Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: proliferation

  • Non-Proliferation Treaty Stays Alive – for now

    With the exception of a few cloistered academics, almost no one would seriously argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a safer place. Most individuals, including policy makers, understand that it is essential to future security to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. Based on this understanding, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was put forward and signed by the US, UK and USSR (three countries with nuclear weapons) in 1968. The Treaty entered into force in 1970. Since then the Non-Proliferation Treaty has become the centerpiece of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Currently there are only four countries in the world that have not signed and ratified the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba. The first three of these have nuclear weapons.

    At the heart of the NPT is a basic bargain: the countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire or otherwise develop these weapons in exchange for the nuclear weapons states agreeing to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate their arsenals. This bargain is found in Article VI of the Treaty, which calls for “good faith” negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Many of the non-nuclear weapons states have complained over the years that the nuclear weapons states have not upheld their end of the bargain.

    In 1995, when the Treaty was extended indefinitely after powerful lobbying by the nuclear weapons states, these states promised the “determined pursuit” of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of their elimination. Over the next five years, however, these countries continued to rely upon their nuclear arsenals to the dismay of many countries without nuclear weapons.

    When the five-year Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was held in April and May 2000, the parties to the Treaty, including the nuclear weapons states, agreed to take a number of “practical steps” to implement promises under Article VI of the Treaty. Thirteen steps were listed. I would like to highlight just two. The first of these is an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals….” The second is “early entry into force and full implementation of START II [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II] and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons….”

    The “unequivocal undertaking” is language that the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa) has been pressing for, along with practical steps to achieve “the total elimination” of nuclear weapons. In essence this commitment is a reaffirmation of what the nuclear weapons states promised many years ago when they first signed the Treaty in 1968.

    Moving forward with START II and START III are also in the offing. After many years, the Russian Duma finally ratified START II, and President Putin has indicated that he is prepared to proceed with reductions to 1,000 to 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads in START III. The US has responded for inexplicable reasons that it is only prepared to discuss reductions to the 2,500 level at this point, a response hardly in keeping with its promises to pursue good faith efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons globally.

    An even greater problem, however, lies in US determination to deploy a National Missile Defense. It can hardly do this and keep its promise of “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US has been trying unsuccessfully to convince the Russians that the ABM Treaty should be amended to allow the US to deploy a National Missile Defense. However, this is exactly what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent, based on the reasoning that a strong defense would lead to further offensive arms races, and the Russians want nothing to do with altering the ABM Treaty.

    US officials have told the Russians that the National Missile Defense that the US seeks to deploy is aimed not at them, but at “states of concern” (the new US name for states they formerly referred to as “rogue states”). These officials have actually encouraged the Russians to keep their nuclear armed missiles on hair-trigger alert and not reduce the size of their arsenal below START III levels in order to be able to successfully overcome a US National Missile Defense. In their eagerness to promote the National Missile Defense, these officials are actually encouraging Russian policies that will make an accidental or unintended nuclear war more likely. Russia is not buying this, and has made clear that if the US proceeds with deployment of a National Missile Defense, thereby abrogating the ABM Treaty, Russia will withdraw from START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    US insistence on proceeding with a National Missile Defense will be even more destabilizing in Asia. The Chinese have made clear that their response to US deployment of a National Missile Defense will require them to further develop their nuclear forces (at present the Chinese have only 20 nuclear armed missiles capable of reaching US territory). Should China increase its nuclear capabilities, India is likely to follow suit and Pakistan would likely follow India. How Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan would respond remain large question marks.

    At the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference the US committed itself to “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. US plans to move forward with a National Missile Defense are incompatible with this promise. If the US wants to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevent the disintegration of this Treaty, it must act in good faith. This means finding another way to deal with potentially dangerous states than building an unworkable, provocative and hugely expensive missile defense system.

    The 2000 NPT Review Conference offered some promise of progress on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the fine words Final Document of the Conference notwithstanding, this promise will be dashed if the US continues in its foolhardy and quixotic attempt to put a shield over its head. Such a course will lead only to a leaky umbrella and global nuclear chaos. A far safer course for the US would be to carry out its promise of seeking “the total elimination” of the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without US leadership this will not happen. With US leadership a nuclear weapons free world could become a reality in fairly short order. It is past time for this issue to enter the public arena and move up on the public agenda. The American people deserve to become part of this decision which will so dramatically affect their future and the future of the planet.

  • A Nuclear Crisis

    This article appeared in the Washington Post, Editorials and Opinions Section.

    Every five years, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) comes up for reassessment by the countries that have signed it. This is the treaty that provides for international restraints (and inspections) on nuclear programs. It covers not only the nuclear nations but 180 other countries as well, including Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya. An end to the NPT could terminate many of these inspections and open a Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation in states that already present serious terrorist threats to others.

    Now it is time for the 30-year-old NPT to be reviewed (in April, by an international assembly at the United Nations), and, sad to say, the current state of affairs with regard to nuclear proliferation is not good. In fact, I think it can be said that the world is facing a nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, U.S. policy has had a good deal to do with creating it.

    At the last reassessment session, in 1995, a large group of non-nuclear nations with the financial resources and technology to develop weapons–including Egypt, Brazil and Argentina–agreed to extend the NPT, but with the proviso that the five nuclear powers take certain specific steps to defuse the nuclear issue: adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996; conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and “determined pursuit” of efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them.

