Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: proliferation

  • Non-Proliferation Treaty

    The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

    Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

    Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

    In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

    Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

    Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

    Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

    Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

    Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

    Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

    Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

    Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

    Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

    Have agreed as follows:

    Article I

    Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

    Article II

    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

    Article III

    1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

    2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

    3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

    4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

    Article IV

    1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

    2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

    Article V

    Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

    Article VI

    Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

    Article VII

    Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

    Article VIII

    1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

    2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

    3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

    Article IX

    1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

    2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

    3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

    4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

    5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

    6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

    Article X

    1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

    2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1

    Article XI

    This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

    DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

  • Why Waltz is Wrong

    David KriegerThe lead article in the July/August 2012 issue of Foreign Affairs is titled “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.”  The author, Kenneth Waltz, a former president of the American Political Science Association, argues that the world should stop worrying about Iran getting the bomb.  He sums up his basic argument this way: “If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers always have.  There has never been a full-scale war between two nuclear-armed states.  Once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply, even if the Iranian arsenal is relatively small.”


    In essence, Waltz puts his faith in nuclear deterrence and justifies this in historical terms.  But the history is short and there have been many close calls.  During the 67-year period since the dawn of the Nuclear Age there have been numerous accidents, miscalculations and threats to use nuclear weapons.  Fifty years ago, the US and Soviet Union stood at the precipice of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Waltz’s faith in nuclear deterrence reflects a belief in rationality, a belief that all leaders will behave rationally at all times, including under conditions of extreme stress.  This defies our understanding of human behavior and the ever-present potential for human fallibility. 


    Another way to view the historical data from which Waltz finds comfort is by an analogy of a man jumping off a hundred-story building.  As he passes floor after floor, he wonders why people on the ground are showing concern for his well-being.  He ignores the approaching ground and focuses his attention on the fact that nothing bad has happened to him yet.  In Waltz’s theory of nuclear deterrence, there is no hard ground below, nor gravity acting upon the jumper.  He argues that “history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability.  When it comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever, more may be better.”  While having more may be better, it may also be far worse. 


    Martin Hellman, a professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford University and an expert in risk analysis, argues that a child born today has a ten percent or greater chance of having his or her life cut short by nuclear war.  Unlike Waltz’s analysis, risk analysis takes into account the odds of an event occurring and doesn’t base its analysis of the future simply on what the historical record shows at a given point in time.  Ten coin flips may produce ten straight “heads,” but it would be unwise to assume that the results between heads and tails would not even out over time.  With nuclear weapons, the consequences of being wrong in one’s projections are, of course, far more dire than with coin tosses.


    Another analogy that has been used to describe the standoff between nuclear-armed powers, particularly the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, was of two men standing up to their waists in the same pool of gasoline and each man being ready to strike an unlit match.  If either man struck the match, both men would be consumed by the fire that would result.  With nuclear weapons, the conflagration would not stop at the two men – it would include their families, their communities, their countries and the world. 


    Waltz makes the bet that no leader of a nuclear weapon state will ever strike the match or allow the match to fall into hands that will strike it.  It is a foolish bet to make.  The two men, and the rest of us, would be far safer if the gasoline were drained from the pool.  In the same way, the world would be much safer if nuclear weapons were abolished, rather than shared in the hope they would enhance security in the Middle East or elsewhere.


    Waltz may believe that it is precisely the threat of conflagration that keeps the men from striking the matches.  For many, even most, men he may be correct, but the fact is that neither Waltz nor anyone else can predict human behavior under all conditions.  There may be some leaders in some circumstances for whom striking the match would seem rational.  In addition, even if neither man were to strike a match, lightning may strike the pool of gasoline or other sparks may ignite the pool from unforeseen causes.  Instances of accidents, madness and human fallibility abound.


    Nuclear weapons have brought humankind to the precipice.  These weapons threaten cities, countries, civilization and complex life on the planet.  It is the responsibility of those of us alive on the planet now to abolish these weapons of mass annihilation, not justify their spread, as Waltz would have us do.

  • Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT

    Following is the text of a joint statement issued by China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States of America at the conclusion of the Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT June 27-29, 2012 in Washington, DC.

    Begin text:

    The five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or P5, met in Washington on June 27-29, 2012, in the wake of the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and to continue discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences.

    The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of working together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2011 Paris P5 Conference. In particular, the P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, continued their discussion of how to report on their relevant activities, and shared views, across all three pillars of the NPT, on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee and the intersessional period. The 2012 PrepCom outcome included issuance of a P5 statement comprehensively addressing issues in all three pillars (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/12).

    The P5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered proposals for a standard reporting form. The P5 recognize the importance of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, and the P5 will continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon final document.

    Participants received a briefing from the United States on U.S. activities at the Nevada National Security Site. This was offered with a view to demonstrate ideas for additional approaches to transparency.

    Another unilateral measure was a tour of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center located at the U.S. Department of State, where the P5 representatives have observed how the United States maintains a communications center to simultaneously implement notification regimes, including under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document.

    The P5 agreed on the work plan for a P5 working group led by China, assigned to develop a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms that will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters.

    The P5 again shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification, including information on the P5 expert level meeting hosted by the UK in April, at which the UK shared the outcomes and lessons from the UK-Norway Initiative disarmament verification research project. The P5 heard presentations on lessons learned from New START Treaty implementation, were given an overview of U.S.-UK verification work, and agreed to consider attending a follow-up P5 briefing on this work to be hosted by the United States.

    As a further follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the P5 shared their views on how to discourage abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), and how to respond to notifications made consistent with the provisions of that article. The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. The P5 agreed that states remain responsible under international law for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal.

    The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 discussed concrete proposals for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol; and the reinforcement of the IAEAs resources and capabilities for effective safeguards implementation, including verification of declarations by States.

    The P5 reiterated their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. The P5 reviewed progress in developing the CTBTs verification regime in all its aspects and efforts towards entry into force. Ways to enhance the momentum for completing the verification regime, including the on-site inspection component, were explored. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. The moratoria, though important, are not substitutes for legally binding obligations under the CTBT.

