Tag: testing

  • Missile Launching in the Dark

    This article was originally published by Truthout.

    David KriegerIn the early morning hours of December 17, under cover of darkness, the Air Force launched a Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base. It was a test of a nuclear-capable missile. Despite the claims of the Air Force, such tests do not make us safer or more secure — only more terrifying to others, and when it comes to nuclear weapons we should be terrifying ourselves. These are weapons that could destroy civilization, and yet we have the hubris to play Russian roulette with them and continue to do so more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War.

    As General Lee Butler, former commander of the US Strategic Command, said, “Nuclear deterrence was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence and fragile human relationships.” We would do well to pay attention to General Butler and get on with the hard and urgent work of negotiating to achieve Nuclear Zero globally, as we are required to do under international law.

    Following the test launch, Lt. Colonel Thomas Vance said, “The test launch is one demonstration of the professionalism and pride all members of Team Malmstrom take in executing our mission.”

    The Air Force seems excessively proud of its ability to have “successfully launched” the nuclear-capable Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile. Is it pride in their ability to obey orders and carry out a mission fully capable of ending civilization should they be called upon to launch nuclear-armed Minuteman III missiles? The Air Force views its test launches as providing “data to ensure a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent.” But neither the Air Force nor anyone in authority can assure that nuclear deterrence will be safe, secure or effective.

    Nuclear deterrence itself only provides a hypothesis about human behavior, the hypothesis being that if one threatens to totally destroy another, the other country will refrain from attacking. This hypothesis requires, at a minimum, rational political leaders, and not all political leaders behave rationally at all times and under all circumstances.

    Test launches of ICBMs do not make nuclear weapons safe, secure or effective. The capability to conduct murderous retaliation does not make us safe, should not make us feel secure, and is not effective in protecting us. Rather than protecting Americans, the Air Force is conducting test launches that are provocative, encourage nuclear proliferation and call into question the seriousness of the United States to fulfill its obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

  • Fueling the Fire in North Korea

    Santa Barbara, CA – While tensions appear to have eased between North Korea and the U.S. in the past few weeks, the U.S.- North Korean nuclear crisis is not over. Any overt action by either country could easily reignite an already volatile and dangerous situation.

    It is in this context that later this month, on May 21, the U.S. plans to launch a Minuteman III Intercontinental Ballistic Missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California to the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, 4,200 miles away. The test was originally scheduled for early April, at the height of the current U.S.-North Korea nuclear crisis. At that time, U.S. officials postponed the test, stating they did not want to provoke a response from North Korea.

    So one must ask, has anything truly changed between North Korea and the U.S. since early April? Is a missile launch really any less provocative now than it was then? The answer is clearly that missile testing remains provocative. The posturing and exchanges that the world has been witnessing are capable of spiraling out of control and resulting in nuclear war today, just as they were a month ago.

    David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, said, “The testing of a Minuteman III nuclear missile at this time is a clear example of U.S. double standards. The government believes that it is fine for the U.S. to test-fire these missiles when we choose to do so, while expressing criticism when other countries conduct missile tests. Clearly U.S. leaders would be highly critical if North Korea were to conduct a long-range missile test, now or at any time. We seem to have a blind spot in our thinking about our own tests. Such double standards encourage nuclear proliferation and make the world a more dangerous place.”

    One must also consider that each missile test is a clear reminder of the United States’ continued reliance on nuclear weapons in spite of proclamations by the Obama administration of the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. Nor should one overlook the tens of millions of dollars spent on each missile test at a time when the U.S. economic recovery is still weighing in the balance.

    Clearly this upcoming long-range missile test is more than just a test. It is a provocative move in a nuclear war game. A game where there is no winner.
    #  #  #

    For further comment, contact Rick Wayman, Director of Programs of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, at rwayman@napf.org or (805) 965-3443. Outside of regular office hours, please contact Rick Wayman at (805) 696-5159.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation — The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s mission is to educate and advocate for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons and to empower peace leaders.  Founded in 1982, the Foundation is comprised of individuals and organizations worldwide who realize the imperative for peace in the Nuclear Age. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit organization with consultative status to the United Nations.  For more information, visitwww.wagingpeace.org

  • The Nuclear Policy of the Bush Administration

    The euphoria in the West that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union had an amazing effect. The general public came to believe that the end of the Cold War also meant the end of the nuclear peril, and that the nuclear issue can be taken off the agenda of important problems.