    It is almost universally conceded that none of these commitments has been honored. India and Pakistan have used this failure to justify their joining Israel as nations with recognized nuclear capability that are refusing to comply with NPT restraints. And there has been a disturbing pattern of other provocative developments:

    • For the first time I can remember, no series of summit meetings is underway or in preparation to seek further cuts in nuclear arsenals. The START II treaty concluded seven years ago by presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin has not been seriously considered for ratification by the Russian parliament.
    • Instead of moving away from reliance on nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and NATO have sent disturbing signals to other nations by declaring that these weapons are still the cornerstone of Western security policy, and both have re-emphasized that they will not comply with a “no first use” policy. Russia has reacted to this U.S. and NATO policy by rejecting its previous “no first use” commitment; strapped for funds and unable to maintain its conventional forces of submarines, tanks, artillery, and troops, it is now much more likely to rely on its nuclear arsenal.
    • The United States, NATO and others still maintain arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, including up to 200 nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
    • Despite the efforts of Gens. Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster, Adm. Stansfield Turner and other military experts, American and Russian nuclear missiles are still maintained in a “hair-trigger alert” status, susceptible to being launched in a spur-of-the-moment crisis or even by accident.
    • After years of intense negotiation, recent rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a serious blow to global nuclear control efforts and to confidence in American leadership.
    • There is a notable lack of enforcement of the excessively weak international agreements against transfer of fissile materials.
    • The prospective adoption by the United States of a limited “Star Wars” missile defense system has already led Russia, China and other nations to declare that this would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which has prevailed since 1972. This could destroy the fabric of existing international agreements among the major powers.
    • There is no public effort or comment in the United States or Europe calling for Israel to comply with the NPT or submit to any other restraints. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge what a powerful incentive this is to Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt to join the nuclear community.
    • The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has been recently abolished, removing an often weak but at least identifiable entity to explore arms issues.

    I believe that the general public would be extremely concerned if these facts were widely known, but so far such issues have not been on the agenda in presidential debates.

    A number of responsible non-nuclear nations, including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden have expressed their disillusionment with the lack of progress toward disarmament. The non-proliferation system may not survive unless the major powers give convincing evidence of compliance with previous commitments.

    In April, it is imperative that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty be reconfirmed and subsequently honored by leaders who are inspired to act wisely and courageously by an informed public. This treaty has been a key deterrent to the proliferation of weapons, and its unraveling would exert powerful pressures even on peace-loving nations to develop a nuclear capability.

    All nuclear states must renew efforts to achieve worldwide reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it requires no further negotiations for leaders of nuclear nations to honor existing nuclear security agreements, including the test ban and anti-ballistic missile treaties, and to remove nuclear weapons from their present hair-trigger alert status.

    Just as American policy is to blame for many of the problems, so can our influence help resolve the nuclear dilemma that faces the world.

  • The Non-Proliferation Treaty Crisis

    The global nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty is in jeopardy due to the continued failure of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty.

    Background

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed on July 1, 1968 and remains the foundation of the post-World War II global nuclear nonproliferation. 187 nations signed the treaty; four did not — Cuba, Israel, India and Pakistan. The signers agreed to convene a special conference in 25 years to decide on whether or not to continue the treaty. And in 1997 at the UN headquarters in New York, 174 nations agreed to strengthen the treaty’s review process, i.e., to continue to hold more review conferences in the years to come.

    The latest treaty review conference — the year 2000 NPT Review Conference — will be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from April 24 to May 19, 2000. The central issue for that conference is if this treaty will continue to be the centerpiece for global efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons, or if the Treaty will begin to unravel.

    The upcoming Review Conference has crucial implications not only for NPT member states, but also for non-member states, especially India, Pakistan and Israel. The upcoming conference presents a tremendous opportunity to make substantive progress towards nuclear disarmament. Crucial to the outcome of this Review Conference will be the extent to which the nuclear weapon states are able to demonstrate any progress made toward fulfilling obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which states:

    “Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

    In its 1996 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that:

    “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.’

    While the number of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear weapon states has decreased, the status of Article VI obligations is in a state of impasse. Parties of the NPT must take nuclear responsibility and avoid further attempts to weaken non-proliferation efforts.

    Challenges to the NPT

    The following developments represent the growing peril that challenges international and human security:

    Though the Cold War ended more than ten years ago, more than 30,000 nuclear weapons remain worldwide.

    Since the 1995 NPT review and extension conference, two additional countries, India and Pakistan, have tested nuclear weapons.

    US and Russian nuclear arsenals remain in permanent, 24 hour, “launch on warning” status in spite of recommendations to de-alert nuclear weapons made by the Canberra Commission (1996), two resolutions passed by massive majorities in the UN General Assembly in 1998, another two in 1999, and a unanimous resolution of the European Parliament (1999).

    The US Senate has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in spite of nearly unanimous endorsement of the treaty by the international community and massive US public support for nuclear disarmament. In addition, the US and Russia, continue to conduct “subcritical” nuclear tests, undermining the spirit and purpose of the CTBT. The clear aim of the CTBT is to restrain weapons development, yet the US, Russia, and other weapons states proceed to develop new nuclear weapons in computer-simulated “virtual reality”, with the aid of subcritical underground nuclear testing.

    NATO has jeopardized the NPT by declaring in April 1999 that nuclear weapons are “essential” to its security.

    US efforts to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) system and circumvent the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, have increased tensions with Russia and China and threaten a new arms race.

    The irresponsibility of the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons is unacceptable. Failure to make progress on Article VI obligations provides incentive for non-nuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons, thereby increasing the nuclear danger.

    Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have undermined the international norm of nonproliferation established by the treaty.

    medium range missile tests in India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea have undermined the NPT

    Iraq’s defiance of UN Security Council Resolutions requiring it to complete its disclosure of efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction have threatened the stability of the NPT

    Nuclear weapons states are not strongly supporting the treaty’s review process. For example, the US Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 sending a message to the world that nuclear nonproliferation was not a critical issue according to the US Senate.