    The P5 discussed ways to advance a mutual goal of achieving a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), building on CD/1864, and exchanged perspectives on ways to break the current impasse in the CD, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD.

    The P5 remain concerned about serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime and in this connection, recalled their joint statement of May 3 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT.

    An exchange of views on how to support a successful conference in 2012 on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was continued.

    The P5 agreed to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 will follow on their discussions and hold a fourth P5 conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

  • A Bomb in Every Reactor

    Joschka FischerTwenty-five years after the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl, the ongoing catastrophe at the Fukushima nuclear reactor in Japan has ― it must be hoped ― made clear once and for all that the purported blessings of the nuclear age are mere illusions: nuclear power is neither clean nor safe nor cheap.


    Indeed, the opposite is true. Nuclear power is saddled with three major unresolved risks: plant safety, nuclear waste, and, most menacing of all, the risk of military proliferation. Moreover, the alternatives to nuclear energy ― and to fossil fuels ― are well known and technically much more advanced and sustainable. Taking on nuclear risk is not a necessity; it is a deliberate political choice.


    Fossil-fuel and nuclear energy belong to the technological utopias of the 19th and 20th centuries, which were based on a belief in the innocence of the technologically feasible and on the fact that, at the time, only a minority of people worldwide, largely in the West, benefited from technological progress.


    By contrast, the 21st century will be informed by the realization that the global ecosystem and its resources, which are indispensable for human survival, are finite, and that this implies an enduring responsibility to preserve what we have. Meeting this imperative entails both an enormous technological challenge and an opportunity to redefine the meaning of modernity.


    The energy future of nine billion people, which is what the world population will be in the middle of the century, lies neither in fossil fuels nor in nuclear energy, but in renewable energy sources and dramatic improvements in energy efficiency. We already know this.


    Why, then, do the most advanced countries, in particular, take on the risk of a mega-catastrophe by seeking to create energy from radioactive fission?
    The answer, ultimately, doesn’t lie with any civilian use of nuclear energy, but first and foremost with its military applications.


    The energy derived from splitting uranium and plutonium atoms was originally used for the ultimate weapon, the atomic bomb. Being a nuclear power provides sovereign states with protection and prestige. Even today, the bomb divides the world into two classes: the few states have it, and the many that do not.


    The old Cold War world order was based on the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union. To stop others from trying to become nuclear powers, which would have multiplied and spread the risk of nuclear confrontation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was framed in the 1960s. To this day, it governs the relationships between the nuclear powers and the rest of the world, imposing renunciation on the have-nots and nuclear-disarmament obligations on the haves.


    Of course, the NPT has repeatedly been violated or circumvented by states that never subscribed to it. To this day, therefore, the risk remains that the number of nuclear powers will increase, particularly given small and medium powers’ hope to enhance their prestige and position in regional conflicts. Iran is the most current example of this.


    The nuclearization of these not-always-stable states threatens to make the regional conflicts of the 21st century much more dangerous, and will also substantially increase the risk that nuclear weapons eventually end up in the hands of terrorists.


    Despite the NPT, a clear separation between civilian and military use of nuclear energy hasn’t always worked, or worked completely, because the NPT’s rules permit all signatory states to develop and use ― under international supervision ― all of the components of the nuclear fuel cycle for civilian purposes. From here, then, all that is required to become a nuclear power are a few small technical steps and political leaders’ decision to take them.


    This political power, not the requirements of energy policy, is what makes giving up nuclear energy so difficult. As a rule, the path to nuclear-power status always begins with so-called “civilian” nuclear programs. The supposed “civilian” nuclear ambitions of Iran have thus, for instance, led to a large number of such “civilian” programs in neighboring states.


    And, of course, the reactions of the nuclear powers to the disaster at Fukushima will be watched and analyzed closely by the so-called “clandestine threshold countries.”


    So how will the world ― first and foremost, the main nuclear powers ― react to the Fukushima disaster? Will the tide truly turn, propelling the world toward nuclear disarmament and a future free of nuclear weapons? Or will we witness attempts to downplay the calamity and return to business as usual as soon as possible?


    Fukushima has presented the world with a far-reaching, fundamental choice.


    It was Japan, the high-tech country par excellence (not the latter-day Soviet Union) that proved unable to take adequate precautions to avert disaster in four reactor blocks. What, then, will a future risk assessment look like if significantly less organized and developed countries begin ― with the active assistance of the nuclear powers ― to acquire civilian nuclear-energy capabilities?


    Any decision to continue as before would send an unambiguous message to the clandestine threshold countries that are secretly pursuing nuclear weapons: despite lofty rhetoric and wordy documents, the nuclear powers lack the political will to change course. Were they to abandon nuclear energy, however, their epochal change of heart would constitute a seminal contribution to global nuclear security ― and thus to the fight against nuclear proliferation.

  • New Think and Old Weapons

    Every four years the White House issues a “nuclear posture review.” That may sound like an anachronism. It isn’t. In a world where the United States and Russia still have more than 20,000 nuclear weapons — and Iran, North Korea and others have seemingly unquenchable nuclear appetites — what the United States says about its arsenal matters enormously.

    President Obama’s review was due to Congress in December. That has been delayed, in part because of administration infighting. The president needs to get this right. It is his chance to finally jettison cold war doctrine and bolster America’s credibility as it presses to rein in Iran, North Korea and other proliferators.

    Mr. Obama has already committed rhetorically to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. But we are concerned that some of his advisers, especially at the Pentagon, are resisting his bold ambitions. He needs to stick with the ideas he articulated in his campaign and in speeches last year in Prague and at the United Nations.

    These are some of the important questions the posture review must address:

    THEIR PURPOSE: Current doctrine gives nuclear weapons a “critical role” in defending the United States and its allies. And it suggests they could be used against foes wielding chemical, biological or even conventional forces — not just nuclear arms. Mr. Obama’s aides have proposed changing that to say that the “primary” purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. This still invites questions about whether Washington values — and might use — nuclear forces against non-nuclear targets.

