Tag: symposium

  • The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Final Symposium Statement

    THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NUCLEAR ZERO*

    [This document reflects the discussions at the symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse,” held in Santa Barbara, California, on October 24-25, 2016, and also takes into account the changed political landscape in the U.S. following the election of Donald Trump, which occurred two weeks after the symposium. The symposium was sponsored and organized by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.]

    Humanity and the planet face two existential threats: environmental catastrophe and nuclear annihilation. While climate change is the subject of increasing public awareness and concern, the same cannot be said about growing nuclear dangers arising from worsening international circumstances. It’s time again to sound the alarm and mobilize public opinion on a massive scale. Our lives may depend on it.

    More than a quarter of a century since the end of the Cold War, some 14,900 nuclear weapons, most an order of magnitude more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, 93% held by the U.S. and Russia, continue to pose an intolerable and increasing threat to humanity and the biosphere. Recent studies by atmospheric scientists show that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan involving 100 Hiroshima-size atomic bombs dropped on cities could produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. A drop in average surface temperatures, depletion of the ozone layer, and shortened agricultural growing seasons would lead to massive famine and starvation resulting in as many as two billion deaths over the following decade. A full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia would result in a “Nuclear Winter,” triggering a new Ice Age and ending most complex life on the planet.

    The danger of wars among nuclear-armed states is growing. There is hope that such wars can be avoided, but that hope, while the essential basis of action, is not sufficient to end the nuclear threat facing humanity and complex life on this planet. Hope must give rise to action.

    The United States is poised to spend one trillion dollars over the next 30 years to modernize its nuclear bombs and warheads, the submarines, missiles and bombers to deliver them, and the infrastructure to sustain the nuclear enterprise indefinitely. The other nuclear-armed countries – Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea – are modernizing their nuclear arsenals as well.

    RISING TENSIONS

    Tensions between the United States/NATO and Russia have risen to levels not seen since the Cold War, with the two nuclear giants confronting each other in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Syria, and an accelerated tempo of military exercises and war games, both conventional and nuclear, on both sides.

    The U.S., the only nation with nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil, is estimated to have 180 nuclear weapons stationed at six NATO bases in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. In June 2016, the largest NATO war games in decades were conducted in Poland. The exercises came weeks after activating a U.S. missile defense system in Romania and ground breaking for another missile defense system in Poland. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that there would be “action in response to guarantee our security.”

    In October 2016, Russia moved nuclear-capable Iskander missiles into the Kaliningrad territory bordering Poland and Lithuania, signaling its response to NATO, while claiming it was a routine exercise. Russian officials have previously described the role that the 500 km-range Iskander system would play in targeting U.S. missile defense installations in Poland.

    In mid-December 2016, the Obama administration announced plans to deploy troops in Poland, the Baltic states and Romania. According to the U.S. Commander, this would send “the very powerful signal” that “the United States, along with the rest of NATO, is committed to deterrence.”

    In Syria, with perhaps the most complex war in history raging, the U.S., Russia and France are bombing side-by-side and sometimes on opposing sides.

    Adding to the conflicts among nuclear-armed states, the U.S., with its “pivot” to the Pacific, is facing off against China in seas where other Asian nations are contesting Chinese territorial claims. India and Pakistan remain locked in a nuclear arms race amid mounting diplomatic tensions, border clashes and rising military budgets. And North Korea, refusing to heed strong international condemnation, continues to conduct nuclear weapons tests. It has even announced an intention to test an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States.

    These potential nuclear flashpoints are ripe for escalation. An accidental or intentional military incident could send the world spiraling into a disastrous nuclear confrontation. A great danger is that the rulers of one nuclear-armed state will miscalculate the interests and fears of another, pushing some geopolitical gambit to the point where economic pressures, covert actions, low-intensity warfare and displays of high-tech force escalate into regional or general war. This vulnerability to unintended consequences is reminiscent of the circumstances that led to World War I, but made more dangerous by U.S. and Russian policies of nuclear first-use, keeping nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, and launch-on-warning.

    THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY

    During the Presidential campaign, Donald Trump’s nuclear weapons rhetoric was cavalier, suggesting deep ignorance. No one knows what he’ll do in office, but U.S. national security policy has been remarkably consistent in the post-World War II and post-Cold War eras, despite dramatically changed geopolitical conditions and very different presidential styles. The threatened use of nuclear weapons as the “cornerstone” of U.S. national security policy has been reaffirmed by every President, Republican or Democrat, since 1945, when President Harry Truman, a Democrat, oversaw the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    According to the Trump transition website: “Mr. Trump will ensure our strategic nuclear triad is modernized to ensure it continues to be an effective deterrent….” This is essentially a continuation of the Obama administration’s policy. Trump’s ominous December 22, 2016 tweet – “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes” – seemed to indicate an intention to increase the level of reliance on the nuclear threat.

    While Trump’s conciliatory tone towards Russia offers a glimmer of hope for lowering tensions between the two nuclear-armed giants, the firestorm raging around U.S. government assertions that Russia manipulated the U.S. election to help Trump win has immeasurably compounded the difficulties in predicting what will happen next. Trump’s stated aim to tear up the Iran nuclear deal reveals his deficient understanding of international relations, indicating a lack of awareness that this is a multilateral agreement involving all five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany, and that Russia and Iran are engaged in cooperative military operations, including against ISIS. Trump’s belligerent attitude toward China, a strategic ally of Russia, and his threat to upend the decades-long U.S. “one China” policy, is another cause for serious concern.

    In his farewell address to the nation in 1961, President Dwight Eisenhower warned: “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.” An earlier version of his warning referred to the “military-industrial-congressional complex.”

    We now face the likelihood of a far more military-industrial Presidential cabinet. The specter of a Trump presidency with a right-wing Republican House and Senate, as well as a compliant Supreme Court, is chilling to an unprecedented degree. Trump’s appointments and nominations of reactionary, hardliner ex-generals, billionaire heads of corporations, and climate-change deniers are cause for grave concern in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas.

    The Cold War concept of “strategic stability” among great powers, although itself never an adequate basis for genuine international security, is foundering. The Cold War and post-Cold War managerial approach to arms control must be challenged. Addressing nuclear dangers must take place in a much broader framework, taking into account the interface between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and militarism in general, the humanitarian and long-term environmental consequences of nuclear war, and the fundamental incompatibility of nuclear weapons with democracy, the rule of law, and human well-being.

    GROWING CRISES

    In 2009, former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev warned, “Military superiority would be an insurmountable obstacle to ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Unless we discuss demilitarization of international politics, the reduction of military budgets, preventing militarization of outer space, talking about a nuclear-free world will be just rhetorical.”

    Nuclear arms control has ground to a halt and the world is backsliding. The growing crises among nuclear-armed states must be defused and disarmament efforts put back on track. Nothing is more important now than to counter the notion that collaborative security with Russia is to be regarded as treasonous or somehow more dangerous than confrontational geopolitics. Peace is an imperative of the Nuclear Age. Starting with the U.S. and Russia, the nuclear-armed states must sit down at the negotiating table and begin to address Gorbachev’s agenda.

    It is essential at this time to assert the credibility and the necessity of a transformational approach to nuclear disarmament. We should do our utmost to marshal public discourse to counter the militarization of governments’ imaginations. The use of military force should always be the last option, not just in rhetoric, but in diplomatic practice.

    There has never been a greater need for imaginative diplomacy. The cycle of provocation and response must be halted. Nuclear threats must cease. Nuclear weapons modernization programs must be terminated. Military exercises and war games must be curtailed and conducted with great sensitivity to geopolitical conditions. The U.S. should withdraw its nuclear weapons from NATO bases and, at a minimum, stop NATO expansion and provocative deployments. Policies of nuclear first-use, hair-trigger alert, and launch-on-warning must be ended.

    In the longer term, military alliances should be dismantled and replaced by a new collective security paradigm. All nations, first and foremost the U.S., by far the largest weapons exporter, should stop the sale and supply of arms to conflict regions.

    CHANGING THE DISCOURSE

    Changing the discourse involves both language and processes. We need to take seriously our human role as stewards of the earth and talk about nuclear dangers in terms of potential omnicide. Nuclear weapons are incompatible with democracy. They place vast unaccountable power in a few leaders’ hands, unchecked by the millions of voices that true democracy depends on. We must reject notions of U.S. exceptionalism that exempt this country from respect for the rule of law and the authority of the United Nations. Further, we must revitalize the U.S. Constitution by reintroducing checks and balances into decision-making about war and peace.

    Indeed, much of the world does seem to be coming to its senses regarding nuclear weapons. Deeply frustrated by the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, in December 2016 the United Nations General Assembly voted by a large majority to hold negotiations in 2017 on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, leading to their elimination. The vote represents an historic global repudiation of the nuclear weapons status quo among the vast majority of non-nuclear weapons states. None of the nine nuclear-armed nations supported the resolution, and it is unlikely that any nuclear-armed states will participate in the negotiations.

    To realize the full value of a “ban” treaty, we must demand that the nuclear-armed states recognize the existing illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under international law protecting civilians and the environment from the effects of warfare. The governments of these states must finally act to meet their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and customary international law, and participate in good faith in the negotiations as unanimously mandated by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion.

    The media have narrowed the boundaries of debate, and the public has virtually no feasible means to engage decision-makers on disarmament imperatives. Yet the need for such discourse has never been more urgent. We reject the apocalyptic narrative and summon the imaginations of people everywhere to envision a vastly different future. There is no inevitability to the course of history, and a mobilized citizenry can redirect it toward a positive future.

    AN ETHICAL IMPERATIVE

    There exists an ethical imperative to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The survival of the human species and other forms of complex life requires acting upon this imperative. We will need to successfully reach out to constituencies and organizations outside the peace and disarmament sphere to inspire and engage millions, if not tens of millions, of people. Education and engagement of both media and youth will be critical for success. Hope must be joined with action if we are to abolish nuclear weapons before they abolish us. The alarm is sounding.


    *Initial endorsers of this statement include: Rich Appelbaum, Jackie Cabasso, Paul K. Chappell, Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg, Richard Falk, Mark Hamilton, Kimiaki Kawai, David Krieger, Peter Kuznick, Robert Laney, Judith Lipton, Elaine Scarry, Jennifer Simons, Daniel U. Smith, Steven Starr, and Rick Wayman. A full list of symposium participants, along with videos, audio and transcripts of presentations, are available at www.wagingpeace.org/symposium-fierce-urgency. The Spanish version of this statement is here.

    From L to R: Front Row: Daniel Ellsberg, David Krieger, Noam Chomsky. Second Row: Paul K. Chappell, Rick Wayman, Elaine Scarry, Steven Starr, Richard Falk, Jackie Cabasso, Jennifer Simons, Peter Kuznick, Judith Lipton, Kimiaki Kawai. Third Row: Robert Laney, Mark Hamilton, Daniel Smith, John Mecklin, Hans Kristensen, Rich Appelbaum.
    From L to R: Front Row: Daniel Ellsberg, David Krieger, Noam Chomsky. Second Row: Paul K. Chappell, Rick Wayman, Elaine Scarry, Steven Starr, Richard Falk, Jackie Cabasso, Jennifer Simons, Peter Kuznick, Judith Lipton, Kimiaki Kawai. Third Row: Robert Laney, Mark Hamilton, Daniel Smith, John Mecklin, Hans Kristensen, Rich Appelbaum.
  • The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse – A Symposium Overview

    THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NUCLEAR ZERO: CHANGING THE DISCOURSE
    A SYMPOSIUM OVERVIEW
    By David Krieger

    From L to R: Front Row: Daniel Ellsberg, David Krieger, Noam Chomsky. Second Row: Paul K. Chappell, Rick Wayman, Elaine Scarry, Steven Starr, Richard Falk, Jackie Cabasso, Jennifer Simons, Peter Kuznick, Judith Lipton, Kimiaki Kawai. Third Row: Robert Laney, Mark Hamilton, Daniel Smith, John Mecklin, Hans Kristensen, Rich Appelbaum.
    From L to R: Front Row: Daniel Ellsberg, David Krieger, Noam Chomsky. Second Row: Paul K. Chappell, Rick Wayman, Elaine Scarry, Steven Starr, Richard Falk, Jackie Cabasso, Jennifer Simons, Peter Kuznick, Judith Lipton, Kimiaki Kawai. Third Row: Robert Laney, Mark Hamilton, Daniel Smith, John Mecklin, Hans Kristensen, Rich Appelbaum.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) hosted a symposium on October 24-25, 2016 on “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse.”  The symposium participants, long-time experts on nuclear dangers, included Noam Chomsky, Daniel Ellsberg and Richard Falk.  For a complete list of participants, click here.   Participants voiced concerns that nuclear dangers are increasing in many parts of the world, including Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia.  Particular concern was expressed over the deterioration in US-Russian relations.  Speakers stressed that a war between the U.S. and Russia is possible, even likely, under current conditions; that such a war could escalate to nuclear exchanges; and could, in that case, trigger a Nuclear Famine or a Nuclear Winter and be a war to end civilization and even cause the extinction of the human species and many other forms of life on the planet.  These concerns are not meant to be alarmist, but they are meant to sound an alarm.

    Hope to Action

    There was general agreement that nuclear war poses an existential threat to humankind and that the warning sirens are now sounding.  There is hope that such a war can be avoided, but that hope, while necessary, is not sufficient to end the nuclear threat now facing humanity and complex life on the planet.  Hope must be joined with action to end the nuclear weapons era in order to abolish nuclear weapons before they abolish us.  And the action must be preventive in nature since there is virtually no possibility of recovery from a nuclear war.  In fact, if one side only were to launch its nuclear arsenal at the other and there were no retaliatory response, the likelihood is that the initial attack would be sufficient to destroy not only the opponent but the attacking side as well.  Thus, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) must not be reconsidered in light of Self-Assured Destruction (SAD), even for the attacking side.

    U.S.-Russia Temperatures Rise

    The U.S. and Russia must step back from the confrontations in which they have been engaged in Europe, Ukraine, Syria, the Middle East and elsewhere.  The discourse must be shifted from confrontation and military might to finding common ground through diplomacy to step back from the brink.  This is the only sensible way forward.  As many leaders, including Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, have long realized and stated, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

    Citizens of the two countries, as well as leaders, have a role to play in assuring their common future.  It is time for citizens to enter the discourse in their own interests and those of their families and communities.  We have come too far to sacrifice the future on the dangerous shoals of nationalism, militarism and nuclearism.   As Einstein warned early in the Nuclear Age, “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”  We must change our modes of thinking, our discourse and our actions if we are to prevent a catastrophic nuclear war, one that could be initiated by malice or mistake, by anger or accident.

    The goal must be complete nuclear disarmament, and required negotiations to achieve a nuclear weapon-free world must commence now.  It is positive news that non-nuclear weapon states at the United Nations have voted to begin negotiations in March 2017 for a treaty to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons.  Unfortunately, all nuclear weapon states except North Korea voted against the resolution to begin negotiations or abstained, as did most of the U.S. allies who shelter under its nuclear umbrella.  Such attachment to nuclear weapons and the policies that sustain them is dangerous in the extreme and sends exactly the wrong message to the world.  It is a display of hubris when wisdom is desperately needed.  The question for the non-nuclear weapon states is: can they create a meaningful nuclear ban treaty – one with normative and moral strength – without the participation of key nuclear weapons states?  There was general agreement that the negotiations for a treaty to fill the legal gap in prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons is one of the most important and promising initiatives currently on the international agenda.

    Youth and the Media Must Take the Lead

    There was discussion that two groups in particular could lead the way toward ending the nuclear era: the media because of their power and influential outreach, and youth because of their larger stake in the human future.