    This is seen in a public opinion poll in the UK, in which the question was: what is the most important issue facing Britain. During the Cold War, more than 40 per cent put nuclear weapons as such an issue. Since the end of it, the percentage dropped rapidly, and nowadays it is practically zero. The situation is probably the same in the United States, and it is my opinion that this enabled the hawks to become bolder in their plans, not only to ensure, but to demonstrate to the rest of the world, the overwhelming superiority of the United States. The events of September 11th came as a convenient excuse to put these plans into action.

    The year 2002 was remarkable for the formulation of new policies, starting with the Nuclear Posture Review in January, and ending with the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, released in December.

    This last document starts with: ‘Weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.’

    And this is the crux of the matter. According to the current counter-proliferation policy, nuclear weapons are bad, but only if in possession of some states or groups. In the possession of the United States they are good, and must be kept for the sake of world security.

    The fact that as a signatory of the NPT, the USA is legally bound to their elimination, is completely ignored. Indeed, nuclear arsenals will have to be retained indefinitely, not just as a weapon of last resort, or as a deterrent against a nuclear attack, but as an ordinary tool in the military armoury, to be used in the resolution of conflicts, as has been practiced in the past, and even in pre-emptive strikes, should political contingencies demand it.

    This is in essence the current US nuclear policy, and I see it as a very dangerous policy.

    Towards its implementation, President Bush has already authorized the development of a new nuclear warhead of low yield, but with a shape that would give it a very high penetrating power into concrete, a ‘bunker-busting mini-nuke’, as it has been named. It is intended to destroy bunkers with thick concrete walls in which public enemies, like Saddam Hussein, may seek shelter.

    To give the military authorities confidence in the performance of the new weapon it will have to be tested.

    If the USA resumed testing, this would be a signal to other nuclear weapon states to do the same. China is almost certain to resume testing. After the US decision to develop ballistic missile defences, China feels vulnerable, and is likely to attempt to reduce its vulnerability by a modernization and build-up of its nuclear arsenal. Other states with nuclear weapons, such as India or Pakistan, may use the window of opportunity opened by the USA to update their arsenals. The danger of a new nuclear arms race is real.

    As mentioned before, the new policy includes pre-emptive acts, and this greatly increases the danger. If the militarily mightiest country declares its readiness to carry out a pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, others may soon follow. The Kashmir crisis, of May last year, is a stark warning of the reality of the nuclear peril.

    India’s declared policy is not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But if the United States – whose nuclear policies are largely followed by India – makes pre-emptive nuclear attacks part of its doctrine, this would give India the legitimacy to carry out a pre- emptive strike against Pakistan. Even more likely is that Pakistan would carry this out first.

    Taiwan presents another potential cause for a pre- emptive nuclear strike by the United States. Should the Taiwan authorities decide to declare independence, this would inevitably result in an attempted military invasion by mainland China. The USA, which is committed to the defence of the integrity of Taiwan, may then opt for a pre-emptive strike.

    Finally, we have the problem of North Korea, listed by Bush as one of the ‘axis of evil.’ The disclosure that North Korea is already in possession of two nuclear warheads, and the likelihood of its acquiring more of them if the Yongbyon facility is reactivated, are a direct challenge to current US policy. I fear that a campaign to use military force against the regime of Kim Jong Il, similar to that against Saddam Hussein, will ensue.

    How can we prevent such catastrophes? The traditional method of dealing with such situations – by partial agreements, damage-limitation treaties, confidence- building measures – does not seem to work any more. In its determination to maintain world dominance, particularly on the nuclear issue, the present administration will pay no attention to reasoned and sophisticated arguments. Arms control is as good as dead.

    As I see it, the only way is to go back to basics, to put the goal of total nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. The only way to compel the current decision- makers to change their minds is by pressure of public opinion. For this purpose, the public must be awakened to the danger. The general public is not sufficiently informed about the recent changes in military doctrine, and the perils arising from them. We have to convince the public that the continuation of current policies, in which security of the world is maintained by the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, is not realistic in the long run because it is bound eventually to result in a nuclear holocaust in which the future of the human race would be at stake. We must convince public opinion that the only alternative is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Sir Joseph Rotblat, the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate, is an member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Advisory Council.

  • Failure of the US Senate to Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    In voting down the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the U.S. Senate acted with irresponsible disregard for the security of the American people and the people of the world. It is an act unbecoming of a great nation. The Senate sent a message to the more than 185 countries that have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that the United States is not prepared to lead the global effort for non-proliferation nor to keep its promises to the international community. I urge the American people to send a strong message of disapproval to the Senators who voted against this treaty, and demand that the United States resume a leadership role in supporting the CTBT and preventing further nuclear tests by any country at any time and at any place.

    The American people should take heart that the Treaty is not dead, and this setback should be viewed as temporary — until they have made their voices reverberate in the halls of the Senate.

