analytical purposes, should be understood as the aggressive nuclearization of space (my term) for offensive purposes.

    The 1972 ABM Treaty states that the parties declare that it is “their intention to achieve [at] the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions of strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament”. Further, the treaty states that the parties desire “to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States.” In conjunction with this purpose, it is appropriate to interpret the ICJ ruling in which a unanimous conclusion was reached that upholds the finding that any use of nuclear weapons contrary to Article 2 (4) of United Nations Charter, and not vindicated by Article 51, is “unlawful”. It was agreed by all the judges that a threat or use of nuclear weapons is governed by “the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of humanitarian law, as well as [by] specific obligations” arising from treaties and other undertakings that “expressly deal with nuclear weapons”. On this matter, this finding was not challenged by any nuclear weapons states in their pleading.

    The plan of U.S Space Command and the Bush administration, as outlined in, Vision For 2020, reflects none of these propositions. Rather, the reports states in no unequivocal terms that, “just as land dominance, sea control, and air superiority, have become elements of current military strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare” [EXHIBIT 6]. This plan, contradicts all of the aforementioned laws, rules, conventions, charters, and treaties since the 1970s. In part, American high technology weapons, ever since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, have laid the basis of the phenomenal pace of innovation in the modern computer industry which, in turn, has led directly into a virtual revolution in military affairs. Defense analysts have posited that we are on the threshold of a revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA proponents “believe that military technology, and the resulting potential of radically new types of warfighting tactics and strategies is advancing at a rate unrivaled since the 1930s and 1940s”. These changes reflect radical developments in offensive forces, not defensive forces, as alleged by the Bush administration. Dennis M. Ward has argued that, “American policymakers’ interest in both theatre and national missile defenses is driven by their perceptions of new ballistic missile threats. The threats stem from the proliferation of relatively unsophisticated missiles, not from exotic technologies.” Unfortunately the U.S Space command and the Bush administration have continued to worked in collusion with the civilian and military sectors dedicated to achieving the goal of “global engagement” that “combines global surveillance with the potential for a space-based global precision strike capability” [EXHIBIT 6].

    In the aftermath of the ICJ decision, Professor Falk has argued that it is the obligation of all nuclear states to pursue their good faith obligations by bringing to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and all of its aspects. According to Falk, such an obligation entails giving “weight to the legal commitment by the nuclear weapons states to pursue disarmament as a serious policy goal”. Professor Terrence E. Paupp, in his study, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace and Development in First and Third World Nations, has emphasized the fact that “genuine security and a peaceful world order cannot be premised upon notions of ‘deterrence’ and ‘balance of power’ because a spiral of violence is created by these concepts so that the exercise of power becomes self-defeating…the process that is identified by the spiral model of conflict is associated with the characteristics I have attributed to the leadership and policies of exclusionary states”. The U.S may be depicted as an exclusionary state on the international stage in light of the fact that it retains a strategic focus on the “balance of power” paradigm as its governing principle, it has reinvigorated justifications for unilateral actions in defiance of allies and potential adversaries, and has demonstrated a fidelity to an isolationist credo in an age of “globalization” and interdependence among nation-states. By retaining a “balance of power” focus, the U.S along with the most important nuclear weapon states, has betrayed an arms control approach that is based on minimizing the risks of possessing nuclear weapons. Rather than minimizing the risks, it has enhanced them. In fact, the U.S has periodically, in times of diplomatic and political crisis, actually threatened to use them [EXHIBITS 3 (p.16.), 4].

    Significantly, the legal endorsement of disarmament, also amounts, even if unwittingly, to a sharp criticism of the nuclear weapons states for their abandonment of any serious pursuit of disarmament goals in recent decades. If the ICJ advisory opinion is to achieve any meaning, it must be within the context of helping the advocacy of those committed to nuclear disarmament, demilitarization, and ultimately the abolition of all nuclear weapons on land, sea, and outer space. Such a conclusion demands a thorough condemnation of NMD and its associated technologies.

    (H) The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

    In Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the relevant treaty obligation provides: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effect measure relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729 UNTS 161). Based on this provision, the ICJ found unanimously that “[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects in strict and effective international control”[Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, 35 ILM 809 & 1343, 1996, para. 105 (2) (F)]. The ICJ’s advisory opinion of July 8, 1996, expanded on the phrase, “and bring to a conclusion” as follows: “the legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct: the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear disarmament in all of its aspects-by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith” (paragraph 99).

    The significance of the ICJ’s additional language is to underscore the obligation, which exists to pursue negotiations in good faith toward a particular result-namely, a duty to make all reasonable efforts to reach the goal of disarmament through the negotiating process. The problem is that the Court’s finding does not dictate any timetable or negotiating forum for reaching this result. The failure to establish either a specific timetable or a particular negotiating forum, has resulted in the current crisis surrounding the NMD proposals and the continuing advocacy of TMD strategies. For example, on May 23, 2000, Governor George W. Bush, proclaimed, “it is time to leave the Cold War behind, and defend against the new threats of the 21st century. America must build effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date”. On May 1, 2001, President George W. Bush, stated: “more nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations…Some have already have developed a ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and incredible speeds, and a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world”. These statements of candidate Bush and later President Bush demonstrate the tragic consequences of the American National Security State failed to act on the ICJ Advisory Opinion which calls for meeting an obligation to achieve the precise result of nuclear disarmament in all of its aspects [EXHIBITS 13-22]. Hence, the continuing relevance and importance of a CTBT is even more apparent. The fact that there have been no good faith negotiations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the testing of nuclear weapons, or the first steps toward genuine disarmament has created the political and economic opportunity for R&D investment in NMD and the deployment of NMD/TMD.

