Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: Proliferation Security Initiative

  • Contesting Iran’s Nuclear Future

    Iran continues to challenge international efforts to hold it accountable for its suspicious nuclear activities. Later this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors will meet to address the issue against the backdrop of growing fear that time to contain the country’s nuclear ambitions is running out. This leaves little doubt that Iran will be high on the Bush administration’s foreign-policy agenda in the months to come.

    To date, the IAEA has relied on public shame to force Iran’s compliance. In the past two years, agency inspectors laid bare much of Tehran’s nuclear program. But suspicions remain that Iran’s ruling mullahs have not revealed all. Should Iran continue to waffle, the international community must decide if it must take more aggressive steps to force the revolutionary state to accede. The following options suggest that there is no clear path.

    The most benign approach would be to continue current IAEA efforts. Arguably, agency inspections and quarterly public reports will, in time, embarrass Iran to resist the nuclear-weapons temptation. This butts against two facts, however. First, suspicions persist that Iran has not come clean about all its nuclear activities. Second, Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing endeavors make no sense apart from nuclear weapons. For example, the solitary power reactor Tehran hopes to initiate in 2005 or 2006 does not justify the economic investment in facilities to recycle nuclear fuel into weapons-grade material.

    Believing that diplomacy had not run its course, Britain, France and Germany opened a dialogue with Iran outside the IAEA framework. In October 2003, the three European powers sent their foreign ministers to Tehran. The diplomats offered economic carrots and peaceful nuclear-energy assistance as a quid pro quo for Iran to halt its developing enrichment program. The meeting prompted cautious optimism: Tehran announced that it would suspend the manufacture of nuclear centrifuges. Nine months later, the mullahs reversed themselves.

    Chagrined, the Europeans renewed the dialogue. The Iranians stonewalled. They declared that “no country has the right to deprive us of nuclear technology.” The Europeans remain undaunted. They continue to try. Today, for instance, they are sitting down with the Iranians in Paris, where they will likely continue to dangle economic incentives in exchange for Tehran’s promise of a halt to Iran’s enrichment program. Tehran’s probable, coy response: It might suspend – again – its enrichment activities, but just for a short time, to give diplomacy a chance.

    Unimpressed, the Bush administration remains convinced that Iran is using diplomacy to buy time for its nuclear ambitions. For months, the administration has pushed the IAEA to declare Tehran in violation of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. The result would place the matter before the U.N. Security Council, which could impose sanctions.

    But this is another path to nowhere. Iran’s critical vulnerability to sanctions – reliance on the hard currency earned through oil exports – is a double-edged sword. The United States is unlikely to generate Security Council support for measures that will restrict the already tight oil market. Washington also is stuck on its own petard – the Iraq WMD intelligence debacle. In the absence of a nuclear weapons “smoking gun” – certified by the IAEA – the Security Council is unlikely to issue more than a rhetorical slap on the wrist that calls upon the mullahs to reconsider their transgressions.

    Among the dwindling options is confrontation. One option would galvanize members of the Proliferation Security Initiative – which includes a core group of a dozen or so nations that have agreed to intercept WMD contraband – to isolate Iran until it disgorges its nuclear weapons capacity. However, building the PSI into a serious new “alliance of the willing,” in the absence of a clear and present danger, is unlikely.

    Then there is military action. Only military occupation can guarantee Iran’s nuclear disarmament; limited military strikes will not destroy hidden nuclear facilities. But, in the Iraq aftermath, either option would be a hard sell to the American public. On the other hand, Israel, which considers Iran a mortal enemy, does not require a sales job. Jerusalem repeatedly has declared that it will not allow Iran a nuclear weapons capacity. But Israel is in no better position than the United States to destroy the program.

    This leaves two factors that may impact Iran’s nuclear future. One is peaceful regime change. Although there is some hope that a new generation of Iranians – who might be more nonproliferation compliant – will replace the mullahs, there appears to be little prospect in the short term. In time, impetus could come from a thriving democratic Iraq. Unfortunately, Baghdad’s political future will not be resolved anytime soon.

    On the flip side, the United States and its allies could concede that little can be done to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. By accepting this prospect, the challenge will be to keep the nuclear peace. The solution must include an explicit warning to Tehran from Washington and Jerusalem: Any Iranian nuclear threat or act – or any complicity in a terrorist nuclear act – would result in the elimination of the revolutionary regime by any and all means. The time to issue this warning is now, before the mullahs realize their nuclear ambitions. The result might have a sobering impact as Iran weighs a nuclear armed future.

    Bennett Ramberg served in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the administration of President George H.W. Bush.

    First published by the San Francisco Chronicle.

  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Examining the Policies of Bush and Kerry

    Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Examining the Policies of Bush and Kerry

    President Bush and Senator Kerry agree that nuclear proliferation is the top national security threat facing the United States . Given this agreement, it is worth examining the solutions each candidate is offering to solve the problem.