    List of Senators and How They Voted on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty October 13, 1999 (Rollcall Vote No. 325 Ex.)

    YEAS–48 * Akaka (D-HI) * Baucus (D-MT) * Bayh (D-IN) * Biden (D-DE) * Bingaman (D-NM) * Boxer (D-CA) * Breaux (D-LA) * Bryan (D-NV) * Chafee (R-RI) * Cleland (D-GA) * Conrad (D-ND) * Daschle (D-SD) * Dodd (D-CT) * Dorgan (D-ND) * Durbin (D-IL) * Edwards (D-NC) * Feingold (D-WI) * Feinstein (D-CA) * Graham (D-FL) * Harkin (D-IA) * Hollings (D-SC) * Inouye (D-HI) * Jeffords (R-VT) * Johnson (D-SD) * Kennedy (D-MA) * Kerrey (D-NE) * Kerry (D-MA) * Kohl (D-WI) * Landrieu (D-LA) * Lautenberg (D-NJ) * Leahy (D-VT) * Levin (D-MI) * Lieberman (D-CT) * Lincoln (D-AR) * Mikulski (D-MD) * Moynihan (D-NY) * Murray (D-WA) * Reed (D-RI) * Reid (D-NV) * Robb (D-VA) * Rockefeller (D-WV) * Sarbanes (D-MD) * Schumer (D-NY) * Smith (R-OR) * Specter (R-PA) * Torricelli (D-NJ) * Wellstone (D-MN) * Wyden (D-OR)

    NAYS–51 * Abraham (R-MI) * Allard (R-CO) * Ashcroft (R-MO) * Bennett (R-UT) * Bond (R-MO) * Brownback (R-KS) * Bunning (R-KY) * Burns (R-MT) * Campbell (R-CO) * Cochran (R-MS) * Collins (R-ME) * Coverdell (R-GA) * Craig (R-ID) * Crapo (R-ID) * DeWine (R-OH) * Domenici (R-NM) * Enzi (R-WY) * Fitzgerald (R-IL) * Frist (R-TN) * Gorton (R-WA) * Gramm (R-TX) * Grams (R-MN) * Grassley (R-IA) * Gregg (R-NH) * Hagel (R-NE) * Hatch (R-UT) * Helms (R-NC) * Hutchinson (R-TX) * Hutchison (R-AR) * Inhofe (R-OK) * Kyl (R-AZ) * Lott (R-MS) * Lugar (R-IN) * Mack (R-FL) * McCain (R-AZ) * McConnell (R-KY) * Murkowski (R-AK) * Nickles (R-OK) * Roberts (R-KS) * Roth (R-DE) * Santorum (R-PA) * Sessions (R-AL) * Shelby (R-AL) * Smith (D-NH) * Snowe (R-ME) * Stevens (R-AK) * Thomas (R-WY) * Thompson (R-TN) * Thurmond (R-SC) * Voinovich (R-OH) * Warner (R-VA)

    ANSWERED `PRESENT’–1 * Byrd (D-WV)

     

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    PRESS RELEASE – THE WHITE HOUSE

    Office of the Press Secretary

    For Immediate Release October 13, 1999

    STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

    Outside Oval Office

    8:37 P.M. EDT

    THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. I am very disappointed that the United States Senate voted not to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This agreement is critical to protecting the American people from the dangers of nuclear war. It is, therefore, well worth fighting for. And I assure you, the fight is far from over.

    I want to say to our citizens, and to people all around the world, that the United States will stay true to our tradition of global leadership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

    The Senate has taken us on a detour. But America eventually always returns to the main road, and we will do so again. When all is said and done, the United States will ratify the test ban treaty.

    Opponents of the treaty have offered no alternative, no other means of keeping countries around the world from developing nuclear arsenals and threatening our security. So we have to press on and do the right thing for our children’s future. We will press on to strengthen the worldwide consensus in favor of the treaty.

    The United States will continue, under my presidency, the policy we have observed since 1992 of not conducting nuclear tests. Russia, China, Britain and France have joined us in this moratorium. Britain and France have done the sensible thing and ratified this treaty. I hope not only they, but also Russia, China, will all, along with other countries, continue to refrain from nuclear testing.

    I also encourage strongly countries that have not yet signed or ratified this treaty to do so. And I will continue to press the case that this treaty is in the interest of the American people.

    The test ban treaty will restrict the development of nuclear weapons worldwide at a time when America has an overwhelming military and technological advantage. It will give us the tools to strengthen our security, including the global network of sensors to detect nuclear tests, the opportunity to demand on-site inspections, and the means to mobilize the world against potential violators. All these things, the Republican majority in the Senate would gladly give away.

