Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: security

Two Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons

There are two basic and quite disparate ways in which nuclear weapons are viewed. The first is that these weapons provide security and power to their possessors. I would call this the view of the Nuclear Nine – the nine countries that possess nuclear weapons – and their allies. The second is that nuclear weapons undermine the security of their possessors and must be abolished. I would call this the humane view of the hibakusha (survivors of the atomic bombings).

The perspective of the Nuclear Nine and their allies is based upon nuclear deterrence, which is a hypothesis about human communications and behavior. Nuclear deterrence is the threat to retaliate with nuclear weapons if another country commits a prohibited act. Such an act might be a nuclear attack, but it could encompass a much broader range of prohibited acts. One major problem with nuclear deterrence is that it is unproven to work under all circumstances. It requires rational leaders, and not all leaders are rational at all times. Further, it requires a territory to retaliate against, thus making it inapplicable to terrorist organizations. The bottom line with nuclear deterrence is that it might or might not work. There are no guarantees, and it could fail spectacularly.

Nations rely upon nuclear deterrence at their peril. It is a concept that is intellectually bankrupt. I would equate nuclear deterrence to the French Maginot Line. Prior to World War II, the Maginot Line was highly praised for its high-tech defensive capabilities. However, when the Germans chose to invade and occupy France, they simply went around the Maginot Line and it provided no defense to France. Nuclear weapons are a Maginot Line in the Mind; that is, they provide a false sense of security based on a belief in the effectiveness of threatening mass murder. I fear this will not be understood by political and military leaders until nuclear deterrence fails and that line in the mind proves useless for defense, as surely it will if the status quo continues.

The hibakusha perspective, on the other hand, is based upon the immorality and illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as well as the uncertainty and unreliability of nuclear deterrence. Can there be any doubt that weapons that cannot differentiate between civilians and combatants and that cause suffering to generations yet unborn are immoral and illegal? Further, if nuclear deterrence were to fail, as it has come close to doing on numerous occasions, there would be catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

At the relatively mild end of the spectrum (but, of course, not mild at all), cities and countries would be destroyed, as happened at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the most severe end of the spectrum, nuclear war could be an extinction event for human beings and other forms of complex life. To describe the destructive potential of nuclear weapons, philosopher John Somerville coined the word omnicide, meaning the death of all. In between these degrees of nuclear annihilation, there is the possibility of global nuclear famine, which atmospheric scientists predict would result from a relatively “small” nuclear war using only 100 Hiroshima-size weapons that could lead to a billion deaths by starvation.

Which is the better perspective? The perspective of the Nuclear Nine and their allies is not sustainable. It may provide a false security for some countries, but it provides insecurity for the vast majority of countries as well as for all humans, including those living in Nuclear Nine countries and their allies. This perspective encourages nuclear proliferation, nuclear brinkmanship, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war. The perspective of the hibakusha, on the other hand, would level the playing field and fulfill the obligation for nuclear disarmament, which is an important element in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is a far more sensible, decent, humane and prudent perspective.

David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

May 20, 2013
Simulated Attack Reveals Security Flaws at Livermore

A recent mock terrorist infiltration conducted at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), located near San Francisco, showed that fissile material necessary for building nuclear weapons was not hard to obtain. In Building 332, the faux-invaders found access to approximately 2,000 pounds of weapons-grade uranium and deadly plutonium, a surplus bountiful enough to build at least 300 nuclear weapons. The simulated attack also revealed problems with the lab’s hydraulic system which controls the Gatling gun responsible for protecting the facility.

Voices from Capitol Hill, across party lines, called the incident “an embarrassment to those responsible for securing the nation’s nuclear facilities,” and called for immediate steps to correct the lab’s major security weaknesses. Danielle Brian, Executive Director of the Project on Government Oversight, explained the danger of allowing terrorists access to the wealth of nuclear materials at Livermore. She argued that terrorists willing to sacrifice their lives would not need to escape the lab safely with apprehended fissile materials. “They could simply detonate it as part of an improvised nuclear device on the spot.” With nearly seven million residents within 50 miles of the lab, the possibility of such a detonation has led many experts to urge the lab to choose a more remote location for nuclear material.

The laboratory undergoes staged attacks annually, and the faux foes are timed to see how much damage real invaders could inflict. Can the attackers evade the lab’s security system just in time to build a “dirty bomb” for immediate detonation? Can they hold off the lab’s armed guards long enough to quickly construct a rudimentary device with a destructive capability akin to the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Or, would it be best to simply rush past the out-of-order Gatling gun and leave the lab altogether, fissile materials in tow, to use a nuclear device in the heart of San Francisco?

Located above an irrigation canal, less than two miles from elementary schools, a pre-school, a middle school, a senior center, and a major highway junction, Livermore’s security defects have invigorated opposition to the storage of nuclear weapons materials at the lab. Marylia Kelley, executive director of Tri-Valley CARES, a nuclear weapons watchdog group, argued that the fissile materials at Livermore “simply cannot be made safe and secure.” She explained that the Livermore community, consisting of 81,000 residents, strongly desires that the plutonium and highly enriched uranium be moved elsewhere.

The stores of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium across the street are not the only thing inducing anxiety among Livermore’s residents. The lab’s security system, assuming that its components are in working order, also serves to stir unease in the suburban homes nearby. The laboratory’s Gatling guns, which were purchased by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) just after the Department of Energy approved doubling the lab’s plutonium storing capacity, each release the force of a dozen armed guards, firing 4,000 rounds per minute and taking down targets up to a mile away. Former Administrator of the NNSA, Linton Brooks, explained that the guns “leave no doubt about the outcome” in the event of a military-style air or ground attack on the lab.”

Kelley, of Tri-Valley CARES, referred to “children on bicycles and skateboards … people walking their dogs,” along the western perimeter of the lab, and questioned the transformation of the science laboratory into a fortified arsenal, prepared for military style attacks. In a residential neighborhood, she argued, “you can’t just indiscriminately open fire.” The Gatling guns are supposed to be tested regularly, and no explanation has been given for their malfunction.

While the security failures exposed at Livermore seem unacceptable to most, many experts believe that many more exist, and remain undiscovered due to inherent flaws in the “force-on-force” simulated attacks. The mock intrusions generally occur at night or on weekends when the lab’s employees are safe at home and not susceptible to hostage-taking, and when the defenders are given advance notice of the attack. The staff-free corridors of the laboratory during these simulations do not give the defenders accurate practice at securing the lab, as they do not have to distinguish their firing between innocent bystanders and intruders. The “force-on-force” exercises also do not assess the lab’s capability of withstanding an attack from a rogue aircraft passing along one of the flight paths to or from one of the nearby airports.