    The media needs to get and convey the message that nuclear weapons pose far too great a risk to the human future, and nuclear war would be a catastrophe beyond our ability to imagine.  The media must awaken to the existential dangers of nuclear war and help to awaken people throughout the world to these dangers.  Just as the media has helped to propel a widespread understanding of the existential dangers of climate change, it must do the same for nuclear dangers through documentaries, feature films, news and analysis, fiction, and the use of various forms of social media.

    How to break through the ignorance and apathy of young people regarding nuclear dangers was recognized as a significant challenge.  It was noted that documentaries, like “The Untold History of the United States,” seem to hold promise for reaching this audience and that more of this educational work needs to be done.  The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists “Voices of Tomorrow” program, which involves young writers in the Bulletin’s web content, also offers hope for the next generation’s involvement.  And capturing the attention of the Bernie Sanders movement could also offer a way to mobilize young people around the need for nuclear weapons abolition.  Further, it would be valuable to expand the use of NAPF’s Peace Literacy Program in schools, places of worship and social organizations such as Rotary International.

    The Wisdom of Russell and Einstein

    The symposium concluded with reference to a key paragraph from one of the most important documents of the 20th century, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom.  Shall we instead choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels?  We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest.  If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

    This warning is as valid today as when it was issued in 1955, but it has been largely overlooked or forgotten.  It could become the basis for a new discourse for humanity.

     

    For more information on the symposium, click here.

  • Promising Initiatives for Changing the Discourse by Jennifer Simons

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Jennifer Simons at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 25, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

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    I am deeply appreciative of the invitation to participate in this Conference, and to speak on Promising Initiatives for Changing the Discourse.  I want to thank you, David, for the opportunity, and commend you and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation for your commitment, your Foundation’s stability, its unflagging energy – staying the course since 1982 – in order to advance the agenda for a nuclear free world.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, I imagine, like The Simons Foundation, was an initiative in response to the immense growth of the US nuclear arsenals in the 1980’s – a concrete expression of outrage and an urgent desire to do something about it.

    The numbers are now down from the obscene number in the 1980s of some seventy thousand, to approximately fifteen thousand, three hundred and fifty.   Yet, not only has the pace of elimination significantly lessened, the nuclear weapons states, disregarding their commitments to disarm, are upgrading their arsenals and infrastructure and planning for their indefinite retention.

    The danger, therefore, to humanity still exists.  In fact the current dangers are considered to be greater than during the Cold War. [1]

    Our task remains as urgent – or is, perhaps, more urgent than in the 1980s when the Cold War provided some stability. [2]

    Russia has, not only been flaunting its nuclear capability, but is now breaking the former sacrosanct separation between nuclear and conventional warring.   In retaliation to the global outrage about Russia’s aerial bombardment of Aleppo, Russia has moved its nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to Kalingrad, and as well, has withdrawn from three bi-lateral nuclear disarmament treaties between the US and Russia.

    With the end of the Cold War, hopes for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons were high and at the turn of the century these high expectations remained.  Promising initiatives, like the New Agenda Coalition, pressured the Nuclear Weapons States to fulfil their legal obligation to disarm; and were successful at the 2000 NPT Review Conference with the achievement of commitments, in Article VI, of thirteen steps to disarmament.

    These hopes were dashed by the failure of the 2005 Conference, yet rose again in 2010 when crucial language  – the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” – was accepted as part of the 2010 NPT Review Conference document. [3]   This changed the discourse and set the stage for, what seemed to be, the most promising initiative for achieving the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

    This new language in the 2010 NPT gave fresh life to the issue; and provided a new dimension for action and led to the three global conferences in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons.

    This, in turn, led to the  UN Resolutions   in 2012  and 2015 [4]  to convene  Open-Ended Working Groups.[5][6]

    The outcome of these conferences was that, on September 28th, a group of participating states introduced a draft UN General Assembly Resolution calling for the convening, in 2017, of a two-day UN conference to “negotiate a legally-binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading toward their total elimination.”

    While on the one hand this is the most momentous event since the Reykjavik Summit at which Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev – to the horror of their military bureaucracies – agreed to eliminate all their nuclear weapons. [7]  On the other hand, like Reykjavik, it will not lead to a nuclear-weapon-free world because there would be no regulations for elimination of nuclear weapons, and the critical elements of their irreversible, verifiable and transparent destruction would be left for future negotiations.

    It does, however, hold some promise.  As John Burroughs has pointed out “a prohibition treaty would have the beneficial effect of erecting a further barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons.”   It could “strengthen non-proliferation obligations. It could perhaps “prohibit the development of nuclear weapons” or “prohibit the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.” If nothing else, it would reinforce the norm against nuclear weapons use.[8]

    The glaring weakness of this ban treaty initiative is that the nuclear weapons states have, not only refused to participate in the process, but, in fact, have outright rejected it.   These are the states with the weapons.  And it is only through their agreement that they will rid themselves of their arsenals and sign a treaty eliminating and prohibiting nuclear weapons.

    Nuclear disarmament cannot – and will not – move forward without the participation of the states with the weapons.    It is essential, therefore, to close the gap, to change the discourse – to seek appropriate engagement rather than to attack  – so that this engagement with the nuclear weapons states encourages them to get on with the process of eliminating their arsenals, and within a time-bound framework.

    I do not agree with – or in any way  – support the nuclear weapons states non-compliance with their NPT commitment and their disregard of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion.

    Although he has not been successful, I do support President Obama’s call for a world without nuclear weapons and his efforts to accomplish this.  He said “we cannot succeed in this endeavour alone, but we can lead it, we can start it.”  And this is what he has attempted to do – to work with Russia on bi-lateral cuts to their arsenals as the first step forward, paving the way to multilateral negotiations which will lead to a nuclear weapon free world.

    For this reason it is my view that Global Zero is the most promising initiative because it does change the discourse.  Its mission is to centre on, and to work with, the nuclear weapons states.  Global Zero has developed a foundational plan – a practical time-bound, phased, step-by-step process to zero; and formulates policies, strategies and recommendations for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.  Global Zero engages with governments, both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapons states to advocate for these measures.

    The organization, launched in Paris in 2008, is a nonpartisan, international community of three hundred influential political, military, business, civic and faith leaders backed by some half a million citizens worldwide; and  the organization continues to build “a truly global disarmament movement  from the grassroots to the highest levels of government, firmly rooted  in critical nuclear weapons regions.

    Global Zero has met with extraordinary success.  The organization has attracted much attention from the global media which brought the nuclear disarmament issue, not only to the attention of the public again, but also to governments, their parliaments and Congresses. And some fifty international and national non-governmental organizations have supported and promoted Global Zero and its initiatives in various ways since its inception. [9]

    Its greatest success to date has been its interaction and positive reception in direct dialogue with governments at the highest level, with Global Zero leaders meeting in Foreign Affairs and State Departments, “advancing policies and political strategies” for the reduction of their nuclear arsenals “and to eventually engage in multi-lateral negotiations for elimination and prohibition.” [10]

    Global Zero’s foundational document is its Action Plan – a practical four-phase blueprint of concrete steps, which includes a negotiated and signed legally binding international agreement for verified dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals and the elimination of all nuclear weapons by 2030.   This plan is compatible with Point 1 of UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s Five-Point plan for nuclear disarmament. [11]

    Global Zero has an on-going wealth of Commission Reports delineating essential interim steps, based on the Action Plan, in order to further its goal of a nuclear weapons free world.

    The Global Zero Commission members are drawn from former senior, influential, knowledgeable leaders from the political and military realms in key countries; and undertake in depth research, analysis and recommendations which they present in “high-level outreach and direct dialogue with governments.”

    The Commission issued a report at the Munich Security Conference in 2012 on NATO-Russian Tactical Nukes calling for the United States and Russia to remove all of their tactical nuclear weapons from combat bases on the European continent.

    Another, in 2012, was the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report – Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture.  The Report called for the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals to 900 weapons each.  This would pave the way to bring other nuclear weapons countries into the multilateral nuclear arms negotiations.

    In July of that year, Global Zero was invited to testify before the U.S. Senate regarding the report and the implications of its recommendations for the defence budget.  These recommendations included de-alerting, increased warning and decision time in the command and control systems, eliminating all tactical nuclear weapons and reducing the US arsenal from a triad to a dyad, by eliminating the silo-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

    Global Zero briefed senior Russian officials on this Report at a conference in Moscow, and at meetings with Senior Russian Foreign Affairs officials.

    The Report was endorsed by The New York Times and the recommendations reverberated across the U.S.  – some of which were seized upon by NGOs for their furtherance.  For example, Ploughshares Fund offered grants to NGOs to undertake – under the Ploughshares umbrella – a project to eliminate the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

    In 2014, Global Zero formed a Nuclear Risk Reduction Commission.  In October of that year at the UN, in a First Committee Side Event, Co-Founder, Bruce Blair previewed the Commission’s risk analysis and other findings.  And in 2015, at the NPT Review Conference, the Commission Report was released recommending a number of US-Russia bi-lateral steps to reduce risks, including de-alerting, and multi-lateral steps to stabilize the world’s Nuclear Force Postures. The Report was well-received, with one government committing to take the recommendations forward in a predominantly government – or Track One-and-a-half –meeting.[12]

    The Risk Reduction Commission Report also fed into the Humanitarian Consequences Conferences and the UN-mandated Open-Ended Working Groups; and its “authoritative validators” of risks provided a critical foundation for the Open Ended Working Groups’ Reports.

    There is no doubt that Global Zero is a major influence on the nuclear disarmament agenda.  It is unfortunate that Russia has declined, at the moment, to engage in further bilateral cuts to its arsenals.  President Putin ignored the 2013 offer made by President Obama to cut to a thousand weapons each, and the process is currently stalled.

    The Global Zero Action Plan timetable will not be far off schedule, however, if Russia changes course and re-engages within a few years.   This is not unlikely! Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Vitaly Churkin, in a recent interview said the “current situation is unlike the Cold War in that Russian and American diplomats today speak regularly and manage to accomplish things they can agree upon,” and stressed that he would like to “get back to normal in our relations.” [13]

    According to Russia’s Global Zero Leaders and Commission members, this sentiment is echoed in Russia; and Global Zero is poised  – with the lines of communication and engagement open – ready to move forward at the first signs of détente.

    The resumption of bi-lateral cuts will depend, also, on the outcome of the US election, both in the White House and the Congress.  President Obama’s offer of bilateral cuts to one thousand (1,000) still stands and Hillary Clinton has committed to this proposal. It is to be hoped, if she becomes President, that she will honour this commitment.

    The final Presidential Debate demonstrated that the nuclear issue is on her mind because, in her critique of her opponent’s inability to handle the so-called “nuclear button,” she cited the Global Zero-initiated letter signed by ten nuclear launch officers.

    And if the Democrats form a majority in the Senate, the possibilities are high for not only a resumption of bi-lateral cuts, but too, for positive change in United States Nuclear policy.   Russia’s participation in the process though, will depend on the United States taking into account some of its concerns – missile defense for one, for example.

    During this current period of tense relations between Russia and United States, Global Zero continues to formulate and promote essential steps in the process: for example, the promotion of No First Use as a global norm which, without the risk of a first strike, would provide confidence that no state is under attack and, as Bruce Blair says, would undermine Deterrence Policy.

    No First Use would also have “huge implications for the U.S. Nuclear program”.  It would “reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use, eliminate launch of warning, and thus rationalize de-alerting.  It would also “provide the rationale for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons and the land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missile force, and save the United States about 100 billion dollars.[14]

    An important component of Global Zero is its campaign – its online social media program and its on-ground grassroots campaign in US, which is currently taking advantage of the US election gatherings; and also its global Annual Bike around the Bomb program and its international Action Corps.   This awareness-raising, however, is not delivering enough of a critical mass to prompt leaders in the Nuclear Weapons States to action.

    The most difficult issue with which we nuclear disarmers grapple is how to bring to the streets the numbers, protesting nuclear weapons, which we saw – and many of us were part of – in the 1980s:  the five million in Europe, the one million in New York and the huge marches elsewhere around the globe, which caused Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev to want to do something about it:  And the earlier march in New York against nuclear testing which caused President Kennedy to act.  This is a question that troubles me.

    How can we awaken the public to the dangers of which they do not seem to be aware?  How can we encourage millions of people – people enough so that their representatives in democratic parliaments and congresses will do something about it?  Governments are not convinced by moral arguments, by invoking the devastating consequences to humanity.  So unless there is a huge groundswell of public opinion, nothing will change.

    It is disappointing that the International Court Justice and the U.S. Court declined jurisdiction for the Marshall Islands suit – though I understand that it is still alive and before the U.S. Court of Appeal. The initiative held some promise for change, gained the attention of the media and raised the issue in the public domain, so I do hope the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Nuclear Zero campaign on the Marshall Islands intends to continue; and turn its focus to an educational campaign on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear detonations, centered on schools, universities, parent-teacher associations, community centers and places of worship.

    Who wants to suffer the fate of the Marshall Islanders – to live with the horror, and horrific effects, of nuclear destruction and it radioactive fallout?  Who wants to die from the myriad of fatal cancers?  What person, what parent or grandparent, wants to be the parents or grandparents of “monster babies” – of entities looking like bunches of grapes, or babies like jellyfish with no bones and transparent, so their brains and beating hearts are visible for the few days before they die?

    The United States was responsible for this! Presented to the public as a personal perspective and from the perspective of moral responsibility, it could be an effective motivator in the United States.

    It is past time to wake up America to those sixty-seven nuclear bomb tests on the Marshall Islands. The focus of the consequences of nuclear weapons use is, and has been, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Not enough attention has been paid to the victims of nuclear tests.  [15]

    The Marshall Island tests were a crime against humanity of a magnitude far greater than the crimes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    When the United States tested on the Marshall Islands the devastating consequences to human beings of nuclear detonations were known.  The US government, the Pentagon, the US scientists, the medical researchers sent to Hiroshima and Nagasaki following the blasts, knew about the incineration, the deaths, the consequences of fallout, radiation sickness, the maiming, the bleeding, and the fatal cancers.

    But it is not just about tests, or nuclear war – both are currently unlikely – it is about the risks and dangers that come with possession: it is about the eighteen hundred nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert and targeted for immediate launch; the accidental, malicious or mistaken launch, nuclear accidents; the inadequate command/control and warning systems; and hackers penetrating these systems which are highly automated.  It is about inadequate security of fissile materials and warheads, both of which terrorists have been attempting to acquire.

    I am in full agreement with the Conference title, The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse, but there is no fast track.  The catalyst for a fast track, however, could be an accidental, malicious or unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon in the United States.  This would be so devastating that we do not want this, and this is what we are attempting to prevent.

    Therefore every initiative that brings attention to the issue and raises awareness of the danger holds promise and is important.  It is slow, steady, dedicated work and we must continue to seek appropriate avenues for chances of success in weaning the nuclear weapons states from these inhumane weapons.


    Endnotes

    [1] 1, 800 nuclear weapons of these weapons on hair-trigger alert and targeted for immediate launch.  There is no guarantee that India and Pakistan will not engage in a war and, as well, Pakistan’s command and control systems are not considered secure.  The risks are high from accidental, malicious or mistaken launch; from inadequate command/control and warning systems; and of hackers penetrating these systems which are highly automated.  There is also the possibility of hackers “spoofing an attack which would set off an automated retaliatory response. We are at risk because of inadequate security of fissile materials and warheads, both of which terrorists have been attempting to acquire.

    [2] Earlier this month, German Foreign Minister, Frank Walter Steinmeier, spoke of his dismay at “the collapsing relations between the West and Russia” and said that it is “a fallacy to think that this is like the Cold War.  The current times are different and more dangerous.”  Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, believes that there is “considerable danger of a military confrontation between Russia and the West.” [2]   Mikhail Gorbechev echoed these concerns several days later.

    [3] The 2010 Review Conference of the NPT gave specific focus – inter alia – to this issue in its consensual conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions (2010 Action Plan) by expressing “its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons […] reaffirm(ing) the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law”. Moreover, the 2010 NPT Review Conference resolved in Action 1 of the 2010 Action Plan that “All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.”