    The response of most European countries, with regard to the planned NMD system, has been negative. According to the Center For Defense Information, “the NMD plans put the European countries in a position of assisting a program aimed at providing additional safety for the United States but doing so at the likely expense of their own security. Many European states do not agree with the threat assessment that has led to NMD’s conception in the first place. All oppose any steps that would violate the AMB Treaty.” [EXHIBITS 9, F, G, K, N, O, P, R, T, U, W, Y,]

    Rising levels of fear throughout the entire Asia-Pacific region match the negative response of most of the European countries to Bush’s NMD stance. The introduction of TMD and its impact on security in the Asia-Pacific region has exacerbated China’s fears, increased tension in the Taiwan Straits, and sabotaged negotiations for reconciliation between North and South Korea [EXHIBIT Q]. Further, the Bush administration seems to be leading the United States into an intensified and unnecessary conflict with China. This trend is entirely reckless insofar as China’s foreign policy is predictable. China has never been a global power or thought itself an actor in global affairs, like the European great powers or the United States [EXHIBIT A]. Laying the groundwork for potential hostilities with China, the Bush administration has proposed to tell the Chinese government that it would not object to a missile build up by the Chinese in order to win Chinese acquiescence for an American NMD program [EXHIBIT B]. The American strategy is pursuing a foreign policy course developed by Donald Rumsfeld in the early 1970s under President Gerald Ford. It was a poor proposal at that time and a worse one at the dawn of the 21st century [EXHIBIT C].

    With the nomination of General Richard M. Myers, a former head of Air Forces and Space Command, to the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there is reason for greater consternation among opponents of NMD, in particular, and the international community at the large. General Myers’ nomination is important because it signals the commitment that President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have toward an NMD program. The nineteen months General Myers spent as head of the Space Command, ending in February 2000, gave him a familiarity with the kinds of technology the program would use [EXHIBIT M]. Senator Joseph Biden has assaulted President Bush’s foreign policy focus on NMD, because, he maintains, “everything-including relations with Russia and China, even NATO-is viewed through the prism of missile defense, which is dangerous and potentially disastrous. It weakens us. It weakens NATO. And it weakens our ability to deal with the real threats”. [EXHIBIT R]

    In combination, Article V1 of the NPT, the 1999 defeat of the CTBT in the U.S Senate, and the proposed withdrawal of the U.S from the 1972 ABM Treaty all signal a ruthless disregard of the clear mandates contained in key instruments of international law. Further, despite denials Under Secretary of State, John R. Bolton, of a strict deadline for Russia to accept changes to the ABM Treaty by November 2001, the Bush administration has continued to push for the militarization of outer-space in violation of the good faith principles demanded by the ICJ advisory opinion of 1996 [EXHIBIT 22]. The domestic debate within the U.S over the wisdom of pursuing investment in NMD has become overly conflated with the September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. For the first time in American history, in July, 2001, the defense of the “American homeland” was incorporated into guidelines of American military strategy and also used to request more money from congress in order to spend countless billions of dollars in developing a high- tech missile defense [EXHIBIT 19].

    If congress allocates funds for a truly “defensive” system, then congress must also mandate that such an expenditure does not violate any provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. A congressional mandate ensuring the integrity of the 1972 ABM Treaty is essential for the sake of constraining the course and scope of R&D to purely defensive, not offensive, capabilities. Should the advocates of NMD prevail in undermining attempts in the U.S Senate to protect the existing safeguards contained in the treaty, then there will be no effective legal restraint remaining to keep NMD research and deployment from transmuting into an offensive war fighting capability with existing military technologies.

    In terms of substantive international law, and in the mind of the American general public, the salient feature of the Nuremberg trials was the decision that individuals could be held guilty for participation in the planning and waging of “a war of aggression”. As the International Tribunal at Nuremberg put the matter in its judgment: “…individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing the action moves outside under international law”. Under this standard, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the leadership of Space Command, President Bush, and the corporate interests behind NMD (Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon, TRW), maybe held guilty for participation in the planning of a “war of aggression” [EXHIBITS C, D, E, H, I, J, L, M, N, P, R, X, Y, 4-22]. Space Command’s report, Vision For 2020, reveals that the interest of the military is not defense, but the protection of U.S.-based investments and commercial interests [EXHIBITS N, 6, 10-12].

    Conclusion: International Duties Transcending National Obligations

    In retrospect, the crusade by the advocates of NMD signals a back-to-the-future scenario, repeating the same depleted arguments of the Reagan administration. Prospectively, the crusade by the advocates of NMD constitutes a vision of a United States that is disconnected from the rest of the world. In the words of William D. Hartung, the President’s Fellow at the World Policy Institute at New School University, “the unifying vision behind the Bush doctrine is nuclear unilateralism, the notion that the United States can and will make its own decisions about the size, composition and employment of its nuclear arsenal without reference to arms control agreements or the opinions of other nations”. It is essential, in the area of NMD/TMD that the United States give up its unilateralism if humanity is to survive and prevail as a species. Such a view demands that the American foreign policy framework, employed since the end of World War II, must be discarded and reconfigured. This will mean taking the problem of exclusionary governance and exclusionary states more seriously. This will mean taking the promise and challenge of achieving inclusionary governance and the building of inclusionary states more seriously.

