Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Syria

  • How to Strengthen the UN’s Ability to Maintain International Peace and Security

    This article was originally published by the History News Network.


    Lawrence WittnerConservative politicians often portray the United Nations as a powerful monster, poised to gobble up the United States and other countries and put them under alien rule.


    The reality, of course, is quite different. When it comes to international peace and security, the United Nations is notably lacking in power. Its resolutions along these lines are often ignored or go unenforced. Frequently, they are not even adopted. This situation leaves nations free to pursue traditional practices of power politics and, occasionally, much worse.


    The weakness of the United Nations was illustrated once again on February 4, when Russia and China joined forces to veto a UN Security Council resolution dealing with Syria. The resolution was designed to halt eleven months of bloodshed in that nation, where more than 5,400 people had been massacred, mostly by government military forces. Backing an Arab League plan for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step aside, the resolution was supported by 13 members of the Security Council. But, with Security Council rules allowing even one great power to veto action, the resolution was defeated.


    The rules establishing a great power veto were formulated late in World War II, when three Allied nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain) agreed to create a UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council would have 15 members, but just 5 of them would be permanent members (the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China), and each of these members would be empowered to veto any resolution or action. Thus, from the start, the great powers made sure that each of them had the ability to frustrate any venture of which they disapproved. And this, in turn, meant that, like the League of Nations, the United Nations was woefully weak when it came to enforcing international peace and security.


    In the first decade of the postwar era, the Soviet Union led the way in drawing on the veto to defend what it considered its interests. But, in later decades, the United States surpassed the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia) in use of the veto to block international security action. Indeed, since the establishment of the United Nations, all of the permanent members have relied upon the veto, which they have used hundreds of times to frustrate the majority in efforts to maintain international peace and security. As in the case of two Security Council resolutions dealing with the mass killing in Syria, this includes action to protect civilians in an armed conflict.


    The result has been a dangerous world in which, all too often, rulers of nations (especially, the rulers of the great powers) simply go their own way—squandering their resources on never-ending military buildups, invading other nations, and massacring civilian populations.


    In the context of this continuing disaster, wouldn’t it make sense to eliminate the veto in the Security Council? After all, there is no justifiable reason why great powers—and particularly individual great powers—should be legally accorded the right to frustrate the wishes of virtually the entire international community. Although scrapping the veto is no panacea for conflicts among nations, it seems likely to result in a more equitable and more secure world.


    Furthermore, even if the veto were abolished, the great powers would still hold onto their permanent seats in the Security Council, thus ensuring that they would retain—albeit in a more democratic fashion—some influence over world affairs. And if, as supporters of the current structure insist, it is important to match authority with power, why not elevate additional great powers to permanent membership in the Security Council? Nations that have sometimes been mentioned as useful additions to that UN entity include Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan.


    Plagued by dangerous arms races, bloody wars, and human rights violations, the world desperately needs an alternative form of governance. The great powers have the power to provide it, but not the legitimacy to do so, while the United Nations has the legitimacy but not the power. Hasn’t the time finally arrived to supplement the legitimacy of the United Nations with enough power to maintain international peace and security?

  • Syria’s Challenge to Nuclear Proliferation and What IAEA Could Do

    This article was originally published by the Huffington Post.

    “Syria has not cooperated with the Agency since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As a consequence, the Agency has not been able to make progress towards resolving the outstanding issues related to those sites.”

    So concludes the September 6, 2010 International Atomic Agency report revealing the nuclear investigative dead end bearing on suspect Syrian nuclear activities. Simply reissuing the conclusion, as IAEA does on a quarterly basis, marks a policy to nowhere. The time is long overdue for the nuclear watchdog to take a more assertive stand not simply to hold Damascus accountable for past and continued nuclear cheating but to use Syria as an example to buttress the flailing nonproliferation regime. IAEA can start this week at the Board of Governors meeting.

    Syria’s nuclear weapons ambitions came to light in September 2007 when Israeli aircraft destroyed what had been a concealed nuclear weapons reactor. Subsequent revelations by American intelligence and media uncovered a number of troubling facts. First, IAEA safeguards had failed to detect even a inkling of Syria’s nuclear cheating. The failure continues a pattern found elsewhere–Iraq (in the 1980s), Libya and Iran–raising troubling questions about NPT safeguards generally. Second, even when evidence reveals a nuclear violator, Syria demonstrates IAEA impotence to force transparency or reverse behavior. Indeed, Damascus has done Tehran one better: following its sole material concession–granting inspectors access to the bombed reactor site, but only after Syrian engineers had carted away debris and placed a new building over the plant’s footprint to conceal evidence–it repeatedly has said “no” to IAEA requests to provide additional information about past and current nuclear activity and gotten away with it.

    The collusion of other countries in Syria’s venture remains equally troubling. North Korea provided reactor technology and Iran, financing. Tehran’s contribution marks the first time an NPT party helped another to develop a weapons capacity.

    The implications for the region are not hard to foresee. Fast forward a decade or two. Nuclear energy has spread across the Middle East implementing plans begun in 2010 or earlier: Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and others have in place the skeleton for a weapons program shrouded by “peaceful” energy reactors. Suspicions mount. Rumors spread about hidden weapons activities. IAEA either remains clueless or inspectors report concerns to a sclerotic Board of Governors. Governments and pundits express dismay: how did we get to this point?

    This week IAEA’s Board of Governors can act to promote a different history by confronting Syria. The Board has the ability to do so by calling for a “special inspection” of all suspect Syrian sites as provided by the safeguards agreement the Agency entered into with Damascus: “If the Agency considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement…” it may order “special inspection.” Discovery of nuclear contraband would demand elimination.

    Were Syria to balk, the Board of Governors should declare Damascus in noncompliance and send the matter to the Security Council to take action including sanctions. No doubt the course will bring out the cynic in many of us. After all, Iran’s continuing sanctions defiance and North Korea’s success in detonating a nuclear weapon despite economic penalties and political isolation suggest sanctions offer little.

    But this may misread history. At times, sanctions worked to halt nuclear efforts. They helped defeat Iraq’s inclinations after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. They stunted Libya’s nuclear program. And because Syria remains economically weak, sanctioning Damascus can bring results. Swift and robust application–rather than the Council’s historic incremental approach–can make the strategy work. The alternative–more toothless IAEA reports–will only set the stage for a proliferating world none of us can wish for.