    [4] 2012 (67/56) and 2015 (L.13.Rev)

    [5] The first “to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons”; and the second,   “to address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions, and norms that will need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.”

    [7] October 1986

    [8], Changing the Landscape: The U.N. Open-Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament, John Burroughs, The Simons Foundation Fellow, The Simons Foundation Briefing Paper, September 2016, www.thesimonsfoundation.ca.  My emphasis.

    [9] While Global Zero has not yet become a household word, it has come to refer –  not just to the organization, – but as well, to become the signifier of a nuclear- weapon-free world in the same way that Brexit is universally known as the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union.

    [10] Matt Brown email letter September 8, 2016

    [11] Phases 1 and 2 of the Action Plan call for bilateral action on the part of the US and Russia – to agree to each reduce their arsenals to 1,000 by 2018 and to further reductions to 500 warheads each by 2021.  The U.S. and Russia would ratify a bi-lateral accord and require the other nuclear weapons states to commit to a cap on their existing stockpiles and to participate in multilateral negotiations for proportionate reductions of their stockpiles following the Russian and US reductions to 500 each until 2021. The Action Plan requires “a rigorous and comprehensive verification and enforcement system is implemented, including no-notice, on-site inspections, and strengthened safeguards on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle to prevent diversion of materials to build weapons.”

    Phase 3 of Action Plan requires all “the world’s nuclear-capable countries negotiate and sign a Global Zero Accord: a legally binding international agreement for the phased, verified, proportionate reduction of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by 2030. [compatible with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s 5-point plan for nuclear disarmament]

    And Phase 4 “The phased, verified, proportionate dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads is complete by 2030. The comprehensive verification and enforcement system prohibiting the development and possession of nuclear weapons is in place to ensure that the world is never again threatened by nuclear weapons.”

    [12] 2015 the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction — led by former U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James E. Cartwright and comprised of international military experts — issued a bold call for ending the Cold War-era practice of keeping nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

    The Commission’s extensive report calls for (1) an urgent agreement between the United States and Russia to immediately eliminate “launch-on-warning” from their operational strategy, and to initiate a phased stand down of their high-alert strategic forces, beginning with taking 20% of both countries’ nuclear forces off launch-ready alert within one year and 100% within 10 years; and (2) a longer-term global agreement requiring all nuclear weapons countries to refrain from putting nuclear weapons on high alert

    [13] A Senior Envoy’s take on Relations with the United States: ‘Pretty Bad’, NY Times, October 18th, 2016

    [14] James E. Cartwright and Bruce G. Blair, “End the First-Use Policy for Nuclear Weapons,” The New York Times, 15/08/2016Bruce Blair letter (email) September 13, 2016

    [15] Since 1954, the people of the Marshall Islands have engaged in “a lifelong battle for their health and a safe environment.”  The radioactive fallout destroyed the lives of many – with deaths from leukaemia, brain tumours, thyroid and other forms of fatal cancers.  Their food sources were destroyed – staple crops, like arrowroot, disappeared completely; the fish were radio-active and instantly caused blisters, terrible stomach problems and nausea.

    The radioactive fallout from the nuclear testing has affected the health of three generations so far – and has definitely jeopardized the lives of future generations.  The consequences have been the inability to reproduce and the birth of severely deformed babies – entities – because in many cases they do not resemble human forms.  There were no words in the Islanders’ language to describe these “monster” babies – some with two heads – so they described them as “octopuses,” “apples,” “turtles” and “jellyfish babies” who lived for a day or two – with no bones and transparent – their brains and beating hearts visible

  • Keeping Faith with the Future by Elaine Scarry

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Elaine Scarry at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 25, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

    scarry

    Well, like all of you, I’m exhilarated and honored to be here. And my own emphasis is on the fact that key features of democracy are absolutely incompatible with nuclear weapons. The result of that is that during the nuclear age, these key features of democracy have simply been allowed to atrophy. In fact, they’ve come to seem ridiculous. But the good news is that were we to bring those key features of democracy back, we would be able to eliminate nuclear weapons, because they are mutually exclusive. And if you’re going to have these back in place, you can’t have the nuclear weapons.

    So, we know that nuclear weapons cause profound injury to every living creature on earth and to the surface of the earth itself. As we heard yesterday, the new research on nuclear winter shows that if a tiny fraction of the current arsenal, not 1% but one one-hundredth of 1% is used, 44 million people will die on the first afternoon and 1 billion people will die in the first month. But in addition to that incredible physical injury, there is also, even before the weapons are used, a profound civic injury. Nuclear weapons have eliminated the right of self-defense. The right of self-defense isn’t just one right among many rights. It’s the right that underlies our constitution of any government, and it’s a right underlying many of our other rights.

    For example, the right of free speech gives us many things. But one thing that it does is enhance our ability to defend ourselves. Nuclear weapons, of course, do not allow anybody in this country or any other country, with the possible exception of Switzerland that has an elaborate shelter system, to defend itself in any way. The second thing that we’ve really lost is the right of mutual aid. Any study of cities, even, for example, a recent study by Suzy Schneider and her colleague in the Netherlands showing what would happen if Rotterdam were hit with a Hiroshima-size bomb. It shows that the number of injuries is much greater than anyone can repair.

    For example, they would expect 10,000 severe burn injuries just among survivors, and the Netherlands only has 100 burn beds. I first thought that was shockingly low. Mass General, which is a major hospital in Boston, has seven burn beds. So, there’s no resources for dealing with any kind of use of a nuclear weapon. As the Red Cross has said, “If even one city is hit, their worldwide resources can’t deal with it.” And the loss of mutual aid, I mean, that’s our… The texture, that’s the fabric of our relations with one another, knowing we could help one another, and that is gone.

    As we know, the huge architecture, which is a genocidal architecture, it has no other purpose but this act of massacre, 90% of it, over 90% has been put in place by Russia and the United States. This is a chart made by a committee in Nagasaki. All the icons from the black-out on your left are Russia; all the icons on the black-out on your right are the United States. And as the legend tells you, you have to take each icon and multiply it by five, because there was no way of representing the actual numerical catastrophe that is there. And of course, this is the bulletin clock at the center of their graph, showing that it’s three minutes to midnight.

    Now, the purpose of international law and national law is, of course, to prevent such injuries. But if people have lost the right of self defense, they’ve also lost the voice to make themselves heard. And just a quick reminder of that is the 1995 International Court of Justice case, in which 78 countries asked that nuclear weapons be declared illegal. And that included Islamic countries such as Qatar, and it included countries that didn’t yet have nuclear weapons, such as North Korea and India, both of whom said, “If you don’t declare them illegal, we have to get them.” And those countries called on all kinds of international protocols.

    In our own country, in a joint statement of the Department of Defense and Department of State, as you probably know, argued that having nuclear weapons, threatening to use nuclear weapons, using nuclear weapons, and using nuclear weapons first does not violate the Geneva protocols, St. Petersburg, the Hague Conventions, the conventions against genocide. Yes, millions of people will die, but the intention, they argued, would not be to eliminate a religious or an ethnic group. It did not violate the conventions on ozone layer and the environment, etcetera, etcetera.

    So, the laws are in place to address the fact that we as human beings, as public health physicians, have pointed out, are pretty good at narrative compassion. But we have a hard time with statistical compassion. It’s hard for us to understand numbers like billions and millions. International law and national law solves the problem of statistical compassion by saying, “It doesn’t matter whether you can empathize with these people or not. There’s certain injuries you’re not allowed to do. It doesn’t matter whether you can picture North Koreans or have any understanding of who they are. There’s certain things you’re not allowed to do.”

    So, my own emphasis is on the national laws, which can be used hand-in-hand with the international laws and the other kinds of accords going on. And that’s in the book, ‘Thermonuclear Monarchy’. And essentially, it’s showing that the key provisions of our own constitution and of constitutions as they were understood in ‘Social Contract Theory’ by Hobbes and Locke, and even before that. Many centuries of thinking about contract are made primarily to be impediments on the act of going to war. Yes, constitutions have many phrases and many provisions, but the two key provisions in our own Constitution and in other constitutions are two brakes on going to war. The first one is the requirement for a Congressional declaration of war, and since the invention of nuclear weapons, we haven’t had a single Congressional declaration of war. Not in Korea, not in Vietnam, not in all our invasions of Panama, Haiti, former Yugoslavia, etcetera, and that’s not a coincidence.

    If presidents know that, as Nixon said, “I can go into the next room, pick up a phone, and in 25 minutes 70 million people will be dead.” If presidents know they have that power, it can seem to them preposterous that merely to invade another country they have to go to Congress. As the elder George Bush said, “In order to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, I didn’t have to go to Congress and get some old goat’s permission.” That was a quotation from him.

    Now, if you actually look at the… And the other provision that’s been made a mockery of in the nuclear age is the Second Amendment, which I hope I’ll get time to talk about, but I’m gonna be concentrating on Congress. If you look at the quality of deliberations in the five cases where the United States has had a declaration of war, which is the War of 1812, the War of 1846, the Mexican-American War, the 1898 Spanish-American War, and World War I and World War II, and contrast the quality of deliberation, which is extremely high, the quality of deliberation with the utter lack of deliberation in presidential decisions about going to war, you see why in addition to simply being law-abiding and being constitutional, it’s crucial that this provision be brought back. And we think of the Cuban Missile Crisis as a time when we came closest to nuclear war, but we know that in 1954 Eisenhower seriously considered using atomic weapons in the Taiwan Straits Crisis. He did so again in 1959 in Berlin. We know that JFK three times, according to Robert McNamara, came within a hair breath of all-out nuclear war. So not once, but three times.

    We know that LBJ, that Lyndon Johnson considered using nuclear weapons against China to prevent China from getting a nuclear weapon. And Nixon has said that he considered using them four times. Now, what does considering mean? Does it mean a flash going through like a marquee that just goes and disappears? No. It means something much more serious than that. In Nixon’s case, the written record suggests that he sent 18 B-52s loaded with nuclear weapons over Russia towards Vietnam in a faint, but a very dangerous kind of bluff. There is much to say about the contrast between the quality of Congressional deliberations and the quality of presidential deliberations, starting with the fact that when Congress deliberates, it’s open to the public. When the president deliberates, we find out 30 years later. That’s why in the list enumeration I just gave you of presidential contemplation of nuclear weapons, I had to stop at Nixon, because we’re only going to get… There’s this big time lag. But I’m just going to concentrate on one because of the shortage of time.

    The lack of dissent in any kind of presidential deliberation and the elaborate dissent in testing that goes on in Congress. Members of Congress consider themselves equal to one another. They are equal to one another. Therefore, they try to test each others’ arguments. Maybe they don’t always have great motives, maybe they’re just showing off. That’s fine. Whatever motive they have for coming up with an alternative explanation to test the reality of the proposition that that country over there did something so bad that we’re now going to go to war against them. There is no equivalent dissent in the presidential deliberations. I read through the papers of both the Taiwan Straits Crisis and the 1959 Berlin Crisis. Here’s the closest thing there was to an act of dissent in the first of those two deliberations, and I’m using the word ‘deliberation’, I should be using a different word. Because it’s not deliberation, for the simple fact that it’s a hierarchical structure, and hierarchical structures can be good for doing some things, like commanding an army once the war is underway. It’s not a good structure for determining whether you’re going to go to war.

    The closest thing to an act of deliberation is Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey says, “I just want to ask a question. Are we going to have a hard time explaining to the American people why islands with names they don’t know like Quemoy and Matsu were so important that we dropped an atomic bomb?” Eisenhower immediately scolds him. “A mere look at the maps on the wall will convince you of the strategic importance of these islands, and of dissent.” Secretary Humphrey doesn’t say, “Yeah, but you said something simpler two weeks ago,” which Eisenhower had. Nobody else says, “I had kind of the same question,” and so forth. Now, if we fast forward to 1959, Eisenhower, I should say, in the ’54 Taiwan Straits Crisis, believed he would be impeached if he used an atomic weapon. He says repeatedly, “Because I would be going over the Congress without their consent, I could be impeached, but I’m willing to be impeached if I need to do it.”

    By 1959, he seems to have decided that if he just invites a sprinkling of people from Congress to the meeting, maybe it’ll count as Congressional authorization. At any rate, the single moment that’s close to an act of dissent or an act of testing is Senator Fulbright saying, “I just want to make sure I understand what we’re saying here. Are we saying that the GDR could take out the roads in West Berlin and that we might begin to repair that road, and then an East German soldier might shoot a rifle at our repairman, and then we would drop an atomic bomb?” Eisenhower says, “We’re not exactly sure of the steps that would lead to the dropping of the atomic bomb, but we know that one thing is true, that once the crisis is underway, there’s no chance to stop and talk to the UN about it.” So in other words, he doesn’t say, “Senator Fulbright, have you lost your mind? Of course we will not use an atomic weapon against somebody firing a rifle.” He says, “We don’t exactly know the circumstances that will lead to that.”

    This kind of provision is absolutely crucial, and starting with the fact that there’s a clear set of sentences on the table that everyone understands is the focus of their deliberation. “Be it enacted by Senate and House of Representatives here assembled, we do hereby declare war.” There’s no equivalent set of sentences in the presidential deliberation, there’s no vote. There’s a conspicuous vote in the case of Congress, everybody has to give their name and vote. We know for all of history that Jeannette Rankin voted no against going to war against Germany and against Japan. The record will stand, there’s no kind of equivalent. And these… I’ll skip the right to bear arms right now, except to say that just as Congress has been made to look like a dead institution once it gave up this huge power, the most important power there is, as Justice Story said in the 19th century, the responsibility for going to war, so in the atomic age, the right to bear arms has looked like a kind of confused and disgraceful provision. The point of the right to bear arms is to say, “However much military power we have, whether zero or a great deal, it’s got to be equally distributed among all of us, because it is the whole population’s responsibility to ratify or not ratify the Congressional declaration of war.”

    And if that seems like a militaristic provision, realize that it’s been something that has been celebrated by not only militarists like Mirabeau in the French Revolution, but by pacifists. Gandhi said, “Of all the evil deeds committed by England against India, the worst is the disarming of the population. Give us back our arms, and then we’ll tell you whether we’re going to use them or not.” And of course, Gandhi’s position at that point in his life would be, “We’re not going to use them.” But you don’t even have the power to insist on pacifism if you have no control over the military arsenal. And I said at the outset that… Oh, I should say that if you look at the Constitution, the only thing that requires this double location, other than war making, is constitution making. If you’re going to change the Constitution, you have to have the assembly voting, both houses, and then you have to have a ratification by the population. The same is true of constitutional law, you have to have the authorization from the Congress and then the ratification by the states.

    And just to show you how this works, there have been over 5,000 amendments proposed in Congress and only 27 have passed, so it’s a tremendous impediment kind of structure. The Constitution does not want to impede the ratification of judges, it does not want to impede people going to the library, it does not want to impede people love making, it does not want to impede education. It wants to impede one thing, going to war, and we’ve just jettisoned the provisions that do that. And I mentioned at the outset that there are equivalent provisions in the constitutions of some of the other nuclear states, France, India and Russia, which I can come back to, and it’s also the case that when you go to social contract theory, you see these same two gates, the parliament and the population invoked as crucial.

    This is a quotation that I very much like from Locke in the second treatise where he quotes, it’s nearly illegible there, Caligula saying that… I’m sorry, where he quotes an observation that Caligula wished that the people had but one neck, that he might dispatch them all at a blow, which is exactly the situation we’re in. “We’re not in a democracy, we’re not even in a governance structure if you’ve got an arrangement, an architecture that allows a tiny number of men in any country to dispatch all of civilization.” Now, that’s the theoretical part of my talk, and we agreed that he would give me a five minute warning, so I could just tell you the concrete part. So here’s the concrete part, and maybe you’ll think of better ways of making this concrete.