    Exclusionary states are a reflection of the fact that, “in many parts of the Third World, economic systems function primarily to benefit a relatively limited number of people, and political systems are frequently manipulated to guarantee continued elite dominance. The general public often has little or no opportunity to influence the policy-making process or to participate fully in the economic system. These domestic inequalities, along with an international economic system not designed to operate in the interests of Third World countries, are at the root of underdevelopment.” In this situation, it is incumbent upon the nuclear states, especially the U.S., to move beyond the traditional preoccupation with its narrowly defined national interest (elite-centered) and begin to address the larger human interest. This means that a “better U.S. strategy toward the developing world as a whole will require an overhaul of the structures and processes of policy making.”

    Global Inclusionary Governance in the 21st Century

    The United States has international duties transcending national obligations. In this critical regard, the NMD/TMD approach to global governance is antithetical to building a peaceful, just, or secure world. Rather, the employment and deployment of NMD/TMD systems threaten the integrity of the entire international legal order and the objective living conditions of humanity as a whole. The waste and danger coupled with such an expenditure of resources cannot be either legitimated or rationalized in this content, in this early part of the 21st century.

    If the promise and binding force of the 1945 Nuremberg Principles are to have any meaning and application in building more accountable states, advancing peace between nations, establishing accountability within and between states, then the U.S., the United Nations, and the entire international community, must reject the NMD/TMD approach to global governance and human security. Instead, a new definition of human security must emerge that is no longer primarily prefigured by the imprints and images of the military-industrial mind. Rather, the achievement of inclusionary governance demands the following:

    First, structures and policies that allow for the continued investment in and expansion of both nuclear and non-nuclear assets shall be dismantled and replaced with peacekeeping and monitoring institutions.

    Second, in recognition of the fact that spending on nuclear and non-nuclear assets depletes both First and Third World economies, it shall be the task of inclusionary governments and inclusionary regimes to embark upon the deepening of democratic norms, practices and policies so as to alter current spending priorities (especially in NMD/TMD).

    Third, the necessity to embark upon a path toward inclusionary governance and demilitarization is supported by accumulated scientific evidence, which proves that the exchange and/or detonation of just a few nuclear bombs will have the capacity to create a global condition known as “nuclear winter” that could lead to climate catastrophe, agricultural collapse, and world famine.

    Fourth, the history and evolution of international law is moving in the direction of disarmament and has the capacity to build a global institutional structure that supports an alternative security system. Such a system must lead toward the effective subordination of military establishments of the nation-states under the rubric of values, principles, policies and goals of inclusionary governance.

    Fifth, the historical experience of war and conflict has proven that a failure to recognize the influence of pre-existing beliefs has implications for decision making and that, therefore, the process of decision making must become more inclusionary so as to overcome a history and practice of concealment, secrecy and distortion through propaganda as well as bureaucratic and media manipulation.

    Sixth, genuine security and a peaceful world order cannot be premised upon notions of “deterrence” and “balance of power” because a spiral of violence is created by these concepts so that the exercise of power becomes self-defeating (i.e., the publication of U.S. Space Command, (Vision For 2020).

    Seventh, and finally, the recognized need for a global security policy which places emphasis upon non-military incentives to channel government’s behavior empowers the international system to give added support to an expanded role for international organizations or security regimes to facilitate cooperation and regulate inter-group conflict.

    Establishing a New Congressional Role

    In all of the aforementioned principles surrounding the principles of inclusionary governance there is one underlying requirement that has profound relevance for the U.S Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities. That requirement is in the category of congressional oversight of the executive branch. Specifically, the oversight of Pentagon contracting with major industries and corporations, as well as oversight with respect to procurement decisions and policies, constitutes a primary and fundamental role for the nation’s security.

    With regard to the Star Wars project in 1993, The New York Times reported that the Star Wars project rigged a crucial 1984 test and faked other data in a “program of deception that misled congress as well as the intended target, the Soviet Union.” Former Reagan administration officials said that a program of deception had been approved by Casper W. Weinberger (Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1987). Mr. Weinberger denied that Congress was deceived but argued that deceiving one’s enemies is natural and necessary to any major military initiative. The lesson to be drawn from this deception, in the context of the NMD debate of 2001-2002, is that congressional oversight and investigations into the actions and activities of the executive branch and the Pentagon is essential to maintaining any semblance of democratic accountability. It is also necessary for the sake of overcoming the inherent limitations of the mind-set of the military-industrial complex. I, therefore, propose the following policy changes for the U.S Congress to initiate in order to maintain democratic accountability with respect to NMD funding:

    1. Enhancing Congressional-Oversight

    As the Congress considers the cost of an NMD program, it must take into account numerous lessons that may be learned from the past. For example, in June of 1993, The New York Times reported that federal investigators had determined that the Pentagon misled Congress about both the cost and necessity of many weapons systems built in the decade of the 1980’s to counter the military forces of the Soviet Union. Eight reports from a three-year study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) exposed a pattern of exaggeration and deception by military leaders. In particular, the B-52 bomber, the B-1 bombers, and the B-2 bomber, were cited in the reports as part of a pattern in which the Pentagon misrepresented certain facts to the Congress in order to maintain or increase financing for new nuclear-weapons systems. In the year 2001, it may well be that that Rumsfeld Report of 1998 on the relevance of NMD will fall into the same category. In fact, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was sharply questioned about the high cost and unproven effectiveness of an NMD system and the Bush administration’s threats to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty [EXHIBITS C, V]. Rumsfeld was forced to admit that the technology did not exist and could not guarantee any specific date at which it would be available for defensive purposes.