    Given America’s vast conventional military superiority, broader uses are neither realistic nor necessary. Any ambiguity undercuts Washington’s credibility when it argues that other countries have no strategic reason to develop their own nuclear arms. The sole purpose of American nuclear forces should be to deter a nuclear attack against this country or its allies.

    HOW MANY: President George W. Bush disdained arms control as old think, and Washington and Moscow have not signed an arms reduction treaty since 2002. Mr. Obama launched negotiations on a new agreement that would slash the number of warheads each side has deployed from 2,200 to between 1,500 and 1,675. The talks are dragging on, but there is hope for an agreement soon. Both sides should go deeper.

    The review should make clear that the United States is ready to move, as a next step, down to 1,000 deployed warheads — military experts say half that number is enough to wipe out the assets of Russia, which is no longer an enemy. China, the only major nuclear power adding to its arsenal, is estimated to have 100 to 200 warheads. The treaty being negotiated says nothing about the nearly 15,000 warheads, in total, that the United States and Russia keep as backups — the so-called hedge. And it says nothing about America’s 500 short-range nuclear weapons, which are considered secure, or Russia’s 3,000 or more, which are chillingly vulnerable to theft.

    The review should make clear that there is no need for a huge hedge, and that tactical weapons have an utter lack of strategic value — as a prelude to reducing both. Certainly no general we know of could imagine exploding a warhead on a battlefield. Today’s greatest nuclear danger is that terrorists will steal or build a weapon. That is best countered by halting proliferation and securing and reducing stockpiles and other material.

    NEW WEAPONS: The United States built its last new warhead in 1989. So when aides to President George W. Bush called for building new weapons, with new designs and new capabilities, it opened this country to charges of hypocrisy and double standards when it demanded that North Korea and Iran end their nuclear programs.

    Mr. Obama has said that this country does not need new weapons. But we are concerned the review will open the door to just that by directing the labs to study options — including a new weapons design — for maintaining the arsenal. The government has a strong and hugely expensive system for ensuring that the stockpile is safe and reliable. Mr. Obama has already vastly increased the labs’ budgets. The review should make clear that there is no need for a new weapon.

    ALERT LEVELS: The United States and Russia each still have about 1,000 weapons ready to fire at a moment’s notice. Mr. Obama has rightly described this as a dangerous cold war relic. The review should commit to taking as many of those forces off hair-trigger alert as possible — and encourage Russia to do the same.

    •

    In April, Mr. Obama will host a much needed summit meeting on the need to better secure nuclear material from terrorists. In May, Washington will encourage a United Nations-led conference to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the bedrock, and battered, agreement for curbing the spread of nuclear arms.

    President Obama will also have to persuade the Senate to ratify the Start follow-on treaty, and we hope he will quickly press the Senate to approve the test ban treaty. He is also working with allies to revive nuclear talks with North Korea and to impose tougher sanctions on Iran. Getting the nuclear posture review right is essential for moving all of this ahead.

  • A Brief History of Nuclear Proliferation

    Proliferation_History.pdf

  • Diverse Coalition Launches Campaign to Stop US Nuclear Deal with India

    WASHINGTON, DC –Twenty-three organizations today launched a coalition to stop the Bush Administration’s proposed nuclear trade agreement with India.  The proposed agreement would exempt that nuclear-armed nation from longstanding U.S. and international restrictions on states that do not meet global standards to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

    The Campaign for Responsibility in Nuclear Trade believes the agreement would: dangerously weaken nonproliferation efforts and embolden countries like Iran and North Korea to pursue the development of nuclear weapons; further destabilize South Asia and Pakistan in particular; and violate or weaken international and U.S. laws, including the Hyde Act, which Congress passed in 2006 to provide a framework for the bilateral U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement.

    “When Congress takes a close look at the Bush Administration’s proposed agreement, it will find a dangerous, unprecedented deal,” said John Isaacs of the Council for a Livable World.  “The proposal undermines over 30 years of nonproliferation policy, will increase India’s capability to produce nuclear weapons and its stockpile of nuclear weapons-material, and sends the wrong message to Pakistan during a time of crisis in that country.  We feel confident that, under the Congressional microscope, the many flaws of this deal will be exposed, and it will ultimately be rejected for the sake of preserving national security and global stability.”

    The U.S.-Indian bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement would allow the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology and material to India.  However, it fails to hold India to the same responsible nonproliferation and disarmament rules that are required of advanced nuclear states. The deal will increase India’s nuclear weapons production capability, exacerbate a nuclear arms race in the region, undermine international non-proliferation norms, and encourage the creation of large nuclear material stockpiles. Its contribution to meeting India’s growing energy needs has been greatly exaggerated and it would create economic opportunities for foreign nuclear industries without any guarantees for U.S. businesses.

    The pact must win approval from the U.S. Congress, which changed U.S. law in December 2006 to allow negotiation of the agreement, under several conditions that have not been met in the final language of the agreement.  Those conditions include a new agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for safeguarding Indian power reactors and changes to the international guidelines of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group, which currently restrict trade with India.

    Members of the Campaign are working to educate the U.S. Congress and public about the dangers of the deal, and are working with experts and organizations in two-dozen countries to inform deliberation over the deal within Nuclear Suppliers Group and its member state governments.

    The new coalition’s partners include:  Council for a Livable World, Arms Control Association, Federation of American Scientists, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Washington office, United Methodist Church – General Board of Church and Society, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Institute for Religion and Public Policy, Union of Concerned Scientists, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, All Souls Nuclear Disarmament Task Force, British American Security Information Council, Women’s Action for New Directions, Americans for Democratic Action, Peace Action, Peace Action West, Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative, Beyond Nuclear, Bipartisan Security Group, Citizens for Global Solutions, Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and Nuclear Information Resource Information Service.

    Advisors to the coalition include Ambassador Robert Grey (Ret.), former U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament and Director of the Bipartisan Security Group; Dr. Leonard Weiss, former staff director of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Nuclear Proliferation and the Committee on Governmental Affairs; Dr. Robert G. Gard, Jr., Lt. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.), Senior Military Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Subrata Ghoshroy, Director, Promoting Nuclear Stability in South Asia Project, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Dr. Christopher Paine, Nuclear Program Director, Natural Resources Defense Council.