    The senators who voted against the treaty did more than disregard these benefits. They turned aside the best advice — let me say this again — they turned aside the best advice of our top military leaders, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and four of his predecessors. They ignored the conclusion of 32 Nobel Prize winners in physics, and many other leading scientists, including the heads of our nuclear laboratories, that we can maintain a strong nuclear force without testing.

    They clearly disregarded the views of the American people who have consistently and strongly supported this treaty ever since it was first pursued by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. The American people do not want to see unnecessary nuclear tests here or anywhere around the world.

    I know that some Senate Republicans favored this treaty. I know others had honest questions, but simply didn’t have enough time for thorough answers. I know that many would have supported this treaty had they been free to vote their conscience, and if they had been able to do what we always do with such treaties, which is to add certain safeguards, certain understandings that protect America’s interest and make clear the meaning of the words.

    Unfortunately, the Senate majority made sure that no such safeguards could be appended. Many who had questions about the treaty worked hard to postpone the vote because they knew a defeat would be damaging to America’s interest and to our role in leading the world away from nonproliferation. But for others, we all know that foreign policy, national security policy has become just like every domestic issue — politics, pure and simple.

    For two years, the opponents of this treaty in the Senate refused to hold a single hearing. Then they offered a take-or-leave-it deal: to decide this crucial security issue in a week, with just three days of hearings and 24 hours of debate. They rejected my request to delay the vote and permit a serious process so that all the questions could be evaluated. Even worse, many Republican senators apparently committed to oppose this treaty before there was an agreement to bring it up, before they ever heard a single witness or understood the issues.

    Never before has a serious treaty involving nuclear weapons been handled in such a reckless and ultimately partisan way.

    The Senate has a solemn responsibility under our Constitution to advise and consent in matters involving treaties. The Senate has simply not fulfilled that responsibility here. This issue should be beyond politics, because the stakes are so high. We have a fundamental responsibility to do everything we can to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and the chance of nuclear war. We must decide whether we’re going to meet it.

    Will we ratify an agreement that can keep Russia and China from testing and developing new, more sophisticated advanced weapons? An agreement that could help constrain nuclear weapons programs in India, Pakistan, and elsewhere, at a time of tremendous volatility, especially on the Indian sub-continent? For now, the Senate has said, no.

    But I am sending a different message. We want to limit the nuclear threat. We want to bring the test ban treaty into force.

    I am profoundly grateful to the Senate proponents of this treaty, including the brave Republicans who stood with us, for their determination and their leadership. I am grateful to all those advocates for arms control and national security, and all the religious leaders who have joined us in this struggle.

    The test ban treaty is strongly in America’s interest. It is still on the Senate calendar. It will not go away. It must not go away. I believe that if we have a fair and thorough hearing process, the overwhelming majority of the American people will still agree with us that this treaty is in our interest. I believe in the wisdom of the American people, and I am confident that in the end, it will prevail.

    Q Mr. President, when you say the fight is far from over, sir, do you mean that you expect this treaty to be brought up again during your term in office?

    THE PRESIDENT: I mean, I think that — we could have had a regular hearing process in which the serious issues that need to be discussed would have been discussed, and in which, as the Senate leaders both agreed yesterday when they thought there was an agreement and they shook hands on an agreement, would have resulted in next year being devoted to considering the treaty, dealing with its merits, and then, barring extraordinary circumstances, would have put off a vote until the following year.

    By their actions today the Republican majority has said they want us to continue to discuss and debate this. They weren’t interested in the safeguards; they weren’t interested in a serious debate; they weren’t interested in a serious process. So they could have put this on a track to be considered in an appropriate way, which I strongly supported. They decided otherwise.

    And we, therefore, have to make it clear — those of us who agree — that it is crazy for America to walk away from Britain and France, 11 of our NATO allies, the heads of our nuclear labs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 32 Nobel laureates, and the whole world, having depended on us for all these decades, to lead the fight for nonproliferation. Therefore, we have to keep this issue alive and continue to argue it in the strongest and most forceful terms.

    I wish we could have had a responsible alternative. I worked until the 11th hour to achieve it. This was a political deal. And I hope it will get the treatment from the American people it richly deserves.

    Thank you.