    2. Combating Terrorism Does Not Justify Investments in NMD

    In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks, Rumsfeld stated that “it is the asymmetric threats that are a risk, and they include terrorism, they include ballistic missiles, they include cyber-attacks” [EXHIBIT 19]. Despite the attempted linkage of disparate and unrelated threats to U.S. national security, the Rumsfeld analysis cannot stand the test of critical analysis. In the final analysis, terrorist attacks are a symptom rather than a cause of the underlying global maladies of our age.

    Terrorist attacks are, in large measure, an expression of the powerless position of persons and groups who come from exclusionary states at the periphery of the international capitalist system. Behind the frustration of generations, there is a history of colonialism, imperialism, and great power rivalry. Where widespread poverty and deprivation is the rule, rather than the exception, there is little empirical support for the proposition that a truly “defensive” NMD system could prevent such attacks even if a truly “defensive” system existed [EXHIBIT 21]. Where poverty and deprivation have reigned supreme, there is no basis for alleging the possibility of a missile attack. The real source of U.S. support for investment in and the proposed deployment of a NMD system is largely a domestic concern, more closely associated with peacetime military spending than with the actual world situation. On this matter, Robert Higgs has argued: “if an effective NMD system is ever successfully produced-a big “if”-it will certainly have cost far more than the presently projected amount. Unfortunately, that vast expenditure will have availed little or nothing in the provision of genuine national security, for an enemy can always choose to play a different game, foiling the best -laid NMD plans by firing a nuclear-armed cruise missile from a ship lying off New York, or by delivering a chemical or biological weapon of mass death tucked into a shipment of cocaine bound for Los Angeles, or by any number of other means immune to the missile defense system”.

    3. Establishing New Forms Of Arms Control

    Ever since the mid-1980s, scholars, government officials and military experts have admitted that the deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system will not facilitate the limitation and reduction of offensive forces. In fact, “if the adversary’s deployment of strategic defense is understood to reflect aggressive intentions, as it almost certainly would be” then nuclear states are likely “to be unable to pursue offensive limits or any other form of arms control.”[Italics mine] The planned deployment of space-based weapons, as proposed in, Vision For 2020, represents “aggressive intentions” by the U.S military to dominate space and earth for the purpose of achieving “war fighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict”[EXHIBIT 6].

    The entire U.S Congress must be concerned with establishing new forms of arms control. In this technologically driven environment, which operates behind the camouflage of what defense analysts have euphemistically termed a “revolution in military affairs” [RMA], the Pentagon’s official version of RMA disguises its true intent, which is to embark upon the militarization of space. It focuses on “information systems, sensors, new weapons concepts, much lighter and more deployable military vehicles, missile defenses, and other capabilities…Precision engagement conjures up images of very accurate and long-range firepower. Full dimensional protection suggests, among other things, highly effective missile defenses”. Throughout history, “military revolutions” have been driven by vast social and political changes. “Revolutions in military affairs” have marked war in the Western world since the 14th century. These revolutions are inevitable but difficult if not impossible to predict. In the context of NMD, new forms of arms control must be established in order to avoid a multiplicity of contradictory and conflicting paths, which are antithetical to America’s genuine security.

    America’s genuine security is intimately tied to international agreements such as the CTBT, the NPT, and the ABM Treaty. These agreements are obviously tied and connected to the expectations and stability of other nations. America’s international responsibilities and global power can never be reduced to military calculations, technological superiority, or economic dominance. Rather, America’s ultimate responsibilities can only be effectuated through political trust. Missile defense will destroy political trust. For example, “when the U.S and Japan pursue missile defenses, they do so out of the mentality of ‘fortress ourselves.’ That creates and intensifies distrust and tension among concerned nations that will in turn work as reasons for further arms races and will never be able to serve as forces for building stability”.

    4. Keeping the Nuremberg Principles Alive in the 21st Century

    The late 20th century revealed, in stark horror, the tragedy of genocide in Rwanda and Kosovo. Once again, the specter of “ethnic cleansing” had raised its head. Yet, crimes against humanity can take many forms. According to the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, such crimes must also contemplate “crimes against peace”. As Professor Richard Falk has noted: “The decision to prosecute German and Japanese leaders as war criminals after World War II, although flawed as a legal proceeding, represents an important step forward. It creates a precedent for the idea that leaders of governments and their subordinate officials are responsible for their acts and can be brought to account before an international tribunal. It affirms the reality of crimes against humanity and crimes against peace, as well as the more familiar crimes arising from violations of the laws of war.”

    Proposals for NMD contemplate the inclusion of a variety of offensive weapons capabilities that lend themselves to a hegemonic dominance of the globe, the reinforcement of regimes of exclusion, poverty-producing financial orders, and a deepening gulf between the haves and have-nots. Hence, the NMD scenario represents “imperial overreach”. In the 20th century, its origin may be traced to Wernher von Braun. As a technical leader in the Third Reich’s program of the militarization of space, he embarked upon embracing the goal of creating weapons of terror and mass destruction. His ideological heir, Edward Teller, brought the dream to America. As the father of the H-bomb, he laid the foundation for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan. However, Teller swept responsible science under the rug and led America into the fantasy of NMD, in pursuit of the most dangerous military program of all time.