    The Campaign’s website is www.responsiblenucleartrade.com.

    About the Campaign for Responsibility in Nuclear Trade

    The Campaign for Responsibility in Nuclear Trade, a partnership project of 23 nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, environmental and consumer protection organizations, opposes the July 2005 proposal for civil nuclear cooperation with India and the additional U.S. concessions made to India as a result of subsequent negotiations because they pose far-reaching and adverse implications for U.S. and international security, global nuclear non-proliferation efforts, human life and health, and the environment.  More information about the campaign can be found at www.responsiblenucleartrade.com.

    Arms Control Experts, Environmental Activists, Consumer Advocates, Religious Groups and Doctors Find Proposed Agreement Would Dangerously Undermine National Security, Global Stability

  • US Leadership for a Nuclear Weapons Free World?

    US Leadership for a Nuclear Weapons Free World?

    Since the onset of the Nuclear Age, nuclear weapons have posed an existential threat to humanity. With the development of thermonuclear weapons in the early 1950s and the ensuing Cold War nuclear arms race between the United States and Soviet Union, humanity has stood at the brink of catastrophe. Albert Einstein noted famously, “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

    With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s many people breathed a sigh of relief, believing incorrectly that there was no longer a threat of nuclear annihilation. Today, more than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear devastation remains very much with us. In some respects, in this time of extremism, the possibilities for nuclear weapons proliferation and use may have actually increased.

    Richard Garwin, a respected nuclear scientist, estimates the risk of a terrorist nuclear attack against an American or European city to be greater than 20 percent per year, not a figure that gives reassurance that the dangers have dramatically diminished. Graham Allison, director of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and an expert in international terrorism, believes that the chances of a nuclear terrorist nuclear attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent.

    The surest and perhaps only way to eliminate the threat of nuclear annihilation is to eliminate nuclear weapons. To achieve this goal will require US leadership. Without such leadership, the other nuclear weapons states are unlikely to move toward the elimination of their arsenals. With US leadership it will be possible to forge a path forward. Unfortunately, for those of us who accept the centrality of US leadership on this issue, there have been few signs of hope that such leadership will be forthcoming. The US has been more inclined to place obstacles on the path to nuclear disarmament than to lead the way back from the nuclear precipice. If the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament set forth at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference are taken as a benchmark, the US has failed to lead virtually across the board. If anything, the US has led in the wrong direction.

    The Bush administration has committed in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) to reduce its arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons from about 6,000 to 2,200 or below by the day the Treaty ends, December 31, 2012. It has, however, purposely left out of the agreement any provisions for transparency, verifiability or irreversibility. Weapons taken off deployed status can be put on a shelf in a reserve status for later redeployment. By the terms of the Treaty, the US and Russia are free to again expand their deployed strategic arsenals the day after the Treaty ends.

    In addition, the US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to pursue missile defenses and space weaponization. Despite US assurances that the missile defenses are aimed at rogue nations and not at Russia and China, leaders of these countries have repeatedly stated that US deployment of missile defenses is provocative and is spurring them to increase their offensive nuclear capabilities. China and Russia have also called for banning weapons in outer space, and the US has persisted in blocking their efforts.

    Since the end of the Cold War, the US has failed to take its nuclear arsenal off high alert status; failed to give legally binding pledges of No First Use of nuclear weapons, failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, failed to support a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and failed to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons for its security. To the contrary, it has developed contingency plans for nuclear weapons use against seven countries, including five that were thought to be non-nuclear weapons states at the time. And it has sought to develop new nuclear weapons, such as the “bunker buster” and the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).

    The principal elements of US nuclear policy favor continued reliance on these weapons. When taken together, the first letters of these elements actually spell out “Death Plan.” I don’t mean to imply that there is a conscious plan to destroy humanity, but that is the result of such policy. These elements are:

    — Double standards — Extended deterrence — Ambiguous messages — Threat of preventive use — High alert status

    — Preventing proliferation by force — Launch on warning — Alliance sharing — Negative leadership

    A Bipartisan Plea for US Leadership

    Against this bleak background, a bipartisan plea early in 2007 for US leadership for nuclear disarmament from four former high US officials stands out as a ray of hope. Their commentary, entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” appeared in the Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007. It was remarkable not so much for what it proposed but for who was making the proposal. It was written by four former Cold Warriors: former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn. Shultz and Kissinger served in Republican administrations, while Perry served in a Democratic administration and Nunn was a Democratic Senator from Georgia. Sixteen other former US foreign and defense policy officials also endorsed the view represented in the statement.

    The statement began by recognizing a present opportunity for diminishing nuclear dangers that will require US leadership to achieve. The authors stated: “Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. US leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage – to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”

    The authors expressed their belief in the importance of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but its decreasing relevance in a post Cold War world. They, in fact, found that Soviet-American mutually assured deterrence is “obsolete.”

    The four prominent former US officials reviewed current nuclear dangers and called for US leadership to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons. In essence, the argument leading them to this position was based on the following premises:

    1. Reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence “is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.”
    2. Terrorist groups are outside the bounds of deterrence strategy.
    3. We are entering a new nuclear era that “will be more precarious, disorienting and costly than was Cold War deterrence.”
    4. Attempting to replicate Cold War strategies of deterrence will dramatically increase the risk that nuclear weapons will be used.
    5. New nuclear weapons states lack the safeguarding and control experiences learned by the US and USSR during the Cold War.
    6. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty envisions the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
    7. Non-nuclear weapons states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.
    8. There exists an historic opportunity to eliminate nuclear weapons in the world.
    9. To realize this opportunity, bold vision and action are needed.
    10. The US must take the lead and must convince the leaders of the other nuclear weapons states to turn the goal of nuclear weapons abolition into a joint effort.

    In other words, the bipartisan group found that it was in the self-interest of the US to lead the way toward a world without nuclear weapons. They are not a group of men likely to encourage US leadership for altruistic reasons or humanitarian concerns. They were hardened Cold Warriors, willing to risk humanity’s future during the Cold War nuclear arms race, even if it meant blowing up the world, including the United States, for what they perceived as America’s security.

