Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Russia

  • Questions for the Candidates

    Article originally appeared in the International Herald Tribune

    There has been unusual interest throughout the world in the U.S. presidential race.

    Skeptics, of whom there are quite a few, say the campaign is just a marathon show that has little to do with real policymaking. Even if there’s a grain of truth in that, in an interdependent world the statements of the contenders for the White House are more than just rhetoric addressed to American voters.

    Major policy problems today cannot be solved without America – and America cannot solve them alone.

    Even the domestic problems of the United States are no longer purely internal. I am referring first of all to the economy. The problem of the huge U.S. budget deficit can be managed, for a time, by continuing to flood the world with “greenbacks,” whose rate is declining along with the value of U.S. securities. But such a system cannot work forever.

    Of course, the average American is not concerned with the complexities of global finance. But as I talk to ordinary Americans, and I visit the United States once or twice a year, I sense their anxiety about the state of the economy. The irony, they have said to me, is that the middle class felt little benefit from economic growth when the official indicators were pointing upward, but once the downturn started, it hit them immediately, and it hit them hard.

    No one can offer a simple fix for America’s economic problems, but it is hard not to see their connection to U.S. foreign policies. Over the past eight years the rapid rise in military spending has been the main factor in increasing the federal budget deficit. The United States spends more money on the military today than at the height of the Cold War.

    Yet no candidate has made that clear. “Defense spending” is a subject that seems to be surrounded by a wall of silence. But that wall will have to fall one day.

    We can expect a serious debate about foreign policy issues, including the role of the United States in the world; America’s claim to global leadership; fighting terrorism; nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and the problems caused by the invasion of Iraq.

    Of course I am not pretending to write the script for the presidential candidates’ debates. But I would add to this list of issues two more: the size of America’s defense budget and the militarization of its foreign policy. I am afraid these two questions will not be asked by the moderators. But sooner or later they will have to be answered.

    The present administration, particularly during George W. Bush’s first presidential term, was bent on trying to solve many foreign policy issues primarily by military means, through threats and pressure. The big question today is whether the presidential nominees will propose a different approach to the world’s most urgent problems.

    I am extremely alarmed by the increasing tendency to militarize policymaking and thinking. The fact is that the military option has again and again led to a dead end.

    One doesn’t have to go very far to find an alternative. Take the recent developments on nonproliferation issues, where the focus has been on two countries – North Korea and Iran.

    After several years of saber-rattling, the United States finally got around to serious talks with the North Koreans, involving South Korea and other neighboring countries. And though it took time to achieve results, the dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program has now begun.

    It’s true that nuclear issues in Iran encompass some unique features and may be more difficult to solve. But clearly threats and delusions of “regime change” are not the way to do it.

    We have to look even deeper for a solution. “Horizontal” proliferation will only get worse unless we solve the “vertical” problem, i.e. the continued existence of huge arsenals of sophisticated nuclear weapons held by major powers, particularly the United States and Russia.

    In recent months there seems to have been a conceptual breakthrough on this issue, with influential Americans calling for revitalizing efforts aimed at the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Both John McCain and Barack Obama have now endorsed that goal.

    I have always been in favor of ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction. On my watch, the Soviet Union and the United States concluded treaties on the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) missiles – and on A 50 percent reduction of strategic weapons, which led to the destruction of thousands of nuclear warheads.

    But when we proposed complete nuclear disarmament, our Western partners raised the issue of the Soviet Union’s advantage in conventional forces. So we agreed to negotiate major cuts in non-nuclear weapons, signing a treaty on this issue in Vienna.

    Today, I see a similar and even bigger problem, but the roles have been reversed. Let us imagine that 10 or 15 years down the road the world has abolished nuclear weapons. What would remain? Huge stockpiles of conventional arms, including the newest types, some so devastating as to be comparable to weapons of mass destruction.

    And the lion’s share of those stockpiles would be in the hands of one country, the United States, giving it an overwhelming advantage. Such a state of affairs would block the road to nuclear disarmament.

    Today the United States produces about half of the world’s military hardware and has over 700 military bases, from Europe to the most remote corners of the world. Those are just the officially recognized bases, with more being planned. It is as if the Cold War is still raging, as if the United States is surrounded by enemies who can only be fought with tanks, missiles and bombers. Historically, only empires had such an expansive approach to assuring their security.

    So the candidates, and the next president, will have to decide and state clearly whether America wants to be an empire or a democracy, whether it seeks global dominance or international cooperation. They will have to choose, because this is an either-or proposition: The two things don’t mix, like oil and water.

    Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, is president of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies in Moscow.

  • Cold War Has Thawed Only Slightly

    Article originally appeared in Columbia Tribune

    At the conclusion of their April 2008 summit, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin agreed the Cold War was over and that another Cuban missile crisis would be “unthinkable.” Standing nearby were U.S. and Russian military officers, each holding a briefcase from which their respective president could quickly transmit a launch order that, in about three minutes, would cause hundreds of ballistic missiles armed with thousands of nuclear warheads to begin their 30-minute flights toward Russia or the United States.