    END 8:47 P.M. EDT

    And one last word from a contemporary Peace Hero:

    “Hope is the engine that drives human endeavor. It generates the energy needed to achieve the difficult goals that lie ahead. Never lose faith that the dreams of today for a more lawful world can become the reality of tomorrow. Never stop trying to make this a more humane universe.”- Benjamin Ferencz

  • Denuclearization of the Oceans: Linking Our Common Heritage with Our Common Future

    Introduction

    The oceans were nuclearized shortly after the era of nuclear weapons began in 1945. On July 1, 1946, while still negotiating the internationalization of atomic energy at the United Nations, the United States began testing nuclear weapons at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. Nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific continued through January 1996, when French President Jacques Chirac announced an end to French testing in the region.

    In the 1950s, the United States again led the way in nuclearizing the oceans with the launching of a nuclear powered submarine, the Nautilus. The Nautilus and other nuclear submarines could stay submerged for long periods of time without refueling and cruise throughout the world. During the Cold War the U.S., former USSR, UK, France, and China developed nuclear submarine fleets carrying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Some of these nuclear powered submarines with their multiple-independently-targeted nuclear warheads were and remain capable of single-handedly attacking and destroying more than one hundred major cities. These shadowy creatures of mankind’s darkest inventiveness remain silently on alert in the depths of the world’s oceans, presumably ready and capable, upon command, of destroying the Earth.

    Our oceans are a precious resource to be shared by all humanity and preserved for future generations. It carries the concept of “freedom of the seas” to absurd lengths to allow those nations with the technological capacity to destroy the Earth to use the world’s oceans in so callous a manner.

    Accidents aboard nuclear submarines have caused a number of them to sink with long-term adverse environmental consequences for the oceans. In addition to accidents, many countries have purposefully dumped radioactive wastes in the oceans.

    With regard to proper stewardship of the planet, it is time to raise the issue of denuclearizing the world’s oceans. To fail to raise the issue and to achieve the denuclearization of the oceans is to abdicate our responsibility for the health and well-being of the oceans and the planet.

    Nuclearization of the Oceans

    Nuclearization of the oceans has taken a variety of forms. The primary ones are:

    1. the oceans have served as a medium for hiding nuclear deterrent forces located on submarines;

    2. nuclear reactors have been used to power ships, primarily submarines, some of which have gone down at sea with their nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons aboard;

    3. increasing use is being made of the oceans for the transportation of nuclear wastes and reprocessed nuclear fuels;

    4. the oceans have been used as a dumping ground for nuclear wastes;

    5. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, particularly in the Pacific, has been a source of nuclear pollution to the oceans as well as the land; and

    6. underground nuclear weapons testing, such as that conducted by France in the South Pacific, has endangered fragile Pacific atolls and caused actual nuclear contamination to the oceans as well as risking a much greater contamination should the atolls crack due to testing or future geological activity.

    The problems arising from nuclearization of the oceans can be viewed from several perspectives.

    From an environmental perspective, issues arise with regard to nuclear contamination in the oceans working its way up through the food chain. The biological resources of the oceans will eventually affect human populations which are reliant upon these resources.

    The threat of nuclear contamination has diminished with regard to nuclear testing, which has not taken place in the atmosphere since 1980. Moreover, the nuclear weapons states have committed themselves to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which they have promised to conclude by 1996. This treaty, if concluded, will end all underground nuclear testing.

    The dumping of high-level radioactive waste material was curtailed by the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, which entered into force in 1975. A later amendment to this Convention prohibited ocean dumping of all radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter. However, exemptions authorized by the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-compliance remain a concern. Problems can be anticipated in the future when radioactive contaminants already dumped in canisters or contained in fuel or weapons aboard sunken submarines breach their containment.

    Increased use of the oceans to transport nuclear wastes and reprocessed nuclear fuel (between Japan and France, for example) has substantially increased the risk of contamination. Coastal and island states that are on the route of the transportation of nuclear materials stand high risks of contamination in the event of an accident at sea. International law regarding the transportation of hazardous material must be strengthened and strictly enforced by the international community to prevent catastrophic accidents in the future.

    From a human rights perspective, inhabitants of island states in the Pacific have suffered serious health effects and dislocation as a result of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons testing. In response to assurances by France that their underground testing in the South Pacific is entirely safe, the islanders in Polynesia and throughout the Pacific have retorted: If it is so safe, why isn’t it being done in France itself? The response of the French government has been that French Polynesia is French territory, highlighting the arrogance and abuse that accompanies colonialism.

    Human rights issues also arise with regard to maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that threatens the annihilation of much of humanity. The Human Rights Committee stated in November 1984 in their general comments on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, i.e., the right to life, that “the production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity.” The deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines, therefore, arguably constitutes a crime against humanity, and thus a violation of the most fundamental human right, the right to life.

