Tag: nuclear weapons

  • Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal and the Task for the International Peace Movement

    The US Congress has passed legislation enabling the 2005 US-India nuclear deal to go forward. This deal may accelerate the nuclear arms in South Asia.

    The US Congress explicitly rejected proposals that the deal be conditional on India halting its production of fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons. This is despite the fact that the United Nations Security Council had unanimously demanded that India and Pakistan stop such production (Resolution 1172, 6 June, 1998).

    The U.S.-India deal will allow India access to the international uranium market. This will enable it to free up more of its domestic uranium for its nuclear weapons program. India could, for example, build a third weapon plutonium reactor and begin enriching uranium for weapons, as well as supply enriched uranium to fuel the nuclear submarine it has been trying to build for several decades. India could also convert one of its unsafeguarded nuclear power reactors to weapons-grade plutonium production, and generate an additional 200 kg/year of weapons-grade plutonium. This would allow India to produce an additional 40-50 weapons worth a year of weapon-grade plutonium — up from perhaps seven weapons worth a year today.

    As part of the nuclear deal, the United States also agreed to let Indian keep its nuclear fuel reprocessing plants and plutonium breeder reactor program outside safeguards. The plutonium breeder reactor that India expects to complete in 2010 would produce about 25-30 weapons worth a year of weapon-grade plutonium in its blankets. India expects to build another four such reactors in coming years.

    Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which is chaired by President Pervez Musharraf and has responsibility for its nuclear weapons policy and production, declared that “In view of the fact the [U.S.-India] agreement would enable India to produce a significant quantity of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our credible minimum deterrence requirements will be met.”

    Our task

    The international peace movement can still try to prevent this deal from triggering a major escalation in the South Asian nuclear arms race.

    For the deal to come into force, it has to be accepted unanimously by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The debate may be drawn out – the deal is supported by the United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia, while several members (including Austria, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and New Zealand) are opposed, and other countries (among them Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Finland) are divided. China has proposed that instead of an India-specific exemption from NSG rules, a criteria based approach be adopted. This presumably would open the door for the NSG to eventually consider lifting restrictions on nuclear trade with Pakistan — whose nuclear weapon and nuclear power program China has supported.

    The countries who are members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group must be urged to abide by UN Security Council Resolution 1172. They should promote an end to the production of fissile materials for weapons in South Asia as a condition for any international nuclear trade with India or Pakistan.

    A moratorium on such production could also be important in fostering negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China have all suspended production of fissile materials for weapons. India and Pakistan (along with Israel and North Korea) are continuing their production however. A complete halt to all production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons is a necessary step for nuclear disarmament.

    For more information on the US-India nuclear deal:

    Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana, “Wrong Ends, Means, and Needs: Behind the U.S. Nuclear Deal with India,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IndiaFeature.asp

    Zia Mian, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman and M.V. Ramana, “Fissile Materials in South Asia and the Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal,” http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf

    Zia Mian is a research scientist with the programme on science and global security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. He is the co-editor of Out of the Nuclear Shadow: Pakistan’s Atomic Bomb & the Search for Security (Zed Books, 2001).
  • 30 Years After ‘WarGames,’ Director John Badham Recalls His Nuclear-Brink Blockbuster

    With few exceptions, the major Hollywood movie studios have ignored the ongoing peril of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. While moviemakers can generally rely on stories about zombies, mutants and superheroes to draw today’s crowds, films that spark genuine fear for the survival of our nation and world have become rare.

    Three decades ago, however, several films depicting either circumstances leading up to a Third World War, or dire post-cataclysmic worlds, were spurring wide debate. If the late 1950s and early 1960s were the first golden age of nuclear-menace movies, including “On the Beach,” “Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb,” “Fail-Safe,” and “Seven Days in May,” 1983 and 1984 can be seen as the second such age – and, so far, the last.