    Regardless of public expressions of friendship, the United States and Russia continue to operate under policies that assume each could authorize a nuclear attack against the other. The failure to end their Cold War nuclear confrontation causes both nations together to maintain a total of at least 2,600 strategic nuclear warheads on high-alert, launch-ready status, whose primary missions remain the destruction of the opposing side’s nuclear forces, industrial infrastructure and civilian/military leaders.

    Most Americans don’t know these weapons exist. They have no idea a single strategic nuclear warhead, when detonated over a city or industrial area, could ignite an enormous firestorm over a total area of 40 to 65 square miles. The vast nuclear arsenals have effectively been hidden from public view and removed from public knowledge, thus making it easy for smiling U.S. and Russian presidents to proclaim “peace in our time.”

    Another Cuban missile crisis might be “unthinkable,” but the continued U.S.-Russian nuclear confrontation means it certainly isn’t impossible. Presidential assurances to the contrary, the relations between Washington and Moscow are worse than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. And nuclear weapons remain at the heart of U.S.-Russian political disagreements.

    Eleven months before the April 2008 summit, Putin revealed Russian tests of a new ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads were a response to the planned deployment of a new U.S. missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Bush said the U.S. system is designed to intercept Iranian missiles aimed at America. Russia argues Iran has no long-range missiles and is not soon likely to have them – and even if it did have them, the sites for the proposed U.S. radar and interceptors are hundreds of miles north of where they should ideally be located.

    The U.S. system, however, would be in an ideal spot to track European-based Russian nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. X-band radar in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland are to be located between 800 and 1,000 miles from Moscow. If the situation were reversed, it would be the geographical equivalent of putting Russian missiles on the northern edge of Lake Superior. Russia views the proposed U.S. system as a direct threat to its strategic nuclear weapons and warns it will target its missiles at the Czech and Polish sites where the system is to be based.

    Russian arguments are supported by two respected U.S. physicists, George Lewis and Theodore Postol. They say the U.S. missile defense system would be able to track and engage almost every Russian missile launched toward the United States from Russian sites west of the Urals. The physicists said the only obvious reason for choosing Eastern Europe for a missile defense site is to place U.S. interceptor missiles close to Russia, making it possible for the European-based radar and interceptors to be added as a layer against Russia to the already developing U.S. continental missile defense.

    Russia is also deeply threatened by constant efforts to expand NATO and encircle Russia with U.S. military bases. Despite vehement Russian objections, Bush continues to insist the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia be allowed to join NATO. Should this happen, NATO military forces will be positioned on the borders of Russia. If Ukraine joins NATO and accepts the deployment of U.S. anti-missile defenses on its territory, Russia has threatened to target it with nuclear warheads.

    NATO, which began as an anti-Soviet alliance, is locked in a Cold War mentality that regards Russia as the enemy and keeps nuclear weapons as a primary military option. Four hundred eighty U.S. nuclear bombs (a force larger than the entire deployed nuclear arsenals of France, the United Kingdom, China or Israel) are stored at eight European NATO bases. These forward-based U.S. weapons are intended for use, in accordance with NATO nuclear strike plans, against targets in the Middle East or Russia.

    The Cold War will not really end until the United States and Russia stand down their high-alert, launch-ready nuclear arsenals and finally cease their nuclear confrontation. This surely will not happen as long as the United States continues to push for NATO expansion while ignoring Russian concerns about its proposed European missile defense system.

    Steven Starr is an independent writer who has been published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies. He recently retired from the medical profession to work as an educator and consultant on nuclear weapons issues.

  • Avoiding a Russian Arms Disaster

    Hurricane Katrina drove home the staggering devastation that disasters — natural or man-made –can inflict. Meanwhile, July’s attacks on the London Underground reminded us terrorists can still strike major world cities. Now imagine the two joined together: terrorists, armed with weapons of mass destruction, unleashing Katrina-scale chaos and death in the heart of a U.S. city.

    Such attacks are hardly unthinkable. Roughly half of Russia’s weapons-grade nuclear materials are poorly protected. In the small Russian town of Shchuch’ye, nearly 2 million shells of VX and sarin nerve gas — each lethal enough to kill 85,000 people — lay stacked in chicken cooplike structures. The September 11 commission said al Qaeda has pursued getting and using these weapons as a “religious obligation” for more than a decade.

    Fortunately, unlike hurricanes, much can be done to prevent this nightmare from becoming real. One of our first and best lines of defense is the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, created by former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn, Georgia Democrat, and Sen. Richard Lugar, Indiana Republican. Since 1992, the program has eliminated thousands of Russian nuclear warheads, missiles, submarines and bombers.

    But in recent years, a set of burdensome congressional restrictions has marred the program and led to a series of disruptive stop-and-start cycles. Key projects vital to America’s security have ground to a halt for months on end because, for example, Russian human-rights obligations were not met or the paperwork to waive them was not completed.

    Congress now has the chance to end such dangerous disruptions once and for all. Mr. Lugar, decrying those misplaced priorities, introduced language to repeal all the restrictions, which the Senate embraced by an overwhelming, bipartisan 78-19 vote in July. But until the full Congress approves it, CTR’s vital efforts remain in danger, from both a national security and a business perspective.