    Sharing peaceful uses of nuclear energy has become a contentious issue

    “Additional threats to the regime’s [NPT’s] stability came in 1999 from the erosion of American relations with both China and Russia resulting from NATO’s 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia — with additional harm to relations with China resulting from US accusations of Chinese nuclear espionage and Taiwan’s announcement that it was a state separate from China despite its earlier acceptance of a US-Chinese ‘one China’ agreement. Major threats to the regime also came from the continued stalemate on arms control treaties in the Russian Duma and the US Senate, from a change in US policy to favor building a national missile defense against missile attack and from a Russian decision to develop a new generation of small nuclear weapons for defense against conventional attack.” Ambassador George Bunn, former US Ambassador to the Geneva Disarmament Conference and a negotiator of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

  • Arms Trade Code of Conduct

    As of this writing, about 33 wars are raging across the world and 90% of their casualties are civilians. Over 25 million people have been killed in conflicts since the end of World War II. Yet rather than pursuing real disarmament, governments are spending over $2 billion every single day on armies and weapons. And regimes that abuse human rights are eagerly supplied by the world’s arms producers.

    A global Arms Trade Code of Conduct would prohibit the world’s arms producers, virtually all developed countries, from providing military assistance and conventional arms transfers to foreign governments that do not meet certain requirements. These requirements would include democratic governance, respect for human rights, non-involvement in acts of armed aggression, and participation in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which was established on December 1991.

    Conventional arms include more than rifles and submachine guns. Also included are battle tanks, missiles and landmines. The conventional arms category is broad and ambiguous because it groups many types of dangerous weapons together under the category of “conventional” arms! Sensitive military and dual-use technologies are also included, such as telecommunications systems, sensors, lasers and sophisticated satellites that monitor and prevent unforeseen attacks from other countries. Also, military and security training for expertise in the use of such weapons, munitions, sub-components and sensitive technologies are considered conventional arms. All this can be supplied with little restraint to developing countries, some of which disregard democracy and blatantly abuse human rights.

    The United States is the world’s number one arms exporter. As a democratic nation, it has a responsibility to take the lead in curbing the weapons trade. In 1996, thirty three nations including the Russian Federation, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (but not China) signed the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies. This agreement was an important step toward the control of the arms trade. The Wassenaar Agreement was set up to contribute to global security and stability by promoting “transparency” of arms exports. The Agreement requires clear and detailed information about arms exports and imports for each country once a year. The problem is that the Wassenaar Arrangement has been signed by only a few nations. The world needs a global Code of Conduct.

    In the United States, the Executive Office approves which countries receive military assistance and arms. Once a year, the President gives Congress a list of countries which will receive arms shipments from U.S. manufacturers. All U.S. arms transfer decisions take into account the multiple U.S. interests involved in each arms transfer. Sales are approved by the Executive Office on a case-by-case basis. All U.S. arms transfer decisions take into account certain criteria including; “Appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate U.S. and recipient security needs”, “Consistency with international agreements and arms control initiatives”, and “The human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient and the potential for misuse of the export in question” (Criteria for Decision-making on U.S. Arms Exports, The White House, Feb. 17, 1995).

    Nevertheless, 85% of U.S. arms transfers during 1990-95 went to the nations that did not meet the proposed Code’s criteria. In fact, they went to the Middle East (Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Israel and Lebanon) and to 43 of the 53 countries in Africa, the continent with the most violent conflicts. In President Clinton’s first term, over two-thirds of all arms Wes agreements with the Third World went to dictatorships which are still violating human rights. In 19917 Clinton approved $83 billion in military assistance to dictatorships, an all-time record even during the Cold War years.

    More than half of U.S. weapons sales are now being financed by taxpayers instead of foreign arms purchasers. During fiscal year 1996, the government spent more than $7.9 billion to help U.S. companies secure just over $12 billion in agreements for new international arms sales. The largest single subsidy program for U.S. weapons exporters is the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Another Pentagon’s subsidy is the Defense Export Loan Guarantee (DELG) fund. Furthermore the Pentagon has also been leasing or giving away massive quantities of highly capable U.S. weapons that have been declared “surplus” relative to current needs. In addition to Pentagon programs, other agencies provide subsidies for sales of weapons. After the Pentagon’s FMF program, the second largest subsidy comes from the Economic Support Funds (ESF) program administered by the Agency for International Development. The “Dual Use” Funding of the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank) is another source of funding for military exports. In addition the Senate and House Armed Services Committees are working hard to increase the Pentagon spending encouraged by the “Big Three’ weapons contractors — Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon.

    Besides the United States, there are other countries that export conventional arms to countries violating human rights. France, for example, sent arms to Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and Rwanda. Human Rights Watch and media reports indicate that the French government continued to supply arms to Rwanda for at least two months after international news reports of genocide became public knowledge and after the imposition of an international arms embargo on May 17, 1994. Later, during hearings in March-June 1998, Bernard Debré, who was France’s Minister of Cooperation in 1994, acknowledged that the French government had continued to supply arms to the Rwandan government “ten days after the massacres started,” explaining lamely that this was “because France didn’t immediately realize what was happening.”

    Sales of conventional arms bolster repressive dictatorships at the expense of the poor. In Togo and Rwanda, populations are crying out for schools and doctors, not for guns and military training. In July 1999 more than 100 bodies were found along the coastline of West Africa just after Togo’s June elections, during which opposition party members allegedly were shot and dumped into the sea. Their bodies washed up on the shores of neighboring Benin. They were killed with conventional arms, in this case, rifles or hand guns. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, the AK-47 assault rifle can be purchased on the black market for as little as $6.

    Jose Ramos-Horta, a Nobel Peace Laureate form East Timor”, was affected personally by the danger of arms sales. In August 1977 his 21-year old sister, Maria Ortencia, along with at least 20 young children in a remote village in East Timor, were killed by Indonesian Air Force pilots. His sister and these children were only a few of more than 200,000 civilians who were killed in East Timor from December 1975, when Indonesia invaded and illegally annexed the newly independent land, to 1979. Indonesia waged this war — and continues to wage this war — using an arsenal of weapons imported from the United States and Europe.