    The group outlined a number of steps that need to be taken to lay the groundwork for a world free of nuclear threat. They specifically called for the following:

    • de-alerting nuclear arsenals;
    • reducing the size of nuclear arsenals;
    • eliminating tactical nuclear weapons;
    • achieving Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encouraging other key states to also ratify the Treaty;
    • securing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials everywhere in the world; and
    • reducing proliferation risks by halting production of fissile materials for weapons, ceasing to use enriched uranium in civil commerce and removing weapons-usable uranium from research reactors.

    Evaluation of the Bipartisan Plea

    For individuals and organizations long committed to the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons, there is nothing new in the arguments of the former Cold Warriors. They are arguments that many civil society groups have been making for decades and with particular force since the end of the Cold War. The proposals of the former officials include many of the steps long called for by the international community such as those in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. Other former high-level US officials, such as former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and former head of the US Strategic Command General George Lee Butler, have also made such arguments.

    What is new is that these former Cold Warriors have joined together in a bipartisan spirit to publicly make these arguments to the American people. This means that the perspectives of civil society organizations working for nuclear weapons abolition are finally being embraced by key former officials who once presided over Cold War nuclear strategy.

    The bipartisan advice of Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn to abolish nuclear weapons will require a full reversal of the current Bush administration nuclear policies. The Bush administration has thumbed its nose at the other parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, behaving as though the US has been in full compliance with its obligations under that Treaty.

    If the Bush administration wants to demonstrate leadership toward nuclear weapons abolition, it could immediately take the following steps:

    • submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for ratification;
    • halt its missile defense program;
    • remove US nuclear weapons from Europe;
    • call for negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
    • negotiate with Russia to take nuclear weapons off high-alert status;
    • reach an agreement with Russia to begin implementing deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries, which Russia supports; and
    • call for a summit of leaders of all nuclear weapons states to negotiate a new treaty for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    The Bush Administration Issues Its Own Plea (for RRW)

    The Bush administration unfortunately does not seem to have been influenced by the bipartisan statement. It released a July 2007 Joint Statement by the Secretaries of Defense, State and Energy, entitled, “National Security and Nuclear Weapons: Maintaining Deterrence in the 21st Century.” The Statement begins from the perspective that nuclear weapons will be necessary to maintaining deterrence in the 21st century, although it makes no effort to indicate exactly who is being deterred. Rather, it states the perceived threat in very vague terms, “[t]he future security environment is very uncertain, and some trends are not favorable.”

    Two-thirds of the way through the Joint Statement, one discovers that it is basically a sales pitch for the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which Congress has been reluctant to embrace and fund. “To address these issues of sustainability, safety, security and reliability, and to achieve a smaller yet credible nuclear deterrent force,” the three Secretaries argue, “the United States needs to invest in the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Pursuit of this program is critical to sustaining long-term confidence in our deterrent capability….”

    Ironically, the Bush administration bases its argument for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program, which will replace every nuclear weapon in the US arsenal with a new thermonuclear weapon, on allowing the US to assure its allies, reduce its nuclear arsenal and continue the nuclear testing moratorium. Despite the fact that scientists have concluded that the current US nuclear weapon stock will remain reliable for some 100 years, the Statement actually threatens that “[d]elays on RRW also raise the prospect of having to return to underground nuclear testing to certify existing weapons.”

    Conclusion

    If the United States becomes serious about leading the way to a world free of nuclear weapons, as called for by the former Cold War officials in their bipartisan plea, it can assume a high moral and legal ground, while improving its own security and global security. Each day that goes by without US leadership for achieving a nuclear weapons-free world diminishes the prospects for the future of humanity and the US itself. There is no issue on which US leadership is more needed, and there is no issue on which the US has more to gain for its own security by asserting such leadership.

    The former Cold War officials conclude with a call to vision and action. They state: “Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.”

    These men have seen a new light, one consistent with a human future, and their statement is a fissure in the wall of Cold War security based upon deterrence and mutually assured delusions. It remains to be seen whether their combined bipartisan political clout is sufficiently hefty to move the mountain of US nuclear policy in the direction of their vision. This will depend in part upon the priority they give to this effort and to their persistence in seeking to influence policy. It is certain that one statement will not end the debate.

    In June 2007, Sam Nunn, one of the authors of the bipartisan plea, made an important speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. It was entitled, “The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” He argued that “the accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. The world is heading in a very dangerous direction.” He further stated that the dangers of nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation and accidental nuclear war can only be prevented through cooperation with Russia and China. He reiterated the call for US leadership “to take the world to the next stage.” He likened achieving nuclear abolition to reaching the top of a mountain, and set forth steps to be taken to ascend the mountain.

    Nunn quoted Ronald Reagan, who said, “We now have a weapon that can destroy the world – why don’t we recognize that threat more clearly and then come together with one aim in mind: How safely, sanely, and quickly can we rid the world of this threat to our civilization and our existence?”

    It is late in the day, but the question continues to hang in the air before us. Nunn’s answer was this: “If we want our children and grandchildren to ever see the mountaintop, our generation must begin to answer this question.”

    If we fail to address and adequately answer this question and continue with business as usual, choosing new nuclear weapons systems and continued reliance on these weapons, we tempt fate. If we lack the vision and impetus to change and lead, we will stay stuck, and eventually the mountain will explode and our cities, our countries and civilization at the base of the mountain will be destroyed. We will have failed ourselves and worse, our children and grandchildren.

    The 19th century philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer said, “All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.” The truth that if we are to have a human future the US must lead the way in abolishing nuclear weapons has been frequently ridiculed and violently opposed. The commentary by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn offers the hope that this truth may now be passing the stage of violent opposition and entering the stage of being self-evident – at least to those who stand outside the halls of power.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • Nuclear Weapons: The Narrowing North-South Divide

    “Nuclear bombs.violate everything that is humane; they alter the meaning of life. Why do we tolerate them? Why do we tolerate the men who use nuclear weapons to blackmail the entire human race?” — Arundhati Roy

    David KriegerNorth and South are approximations, reflecting both a geographic and economic divide. There is no monolithic North, nor South. There is South within North and North within South, inasmuch as in the North there exists much poverty and in the South there is a stratum enjoying great wealth in most societies. In general, though, the North tends toward industrialization, wealth, dominance and exploitation, while the South, which has a long history of domination by the North in colonial and post-colonial times, tends toward poverty, including extreme and sometimes devastating poverty. Within both South and North powerful subcultures of militarism and extremist violence have emerged that, when linked to nuclear weapons, threaten cities, countries, civilization and the future of life.