    Danger of delay: Current restrictions carry real costs on the ground. In mid-2002, all new CTR projects — including security upgrades at 10 nuclear weapons storage sites — stalled for four months because the conditions could not be certified. Destruction of the Shchuch’ye stockpile was delayed some 15 months from 2001 to 2003 for similar red-tape reasons.

    Such stoppages not only prolong threats to America, they also endanger the hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars already invested in Shchuch’ye and other projects. So long as the conditions remain, these dangerous disruptions are inevitable.

    Wasted resources: In a yearly drama, defense staffers and intelligence analysts must spend thousands of hours assessing Russian compliance with CTR restrictions — even when it is immediately clear Russia cannot meet them. Nor can the president simply waive the conditions without first submitting to this annual exercise in foregone conclusions.

    Abetting such delays or allowing concerns like human rights, however important, to threaten human existence massively is the height of folly. We not only agree with Mr. Lugar that, during a war on terror, these artificial barriers “are destructive to our national security”; we see them undermining one of the best investments our country can make.

    CTR, simply is good security on the cheap. At an annual cost of as little as one-tenth of 1 percent (0.001) of the Pentagon budget, the program has deactivated and helped guard 6,760 Russian nuclear warheads. It has upgraded security to the Shchuch’ye depot and similar sites. It also helped remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

    Today, CTR continues upgrading security and aiding accounting of nuclear weapons transportation and storage. It also works to destroy biological weapons production facilities and lock down pathogen collections in Russia and the former Soviet republics.

    CTR’s largest current project, eliminating the Shchuch’ye stockpile, will rid us of all 2 million of those weapons — and cost each American roughly the same as a large latte.

    Nor is this money “foreign aid”: More than 80 percent of CTR funds go to five U.S. prime contractors that dismantle and destroy these weapons.

    The risk of a Katrina-scale terrorist attack with Russian weapons is too critical to tolerate any delays to these crucial efforts. Congress must act and free us to meet what President Bush calls “the greatest threat before humanity today.”

    Ted Turner is chairman of Turner Enterprises in Atlanta. Stanley A. Weiss is chairman of Business Executives for National Security, of which Mr. Turner is a member.

  • US and Russian Nuclear Missiles are Still on Hair-Trigger Alert

    Just after midnight, in a secret bunker outside Moscow, the warning sirens began to blare. A simple, ominous message flashed on the bunker’s main control panel: Missile Attack!

    It was no drill. A Soviet satellite had detected five U.S. nuclear missiles inbound.

    The control computer ordered a counterstrike, but the bunker commander, a nerdy lieutenant colonel named Stanislav Petrov, acting on a hunch, overrode the computer and told his Kremlin superiors it was a false alarm. The Soviet brass quickly stood down their missiles, saving 100 million Americans from nuclear incineration.

    This brush with Armageddon happened more than two decades ago, but nuclear missiles are still on hair-trigger alert in Russia and the United States. Today, they may be even more vulnerable to an accidental or renegade launch than they were in Petrov’s day.

    “The security of both nations should not be dependent on the heroic act or good judgment of a single individual,” said Sam Nunn, the former senator from Georgia.

    Long active in anti-proliferation efforts such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Nunn is leading a campaign to persuade U.S. and Russian leaders to take their thousands of strategic nuclear warheads off hair-trigger alert, a status that remains in effect more than a decade after the Cold War ended.

    “The chances of a premeditated, deliberate nuclear attack have fallen dramatically,” Nunn said in an interview with Knight Ridder. “But the chances of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear attack might actually be increasing.”

    In his 2000 election campaign, President Bush called the hair-trigger status “another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation” that creates “unacceptable risks.”

    The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which took effect 10 years ago this month, doesn’t address hair triggering. Nor does the Treaty of Moscow, which Bush signed with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2002 to reduce the size of the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.

    Nunn believes the hair-trigger status has become “the most dangerous element of our force posture.”

    A hair trigger means missiles are launched – either from land or sea [i.e., Trident] – upon the warning of an attack. That is, within about 15 minutes of a confirmed warning. In theory, the assurance that a retaliatory attack would be launched before the missiles could be destroyed would deter either country from trying a nuclear sneak attack.

    “This is the logic of the Cold War – Mutual Assured Destruction,” said Daniil O. Kobyakov, a nuclear expert at the PIR Center, a policy studies institute in Moscow. “De-alerting requires a change in rationale. There’s still a certain inertia on both sides.”

    Nunn and others see that inertia in the Bush administration’s refusal to consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its request – since defeated in the Senate – for some $500 million for research on a so-called “bunker buster” nuclear weapon and low-yield “mini-nukes.”

    Russia, too, has some Cold War inertia to overcome. Putin proudly announced last month that Russia was testing “the newest nuclear missile systems … that other nuclear states do not have.” He offered no further details about the weapons.

    A number of political analysts believe Putin’s comments – which were unprepared remarks made to a group of senior commanders at the Ministry of Defense – were intended to boost military morale and for domestic political consumption.