    From a security perspective, the nuclear weapons states argue that having a submarine-based deterrent force assures their security. Thus, to varying degrees, each of the nuclear weapons states maintains strategic submarines capable of causing unthinkable destruction if their missiles were ever launched. (See Appendix.) Viewed from the self-interests of nearly all the world’s population-except the nuclear weapons states whose leaders appear addicted to maintaining their nuclear arsenals -the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, at sea or on land, poses a frightening threat to continued human existence.

    In 1972 the Seabed Agreement prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed, ocean floor, or subsoil thereof. This agreement prohibited what was already deemed unnecessary by the nuclear weapons states; placing nuclear weapons on submarines made them less vulnerable to detection and destruction than placing them on or beneath the seabed or ocean floor. The oceans continue to be used by the nuclear weapons states as an underwater shadow world for their missile carrying submarines.

    The United States alone currently has 16 Trident submarines, each carrying some 100 independently targeted nuclear warheads. Each Trident submarine has a total explosive force greater than all the explosive force used in World War II, including at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Britain, with the help of the United States, is replacing its older class of Polaris SSBNs with a fleet of four Trident submarines. France currently has five strategic missile submarines with four more of a superior class to be commissioned by 2005. Russia has over 35 strategic missile submarines with an estimated capacity of 2,350 nuclear warheads. China has two modern ballistic missile submarines. Its Xia class submarine carries twelve 200 kiloton nuclear warheads.

    The total destructive force that day and night lurks beneath the oceans is a chilling reminder of our technological capacity to destroy ourselves. That this threat was created and is maintained in the name of national security suggests a collective madness that must be opposed and overcome if, for no other reason, we are to fulfill our obligation to posterity to preserve human life.

    An ongoing responsibility resides with the nuclear weapons states to fulfill the obligations set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in April and May 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely after extensive lobbying by the nuclear weapons states. At the same time the nuclear weapons states promised to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996, and to engage in a “determined pursuit” of the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

    Protecting the Common Heritage

    The Law of the Sea Treaty enshrines the concept of the oceans as the common heritage of [hu]mankind. Maintaining the oceans as a common heritage demands that the oceans be protected from contamination by nuclear pollutants; that they not be used in a manner to undermine basic human rights, particularly the rights to life and to a healthy environment; and that the oceans not be allowed to serve as a public preserve for those states that believe their own security interests demand the endangerment of global human survival.

    It is unreasonable to allow our common heritage to be used to threaten our common future. Deterrence is an unproven and unstable concept that is being tested on humanity by a small number of powerful and arrogant states that have turned nuclear technology to its ultimate destructive end. In order to link the common heritage with our common future, the large majority of the world’s nations advocating an end to the threat of nuclear annihilation should seek to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention by the year 2000 that eliminates all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework. The prohibition and conversion of strategic ballistic missile submarines must be part of this accord. Perhaps this will be the final step in achieving a nuclear weapons free world.

    Life began in the oceans and eventually migrated to land. We must not allow the oceans to continue to provide a secure hiding place for nuclear forces capable of causing irreparable damage to all life. This is an inescapable responsibility of accepting the proposition that life itself, like the oceans, is a common heritage that must be protected for future generations.

     

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    APPENDIX: NUCLEAR POWER AT SEA*

    A. Nuclear Weapons

    UNITED STATES

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 16 Building: 2

    Trident: 16 + 2

    There are presently 16 Trident submarines in operation, eight at Sub-Base Bangor and eight at Sub-Base Kings Bay. The schedule is to complete one submarine per year for a total of 18 with the final one becoming operational in 1997.

    In September 1994 it was announced in the Pentagon’s “Nuclear Posture Review” that the Trident force would be cut from 18 to 14. The submarines to be retired are still under review but are believed to be the four oldest in the fleet. They will be preserved, however, in mothballs until the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II Treaty is fully implemented in 2003.

    These submarines carry 24 missiles each. The submarines are armed with Trident-1 missiles (C-4) and the Trident-2 (D-5). In 1991 all strategic cruise missiles (Tomahawks) were removed from surface ships and submarines.

    The C-4 can carry up to eight 100 kiloton Mark-4/W-76 Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). There are currently 192 Trident-1 missiles deployed in eight Trident submarines based at Bangor, Washington with a total of 1,152 Mk-4 warheads. Four of these submarines are to be deactivated and the remaining four are to be converted to carry Trident-2 missiles. Plans are to then base seven of the 14 submarines on each coast.

