Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: P5

  • Dismay at P5 Boycott of Oslo Conference

    This article was originally published by Pressenza.

    It appears that Norway’s deliberate plan to limit the focus of its conference to the “catastrophic consequences of nuclear war” in an attempt to secure the attendance of the nuclear weapons states, has failed with the five nuclear weapons states who signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (known as the P5, as they are the very same nations that have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and wield the veto power in that damaged institution) boycotting the event.

    The P5 have ganged up on the rest of the world, consulting with each other and refusing as a group to attend, according to Rose Goettemoeler, the US Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and National Security, who briefed a group of US NGOs, starting out the conversation by saying:

    “I want to talk to you about the US decision not to attend the conference, want you to know what the rationale is, we didn’t take this decision lightly.  It was made in consultation with the P5.  They all agreed not to attend.”

    Contending that a focus on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear war was a good strategy for NGOs, Goettemoeller insisted that it would be a “distraction” from the “step-by-step” approach preferred by the P5.  But the beloved “step-by-step” approach, leading to a nuclear weapons free world in an infinite number of lifetimes, has brought us the latest abomination, the modest START treaty where Obama made a deal with the weapons labs and arms merchants for $180 billion worth of three new bomb factories, at Los Alamos, Oak Ridge and Kansas City, as well as new planes, submarines and missiles, over the next ten years, to deliver their lethal nuclear payloads.

    One of the first ugly steps was the deal Clinton made in 1992 with the weapons labs when he was trying to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, where he promised $6 billion a year for new high-tech, computer-simulated nuclear bomb laboratory tests coupled with “sub-critical” tests at the Nevada test site, where plutonium is blown up with high explosives, but doesn’t have a chain reaction.

    Despite the pledge made in the Non-Proliferation Treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”, the rogue P5, are modernizing their arsenals and taking tiny baby steps leading to nowhere.  All the while the US points to the “greatest threat”, a nuclear terrorist getting a bomb or North Korea or Iran.

    Further, they appear to be tone-deaf or blind to the effect that NATO expansion and ballistic missile “offense” is having on the possibility for true nuclear disarmament where major agreements are needed between the US and Russia who have 19,000 of the 20,000 bombs on the planet.  While Goettemoeller said she is looking forward to further progress in nuclear arms cuts with Russia, she discounted Putin’s recent call to beef up its military because of NATO expansion and US missiles planted on its border, characterizing it as a grandstanding speech by Putin made at a meeting of his generals.  We need only recall what happened when the Soviet Union planted missiles in Cuba—we almost started a world war.

    The good news about Oslo is that 130 nations have agreed to attend, including India and Pakistan, two nuclear weapons states outside the NPT regime. Perhaps Asia will lead the way to a negotiated treaty to finally ban the bomb.

    Alice Slater is the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s New York Representative.

  • Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT

    Following is the text of a joint statement issued by China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States of America at the conclusion of the Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT June 27-29, 2012 in Washington, DC.

    Begin text:

    The five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or P5, met in Washington on June 27-29, 2012, in the wake of the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and to continue discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences.

    The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of working together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2011 Paris P5 Conference. In particular, the P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, continued their discussion of how to report on their relevant activities, and shared views, across all three pillars of the NPT, on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee and the intersessional period. The 2012 PrepCom outcome included issuance of a P5 statement comprehensively addressing issues in all three pillars (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/12).

    The P5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered proposals for a standard reporting form. The P5 recognize the importance of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, and the P5 will continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon final document.

    Participants received a briefing from the United States on U.S. activities at the Nevada National Security Site. This was offered with a view to demonstrate ideas for additional approaches to transparency.

    Another unilateral measure was a tour of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center located at the U.S. Department of State, where the P5 representatives have observed how the United States maintains a communications center to simultaneously implement notification regimes, including under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document.

    The P5 agreed on the work plan for a P5 working group led by China, assigned to develop a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms that will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters.

    The P5 again shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification, including information on the P5 expert level meeting hosted by the UK in April, at which the UK shared the outcomes and lessons from the UK-Norway Initiative disarmament verification research project. The P5 heard presentations on lessons learned from New START Treaty implementation, were given an overview of U.S.-UK verification work, and agreed to consider attending a follow-up P5 briefing on this work to be hosted by the United States.

    As a further follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the P5 shared their views on how to discourage abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), and how to respond to notifications made consistent with the provisions of that article. The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. The P5 agreed that states remain responsible under international law for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal.

    The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 discussed concrete proposals for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol; and the reinforcement of the IAEAs resources and capabilities for effective safeguards implementation, including verification of declarations by States.

    The P5 reiterated their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. The P5 reviewed progress in developing the CTBTs verification regime in all its aspects and efforts towards entry into force. Ways to enhance the momentum for completing the verification regime, including the on-site inspection component, were explored. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. The moratoria, though important, are not substitutes for legally binding obligations under the CTBT.

    The P5 discussed ways to advance a mutual goal of achieving a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), building on CD/1864, and exchanged perspectives on ways to break the current impasse in the CD, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD.