    Nuclear weapons have been primarily developed and brandished by the North, and used to threaten other countries, North and South. The South, which for the most part has lacked the technology to develop nuclear weapons, has begun to cross this technological threshold and join the North in obtaining these weapons of mass annihilation. The original nuclear weapons states – the US, Soviet Union, UK, France and China – were largely of the dominant North, although the Soviet Union had major areas of poverty and China, although geographically in the North was the exception, reflecting the poverty of the South after having been subjected to humiliating colonial domination and exploitation.

    Israel, an outpost of the North surrounded by oil-rich but underdeveloped countries of the South, surreptitiously developed a nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan, coming from a background of poverty and colonial domination, developed nuclear arsenals after it became clear that the other nuclear weapons states were intent upon indefinitely maintaining their nuclear arsenals rather than fulfilling their obligations for nuclear disarmament. Both countries were clearly on the Southern side of the economic and colonial divide, as was the final nuclear weapons state, North Korea, which is thought to have developed a small arsenal of nuclear weapons.

    The world is at a critical nuclear crossroads. In one direction lies an increasing number of nuclear weapons states and nuclear-armed terrorist organizations, a world of unfathomable danger. In the other direction, lies a nuclear weapons-free world. It is the responsibility of those of us alive today on our planet to choose in which direction we shall travel. We do not have the option of standing still, with North and South, rich and poor, dominant and exploited frozen in time and inequity. Terrorism is inherent in the possession and implicit threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country. Such state terrorism creates the possibility that extremist non-state actors, who can neither be located nor deterred, will gain possession of these weapons or the materials to make them and threaten or use nuclear weapons against even the most powerful, nuclear-armed countries.

    Hiroshima and Nagasaki as Metaphor

    The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are a metaphor for the North-South divide on nuclear weapons. The United States viewed the explosions from above. In fact, the US sent a camera crew in a separate airplane to record from the air the bombing of Hiroshima. In considering the bombings, the United States focused on technological achievement, the efficiency and power of the bomb, and bringing the war to a rapid conclusion. US politicians and opinion leaders wrapped the bomb in ribbons of mythic goodness and Americans today continue, to their own peril, to treat the bomb as a historically favorable outcome of fortune, scientific skill and determination to prevail. US President Harry Truman invoked God in his first public comment on the bomb: “We thank God that it has come to us, instead of to our enemies; and we pray that He may guide us to use it in His ways and for His purposes.” In the view of Truman and many Americans, God had delivered to the Americans a war-winning tool of dominance, perhaps absolute dominance. This was and remains the view of the North, the rich, powerful, dominant and aloof.

    The Japanese, despite the closer fit of the country with the North than the South, viewed the bomb from the uncomfortable position of being beneath it and victimized by the full fury of its force. At Hiroshima and Nagasaki, over 210,000 men, women and children were killed instantly or given short-term death sentences due to the explosive force of the bombs, the fires that were set in motion by the bombs and the deadly radiation released by the bombs. The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked without warning and the vast majority of those who perished in those destroyed cities were civilians. For more than 60 years the survivors of the atomic bombings have fought for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The memorial cenotaph at Hiroshima carries these words: “Never Again! We shall not repeat the evil.” Those who survived the bombings, the hibakusha, reflect the view of the South, the poor, powerless, dominated and exploited.

    The Metaphor of Master and Slave

    Another metaphor that is apt is that of master and slave. If nuclear weapons are instruments of absolute dominance, they create a master-slave relationship. The master doesn’t need to use the bomb to exercise his power. He only needs to make known his willingness to do so. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki etched into the minds of people everywhere the fact that the US was willing to use the bomb, should circumstances dictate. The US had proven its commitment to power by its ruthless destruction of undefended cities. It sent a message regarding its will to dominance of extraordinary clarity, intended primarily to the Soviet Union, but to people everywhere as well.

    Other states, primarily in the North, followed the US and developed their own nuclear arsenals: first, the Soviet Union, then the UK, France and China. These five states, the victors in World War II and the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, became the first five nuclear weapons states. They developed policies of mutually assured destruction (MAD), which they believed held each other’s nuclear arsenals in check. In their dangerous nuclear posturing, they placed at risk not only their own citizens but the future of life on the planet. They called this posturing deterrence, but more objectively it might have been called state-threatened nuclear terrorism.

    In every aspect of pursuing and perfecting nuclear annihilation, the nuclear weapons states have exploited the South, including the pockets of poverty within their own borders. It has been the poor and disempowered, often indigenous peoples, of the South who have paid the heaviest price in health and future habitability of their lands for the mining of uranium, the atmospheric and underground testing of nuclear weapons, and the dumping of the radioactive wastes in their backyards.

    But by the mid-1960s the nuclear weapons states, which continued to increase the size and power of their own arsenals, became worried that the world would become far more dangerous if nuclear arms spread to other countries, and particularly to countries of the South. They believed that the further proliferation of nuclear weapons would disrupt the patterns of dominance in the post-colonial relationship between the North and South that was developing with the collapse of overt colonialism.

    The Two-Tier Structure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    Thus, it was the US, UK and USSR that proposed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the mid-1960s. By 1968, the treaty was ready for signatures and the three initiating nuclear weapons states were eager to sign. The treaty required the non-nuclear weapons states to agree not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons states to agree not to provide nuclear weapons or the materials to make them to the non-nuclear weapons states. But it went further. To sweeten the deal for the non-nuclear weapons states, the nuclear weapons states agreed in Article IV to assist them with the “peaceful” uses of nuclear technology; and also agreed in Article VI to “good faith” negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    When the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970, the non-nuclear weapons states had every reason to believe that the treaty would lead to nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear weapons states, thus leveling the playing field, rather than creating a permanent two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” a structure that would assure the dominance of the North. As it turned out, the nuclear weapons states did not fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations under the treaty, and continued to build up their nuclear arsenals for two more decades before making any serious attempts to reduce them in the aftermath of the Cold War.