    The D-4 can carry up to 12 MIRV with Mark-4/W-76 100-kT warheads, or Mark-5/W-88 300-475-kT warheads each. Under START counting rules, a limit of 8 reentry vehicles (RV) was set, but this may be further reduced to four or five if START II is implemented. About 400 Mk-5/W-88 warheads for the Trident-2 missiles were produced before they were canceled because of production and safety reasons. Two new Trident subs fitted with D-4 missiles will be delivered by 1997.

    Under the START Treaties, warheads that are reduced do not have to be destroyed. According to the Nuclear Posture Review the current plan is to remove three or four warheads per missile from Trident Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to meet the START II ceiling of 1,750 SLBM warheads. Plans are to reduce the C-4 to 1,280 warheads and the D-4 to 400. These warheads will be kept in storage and if it is determined that the SLBMs need to be uploaded, the Pentagon can reuse them.

    RUSSIA

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 39 Building: 0

    The Russian navy is divided into four fleets: the Baltic, Northern, Black Sea and the Pacific. In the Northern and the Pacific fleets, the primary issue is of what to do with the estimated 85 retired nuclear submarines. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it is believed that over half of their nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet has been withdrawn from operational service. These ships are currently moored at various bases with their reactors still on board. The number is growing faster than the money available to remove and store the fuel elements and decontaminate the reactor compartments. Since 1991, there has been a lack of funds to operate the fleet. Consequently, few of the submarines listed as active have actually been at sea.

    In response to President Bush’s September 27, 1991 decision to remove tactical nuclear missiles from ships, President Gorbachev announced that six SSBNs with 92 SLBMs (presumably five Yankee Is and a single Yankee II) were to be removed from operational forces. Russian Fleet Commander Adm. Oleg Yerofeev reports that as of October 20, 1991 all tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the Northern and Pacific fleet ships and submarines.

    The January-February, 1993 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reports that Russia intends to stop building submarines in its Pacific yards within the next two to three years. Russian President Boris Yeltsin made this announcement during a November 1992 visit to South Korea.

    The Russian (CIS) SLBM stockpile is estimated to be at: 224 SS-N-18 Stingray armed with three warheads at 500-kT, 120 SS-N-20 Sturgeon with ten 200-kT warheads, and 112 SS-N-23 Skiff missiles with four 100-kT warheads. Total warheads are believed to be about 2320.

    According to Pentagon officials, Russia has already reduced its patrols to a single ballistic missile submarine. In contrast, the U.S. Navy continues to patrol with a dozen or so submarines at a time.

    NATO names are used in this listing. Russian names are given in parentheses.

    Typhoon (Akula) Class: 6

    The Typhoon carries 20 SS-N-20 Sturgeon missiles, with six to nine MIRV 200-kT nuclear warheads. The Typhoon can hit strategic targets from anywhere in the world. There are plans to modernize the Typhoons to carry an SS-N-20 follow-on missile which would have improved accuracy. All the Typhoons are stationed in the Northern Fleet at Nerpichya. One was damaged by fire during a missile loading accident in 1992, but has since been repaired.

    Delta IV (Delfin) Class: 7

    The Delta IV carries 16 SS-N-23 Skiff missiles, with four to ten MIRV 100-kT nuclear warheads. These ships are based in the Northern Fleet at Olenya.

    Delta III (Kalmar) Class: 14

    The Delta III is armed with 16 SS-N-18 Stingray missiles. There are three possible modifications for the Stingray. (1) three MIRV at 200-kT, (2) a single 450-kT, (3) seven MIRV at 100-kT. Nine ships are in the Northern Fleet and five are in the Pacific Fleet.

    Delta II (Murena-M) Class: 4

    The Delta II has 16 SS-N8 Sawfly missiles with two possible modifications. The first is with a single 1.2 MT nuclear warhead, the other is with two MIRV at 800-kT. This class of submarine is no longer in production. All four are stationed in the Northern fleet at Yagelnaya and are believed to have been taken off active duty.

    Delta I (Murena) Class: 8

    The Delta I carries 12 SS-N-8 Sawfly missiles, armed with either a single 1.2 MT nuclear warhead or two MIRV 800-kT. Three ships are stationed in the North and the other five are in the Pacific. One of these ships may be converted into a rescue submarine. As with the Delta II’s, all of these ships are believed to have been taken off active duty.

    UNITED KINGDOM

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 4 Building: 2

    Vanguard Class: 2 + 2

    The Vanguard-class is modeled on the United States Trident submarine. It carries 16 Trident II (D-5) missiles with up to eight MIRV of 100-120-kT nuclear warheads. The D-5 can carry up to 12 MIRV but under plans announced in November 1993 each submarine will carry a maximum of 96 warheads. The U.K. has stated that it has no plans to refit their Tridents with conventional warheads, insisting on the nuclear deterrent.