In a press release on the newly exposed security flaws, the Department of Energy (DOE) explained that the “force-on-force” simulation revealed both positive aspects of the security system and others “requiring corrective action.” A spokesperson told Time that the DOE does not believe the nuclear materials at Livermore are at risk, but is “interested in examining any deficiencies.”

As long as there are those who seek access to the US’ stores of plutonium and uranium at Livermore, and those who build their lives on the suburban streets around the lab, perhaps the DOE should examine the prospect of transplanting its fissile material fortress, rather than waiting for new deficiencies to emerge, or simulated failures to become real tragedies.

Rachel Hitow is the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Washington, DC Intern.

May 29, 2008
Major Lapses in Nuclear Security Are Routine

Article originally appeared in The Independent (UK)

Do you know the story of the grizzly bear that nearly destroyed the world? It sounds like a demented fairytale — but it is true. On the night of 25 October 1962, when the Cold War was at its hottest and Kennedy and Krushchev’s fingers were hovering over the nuclear button, a tall, dark figure tried to climb over the fence into a US military installation near Duluth, Minnesota. A panicked sentry fired at the figure but it kept coming — so he sounded the intruder alarm. But because of faulty wiring, the wrong alarm went off: instead, the klaxon announcing an incoming Soviet nuclear warhead began its apocalyptic wah-wah. Everyone on the base had been told there would be no drills at a time like this. The ashen men manning the station went ahead: they began the chain reaction of retaliation against Moscow.

It was only at the last second that the sentry got through to the station. It was a mistake, he cried — just a bear, growling at the fence. If he had made that call five minutes later, you wouldn’t be reading this article now.

I have been thinking about that bear recently, because there has just been a string of startling security lapses in the British and American nuclear arsenals. In the past year alone, a truck carrying a fully-assembled nuclear weapon has skidded off the road in Wiltshire and crashed, while six nuclear warheads were lost by the US military for 36 hours.

A new documentary called Deadly Cargo, recently premiered in Glasgow, documents a simple and extraordinary fact: every week, fully assembled Weapons of Mass Destruction are driven along the motorways and byways of Britain. Britain’s nuclear submarines are up in Scotland, while the factories that need to test and replenish them are down in Reading — so they are shuttled between them all the time in large green trucks that are followed a half-mile behind by decontamination units. It slipped on ice and crashed not long ago.

The film shows how a group of brave protesters called NukeWatch have been able to figure out the exact route of the convoy and track it. One of them explains, “You reach out on the motorway and they’re an arm’s length from you. That’s how close the British public come to nuclear weapons.” If they could work it out, couldn’t other groups with uglier motives do the same?

Leaked documents from the Ministry of Defence show them fretting that an attack on the convoy “has the potential to lead to damage or destruction of a nuclear warhead within the UK” and “considerable loss of life”.

More amazingly still, Britain’s weapons do not have a secret launch code. They can be fired or detonated by the commander in charge of them simply by opening them up manually and turning some switches and buttons. Every other nuclear power has an authorisation code known only to the country’s leader, which has to be read out to the soldiers in charge of the weapon before it can be used. Not us. Whenever the British government has tried to introduce this basic safety procedure, the Navy has got huffy and refused to participate, saying it is “tantamount” to claiming their officers are not “true gentlemen”.

The Navy dismiss the risk of a hijacking, or a Doctor Strangelove situation where a navy commander goes nuts. But the latter has almost happened. In 1963, a US B-47 bomber crew guarding a nuclear bomb discovered that one of their colleagues had broken all the seals, removed all the safety wires, and turned on the pilot’s readiness switch and the navigator’s control switch on the nuclear bomb. The man seemed to be going through a bout of insanity.

In the US, an even-more startling nuclear lapse occurred last summer: bombs with the force of 60 Hiroshimas were simply lost by the military. On 29 August, a group of US airmen accidentally attached six nuclear warheads to their plane, mistaking them for unarmed cruise missiles intended for a weapons graveyard. They were then flown across the continental United States and left, unwatched by anyone, on an airstrip in Louisiana. Nobody even noticed they were gone for more than a day. This is not, it seems, a freak event: the Air Force’s inspector general found in 2003 that half of the “nuclear surety” inspections conducted that year were failures. Yes, that’s half.

This is what we know is happening in relatively orderly and open societies. There have almost certainly been incidents in China and North Korea and Pakistan that we will never hear about — until the worst happens.

The dangers of any individual nuclear accident are, of course, very small — but small risks of massive death, accumulating over the 60 years of the nuclear age, suddenly don’t look so negligible any more. Those who campaign for a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons are often referred to as utopian, or naïve. In fact, it is utopian to believe we can carry on like this without an explosion sooner or later.

So it is disturbing that the number of nuclear weapons in the world may be about to dramatically increase. Not in Iran, where (thankfully) sanctions seem to be working, but in Russia and China. The Bush administration, backed by the British government, has been insisting for more than 20 years on building a “nuclear shield” that would, in theory, shoot down any incoming nuclear weapons before they struck the US and its allies. After more than $100bn of military-industrial bungs, the technology still doesn’t work, but they are pushing on with it anyway. Russia and China have been pleading for a treaty that would prevent it because they want to retain the existing balance of power — but the Bush administration has flatly refused.

The result? China and Russia are now saying they will significantly increase their nuclear weapon production. It is, they insist, the only way to ensure they would be able to punch through the US missile shield and so retain some parity with US power.

The more weapons, the more likely an accident — or worse. But when the world should be scaling down the number of nukes, the Bush administration is actually ensuring they are ramped up.

Almost unnoticed in the Presidential race, Barack Obama has proposed the US recommit itself to moving towards a world without nukes. This isn’t out-of-the-blue: his best work as a Senator has been trying to lock up Russia’s barely guarded old weapons — while Bush tried to slash the funding for it. Some 66 per cent of the US public support the zero-nukes goal. Yet Hillary Clinton has been bragging about her ability to “obliterate” Iran instead, while McCain has cheered on the Bush shield-madness. There is no popular movement to pressure them into sanity.

Without the careful multilateral dismantling of these weapons, thousands of them will remain scattered across the earth, waiting — waiting for an accident with a bear, or a hijacked convoy, or a flipped-out submarine commander. Precisely how many nuclear near-death experiences do you want to risk?

Johann Hari writes for The Independent.

May 29, 2008
Costs of the Iraq War

Key Findings

1. U.S. Military Casualties Have Been Highest During the “Transition”: U.S. military casualties (wounded and killed) stand at a monthly average of 747 since the so-called “transition” to Iraqi rule on June 28, 2004. This contrasts with a monthly average of 482 U.S. military casualties during the invasion (March 20-May 1, 2003) and a monthly average of 415 during the occupation (May 2, 2003- June 28, 2004).