    “I’m sure it was nothing surprising to the U.S.,” said Kobyakov, noting that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty obliges each side to provide technical data on any new nuclear weapons.

    Kobyakov and others believe Putin was probably referring to the Topol-M missile, which has long been in the Russian pipeline, and a sea-launched missile that’s being developed. There are rumors in military circles in Moscow that the new missile could be maneuvered in flight, unlike current ballistic missiles, to foil the Bush administration’s planned national missile defense system. One senior Russian general cryptically called it “a hypersonic flying vehicle.” Government officials in both countries are keen to point out that they’ve stopped targeting each other with their nuclear missiles, although experts say this “de-targeting” is political hokum.

    The old targeting data and missile trajectories are stored in command computers, Kobyakov said. And missiles can be re-targeted in a matter of seconds: A couple of mouse clicks on a computer would put Washington, Miami or Moscow back in the nuclear crosshairs.

    But it’s the danger of accidental or maverick launches that most concerns atomic experts. That danger is heightened, in part, by the decrepit state of Russian defenses.

    “The Russian Early Warning System is essentially useless,” said Theodore Postol, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an expert on early warning issues and technology.

    Holes in Russia’s satellite and radar networks, Postol said, mean U.S. submarines in the North Atlantic can strike Moscow with a two- or three-minute warning for the Russian capital. Launches from the North Pacific could hit the city with no warning at all.

    Postol also said a new Prognoz satellite warning system “may never be in place.”

    Stanislav Petrov, the old bunker commander, the man who saved America back in 1983, nodded his head sadly when told of Postol’s assessment.

    “That’s right, not enough satellites,” he said. “We never had enough.”

  • The Domino Effect: Preemptive Wars on the Rise

    When the Bush administration initiated the invasion of Iraq arguing that preemptive war was a justifiable action, the Pandora’s Box was opened. Russia has just announced that its armed forces will conduct preemptive strikes against terrorist bases in “any region of the world.” How will the UN or NATO or any government dispute the argument of the right that Russia or any other nations would have to defend its security after the actions of the United States?

    Russia has not demonstrated accuracy or capability in dealing with previous terrorist attacks in its country. For example, there was a terrible massacre in the Moscow Theater on October 23, 2002. 129 hostages perished mostly due to the use of narcotic gas that the Russian Special Forces used to subdue the Chechen attackers. This shows incompetence in trying to solve such critical situations. Many mistakes were committed during the siege of the school in Beslan, in North Osetia bordering Chechnya . At the same time, what is happening in Iraq – anarchy, terror and chaos – demonstrates that the Bush administration is incapable of re-establishing peace and order in the afflicted Arab nation. The casualties of American soldiers continue to mount as well as innocent Iraqi citizens.

    How will the world accept any preemptive attack when this action depends on the information from “intelligence” sources like that which was collected by the American and British intelligence prior to the war in Iraq ? The flaws, mistakes and misinformation are not in the open.

    If Putin’s administration is not just trying to intimidate the Chechen separatists by launching preemptive attacks with the excuse of defending Russia , then very soon we could expect similar events from any nation with military power to try to vindicate past or present feuds with the terrible results that such actions will cause. More than one can play this game.

    *Ruben Arvizu is Director for Latin America of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Smoke and Mirror Security

    Last week, the Bush Administration took the American people a step backwards to the dark days of the Cold War. The U.S. formally withdrew from the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia. The withdrawal from the treaty will facilitate Bush’s development of a National Missile Defense System.

    Now, without the treaty and with $8 billion earmarked for National Missile Defense, the Bush administration is clear to develop this controversial and questionable program. But we have a major problem; we simply don’t have the technology to make it work. According to Dr. David Wright of the Union of Concerned Scientists, President Bush is rushing to develop “systems [that] will not provide ’emergency capability’ against real-world threats, only the illusion of capability.”

    A National Missile Defense system would not have prevented September 11th. Every day we encounter more national security challenges that do not have military solutions. We don’t need government “hocus-pocus,” we need to invest our scarce economic resources on proven, cost effective ways to provide for our national security and the future of our children. The $8 billion ear marked for National Missile Defense could be better spent on rebuilding our national economy, improving schools, developing alternative energy resources to lessen our dependency on foreign fossil fuels and enhancing our homeland security: protecting our international borders, increasing airline security and expanding public health measures to combat bioterrorism.

    When President Bush first threatened withdrawal, I introduced House Resolution 313 with the support of 50 of my colleagues to keep the U.S. on the ABM treaty. Most recently, I joined 31 of my colleagues in a lawsuit charging that President Bush does not have the authority to unilaterally withdraw from a treaty without the consent of Congress.

    The ABM treaty is the cornerstone of international arms control. Now that more countries have nuclear weapons, international treaties are even more important. International cooperation is the way to peace and international security; not increased military build-up. Over the past 30 years, ABM treaty has been a vital link to working with the international community and it is more important than ever that we not turn our back on it.

  • Farewell to the ABM Treaty

    Farewell to the ABM Treaty

    Without a vote of the United States Congress and over the objections of Russia and most US allies, George W. Bush has unilaterally withdrawn the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, rendering it void. His withdrawal from this solemn treaty obligation became effective today, June 13, 2002.