    My brother, Joe Scarry, and I went to Congress in early September and met with 10 people, three of them in the House of Representatives, we met with the representatives themselves, and seven in the Senate. We asked for two things, first to have a formal hearing on presidential first use in the Congress. All of them were extremely receptive to that idea. They thought it was fresh and creative. We proposed that they actually bring in former presidents to testify, like Clinton and Carter and the two Bushes, etcetera, about how close they had come, etcetera. And there’s one big problem with it. As you may know, you have to be in the majority party in order to institute a formal hearing. So that will await the… With luck, we’ll have a Democratic House, and then it can be instituted. If that doesn’t happen, then they suggested that we could begin to work with some of the possible Republicans to see if they would initiate it.

    The second thing we proposed was that they become part of a law case where Congressional plaintiffs would be litigants. And the legislative assistants of the Senators listened, I think, with interest. The people in the House didn’t just listen with interest, they jumped right on and said, “Yes, and could… ” And we had proposed we’d come back in December. “No, particularly if Trump gets elected, come back in November, let’s begin this.” And other people, Kennette Benedict from the Bulletin, former executive director has agreed to be part of this legal team. Owen Fiss, who is a constitutional lawyer at Yale, will be part of the legal team. I’m hoping some of you can suggest other people who would be helpful. Of course, the momentum for that is in part driven by the fear of Donald Trump, even though, as we heard yesterday there’s almost equal reason, or maybe equal reason to be afraid of Hillary Clinton.

  • Next Steps from Discourse to Action by Noam Chomsky

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Noam Chomsky at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 25, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

    chomsky 2

    Maybe it would be useful to start with a case where there was action from bottom up and it may have had a significant effect, and I think it has lessons for the present, concern for moving from discourse to action. And what I have in mind is, the last time that a President apparently planned to launch a nuclear attack, not as a result of accident but as a result of design, the facts aren’t crystal clear, they never are in such cases, but the evidence is fairly compelling. I’m referring to 1969, the latter stages of the Vietnam War, President Nixon. It seems from the evidence available that he was pretty close to a decision to resort to nuclear weapons, but was deterred, not by the Russians, but by popular opinion. Huge demonstrations coming up in Washington, already had been one. Nixon and Kissinger already had launched highly provocative action against the Soviet Union, signaling to them but nobody else that, “We’re ready to go all out,” Operation Giant Lance.

    This is something, actually, that Dan suggested years ago, that the popular demonstrations in November might have deterred Nixon from launching a war. And there’s confirmation in some recent studies, in particular a book by Jeffrey Kimball and William Burr, which has the interesting title, sub-title, ‘The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and The Vietnam War’. It’s worth, I’ll come back to that in a minute, but it’s worth remembering how quickly that popular opposition developed. It’s again a lesson for today, I think. So take, say, Boston, where I live, a pretty liberal city, the first international days of protest against the war were in October 1965 and the small group who were protesting the war, pretty small, mostly young people, decided to have a public demonstration on the Boston Common, the normal place for public events. So there was a march and a demonstration on the Common, it was violently broken up by counter-demonstrators, mostly students; the speakers, I was one of them, couldn’t be heard and were only saved from greater violence by a huge police presence. They didn’t like us, but they didn’t want bloodshed on the Boston Common.

    The Boston Globe, the most liberal paper in the country, devoted the whole front page to it the next day, bitterly denouncing the protesters for their lack of patriotism. A couple of years later the Globe became the first newspaper in the country to call for withdrawal from Vietnam. On the Senate floor, people like Mike Mansfield were almost hysterical in their denunciation of people who dared to make what in fact were very mild, embarrassingly mild protests, mostly about the bombing of North Vietnam, which we all knew was a side-show, but at least you get somebody to listen to it. The bombing of South Vietnam, obviously far worse, you could barely raise at the time.

    The next international day of protest was March, 1966. We realized we couldn’t have a public demonstration, so we decided to have an action at a church, Arlington Street Church. The church was attacked, tin cans, tomatoes, big police presence, could of gotten worse. That was early ’66. By ’67 things had changed, by ’68 substantially. By ’69, just a couple of years later, a huge public protest sufficient to, very likely, deter what could have been a resort to nuclear weapons. Actually, all of this bears a comment that Robert ended this morning’s session with, about lack of government response. That’s quite true, the government doesn’t want to do any of the things we’re talking about, and they don’t respond unless it reaches sufficient scale. And even a totalitarian state can’t ignore mass public opinion, actually; we even saw that in the case of Nazi Germany, and certainly a more free society can’t. And I think what all this suggests is that it’s possible to have a pretty rapid transition from not just apathy, but bitter antagonism, bitter, violent antagonism to massive public support by proper actions. And the actions were mostly taken by young people, and pretty effective ones.

    Well, let’s go back to the subtitle, the ‘Madman Diplomacy and The Vietnam War.’ The Madman Theory is commonly attributed to Richard Nixon on the basis of pretty thin evidence, mainly Haldeman’s memoir, but there’s actually much stronger evidence for the same theory under Clinton, it actually was released by Hans M. Kristensen about 15 years ago, a document, one of the many, that doesn’t get sufficient attention, I think, ‘Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence’ came out in 1995, STRATCOM document, which calls for first use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear states, and gives a rationale. The rationale is essentially what Dan was talking about yesterday. It said, “Nuclear weapons provide a cover, a shadow that covers all of our ordinary conventional actions.”

    In other words, if we make people think we might use nuclear weapons, they’ll back off when we carry off conventional actions. That’s Dan’s image of holding a gun, but not shooting it, but using it. This is STRATCOM talking about it. Then they go on to say we should project a national persona of being irrational and vindictive, so that people don’t know what we’re going to do next. That’s a madman theory from a better source than Haldeman’s memoirs. And remember it’s the Clinton years, first major post-Cold War document about so-called deterrence. And it’s worth remembering other things, say, about a Clinton liberal America, which tend to be forgotten. There was a huge and appropriate, popular uproar, at least in some circles, about George Bush II’s doctrine of preventive war. But go back to Clinton. There was also a Clinton doctrine. Every president has a doctrine. Now the Clinton doctrine was that the US has the right to resort to unilateral use of force in case of, I’ll read the words, “to ensure uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources.” That goes way beyond the Bush doctrine.

    But it was quiet testimony to Congress, no big flashy statements. But that’s the thinking that’s in the background, a version of the madman theory, make sure we get uninhibited access to energy resources, supplies, key market strategic resources or else we’re entitled to use force, all right in the background. We can run through a kind of a wish list of things that ought to be done, and they actually should be done, no question about them. Drew’s first aid kit yesterday is a good collection: Move forward with the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty; put an end to emplacing first-strike weapons on the Russian border disguised as a missile defense against non-existent Iranian missiles; a move towards eliminating the land-based component of a triad somebody mentioned this morning, certainly makes sense, useless, dangerous move towards establishing nuclear weapon-free zones in the world.

    I think that’s important. For one thing it has, apart from the policy consequences, has a psychological effect that indicates we’re this part of the world, we’re getting out of this insanity. That can become effective and infectious if it’s known. Unfortunately like many things, it’s barely known. And again the most important one by far is for the Middle East, where there is no regional opposition, in fact strong regional support, with the exception of Israel backed by the United States. Iran is in the lead of advocating it. The Arab states have been proposing it for 20 years. And a lot is at stake.

    The perpetuation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is conditional on establishing that, and the fact that the United States blocks it is very serious. There are many examples of missed opportunities to shift from reflexive reliance on force to diplomacy and negotiations. And force means not just bombs, it also means, for example, sanctions, which can be very brutal and destructive. Just recently a UN report came out on the impact of sanctions on Syria, which doesn’t harm the Assad regime, they go ahead and do what they want with plenty of Russian support, but it does harm the population bitterly. And the worst such case was Iraq. Not discussed enough. The Iraqi sanctions were… Let’s just take the wording of the UN administrators who administered the humanitarian component of the Iraq sanctions, Denis Halliday, Hans Von Sponeck, both of whom resigned in protest against the US and Britain, arguing that the sanctions were, in their words, “genocidal”. Hans von Sponeck wrote an important detailed book about it, ‘Another Kind Of War’. Not a mention, I don’t think that there was a review or barely a mention in the United States or England.

    They also protected Saddam Hussein. It’s not impossible, as they kind of suggested, that he might have undergone the same fate as a whole series of other tyrants who were overthrown from within. He was protected by the sanctions, the sanctions compelled the population to rely on his distribution system for survival, and undermined the civil society that could have overthrown him. What happened to Samosa and Marcos and Ceausescu, another darling of the United States, incidentally, Mobutu, a whole series. That was the effect of virtually genocidal sanctions and force, we have plenty of examples. The discussions here have made it amply evident, if it wasn’t already, that no possible variety of tactical planning and considerations can ever justify the insanity, as David put it yesterday, of even the threat of maybe using nuclear weapons, let alone trying to use them on a small scale or anything crazy like that.

    The only hope that we have is a major shift in attitudes from reflexive resort to violence, the normal reaction to… What are taken to be publications or threats, to diplomacy, negotiations, and peaceful means. We certainly can see right in front of us constantly that resort to the sledgehammer is not the answer. It takes a so-called ‘Global War on Terror’. And when it was declared, radical Islamic terror was confined to a small tribal area in the northwest, in the region of Afghan and Pakistan border. But where is it now? All over the world. Every sledgehammer blow has expanded it, every single one. The Iraq War that was predicted by US Intelligence, we now know from the Chilcot Report by British Intelligence too, that it would extend terror, and it did, according to RAND statistics, quasi-governmental statistics, it increased terror by a factor of seven in the first year. It also instigated a sectarian conflict which didn’t exist, which is now tearing not only Iraq but the whole region apart. Libya, hit it with a sledgehammer in violation of our own Security Council resolution. Result: Huge, apart from destroying Libya, a huge flow of weapons and jihadis, mostly to West Africa, which is now the major source of Islamic terrorism in the world, according to UN statistics. And so, it is case after case. And there are plenty of alternatives. The same is true of killing leaders.

    There’s a very interesting book which, if you haven’t read it, you might look at, by military historian Andrew Cockburn called ‘Kill Chain,’ who runs through a long record, starting with drug cartels, moving on to terrorist groups, of assassinations of leaders that try to terminate the threat. Consistently, when you murder a leader, what you get, without looking at the roots of what’s going on, what you get is a younger, more violent, more militant leader who goes well beyond what has happened before. The record is pretty impressive and it goes on. A couple of weeks ago, Hillary Clinton advocated assassinating Baghdadi. Sure, the head of Isis, and no doubt plenty of plans to do that. You look at US government terrorism specialists, like Bruce Hoffman, they strongly oppose that. They say, “You kill Baghdadi, you’ll get somebody without getting to the source of what’s going on, you’ll get somebody younger, more militant, more violent, more radical, who may even do what Baghdadi has refused to do, mainly form an alliance with al-Qaeda.” ISIS and al-Qaeda are virtually at war now. An alliance with al-Qaeda would create a terrorist group much worse than what we’re facing now. That’s consistent. And there are many opportunities, many missed opportunities, we just heard about one this morning.

    Again, the current UN resolution on making the use, or even threat of possession of nuclear weapons illegal, that’s just gonna die. It’ll vanish, like all other opportunities, unless there is massive popular support for it, which has to begin with at least information. I doubt if a tenth of 1% of the population even knows it’s happening, there’s essentially nothing reported, nobody hears. But it can be done. What happened in 1969 is one of many illustrations. And there have been others, just keeping to recent years. The most important, which has come up several times, was the 1991, end of the Cold War, Gorbachev’s vision of a common Europe, an integrated security system for Europe and Eurasia, the whole region, no military alliances. Not much was known about it, scholarship has covered it, but the details are not known to the population. We now know that Bush and Baker not only rejected it and moved directly to expanding NATO, contrary to and in opposition to verbal promises to Gorbachev, which it now looks we’re deceitful and intended to mislead. Leading right up to what we have now: Confrontation on the Russian border which could easily lead the war.

    Gorbachev’s vision didn’t die, it’s been reiterated. It was reiterated by Medvedev when he was Prime Minister, it was reiterated by Putin, the demon Putin in 2014 that came forth with a fairly similar proposal, not quite the same words, but same in spirit. We don’t know if these could work, you have to try them, But they passed, they were missed, not discussed, no popular opposition, government could do what it wanted, namely reject them and move on to greater confrontation. 1999, Putin proposed US-Russian co-operation against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Ignored. Could it have worked? Yeah, it could have averted 9/11.

    Let’s turn to 2001, invasion of Afghanistan. Was that necessary? You can see the effects in Afghanistan. There was strong opposition to it from the leading anti-Taliban Afghan activists like Abdul Haq, the most respected of them, who bitterly condemned the bombing, said, “The US is just trying to show its muscle and harm Afghans, and it’s undermining our efforts to overthrow the Taliban from within, supported by others”. There were opportunities, we don’t know if they were real, for extradition, not pursuit. 2005, North Korea, big danger. Is there a way to deal with North Korea? Well, one way is to, the normal resort to more force. North Korea reacts, tit for tat. What happens when you move towards negotiations? It seems to succeed. In 2005, for example, there were actual negotiations between the Bush administration and North Korea. North Korea agreed to abandon all nuclear weapons, all existing weapon programs, allow international inspectors, in return for an end to aggressive talk and actions, international aid, a non-aggression pledge and a light water reactor for research and medical purposes. Bush immediately responded by dismantling the international consortium that was to provide the reactor, pressured banks to squeeze North Korean assets, North Korea returned to weapons development.

    If you go back to 1994, that’s been happening consistently, no time to run through it, but it’s reviewed in the professional literature. Go on to 2010, Iran and its nuclear programs were the great fear, supposedly. There was a proposal in 2010 initiated actually by a friend of my wife, Valeria’s, Celso Amorim in Brazil. Valeria has now got his book translated into English. He reviews this and is organizing a speaking tour for him. What happened? 2010, at Brazilian initiative, Brazil, Turkey and Iran reached an agreement. The agreement was to send the low enriched uranium in Iran to Turkey in return for provision of isotopes for research and medical work. As soon as it was mentioned it came under bitter attack in the United States; the press, the government and so on.

    Amorim was annoyed enough so that he released the letter from Obama, in which Obama had proposed precisely this, evidently expecting that Iran would turn it down and he’d get a propaganda coup. Well, they accepted it, so therefore we had to block it, of course the US has to run it, we don’t want peace. Again, no protests, no actions. Turn to Syria, one of the worst atrocities in the world. Is there a way to stop it? There might have been. 2012, Geneva 1, there was a meeting under the auspices then of Lakhdar Brahimi, a serious negotiator. Kofi Annan released a communique saying that there was agreement on a transitional government with the participation of members of the Assad regime, and any negotiation that tells the Assad regime, “Please commit suicide”, is just a death sentence for Syria, of course they’re not gonna do that.

    So there had to be participation of the Assad regime, can’t avoid that, no matter how horrible they are. It was blocked by Hillary Clinton, speaking for the government. Shortly before that, according to Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish Prime Minister, a long record in peace negotiations, according to him, the Russian Ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, the UN proposed that in negotiations Assad would step aside during the negotiations, leaving some participation of his regime. According to Ahtisaari, Britain, France and the United States rejected it. They assumed at the time Assad was gonna fall, so we lost that one.

    2015, again the five-year review period of the NPT conference, WMD free zone in the Middle East came up. It was blocked by the United States. Has to protect Israeli nuclear weapons from inspection. Again, threatening even the perpetuation of the NPT. No protest, no action, no knowledge. Another missed opportunity. And so it goes. There is a consistent record that goes back to the early ’50s of major opportunities that were ignored, rejected, unknown, no pressure, nothing happens. And it’s again worth remembering that pressure can build up even quickly and can be effective, and it’s imperative to keep trying.