    Resolution Class: 2

    The Resolution-class was initially fitted with 16 Polaris A3 missiles with three multiple reentry vehicles of 200-kT each. Beginning in 1982, the warheads were replaced under the “Chevaline Program.” The Chevaline is a similar warhead, but contains a variety of anti-ballistic missile defenses. The two remaining submarines in this class are both scheduled for decommission.

    CHINA

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 1 Projected: 1

    Intelligence on Chinese nuclear submarines is extremely limited. Experts disagree on whether there is one or two SSBNs in the Chinese fleet. A new class of SSBN is expected to begin construction in 1996 or 1997.

    Xia Class: 1 or 2

    The Xia carries 12 Julang or “Giant Wave” CSS-N-3 missiles armed with a single 200-300-kT nuclear warhead. Approximately 24 of these missiles have been deployed. An improved version of this missile is currently being developed.

    Golf Class (SSB): 1

    Although the Golf is not nuclear driven, it is armed with ballistic missiles. The submarine is outfitted with two Julang missiles.

    FRANCE

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 5 Building: 3 Projected: 1

    In 1992 France announced that it would cut the number of new Triomphant-class SSBNs under construction from 6 to 4. Robert Norris and William Arkin of the Natural Resource Defense Council estimate that France will produce 288 warheads for the fleet of four submarines, but with only enough missiles and warheads to fully arm three boats. It is estimated that France has 64 SLBMs with 384 warheads.

    Triomphant Class: 0 + 3(1)

    The first submarine of its class, Le Triomphant, recently began conducting trials in the sea and is scheduled to depart on its first patrol in March 1996. The other ships are expected to be operational by 2005. The Triomphant-class is armed with 16 M45 missiles with 6 multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) at 150-kT. There are plans to later refit the submarines with the more powerful M5 with 10-12 MRV around 2010. Testing for these new missiles were recently conducted at the Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls.

    L’Inflexible Class: 5

    L’Inflexible is armed with 16 Aerospatiale M4B missiles with six MRV at 150-kT. The French navy has 80 SLBMs deployed on its five submarines. This class of ships is based at Brest and commanded from Houilles. They patrol in the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. The minimum number of submarines always at sea has been reduced from three to two.

    B. OTHER NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS

    UNITED STATES

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 86 Building: 4 Projected: 1

    Permit Class: 1
    Benjamin Franklin Class: 2
    Narwhal Class: 1
    Los Angeles Class: 57 + 2
    Sturgeon Class: 25
    Seawolf Class: 0 + 2(1)

    The Seawolf was launched in July 1995, and is scheduled to be commissioned in May 1996.

    Aircraft Carriers (CVN )

    Active: 6 Building: 3

    Nimitz Class: 6 + 3

    Guided Missile Cruisers (CGN)

    Active: 5

    Virginia Class: 2
    California Class: 2
    Brainbridge Class: 1

    RUSSIA

    Cruise Missile Submarines (SSGN)

    Active: 19 Building: 1 Projected: 1

    Echo II Class (Type 675M): 3
    Oscar I (Granit) Classes: 2
    Oscar II (Antyey): 10 + 1(1)
    Charlie II (Skat M) Class: 3
    Yankee Sidecar (Andromeda) Class: 1

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 51 Building: 6 Projected: 1

    Severodvinsk Class: 0 + 3(1)
    Sierra II (Baracuda) Class: 2
    Akula I (Bars) Class: 4
    Akula II (Bars) Class: 8 + 3
    Sierra I (Baracuda I) Class: 2
    Alfa (Alpha) Class: 1
    Victor III (Shuka) Class: 26
    Victor II (Kefal II) Class: 3
    Victor I (Kefal I) Class: 2
    Yankee Notch (Grosha) Class: 3

    Battle Cruisers (CGN)
    Active: 4

    Kirov Class: 4

    UNITED KINGDOM

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 12 Projected: 5

    Trafalgar Class: 7 + (5)
    Swiftsure Class: 5

    CHINA

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 5 Building: 1
    Han Class: 5

    Nuclear attack submarines are believed to be a high priority for the Chinese, but due to high internal radiation levels, production has been suspended.

    FRANCE

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 6 Projected: 1

    Rubis Class: 6 + (1)

    The nuclear attack submarine Rubis collided with a tanker on July 17, 1993 and has had to undergo extensive repairs. On March 30, 1994 the Emeraude had a bad steam leak which caused casualties amongst the crew.

    Aircraft Carriers (CVN)

    Active: 0 Building: 1 Projected: 1

    The nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was launched in 1994, it is expected to be commissioned in July 1999.