Tag: Pacific

  • Auckland Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

    Auckland Statement on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

    5-7 December 2018 Auckland, New Zealand

    The TPNW and the Pacific

    1. Pacific countries (Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) came together in Auckland from 5-7 December 2018 to discuss the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), to take stock of the Treaty from a regional perspective, to assess its prospects for advancing nuclear disarmament and global security, and to canvass progress toward its entry into force.

    2. The Conference took place at a time of increasing concern in the Pacific region, and globally, regarding the slow pace of progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world and the serious implications of this (including for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)) in view of the lack of progress in implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligation of Article VI.

    3. Rising tensions, the modernisation of nuclear arsenals, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts as well as on high alert postures, and threats regarding the possible use of nuclear weapons are widely seen as increasing the risk of a deliberate or accidental nuclear detonation.

    4. For its part, the Pacific is only too well aware of the catastrophic consequences of any nuclear detonation as a result of its own experience with over 300 nuclear weapon tests carried out  over  many  years  and  which  has  resulted  in  long-term humanitarian  and environmental harm to parts of the region. Efforts by Pacific countries to stop this testing; to “promote the national security of each country in the region and the common security of all”; and, so far as lies within the region’s power, to retain “the bounty and beauty of [its] land and sea”; were key factors in the adoption of the Treaty of Rarotonga in 1985 and its establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

    5. Pacific countries continued after the end of testing in the region in 1996 to show leadership in efforts to advance nuclear This reflected their awareness that all regions and peoples have a stake in international security and an important part to play in efforts to advance International Humanitarian Law and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

    6. Building on their full support for the NPT as the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament, and for other aspects of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), many Pacific countries took an active part in the Humanitarian Initiative on Nuclear Weapons with Pacific voices bearing witness to the horrors of nuclear weapon testing. Many Pacific countries were active, too, in the subsequent negotiations which resulted in the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July In this, they were giving reality to the words of the Pacific Conference of Churches that nuclear weapons “are no good for the Pacific, and no good for the world”.

    7. Five Pacific countries had already ratified the TPNW (Cook Islands, New Zealand, Palau, Samoa, and Vanuatu), and three others had signed it (Fiji, Kiribati, and Tuvalu) by the time of the convening in Auckland of the Pacific Conference.

    The Pacific Conference

    8. The Pacific Conference on the TPNW was hosted by New Zealand with an opening reception and welcome remarks given by the New Zealand Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, Deputy Prime Minister, Rt Hon Winston Noting the increasing risks which nuclear weapons entail, Minister Peters expressed his hope that the region would be as strong in its support for the TPNW as it had been for the Treaty of Rarotonga. He conveyed New Zealand’s willingness to partner with its Pacific neighbours in carrying forward priority topics identified for action in the UN Secretary-General’s recent “Agenda for Disarmament”.

    9. A “Global Youth Forum on Nuclear Disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” was held concurrently with the Conference attendees welcomed the opportunity to engage with youth participants from NZ and from the wider Pacific, as well as further afield.

    10. In a video message to the Conference at its outset, New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Rt Hon Jacinda Ardern, described the TPNW as a significant first step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. She invited Pacific countries to join together in supporting it and taking the Treaty of Rarotonga global.

    11. A statement was also delivered on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vanuatu, Hon Ralph Regenvanu, highlighting the two key issues for Pacific countries of nuclear disarmament and climate change. Pacific Island nations must “continue to work in unity against the use of nuclear weapons for our good and, most importantly, for the good of our future generations”.

    12. Keynote speaker, Beatrice Fihn – Executive Director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize laureate – conveyed ICAN’s pride in standing with Pacific nations to advance the Noting that “voices from the Pacific continue to bear witness to the horrors of nuclear weapon testing”, she attributed the awarding of the Nobel Prize in part to ICAN’s work with Pacific survivors of testing. She stressed the lack of an effective response capacity to any use of nuclear weapons, and observed that “the only way to prevent nuclear weapons from harming us is by getting rid of them – no other solution is realistic.”

    13. The participation at the Conference of representatives from Austria, Brazil, Ireland and South Africa – members of the Core Group which led the adoption of the TPNW – was welcomed by all The Conference also benefitted from presentations by colleagues from Auckland and Princeton Universities and input from the New Zealand Red Cross on behalf also of the Red Cross Movement.