2. Non-Iraqi Contractor Deaths Have Also Been Highest During the”Transition”: There has also been a huge increase in the average monthly deaths of U.S. and other non-Iraqi contractors since the “transition.” On average, 17.5 contractors have died each month since the June 28 “transition,” versus 7.6 contractor deaths per month during the previous 14 months of occupation.

3. Estimated Strength of Iraqi Resistance Skyrockets: Because the U.S. military occupation remains in place, the “transition” has failed to win Iraqi support or diminish Iraqi resistance to the occupation. According to Pentagon estimates, the number of Iraqi resistance fighters has quadrupled between November of 2003 and early September 2004, from 5,000 to 20,000. The Deputy Commander of Coalition forces in Iraq , British Major General Andrew Graham, indicated to Time magazine in early September that he thinks the 20,000 estimate is too low; he estimates Iraqi resistance strength at 40,000-50,000. This rise is even starker when juxtaposed to Brookings Institution estimates that an additional 24,000 Iraqi resistance fighters have been detained or killed between May 2003 and August 2004.

4. U.S.- led Coalition Shrinks Further After “Transition”: The number of countries identified as members of the Coalition backing the U.S.-led war started with 30 on March 18, 2003, then grew in the early months of the war. Since then, eight countries have withdrawn their troops and Costa Rica has demanded to be taken off the coalition list. At the war’s start, coalition countries represented 19.1 percent of the world’s population; today, the remaining countries with foces in Iraq represent only 13.6 percent of the world’s population.

HUMAN COSTS TO THE U.S. AND ALLIES

U.S. Military Deaths: Between the start of war on March 19, 2003 and September 22, 2004, 1,175 coalition forces were killed, including 1,040 U.S. military. Of the total, 925 were killed after President Bush declared the end of combat operations on May 1, 2003. Over 7,413 U.S. troops have been wounded since the war began, 6,953 (94 percent) since May 1, 2003.

Contractor Deaths: As of September 22, 2004, there has been an estimated 154 civilian contractors, missionaries, and civilian worker deaths since May 1, 2004. Of these, 52 have been identified as Americans.

Journalist Deaths: Forty-four international media workers have been killed in Iraq as of September 22, 2004, including 33 since President Bush declared the end of combat operations. Eight of the dead worked for U.S. companies.

SECURITY COSTS

Terrorist Recruitment and Action: According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, al Qaeda’s membership is now at 18,000, with 1,000 active in Iraq . The State Department’s 2003 “Patterns of Global Terrorism,” documented 625 deaths and 3,646 injuries due to terrorist attacks in 2003. The report acknowledged that “significant incidents,” increased from 60 percent of total attacks in 2002 to 84 percent in 2003.

Low U.S. Credibility: Polls reveal that the war has damaged the U.S. government’s standing and credibility in the world. Surveys in eight European and Arab countries demonstrated broad public agreement that the war has hurt, rather than helped, the war on terrorism. At home, 52 percent of Americans polled by the Annenberg Election Survey disapprove of Bush’s handling of Iraq.

Military Mistakes: A number of former military officials have criticized the war, including retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who has charged that by manufacturing a false rationale for war, abandoning traditional allies, propping up and trusting Iraqi exiles, and failing to plan for post-war Iraq , the Bush Administration made the United States less secure.

Low Troop Morale and Lack of Equipment: A March 2004 army survey found 52 percent of soldiers reporting low morale, and three-fourths reporting they were poorly led by their officers. Lack of equipment has been an ongoing problem. The Army did not fully equip soldiers with bullet-proof vests until June 2004, forcing many families to purchase them out of their own pockets.

Loss of First Responders: National Guard troops make up almost one-third of the U.S. Army troops now in Iraq . Their deployment puts a particularly heavy burden on their home communities because many are “first responders,” including police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel. For example, 44 percent of the country’s police forces have lost officers to Iraq . In some states, the absence of so many Guard troops has raised concerns about the ability to handle natural disasters.

Use of Private Contractors: An estimated 20,000 private contractors are carrying out work in Iraq traditionally done by the military, despite the fact that they often lack sufficient training and are not accountable to the same guidelines and reviews as military personnel.

ECONOMIC COSTS

The Bill So Far: Congress has approved of $151.1 billion for Iraq. Congressional leaders anticipate an additional supplemental appropriation of $60 billion after the election.

Long-term Impact on U.S. Economy: Economist Doug Henwood has estimated that the war bill will add up to an average of at least $3,415 for every U.S. household.

Oil Prices: U.S. crude oil prices spiked at $48 per barrel on August 19, 2004, the highest level since 1983, a development that most analysts attribute at least in part to the deteriorating situation in Iraq.

Economic Impact on Military Families: Since the beginning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan , 364,000 reserve troops and National Guard soldiers have been called for military service, serving tours of duty that often last 20 months. Studies show that between 30 and 40 percent of reservists and National Guard members earn a lower salary when they leave civilian employment for military deployment. Army Emergency Relief has reported that requests from military families for food stamps and subsidized meals increased “several hundred percent” between 2002 and 2003.

SOCIAL COSTS

U.S. Budget and Social Programs: The Bush administration’s combination of massive spending on the war and tax cuts for the wealthy means less money for social spending. The $151.1 billion expenditure for the war through this year could have paid for: close to 23 million housing vouchers; health care for over 27 million uninsured Americans; salaries for nearly 3 million elementary school teachers; 678,200 new fire engines; over 20 million Head Start slots for children; or health care coverage for 82 million children. A leaked memo from the White House to domestic agencies outlines major cuts following the election, including funding for education, Head Start, home ownership, job training, medical research and homeland security.

Social Costs to the Military: In order to meet troop requirements in Iraq, the Army has extended the tours of duty for soldiers. These extensions have been particularly difficult for reservists, many of whom never expected to face such long separations from their jobs and families. According to military policy, reservists are not supposed to be on assignment for more than 12 months every 5-6 years. To date, the average tour of duty for all soldiers in Iraq has been 320 days. A recent Army survey revealed that more than half of soldiers said they would not re-enlist.

Costs to Veteran Health Care: About 64 percent of the more than 7,000 U.S. soldiers injured in Iraq received wounds that prevented them from returning to duty. One trend has been an increase in amputees, the result of improved body armor that protects vital organs but not extremities. As in previous wars, many soldiers are likely to have received ailments that will not be detected for years to come. The Veterans Administration healthcare system is not prepared for the swelling number of claims. In May, the House of Representatives approved funding for FY 2005 that is $2.6 billion less than needed, according to veterans’ groups.