  • Keeping Faith with the Future by Peter Kuznick

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Peter Kuznick at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 25, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

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    This session is called ‘Keeping Faith With the Future’, but after hearing so many presentations yesterday I decided I was going to do something a little different and talk about keeping faith with the past. We’ve been talking a lot about the public ignorance about nuclear war, nuclear winter, the risk that we face now. I’m always appalled by the public ignorance about history. In the national report card that was issued in 2011, among American high school seniors the area they came in last in was not math and science or languages, the area they came in last in was their understanding of US history. 12% of high school seniors were judged to be proficient in US history, but even that number is misleading, because only 2% could identify what Brown versus Board of Education was about, even though it was obvious from the way the question was posed.

    So we’ve got this vast problem of historical ignorance in this country, and that’s why Oliver Stone and I decided to do our project, ‘The Untold History of the United States’, because we wanted to address this. Oliver had… We come from different perspectives. Oliver comes from a conservative Republican family. He was a Goldwater supporter, he volunteered for combat in Vietnam, the only person probably in the history of Yale at least during the Vietnam War to volunteer for combat. I came from a left-wing New York family, and we decided we were going to look at this partly… Oliver wanted to figure out if George Bush was an aberration or if we looked at the patterns of American history, if George Bush was reflective of those patterns.

    He also saw his daughter’s high school history textbook and it repeated all the same lies, all the same myths that we all grew up with in the 1950s and 1960s. So we decided we were going to look at the broad range of American history. So we did a history… The Untold History Project is a history of the American empire and national security state. And one of the things we began to take on that was brought up yesterday is the question of American exceptionalism, because that’s so key to the American mindset in the world, the idea of exceptionalism, the idea that the United States is not only different from all other countries but the United States is better than all other countries.

    Other countries are motivated by greed, by geopolitical considerations, by territory. The United States, however, is motivated only by altruism, benevolence, one that’s bred freedom and democracy. But this is so deeply believed that it’s not even questioned in our society that the United States is different. It goes back to Woodrow Wilson saying after Versailles, “Now the world will see the United States as a savior of the world.” In more recent manifestations of that, Madeline Albright, “If we use forces because we’re America, we’re the indispensable nation. We stand taller and see farther than other countries.” Hillary Clinton repeating that over and over again that we’re the indispensable nation. Barack Obama. I don’t know if you remember when Obama welcomed the troops home at Fort Bragg at the first end of the Iraq war and he said to them, he said, “Your willingness to sacrifice so much for a people that you had never met is part of what makes us special as Americans. Unlike the old empires, we don’t make these sacrifices for territory, for resources, we do it because it’s right. There could be no fuller expression of America’s support for self-determination than our leaving Iraq to its people, that says something about us.” He says, “Wars make us stronger and more secure about our values,” he goes on and on.

    But this notion of American exceptionalism is so deeply ingrained in our psyche, in our culture, that we have to begin to really take it on. And that’s what Oliver and I tried to do in this project. So the idea started back in 2007. Oliver and I were having dinner and he said, “Let’s do a documentary.” It was going to be a one-hour documentary about Henry Wallace and Hiroshima. Then when I went to see him in New York two weeks later he now had an idea for a 10-hour, 10-part documentary series.

    I thought I could get it done during my sabbatical. It ended up taking us five years. Halfway through the project we decided we had to add a book, so we wrote this 800-page book in addition. And what you can say in a documentary in 58 minutes and 30 seconds, is very, very limited. I thought Oliver was going to narrate them like a New Yorker on speed, so my initial drafts were each about three times as long as you could do in 58 minutes. But then we had to obviously re-think it and do it a little bit differently. But, so we started with… And then it aired on Showtime in the United States, it’s aired all over the world. The books, there’s various versions of the book. There’s the Concise Untold History, based on the documentary scripts, the Young Readers book, the first of four volumes is out now. The graphic novel is on the way. So we’ve been doing this around the world and we start really initially with the myths about World War II, again so deeply ingrained in the United States.

    The first myth was that the United States won the war in Europe, right? That’s really unquestioned in the United States. The reality of, course, is that the Soviets won the war in Europe with some help from the United States and Britain. Throughout most of that war, the United States and Britain faced 10 German divisions combined; the Soviets were facing 200 German divisions combined. That’s why Churchill said that the Red Army tore the guts out of the Nazi war machine. Americans don’t know that. I did an anonymous survey with students recently. College students, all A students in high school. You would think they would know something. And I asked them how many Americans died in World War II. The median answer I got was 90,000. So it’s okay, they’re only 300,000 off, that’s in the ballpark. I asked them how many Soviets died in World War II. The median answer I got was 100,000. Which means they were only 27 million off. These kids, they can’t understand anything about the Cold War. They don’t know, can’t understand what’s going on in Ukraine now. This level of ignorance, I think, is pervasive throughout American society.

    The second myth, we look at the same kind of ignorance about Vietnam. College students now don’t really remember much or know much about Vietnam. The Gallup poll that came out last year said that 51% of 18-29 year olds in this country think the Vietnam war was worth fighting, that it wasn’t a mistake. 51%. And so yeah, you have to try to conceptualize this in a way they can understand. When I deal with World War II, I try to explain that the 27 million Soviet losses. You think of 9/11 in the United States, about 3,000 people lost. After that we turned the world upside down. We invaded several countries, we bombed many more countries, droning the world, special forces in 135 countries. And I tell them that, quantitatively, 9/11, that the Soviet losses in World War II are the equivalent of one 9/11 a day, every day for 24 years. One 9/11 a day, every day for 24 years.

    The Vietnam, how do you make that graphic for them? McNamara, when he came into my class, said he accepts that 3.8 million Vietnamese died in the war. Most of my students have gone down to the Vietnam Memorial Wall. And I asked them, “What is the message of that?” They say it’s got the names of 58,280 Americans who died in the war. The lesson of that is the tragedy of Vietnam is that 58,280 Americans died. And I say, “What if… And that wall is 492 feet long. If it included the names of the 3.8 million Vietnamese, the million Cambodians and Laotians, the Americans, Brits, Aussies, everybody who died, the wall would be more than eight miles long. That would be a fitting memorial to the Vietnam war.” But that’s not obviously what we have.

    So Oliver and I decided to take these things on. We go around to campuses all over the country. Our focus is largely our nuclear history, from an apocalyptic perspective. We’re trying to show, if you look at the broad range of American history, you can understand the question of nuclear winter and how deeply rooted that is. And if you study the history, he knows what we were talking about yesterday is not a surprise. And there were times when Americans weren’t even that ignorant. But the main one we show when we go to different campuses is our episode about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I’ve been working on this question for a long time. Back in 1995 I started taking students on a study abroad class to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I’ve done that every summer since then, since 1995. So American students, we travel with Japanese students from Japanese universities and we deal with this whole thing.

    But if you look at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, what we’re really talking about is World War II. It’s this tiny bomb and the destruction and damage it caused is minuscule compared to what a nuclear war would look like today, as we all understand. In our episodes, so we go around to campuses and to high schools and to community centers here and other countries and we show our episode about the decision to drop the bomb. And we make clear there is, first of all, that there was no military necessity to drop the bomb. One of… The fundamental myth about the bomb is that the atomic bombs ended World War II, and therefore they were justified and that they avoided an invasion, that if the United States had not dropped the bomb we would have had to invade Japan.

    Truman says Marshall told him that we’d lose a half million men in an invasion. Therefore the bombing was necessary, it was actually humane because it not only saved American lives, it saved Japanese lives. It’s the fundamental myth. And what does Obama say when he goes to Hiroshima? I was in Hiroshima. NHK, the Japanese public broadcaster who brought me over there to do some tv shows while Obama was there, and I probably did 50 interviews here as well about this. And what does Obama say there? It was great that he went. I was pushing him to go from the day he got elected. He should have really given his Prague speech in Hiroshima and it would have been even more meaningful and powerful. But what Obama says there from the very beginning is full of lies. The first sentence, “Death fell from the skies.” Death didn’t fall from the sky, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. But he says there that we have to look history straight in the eye and that we have to tell the truth and tell a different story.

    And what does he say? He says, “World War II reached its brutal end in Hiroshima and Nagasaki”. That’s the lie. That’s what the people have been taught. What is the reality? The reality is that what ended the war, is what we show in our episode, was the Soviet invasion. But not only was the Soviet invasion of Manchuria that ended the war as prime minister Suzuki and others said, the military people said. But Truman knew that in advance. That was the crazy thing about this, is that Truman knew that the Soviet invasion would end the war. He knew there were two ways to end the war, to speed it up. One was changing the surrender terms, tell the Japanese they can keep the emperor. The other was wait for the Soviet invasion. Truman said he went to Potsdam to make sure that Stalin was coming into the war. Stalin had promised Roosevelt at Yalta in February that the Russians would come into the Pacific war three months after the end of the war in Europe, and he gets the agreement from Stalin, and he writes in his journal that night, “Stalin will be in the Jap war by August 15th. Fini Japs when that occurs.” He writes home to his wife, Bess, the next day, says, “The Russians are coming in, we’ll end the war a year sooner now, think of all the boys who won’t be killed.” He looks at the intercepted July 18th cable, and he calls it “the telegram from the Jap emperor asking for peace”.

    He’s fully aware that there are other alternatives to using the bomb, but he chose to use the bomb, and that’s what historians have been debating, why did he want to use the bomb so desperately? And he wanted to use the bomb because he wanted to send a signal to the Soviets that if they messed with American plans in Europe or the Pacific, this is what they’re going to get. And they understood that better than anybody, because the Japanese had adopted an unfortunate strategy of trying to get the Soviets to negotiate on their behalf for better surrender terms, so they could keep the emperor, and they had a couple other demands that they were hoping for.

    So the Soviets interpreted the atomic bombing exactly that way, that this bomb was not dropped on Japan because Japan was defeated, but it was dropped on them. So right from the very beginning, this is key to understanding the arch of the Cold War, but the perspective that Oliver and I have that’s different from other historians… John Dower, great historian from MIT, said that there are two basic narratives about the decision to drop the bomb. One is the tragic narrative and the other is the heroic narrative.

    So the heroic narrative, which we all know is the standard one, it saved American lives and we were the good guys in the war against fascism. The tragic narrative is that it didn’t have to be dropped, and it was a tragedy because of all the people who were killed and wounded and suffered ever since. But Oliver and I have done what we call the apocalyptic narrative, which ties directly into what we were talking about yesterday.

    The apocalyptic narrative argues that Truman knew, understood, and said on several occasions that he was not just dropping a bigger, more powerful bomb, but he was beginning a process that could end all life on the planet, and that was inherent in the bomb from the very beginning. In the summer of ’42, Edward Teller didn’t even want to waste time on the atomic bomb, he wanted to push for the fusion bomb, for the hydrogen bomb from the very beginning, was Teller’s idea.

    On May 31st, 1945, Robert Oppenheimer briefs America’s military and political leaders, and says that within three years, we’re likely to have weapons between 700 and 7,000 times as powerful as the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. We knew what was happening. And America’s military leaders knew this too, so at Potsdam, Truman gets the briefing on how powerful the Alamogordo test was, and he writes in his journal, he says, “We’ve discovered the most terrible weapon in history, this may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates valley era after Noah and his fabulous ark.”

    Not a bigger more powerful bomb, the fire destruction. So Truman uses it, right, to kill innocent people is a war crime, but to threaten all of humanity with extinction, which is what we were doing from the start of the nuclear age, is far, far worse. And from the standpoint of it being necessary, even in a military sense, America had eight five star admirals and generals in 1945. Seven of the eight are on record saying the bomb was either militarily unnecessary or morally reprehensible, or both. So we’re not talking about pacifists, we’re talking about Eisenhower, MacArthur, Leahy. We’re talking about… Nimitz. The key American military leaders, but does the American public know this?

    Well, maybe they’re starting to, because if we look at the polling over the years, it’s usually about 55% to 45% in favor of the atomic bomb in the public opinion polling. There was one that came out last year that was actually 57% in favor of the bomb, to 34% percent opposed. But in late May of this year, May 27th, CBS News released a poll that showed that 44% of Americans were opposed to the dropping of the atomic bomb, and only 43% support it.

    So I think our collective efforts of trying to get this message out there, perhaps is finally starting to reach people. I gave a talk in a senior citizens living center this summer, and before the talk I asked them, “How many of you think that Truman did the right thing in dropping the atomic bomb, and these are people in their 70s, 80s and 90s, and of the 27 people in the room, 26 hands went up supporting Truman in dropping the bomb. But you can get, sometimes on campuses, I get just the opposite response, and Oliver and I used to go around to campuses all over the country, and we’d get a fabulous response.

    That’s one of the reasons why I’m more optimistic about some of this, because a lot of it just has to do with our ability to reach people, because once they are exposed to things that they’ve never heard before, it wakes them up, it opens their eyes. And even the US, the museum, National Museum of the US Navy in Washington DC, says that now, in its exhibit, says, “The vast destruction wreaked by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made little impact on the Japanese military; however, the Soviet invasion on Manchuria on August 9th changed their minds.” So even the National Museum of the US Navy is finally talking a little bit of truth about this.

    So we talk about that. Then we go into the Cold War and the arms race. One of the people we highlight, is a man who’s been lost to history and I think it’s very, very unfortunate, and that’s Henry Wallace. I go to audiences and I ask them, “Who is Roosevelt’s vice president from ’41 to ’45?” Nobody knows. Most people have never even heard of Henry Wallace. So Oliver and I really featured him very prominently. I assume that this group does know more about Henry Wallace, but I’ll just tell you a little since I don’t have much time.

    Roosevelt in 1940 knew we were about to get to war against fascism and he wanted a progressive on the ticket as vice president. So, he chose former Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, who was a leading anti-fascist in the New Deal administrations. It’s an interesting story, because the convention didn’t want to give him Wallace as vice president. So Roosevelt wrote a remarkable letter to the convention turning down the nomination for the third term saying, “We already have one conservative, money-dominated party in this country, the Republicans. So if the Democrats are not going to stand for liberal, progressive ideas and social justice, then this party has no reason to exist and I’m not going to run as a candidate for president on this ticket.” Eleanor went to the floor of the convention and convinced them that he was serious and they put Wallace on as vice president.

    In 1941, Henry Luce announced that the 20th century is going to be the American century, where the United States is going to dominate the world in every way. Wallace countered that, said that the 20th century must be the century of the common man. He called for a worldwide people’s revolution in the tradition of the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Latin-American Revolutions and the Russian Revolution, said we have to end monopolies and cartels, go for global full employment, said we need a worldwide people’s revolution… It is visionary, this progressive vision, and so in ’44, the conservatives in the party want to get Wallace off the ticket. They knew that Roosevelt was not going to survive another term and they wanted somebody much more conservative. The problem was that Wallace was the second most popular man in the United States.

    And on the day the Democratic Party convention started, July 20th, ’44, Gallup released a poll asking potential voters who they wanted on the ticket as vice president. 65% said they wanted Wallace back as vice president, 2% said they wanted Harry Truman, but how could the party bosses control the convention in order to get Truman on there? The first night, Wallace makes a seconding speech for Roosevelt. The place goes wild and a big demonstration goes on for an hour. In the middle of it, Claude Pepper, the senator from Florida, realized if he could get to the microphone, get Wallace’s name in nomination, Wallace would sweep the convention, defy the bosses, be back on the ticket as vice president and would’ve become president on April 12th, 1945.