    14. Participants noted that the TPNW was fully consistent with the existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime including the NPT and Equally, they emphasised the consistency of the TPNW with regional instruments, most notably the Treaty of Rarotonga, but also the recent Boe Declaration on Regional Security which reaffirms the importance of the rules-based international order founded on the UN Charter, and adherence to international law, and which outlines an expanded concept of security inclusive of human security and humanitarian assistance. It was also highlighted that the TPNW, and efforts to advance nuclear disarmament, support progress in attainment of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals, in particular SDG 16 with its focus on peace, justice and strong institutions.

    15. Conference participants accepted the clear moral and humanitarian rationale for joining the Recalling the words of a former UN Secretary-General that “there are no right hands for wrong weapons”, the advantage of the TPNW’s unambiguous prohibition of nuclear weapons was noted both in advancing disarmament and in reducing the incentive for proliferation. A number of those who had already ratified the TPNW conveyed their pride at their country’s leadership on this issue. Palau had led the way for the region, being the first to ratify the Treaty.

    16. Participants exchanged views on key provisions of the Discussion on Article 1 of the TPNW centred on the range of prohibitions which were included in that Article as well as those activities (such as military co-operation and transit) which were not prohibited. Discussion on Article 2 revealed that one country, with praise-worthy promptness, had already forwarded its declaration to the UN Secretary-General.

    17. The discussion under Article 3 highlighted the region’s commitment to meeting its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards In this regard, it was noted that almost all Pacific countries (and all attendees at the Pacific Conference) do have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in place and a considerable number have also adopted the Additional Protocol. Under the TPNW, if a State has the Additional Protocol in place at the time of entry into force of the Treaty, it must retain this as its minimum standard.

    18. Discussion on Article 7 served to emphasise the region’s strong interest in its provisions for victim assistance and environmental remediation of contaminated Access to such assistance was recognised as being of importance in the region in view of the legacy of nuclear testing.

    19. Emphasis was given to the obligation in Article 12 to promote universal adherence of all states to the Treaty.

    Next Steps on the TPNW

    20. It was recognised that the Pacific region has a role to play in adding its voice to the global effort to strengthen the norm against these inhumane weapons and to increase their In the Pacific, “we are small, but we can have a big impact.”

    21. Participants acknowledged the need to expedite the Treaty’s entry into force and lend weight to efforts to advance its A range of options were discussed for taking the TPNW forward in the region, as well as the potential to work with other regions around the world. Wider ratification in the Pacific region would be assisted by greater awareness-raising and by ensuring capacity for its implementation.

    22. In this regard, the range of offers of assistance to regional countries in moving forward with the Treaty – including from New Zealand, Core Group countries, the New Zealand Red Cross and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as by Auckland and Princeton Universities, and by ICAN – were welcomed by participants.

    23. Participants were also encouraged to make use of the existing assistance tools including the Signature and Ratification Kit for the Treaty published by the ICRC as well as the Information Kit on Signature and Ratification published by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA). Use could also be made of the recent publication entitled “The TPNW: Setting the Record Straight” produced by the Norwegian Academy of International Law, and a range of other resources.

    24. Many participants agreed to work toward signature and ratification (as applicable) of the Participants agreed to stay in close touch in the lead-up to entry into force of the TPNW and to continue to engage actively, including in all appropriate regional contexts.

  • Tone Deaf US Foreign Policy Announcements Create New Provocations in Asia

    This article originally appeared in the January 2012 newsletter of the Global Network Against Nuclear Weapons and Power in Space.


    Alice Slater


    On UN Day, at a panel on Nuclear Disarmament, Secretary General Ban-ki Moon spoke about his 2008 five point proposal for nuclear disarmament, including the requirement for negotiations to ban the bomb.  It was dismaying  when the next speaker, a retired US Air Force General, Michal Mosley, breezily assured  the audience and his fellow panelists that it certainly was now possible to rid the world of nuclear weapons, since atomic bomb technology is thoroughly out of date.  He boasted that today “we” have long range attack weapons of such “unbelievable precision and lethality” that we no longer need nuclear weapons in the US arsenal.  Our conventional weapons are ever so superior to those of any other nation.  He said this as his fellow co-panelists, the Russian and Chinese ambassadors, took in the full import of his braggadocio, to my extreme embarrassment as a US citizen.  Did the General consider for a moment the effect his words were having on the Ambassadors and the other non-US participants in the meeting?  His astonishing disregard for the effect of such provocative war talk on our fellow earth mates seems to be a major failure of our “tin ear” foreign policy.