    Nevertheless, there are still some people who think that an Arms Trade Code of Conduct is not necessary. Congressman Dan Burton (R-IN), for example, believes that a Code of Conduct “hamstrings the President of the United States in his conducting of foreign policy.” He argues, “If anybody believes that a country that wants to buy weaponry is going to not buy it simply because they cannot buy them from the United States, they are just barking up the wrong tree.” Congressman Mat Salmon (R-AZ) declared that the Code of Conduct is “not about human rights, and is not about foreign policy. This … is about a philosophical difference that exists within the Congress.” I wonder if Jose Ramos-Horta believes that the Arms Trade Code of Conduct is only a big philosophical pillow-fight in Congress!

    There is a boomerang effect on U.S. interests, Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (D-GA) explained, citing that the U.S. spends twice as much to fight against countries like Yugoslavia, which was initially armed by U.S. arms exporters. McKinney is the Sponsor of the Code of Conduct bill (HR2269), a bill now pending (Nov 99) in the House International Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. (Contact your legislator)

    There are a growing number of people who agree with the establishment of a global Arms Trade Code of Conduct, people who have a very realistic view of the world. Oscar Arias, former President of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Peace Prize winner, argues against a “military-dominated mind-set that prevailed throughout the Cold War.” He also states, “It is embarrassing that five permanent members of the UN Security Council are responsible for the largest quantity of arms sales to the developing world. The very countries that should be maintaining world peace and security are the ones most responsible for promoting war and insecurity by producing and selling weapons.”

    I believe that the United States now has an unprecedented opportunity to take the lead in this international effort. In my opinion, if the U.S. leads the way for the establishment of a Code of Conduct, other arms exporters will follow.

    In 1994 alone, the U.S. taxpayer paid more to subsidize weapons sales than they paid for elementary and secondary education programs. The original meaning of the word “subsidize” derives from the Latin word subsidium which means to help each other. To spend billions in weapons subsidies and billions more to fight against soldiers armed with these same weapons is simply bad policy. I agree with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who pointed out, “All of us whose nations sell such weapons, or through whose nations the traffic flows, bear some responsibility for turning a blind eye to the destruction they cause. And all of us have it in our power to do something in response.” U.S. foreign policy should mirror this statement and reduce weapons sales in order to establish programs that will benefit not only U.S. citizens but also citizens of the global community.

    * Stefania Capodaglio was the 1999 Ruth Floyd Intern in International Law and Human Rights at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation headquarters in Santa Barbara, California. Presently she is completing a Political Science degree at the Catholic University of Milan, Italy.

  • Nuclear Nationalism

    On May 28th last year the government of Pakistan followed that of India and tested nuclear weapons. While everyone else worried about the prospect of nuclear war in South Asia, Eqbal Ahmad, who died recently, predicted that Pakistan’s nuclear tests would have a more profound impact on its domestic politics than on its defence or foreign policies. As on so many other occasions he was proven right. In early May, the government ordered 10 days of national celebrations to mark the first anniversary of Pakistan’s new found “self reliance” and “impregnable defence.” The festivities offer a window into the minds of those heading the newest nuclear weapon state and warn of a dangerous future for the country.

    The numerous events organised and sponsored by the state made it clear that at one level the celebrations were designed to deepen and broaden support across the country for the government and for nuclear weapons. The events announced were to include “a competition of ten best milli [nationalistic] songs, seminars, fairs, festive public gatherings, candle processions, sports competitions, bicycle races, flag hoisting ceremonies, etc.” Thanksgiving prayers and special programmes for children and debates among school children were also arranged. Appropriate programmes were aired on national television and radio networks as well as local radio in the regional languages. To make sure that no missed out on what was being celebrated, cities and towns were decorated with banners and giant posters carrying pictures of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons scientists and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif against a backdrop of mushroom clouds. The weapons themselves were not absent. Replicas of Pakistan’s recently tested nuclear missiles and a giant scale model of the nuclear test site at Chaghi in Baluchistan were constructed and put up. Even markets and crossroads were named after nuclear weapons scientists.

    There has probably never been an occasion like this before. It is nothing less than glorying in having acheived the capacity to commit mass murder and, as such, fundamentally immoral. Weapons are tools of violence and fear; and nuclear weapons the ultimate in such tools. All decent people detest them. No one should glory in their existence, never mind their possession.

    There is more here than glory. A state is using all its authority and instutional resources to build pride in having nuclear weapons into the very national identity of a people. Pakistanis are meant to rejoice and delight and think of themselves as citizens of “Nuclear-Pakistan” — a term used by state media. To the extent the state succeeds at its efforts at creating a nuclearised nationalism, Pakistan, henceforth, shall be a country whose identity is based not just like others on a sense of a shared place, or history, language, culture, or even religion. Its identity shall be inextricably linked to a technology of mass destruction. For some this has already happened: as Information Minister Mushahid Hussain proudly puts it: “Chaghi has become a symbol of Pakistan’s identity all over the world.”