    So Pepper fights his way to the microphone. Mayor Kelly and the other bosses are screaming, “Adjourn this convention immediately, it’s a fire hazard!” Sam Jackson is chairing it, he didn’t know what to do, said, “I have a motion to adjourn, all in favor say ‘Aye’.” About 5% said aye, all opposed no, everybody else yelled out, “no”. He said, “Motion carried, meeting adjourned”. Pepper was literally 5 feet from the microphone at that point. What we argue here, is that had Pepper gotten five more feet to the microphone, then Wallace would have become president instead of Truman. There would have been no atomic bombing in 1945 and very possibly no Cold War, because Wallace had that rare ability to see the world through the eyes of our adversaries, which most American presidents can’t do at all. And Wallace agreed with Roosevelt that we were going to have to… The post-war period would have to be one in which the United States and the Soviets led the world as friends and allies in order to maintain peace and stability in the post-war world.

    We tell that story because part of the problem, if people’s vision of history is such that they think that the way the world’s turned out is the only way the world could have been, and they can’t imagine a better world. One of the things that’s missing now is this utopianism that we felt so strongly in the 1960s, the idea that we could make a better world, we could make a different world. Students now don’t see that nearly as much. They want to do piece-meal reforms. They don’t have a broad, radical vision that many of us had then, and hopefully still do have. So we wanted to show how many times, how close we’ve come to very, very different histories. How close we came, somebody mentioned yesterday about Eisenhower’s wonderful speech in 1953, which was the first one that Eisenhower gave after Stalin died. After a long silence, Eisenhower gives that speech about building roads and post offices at the cost of one bomb, but what we don’t know is that two days later, Dulles gives a speech and contradicts everything in Eisenhower’s speech and again waves a red flag of confrontation with the Soviets. Eisenhower’s speech was front page news all over the Soviet Union. They were thrilled. They were so excited. We had that possibility when Stalin died in 1953. We had that potential over and over again to create a different history, and that’s part of what we we’re about. We want to grab history now and bend it in a very, very different way than it’s been going.

    I have a lot more that I was going to talk about what the Cold War was really about. This is something that I’ve seen Noam use, but almost no historians use it. George Kennan’s secret memo in 1948 when he was talking about the Cold War. And he says, “We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population. We cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity.” He said, “To do so, we will have to dispense will all sentimentality and day-dreamings. We should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives, such as human rights, the raising of the living standards and democratization. We’re going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.”

    What was the Cold War really about? What was Vietnam really about? What was going on in the 1950s? The background to what Dan was talking about yesterday. Somebody mentioned there some numbers, I think Hans threw out some numbers about Eisenhower’s nuclear build-up. When Eisenhower became president, the United States had about a thousand nuclear weapons. When Eisenhower left office, the United States had 22,000 nuclear weapons. When Eisenhower’s budgeting cycle was finished two years later, the United States had 30,000 nuclear weapons. So most people when… Or my students, when I ask them what they know about Eisenhower, they talk about the military industrial complex. Yeah, Eisenhower knew about the military industrial complex, because he created it.

    And as Dan has shown, we went from one finger on the nuclear button with sub-delegation and delegation to dozens of fingers on the nuclear button. Nuclear weapons went from being our last resort to our first resort. They went from civilian control to military control. The last psyop or the first psyop that Dan actually was able to reveal said that in the event of a nuclear war we would immediately shoot off our entire arsenal. It was the Eisenhower strategy, and it would lead to between 600 and 650 million deaths from the American weapons alone. So, as Dan says, a holocaust is what the American strategy was.

    So this apocalyptic vision, this idea of nuclear winter that we’ve been so fixated on is something that was very well-known in the 1950s when there was discussion of cobalt bombs, when there was a world-wide movement to try to control nuclear weapons, where there was a broad discussion that even a nuclear launch by the United States would be suicidal. And that understanding during the Cuban Missile Crisis, it continues in the 1980s, where we still have… Remember the movies like ‘The Day After’, ‘Threads’, ‘Testament’, this was broadly part of the culture. But since the end of the Cold War it has largely vanished. Our goal and our responsibility is to figure out how to bring that back, how to rekindle it. Thanks.

  • Next Steps from Discourse to Action by Richard Falk

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Richard Falk at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 25, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

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    Well, let me begin by saying how grateful I am to David, Rob and Rick, in particular, for bringing us together for this really very exceptional set of discussions. I think it’s been invaluable. Not so much I think that it led us to understand the issues differently, but I think it attuned us to the general challenges that are embedded in this effort to move from discourse to action, and to diagnose what the disease is. There’s a Burmese slogan, “Disease unknown, cure unknown.” And I think it’s essential in framing hope in a way that doesn’t lead to false hopes, that we are explicit about how to diagnose what it is we’re trying to overcome. And in that sense, we need to understand what sorts of action, what sorts of initiatives can be useful within the historical circumstance that we’re in. And there’s no question that it’s as dangerous as anything that has existed, certainly since the end of the Cold War. If you doubt that, you might read the current issue of The Economist, which has the cover story on Putinism, and has a long leader editorial in which it depicts the risks of a nuclear confrontation, but puts all the onus of the blame for creating this situation on Russia. There’s no self-scrutiny in terms of the West and the provocative deployments and other kinds of initiatives that it’s taken. But it is a very, I think, vivid indicator that this very influential journal would highlight the nuclear dangers at this moment in time.

    I think that there’s no question that in order to be effective in a political context, there has to be a grounding of hope, that one has to hope that valuable initiatives are both practical and lead toward the goals that we seek to attain. I’m sometimes disturbed by the discourse of hope, because I think it looks too facilely at what seems to be acceptable within the Beltway, or to governmental sources at the moment, what one can do. And I feel we, especially if we’re trying to change the discourse among the citizenry, among the young, within the media, that we have to start from a very strong ethical repudiation of any link between security and nuclear weapons. I think it’s not a rational issue. As long as you keep it on a rational plane of being dangerous or imprudent, there are always counter-arguments.

    In other words, on the plane of rationality, you may persuade yourself and your friends, but it won’t have an impact on the consensus that I think has persisted ever since nuclear weapons were developed, that the best one can hope for is an effective non-proliferation regime reinforced by trying to avoid vulnerability to accidents, miscalculations and the like. In other words, prudent nuclearism has been the prevailing consensus, not only on the part of the US, but on the part of all the nuclear governments. And I feel that unless we clearly repudiate that consensus, we will not create the foundation for a genuine movement to eliminate nuclear weapons. So what I’m really trying to express is the ethical imperative that really should lead to self-scrutiny about the fact that we’ve been threatening the annihilation of tens of millions of people for decades. You know, it’s the point that E. P. Thompson made a long time ago, about a culture of exterminism, that you don’t have to use the weapons, you don’t have to threaten them, but even to base your security on the idea that you might use them is so deeply immoral and incompatible with the values of a civilized society, that it seems to me one important contribution would be to acknowledge that ethical imperative.

    I’ve also tried to stress my feeling that unless arms control measures, these sort of step-by-step approach, or incremental approach, or risk-reduction approach, that that’s, as Rob, I think, pointed out very well, we’ve been waiting 47 years for Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be implemented, and despite the unanimous call by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 opinion, it completely, there’s a Teflon effect. There’s no, we are no nearer that goal. And what has happened is that you have two types of non-proliferation regimes. You have the explicit Treaty, which contains Article VI, and the withdrawal clause in Article X, and then you have the geopolitical regime that excludes those Articles.

    Iran has no option to withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty without facing the prospect of aggressive war against it, and it certainly can’t invoke the Article X, which gives states the option to withdraw if they feel their security is threatened. And Iran and North Korea both have extremely good deterrence arguments in support of acquiring nuclear weapons. So it seems to me very important that while seeking a prudent posture toward the risks that presently exist, that they be contextualized in a, by reference both to the ethical imperative and to the need to transform our understanding of stability and security. And so that, where do you go with that, and it seems to me it provides the foundation for relevant pedagogy, for educating the kinds of audiences that we need to mobilize if we’re really to challenge the kind of prudent nuclearism that has prevailed for so long.

    And I feel, finally, that it’s important not to succumb to the liberal ideology, which Judith alluded to in her presentation, about the good being the enemy of the best. What I feel here, is that the, if you call arms control the good, it’s the friend of the unacceptable, because it stabilizes what should be repudiated. And therefore, it’s not the path, it’s a very difficult challenge, because you obviously don’t want to act imprudently, and so you want to encourage prudence. But at the same time it’s a Faustian bargain. If the prudence is achieved at the cost of stabilizing nuclearism, and that’s what’s happened, in my view, over the whole period where nuclear weapons have existed.

    Richard Barnett wrote a book in the 1960s called ‘Who Wants Disarmament’, it was a time when both the US and the Soviet Union were putting forth proposals that seemed to indicate a commitment to a general and complete disarmament but preceded by total nuclear disarmament. And he shows in that book very clearly that that wasn’t the real policy, the stated policy was not the real policy of either side, and that this was a kind of peace propaganda, which disguised the deeper engagement with what I’ve been calling ‘prudent nuclearism’, that that was the real policy. And part of prudent nuclearism is as rigorous a non-proliferation regime as is geopolitically possible, that combination of events.

    So, let me end by trying to say that I think that we need to see whether there is a consensus on these ideas. In our drafting group discussions, there’s been a certain tension between saying, “Let’s focus on what seems feasible and necessary in the present context without raising these underlying issues,” and the view that I’m associated with or express that says, “Unless you raise the underlying issues you will get more of the same.”

  • Assessing the Alarming Lack of Progress by Noam Chomsky

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Noam Chomsky at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 24, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

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    I have a few reflections on the alarming lack of progress since David ended with one of his eloquent poems. Maybe I’ll begin with one of my favorites. Unfortunately, I don’t have the exact words, so it won’t have the proper eloquence. But it’s brief and succinct enough so I can make the point in simple prose. The poem is called something like “A Lesson in History”, and it mentions three dates: August 6th, 1945, Hiroshima; August 8th, 1945, the announcement of the Nuremberg Tribunals; August 9th, 1945, Nagasaki. Nothing else to be said. That does tell us something about the alarming lack of progress, in this case in understanding our own actions and their consequences. And it should remind us that we’re very lucky, very fortunate, in that we are in the most powerful country in world history, its actions will shape significantly what happens in the future, and also a country which is one of the most free in world history, which means we have enormous opportunities to address the crucial issues that confront the human species, and they are beyond anything that has arisen in the past.

    Well, turning to lack of progress, lack of progress may not be a strong enough phrase. David’s word “regress” is more to the point. It’s hard to disagree with William Perry, who pointed out in his recent book that by 2011, in his words, “The US and Russia began a long backward slide.” As he points out at that time, the new START Treaty, which was indeed finally implemented, was so politically contentious that Obama decided not to offer the comprehensive test-ban treaty for ratification. That’s a big step backwards. Russia has since been engaged in a massive nuclear armaments program, general armaments program. It includes ICBMs with MIRVs, very dangerous nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles, and many other extremely dangerous weapons. The US is undertaking modernization, as you know, the trillion dollar, 30-year modernization program. Along with new missiles that are understood to be particularly dangerous because they’re small and can be scaled down for battlefield use, tactical nuclear weapons, which is an incitement to escalation of a very enormous threat.

    And events on the ground are particularly threatening, primarily at the Russian border, where it’s becoming really ominous. Accidents could lead to sudden escalation. Syria is another flash point, and there are others. India/Pakistan is one of the most severe. The Kashmir crisis has been escalating, and no serious proposals for resolving it. Open The New York Times this morning, and you’ll see Prime Minister Modi’s warnings about a sharp, Indian reaction to any Pakistani-based terrorist attack, which is likely. And at the border, up in the high Himalayas, there’s one of the most ridiculous wars that has ever happened. It’s captured very nicely in a comment by Arundhati Roy, which I should have looked up so I could quote it exactly, but what she describes as 12,000 feet up in the mountain, the glaciers are melting, threatening the water supply for India and Pakistan, and as the glaciers melt, you see the detritus of the battles that they’re fighting there, over nothing. The helmets, arms, skeletons, and so on.

    It’s reminiscent of Borges’s comment on wars, which are like two bald men fighting over a comb, except this one is a lot more serious. This is an indication of significant wars that could be just on the horizon. Water wars. India/Pakistan’s a striking case. Or simply imagine what the consequences will be when tens of millions of people are fleeing out of the coastal plains of Bangladesh. Where are they going go? What’s going to happen to them? Take a look this morning at the dismemberment of the Calais Jungle. What’s going to happen when it’s not thousands, but tens of millions? And that’s coming very soon, unless we do something about it. The circumstances that lead to potential conflict are growing and are frightening and, in many ways, I think that’s the most alarming lack of progress, the lack of attention to try and do something about these things, which is shocking. There are disappointments, like the recent ICJ, rejection of the Marshall Islands claim, but as David pointed out, it’s not all grim. It was a virtually split decision and on narrow technical grounds, not getting to the substance, and there are many avenues to pursue at the UN as well, as we just heard, that’s a very important initiative and it’s kind of shocking that it… I don’t think it’s even made the press, as far as I know.

    One of the most important initiatives underway should be known by everyone, should have massive public support, which could possibly lead to a modification of the US position, or at least mitigation of the US position of extreme hostility to what could be a historic decision of the UN. Now, there’s a crucial lack of progress, and in, maybe, ways regress in other significant areas. Steps towards abolition can’t, as we all know, can’t be just click of your fingers. There have to be many avenues pursued. And one of the most significant of them, I think, which doesn’t receive the attention it deserves, is the development of weapons, nuclear weapons, WMD-free zones in various parts of the world which restricts the possibility of conflict. They’re not air-tight, of course, but they are steps forward. There is one in the Western hemisphere which, of course, excludes the United States and Canada.

    There’s one in the Pacific, which for a long time was impeded by France, which insisted on carrying out nuclear weapons tests in the French possessions. But more recently, it’s blocked by the United States, which insists on nuclear weapons positioning and nuclear submarines passing through the US Pacific Islands. So the Pacific WMD-free zone can’t really be implemented. There’s one for Africa, but it’s also, for the moment, impeded by the United States because the US insists on a major military base in Diego Garcia. A nuclear base, one which is in fact used… It’s been used extensively in the bombings in Central Asia. And it’s been built up very sharply under the Obama administration, again with very little attention. So that blocks the Africa zone.

    But the most important of all, by far, is the Middle East. Now, that’s where there certainly should be significant efforts to impose a nuclear weapons free zone and it’s… There’s no reason… Among the major states, the most importance, with one exception, the obvious exception, the states in the region are strongly in favor of it. Iran is in the lead, in fact, in pressing to try to establish a WMD-free zone in the region. That’s in its position as head of the non-aligned movement, which has taken a very strong stand on that. The Arab states are all in favor of it. In fact, they initiated it back in 1995. It was Egypt and other Arab states that initiated the call for a WMD-free zone. It comes up every five years in the NPT review sessions, every time the US blocks it, most recently in 2015, under Obama, just simply blocked the steps towards moving, towards establishing this.

    Now that’s extremely significant. For one thing it threatens the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The commitment of the Arab states to the NPT is conditioned, explicitly, on moves to establish a WMD-free zone in the region. And it’s kind of striking that the US… And of course the reason the US blocks it is totally obvious, it’s to protect Israel’s nuclear weapons system from inspection, and that’s such a high priority here that the government is willing to threaten the NPT, the most important arms control treaty that exists. That’s very serious, nothing talked about it and which is again the, what David called the “terrible silence” that is the worst form of lack of progress.

    Incidentally, for anyone who took seriously the hysteria about Iranian nuclear weapons, the easiest, simplest way to eliminate whatever threat one believes might exist would be simply to accept the Iranian proposal to move towards a verifiable nuclear weapons-free zone. Not discussed for reasons we know; incidentally, the Iranian deal was, I think, a step forward, but we should bear in mind that the concept of an Iranian threat was hardly credible, and the idea that we should put… If you read US intelligence reports, they say… The reports to Congress, they do point out that there’s a potential danger of Iranian nuclear weapons if they ever develop them. Namely, they could be a deterrent. They could be a deterrent. And the US and Israel cannot tolerate a deterrent. If you want to use force freely, you can’t have deterrents. That’s the Iranian nuclear threat, such as it is. These are all things that we should… Everyone should know.