    Hillary Clinton proclaimed a similarly tone-deaf policy in an article in November’s Foreign Affairs, “America’s Pacific Century”,    remarking that now that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were winding down, we were at a “pivot point”   and that “one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic economic, strategic and otherwise—in the Asia-Pacific region.”  Calling for “forward-deployed” diplomacy, she defined it to include “forging a broad-based military presence” in Asia…that would be “as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we have built across the Atlantic…capable of deterring provocation from the full spectrum of state and non-state actors” She added that just as our NATO alliance “has paid off many times over…the time has come to make similar investments as a Pacific power”.


    Citing our Treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand as the “fulcrum for our strategic turn to the Asian-Pacific”, she also spoke of the need to expand our relationships to include India, Indonesia Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia Vietnam, and the Pacific Island countries.  While acknowledging “fears and misperceptions that “linger on both sides of the Pacific”, stating that “some in our country see China’s progress as a threat to the United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain China’s growth” she blithely asserted, “we reject both those views …a thriving America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America”.  This said as the United States aggressively lines up a host of new nations in an expanded Pacific military alliance, providing them with missile defenses, ships, and warplanes, encircling China.   What is she thinking?


    Shortly after Clinton’s article appeared, Obama went to Australia to open up a new military base there with a token 250 US soldiers, and a promise of 2500 to come with plans for joint military training, promising that “we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region.” He also adopted the “Manila Declaration”, pledging closer military ties with the Philippines and announced the sale of 24 F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia. Clinton just paid a visit to Myanmar, long allied with China, to re-establish relations there.


    In her article’s conclusion Clinton bragged, “Our military is by far the strongest and our economy is by far the largest in the world.   Our workers are the most productive.   Our universities are renowned the world over.   So there should be no doubt that America has the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century as we did in the last.”  Didn’t anyone tell her that the number of Americans living below the official poverty line, 46.2 million people, was the highest in the 52 years the census bureau has been publishing those figures?  Or that the United States deteriorating transportation infrastructure will cost the economy more than 870,000 jobs and would suppress US economic growth by $3.1 trillion by 2020, according to the American Society of Civil Engineers?  


    The tone-deaf quality of US foreign policy pronouncements is like an infant who pulls the covers over his head to play peek-a-boo, thinking he can’t be seen so long as he can’t see out.  China has responded as would be expected.  A Pentagon report warned Congress that China was increasing its naval power and investing in high-tech weaponry to extend its reach in the Pacific and beyond. It ramped up efforts to produce anti-ship missiles to knock out aircraft carriers, improved targeting radar, expanding its fleet of nuclear-powered submarines and warships and  making advances in satellite technology and cyber warfare.   What did we expect?  And now, having provoked China to beef up its military assets, the warmongers in the US can frighten the public into supporting the next wild burgeoning arms race in the Pacific and what appears to be endless war.


    This month, Mikhail Gorbachev, in The Nation, observed the US elite’s “winner’s complex” after the end of the Cold War, and the references to the US as a “hyperpower”, capable of creating “a new kind of empire”.  He said, “[t]hinking in such terms in our time is a delusion.  No wonder that the imperial project failed and that it soon became clear that it was a mission impossible even for the United States.”  The opportunity to build a “truly new world order was lost.”  The US decision to expand NATO eastward “usurped the functions of the United Nations and thus weakened it. We are engulfed in global turmoil, “drifting in uncharted waters.  The global economic crisis of 2008 made that abundantly clear.” 


    Sadly, the powers in control of US public policy and their far-flung global allies appear to have learned nothing from the extraordinary opportunity we lost for a more peaceful world at the Cold War’s end.  We are now repeating those expansionary designs in Asia, and “thus we continue to drift towards unparalleled catastrophe” as Albert Einstein observed when we split the atom which “changed everything save man’s mode of thinking”.