    It is worth considering how having imagined itself as a nuclear-nation Pakistan will ever deal with nuclear disarmament. For the nuclear hawks, such as Mushahid Hussain, who have orchestrated the celebrations, that day is never to be allowed to dawn. Whenever the question of disarmament is raised, they will point to the public support for nuclear weapons they have worked so hard to manufacture and say: “How can we? Our people will not permit it. They want nuclear weapons.” With this they are trying to close permanently the door to real peace. Far better in their view an endless nuclear-armed confrontation with India, that in turn gives cause for demands for high military spending and excuses state failure and government excesses in other areas. Revelling in the success of the nuclear tests of 28 May last year was also meant to overcome the growing sense of fundamental political and social crisis. The whole affair certainly had the feel of a circus, albeit a nuclear circus. It offered a national distraction, a brief respite from the grinding daily experience of failure that consumes the time, energy and resources of the people of the country. There is hardly any point in recounting either the specific failures or the crises that have created them. They are all so well known. But it is worth doing as an act of solidarity with Najam Sethi, the editor of The Friday Times, who before he was abducted in the middle of the night by the police and intelligence agencies had written that the country was “in the throes of a severe multi-dimensional crisis. I refer to six major crises which confront Pakistan on the eve of the new millenium: (1) the crisis of identity and ideology; (2) the crisis of law, constitution and political system; (3) the crisis of economy; (4) the crisis of foreign policy; (5) the crisis of civil society; and (6) the crisis of national security.”

    The sense that in the glitter and the noise people were meant to forget that there has been 50 years of abject failure when it comes to the state providing them with social justice or basic needs is sharpened by 28 May being declared to be the most important date since independence. It suggests a search for a new beginning; the rebirth of a nation. This third birth of Pakistan, after 1947 and 1971, is no more auspicious than the first two. Each birth has been violent and produced violence. The first, out of the horrors of Partition, failed to produce a viable constitution and led to military dictatorship and twice to war. The second birth, out of the slaughter in Bangladesh, failed to produce democracy and led to more dictatorship, and the sectarian demons who now haunt the land. The third life, a Pakistan born out of nuclear explosions, carries the threat of terminal violence.

    It is worth delving a little deeper into what the nuclear circus was meant to conceal. It was meant to be an affirmation of strength, pride and ‘virility’ – at least that is what Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar called it. What this tries to conceal, if not erase altogether, is that events after last year’s nuclear tests provided clear evidence of the weakness of this country. The sanctions that were imposed by the international community after the tests were lifted not because the world was awed by Pakistan’s new nuclear might, but because they took a really good look at it and were horrified by its obvious fragility. Sanctions were lifted because otherwise the country would have fallen apart and nobody wanted to see that happen particularly now that nuclear weapons were involved. It was an act aimed to protect Pakistan from itself–or more accurately, to try to protect its people from the criminal stupidity and recklessness of its leaders.

    It is easy to see how having to accept this realisation of weakness would have created a crisis among those who were responsible for taking the decision to test. One the one hand they tested nuclear weapons and thought of themselves as being strong and having broken the “begging bowl”. On the other, the world offered them pity and charity, because otherwise the country would collapse. And thus the nuclear circus as a way of ridding their minds of these fears and memories. The louder and brighter the circus the deeper the anxiety about being weak could be pushed. No wonder then that government press releases insisted the nation was united “to pay tribute to the courage, statesmanship and maturity of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.”

    A bomb, a nation, a leader.

  • Appeal for Negotiations to Eliminate Nuclear Arms

    The nuclear tests in South Asia have jarred the world into new awareness of nuclear danger. They have demonstrated unmistakably the peril of nuclear proliferation and the weakness of international measures of control. They have also cast harsh new light on the persistence of the arsenals of the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, and France, who jointly possess some 35,000 nuclear weapons. These two main components of nuclear danger-proliferation on the one hand, and the remaining cold war arsenals on the other-can no longer be considered in isolation. They must be addressed together.

    To this end, we call for negotiations to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons in a series of well defined stages accompanied by increasing verification and control. We direct our appeal especially to the nuclear powers, to confirm and implement their existing commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. India has declared a moratorium on tests and its willingness to give up nuclear weapons in the context of a global plan for their elimination. Today, only a commitment to nuclear abolition can realistically halt nuclear proliferation.

    The tests of South Asia pose great danger but, against the background of the end of the cold war, they have also created an opportunity that must not be missed to take action that can at last free the world of nuclear danger. The hour is late, and the time for action is now.

    Signatories are:
    Oscar Arias, Alan Cranston, Daniel Ellsberg, Mark Hatfield, Joseph Rotblat, Admiral Eugene Carroll, Richard Barnet, Mikhail Gorbachev, Marcus Raskin, Bishop Walter R. Sullivan, Jimmy Carter, Jonathan Dean, Morton Halperin, Douglas Roche, David Cortright.

     

  • Chronology of the India-Pakistan Conflict

    NEW DELHI, July 26 (Reuters) – Following is a chronology of major events involving arch-rivals India and Pakistan, whose prime ministers meet in Colombo on the sidelines of a regional conference in Sri Lanka on Wednesday.

    October 27, 1947: War breaks out between India and Pakistan in disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir barely two months after their independence from Britain.

    January 1, 1949: Ceasefire, ordered by United Nations Security Council, takes effect in Kashmir.

    September 6-22, 1965: Full-scale India-Pakistan war over Kashmir, which ends after a U.N. call for ceasefire.

    January 3, 1966: Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan sign Soviet-mediated peace pact.

    December 3-17, 1971: India-Pakistan War over East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) which ends when 90,000 Pakistani troops surrender.

    July 2, 1972: Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and counterpart Zulfikar Ali Bhutto sign peace accord in Shimla.

    Nov 1, 1982: Gandhi and Pakistani President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq agree to begin talks on a non-aggression treaty.

    May 18, 1974: India detonates first nuclear device, but says it is for atomic research and not weapons.

    January 20, 1986: Talks between Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries end inconclusively in Islamabad. But both agree on “desirability” of a peace treaty and non-aggression pact.

    December 31, 1988: India and Pakistan sign agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities.

    February 5, 1989: Pakistan army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg says Pakistan has successfully test-fired its first long-range surface-to-surface rockets, named Hatf-1 and Hatf-2.

