Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: resolution

  • Draft City of Santa Barbara Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Resolution

    Draft City of Santa Barbara Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Resolution

    This is a draft resolution for the Santa Barbara City Council. The final resolution may differ slightly. To sign the petition in support of this resolution, click here.

    WHEREAS, global nuclear arsenals contain some 15,000 nuclear weapons, with more than 90 percent of these in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia; and

    WHEREAS, the United States government, as a major producer and deployer of nuclear weapons, should take the lead in the global renunciation of nuclear arms and the elimination of the threat of impending devastation; and

    WHEREAS, a large-scale nuclear war would kill hundreds of millions of people directly and cause unimaginable environmental damage, producing conditions in which the vast majority of the human race would starve and could become extinct as a species; and

    WHEREAS, the policy of nuclear deterrence relied on by the U.S. government is based upon an unproven and unprovable hypothesis regarding human behavior, and is subject to catastrophic failure; and

    WHEREAS, the projected expenditure of more than $1.2 trillion to enhance the U.S. nuclear arsenal will exacerbate these dangers by fueling a global arms race and will divert crucial resources needed to assure the well-being of the American people; and

    WHEREAS, the failure of the governments of nuclear-armed nations, including the U.S. government, to adequately reduce or eliminate the risk of devastating nuclear attacks requires that the people themselves, and their local elected representatives, take action; and

    WHEREAS, the expenditure of City of Santa Barbara (City) funds on goods and services produced by nuclear weapons makers, the investment of City funds in nuclear weapons makers, and the presence of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons work within the City directly detracts from the maintenance of the City’s public health, safety, morals, economic well-being, and general welfare; and

    WHEREAS, the public morality is affronted by the expenditure and investment of City funds on goods or services produced by nuclear weapons makers and the presence of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons work may ultimately lead to death and devastation; and

    WHEREAS, the emergency response services of the City will almost certainly be unable to secure the effects following a major fire, traffic accident, earthquake or similar disaster involving nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors or shipments of hazardous radioactive materials; and

    WHEREAS, the allocation of City resources in the form of police, fire, and other services to prepare for and contain the effects of an accident involving nuclear weapons, nuclear reactors, and shipments of hazardous radioactive materials diverts the City’s limited resources from urgently needed human services such as services for children, the elderly and disabled, shelter for the homeless, healthcare, education, and drug abatement; and

    WHEREAS, the United States and the residents of Santa Barbara, California would benefit from fully embracing this call for nuclear disarmament as the centerpiece of our national security policy; and

    WHEREAS, the City of Santa Barbara has adopted a Socially Responsible Investment Policy in 2017, which discourages investments, ‘in entities that manufacture, distribute or provide financing for tobacco products, weapons, military systems, nuclear power and fossil fuels.”

    WHEREAS, the future of today’s young people and generations to come will be disproportionately affected by the consequences of nuclear war and threats of war; and

    WHEREAS,  there is an alternative to this march towards nuclear catastrophe. In July 2017, 122 nations called for the banning of all nuclear weapons by adopting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,

    NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED,

    The City of Santa Barbara shall hereby be established as a Nuclear Free Zone, in which nuclear reactors and/or nuclear weapons work – including developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, otherwise acquiring, possessing or stockpiling them – is prohibited.

    BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,

    • The City calls upon our federal leaders and our nation to spearhead a global effort to prevent nuclear war by:
      • renouncing the option of using nuclear weapons first;
      • ending the President’s sole, unchecked authority to launch a nuclear attack;
      • taking U.S. nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert;
      • canceling the plan to replace the entire U.S. arsenal with enhanced nuclear weapons;  
      • actively pursuing a verifiable agreement among nuclear-armed states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals; and
      • Encouraging the U.S. to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; and
    • The City of Santa Barbara will inform the President of the United States, the United States Secretary of Defense and the Governor of California that the City is now a Nuclear Free Zone; and
    • The City will not invest resources or enter into contracts with businesses that are involved in nuclear weapons work.

    NUCLEAR FREE COMMEMORATION DAY

    Nuclear Free Zone Commemoration Day shall be observed annually within the City of Santa Barbara on September 26th, the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

    NUCLEAR FREE SANTA BARBARA COMMITTEE:

    Within 60 days of the effective date of this resolution, the mayor shall appoint, with the approval of the City Council, a non-partisan committee to oversee the implementation of and adherence to this resolution.

  • Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

    United States Draft
    UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament
    The Security Council,
    PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,
    PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,
    PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,
    PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,
    PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,
    PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,
    PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,
    PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,
    PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,
    PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,
    PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,
    PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

    PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),
    PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),
    PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,
    PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,
    PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,
    PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,
    PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
    PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,
    PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

    1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;
    2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;
    3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;
    4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;
    5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;
    6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;

    7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

    8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

    9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty;

    10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

    11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;
    12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:
    a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,
    b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,
    c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;
    13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;
    14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;
    15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;
    16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;
    17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;
    18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;
    19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;
    20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;
    21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;
    22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;
    23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;
    24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;
    25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;
    26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

    US President Barack Obama will chair a special meeting of the UN Security Council on September 24 to discuss nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

  • Excerpts from German Parliamentary Resolution Against Nuclear Weapons

    2010_03_30_german_parliament.pdf

  • Results of the UN First Committee Votes on the New Agenda Coalition Resolutions

    In an attempt to address the increasing threat of nuclear proliferation, existing nuclear weapons and emerging nuclear doctrines, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) sponsored two resolutions at the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security at the United Nations on 15 October 2003. The New Agenda Coalition member countries are Brazil, Sweden, Mexico, Ireland, South Africa, New Zealand and Egypt.