Mental Health Costs: The New England Journal of Medicine reported in July 2004 that 1 in 6 soldiers returning from war in Iraq showed signs of post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, or severe anxiety. Only 23 to 40 percent of respondents in the study who showed signs of a mental disorder had sought mental health care.

COSTS TO IRAQ

HUMAN COSTS

Iraqi Deaths and Injuries: As of September 22, 2004, between 12,800 and 14,843 Iraqi civilians have been killed as a result of the U.S. invasion and ensuing occupation, while an estimated 40,000 Iraqis have been injured. During “major combat” operations, between 4,895 and 6,370 Iraqi soldiers and insurgents were killed.

Effects of Depleted Uranium: The health impacts of the use of depleted uranium weaponry in Iraq are yet to be known. The Pentagon estimates that U.S. and British forces used 1,100 to 2,200 tons of weaponry made from the toxic and radioactive metal during the March 2003 bombing campaign. Many scientists blame the far smaller amount of DU weapons used in the Persian Gulf War for illnesses among U.S. soldiers, as well as a sevenfold increase in child birth defects in Basra in southern Iraq.

Rise in Crime: Murder, rape, and kidnapping have skyrocketed since March 2003, forcing Iraqi children to stay home from school and women to stay off the streets at night. Violent deaths rose from an average of 14 per month in 2002 to 357 per month in 2003.

Psychological Impact: Living under occupation without the most basic security has devastated the Iraqi population. A poll conducted by the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies in June 2004 found that 80 percent of Iraqis believe that coalition forces should leave either immediately or directly after the election.

ECONOMIC COSTS

Unemployment: Iraqi joblessness doubled from 30 percent before the war to 60 percent in the summer of 2003. While the Bush administration now claims that unemployment has dropped, the U.S. is only employing 120,000 Iraqis, of a workforce of 7 million, in reconstruction projects.

Corporate War Profiteering: Most of Iraq ‘s reconstruction has been contracted out to U.S. companies, rather than experienced Iraqi firms. Top contractor Halliburton is being investigated for charging $160 million for meals that were never served to troops and $61 million in cost overruns on fuel deliveries. Halliburton employees also took $6 million in kickbacks from subcontractors, while other employees have reported extensive waste, including the abandonment of $85,000 trucks because they had flat tires. Iraq ‘s Oil Economy: Anti-occupation violence has prevented Iraq from capitalizing on its oil assets. There have been an estimated 118 attacks on Iraq ‘s oil infrastructure since June 2003. By September 2004, oil production still had not reached pre-war levels and major attacks caused oil exports to plummet to a ten- month low in August 2004.

SOCIAL COSTS

Health Infrastructure: After more than a decade of crippling sanctions, Iraq ‘s health facilities were further damaged during the war and post-invasion looting. Iraq ‘s hospitals continue to suffer from lack of supplies and an overwhelming number of patients.

Education: UNICEF estimates that more than 200 schools were destroyed in the conflict and thousands more were looted in the chaos following the fall of Saddam Hussein.

Environment: The U.S-led attack damaged water and sewage systems and the country’s fragile desert ecosystem. It also resulted in oil well fires that spewed smoke across the country and left unexploded ordnance that continues to endanger the Iraqi people and environment. Mines and unexploded ordnance cause an estimated 20 casualties per month.

HUMAN RIGHTS COSTS

Even with Saddam Hussein overthrown, Iraqis continue to face human rights violations from occupying forces. In addition to the widely publicized humiliation and torture of prisoners, abuse has been widespread throughout the post-9-11 military operations, with over 300 allegations of abuse in Afghanistan , Iraq and Guantánamo. As of mid-August 2004, only 155 investigations into the existing 300 allegations had been completed.

SOVEREIGNTY COSTS

Despite the proclaimed “transfer of sovereignty” to Iraq , the country continues to be occupied by U.S. and coalition troops and has severely limited political and economic independence. The interim government does not have the authority to reverse the nearly 100 orders by former CPA head Paul Bremer that, among other things, allow for the privatization of Iraq ‘s state-owned enterprises and prohibit preferences for domestic firms in reconstruction.

COSTS TO THE WORLD

HUMAN COSTS

While Americans make up the vast majority of military and contractor personnel in Iraq , other U.S.-allied “coalition” troops have suffered 135 war casualties in Iraq . In addition, the focus on Iraq has diverted international resources and attention away from humanitarian crises such as in Sudan.

DISABLING INTERNATIONAL LAW

The unilateral U.S. decision to go to war in Iraq violated the United Nations Charter, setting a dangerous precedent for other countries to seize any opportunity to respond militarily to claimed threats, whether real or contrived, that must be “pre-empted.” The U.S. military has also violated the Geneva Convention, making it more likely that in the future, other nations will ignore these protections in their treatment of civilian populations and detainees.

UNDERMINING THE UNITED NATIONS

At every turn, the Bush Administration has attacked the legitimacy and credibility of the UN, undermining the institution’s capacity to act in the future as the centerpiece of global disarmament and conflict resolution. The efforts of the Bush administration to gain UN acceptance of an Iraqi government that was not elected but rather installed by occupying forces undermines the entire notion of national sovereignty as the basis for the UN Charter. It was on this basis that Secretary General Annan referred specifically to the vantage point of the UN Charter in his September 2004 finding that the war was illegal.

ENFORCING COALITIONS

Faced with opposition in the UN Security Council, the U.S. government attempted to create the illusion of multilateral support for the war by pressuring other governments to join a so-called “Coalition of the Willing.” This not only circumvented UN authority, but also undermined democracy in many coalition countries, where public opposition to the war was as high as 90 percent. As of the middle of September, only 29 members of the “Coalition of the Willing” had forces in Iraq , in addition to the United States . These countries, combined with United States , make up less than 14 percent of the world’s population.

COSTS TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

The $151.1 billion spent by the U.S. government on the war could have cut world hunger in half and covered HIV/AIDS medicine, childhood immunization and clean water and sanitation needs of the developing world for more than two years. As a factor in the oil price hike, the war has created concerns of a return to the “stagflation” of the 1970s. Already, the world’s major airlines are expecting an increase in costs of $1 billion or more per month.

UNDERMINING GLOBAL SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The U.S.-led war and occupation have galvanized international terrorist organizations, placing people not only in Iraq but around the world at greater risk of attack. The State Department’s annual report on international terrorism reported that in 2003 there was the highest level of terror-related incidents deemed “significant” than at any time since the U.S. began issuing these figures.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS

U.S.-fired depleted uranium weapons have contributed to pollution of Iraq ‘s land and water, with inevitable spillover effects in other countries. The heavily polluted Tigris River , for example, flows through Iraq , Iran and Kuwait.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The Justice Department memo assuring the White House that torture was legal stands in stark violation of the International Convention Against Torture (of which the United States is a signatory). This, combined with the widely publicized mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. military and intelligence officials, gave new license for torture and mistreatment by governments around the world.