    Feb 6, 1992: Pakistan says it has acquired knowledge to make a nuclear bomb but will not do so.

    January 1-3, 1994: Foreign secretaries of the two countries fail to narrow differences on Kashmir. Pakistan rules out more talks unless India stops alleged human rights violations in Kashmir.

    August 23, 1994: Then former premier Nawaz Sharif tells rally in Pakistan-ruled Azad (Free) Kashmir, forming a third of Jammu and Kashmir, that Pakistan has an atomic bomb. The government denies this.

    January 30, 1996: Pakistani and Indian military officers meet on ceasefire line dividing Kashmir to ease tension after clashes.

    June 4, 1996: Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto urges Indian counterpart H.D. Deve Gowda to resume dialogue. Deve Gowda responds positively, but Pakistan drops idea when India holds local elections in Jammu and Kashmir.

    March 28-31, 1997: Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries open the first round peace talks in New Delhi, agree to meet again in Islamabad.

    April 9: Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral and Pakistani counterpart Gohar Ayub Khan meet in New Delhi. India says several hundred fishermen held by each side will be freed.

    May 12: Prime Ministers Inder Kumar Gujral and Nawaz Sharif hold separate talks at SAARC summit in Maldives.

    June 19-23: After second round of talks in Islamabad, Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries announce eight-point agenda for peace talks, including Kashmir issue, and say they will set up mechanism to tackle it.

    August 14-15 : India and Pakistan mark 50 years of independence.

    Aug 26 – India rejects U.S. offer to mediate to end Kashmir border clashes, saying differences should be solved in bilateral talks.

    September 18 – Talks between foreign secretaries end in stalemate, but both sides say they will meet again.

    Sept 22 – In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif offers to open talks on a non-aggression pact with India, proposing that both nations strike a deal to restrain their nuclear and missile capabilities.

    Sept 23 – Sharif meets Gujral for talks in New York which end with no breakthrough.

    Oct 26 – Gujral says he is cautiously optimistic that personal friendship with Sharif will help ease tension over Kashmir, but their meet on the fringes of a Commonwealth summit achieves little.

    Feb 4, 1998 – Pakistan warns it might review its policy of nuclear restraint if India’s new Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party government redeems election pledge to make nuclear weapons.

    April 6 – Pakistan tests its longest range, 1,500 km (932 mile) Ghauri missile.

    May 11 – India conducts three underground nuclear tests in the western desert state of Rajasthan near the border with Pakistan.

    May 13 – India conducts two more tests and says its series of tests is complete.

    May 14 – U.S. President Bill Clinton says the tests ae a “terrible” mistake and orders sanctions that put more than $20 billion of aid, loans and trade on ice. Japan orders a block on around $1 billion of aid loans, followed by a host of European nations.

    May 28 – Pakistan conducts five nuclear tests in response to the Indian blasts. President Clinton, his request to Sharif not to test rebuffed, vows sanctions.

    May 30 – Pakistan conducts one more nuclear test and says its series of tests is complete.

    June 6 – U.N. Security Council condemns India and Pakistan for carrying out nuclear tests and urges the two nations to stop all nuclear weapons programs.

    June 12 – India and Pakistan invite each other for talks, but fail to agree on the agenda.

    Group of Eight Nations (G-8) imposes a ban on non-humanitarian loans to India and Pakistan as punishment for their nuclear tests.

    June 23- India suggests talks between the two countries’ prime ministers at South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

    June 24 – Pakistan agrees to talks with India in Colombo.

    July 10 – Vajpayee offers Pakistan a no-first-use pact, economic cooperation, and appeals for its participation in joint efforts to achieve universal disarmament. Pakistan in turn says it is ready to sign a non-aggression treaty with India.

    July 25 – Vajpayee says in a magazine interview that India is committed to resolving differences with Pakistan through a bilateral dialogue. He also indicates that India could conduct further tests of its Agni intermediate-range missile.

  • India Press Statement

    As announced by the Prime Minister this afternoon, today India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests conducted today were with a fission device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurement have also confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted in May 1974.

    These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme. They also provide a valuable database which is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different applications and for different delivery systems. Further, they are expected to carry Indian scientists towards a sound computer simulation capability which may be supported by sub-critical experiments, if considered necessary.

    The Government is deeply concerned, as were previous Governments, about the nuclear environment in India’s neighbourhood. These tests provide reassurance to the people of India that their national security interests are paramount and will be promoted and protected. Succeeding generations of Indians would also rest assured that contemporary technologies associated with nuclear option have been passed on to them in this the 50th year of our independence.

    It is necessary to highlight today that India was in the vanguard of nations which ushered in the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 due to environmental concerns. Indian representatives have worked in various international forums, including the Conference on Disarmament for universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable arrangements for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. The Government would like to reiterate its support to efforts to realise the goal of a truly comprehensive international arrangement which would prohibit underground nuclear testing of all weapons as well as related experiments described as ‘sub-critical’ or ‘hydronuclear.’

    India would be prepared to consider being an adherent to some of the undertakings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But this cannot obviously be done in a vacuum. It would necessarily be an evolutionary process from concept to commitment and would depend on a number of reciprocal activities.

    We would like to reaffirm categorically that we will continue to exercise the most stringent control on the export of sensitive technologies, equipment and commodities – especially those related to weapons of mass destruction. Our track record has been impeccable in this regard. Therefore we expect recognition of our responsible policy by the international community.

    India remains committed to a speedy process of nuclear disarmament leading to total and global elimination of nuclear weapons. Our adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention is evidence of our commitment to any global disarmament regime which is non-discriminatory and verifiable. We shall also be happy to participate in the negotiations for the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Geneva based Conference on Disarmament.