    The first resolution, A/C.1/58/L.40/Rev.1, “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: a New Agenda” is based on the Final Document of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, where all parties to the NPT unanimously agreed to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda by means of 13 practical steps. The resolution expresses “deep concern at the limited progress to date” on implementing the 13 steps and calls for all nations to abstain from actions that could initiate a global arms race.

    The resolution raises concerns about the possible effects of development of missile defenses in sparking an arms race around the world and in outer space. It is deeply apprehensive “about emerging approaches to the broader role of nuclear weapons as part of security strategies, including rationalizations for the use of, and the possible development of new types of, nuclear weapons.” These comments were made primarily in reference to the US.

    Voting took place on 4 November 2003. The resolution received 121 votes in favor, 6 in opposition and 38 abstentions. US, UK and France voted against the resolution. Whilst maintaining their commitment to the NPT, the three Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Permanent Security Council members claimed that the NAC resolution went beyond the agreements of 1995 and 2000 and did not take into account progress made since 2000, including the Moscow Treaty. In the text, the NAC resolution urged the US and Russia to make the Moscow Treaty “a disarmament measure” by making it verifiable and irreversible, and by addressing non-operational warheads.

    Pakistan and India also voted against the resolution. They opposed the resolution’s language expressing the “regional tensions and deteriorating security situation” in South Asia and its further calls on India and Pakistan to join the NPT. Pakistan claimed that the resolution did not take into account Pakistan’s “reasons for acquiring nuclear weapons,” which were “for self defense and strategic balance,” whilst India said the resolution was “very prescriptive” and failed to reflect “ground realities.”

    Israel was the sixth country to vote against the resolution, Iran voted in favor of it.Germany, Japan and Australia all abstained on the resolution. North Koreaalso abstained from the resolution, stating that it “did not fairly reflect the nuclear issues between DPRK and the US.” The North Korean representative added, “The draft resolution also does not speak a single word about US nuclear threats against DPRK. And instead highlights unilateral and one-sided demand calling for the DPRK to give up its own self-defensive rights, which is subjected to constant nuclear threats from the US.”

    China and most members of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) voted in favor of the resolution. China, however, expressed that they “are of the view that all Nuclear Weapon States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which is essential to the realization of total nuclear disarmament.” Canada was the only NATO member to vote in favor of the resolution.

    Canada requested a vote on preambular paragraph 20 (PP20), which expressed concern that missile defenses “could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space….” The PP20 received 117 votes in favor, 6 in opposition and 39 abstentions. Canadaabstained from the vote, saying that if carried out cooperatively, missile defense “could complement non-proliferation efforts.” The US, UK, Israel and Micronesia voted against the PP20. Japan also voted against the PP20’s statement on missile defense, arguing that the steps needed to be “realistic and practical and take into account different circumstances”. Australia shared the same views.

    The full text of the first resolution, “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World: a New Agenda” can be found at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/res/L40rev1.htm

    The second resolution, A/C.1/58/L.39/Rev.1, “Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” specifically addresses the issue of tactical (sub-strategic or short range) nuclear weapons. It raises concerns about the threats posed by Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) “due to their portability, proximity to areas of conflict and probability of pre-delegation in case of military conflict.” It also addresses “the risk of proliferation and of early, preemptive, unauthorized or accidental use,” as well as shifting security doctrines and the “possible development of new types of low yield” NSNW. The resolution highlights the need for transparent and verifiable measures to ensure the elimination of NSNW in the context of commitments made in the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    In addition, the resolution warns against Nuclear Weapon States in expanding or developing their NSNW arsenal as well as rationalizing their use. It also calls for the need to further reduce the status of NSNW in order to enhance global security, reducing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons. The resolution also called on the US and Russia to formalize their 1991-92 Presidential Initiatives on eliminating tactical nuclear weapons.

    Voting took place on 4 November 2003 and the resolution received 118 votes in favor, 4 in opposition and 41 abstentions.

    The US, UK, France and Russia voted against the resolution, while China did not vote at all, claiming that “both the concept and definition of ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons’ as mentioned in the resolution are unclear.” Speaking on behalf of the UK and France, the US said the “three countries could not support the resolution because it fails to take into account efforts already under-way to address the concerns underlying the resolution.” The US said it completed its pledges under the 1991-2 Presidential Initiatives without a formal treaty and that a multilateral approach to the issue would only complicate matters.

    Russia said it was compliant with commitments it made in reducing NSNW. It claimed the resolution was insufficiently precise and proposed “new and specific” commitments that went beyond agreements taken in 1991-2 and 2000.

    The full text of the second resolution, “Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons” can be found athttp://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/res/L39Rev1.htm

    *Justine Wang is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.