    We, on this planet, can neither allow nor permit the slow undoing of treaty commitments embodied in the 1972-ABM Treaty, block the application of the Nuremberg Principles, or ignore the lessons contained in diplomatic history and the history of conflict resolution. Rather, it is our task as human beings to recognize and honor our common humanity. In recognizing our common humanity, we also recognize the dangers of pride and arrogance when coupled to power. The possession and exercise of power requires both wisdom and restraint. The production, deployment, and potential use of NMD and TMD reflect neither wisdom nor restraint. It is, therefore, incumbent upon us, in this generation, to advance a strategy of peace that emphasizes the value of inclusionary governance at the state and international level. For, in the final analysis, it is not the triumph of exclusionary forms of governance and decision making that will enhance the chances for peace but, rather, it is the achievement of inclusionary governance in all of our deliberations that makes peace and development possible and achievable for all people on this small planet.

    _____________________________________________________ Footnotes

    Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Bantam Books, c. 1971, pp. 83-84. Vision 2020 is available online at, www.spacecom.af.mil/usspace/visbook.pdf. Kevin Martin, Rachel Glick, Rachel Ries, Tim Nafziger, and Mark Swier, “The Real Rogues: Behind the Star Wars Missile Defense System”, Z-Magazine, September 2000, pp. 29-33. Rosy Nimroody, senior project director for, The Council on Economic Priorities, Star Wars: The Economic Fallout, Ballinger Publishing company, c. 1988, pp. 27 and 206. Center For Defense Information, National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?— a CDI Issue Brief, c. 2000, p. 1. John D. Steinbruner, “NMD and the Wistful Pursuit of Common Sense”, National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 2000, Volume VI, Issue #3, p.114. Heather A Purcell and James K. Galbraith, “Did the U.S. Military Plan a Nuclear First Strike for 1963?”, The American Prospect, Fall 1994, p.88. Id., p.96. John F. Kennedy, speech to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 25, 1961, “Let The Word Go Forth”: The Speeches, Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy, Selected and with an Introduction by Theodore C. Sorenson, Delcorte Press, p.380. John D. Steinbruner, “NMD and the Wistful Pursuit of Common Sense”, National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 2000, Volume VI, Issue 3, p.112. Thomas Graham Jr., Robert McNamara, and Jack Mendelsohn, “NATO-and Peace- Would Gain From a No-first-Use Policy”, Los Angeles Times, December 15, 1999, p. B-9. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S Nuclear Weapons Policy”, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), p. 41. Senator Tom Daschle, as quoted in, ” Ballistic Missile Defense: Shield or Sword?” by Carah Ong, Waging Peace: News letter of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Summer 2001, Vol. 11, No. 2, p 7. Richard Falk, Lee Meyrowitz, and Jack Sanderson, ” Nuclear Weapons and International Law,” The Indian Journal of International Law, Vol. 20, 1980. p. 595. “Legality of The threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” (advisory opinion of July 8, 1996), 35 ILM 809 & 1343 (1996) [ hereinafter, Opinion for UNGA ]; and “Legality of the use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict”, 1996 ICJ Rep. 66 (Advisory Opinion of July 8 ) [ hereinafter Opinion for WHO] Ved P. Nanda and David Krieger, Nuclear Weapons and the World Court, Transnational Publishers, Inc. c. 1998 Richard Falk, ” Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, No. 1, January 1997, p.64. Center For Defense Information, National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean? A CDI Issue Brief, c. 2000, p.20. Ibid., p 21. Richard Falk, “Nuclear Weapons, International Law and The World Court: A Historic Encounter”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 91, No. 1, January 1997, p. 65. Micheal O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare, Bookings Institution Press, c. 2000, p.7. Dennis M. Ward, ” The Changing Technological Environment”, Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics, edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffery A. Larsen, Westview Press, c. 2001, p. 80. Richard Falk, “Nuclear Weapons, International Law, and The World Court: A Historic Encounter”, American Journal Of International Law, Vol.91, No.1, January 1997, p. 65 Terrence E. Paupp, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace And Development In First And Third World Nations, Transnational Publishers, Inc. c. 2000, p. 101 Ibid., p. 76 George W. Bush, “New Leadership on National Security”, May 23 2000, as quoted in, Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defenses and The Future of World Politics, edited by, James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Westview Press, c. 2001, p. 331 Ibid, p.334 Center For Defense Information, National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?-A CDI Issue Brief, c.2000, p.36. Senator Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Delaware), as quoted in, “Democrats Plan Attack On Missile Defense”, Los Angeles Times, September 10, 2001. I Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 223, as quoted in, Telford Taylor, Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Bantam Books, c. 1971, p. 84. William D. Hartung, “Bush’s Nuclear Revival”, The Nation, March 12, 2001, p.4. Terrence E. Paupp, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace and Development in First and Third World Nations, Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2000. Nicolle Ball, Security and Economy in the Third World, Princeton University Press, c.1988, p.390. Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, editors, The Pivotal States: A New Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World, W.W. Norton & Company, c.1999, p. 425. Terrence E. Paupp, Achieving Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace and Development in First and Third World Nations, Transnational Publishers, Inc., c. 2000, pp.84-104. Tim Weiner, “Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin, and Congress”, The New York Times, August 18, 1993. Tim Weiner, “Military Is Accused of Lying on Arms for Decade”, The New York Times, June 28, 1993, p.A-8. Ernest A. Fitzgerald, The Pentagonists: An Insider’s View of Waste, Management, and Fraud in Defense Spending, Houghton Mifflin, 1989, p. 132. Robert Higgs, “The Cold War Is Over, But U.S Preparation Continues”, The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, Vol. VI, No.2, Fall 2001, p. 300. Charles L. Glaser, “Do We Want The Missile Defenses We Can Build?” The Star Wars Controversy: An International Security Reader, edited by Steven E. Miller and Stephan Van Evera, Princeton University Press, c. 1986, p.113. Michael O’Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future Of Warfare, Brookings Institution Press, c. 2000, p.19. Macgregor Knox, Williamson Murray, editors, The Dynamics of Military Revolution, Cambridge University Press, c. 2001; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton & Company, c. 2001; Michael O’Hanlon, “Alternative Architectures and U.S Politics”, Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics, James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, editors, Westview Press, c. 2001; Steven Lambakis, On The Edge of Earth: The Future of American Space Power, The University Press of Kentucky, c. 2001; Gordon R. Mitchell, Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy, Michigan State University Press, c. 2000; David Krieger and Carah Ong, editors, A Maginot Line In The Sky: International Perspectives On Ballistic Missile Defense, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, c. 2001. Samsung Lee, “Missile Defenses And The Korean Peninsulas”, A Maginot Line In The Sky: International Perspectives On Ballistic Missile Defense, David Krieger and Carah Ong, editors, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, c. 2001, p. 30. Richard Falk, “Keeping Nuremberg Alive”, International Law: A Contemporary Perspective, edited by Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Medlovitz, Westview Press, c.1985, p.494. Dennis Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War, Praeger, c.1995. William J. Broad, Teller’s War: The Top Secret Story Behind the Star Wars Deception, Simon & Schuster, c.1992.