    Bush’s action is being challenged in US federal court by 31 members of Congress, led by Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH). We should be thankful that there are still members of Congress with the courage and belief in democracy to challenge such abuse of presidential power.

    Since becoming president, Bush has waged a campaign against international law. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is but one of a series of assaults he has made, including pulling out of the Kyoto Accords on Climate Change, withdrawal of the US from the treaty creating an International Criminal Court, opposing a Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention that would allow for inspections and verification, and failing to fulfill US obligations related to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

    Bush told the American people that he was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty so that the US could proceed with the deployment of missile defenses defenses that most independent experts believe are incapable of actually providing defense. The president has traded a long-standing and important arms control treaty for the possibility that there might be a technological fix for nuclear dangers that would allow the US to threaten, but not be threatened by, nuclear weapons. In doing so, he has pulled another brick from the foundation of international law and created conditions that will undoubtedly make the US and the rest of the world less secure. He has also moved toward establishing an imperial presidency, unfettered by such constitutional restraints as the separation of powers.

    In 1972, when the US and USSR agreed to a treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, they did so for good reasons, which are described below in the Preamble to the treaty to which I have added some comments.

    Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind, [Nothing has changed here, except that 30 years later we might better use the term “humankind.”]

    Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons, [This relationship between offensive and defensive systems still holds true.]

    Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms, [The recent treaty signed by Bush and Putin only applies limits to actively deployed nuclear weapons and at levels high enough to still destroy civilization and most life on the planet.]

    Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, [The United States under the Bush administration has been contemptuous of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Article VI obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament.]

    Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament, [These promises remain largely unfulfilled 30 years later.]

    Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States…. [The US missile defense program and related US plans to weaponize outer space have the potential to again send the level of international tensions skyrocketing, particularly in Asia.]

    The ABM Treaty was meant to be for an “unlimited duration,” but allowed for withdrawal if a country should decide “that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” Bush never bothered to explain to the American people or to the Russians how the treaty jeopardized the supreme interests of the United States. It is clear, though, that withdrawal from the treaty as a unilateral act of the president has undermined our true “supreme interests” in upholding democracy and international law.

     

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • An Open Letter to Vladimir Putin – Why?

    The Russian agreement to the U.S.-initiated agreement to cut their strategic nuclear forces by two-thirds is astounding, given that this is playing directly into U.S. plans for global supremacy. For one thing, the U.S. is not going to actually destroy but only shelve the above cuts, at any time able to retrieve them from storage. The Russian nuclear military regime, on the other hand, is in shambles. Retrieval for them will be more difficult. At the same time, the Russians are actually requesting U.S. assistance to rationalize their nuclear regime, providing the U.S. with important intelligence data, such as the stored missile site.

    But even worse, the basic motive of the U.S. in initiating these strategic missile cuts is to improve the effectiveness of their anti- ballistic missile defences, radically reducing the number of targets comprising a Russian attack on the U.S. Given the U.S. basic counterforce strategy, we are moving into a time when mutual assured destruction between the two major nuclear powers is becoming an American monopoly, altering the mutual to the unilateral. Do the Russians really believe that the land-based missile defences being constructed in Alaska and the new Northern Command are directed to an attack by Iraq?

    The only possible rationale for the Russian position is that they are confident they can develop a variety of penetrating aids for their strategic missiles which will distract, confuse and overcome U.S. missile defences. We would then be entering a new dynamic of the nuclear arms race between anti-missiles and anti anti-missiles. Given the disarray of the Russian nuclear regime and their general economic problems, the latter may be a vain hope.

    Thus we are left to conclude that the Russian position is inexplicable. They had the opportunity to tie strategic missile reductions in exchange for the U.S. to uphold the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Could it just have been the mighty U.S. dollar that denied them this option? For example, we know they desperately require assistance to clean up their vast nuclear reserves consisting of huge amounts of radioactive waste, large numbers of tactical weapons and stockpiles of weapons grade nuclear materials comprising an open invitation for accidents or acts of malice of one kind or another. Also we are witnessing an increasing U.S. presence in the former Soviet republics that surround Russia, at some future time representing a direct threat. And finally, we cannot understand Russia’s lack of response at being identified as one of the seven enemy states to be targeted with nuclear weapons in the U.S. 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, let alone the existing U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), a nuclear hit list against Russian targets of value. And surely they are aware of the U.S. first disarming strike policy.

    Putin can still recoup a major diplomatic victory by supporting the forthcoming Space Preservation Treaty. Both Russia and China have expressed their opposition to the U.S. abrogation of the Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. Together Canada, Russia and China could have a very positive impact on the success of the Treaty. The Space Preservation Treaty, initiated by Congressman Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio), is being circulated to every nation state leader. It can be immediately signed and sent to the U.N. Secretary General’s office as Treaty Depositary, and ratified quickly.

