Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: strategic arms reduction treaty

  • Answering Bolton and Yoo: New START Will Strengthen U.S. National Security

    Two staunch ideologues who served in the George W. Bush administration, John Bolton and John Yoo, ask rhetorically in a New York Times opinion piece, “Why Rush to Cut Nukes?”  Bolton, a recess appointment as United Nations Ambassador under Bush II, never met an arms limitation agreement that he supported.  Yoo, the lawyer who wrote memos supporting the legality of water boarding under international law (not a very favorable prospect for captured U.S. soldiers), worked in Bush II’s Justice Department.  Bolton and Yoo can find no good reason to support the New START agreement with the Russians, arguing that without amendments it will weaken “our national defense.”  

    Let me answer the question posed in the title of their article.  The Senate should support and ratify this treaty because it will strengthen U.S. national security by:

    • reducing the size of the bloated nuclear arsenals in both countries, creating a new lower level from which to make further reductions;
    • reinstating verification procedures that ended with the expiration of the first START agreement in December 2009;
    • building confidence in the Russians that we stand behind our agreements; and
    • sending a signal to the rest of the world that we are taking steps to fulfill our legal commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    The downsides of failing to ratify the treaty would be to remove restraints on the size of the Russian arsenal, forego inspection and verification of the Russian arsenal, undermine Russian confidence in U.S. commitments, and encourage further nuclear proliferation by other countries thereby increasing the possibilities of nuclear terrorism. Further, if the treaty is not ratified before the new Congress is seated in January 2011, its future ratification will be far more difficult.

    What do Bolton and Yoo say they want?  First, to remove language in the treaty’s preamble, which is not legally binding, that says there is an “interrelationship” between nuclear weapons and defensive systems.  That language only recognizes a reality.  Of course, there is a relationship between missiles and missile defenses.  Second, they don’t want the U.S. to be limited in putting conventional weapons on formerly nuclear launch systems.  But that is a price, and a fair one, that each side will pay for lowering the other side’s nuclear capabilities.  Third, they want a Congressional act for the financing, testing and development of new U.S. warhead designs before the treaty is ratified.  In other words, they want guarantees that the U.S. nuclear arsenal will be modernized.  They seek long-term reliance on the U.S. nuclear threat, but this means that U.S. citizens will also remain under nuclear threat for the long-term.

    Bolton and Yoo are an interesting pair.  The first would lop ten floors off the United Nations, the second do away with the laws of war when they aren’t convenient.  Do they deserve their own opinions?  Of course.  Do their opinions make any sense?  Only in the context of the American exceptionalism and militarism that were the trademarks of the Bush II administration and have done so much to weaken the spirit, values and resources of the country while continuing to haunt us in our aggressive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

    One must wonder what possessed the New York Times to publish their rantings.  Additionally, using the word “Nukes” in the title suggests somehow that nuclear weapons are cute enough to have nicknames and not a serious threat to the very existence of civilization.  That Bolton and Yoo could rise to high positions in our country is a sad commentary on the country, but perhaps understandable in the context of the Bush II administration’s persistent flouting of international law.  That the New York Times would find sufficient merit in their discredited opinions to publish their article is an even sadder commentary on the editorial integrity of one of the country’s most respected newspapers.

  • US and Russian Nuclear Missiles are Still on Hair-Trigger Alert

    Just after midnight, in a secret bunker outside Moscow, the warning sirens began to blare. A simple, ominous message flashed on the bunker’s main control panel: Missile Attack!

    It was no drill. A Soviet satellite had detected five U.S. nuclear missiles inbound.

    The control computer ordered a counterstrike, but the bunker commander, a nerdy lieutenant colonel named Stanislav Petrov, acting on a hunch, overrode the computer and told his Kremlin superiors it was a false alarm. The Soviet brass quickly stood down their missiles, saving 100 million Americans from nuclear incineration.

    This brush with Armageddon happened more than two decades ago, but nuclear missiles are still on hair-trigger alert in Russia and the United States. Today, they may be even more vulnerable to an accidental or renegade launch than they were in Petrov’s day.

    “The security of both nations should not be dependent on the heroic act or good judgment of a single individual,” said Sam Nunn, the former senator from Georgia.

    Long active in anti-proliferation efforts such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nunn is leading a campaign to persuade U.S. and Russian leaders to take their thousands of strategic nuclear warheads off hair-trigger alert, a status that remains in effect more than a decade after the Cold War ended.

    “The chances of a premeditated, deliberate nuclear attack have fallen dramatically,” Nunn said in an interview with Knight Ridder. “But the chances of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear attack might actually be increasing.”

    In his 2000 election campaign, President Bush called the hair-trigger status “another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation” that creates “unacceptable risks.”

    The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which took effect 10 years ago this month, doesn’t address hair triggering. Nor does the Treaty of Moscow, which Bush signed with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2002 to reduce the size of the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.

    Nunn believes the hair-trigger status has become “the most dangerous element of our force posture.”

    A hair trigger means missiles are launched – either from land or sea [i.e., Trident] – upon the warning of an attack. That is, within about 15 minutes of a confirmed warning. In theory, the assurance that a retaliatory attack would be launched before the missiles could be destroyed would deter either country from trying a nuclear sneak attack.

    “This is the logic of the Cold War – Mutual Assured Destruction,” said Daniil O. Kobyakov, a nuclear expert at the PIR Center, a policy studies institute in Moscow. “De-alerting requires a change in rationale. There’s still a certain inertia on both sides.”

    Nunn and others see that inertia in the Bush administration’s refusal to consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its request – since defeated in the Senate – for some $500 million for research on a so-called “bunker buster” nuclear weapon and low-yield “mini-nukes.”

    Russia, too, has some Cold War inertia to overcome. Putin proudly announced last month that Russia was testing “the newest nuclear missile systems … that other nuclear states do not have.” He offered no further details about the weapons.

    A number of political analysts believe Putin’s comments – which were unprepared remarks made to a group of senior commanders at the Ministry of Defense – were intended to boost military morale and for domestic political consumption.

    “I’m sure it was nothing surprising to the U.S.,” said Kobyakov, noting that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty obliges each side to provide technical data on any new nuclear weapons.

    Kobyakov and others believe Putin was probably referring to the Topol-M missile, which has long been in the Russian pipeline, and a sea-launched missile that’s being developed. There are rumors in military circles in Moscow that the new missile could be maneuvered in flight, unlike current ballistic missiles, to foil the Bush administration’s planned national missile defense system. One senior Russian general cryptically called it “a hypersonic flying vehicle.” Government officials in both countries are keen to point out that they’ve stopped targeting each other with their nuclear missiles, although experts say this “de-targeting” is political hokum.

    The old targeting data and missile trajectories are stored in command computers, Kobyakov said. And missiles can be re-targeted in a matter of seconds: A couple of mouse clicks on a computer would put Washington, Miami or Moscow back in the nuclear crosshairs.

    But it’s the danger of accidental or maverick launches that most concerns atomic experts. That danger is heightened, in part, by the decrepit state of Russian defenses.

    “The Russian Early Warning System is essentially useless,” said Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an expert on early warning issues and technology.

    Holes in Russia’s satellite and radar networks, Postol said, mean U.S. submarines in the North Atlantic can strike Moscow with a two- or three-minute warning for the Russian capital. Launches from the North Pacific could hit the city with no warning at all.

    Postol also said a new Prognoz satellite warning system “may never be in place.”

    Stanislav Petrov, the old bunker commander, the man who saved America back in 1983, nodded his head sadly when told of Postol’s assessment.

    “That’s right, not enough satellites,” he said. “We never had enough.”