    Another step backwards is continuing, Israel’s a case in point, but continuing support for the three nuclear weapon states that have refused to join the NPT, Israel, Pakistan, and India, all of which developed their nuclear weapons with considerable US support. In the case of India, since Bush, not before. Case of Pakistan, primarily under Reagan. The administration pretended that they didn’t know that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons, though everyone outside of the Beltway could see it quite clearly. Bush number two changed the policy towards India, and it continues. Just last June, Obama authorized six new nuclear reactors in India. These are called peaceful, but we all know that the transition from nuclear power to nuclear weapons under contemporary technology is not very great. And furthermore, subsidizing Indian nuclear power simply allows them to divert resources to their nuclear weapons program, which is extremely dangerous, primarily because of the India/Pakistan conflict. But also because of what is likely to happen when tens of millions of people from Bangladesh start to flee because they’re drowning. What happens then?

    These are serious issues. All of this ends by… It all combines on the matter of lack of awareness, lack of public awareness. It’s striking that there’s nothing today like the huge anti-nuclear movement of the early ’80s, enormous movement, some of the biggest mobilizations in history. And they had an effect. They had a significant effect on modifying US policy, leading ultimately to the Reagan/Gorbachev agreements, which were a significant step forward and were followed by many years of pretty sharp reduction in nuclear weapons, other positive steps; some steps backward, but general progress, up until the turning point in 2011, when we started going backwards again. There’s no such popular mobilization today. The election’s going on, nothing being said about it. And worse, no popular mobilization to try to force something to be said about it.

    There are some encouraging signs. So you all read, I’m sure, the leaked discussion between Hillary Clinton and several of the prominent donors, and others, in which… She’s a politician, she’s telling the audience what they want to hear, but it doesn’t matter. What she said was not insignificant. She did question… Said we have to raise questions about the modernization program, not just authorize it. And she, specifically, opposed the worst part of it, the development of these smaller nuclear weapons which can be scaled down to battlefield use. Well, there’s two possible reactions to that disclosure. One of them is silence. The other would be popular mobilization to keep her feet to the fire, make press to get the government, assuming she wins the election, to move forward on the programs that she claims, at least, that she’s committed to.

    Now that can have an effect. It has had in the past. It often can again. Well, as you know the reaction was silence. It appeared, no comment, disappeared, just like the UN proposal will be voted on, probably no comment, maybe not even a report, and it’ll disappear, unless there is popular mobilization. That’s the major element of alarming lack of progress, in many ways, regression, and an indication of the basic work that we all have to be dedicating ourselves to.

  • Overcoming Geopolitical Obstacles to Nuclear Zero by Daniel Ellsberg

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Daniel Ellsberg at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 24, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

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    I think each speaker has, understandably, started by saying what a privilege it is to be here. Let me define that privilege as I feel it, very much very specifically. I don’t believe, in my lifetime, I have been in a discussion group for one day or two days with as many knowledgeable people about nuclear war, nuclear policy, nuclear. If others have been more fortunate, fine. But I see this as a group that is unprecedented for me, and I’m 85. Just saying… A question of age here. We were just a little interested. Noam is the senior person here at 87, I have a senior here, six months more than I am, I’m 85. How many people here are over 64? Okay. You were 10 years old at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which I’d say is close to being old enough, and if you’re 70, you’d be 16. That was the last time the American people were conscious of being close, possibly close, to nuclear war. If you’re under that… Let’s say if you’re under 25, you were born after the Cold War, the first Cold War. They’re going to see another one. The people who are in college now are going to understand what ‘Cold War’ means. I’m sorry, ’cause we’re on the way, if we’re not in it already.

    But they have no consciousness of what the first one meant, they couldn’t have. My understanding of… I think that the American public’s understanding and elite’s understanding of nuclear war is almost non-existent. When somebody mentioned earlier whether they knew the difference between an A-bomb and an H-bomb, I’ve asked many audiences that over the year. And I expect to get one, two or three people out of 500 or 1,000 who know that difference. In other words, they know almost nothing. So, let me ask, why aren’t the young involved in this? No American government and no other government has ever taken an effort to educate its people, and that includes non-nuclear states, as well. Eisenhower actually went through a brief period, in the very first months of his administration, on an op… What he called Operation Candor. Capital C-A-N-D-O-R, Candor. It was 1953, we had just tested a thermonuclear weapon in the last days of the Truman administration, having decided not to postpone that ’til Nixon. And he was actually tempted to tell people that the group worked on it in the White House, actually. On telling them of what fallout meant and what difference it made to have H-bombs over A-bombs.

    I think Steven pointed out on your picture the difference is a thousand. In 1954, the first droppable H-bomb was tested. It was one thousand times the Hiroshima weapon. Very few people have a sense of what that means, or what it means right now, that India and Pakistan don’t have H-bombs, and will shortly if testing resumes, which many Republicans and others have been favoring for a long time, and what difference that would make. And I’ll go into that in just a moment. So, that’s sort of not knowing the first thing about the situation we’re in today. I was actually, I have to say, physically dizzy and fainting from the last two talks today by Steven and Hans. Not because I was unfamiliar, I am one of those who actually did know probably most, though far from all, of what each of them had to say. But seeing it all together in one place, and as of today, I was fainting. And the reason was this. Here’s something where I differ from the other people here, who are comparably knowledgers to me, but I’m the one who was part of the problem. No one else here, I suspect, has to think about or deal with the fact that they were on the side of the nuclear arms race at any point in their lives.

    But I wasn’t just, say, designing nuclear weapons, which I know nothing about, or looking at weapons effects specifically. I’m not a scientist, I was an economist. I’m not a scientist. My work was on war plans. And what I was hearing was, “It’s back.” The insanities that I was dealing with, insanities that I was dealing with at that time, and was part of, are coming back. And let me make a little distinction there, my job was to try to somehow edge away, or more than edge away, from the insanities of the Eisenhower war plans. And I was to devise new… I was given the job under the Secretary of Defense McNamara to do new guidance for the operational war plans, that would be a major, major revision of the Eisenhower plans. Which I won’t even take time… I’ve sent my manuscript, by the way, to everybody here. I didn’t expect any of you to have time in the couple of weeks to really look at it. I’m going to talk about a couple of things today that actually aren’t yet dealt with that much in the book. But you will get in the chapters the nature of the Eisenhower proposals. And you know, it was mind-boggling.

    And yet I’ve come to realize that the plans that I, and later, the Kennedy administration worked on, were infeasible modifications of the Eisenhower plan. The actual experience of a nuclear war would’ve been virtually unchanged then and now from the Eisenhower plans, mad as they were. And the subtitle to my book might be the title in the end, Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner, started out in my mind as somewhat ironic, an attention-catcher. But as I worked along, realized no, they’re real confessions. I have more to confess of being on the wrong track and taking too long to learn it and so forth. They really are confessions. Now, I do think that that background, when I say that I see it coming around again, is based on a understanding of what nuclear weapons were and have been for that is shared by most anti-nuclear activists or specialists, few of whom I think have had real exposure to the actual plans. They’ve heard about them, but they haven’t actually held a plan in their mind or been part of it and so forth. For instance, the word “deterrent” was and is deliberately ambiguous and little understood by most people.

    The purpose of US nuclear war plans and preparations has always been primarily, and at first exclusively, to deter conventional attack by communist forces, by US first-use of nuclear weapons. Let’s remember that between ’45 and ’49, late ’49, when there were plans, nuclear war plans. We had a monopoly which we expected to continue. It was not to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, they didn’t have any and they weren’t expected to for quite a while. And actually, they were slower than we expected to build up their stockpile, especially when it came to ICBMs, but even early on. So that as long as a decade into the nuclear era, we had close to a monopoly. Not literally a monopoly after ’49, but something close to a monopoly. That’s where our policies and our planning were based on that period, essentially where we did not have to fear, especially in the US, putting aside Europe later, but for the US we didn’t have to fear a nuclear weapon landing on us, any more than when we firebombed Tokyo we had to worry that we would be firebombed in return. It was not an issue. And by the way, the plans were started in a period when the initial A-bombs did not, of which we had a very limited stock, again we had three by the end of the month, maybe 10 by the end of the year, did not affect the level of destruction we were already inflicting on Japan.

    Oppenheimer and the others did not expect the first A-bomb to kill as many people as Tokyo in March 9th and 10th, and it didn’t come close. So it wasn’t changing the level of destruction, it was simply a more efficient, cheaper way of doing it with one bomb instead of 300 bombers, but we had 300 bombers and we were using them every day, so it wasn’t changing. And really, the level of expected casualties in Europe or Russia or anywhere, did not reach World War II levels in our estimation. And none of you… That really hasn’t come out very much, what the expectations were. But I can tell you that as late as the early 50s, even mid 50s, you were talking about 15 or 20 million, big figure. But compared to 60 million dead in World War II, so you haven’t gone beyond World War II. From one year to the next in the planning, the casualties went from 15-20 million to 150 million and 200 million, up by 10 times. The mega-tonnage went up much more than that, but for a variety of reasons the damage is in proportional. But you’re going up to hundreds of millions instead of tens. Now that’s something different.

    Okay, the purpose, though, what was the purpose of those weapons? The purpose was almost exclusively to deter. We weren’t anxious to fight, except for a very few individuals. Curtis LeMay was probably correctly perceived as having wanted to get rid of the… Final solution to the Soviet problem, to the communist problem. And there were a few others like that, but they could be named mostly in the Air Force on a hand or two hands, something like that. No, it was to deter. To deter by exterminating the Soviet Union, by the ability to do it. Now, Dick mentioned that… Dick Faulkner, just now, that the Soviets perceive us, and most people, maybe we perceive us, as the one country that’s actually used these weapons. I wish that were true. Actually, we’ve used them dozens of times and to some degree continuously ever since 1945, and some other countries have, too. Why do you think Israel or Pakistan have gotten nuclear weapons, so as not to use them? They are using them the same way we’ve used them every year we’ve had them, which is the way you use a gun when you point it at someone’s head in a confrontation, whether or not you pull the trigger.

    You are using the gun and you could not make that threat whether it’s successful or not if you didn’t have it. And we’re not pointing it. It’s been very conspicuously on our holster on our side. Which, as USAF, as Air Force will point out, is a continuous use. And so it is, indeed. So, that use has been not only by the United States. I’ve been recently reading stuff from the Soviet archives now that’s come out in the last 20 years, and realized, for example, that Khrushchev believed that his threats in Suez, which I must say I thought at the time, everybody thought were ridiculous and may have been ridiculous, he believed it got the Suez War ended. So, he used it over Kuwait, a crisis which I’m sure almost none of you are aware of. The so-called Lebanon-Iraq crisis in Kuwait. Khrushchev made nuclear threats then, as he did later after the Bay of Pigs, which looked pretty ridiculous. And it was certainly bluffs, except that the Soviet specialists say now, “But he believed they worked.” And that encouraged him, then, as soon as he got ICBMs, to make threats over Berlin in 1958, which didn’t get him what he wanted.

    Now in short, this is using the weapons, and using them to what? To deter nuclear attack? No. Not in any single case. And I could give you a list. Berlin, South Vietnam in the 50s, Dien Bien Phu, when we offered, and so forth. Let’s come up, because I don’t have much time here, let’s come right up to the present.

    How many of you had ever heard the name Kaliningrad more than a year ago? How many of you heard it before today? Not so many, right? Look it up on Google. I just found, by the way, that it was originally called Königsberg, which rings in my memory a little bit, under Prussia. But it changed that name in 1946. So we’ve heard of Kaliningrad. Hans mentioned that it’s on the Polish border, right? And when I heard you say that, I thought, “There’s a little better way of saying that.” It’s between Poland and Lithuania. Those are both in NATO. It is part of Russia. It has no land access to Russia, to the rest of Russia. It’s an enclave. It has sea, it’s on a seaport, so they take that seriously.

    It’s now surrounded by NATO, like West Berlin, which had 22 Soviet divisions around it, between it and the rest of NATO. First of all, there’s only one way for the Russians then militarily to defend. It can’t defend, protect. Can it protect? Deter an attack on Kaliningrad, in the area of Kaliningrad. It can say, “Well, we’ll attack you elsewhere if you go into Kaliningrad.” There’s only one way, and that’s to threaten nuclear war, first use. That’s what they are doing. And not implicitly, but explicitly. Putin has said publicly, more than once, “Go into Kaliningrad… ” Which has a population of 400,000, it’s 86 square miles, and so forth. “Go into Kaliningrad, it’s nuclear war. It’s the same as invading Russia, okay?”

    Iskander missiles, dual-capable, in Kaliningrad. Now, do they have nuclear weapons? Warheads? We don’t know. They’re dual-capable. But I say again, you know, he has no other way of doing it, and he is doing it. And the NATO exercise we heard about earlier, had us, NATO, us, going into Kaliningrad. Now, maybe he wouldn’t start a nuclear war. He’d be insane to do it, of course, wouldn’t he? And so, should we assume that’s silly, it’s a bluff? It probably is mainly a bluff. Should we assume, then, that no problem, going into Kaliningrad, now why would go into Kaliningrad? Well, because NATO has just accepted the Baltics into the… If you look at the map on the Baltics. We have no more way of defending the Baltics locally with our divisions that we’re putting… Not divisions, brigades, we’ve been putting there in exercises, than they have of defending Kaliningrad. So what is the NATO answer to that? First use, which it’s always been. When I say, are we… It’s all coming back, let me go back to one little bit of history. Possibly the first use of our nuclear weapons, which was a bluff after the World War, Second World War, was sending publicly described nuclear capable bombers, B-29s, over to England for possible use with the Berlin Blockade, when I was 17. The Berlin Blockade.

    And needed why? Well, if they had interfered with our air access, which they could easily have done, very easily, stopped our air access, we had no other plan than going to war or NATO plan, at that point. How, against the overwhelming Soviet armed forces? No, impossible. So, anyway, Truman believed, by the way, rightly or wrongly, as Gregg Herken has brought out in his book, definitely believed we were successful on that. We kept them from interfering with our air, by fighter pilots in the Axis, it made it possible to stay in West Berlin and get committed there. So, it was a success, which encouraged us to base NATO and other, make all the other uses, I’ve talked of here, that as our first, useful success. Even though it was, in the short run a bluff, the bombers weren’t even configured for nuclear weapons, those B-29s. But they could have been, within weeks. We only had, at that point, a relative handful, a dozen, or a couple dozen, of nuclear weapons.

    Russia is today… There was only one way ever to defend West Berlin ’til the end of the Cold War. Granted, it got less acute after Ostpolitik with Willy Brandt, for which he got the Nobel Prize in ’72. Cold War lasted another 14 years, 15 years. But, in principle, from beginning to end, Berlin was defended by the threat of first use of nuclear weapons. And then by the way, the Kennedy administration came in and, contrary to Eisenhower, Eisenhower’s attitude always was, “Don’t talk about limited nuclear war, especially with Russia. Out of the question. It’ll get big, so go big from the beginning. Go first.” That was Eisenhower’s policy.

    The US didn’t think that looked so good. What’s the alternative? Well, Kennedy, I believe, and the others, the civilians I knew inside said, “You don’t want to initiate nuclear war. But how do you deter it? How do you deal with and how do you reassure Adenauer and reassure the rest of Europe and so forth?” Well, by making the commitment and making the threat. And so what do we try to fill NATO on, with some success? Demonstration strikes. Have you heard that? You heard it earlier this morning. Escalate to de-escalate. A demonstration to show that, I’m sure, Noam, you’ve read stuff on this, if I’m not mistaken, those who were in charge of Berlin planning, you don’t want to go all out. So throw one or two nuclear weapons at them to let them know the risks. So they’ll pull back. Right? Crazy, it was crazy. Crazy then, and crazy now.