    The issue of Russian “loose nukes” has been at the forefront of the non-proliferation agenda since the end of the Cold War. A January 2001 Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia concluded: “The most urgent, unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction of weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.” This bipartisan report called for the US to develop and implement a ten-year $30 billion plan to bring Russian nuclear weapons and materials under control. The Bush administration has been spending at a rate of less than half this amount and has made little progress. Senator Kerry calls for completing the task in a four-year period.

    In Northeast Asia, North Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and claims to have nuclear weapons. Under the Bush administration, the US has been engaged in periodic six-party talks on security issues with North Korea , South Korea , Japan , China and Russia . These talks have made little progress. By initiating its war against Iraq on the basis of purported weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration has provided incentive to countries such as North Korea to develop nuclear deterrent forces against US attack. Adding to this, Bush has labeled North Korea as part of his “axis of evil” and referred to its leader as a “pygmy.” Senator Kerry has indicated that he would intensify the process of stopping North Korean nuclear proliferation by engaging in bilateral talks, as well as six-party talks, with the leaders of North Korea on the full range of issues of concern.

    In the Middle East, the Bush administration has enraged Arab populations by initiating its war against Iraq on false pretenses. Further, President Bush branded both Iraq and Iran as part of his “axis of evil.” The administration has put pressure on Iran to cease its uranium enrichment, which Iran claims is for peaceful purposes, but thus far with little effect. The US is widely viewed in the region as hypocritical for failing to apply equal pressure on Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Senator Kerry has set forth a plan to create a consortium to supply Iran with the fuel it needs for peaceful purposes with the agreement that Iran would return the spent fuel to the consortium, thus eliminating the threat that this material would be converted to use for weapons.

    In South Asia, both India and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons capabilities. Following the nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, the US placed sanctions on them. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has largely removed the sanctions and has developed close ties with Pakistan . President Bush claims to have “busted” the network of A. Q. Khan that was supplying nuclear materials and technology around the world. In fact, Khan was pardoned by Pakistani President Musharraf and has never been questioned by US intelligence agents. Senator Kerry has promised to work multinationally to toughen export controls and strengthen law enforcement and intelligence sharing to prevent such non-proliferation breaches in the future. Further, he has called for working through the United Nations to make trade in nuclear and other technologies of mass destruction an international crime.

    The United States has itself been engaged in a program to create new and more usable nuclear weapons, weapons for specific purposes such as “bunker busting,” and smaller nuclear weapons that are about one-third the size of the Hiroshima bomb. The Bush administration has supported this program, while Senator Kerry has said that he would end it because seeking to create new nuclear weapons sets the wrong example when we are trying to convince other nations not to develop nuclear arsenals.

    Both candidates recognize the dangers of nuclear proliferation and of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The Bush administration has set up the Proliferation Security Initiative that allows for boarding ships at sea to inspect for nuclear materials. Senator Kerry has pointed out that this initiative allows for inspecting on short notice only 15 percent of the 50,000 large cargo ships at sea and has less than 20 full participants. He plans a comprehensive approach that would not rely only on “coalitions of the willing,” but would create a broad international framework for preventing nuclear proliferation. Senator Kerry would also appoint a Presidential Coordinator to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism and make the issue a cabinet-level priority.

    In evaluating the candidates in regard to their willingness and ability to deal with the threats of nuclear proliferation, we should consider also the commitments made in 2000 by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the US , to achieving 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These steps include ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the creation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, making nuclear disarmament irreversible, and an unequivocal undertaking to achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. These steps are important not only because they are international obligations, but because the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation regime in general rests upon the nuclear weapons states as well as the non-nuclear weapons states fulfilling their obligations.

    In nearly all respects President Bush has failed to meet these obligations. He has opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, opposed verification of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, made nuclear disarmament entirely reversible under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and, rather than demonstrating leadership toward the elimination of nuclear arsenals, has sought to create new nuclear weapons.

    It is difficult to imagine any US president achieving so dismal a record on so critical an issue. It is time for presidential leadership that will restore US credibility in the world and not betray the national security interests of the American people.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and co-author of Nuclear Weapons and the World Court.

  • Get Rid of All Nuclear Arms

    President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) provides the right solution, but to the wrong problem. Nuclear proliferation is merely a symptom; the real issue is the nuclear weapons themselves. And, in this sense, the PSI is no more than a Band-Aid, and a quite small one at that.

    The recent scandal in Pakistan, where a corrupt scientist sold nuclear secrets for profit, only demonstrates that such traffic is much too lucrative to be stopped by increased policing. For 60 years, ever since Hiroshima, the U.S. and the world have tried to control the spread of nuclear weapons. We’ve tried treaties, economic sanctions and moral persuasion. And we’ve failed.

    We could not stop the Soviets from getting nukes. We chose not to resist, and actually ignored, Israel’s nuclear program. We looked the other way when India went nuclear and, thus, could do little when Pakistan followed suit. And we merely fumed when North Korea flexed its nuclear muscles. In the meantime, we have built and maintained the world’s largest nuclear stockpile.