    The Space Preservation Treaty is an international companion to legislation introduced by Kucinich in the U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. 3616, the Space Preservation Act of 2002, in January, 2002. Both the Treaty and the bill ban all space-based weapons and the use of weapons designed to destroy any object in space that is in orbit. It also immediately terminates research, development, testing, manufacturing, and deployment of all space- based weapons, but does not prohibit space exploration, R&D, testing, production, manufacturing and deployment of any civil, commercial or defense activities in space that are not related to space-based weapons, thus reserving space for the benefit of all living things on our small planet. This Treaty will also be verifiable. It requires that an outer space peacekeeping agency be established to monitor and enforce the ban.

    The momentum of getting this Treaty supported and passed into law has begun, and this ban on space-based weapons can become reality in 2002. This world treaty will fill the legal void left by the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. It will replace the ABM Treaty. With the support of Canada, Russia and China a large majority of members of the United Nations would likely sign on to the Treaty, as most nation-state leaders have already expressed support for preserving space for weapons-free peaceful, cooperative purposes. The European Union (with the exception of Britain) are likely signatories. isolating the United States and exposing its unilateralism and contempt for the rest of the world is, in itself, a lofty goal. A possible change in the balance of power in the U.S. Congress at the end of 2002 and a strong contender for a president in 2004 devoted to strength through peace rather than the reverse, who could establish this Treaty as Universal Law and save the world from an inevitable nuclear catastrophe.

    In conclusion, the Space Preservation Treaty is one of the most important initiatives of our time! It is truly worthy of our support. Let us all begin by moving Canada to be an early signatory.

    For detailed information on the Space Preservation Treaty, contact the Institute for Cooperation in Space (ICIS) at www.peaceinspace.com, c/o Dr. Carol Rosin : e-mail: rosin@west.net or call 805-641-1999 (in the U.S.) or Alfred Webre JD MEd at info@peaceinspace.com or call 604-733-8134 (in Canada).
    *F.H. Knelman received his doctorate in Engineering at the Imperial College of Science, University of London, U.K. He has enjoyed a long teaching career, having taught Liberal Studies of Science, York University, 1962-1967 and Director and Full Professor of Science & Human Affairs, Concordia University, 1967-1987. Dr. Knelman also taught Peace Studies at the Grindstone Island Peace School, Santa Barbara College, Langara College and Simon Fraser University. As well, he taught Environmental Studies at UC Santa Barbara and Santa Cruz and the University of Victoria. He is the author of over 500 articles, papers and studies on the subjects of common security, environment, energy and the social relations of science and technology, as well as many technical papers and numerous keynote addresses.

    Among his books are 1984 and All That, Wadsworth Publishing; Nuclear Energy: The Unforgiving Technology, Hurtig Publishers (1975); Anti-Nation: Transition to Sustainability, Mosaic Press (1979); Reagan, God and the Bomb, Prometheus Books (1985); America, God and the Bomb: The Legacy of Ronald Reagan, New Star Books (1987) and Every Life is a Story: The Social Relations of Science, Peace and Ecology, Black Rose Books (1999).

    He is the recipient of many awards, among which are the World Wildlife Fund Prize, 1967, the World Federalists Peace Essay Prize (1970), the White Owl Conservation Prize (1972 – as Canada’s outstanding environmentalist), the Ben Gurion University Medal of Merit, 1983, the United Nations Association Special Achievement Award (Montreal) and a special award for meritorious service to the cause of common security by the Canadian Peace Research and Education Association in 1987. Dr. Knelman was awarded the Queen’s 1992 Commemorative Medal and, in 1994 the World Federalists of Canada “World Peace Prize.” In 1996 he was awarded the Environmental Lifetime Achievement Award by The Skies Above Foundation. He is also a lifetime member of the 500 Club of Rome.

    Professor Knelman has a long history of involvement in environmental issues, spanning some forty years. He is associated with the founding of the earliest environmental Non-Government Organizations (ENGOs) in Canada, as well as being the founder of Scientists for Social Responsibility, Canada’s first scientific group concerned with environmental issues (1964). He is currently Vice- President and Founding Director of the Whistler Foundation for a Sustainable Environment. Dr. Knelman was attached to the Science Council of Canada on a major energy conservation study (Background Study #33). He is on the Advisory Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in Santa Barbara, CA and past Editor of The Health Guardian, a Journal of Alternative Medicine.

    Dr. Knelman has conducted extensive research in energy/environment policy. He has been the keynote speaker at some twenty-five national and international conferences on these themes. In 1981 he was the special adviser on energy/environment to the State of California and an early consultant to the Federal Department of Environment, Ottawa, in the 1970’s. He was one of forty scientists in the world invited to a parallel conference at the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972. He co-authored a Nobel Prize Winner Declaration submitted to the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio.

    Dr. Knelman is a founding member of the Canadian Peace and Education Association and writes a regular monthly column, “Our Nuclear Age” for the Vancouver-based journal “Outlook” and is a frequent contributor to several other journals.