    The P5 remain concerned about serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime and in this connection, recalled their joint statement of May 3 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT.

    An exchange of views on how to support a successful conference in 2012 on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was continued.

    The P5 agreed to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 will follow on their discussions and hold a fourth P5 conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

  • Nuclear Deterrence Scam Blocking Progress to a Safer World

    This article was originally published on The Huffington Post.

    I recently returned home to New Zealand from attending a major conference at the United Nations in New York reviewing prospects for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Because a shaky consensus was reached, the conference has been hailed a success. However, what struck me was how detached the negotiations were from the reality of what the diplomats were haggling over.

    As a former operator of British nuclear weapons, I try to articulate this reality, and to “get up close and personal” with this desperately serious issue for humanity, most recently in Security Without Nuclear Deterrence and a New York Review of Books symposium on “Debating Nuclear Deterrence.”

    The nuclear weapon states’ blocking of any serious moves towards honoring their obligation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to get rid of their nuclear arsenals is driven by their uncritical acceptance of nuclear deterrence. Yet my carefully considered conclusion is that nuclear deterrence is a huge confidence trick – an outrageous scam cooked up fifty years ago by the US military industrial monster created by the Manhattan Project and now dominating US politics. Look at how President Barack Obama’s vision for a nuclear weapon free world, raising global expectations in his Prague speech in April last year, was quickly contradicted by his caveat that “as long as these weapons exist, we will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies…”

    In a statement on behalf of the non-governmental organization (NGO) community to delegates, I pointed out that belief in nuclear deterrence is based on a crazy premise: that nuclear war can be made less likely by deploying weapons and doctrines that make it more likely.

    A rational leader cannot make a credible nuclear threat against a nuclear adversary capable of a retaliatory strike. And a second strike is pointless, because it would be no more than posthumous revenge, in which millions of innocent people would die horribly. This is why enthusiasm for a nuclear weapon free world is incompatible with the nuclear-armed states’ copout mantra: “We’ll keep nuclear weapons for deterrence as long as anyone else has them.”

    Nuclear deterrence, like all theories, is not foolproof. It entails a hostile stand-off where, in the case of the US and Russia, each side still has over 2,000 warheads ready for launch within half an hour, over twenty years after the Cold War officially ended. What is more, they still have nearly 18,000 more nuclear warheads between them held in reserve.

    The George W. Bush administration was the first to admit nuclear deterrence would not work against terrorists, now perceived to be the greatest threat to Americans – other than the real risk of inadvertent nuclear war with Russia because nuclear deterrence dogma requires all those warheads on hair-trigger alert. As for terrorism, a nuclear “weapon” is militarily unusable, combining uniquely indiscriminate, long-term health effects, including genetic damage, from radioactivity with almost unimaginable explosive violence. In fact, it is the ultimate terror device, far worse than chemical or biological weapons, which are banned by global treaties.

    Recent research assessing a regional nuclear war involving use of just 100 warheads, each with an explosive power of 15 kilotons like the US bomb detonated over Hiroshima, on cities in India and Pakistan found that, in addition to millions of immediate casualties, smoke from fires could block enough sunlight to cause widespread famine. For all these reasons, the overwhelming majority of states feel more secure without depending on the circular logic, myths and misleading promises of nuclear deterrence – which is effectively state-sponsored nuclear terrorism.

    As in 2005, this year’s NPT Review Conference was bedevilled by two closely related issues: the nuclear programmes of Iran, which is suspected of trying to build nuclear weapons, and Israel, which has denied having them for over forty years. Intertwined with these is one of several fundamental contradictions about the NPT: its promotion of nuclear energy, which inevitably stimulates nuclear proliferation because it provides the fissile material for nuclear weapons. This, and the double standards imposed on the non-nuclear member states by the privileged five recognized nuclear-armed states, with their associated veto power in the UN Security Council, have finally reduced the NPT process to impotence.

    Perhaps the most positive outcome was a new groundswell of opinion among a large majority of the non-nuclear signatory states that the only hope of making any meaningful progress towards nuclear weapon abolition is to start a parallel process leading to a Nuclear Weapons Convention, like the ones banning chemical and biological weapons. A model treaty exists, drafted by a group of experts from the NGO community. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has been sufficiently impressed to have endorsed it as part of his five-point plan for nuclear disarmament.

    Meanwhile, in Britain a coalition government has taken power at a crucial moment for the future of British and global nuclear policy. The deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, leads the Liberal Democrats, whose election manifesto included opposition to both nuclear energy and replacing the Trident nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine force with a similar system. What is more, Clegg challenged the value to Britain of the US-UK special relationship, after the debacle of blindly following the US into Iraq and Afghanistan. Such poor decisions, driven by British nuclear dependence on the US, have left a black hole in the British defence budget, with the white elephant of a replacement Trident system increasingly vulnerable.

    Britain should take this opportunity to reassert its sovereignty, and exploit the US-UK relationship in a dramatically new way. Making a virtue from necessity, it should announce that it had decided to rescue the dysfunctional non-proliferation regime by becoming the first of the P5 to rely on more humane, lawful and effective security strategies than nuclear deterrence.