Prepared by the Institute for Policy Studies and Foreign Policy In Focus

November 21, 2004
The Challenge of Hiroshima: Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization in a North East Asian Context
Conference Statement

Six non-governmental organizations* brought together experts and activists from nine countries** in Hiroshima, Japan to discuss issues of global and regional peace and security. Almost 60 years after this city suffered the first atomic bombing, we confront new and continuing nuclear dangers in North East Asia and around the world.

An inspiring opening to the conference was provided by Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba, who discussed the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons by 2020. A prominent sentiment that underlay the discussions during the meeting was the suffering experienced by the survivors of the atomic bombing, the hibakusha , and their courage and determination in their efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

Despite the efforts of the hibakusha and the efforts of millions of other people for more than half a century to eliminate nuclear weapons, over twenty thousand remain deployed worldwide. Under the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to negotiate for the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, there are no such negotiations in progress or even on the horizon for further nuclear reductions. Entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty also remains an unrealized goal, in no small part due to the refusal of the United States to ratify the Treaty.

North Korea has announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and that it has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. It justifies this decision in part because the United States government has listed North Korea as a potential nuclear target. North Korea also cites other implied United States threats to use force against it, manifested by the continued deployment of powerful United States military forces in the region.

The United States and Japan are also proceeding with joint ballistic missile defense research, claiming a need to counter a North Korean missile threat. Missile defense deployment, and the possibility that it could be extended further to Taiwan , is viewed with great concern by China , and by other governments and peace movements throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States is pursuing ambitious programs for the modernization of its nuclear forces, from its missiles and the warheads they deliver to the systems used to plan and execute nuclear strikes. China and Russia , the major nuclear powers in the region, also continue to modernize some elements of their nuclear arsenals, although at a far slower pace than the United States . In addition, the United States continues to develop new kinds of high technology conventional weapons, including increasingly accurate and long-range conventionally armed missiles. A growing proportion of United States military forces are being deployed in the Pacific region.

All countries in North East Asia and the surrounding region have a strong interest in a stable and peaceful environment. The development and deployment of dangerous weapons systems in the region undermines this goal.

After extensive discussions, the conference participants concluded:
- Every available diplomatic means should be employed to resolve the current standoff between the United States and North Korea , ranging from the existing six-party talks between North Korea , South Korea , Japan , China , Russia and the United States , to bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States.
- Joint ballistic missile defense research by Japan and the United States complicates the relationship between the three major nuclear powers, and furthers proliferation of sophisticated military technologies. Missile defense development will make a regional arms race more likely. Therefore, joint ballistic missile defense development should not proceed, and the United States should not deploy anti-ballistic missile systems in the region.
- Normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan and between North Korea and the United States should be encouraged.
- China , Russia , and the United States , the three nuclear weapons states with forces in the region, should actively pursue global negotiations for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals, consistent with their disarmament obligations under the NPT. These negotiations should involve all nuclear weapons states, including those not party to the NPT.
As a way forward, the conference participants agreed that the six-party talks should be considered a starting point for long-term discussions to address further regional security-enhancing measures, including:
- the withdrawal of missiles to such locations as would reduce perceived threats to countries in the region;
- limitations and reductions of missiles in the region;
- the creation of a North East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone; and
- the withdrawal of foreign military forces based in the region.
The conference participants recognized that regional security also depends on the global security environment. They were particularly concerned about the weaponization of space, and wide-ranging United States plans for space dominance and the use of space for war fighting. The conference participants recommended the beginning and early conclusion of negotiations for a treaty banning these developments.

The participants agreed that the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference will be critical for the future of non-proliferation and disarmament. The cry of the hibakusha – no more Hiroshimas, no more Nagasakis – must be taken up by the people of the world, strongly enough this time that the governments finally must listen and act to fulfill their legal obligations for the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

*Convened by the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, the Hiroshima Peace Institute, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), Mayors for Peace, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF), and the Peace Depot. This was the fourth in a series of conferences in the project Moving Beyond Missile Defense, sponsored by INESAP and NAPF.

** Canada, China, Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
October 8, 2004
Who Will Make Us Safer from the Biggest Threat Facing the US?

If you watched or heard about the first Presidential debate on September 30th, then you probably already know that one thing both presidential candidates agree upon is that nuclear proliferation poses the biggest threat to the US. What you might not know is which candidate will actually make Americans far safer and more secure. Understanding how the presidential candidates will deal with nuclear proliferation is essential in allowing US citizens to make an informed decision on who is best suited to lead this great country.

One thing President Bush failed to mention is that, despite calls from past Presidents, nuclear weapons have assumed a far more central role in US security policy. The new, more “usable” role that the US government has assigned to nuclear weapons and its doctrine of pre-emptive warfare can encourage other nations to obtain nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction) in pursuit of their own security needs. These policies diminish US national security and attempts to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction, increasing the risk that other countries and terrorists will obtain and use nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction against the US.

So, let’s take a moment to examine exactly where President Bush and Senator Kerry stand on just four key policies that would protect Americans and their families.

Oppose creating dangerous new nuclear weapons that will lead others to follow our example.

President George W. Bush requested some $36.6 million in the 2005 Budget for research on dangerous new nuclear weapons, including the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator or “bunker-buster” and “mini-nukes.”

John Kerry has stated, “As president, I will stop this administration’s program to develop a whole new generation of bunker-busting nuclear bombs. This is a weapon we don’t need. And it undermines our credibility in persuading other nations. What kind of message does it send when we’re asking other countries not to develop nuclear weapons but developing new ones ourselves?”

Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and continue the current moratorium on nuclear testing, which are essential elements to promoting the international non-proliferation regime and protecting American security.

President Bush opposes ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, already ratified by 115 countries, and has proposed $30 million in the 2005 Budget for reducing the time to resume nuclear testing from 24 months to 18 months.

Senator Kerry supports ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and has emphasized its importance in promoting the international non-proliferation regime.

Cancel funding for and plans to deploy offensive missile “defense” systems that could ignite a dangerous nuclear arms race and offer no security against terrorist weapons of mass destruction.

In 2001, President Bush unilaterally withdrew the US from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the former Soviet Union in order to deploy a missile “defenses.” He is seeking to deploy an inadequately tested missile defense system this year, and has requested a budget of more than $10 billion for this unproven system in 2005.