  • Preventing An Accidental Armageddon

    Overview

    “There is no doubt that, if the people of the world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject them.” This conclusion appeared in the 1996 report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

    Although international relations have changed drastically since the end of the Cold War, both Russia and the U.S. continue to keep the bulk of their nuclear missiles on high-level alert. The U.S. and Russia remain ready to fire a total of more than 5,000 nuclear weapons at each other within half an hour. These warheads, if used, could destroy humanity including those firing the missiles. A defense that destroys the defender makes no sense. Why then do Russia, the U.S., and other countries spend vast sums each year to maintain such defenses? Since 400 average size strategic nuclear weapons could destroy humanity, most of the 5,000 nuclear weapons that Russia and the U.S. have set for hair-trigger release, present the world with its greatest danger — an enormous overkill, the potential for an accidental Armageddon.

    Consequences Never Considered

    When General Lee Butler became head of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC), he went to the SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska to inspect the 12,000 targets. He was shocked to find dozens of warheads aimed at Moscow (as the Soviets once targeted Washington). The US planners had no grasp of the explosions, firestorms and radiation from such overkill. “We were totally out of touch with reality,” Butler said. “The war plan, its calculations and consequences never took into account anything but cost and damage. Radiation was never considered.”

    No Long-Range Plan

    Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, says there was no long-range war plan. The arms race was mainly a race of numbers. Neither Russia or the U.S. wanted to get behind. Each side strove to build the greatest number. “The total far exceeded the requirements of any conceivable war plan,” according to McNamara.

    Since Russia and the U.S. have each built enormous nuclear weapon overkills with little thought as to the consequence of their use, it is imperative to assess what would happen if these weapons were used. Humanity’s fate could depend upon it.

    It is proposed that a Conference on the Consequence of Nuclear Weapons Use be held soon. Conference news reports could increase public awareness of the dangers. It is also hoped that such a conference could help create a Consequence Assessment Center within the United Nations. By working together, many countries would have confidence in the accuracy of the assessments. The cost of consequence studies could be relatively small and could be done fairly quickly.

    A Preliminary Assessment of the Consequences

    A preliminary assessment of the consequences of nuclear weapons use in relation to the number of nuclear weapons used show them to be far more destructive than most people realize. Let’s examine the effects of one nuclear weapon, hundreds of nuclear weapons and, as the SAC had planned and targeted for use, thousands of nuclear weapons.

    One Nuclear Weapon

    One average size U.S. strategic nuclear warhead can be carried in an average size truck. Such a nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 20 Hiroshima size nuclear bombs, or to 250,000 tons of dynamite or 25,000 trucks each carrying 10 tons of dynamite. An average size Russian strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 32 Hiroshima size bombs, or 40,000 trucks bombs each carrying 10 tons of dynamite. By comparison, the terrorists’ truck bombs exploded at the World Trade Center in New York and the federal building in Oklahoma City each had an explosive force equal to about 10 tons of dynamite.

    If one average size Russian strategic nuclear warhead was detonated over Washington, D.C., it could vaporize Congress, the White House, the Pentagon, and headquarters for many national programs. One U.S. nuclear warhead detonated over Moscow could be similarly devastating. Is it any wonder that General Butler was shocked to find dozens of warheads aimed at Moscow?

    If one nuclear bomb were exploded over New York City it could vaporize the United Nations headquarters, communication centers for NBC, CBS, ABC, Fox, etc., the New York Stock Exchange, world bank centers, international transportation centers and other centers for international trade and investments where billions of dollars are being exchanged daily. A nuclear explosion would also leave the areas hit highly radioactive and unusable for a long time. Where the radioactive fallout from the mushroom cloud would land in the world would depend upon the direction of the wind and rain conditions at the time of the explosion.

    Hundreds Of Nuclear Weapons

    The late Dr. Carl Sagan and his associates, in their extensive studies, found that a nuclear explosive force equal to 100 million tons of dynamite (100 megatons) could produce enough smoke and fine dust to create a Nuclear Winter over the world leaving few survivors. A nuclear bomb blast can produce heat intensities of 3,000 to 4,000 degrees Centigrade at ground zero which, in turn, could start giant flash fires leaving large cities and forests burning with no one to fight them. Also, nuclear explosions can lift an enormous quantity of fine soil particles into the atmosphere, more than 100,000 tons of fine dust for every megaton exploded in a surface burst.

    Since an average size U.S. strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 250,000 tons of dynamite it would take 400 warheads to have an explosive power equal to 100 megatons or enough to destroy the world. It would take less Russian strategic nuclear warheads to destroy the world since they are more powerful. Any survivors in the world would have to contend with radioactive fallout, toxic gases such as carbon monoxide, cyanides, dioxins, furans, etc. from burning cities, and increased ozone burnout.

    Thousands of Nuclear Weapons

    Russia and the U.S. have more than 90 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. Many of their nuclear missiles are set on high-level alert so that within half an hour of receiving a warning of an attack more than 5,000 nuclear weapons could be launched. While the U.S. and Russia no longer have their nuclear weapons aimed at each other, they can re-target each other within minutes.

    Analyzing Overkill

    The consequence of nuclear weapons use needs to be widely publicized to help efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons for the following reasons:

    Overkill Doesn’t Deter. Being able to destroy another country more than once serves no purpose for deterrence. How many times can one country destroy another?

    Overkill Is Self-Destructive. The larger the number of nuclear weapons used to carry out a “first strike” or a “launch-on warning” defense, the greater the certainty of self-destruction.