    As with the abolition of slavery, a new world role awaits the British. Such a ‘breakout’ would be sensational, transforming the nuclear disarmament debate overnight. In NATO, the UK would wield unprecedented influence in leading the drive for a non-nuclear strategy – which must happen if NATO is to survive the growing strains from overstretch in Afghanistan and confusion over a common European security policy. British leadership would create new openings for shifting the mindset in the US and France, the other two most zealous guardians of nuclear deterrence.

    The key is to see nuclear disarmament as a security-building process, moving from an outdated adversarial mindset to a co-operative one where nuclear weapons are recognized as a lethal liability.

  • The 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    The principal message from the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, which concluded on May 28, 2010, is that the nuclear weapon states are still on a Snail Plan for eliminating their nuclear arsenals – moving slowly and not recognizing the vulnerability of their thin shells.  If a sense of urgency is to be instilled in the nuclear disarmament process, the people will need to press their leaders from below. 

    At five-year intervals, the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty meet for a Review Conference.  In 1995, on the 25th anniversary of the treaty, the parties extended the treaty indefinitely, with promises from the nuclear weapon states that they would pursue “systematic and progressive efforts” for nuclear disarmament.  Five years later, in 2000, the parties to the treaty agreed upon 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament.  These included an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament….” 

    Five years later, however, the parties were deadlocked, could not agree on a Final Document, and the 2005 NPT Review Conference ended in failure.  Since that time, the US has elected a new president, one who has expressed a vision of seeking “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”  President Obama’s vision brought hope to the non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the treaty that the 2010 Review Conference would produce a positive outcome. 

    The treaty is often referred to as having three significant pillars: nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and assistance with peaceful nuclear energy.  The principal tension among the parties to the treaty is over whether the nuclear weapon states have made sufficient progress toward their nuclear disarmament obligations.

    The initial draft Report of Main Committee I (on nuclear disarmament), which was released on May 14, contained some very promising text.  It called for “the need to implement Article VI [requiring nuclear disarmament] within a timebound framework.”  It has long been a goal of the non-nuclear weapon states to achieve a timebound commitment to nuclear disarmament from the nuclear weapon states.  Further, the draft called for the nuclear weapon states to “convene consultations not later than 2011 to accelerate concrete progress on nuclear disarmament….”

    In addition, this draft contained a provision inviting the Secretary-General of the United Nations “to convene an international conference in 2014 to consider ways and means to agree on a roadmap for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe, including by means of a universal, legal instrument.” 

    These provisions raised hopes among representatives of non-nuclear weapon states and civil society organizations that real progress on nuclear disarmament would come from the NPT Review Conference.  Unfortunately, this was not to be.  The Final Document of the Review Conference requires consensus from all parties, and consensus agreements tend to result in a watering down of key provisions.  Many of the key disarmament provisions were diluted by the US, UK, France and Russia. 

    Instead of a commitment to nuclear disarmament within a timebound framework, the Final Document simply affirmed that “the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of States parties believe should include specified timelines.”  [Emphasis added.]  In fact, the belief of the majority of states was clearly overridden by the nuclear weapon states, which did not want to be bound by timelines. 

    Many of the main nuclear disarmament points in the Final Document involved no more than the conference taking note of something, without commitment.  For example, “The Conference notes the proposals for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to inter alia consider negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.”  This strong proposal by the UN Secretary-General would seem worthy of strong support rather than simply taking note. 

    Instead of committing to convene an international conference for nuclear disarmament in 2014, the Final Document called upon the nuclear weapon states only to report back on their progress in achieving a series of steps in 2014.  It further called upon the 2015 NPT Review Conference “to take stock and consider the next steps of the full implementation” of the Article VI disarmament obligation. 

    The Final Document of the Review Conference gave strong affirmation to the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  While this is in accord with the treaty provisions referring to nuclear energy as an “inalienable right,” it would increase the possibilities of nuclear materials being used for weapons – as was the case with Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa – and would thus complicate the likelihood of actually achieving nuclear disarmament. 

    One very positive outcome of the Review Conference was its endorsement of practical steps to achieve a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.  The Final Document called upon the UN Secretary-General, along with others, to convene a regional conference in 2012 for the establishment of a “Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.”

    The 2010 NPT Review Conference resulted in a reaffirmation by the nuclear weapon states of their “unequivocal undertaking to accomplish…the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”  In the end, the Final Document was largely aspirational.  It brought the parties back to where they stood in the year 2000, but provided few specific guidelines for success to measure progress in 2015.  One such measure, albeit a difficult one, will be progress toward the attainment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

    Most of the people of the world view the need to eliminate nuclear weapons, weapons capable of destroying civilization and ending most complex life on Earth, as urgent.  Clearly, though, that sense of urgency has not reached the upper levels of political authority in the nuclear weapon states.  The people throughout the world, and particularly those in the nuclear weapon states, will have to continue speaking out ever more forcibly in an attempt to move their governments to serious action.