Senator Kerry has stated that he believes in further missile defense research, but he does “not believe in rapid deployment of a system that hasn’t been adequately tested.” He has stated that “to abandon [the ABM Treaty] altogether is to welcome an arms race that will make us more vulnerable, not less.”

Work with Russia to reduce the nuclear arsenals of both countries and ensure that nuclear weapons and materials stay out of the hands of terrorists or countries seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities.

President Bush signed a treaty with the Russians that calls for bringing down the number of deployed strategic weapons to between 2,200 and 1,700 by the year 2012. The treaty, however, does not provide for verification and does not make the reductions irreversible. The treaty also terminates in the year 2012. Since weapons taken off active deployment will be kept on the shelf in reserve, they will be a tempting target for terrorists. President Bush has also called for reductions of more than nine percent in the funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to secure nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union.

Senator Kerry has stated that the treaty that President Bush entered into “runs the risk of increasing nuclear theft by stockpiling thousands of warheads.” He further stated that “if we are to make America safer, and we must, it will take more than cosmetic treaties that leave Russia’s nuclear arsenal in place.” Kerry has called for increased joint efforts with the Russians to dispose of stocks of existing nuclear materials. He has stated that he will make securing nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union a priority in relations between the US and Russia and work with our allies to establish global standards for the safekeeping of nuclear materials.

It is up to us voters to elect a President who will make us safer from the biggest threat facing the US. If you want to see the US implement more responsible nuclear policies, then visit www.chartinganewcourse.org to learn more and take action today.

Carah Ong is the Development and Communications Director of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

October 1, 2004
A Safer Form of Deterrence and Security
Proliferation Brief, Volume 7, Number 9
The following are excerpts from remarks by Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004 . To read the full text, and for video and audio of the remarks, visit www.ProliferationNews.org.

Nuclear weapons nations must visibly and steadily reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, and today they are not. The presidents of the United States and Russia should urgently undertake a new nuclear initiative and end their nations’ Cold War nuclear force postures by removing all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger status.

Today, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon is unacceptably high. We are running the irrational risk of an Armageddon of our own making. It is time to find a safer form of deterrence and security. If both the United States and Russia remove nuclear weapons from hair-trigger status, we can immediately eliminate the threat of rapid assured destruction and dramatically reduce the chance of an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized launch. By taking this step, we will de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons and make them less relevant.

Keeping our nuclear weapons on hair trigger now increases the risk it was designed to reduce. President Bush knows this: In the summer of 2000, Presidential candidate George W. Bush said: “The Clinton-Gore administration has had over seven years to bring the U.S. force posture into the post-Cold War world. Instead, they remain locked in a Cold War mentality.”

Later in the same speech, Mr. Bush said: “The United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status – another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation. Preparation for quick launch – within minutes after warning of an attack – was the rule during the era of superpower rivalry. But today, for two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. So, as president, I will ask for an assessment of what we can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.”

I have a proposal. Candidate Bush said we should remove “as many weapons as possible” from hair-trigger status. I propose that today “as many weapons as possible” should mean “all of them.” I urge the president of the United States and the president of Russia to order the military and defense officials of each country to present to the presidents, within six months, a set of options for removing all nuclear weapons of both countries from hair-trigger status. These officials should jointly:
1. Determine what threats posed by the other side justify keeping any nuclear weapons on hair-trigger status.
2. Determine what steps the other side must take to remove those threats and thus end the justification for hair-trigger status.
3. Integrate these findings into proposed nuclear force postures that can assure the survivability of nuclear forces and end the need for quick launch capacity by either the U.S. or Russia.
The presidents should then jointly adopt an approach and a timetable to get the job done and challenge other nuclear nations to follow this lead. If the defense establishments say they cannot, we need clear and convincing answers why not. The burden of proof must shift to those who insist on maintaining the hair-trigger posture in Russia and in the United States .

Removing all nuclear weapons from hair trigger alert would move towards a nuclear posture where the decision to launch will be slower, more deliberate and far less likely. This is an essential first step in coming out from under the shadow of Mutual Assured Destruction toward an expanded doctrine of “Mutual Assured Safety” – an idea first advanced by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry – where both the U.S. and Russia would shift their nuclear weapons doctrine from one that “seeks security by threatening destruction” toward one that “seeks security by threat reduction.”

There are a number of possible options for beginning the removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, including:
1. Immediately ordering that the warheads from each side scheduled to be taken out under the 2002 Treaty of Moscow be taken off alert;
2. Limiting the number of hair-trigger status warheads each side can deploy to several hundred;
3. A reciprocal approach where the U.S. would remove all land-based missiles from hair-trigger alert, and Russia would do the same for its sea-based missiles.
If the United States and Russia de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in our security, it would: immediately reduce the danger we pose to each other; give us more standing to encourage other nations to dismiss the nuclear option; and help build the international cooperation required to apply pressure on nations still seeking the nuclear option – nations like Iran and North Korea – and rally the world to take essential steps in preventing catastrophic terrorism
July 7, 2004
Diplomats and Military Commanders for Change Official Statement

The undersigned have held positions of responsibility for the planning and execution of American foreign and defense policy. Collectively, we have served every president since Harry S. Truman. Some of us are Democrats, some are Republicans or Independents, many voted for George W. Bush. But we all believe that current Administration policies have failed in the primary responsibilities of preserving national security and providing world leadership. Serious issues are at stake. We need a change.

From the outset, President George W. Bush adopted an overbearing approach to America’s role in the world, relying upon military might and righteousness, insensitive to the concerns of traditional friends and allies, and disdainful of the United Nations. Instead of building upon America’s great economic and moral strength to lead other nations in a coordinated campaign to address the causes of terrorism and to stifle its resources, the Administration, motivated more by ideology than by reasoned analysis, struck out on its own. It led the United States into an ill-planned and costly war from which exit is uncertain. It justified the invasion of Iraq by manipulation of uncertain intelligence about weapons of mass destruction, and by a cynical campaign to persuade the public that Saddam Hussein was linked to Al Qaeda and the attacks of September 11. The evidence did not support this argument.

Our security has been weakened. While American airmen and women, marines, soldiers and sailors have performed gallantly, our armed forces were not prepared for military occupation and nation building. Public opinion polls throughout the world report hostility toward us. Muslim youth are turning to anti-American terrorism. Never in the two and a quarter centuries of our history has the United States been so isolated among the nations, so broadly feared and distrusted. No loyal American would question our ultimate right to act alone in our national interest; but responsible leadership would not turn to unilateral military action before diplomacy had been thoroughly explored.