    Is it possible for anybody to believe in that? Well, a lot of people seemed to believe in it. The Russians are talking as if they believe in it. Do they really? Who knows? Let me extend that just a moment more.

    The Russians are now defending Kaliningrad by the same threat that NATO used for 50 and more years to defend West Berlin. We are now openly and explicitly defending the Baltics the same way we defended West Berlin or the Russians defended Kaliningrad. And I put to you, there is no other military way to do these things. Let me come back to the last time we came really close, in our knowledge, to nuclear war. It wasn’t the last time, but the public doesn’t know that. Noam made some examples, and others, as late as 1995, actually, with Yeltsin, well after the Cold War. 1983, Andropov, false alarms in his countries, serious ones in 1979, 1981. Serious ones.

    Okay. But the public doesn’t know of any of those. The last time was the Cuban Missile Crisis. How did that come about? Very quickly in one word. Khrushchev knew something that I didn’t know, and I worked for the EXCOM, the Executive Committee, NSC, I was on two of the working groups for the EXCOM, or the NSC during that. And then, a year later, no that was ’62. And two years later, with high clearances, higher than top secret, I studied the Cuban Missile Crisis for most of the year inside the government.

    I still didn’t know that Kennedy had, for a year prior to that, been making every preparation for an invasion of Cuba, which the Russians knew. Exercising it, including an exercise against the Caribbean dictator Ortsac, O-R-T-S-A-C, Ortsac, which as Khrushchev recognized was Castro spelled backwards. And that was the public description of this. And we had been making covert operations into Cuba on an enormous scale. The man who burglarized my doctor’s office, Eugenio Martinez, had as a boat captain made 300 visits, covertly, into Cuba, before the Cuban Missile Crisis, as part of Mongoose. 300, okay.

    So Castro was saying, as he said in his memoirs and later, and we now know very well, “How am I going to keep from losing Cuba? The only country that is going communist without Soviet forces there?” They felt very romantically, almost sentimentally, and also, their foothold in the Western hemisphere and so forth. “I’m going to lose Cuba.” And then he had a brainstorm. And almost nobody in the whole literature describes that brainstorm in the following terms, “I’m going to defend Cuba the way the US defends Berlin.” The only way it could be defended from the Soviet Union, by threatening nuclear weapons. But, he only had, in ’62, still going on, 10 or some say 40 ICBMs. He had threatened to use those over the Bay of Pigs, but that was silly. No. Put nuclear weapons in Cuba.

    That was the only way he could do it, and it would have worked. It wasn’t that crazy, if you could get them there without being stopped. So he had to do it secretly, and he succeeded. He did get them there without being stopped, and once they were there, had he revealed them, I would say, nobody says this, had he revealed them, simply said, “They’re there, just the way your weapons are in Turkey. They’re there. Live with it,” there would have been no question of invading Cuba. It would be out of the question. He would have defended Cuba as long as he wanted to, or if he wanted to trade the weapons, he could trade them not just for Turkish weapons, he could make a big trade if we had to get those out of there.

    So what we see now is then we are currently preparing… I’ll sum it up. No one, no civilian that I know of, put aside LeMay and a couple of others, have wanted to see us in a nuclear war. No president has found himself able or willing to back off from threats of initiating nuclear war and preparing to do it. And the only way that threat can be made they thought plausible, even remotely, in the early years, decades, against the Soviet Union was to have some ability to limit the damage to the United States by hitting all of their hard targets, hitting all of their ICBMs, hitting their command and control, everything else. That was your only way supposedly of surviving. That’s why we had 10,000 weapons, 20,000 weapons, and so forth. It was not to deter a Soviet nuclear attack. It was to make credible a US first strike, and it still is. And that is what it’s for today.

    But now, and I have to take… I’m sorry, but here’s the last 60 seconds. Steve Star today, to my surprise… I mean I hadn’t planned on it, gave you the talk that I had planned to give about nuclear winter, because I think it’s of extreme importance. I know most of what he said, though I was still startled by some things. Of how many of you is that true? How many of you felt you knew most of what Steve Star said today? Really, can I see the hands? Well, it’s more than I would have thought, and we’re talking now about not nuclear winter as it was in 1983, but the studies of the last 10 years since 2007. Let me just ask again. How many of you have read studies by Alan Robock or Toon? Okay. Now you’ve published several. Okay. Meaning that no one has drawn from them that I’ve seen in writing. It’s not just that we’re talking that a nuclear war with Russia of the kind we’re threatening and preparing as in the past would lead to the death of not just most humans, but 99% of humans at most, 98%, 99%. Okay. People understand that if they’ve read the studies.

    I see no one draw the following point, which is very simple. Counterforce, striking first, makes no difference compared to striking second. Most of our warheads, our counterforce, are for striking first. They are for preemption, they are for damage limiting, which is if you believe the studies, which I do, is totally infeasible. Everybody dies, whether you go first or second. So all of these weapons we’re now modernizing and building, actually we are preparing nothing other. They still make credible threats. Credible why? Because humans are crazy, and nations are crazy. It’s credible to make a threat of omnicide, I’m sorry to say, but people don’t realize that’s the threat they’re making. It is the threat we are making. We are in the position of threatening to be a suicide bomber? No. A mutual homicide bomber? No. An omnicide bomber is what we’re threatening to do, not because we want to do it. And I think if that were known, it would at least change the discourse, shall I say. And it certainly is not known.

    As I was saying to my wife, finally, last night… Patricia was saying… I said, “Immoral,” and she said, “Immoral. Immoral is what? Masturbation, adultery, gayness, and so forth. It’s not the right word, somehow, for this.” And I said, “Alright. What is the right word?” We were up late discussing this kind of thing. “What is the… ” There’s no language. Humans never faced precisely this until let’s say 2007, except that who’s heard of it? Nobody knows it, and so forth. We’ve never in our lives faced what we are threatening on either side. It’s not a concept in humans. Can humans relate to this? Well, that remains to be seen, but we haven’t tried.

  • Overcoming Psychological Obstacles to Nuclear Zero by Judith Lipton

    This is the transcript of a talk given by Judith Lipton at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s symposium “The Fierce Urgency of Nuclear Zero: Changing the Discourse” on October 24, 2016. The audio of this talk is available here. For more information about the symposium, click here.

    judith pages

    My name is Judy Lipton, I’m a psychiatrist. I’ve been involved with Physicians for Social Responsibility since 1979, but actually I was involved with SANE and SDS and SNCC and the Institute for Policy Studies back in 1965 during the Selma years and so forth. So I have a fairly long background in politics. You need to imagine that I’m not the only one sitting here. Please imagine for a second that there’s me, here, but that next to me, right over here is my husband, David Barash. And he’s the ghost in the room who’ll be speaking partly through my voice and sometimes through his own voice, but he’s definitely here, and you’ll hear him at times and I’ll try to tell you when he’s talking and when I’m talking.

    I need to tell you that I’m stunned to be here; I’m extremely grateful to Richard Falk and David Krueger, I’m so incredibly happy to meet my hero Dan Ellsberg and Paul Chappell. But I do feel like Dorothy the small and meek, and I’m aware that each of you are what are called woggle-bugs, which is from volume II in the Wizard of Oz series, HM Woggle-bug, TE. And each of you should have an envelope with pictures, a bibliography, a list and some song lyrics here, a bunch of things. Much more than I could say in 15 minutes, because I had no clue how to wake people up in 15 minutes before dinner, except to put things down in a way that you could get back to them, and also these things are available online.

    So I’m aware that all of you are highly educated, thoroughly magnified woggle-bugs in each of your own specialties. And I am Dorothy the small and meek, and I’m grateful for the opportunity to be here. My expertise as a psychiatrist is, we’ll come in a little bit, and I’m also somewhat an expert in evolutionary biology and psychopharmacology, I’m not going to talk about that stuff very much. What I really want to talk about to begin with is that I am totally sick of the cat fights, the undermining, the catty undermining, the fratricide, the cannibalism, and the general conflict in the left that has plagued me and the movements in the left ever since I’ve been involved since the 1960s. I’ve had more trouble organizing demonstrations and things from the young Trotskyites than I have from the military.

    The left tends to eat itself. And academics tend to eat themselves as well, and I’m totally sick of and refuse to talk about, unless it’s way after dinner and some drinks, I’m really not going to talk about the nature of human nature; I’m not going to talk about sociobiology versus post-modernism; I’m not going to talk about psychopharmacology versus psychotherapy. I’m absolutely sick of the way that paradigms make woggle-bugs fight with one another, and I don’t think we need to do that. So my purpose tonight is to try to bring us together, understanding that we each come from very different perspectives, and we could argue about sociobiology and evolutionary psychiatry and memes and genes and human nature and all that, but I’m deathly sick of it and I don’t want to do it. I want to talk about ways to move this movement forward, and here’s what I want to teach you.

    Back when my husband and I were young, we were married 40 years, so that was a long time ago. First we were mountain climbers, ice climbers, we did Mt. Rainier and Mt. Baker and stuff like that. And then we had children and we became hikers, and as we would hike, we would play a game called the cream of mushroom soup game. The cream of mushroom soup game is to imagine a can of cream of mushroom soup, say a Campbell’s, and then deconstruct it, say from a Marxist point of view. Please tell me how cream of mushroom soup represents the food of the proletariat, or not? Does it represent the capitalist takeover of the food system? What is the biological content of cream of mushroom soup? Does it have food value or is it empty calories? What is the post-modern view? Does cream of mushroom soup even exist or is it a fantasy of our culture? Is it simply an Andy Warhol picture?

    So we would walk hundreds of miles with our children, talking about paradigms, and we would go… Think about cream of mushroom soup and paradigms, Freudian paradigms, Jungian paradigms, biblical paradigms, Christian paradigms, Jewish paradigms, Buddhist paradigms, you name it. If you could find a way to talk about a Buddhist approach to cream of mushroom soup, we would find it. And that’s how we spend our time hiking. So, what I decided to do for this conference… Well, there are two things I’m going to do. Alright, first of all, I want everyone to sing a song with me. I’m not a good singer like the people who are singing here, but this is a song about unity.

    I want you to realize that we’ve been talking about people in this meeting. And to be honest, I’m a little sick of people too. There are 10 to the 20 species of animals on this Earth, of which we represent one. There are 975 species of beetles in Costa Rica. When we begin to talk about omnicide, we are talking about killing 10 to the 20th creatures, some of whom are sentient beings. Not just cats and dogs and whatever, Cecil the lion’s offspring will be vaporized. The ivory trade, all of the elephants. We’re talking about every living thing.

    And so, it seems to me that we have to broaden the dialogue here that omnicide doesn’t just mean our esteemed race. We made the bombs, we get to blow things up. But really, we’re talking about responsibility for an entire ecosystem that’s much bigger and much more complicated than we can imagine. And at the very end, I’ll introduce you to my favorite microbe, which may be the solution to our entire question for this meeting.

    Alright. So the song I want people to sing together with me, you may know it from school or you may know it from summer camp. It’s called “All God’s Critters.” And it goes: All God’s Critters got a place in the choir, some sing low and some sing higher. Some sing out loud on the telephone wire and some just clap their hands, their paws or anything they got now. Woo!” Any of you know this song?

    Listen to the bass, it’s the one at the bottom where the bullfrog runs and the hippopotamus moans and groans with the big to-do and that old cow just goes moo. The dogs and the cats they take up the middle where the hummingbirds hum and the crickets fiddle, the donkey brays and the pony neighs and the old coyote howls. Listen to the top where the little birds sing and The melodies with the high notes ringing. The hoot owl hollers about everything and the neighbor disagrees. Singing in the nighttime, singing in the day. The little duck quacks and he’s on his way. The possum ain’t got much to say and the porcupine talks to himself. It’s a simple song of livings on everywhere by the ox and the fox and the grizzly bear, the grumpy alligator and the hawk above, the sly raccoon and the turtle dove.

    So, I feel that that’s our responsibility, really. Beyond the 7 billion people on the planet and we have to be very serious about it. So, I began to play the cream of mushroom soup game and one of your handouts is called “Psychological Obstacles to Nuclear Zero or Even to Nuclear Reductions for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Retreat”, by Judith Lipton and David Barash.

    On this list are 50, count them, 50 potential paradigms for obstacles to nuclear zero. They were what I could throw up on the bulletin board. They were what occurred to me as I was playing the cream of mushroom soup game. And everyone here in the room could play the cream of mushroom soup game and add to this and add different paradigms and play with the paradigms, because my conviction is that each person, whether it’s a plumber, a gardener, an equestrian, somebody who grows orchids, everyone has something to contribute. All God’s critters got a place in the choir. All these people have a place in the choir. And our job is not to confine ourselves to the elite intellectuals who read the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the FAS and the ACA. I mean, I’ve been doing that. I can talk the language.

    But that’s not what’s going to make change. We have to get out to like plumbers for social responsibility, because nuclear war is really bad for the construction industry. Boeing has a union that builds equipment, not for the bombers, but literally like their desks, and their furniture and other stuff. Those Boeing workers can be brought together, because nuclear war is bad for their income. It’s a general call. So, I wanted to mention to you… Yes. I told you that there were 950,000 species of insects, 390,900 plant species known to man, and at the end of your handout is what I think is the cutest animal in the whole world and maybe the solution to the problem of nuclear war. It’s under… It’s either XX… Oh, XX and XY.

    I don’t know if any of you have ever seen a tardigrade. A tardigrade is a micro-animal, it’s about 0.5mm and they look like this. This is electron. They have little snouts. They live everywhere. They live on the external parts of spaceships. They go down to -2 degrees Kelvin and up to 350 degrees Celsius. When they’re not happy, if they don’t get what they need, they turn into what are called TONS, T-O-N-S. TONS from tardigrades have been found in Shakespeare portfolios and things. All you do to get them to turn back to tardigrades is you add water and then they fluff up and become happy tardigrades again. You can find them in moss all over the world and in the bottom of volcanoes.

    One of the theories of the world is that the tardigrades have come and are taking over the planet and that eventually we will in fact be extinguished, because the tardigrades are more adaptive. So I wanted to introduce you to the tardigrades, because I think they’re so cute and think that as long as we’re talking about putting crazy ideas up on the wall, why not tardigrades?

    In the other parts of the handout, again because I’m a doctor, I think in terms of triage and I think of long-term solutions. There is a part in here about triage, about immediate steps to reduce the threat of nuclear war. I think one of the biggest immediate threats to reducing the threat of nuclear war is nuclear fundamentalism that says, “If we can’t get to zero, it’s not worth anything.” I apologize to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and if you want to send me home, that’s okay. I think we should not let the best be the enemy of the good and that there are immediate steps that can be taken now, stat! , to reduce the risk of nuclear war this year. This moment. Tonight. I made a list of those. But again, I’m not a woggle-bug, so my list may be woefully inefficient. And then finally I made a list of where to go from here. There’s a first aid emergency measure list. There’s another list in here about suggestions for where to go for the future. Some of the suggestions have already been mentioned, like media and youth and things like that.

    But I think that there have to be much more aggressive academic approaches that transcend the normal bureaucracies within our departments and cause us to fight with each other because we don’t agree about our paradigms. We have to gang up on our department chairmans and say, “Nuclear war is bad, whether you’re a psychoanalyst or a psychopharmacologist or a sociobiologist or a postmodernist.” It doesn’t matter. We need to get this on the agenda. So academic approaches, labor and union approaches, and finally and many media… Oh, yes, and direct action.

    I have one controversial suggestion, which is that I was thinking that perhaps Russia, NATO, Israel, India, Pakistan and China could blow up one bomb that was well-televised somewhere. Just do it. People have forgotten what nuclear explosions look like. The pictures are old, they’re black and white. And I think if it were possible for the nuclear countries to come together and just do one 10 kiloton bomb somewhere, but in really good Technicolor, with good, good, video. I think that that might be quite an eye-opener for people. So that’s my, I suppose, most controversial suggestion.