    In our neighbourhood we have many friends with whom relations of fruitful cooperation for mutual benefit have existed and deepened over a long period. We assure them that it will be our sincere endeavour to intensify and diversify those relations further for the benefit of all our peoples. For India, as for others, the prime need is for peaceful cooperation and economic development.

     

  • Resolution 715 (1991) on Iraq

    Adopted by the Security Council at its 3012th meeting

    The Security Council,

    Recalling its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, and its other resolutions on this matter,

    Recalling in particular that under resolution 687 (1991) the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were requested to develop plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification, and to submit them to the Security Council for approval,

    Taking note of the report and note of the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1), transmitting the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,

    Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

    1. Approves, in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and the present resolution, the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (S/22871/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1);

    2. Decides that the Special Commission shall carry out the plan submitted by the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev.1), as well as continuing to discharge its other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991) and performing such other functions as are conferred upon it under the present resolution;

    3. Requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission, the plan submitted by him (S/22872/Rev.1) and to continue to discharge his other responsibilities under resolutions 687 (1991), 699 (1991) and 707 (1991);

    4. Decides that the Special Commission, in the exercise of its responsibilities as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, shall:

    (a) Continue to have the responsibility for designating additional locations for inspection and overflights;

    (b) Continue to render assistance and cooperation to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, by providing him by mutual agreement with the necessary special expertise and logistical, informational and other operational support for the carrying out of the plan submitted by him;

    (c) Perform such other functions, in cooperation in the nuclear field with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as may be necessary to coordinate activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, including making use of commonly available services and information to the fullest extent possible, in order to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum use of resources;

    5. Demands that Iraq meet unconditionally all its obligations under the plans approved by the present resolution and cooperate fully with the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the plans;

    6. Decides to encourage the maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, from all Member States to support the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out their activities under the plans approved by the present resolution, without prejudice to Iraq’s liability for the full costs of such activities;

    7. Requests the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990), the Special Commission and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop in cooperation a mechanism for monitoring any future sales or supplies by other countries to Iraq of items relevant to the implementation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, including the present resolution and the plans approved hereunder;

    8. Requests the Secretary-General and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the plans approved by the present resolution, when requested by the Security Council and in any event at least every six months after the adoption of this resolution;

    9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

  • Resolution 687 (1991)

    Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting

    The Security Council,

    Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990, 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990 and 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991,

    Welcoming the restoration to Kuwait of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and the return of its legitimate Government,

    Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait and Iraq, and noting the intention expressed by the Member States cooperating with Kuwait under paragraph 2 of resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with paragraph 8 of resolution 686 (1991),

    Reaffirming the need to be assured of Iraq’s peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

    Taking note of the letter sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq on 27 February 1991 and those sent pursuant to resolution 686 (1991),

    Noting that Iraq and Kuwait, as independent sovereign States, signed at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, thereby recognizing formally the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait and the allocation of islands, which were registered with the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations and in which Iraq recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of the State of Kuwait within its borders as specified and accepted in the letter of the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21 July 1932, and as accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait in his letter dated 10 August 1932,

    Conscious of the need for demarcation of the said boundary,

    Conscious also of the statements by Iraq threatening to use weapons in violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and of its prior use of chemical weapons and affirming that grave consequences would follow any further use by Iraq of such weapons,

    Recalling that Iraq has subscribed to the Declaration adopted by all States participating in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical and biological weapons,

    Recalling also that Iraq has signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972,

    Noting the importance of Iraq ratifying this Convention,

    Noting moreover the importance of all States adhering to this Convention and encouraging its forthcoming Review Conference to reinforce the authority, efficiency and universal scope of the convention,

    Stressing the importance of an early conclusion by the Conference on Disarmament of its work on a Convention on the Universal Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and of universal adherence thereto,

    Aware of the use by Iraq of ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq,

    Concerned by the reports in the hands of Member States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968,

    Recalling the objective of the establishment of a nuclear- weapons-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

    Conscious of the threat that all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and of the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons,

    Conscious also of the objective of achieving balanced and comprehensive control of armaments in the region,

    Conscious further of the importance of achieving the objectives noted above using all available means, including a dialogue among the States of the region,

    Noting that resolution 686 (1991) marked the lifting of the measures imposed by resolution 661 (1990) in so far as they applied to Kuwait,

    Noting that despite the progress being made in fulfilling the obligations of resolution 686 (1991), many Kuwaiti and third country nationals are still not accounted for and property remains unreturned,

    Recalling the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979, which categorizes all acts of taking hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

    Deploring threats made by Iraq during the recent conflict to make use of terrorism against targets outside Iraq and the taking of hostages by Iraq,

    Taking note with grave concern of the reports of the Secretary-General of 20 March 1991 and 28 March 1991, and conscious of the necessity to meet urgently the humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq,

    Bearing in mind its objective of restoring international peace and security in the area as set out in recent resolutions of the Security Council,

    Conscious of the need to take the following measures acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

    1. Affirms all thirteen resolutions noted above, except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of this resolution, including a formal cease-fire:

    A
    2. Demands that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the international boundary and the allocation of islands set out in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters”, signed by them in the exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on 4 October 1963 and registered with the United Nations and published by the United Nations in document 7063, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1964;

    3. Calls upon the Secretary-General to lend his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait, drawing on appropriate material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document S/22412 and to report back to the Security Council within one month;

    4. Decides to guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned international boundary and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

    B
    5. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with Iraq and Kuwait, to submit within three days to the Security Council for its approval a plan for the immediate deployment of a United Nations observer unit to monitor the Khor Abdullah and a demilitarized zone, which is hereby established, extending ten kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the boundary referred to in the “Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters” of 4 October 1963; to deter violations of the boundary through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone; to observe any hostile or potentially hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the other; and for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Security Council on the operations of the unit, and immediately if there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace;