    *Terrence Edward Paupp, J.D. is a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Policy Analyst; National Chancellor of the United States, for the International Association of Educators for World Peace (IAEWP); on the Advisory Board of, The Association of World Citizens; Professor of Politics and International Law, National University, San Diego, CA.

  • Welcoming the Disarmament Committee of the United Nations General Assembly

    Statement by Under-Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala, October 8, 2001

    I begin by congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, upon your election to guide the work of this Committee. Your distinguished career equips you well for the tasks ahead — a career that, in the disarmament area, features your prominent role in the historic 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as your chairmanship of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. I also congratulate the other members of the bureau and pledge the fullest support of the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) in all your efforts to make this a productive session.

    On 10 September 2001, the Secretary-General issued his annual Message on the eve of what was to be the International Day of Peace. He urged people everywhere to “try to imagine a world quite different from the one we know.” He called on everybody to “picture those who wage war laying down their arms and talking out their differences.” He stated that this “should be a day of global ceasefire and non-violence.” And he closed with these words of hope: “let us seize the opportunity for peace to take hold, day by day, year by year, until every day is a day of peace.”

    The next morning, only an hour before the Secretary-General was planning to ring the Peace Bell, thousands of citizens from dozens of countries perished in acts of unmitigated brutality that defy description. The challenge now facing this Committee, as it convenes in the shadow of this dark and ominous cloud, is to confront these new and old threats to international peace and security. At this critical juncture — when the peoples of the world stand together in repudiating mass terrorism — we must all work together to build upon this remarkable display of unity. This is a time for cooperation, for reaffirming the rule of law, for recognizing common threats, and for acknowledging the extent to which our common security depends upon justice, fundamental human rights, and equitable development for all societies. For this Committee, it is particularly a time for reinforcing the roads and bridges leading to the fulfilment of multilateral disarmament commitments, while exploring new paths to reach the same destinations. It is, in short, a time to resume the work of realizing the vision described in the Secretary-General’s Message on the International Day of Peace.

    Only history will decide how much of a defining moment 11 September will be. But history will certainly not absolve us for failing to learn the lessons of this unspeakable tragedy. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his address on 1 October to the General Assembly, stated “While the world was unable to prevent the 11 September attacks, there is much we can do to help prevent future terrorist acts carried out with weapons of mass destruction.” For us in the disarmament community he set out several guidelines for future actions that I hope delegations will consider carefully.

    Some specific initiatives that merit serious consideration include:

    · First, the need to expand the membership of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, while strengthening controls over nuclear facilities and the storage and transportation of nuclear materials.

    · Second, the need for new efforts to negotiate a convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism — the recent terrorist attacks should add new urgency to these efforts.

    · Third, the need for a global database — based on publicly available material — on acts, threatened acts, or suspected acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. The Department for Disarmament Affairs is in contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on many of these issues and is prepared, if so mandated, to establish such a database.

    Mr. Chairman, the starting point for the work of this Committee must be the sobering realization that last month’s tragedy could have been so much worse had nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons been used. The objective facts require that we be neither alarmist sowers of panic, nor complacent do-nothings. We do, however, have a duty to protect innocent citizens throughout the world by reinforcing the multilateral disarmament regime. Many of the deadliest super-weapons remain difficult to manufacture due to the unique characteristics of their weapons materials, improvements in methods of detecting the production or testing of such weapons, and technical problems in converting dangerous materials into effective, deliverable weapons. The world community must do all it can to raise these hurdles, while strengthening the fundamental norms against the possession or use of such weapons. The best way to accomplish this is through the active pursuit of a robust disarmament agenda. Of one thing we must be clear — in the disarmament area there is no going back to business as usual.