    Overkill Increases Danger Of Accidental War. The more nuclear weapons there are in the world, the greater is the probability of their accidental use.

    Overkill Encourages Nuclear Proliferation By Example.

    Overkill Wastes Money. Spending billions of dollars per year to maintain an ability to destroy the world is the worst possible waste of money.

    Accidental Nuclear Wars

    The Canberra Commission stated “… that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used, accidentally or by decision, defies credibility. The only complete defense is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.” The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden, when formulating the New Agenda Coalition, agreed with the Canberra Commission statement.

    If any one of the following three near-accidental nuclear wars had occurred it could have been the end of humanity.

  • Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Cuts Are Not Enough

    Bush-Putin Nuclear Arms Cuts Are Not Enough

    Presidents Bush and Putin announced jointly that their countries “have overcome the legacy of the Cold War.” While the new cooperative relationship between the US and Russia is to be applauded, what their Presidents said and what was left unsaid about nuclear arms reductions still resonated with Cold War logic.

    President Bush announced that he would be reducing the US arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons by two-thirds from some 7,000 weapons to somewhere between 2,200 and 1,700 over a ten-year period. President Putin said, “we will try to respond in kind.” These cuts, which need to be viewed in the context of the post Cold War world, will not make us two-thirds safer.

    It was Presidents Bush Sr. and Yeltsin that agreed back in 1993 in the START II agreements to cut long-range nuclear arsenals to 3,500 each by the beginning of 2003. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin moved this date back to the end of 2007, but also agreed in principle to go beyond this in a next step to 2,500 long-range nuclear weapons in START III negotiations.

    Since entering office, President Putin has let it be known that he is prepared to reduce the long-range nuclear arsenals of the two sides to 1,500 or less. Some of his aides have said privately that President Putin was prepared to go down to 1,000 or less. Chances are he still is prepared to move to lower levels.

    Still lower levels of nuclear armaments would be consistent with leaving behind the legacy of the Cold War, while improving the security of both countries. If the US and Russia are no longer using these weapons to deter each other from attacking (since there is no reason to do so), for what reason do they need these weapons at all? It is widely understood that nuclear weapons have no military utility other than deterrence, and even this was shown to be ineffective in preventing terrorist attacks on September 11th.

    China has a minimal deterrent force of only some 500 weapons with only some 20 missiles capable of reaching the United States. India and Pakistan also have small nuclear arsenals, but surely they pose no threat to the US or Russia. The UK, France and Israel also have small nuclear arsenals, but pose no threat to either the US or Russia.

    North Korea, Iran and Iraq have neither nuclear weapons nor missiles with which to attack the US or Russia, and they would certainly be foolish to do so, given the conventional military power alone of these two countries.

    The greatest danger posed to both countries is not from each other or any other country. It is from terrorists, but terrorists cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons. Certainly this was one crucial lesson of September 11th.

    The US and Russia need to ensure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists. The best way to do this is to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in all states to a level that can be controlled with certainty and to institute controls on weapons-grade fissile materials.

    To achieve such controls, which are truly in the security interests of both countries, will require even deeper cuts made with far more sense of urgency. Such cuts are necessary to keep Russian “loose nukes” out of the hands of terrorists and to demonstrate to the world the US and Russia are truly committed to achieving the nuclear disarmament they promised when they signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty more than three decades ago.

    Presidents Bush and Putin have also left some important things unsaid in regard to nuclear arms. They have made no mention of the continued high alert status of their nuclear weapons. Currently each country has some 2,250 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched within moments of an order to do so. This tempts fate unnecessarily, and could lead to an accidental nuclear war.

    Neither have the two Presidents made reference to tactical nuclear weapons, the smaller battlefield nuclear weapons that would be most likely to be used and that could most easily fall into the hands of terrorists. Nor has President Bush made mention of the serious implications for global stability if the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is amended or abrogated, as the US is seeking, to allow for the testing of space based weaponry.

    President Bush has said that he is prepared to reduce the US nuclear arsenal unilaterally, but this means that it is also possible to reverse this decision unilaterally. Several thousand US and Russian nuclear warheads will be dismantled in the coming ten years, but their nuclear cores will presumably be stored and available for reassembly on short notice. The decision to reduce nuclear arsenals should be committed to writing and made irreversible, such that the nuclear cores are unavailable for future use and subsequent administrations in both countries will be bound by the commitment.

    In the year 2000, the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agreed that the principle of irreversibility should apply to nuclear disarmament. The US and Russia also agreed, along with the UK, France and China, to an “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    If the US and Russia truly want to prevent future nuclear terrorism, this is the time for leadership to accomplish the “total elimination” that has been promised. The US and Russia are the only countries capable of providing this leadership, but it is unlikely that they will do so unless pressed by the American and Russian people. And this will only happen if our peoples grasp the extent of the nuclear dangers that still confront us.

    We should not be lulled into thinking that reductions of long-range nuclear weapons to 2,200 to 1,700 in ten years time are sufficient. Such arsenals will continue to place at risk our cities as well as civilization and most of life.

    *David Krieger, an attorney and political scientist, is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.