    6. Notes that as soon as the Secretary-General notifies the Security Council of the completion of the deployment of the United Nations observer unit, the conditions will be established for the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with resolution 686 (1991);

    C
    7. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, of 10 April 1972;

    8. Decides that shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

    1. All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
    2. All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

    9. Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following:

    1. Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution, a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified in paragraph 8 and agree to urgent, on-site inspection as specified below;
    2. The Secretary-General, in consultation with the appropriate Governments and, where appropriate, with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, within forty-five days of the passage of the present resolution, shall develop, and submit to the Council for approval, a plan calling for the completion of the following acts within forty-five days of such approval:
      1. The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself;
      2. The yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, taking into account the requirements of public safety, of all items specified under paragraph 8 (a) above, including items at the additional locations designated by the Special Commission under paragraph 9 (b) (i) above and the destruction by Iraq, under the supervision of the Special Commission, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers, as specified under paragraph 8 (b) above;
      3. The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and cooperation to the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency required in paragraphs 12 and 13 below;

    10. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with this paragraph. to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of this resolution;

    11. Invites Iraq to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968;

    12. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material or any subsystems or components or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above; to submit to the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency within fifteen days of the adoption of the present resolution a declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified above; to place all of its nuclear-weapons-usable materials under the exclusive control, for custody and removal, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General discussed in paragraph 9 (b) above; to accept, in accordance with the arrangements provided for in paragraph 13 below, urgent on-site inspection and the destruction, removal or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items specified above; and to accept the plan discussed in paragraph 13 below for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings;

    13. Requests the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, through the Secretary-General, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission as provided for in the plan of the Secretary-General in paragraph 9 (b) above, to carry out immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission; to develop a plan for submission to the Security Council within forty-five days calling for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless as appropriate of all items listed in paragraph 12 above; to carry out the plan within forty-five days following approval by the Security Council; and to develop a plan, taking into account the rights and obligations of Iraq under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968, for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with paragraph 12 above, including an inventory of all nuclear material in Iraq subject to the Agency’s verification and inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency to confirm that the Agency’s safeguards cover all relevant nuclear activities in Iraq, to be submitted to the Security Council for approval within one hundred and twenty days of the passage of the present resolution;

    14. Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons:

    D
    15. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact;

    E
    16. Reaffirms that Iraq, without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which will be addressed through the normal mechanisms, is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq’s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait;

    17. Decides that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are null and void, and demands that Iraq adhere scrupulously to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;

    18. Decides also to create a fund to pay compensation for claims that fall within paragraph 16 above and to establish a Commission that will administer the fund;

    19. Directs the Secretary-General to develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than thirty days following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to meet the requirement for the programme to implement the decisions in paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 above, including: administration of the fund; mechanisms for determining the appropriate level of Iraq’s contribution to the fund based on a percentage of the value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq not to exceed a figure to be suggested to the Council by the Secretary-General, taking into account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq’s payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the Iraqi economy; arrangements for ensuring that payments are made to the fund; the process by which funds will be allocated and claims paid; appropriate procedures for evaluating losses, listing claims and verifying their validity and resolving disputed claims in respect of Iraq’s liability as specified in paragraph 16 above; and the composition of the Commission designated above.

    F
    20. Decides, effective immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait or, with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated “no-objection” procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 19919, and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee;

    21. Decides that the Security Council shall review the provisions of paragraph 20 above every sixty days in the light of the policies and practices of the Government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the prohibitions referred to therein;

    22. Decides that upon the approval by the Security Council of the programme called for in paragraph 19 above and upon Council agreement that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 above, the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in resolution 661 (1990) shall have no further force or effect;

    23. Decides that, pending action by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) shall be empowered to approve, when required to assure adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the activities under paragraph 20 above, exceptions to the prohibition against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq;

    24. Decides that, in accordance with resolution 661 (1990) and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the scale or supply, or the promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals, or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of:

    1. Arms and related matérial of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment, including for paramilitary forces, and spare parts and components and their means of production, for such equipment;
    2. Items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above not otherwise covered above;
    3. Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;
    4. Personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance or support of items specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

    25. Calls upon all States and international organizations to act strictly in accordance with paragraph 24 above, notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agreements, licenses of any other arrangements;

    26. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate Governments, to develop within sixty days, for the approval of the security Council, guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24 and 25 above and paragraph 27 below, and to make them available to all States and to establish a procedure for updating these guidelines periodically;

    27. Calls upon all States to maintain such national controls and procedures and to take such other actions consistent with the guidelines to be established by the Security Council under paragraph 26 above as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the terms of paragraph 24 above, and calls upon international organizations to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring such full compliance;

    28. Agrees to review its decisions in paragraphs 22,23,24 and 25 above, except for the items specified and defined in paragraphs 8 and 12 above, on a regular basis and in any case one hundred and twenty days following passage of the present resolution, taking into account Iraq’s compliance with the resolution and general progress towards the control of armaments in the region;

    29. Decides that all States, including Iraq, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iraq, or of any person or body in Iraq, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 661 (1990) and related resolutions;

    G
    30. Decides that, in furtherance of its commitment to facilitate the repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals, Iraq shall extend all necessary cooperation to the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and facilitating the search by the International Committee of the Red Cross for those Kuwaiti and third country nationals still unaccounted for;

    31. Invites the International Committee of the Red Cross to keep the Secretary-General apprised as appropriate of all activities undertaken in connection with facilitating the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains present in Iraq on or after 2 August 1990;

    H
    32. Requires Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit or support any act of international terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of such acts to operate within its territory and to condemn unequivocally and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism;

    I
    33. Declares that, upon official notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provisions above, a formal cease-fire is effective between Iraq and Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with resolution 678 (1990);

    34. Decides to remain seized of the matter and to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area.