The United States suffers from close identification with autocratic regimes in the Muslim world, and from the perception of unquestioning support for the policies and actions of the present Israeli Government. To enhance credibility with Islamic peoples we must pursue courageous, energetic and balanced efforts to establish peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and policies that encourage responsible democratic reforms.

We face profound challenges in the 21st Century: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unequal distribution of wealth and the fruits of globalization, terrorism, environmental degradation, population growth in the developing world, HIV/AIDS, ethnic and religious confrontations. Such problems can not be resolved by military force, nor by the sole remaining superpower alone; they demand patient, coordinated global effort under the leadership of the United States.

The Bush Administration has shown that it does not grasp these circumstances of the new era, and is not able to rise to the responsibilities of world leadership in either style or substance. It is time for a change.

Signatories

The Honorable Avis T. Bohlen
Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, 1999
Ambassador to Bulgaria, 1996
District of Columbia

Admiral William J. Crowe, USN, Ret.
Chairman, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Committee, 1993 Ambassador to the Court of Saint James, 1993 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1985 Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command
Oklahoma

The Honorable Jeffrey S. Davidow
Ambassador to Mexico, 1998
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1996 Ambassador to Venezuela, 1993 Ambassador to Zambia, 1988
Virginia

The Honorable William A. DePree
Ambassador to Bangladesh, 1987
Director of State Department Management Operations, 1983 Ambassador to Mozambique, 1976
Michigan

The Honorable Donald B. Easum
Ambassador to Nigeria, 1975
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1974 Ambassador to Upper Volta, 1971 Virginia

The Honorable Charles W. Freeman, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 1993 Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1989
Rhode Island
Read more >>

The Honorable William C. Harrop
Ambassador to Israel, 1991
Ambassador to Zaire, 1987
Inspector General of the State Department and Foreign Service, 1983 Ambassador to Kenya and Seychelles, 1980 Ambassador to Guinea, 1975
New Jersey
Read more >>

The Honorable Arthur A. Hartman
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1981
Ambassador to France, 1977
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, 1973
New Jersey

General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, Ret.
Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, 1991
Deputy Chief of Staff, Marine Corps, 1990
Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, 1987
Massachusetts

The Honorable H. Allen Holmes
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, 1993 Ambassador at Large for Burdensharing, 1989 Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, 1986 Ambassador to Portugal, 1982
Kansas
Read more >>

The Honorable Robert V. Keeley
Ambassador to Greece, 1985
Ambassador to Zimbabwe, 1980
Ambassador to Mauritius, 1976
Florida

The Honorable Samuel W. Lewis
Director of State Department Policy and Planning, 1993 Ambassador to Israel, 1977 Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1975
Texas

The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, 1997 Ambassador to South Africa, 1992 Director, Bureau of Refugee Programs, 1989 Ambassador to Nigeria, 1986
Maryland
Read more >>

The Honorable Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1987
Director for European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council, 1983 Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 1981
Florida

The Honorable Donald F. McHenry
Ambassador and U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1979
Illinois

General Merrill A. (Tony) McPeak, USAF, Ret.
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 1990
Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces, 1988
Commander, 12th Air Force and U.S. Southern Command Air Forces, 1987
Oregon

The Honorable George E. Moose
Representative, United Nations European Office, 1997
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1993 Ambassador to Senegal, 1988 Director, State Department Bureau of Management Operations, 1987 Ambassador to Benin, 1983 Colorado

The Honorable David D. Newsom
Secretary of State ad interim, 1981
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 1978
Ambassador to the Philippines, 1977
Ambassador to Indonesia, 1973
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 1969 Ambassador to Libya, 1965
California
Read more >>

The Honorable Phyllis E. Oakley
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, 1997 Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, 1994
Nebraska
Read more >>

The Honorable Robert Oakley
Special Envoy for Somalia, 1992
Ambassador to Pakistan, 1988
Ambassador to Somalia.1982
Ambassador to Zaire, 1979
Louisiana

The Honorable James D. Phillips
Diplomat-in-Residence, the Carter Center of Emory University, 1994 Ambassador to the Republic of Congo, 1990 Ambassador to Burundi, 1986
Kansas

The Honorable John E. Reinhardt
Director of the United States Information Agency, 1977 Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1975 Ambassador to Nigeria, 1971
Maryland

General William Y. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Chief of Staff for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 1979 Assistant to the Chairman, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1975 Director of National Security Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1974
Arkansas

The Honorable Ronald I. Spiers
Under Secretary General of the United Nations for Political Affairs, 1989 Under Secretary of State for Management, 1983 Ambassador to Pakistan, 1981 Director, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1980 Ambassador to Turkey, 1977 Ambassador to The Bahamas, 1973 Director, State Department Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 1969 Vermont

The Honorable Michael E. Sterner
Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, 1974
New York

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN, Ret.
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1977
Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO), 1975 Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, 1974
Illinois

The Honorable Alexander F. Watson
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1993 Ambassador to Brazil, 1992 Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1989 Ambassador to Peru, 1986 Maryland

June 16, 2004
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security
A Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Panel Discussion
During the 2004 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee at the United Nations, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation convened a panel discussion entitled “Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security,” enabling the opportunity to discuss current proliferation trends and recommendations to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

The panel was moderated by David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and speakers at the event included Canadian Senator and Chair of the Middle Powers Initiative, Douglas Roche OC, Kate Hudson, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation, and Justine Wang, Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The resulting discussions were constructive as panelists debated the challenges posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the responsibility to offer alternative visions of security for a more peaceful world.

Senator Roche set the tone by addressing the current state of the world today. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, nuclear weapons states have shown scant inclination to abide by their promise of good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Without a serious effort by nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament, the NPT will continue to promote double standards that allow some states to continue to expand and improve their nuclear arsenal while denying others of the same rights. In order to meet the challenges of today, the NPT and the non-proliferation regime is in urgent need of reconstruction. In reflecting on the role he played both as a parliamentarian and as a representative of civil society, Senator Roche underlined the importance of the role of civilian grassroots and non-governmental organizations in educating the public and influencing top level policy decisions among different countries.

Kate Hudson spoke on the subject of the “Special Relationship between the US and UK .” Having summarized the background to the relationship based on the UK ‘s historical economic dependence, Hudson spoke of the problems arising from the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) between the two countries. This provides the basis for extensive nuclear collaboration, without which it is unlikely that the UK would be able to sustain its possession of nuclear weapons on Trident submarines. According to Hudson , “It is unlikely that the UK could remain a nuclear weapon states without the support of the US .” The MDA is in line for renewal during 2004, which has a strong bearing on the issue of a possible Trident replacement and the potential development of new nuclear weapons.