    The agenda of this Committee has always been challenging, yet the tasks ahead are more critical than ever. Many of these challenges, however, existed well before the tragic events of 11 September. At the conclusion of its 37th session in Geneva last July, the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters concluded that “there currently exists a crisis of multilateral disarmament diplomacy.”

    The symptoms of that crisis — while numerous earlier in the year — are now self-apparent even to casual observers. We are witnessing a weakening of the basic infrastructure of disarmament — one of the eight priority areas in the United Nations work programme. This state of affairs — if allowed to continue — will threaten the very sustainability of disarmament as a means of enhancing international peace and security.

    Disarmament is facing difficult times. There is no doubt that its future rests heavily upon a strong level of understanding and support in civil society. Yet today we see signs of private foundations and other funding agencies moving out of the field of disarmament or reducing their commitments to this goal. As funding grows scarce — a problem aggravated by the turbulent global financial markets — key groups in civil society are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their work on disarmament issues. In academia, we find all too few articles in serious scholarly journals on disarmament per se and very few new doctoral dissertations that deal directly with disarmament. We find the news media focusing on the glare of current conflicts rather than the typically slow and incremental process of eliminating the weapons used in such conflicts — or eliminating the weapons that could even destroy the world. These trends must be reversed, and at a minimum, more funding made available to non-governmental groups working in the field of disarmament.

    On an inter-state level, we find few governments with offices specifically devoted to disarmament issues, and New Zealand still has the distinction of having the only minister of disarmament. We see a flourishing global arms market — the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimates the total value of arms transfers from 1993 through 2000 at around $303 billion — and almost 70 percent of these arms were imported by developing countries. Meanwhile, global military expenditures are again on the rise — amounting last year to an estimated $800 billion. This growth in the arms trade and military spending contrasts with the terms of Article 26 of the Charter, which refer to the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources for armaments.

    At times it appears — certainly in terms of the United Nations budgetary procedures — that we are seeing instead the least diversion of resources for disarmament. It goes without saying that the smallest department in the United Nations is the Department for Disarmament Affairs, which is now seeking a modest increase in the 2002-2003 biennium budget that is before this session of the General Assembly. It is also not uncommon to read of financial problems and resource shortages in key treaty-based organizations like the IAEA and OPCW.

    Two of the classic diplomatic measures for advancing disarmament, non-proliferation, and anti-terrorism goals — export controls and sanctions — are now in dispute, based on claims that they are ineffective, discriminatory, or harmful to other global values. The utility and legitimacy of these mechanisms requires that these criticisms be addressed, with a view to reaching universally-agreed guidelines. The danger remains that without them, the world community would find itself confronted with a stark choice between ignoring gross violations of global disarmament and non-proliferation norms and having to defend such norms by force of arms.

    The treaties that constitute the global legal regime for disarmament are also seriously incomplete. None of the key treaties prescribing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction has universal membership, and un-documented allegations of non-compliance continue to be heard among the States parties, eroding confidence in the various treaty regimes. Many important treaties have still not entered into force, including START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), whose members will soon meet in New York to consider ways of accelerating the ratification process. With respect to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), many years of efforts to conclude a protocol to strengthen this key treaty have ended abruptly. The treaty’s next five-year Review Conference, scheduled to convene next month in Geneva, provides an opportunity to revisit this issue. It must not be missed.

    With regard to the NPT, while it is still too early to predict the fate of the “thirteen steps” to nuclear disarmament agreed at the NPT 2000 Review Conference, it is fair to say that delegates attending next year’s first Preparatory Committee meeting for the treaty’s 2005 Review Conference will certainly expect hard evidence of a good faith effort to implement each of these important goals.

    The elimination of landmines is another very important international disarmament activity, given that they continue to impede the development and security of populations in almost one third of the world’s countries. Last month, I attended the third annual meeting of the States parties to the Mine Ban Convention in Managua, Nicaragua, convened by the United Nations pursuant to Resolution 55/33 V. Despite the uncertainties of air travel at the time, the event was marked both by an impressive attendance of more than 90 states and by positive results that augur well for the future implementation of this convention. The second annual conference of States parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) will take place later this year. It will consider several proposals addressing the scope of the convention, compliance issues, small calibre weapons and ammunition, anti-vehicle mines, and the problem of explosive remnants of war. The Secretary-General is committed to fulfilling his responsibilities as Depositary to both of these important legal instruments.

    The global legal regime is particularly underdeveloped in the fields of conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons, preventing an arms race in outer space, and missiles and other delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction. Some of these problems, however, have been getting increased attention in recent years. General Assembly Resolution 55/33 A has asked the Secretary-General to prepare a report, with the assistance of a panel of governmental experts, on the issue of missiles in all its aspects, and to submit this report to the General Assembly at its 57th session. China has introduced in the Conference on Disarmament a proposal for a treaty banning the deployment of weapons in space. The Programme of Action successfully adopted at the July 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects provides a blueprint for international cooperation that may eventually lead to binding international norms. A question remains: will the events of 11 September encourage States to consider once again the need to prohibit the transfer of military-grade small arms and light weapons to non-state actors?