    Many leaders in the South recognized the spiritual bankruptcy and extreme dangers of nuclear weapons, as well as the threats to humanity posed by the Cold War nuclear arms race. States of the South, for the most part, were content to forego nuclear weapons in the interests of other forms of security. Nearly all states of the South became parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and most of the states in the Southern hemisphere entered into agreements to create regional Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones in Latin America and the Caribbean; the South Pacific; Southeast Asia; and Africa. Nearly the whole of the Southern hemisphere is now part of the series of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones that are committed to keeping nuclear weapons out of their regions. While this was going on, the nuclear weapons states turned a blind eye or, in some cases worse, assisted Israel in developing a nuclear arsenal.

    By the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a review conference of the parties took place at five year intervals and a Review and Extension Conference was scheduled for 25 years after the treaty’s entry into force. The Review and Extension Conference took place in 1995 at the United Nations headquarters in New York. The nuclear weapons states, led by the United States, pushed for an indefinite extension of the treaty to make it permanent. A few courageous states of the South and many civil society organizations took issue with this position on the grounds that the nuclear weapons states had not fulfilled their obligations for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Under such circumstances, they argued, an indefinite extension would be akin to giving these states a blank check to continue with business as usual. The opponents of an indefinite extension pressed for extensions for periods of years, in which the nuclear weapons states would be required to make progress toward achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament.

    The Indefinite Extension of the Treaty

    At the end of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the nuclear weapons states prevailed and the treaty was extended indefinitely. The nuclear weapons states reaffirmed their Article VI commitment “to pursue good faith negotiations of effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.” They also promised “determined pursuit.of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons.” But their pursuit of these goals has been far less than “determined.”

    What the opponents of the indefinite extension feared would happen, has indeed transpired. In the light of little tangible progress on nuclear disarmament or sincerity on the part of the nuclear weapons states, India and Pakistan both tested nuclear weapons in 1998, announcing that they would not live in a world of “nuclear apartheid.” India, a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, had tested what it called a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974. In 1998, India clearly crossed the line into the status of nuclear weapons state. There was cheering in the streets of India, and this would be matched by the wild excitement demonstrated in the streets of Pakistan following their nuclear tests. A very dangerous region of repeated crises and violence over the disputed territory of Kashmir had now taken on a nuclear dimension, one with the possibility of taking tens of millions, even hundreds of millions, of innocent lives.

    In the year 2000, the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty met for their sixth five-year review conference and the first since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. After much jockeying for position, the parties to the treaty agreed unanimously to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These steps included ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons states committed to an “unequivocal undertaking.to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament.” But despite the agreement of the nuclear weapons states to these and other steps for nuclear disarmament, they have accomplished almost nothing to demonstrate that their words were anything more than additional empty promises.

    At the seventh Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in the year 2005, there was virtually no progress. The delegates spent the first ten days of the meetings trying to reach agreement on an agenda, and then could only take note of the failure to make progress on any of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. Much of this failure can be attributed to a single incompetent leader in the North, George W. Bush, who has promoted new uses for nuclear weapons use while expressing implacable hostility to international law in all its forms.

    The Tragic Policies of George W. Bush

    The policies of George W. Bush have opened the door to preemptive or preventive uses of nuclear weapons, and have made clear that under his leadership US nuclear policy contemplates the use of nuclear weapons as opposed to a more limited policy of deterrence. Mr. Bush has opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and encouraged funding to reduce the time needed to make the Nevada Test Site ready for testing from three years to about 18 months. Bush also withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, despite protests from both Russia and China. In addition, Bush pushed the Russians into signing the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002, a treaty which provides for reducing the number of actively deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side from about 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. Among the many problems with this treaty are that it has no provisions for verification or irreversibility, no timetable other than the end date, and no means to continue the treaty beyond 2012, when both sides could immediately and dramatically expand their nuclear arsenals.

    In his first State of the Union speech, Mr. Bush named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” Despite the fact that the three countries formed no axis, Bush lumped them together and branded them as evil. Once a country has been tarred as evil, it is far easier to commit atrocities against its people, as Mr. Bush has demonstrated in the aggressive war he has pursued against Iraq. North Korea has withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Iran, as yet still a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been pursuing uranium enrichment, a potential step toward the development of nuclear weapons, but one that has been allowed under Article IV of the treaty and has been exercised by other non-nuclear weapons states parties to the treaty.

    In these early years of the 21st century, the North continues to find uses for nuclear weapons that threaten the countries of the South. What the countries of the North, perhaps particularly the United States, don’t seem to grasp is that nuclear weapons are likely to be their undoing in a time of non-state extremism. While it may be possible to deter another country from using nuclear weapons (this is arguably the principal reason that North Korea and Iran would pursue nuclear arsenals), it is impossible to deter a non-state terrorist organization from using nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence has its limits, and one clear limit is that a country cannot threaten or retaliate against organizations that cannot be located or whose members are suicidal. The longer the US and other nuclear weapons powers continue to rely upon nuclear weapons for their security, the greater the likelihood that these weapons will find their way into the hands of terrorist organizations intent on inflicting damage on the nuclear weapons states.