    Can we contain Pakistan’s nuclear program? Yes, we can. But first we will need to contain India’s. To do that, however, India will need to see China’s program rolled back. How does that happen? For that, we will need to start looking at our own. As my grandmother used to say, “If you point one finger at someone, at least three will point back at you.” No one said this was easy!

    Are we really surprised that the rest of the world rolls its eyes when we pontificate about the dangers of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in general — as when Bush referred to them as “the greatest threat to humanity today”? What other countries doubt is our sincerity. It is hypocritical to tell the rest of the world that nuclear weapons are good enough for us, but not for them. We can’t have a world part nuclear and part not.

    Perhaps the fathers of our own atom bomb — Robert Oppenheimer and his colleagues from the Manhattan Project — were correct in believing that the only real way of dealing with nuclear proliferation is to ban nuclear weapons altogether. Everywhere.

    International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohamed ElBaradei understands this reality. He recently wrote: “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.”

    We must insist on a nuclear-free world. We must make a sincere commitment to it at home and demand it abroad. Rather than better mousetraps for proliferating nations, we need an approach to eliminate nuclear weapons. Some may argue this is unrealistic. But no more so than the misguided, even naive, hope that a feel-good Band-Aid called PSI will make the world a safer place.

    *Adil Najam is an associate professor of international negotiation and diplomacy at the Fletcher School at Tufts University. This article was originally published by USA Today on February
    18, 2004.

  • The Krakow Initiative: Another Blow from Bush

    On May 31, 2003 in the royal castle of Wawel, Krakow, during a state visit to Poland, U.S. President George W. Bush, delivered another forceful blow. This latest onslaught is part of the hegemonic strategy of absolute domination that the Bush administration has assumed in its efforts to consolidate a unipolar vision of the world that the international community rejects with certain timidity but, with a few exceptions, has ended up accepting in real life.

    Significantly, little is known and even less has been commented on in relation to the so-called “Krakow initiative” or, more formally, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in principle aimed at halting the trafficking and increase in weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In formalizing his proposal, Bush’s explanation was as follows: “The greatest threat to peace is the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. And we must work together to stop proliferation …. When weapons of mass destruction or their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them.”

    Although he attempted to cloak his words in the rhetoric of legality, the U.S. president promoted and continues to promote a dependent mechanism used by Washington, outside the confines of the United Nations, to control international air space and maritime routes. Initially, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom responded to the call, emphasizing, according to an official statement from the White House released on September 4, 2003, “the need for proactive measures to combat the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

    The goal, to be sure, appears worthy of approval. In practice, however, other nations — Brazil, China, Canada, Russia, South Korea, India, and Pakistan, for the time being, have expressed their concern that the United States seeks to use an instrument of such a scope to strengthen its supremacy in the production of cutting-edge nuclear, ballistic, biological, and chemical technology and to control global transportation routes.

    If the PSI is indeed concretized as conceived by Bush and his strategists, Washington will monopolize espionage, the interception of ships on the high seas and aircraft in international air space, and multilateral control devices, all under the pretext of the simple suspicion that WMD or their components could be in transit.

    The countries that openly oppose the U.S. proposal have pointed to the danger of a quite flexible interpretation of the legal basis for intercepting international transport, as understood by Washington. A first consequence would be the displacement of other producers of weapons and chemical, biological and nuclear products, in favor of the U.S. industrial complex.

    According to the interpretation offered by the Bush administration, almost all cutting-edge technology products can be used in the production of WMD and for the same reason, they can be subject to confiscation by the United States and its allies. This immediately and directly threatens compliance with purchase-sale contracts worldwide and with free international trade, which would become a virtual monopoly of large U.S. corporations and, to a lesser extent, Washington’s European and Asian partners.

    The threat of bioterrorism, for example, which has still not thus far been concretized in specific incidents, has allowed Washington to unilaterally impose much stricter measures of control over foodstuffs and agricultural products exported to the United States and its allied or nearby countries. This, in reality, is an instrument of pressure on exporter countries, which contradicts the norms of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

    In this sense, the law on bioterrorism that is expected to be approved next October is, from the point of view of the Latin American countries, a new and virtually impenetrable barrier to the development of free international trade in agricultural products. This measure, coupled with the U.S. government’s protectionist measures, will sooner than later, cause the collapse of the economies in the region.

    To be sure, no one can have doubts on the importance of strengthening measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and in this sense, Bush’s initiative is aimed in the right direction. However, the way in which its functioning has been structured moves away from such real and desirable objectives, to become an element of hegemonic domination.

    The principles that should prevail in the Proliferation Security Initiative should respect international law and the system of norms accepted within the framework of the United Nations. Otherwise, the blow to world legality will be devastating and perhaps definitive.

    *The author is President, Latin American Circle for International Studies (LACIS).