    The chronic deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament — the world’s single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — is another serious problem that demands an urgent solution, one that will be found only in the political will of Member States to begin negotiations. Perhaps the new spirit of cooperation that has been re-kindled by the events of 11 September will help to breathe new life into this vitally important international institution.

    Taken alone, any one of these obstacles would be a cause for concern, but taken together, they suggest that disarmament is facing a very difficult road ahead. The crisis that disarmament is facing in multilateral diplomacy may reflect a deeper crisis of the nation-state system as it copes with the new forces of globalization. Large-scale terrorist events, and the possession or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are only two of a growing list of twenty-first century problems that are straining the capacities of political institutions that were developed in other historical contexts, while casting new doubts on the utility of attempting to solve such problems through the exercise of military might. As highlighted in the Millennium Declaration, the Road Map to implement that declaration, and the Secretary-General’s recent report on the work of the organization, the United Nations offers indispensable tools to address precisely such twenty-first century problems.

    Despite the difficult challenges ahead for international peace and security, disarmament remains an attractive alternative to both deterrence and military defensive measures as responses to these challenges. One of the most important contributions of the United Nations in this field comes in the gathering and dissemination of information about worldwide progress in achieving important arms limitation and disarmament goals. On behalf of Member States, the DDA maintains the Register of Conventional Arms, which keeps track of the production and trade of seven categories of major weapons systems. This year more than a hundred governments made submissions to the Register, the highest level of participation since the Register was created nine years ago.

    More Member States are also using the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures — this year, nearly 60 have reported data using this instrument, almost double the average number from previous years. Last July, the States attending the United Nations Small Arms Conference assigned the DDA the responsibility of collating and circulating data on the implementation of the Programme of Action agreed at that conference. DDA’s role as the coordination centre in the Secretariat of all United Nations activities in the field of small arms was specifically welcomed in UNGA Resolution 55/33 F.

    As requested by the General Assembly, DDA is also working with a group of outside experts to prepare a study on disarmament and non-proliferation education that the Secretary-General will submit to the General Assembly at its 57th session. These experts have met twice this year and are making progress in identifying constructive initiatives at the primary, secondary, university and postgraduate levels of education, in all regions of the world. Through its many symposia, newsletters, databases, monographs, films, posters, brochures, lectures to student groups, intern and fellowship programmes, a regularly-updated web site, and its new 454-page annual United Nations Disarmament Yearbook — DDA is giving its educational responsibilities every bit of attention they deserve, despite the heavy strain on its limited resources.

    I would like to take this occasion to invite all members of this Committee to attend a special symposium on “Terrorism and Disarmament” that the DDA will host on the afternoon of 25 October, involving experts from the IAEA, the OPCW, and other institutions. This timely event will examine the specific contributions that disarmament can make in addressing global terrorist threats.

    Mr. Chairman, this Committee faces the difficult task of moving beyond the tears, the grief, and the anger from 11 September — and from all acts of terrorism in all countries — to the re-establishment of a just and stable foundation for international peace and security. The Committee must adhere to its long-standing priorities — it must keep its focus on discovering the ways and means of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. As the Secretary-General stated in his message last month to the General Conference of the IAEA, “Making progress in the areas of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is more important than ever in the aftermath of last week’s appalling terrorist attack on the United States.” Though all terrorism is tragic and unacceptable, the United Nations must place its highest priority on eliminating threats that potentially affect the greatest number of people — threats to international peace and security — threats, in short, that arise from weapons of mass destruction.

    The Committee has before it many resolutions that point the way ahead in achieving this basic aim. As it considers these resolutions, Member States may also wish to consider in their deliberations some broader questions that concern the disarmament machinery of the United Nations. Recent events, combined with the current crisis in multilateral disarmament diplomacy, may also suggest that the time has come to re-visit the proposal to convene a Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament.

    There is one question, however, that surely does not belong on this agenda, and that is the question of whether the primary focus of this Committee should change from “disarmament” to merely the regulation or limitation of arms. There is of course an important need for efforts on both fronts. When it comes to weapons of mass destruction, there is no question that the world would be far better off pursuing the total and verifiable elimination of such weapons than in perpetuating the fantasy that their possession can be permanently limited to an assortment of exclusive, but by no means leak-proof clubs. By contrast, controls over conventional weapons are in general better pursued by transparent regulatory approaches that limit the numbers or characteristics of agreed weapons systems — approaches that are consistent with the inherent right of self defence in Article 51 of the Charter. Together, both approaches complement each other well in serving the common interest of international peace and security

    Much ground has already been tilled. In their Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the States parties reaffirmed their common conviction that “the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons” — and that includes a terrorist use of a nuclear weapon. Given the consequences of even a single use of a nuclear weapon, is international peace and security best preserved by partial or conditional guarantees, or by an absolute guarantee? The same question also applies to other weapons of mass destruction.

    It is not at all unrealistic or inappropriate for this Committee to keep its focus on the search for absolute guarantees, and the more it searches, the more it will return to disarmament — not regulation — as the solution for weapons of mass destruction. In addressing such weapons, the Committee should explore ways of bringing disarmament to the world, or of bringing the world to disarmament, but disarmament must be done. As members of this committee, ask not for whom the Peace Bell tolls. It tolls for you.