Hudson also discussed the UK ‘s strong support for the new framework of the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review. It was noted that many observers feel that political support for US initiatives is part of the “Special Relationship.” The problem in the UK is that the current British government strongly supports the relationship and backs the full range of US policies, including pre-emptive war and nuclear first strike. CND is currently campaigning against the development of new nuclear weapons; for an immediate parliamentary discussion on MDA; for a rejection of pre-emptive war and nuclear first use policies; in opposition to a Trident replacement; for withdrawal of permission for US use of British bases for Missile Defense; and for withdrawal of US weapons from Lakenheath.

Jacqueline Cabasso focused on US nuclear weapons policy and underlined the importance of nuclear disarmament as a core issue on the global peace movement’s agenda. According to Cabasso, while the Bush administration is demanding nuclear disarmament from other nations, it continues to upgrade and expand its nuclear arsenal. Cabasso supports this by referring to several US documents, including:
- The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for:
- The 2002 US National Security Strategy which highlights the administration’s willingness to engage in pre-emptive war, including the possibility of nuclear first strike by “acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
- The US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction which reserves to the US the right to respond with overwhelming force – including using nuclear weapons – to the use of weapons of nuclear, chemical or biological against the US or its allies.
According to Cabasso, the legitimization of nuclear weapons by the world’s first nuclear weapons state and super power, the US , poses the gravest threat to international security. The US policy of preventive war and its push to modernize its nuclear arsenal provide arguments for other countries to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

Cabasso challenged that while the security policy of the Bush administration are more extreme than other administrations, they are really a continuation of them. Cabasso continued by pointing out that even if Democratic Presidential Candidate John Kerry (D-MA) succeeds in winning the election in November 2004, the global community must not assume that current US nuclear weapons policy will take a dramatic turn for the better. Reading excerpts from An American Security Strategy, released in July 2003 by the National Security Advisory Group to the Democratic Party, Cabasso revealed that Democratic national security policies are not necessarily opposed to current US nuclear weapons policy. The policy paper only demonstrates a marginal change from the current US stance and endorses the current level of spending on US nuclear weapons and other military programs.

Current US nuclear policies have made visible the present and very real dangers of nuclear weapon use. Nuclear weapons threaten everyone’s security and Cabasso concluded for the need to redefine security, “throwing out the outdated model completely to replace it with a human security model” based on food, shelter, clean air and water, jobs, healthcare and education for everyone everywhere, without regard to national borders.

Justine Wang ended the panel discussion by addressing recent calls for countering proliferation and suggesting recommendations for improving the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Wang addressed the recent initiatives proposed by US President George Bush on February 11 2004, IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei and the recently passed US-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While these proposals are constructive and necessary to the extent that they don’t enshrine double standards, they fall seriously short of being able to meet the current global proliferation challenge.

Wang called for the stemming of nuclear proliferation under a more strict, equitable and effective multilateral framework and shared recommendations of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation to improve the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Recommendations include commencing negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, universal application of the NPT to all states under a strict timetable, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty , universal and equal application of the Additional Protocol , and the phased elimination of nuclear power.

Wang reiterated that the continuation of the current NPT regime that ignores existing double standards is destined to result in both further nuclear proliferation and the use of nuclear weapons. Only by embracing significant changes that end existing double standards and elevate nuclear disarmament obligations can the non-proliferation regime succeed.

Krieger concluded the panel discussion and mentioned that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is launching an online campaign entitled “Turn the Tide: Charting a New Course for US Nuclear Policy” as an example of a grassroots initiative needed to mobilize the public to alert policy makers on the threat of nuclear weapons on the world’s security.

Discussions ended with a question and answer session, where many participants engaged in constructive dialogue on facing the challenge of the increasing threat of nuclear weapons and the future of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime.
April 28, 2004
Security in the Post 9/11 World

The Bush administration’s approach to security in the post 9/11 world is built on military strength, and is composed of the following elements: increased military expenditures, the pursuit of global military dominance, indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons, the development and deployment of missile defenses and the threat to initiate preemptive wars in the name of security. There was a time, when nations fought nations and armies battled against armies, when this strategy might arguably have been relevant, but in the post 9/11 world it is a dysfunctional strategy that is certain to fail.

Military force is too blunt an instrument for providing security against terrorists. One need only look at the results of the US-led war against Afghanistan. Military force could topple the Taliban regime, but it could not capture or kill the leading terrorists purported to have initiated the 9/11 attacks. In the process of prevailing over the Taliban, which hardly required the world’s most advanced military force, many innocent civilians were killed, undoubtedly resulting in new sympathies and new recruits for the terrorist forces aligned in their hatred toward the policies of the United States.

Mr. Bush has named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an Axis of Evil, certainly a provocative statement which, combined with Bush’s stated willingness to engage in preemptive war, is likely to elicit steps by these nations to protect themselves against possible attacks by US forces. The Bush administration is already well advanced in its plans to wage war against Iraq. It is worth contemplating that such a war against Iraq would be the first war ever fought for nuclear disarmament, ironically pursued by a country with 10,000 nuclear weapons against a country with no demonstrated nuclear weapons.

Would a war against Iraq make US citizens more secure? There is every reason to believe that it would make US citizens far less secure. Such a war, rightly or wrongly, would be perceived in the Arab world as reflecting the double standards that allow the US to turn a blind eye to Israel’s arsenal of some 200 nuclear weapons while being willing to attack an Arab country for pursuing the same path. A US-led war against Iraq would require a bloody battle to topple Saddam Hussein, and would undoubtedly result in more hatred and determination by terrorists, old and new, to attack US citizens where they are most vulnerable.

A war against terrorism is not a war that can be won on the battlefield because there is no battlefield. It is not a war that can be won by throwing more money at the military or by building the most dominant military force in the world (we already have that). Nuclear weapons certainly will not be able to deter terrorists, particularly since they are virtually unlocatable. Nor will missile defenses be of any value against terrorists, who will use low-tech stealth approaches to go under the high-tech missile defenses. And the threat of preemptive war by the US will only provoke other countries to seek clandestinely to develop their own deterrent forces.

In sum, the Bush administration’s approach to providing security in the post 9/11 world is a strategy not only destined to fail, but to make matters far worse than they already are. Achieving security in a world of suicidal and determined terrorists requires a new approach, something other than the Rumsfeld doctrine of “find and destroy the enemy before they strike us.”

This new approach to security must be built on the power of diplomacy and aid rather than on military power. It must be built on policies that reverse inequities in the world and seek to provide basic human rights and human dignity for all. These policies must adhere to international law, and end the double standards that have helped to produce extreme misery in much of the Arab world. In the 21st century there must be dignity for all, or there will be security for none.
*David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He is the editor of The Poetry of Peace (Capra Press).

December 30, 2002