    Need for New Leadership

    Mr. Bush has embarked upon what appears to be a highly unsuccessful “Global War on Terrorism,” a war that seems to be stimulating and breeding terrorism rather than eradicating it. It is a war pitting extremists against extremists, made more dangerous by the possibility of nuclear weapons being used by the North on countries of the South, or by terrorist organizations obtaining nuclear weapons and using them in the form of a nuclear 9/11. The possibility of nuclear weapons again being used in war has perhaps not been greater since their last use at Nagasaki. The clash of fundamentalists has pushed the door to nuclear annihilation open wider than ever. Common sense and reasonable concerns for security suggest that it is time to close that door by eliminating nuclear arsenals. The leadership to do this must come from the North, particularly from the US and Russia, the most dominant of the nuclear weapons states, which together possess over 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

    Unfortunately, the leaders of the nuclear weapons states don’t appear to recognize the imperative to end the nuclear weapons era, and continue to cling to their nuclear arms as instruments of dominance. Einstein recognized early in the Nuclear Age that these new weapons required a change in thinking. He famously said, “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” That is the nature of our drift, toward catastrophe, but a catastrophe in which the likelihood of the dominant powers becoming the victims is as great as their further victimization and dominance of the South. Nuclear weapons give more power to the relatively weak than they do to the powerful. With nuclear weapons, the weak can destroy the powerful. The powerful, on the other hand, would certainly destroy their own souls by attacking the weak with nuclear weapons. In the end, nuclear weapons are equalizers and equal opportunity destroyers.

    The question that the North needs to consider seriously is whether it wishes a world with many nuclear powers, including non-state actors, or a world with no nuclear weapons. What exists between these poles, including the current nuclear status quo, is not sustainable. It must tip in one direction or the other. If it tips toward many nuclear weapons powers, the price will be widespread annihilation. If it tips in the direction of eliminating nuclear weapons, humanity may save itself from destruction by its most powerful and cowardly tools of warfare.

    In the Nuclear Age, the South has attempted to pull itself up by its bootstraps, while the North has wasted huge resources on the development of its weaponry in general and on its nuclear weaponry in particular. The United States alone has spent over $6 trillion on its nuclear arsenal and its delivery systems since the beginning of the Nuclear Age. It is worth contemplating how our world might have been different if these resources had been used instead to eradicate poverty and disease and provide education and hope in the far corners of the world. Would the North still be resented, as it is now, by the politically aware poor and dispossessed?

    In analyzing the North-South divide in nuclear weaponry, one realizes that this divide has benefited neither the North nor the South, and is bound to end in disaster for all. But the same is true of the North-South divide absent nuclear weapons. A relationship of domination, enforced by any means – military, economic or political – is not sustainable. This divide is perhaps most dangerous when it could ignite a nuclear conflagration, but it is still dangerous when the divide breeds terrorism in response to structural violence. It is not only the nuclear divide that must be ended by the elimination of nuclear weapons, but the greater divide between the North and South that must be closed. The world cannot continue indefinitely half-slave and half-free, half mired in poverty and half indulged in abundance. Resources are not limitless and modern communications make each half aware of the status of the other half.

    The Narrowing Nuclear Divide

    Nuclear weapons, the ultimate weapon of cowardice, may be seen as a symbol of what separates rather than what unites the world. Nuclear weapons turn the North into cowards and bullies and the South into victims that may most effectively find their heroism and personhood in acts of resistance. Ending the nuclear threat by eliminating nuclear weapons will lead to finding more equitable and decent ways of settling differences between states of the North and South, ways that will in the end benefit both sides of this divide.

    In 1955, Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and nine other distinguished scientists issued an appeal, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. This appeal concluded with these thoughts: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

    More than fifty years later, the warning in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto rings true. Nuclear weapons confront humankind with the risk of universal death. We are challenged, North and South alike, to end this risk to humanity and to the human future. To effectively end this risk will require that peoples of North and South to join hands and form a bond rooted in their common humanity and their common concern with protecting and passing on the planet and all its natural and man-made treasures in tact to future generations.

    The starting point for this effort, the elimination of nuclear weapons, may seem to some like a sacrifice on the part of the nuclear weapons states, but will, in fact, assure their own security as well and liberate their people from the soul-crushing burden of being complicit in threatening the massive annihilation of innocent people. The greatest challenge of our time, for North and South alike, is to eliminate nuclear weapons before they eliminate humankind and to redirect the resources being spent to create, maintain and improve these weapons to programs that will uphold human dignity by assuring that basic needs are met and education provided for all of the world’s people.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.
  • End U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Standoff by Ending Double Standards

    End U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Standoff by Ending Double Standards

    The Bush administration is being hypocritical about Iran, approaching it with very different standards than it has for Israel, India or even itself.
    If the United States expects Iran to fully adhere to the rules set forth in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then Washington should be expected to do so as well. This treaty requires the United States and other nuclear powers that are parties to the treaty to enter into good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. The United States is not doing so.

    In 1999, the US Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Bush administration has not resubmitted this treaty to the Senate. For the past five years, the US has opposed a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. In 2002, the US withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

    The Bush administration has also sought to develop new nuclear weapons — such as the “bunker buster” — and has generally thwarted negotiations leading to transparent and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

    Further, the Bush administration has indicated its intent to rely on nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. It also has made not-so-veiled threats to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.

    These policies violate the spirit if not the letter of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And they perversely encourage states such as Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear arsenals.
    Nevertheless, the Bush administration claims Iran is acting illegally under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This 1970 treaty encourages the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In Article IV of the treaty, it refers to the “inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”
    As a result, Iran argues that, as a party to the treaty, it is within its legal rights to develop a nuclear energy program, including a program that involves the enrichment of uranium. Uranium enriched to 6 percent to 8 percent U-235 may be beneficial for use in nuclear reactors for generating power. However, if uranium is enriched to higher levels of U-235 — 80 percent to 90 percent — it may be used as fissionable material in nuclear weapons.

    While Iran has begun enriching, it is nowhere near the level needed for nuclear weapons. But that possibility cannot be ruled out. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has tried for three years to find out about Iran’s nuclear program. So far, Iran has provided inadequate transparency, according to the IAEA.
    Iran has cooperated with IAEA inspectors, voluntarily subjecting its facilities to the more comprehensive inspection requirements of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA agreement. However, when the United States threatened to take the matter to the U.N. Security Council, Iran responded by ending its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol, and raising the possibility of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty altogether.
    The United States must lead by example. It must work toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The United States should seek universal standards so that all uranium enrichment for all states, including for United States and its allies, is placed under strict international control and verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Maintaining nuclear double standards under international law is not sustainable. It is just plain bad policy.

     

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Find out more at the Foundation’s website and its blog.