    Thirty years ago, international events clearly were exacerbating the worries of people already concerned about U.S.-Soviet relations. The year 1982 had seen NATO moving ahead with plans to place new mid-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Secretary of State Alexander Haig was talking freely about “levels” of nuclear war, how such wars might be “limited,” and whether the U.S. could someday explode a nuclear bomb as a warning to scare Russian leaders during a crisis. President Ronald Reagan’s “defense modernization program” was a euphemism for a vast arms build-up seeking to add 17,000 warheads to the 25,000 that the U.S. already had. The government also had begun planning to pump much more funding into civil defense shelters.

    As tensions between the U.S. and the USSR persisted, the nuclear freeze movement hit its full stride. Protests and state and local referenda on the issue abounded. In one event, some 500,000 people gathered in New York’s Central Park in June 1982 to demand the bilateral freeze that Reagan fervently opposed.

    In theaters and on TV, anxiety over nuclear war was reflected in acclaimed movies such as “Threads” in Great Britain and “Testament” in the U.S. – both stark depictions of people suffering and dying amid nuclear fallout. The movie that reached the greatest audience was “The Day After,” a 1983 ABC-TV production watched by a record 100 million people. The program dramatized the nuclear destruction of Lawrence, Kan., and Kansas City, Mo., and shocked and depressed many – including Reagan, who supposedly was profoundly troubled by it.

    But it’s the 1983 nuclear action-adventure movie “WarGames” that probably is remembered most today as a memorable artifact of that era. The film presents the story of David Lightman (Matthew Broderick), a high school student, computer prodigy and hacker who uses a dial-up modem to play what he thinks is a computer game – only to reach a top-secret system at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The intrusion is accidental but triggers a domino effect that accelerates toward world war, as government computer experts and generals find themselves helpless to halt the “game” that NORAD’s overzealous computer has initiated on Lightman’s suggestion.

    The movie was a huge, and perhaps unexpected, summer hit, grossing $79.6 million at the box office. It earned high praise from most critics and received three Oscar nominations. It also led to new media attention to whether accidental nuclear war was more likely in a new age of easy, widespread availability of computers. In addition, for the first time for the young audiences of the ’80s, “WarGames” made vivid the implications of U.S. nuclear missiles being on high-alert: the impossibly brief amount of time that the White House, and military, have to decide if signs of an enemy attack are real or a mistake.

    To mark the 30th-anniversary year of “WarGames,” NAPF talked to John Badham, the film’s director. Badham (also known for his direction of the 1977 iconic disco movie “Saturday Night Fever”), was brought in by MGM/United Artists early in the film’s production to replace another director. Badham’s decision to mix the right amounts of humor, action and teen romance into the film is now credited with making it a smash hit – without sacrificing a serious moral about the futility of war and a nightmarish quality of dread that persists throughout.

    The following is an edited version of the conversation.

    KAZEL: I’ve been watching nuclear-war-related movies from the early ’60s and late ’50s, and the ’80s, and it seems a lot of the directors and producers who did those projects went into them with strong political views about the arms race. I know that Stanley Kubrick was deeply troubled about nuclear war, and Sidney Lumet was worried about it – and so were several of the actors who did [Lumet’s] Fail-Safe. Do you remember having any strong feelings about the topic before you were asked to directWarGames?

    BADHAM: It was a time, going of course back to the middle 1940s, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that even as a real youngster you became aware of the power of nuclear weapons and the frightening danger of them. In my grammar school, and this is late 1940s, we were having nuclear-war drills, as silly as they were – duck-and-cover and all that. It was very much on our minds. It was an environment setting up for the McCarthy business in the 1950s and that kind of paranoia. It’s always interesting that it takes a while for those kinds of worries to emerge in the popular media, in the form of Strangelove and Fail-Safe. Were they not almost the same year?

    KAZEL: Yes, Fail-Safe came out just a few months after Strangelove[in 1964].

    BADHAM: Right. Strangelove was such a definitive piece, but then along comes Lumet with a much darker take on it, in a way, because it was so serious. There was no laughing allowed (laughs) in the theater for Fail-Safe.

    KAZEL: I’ve read your stepfather retired as a brigadier general in the Air Force. He served in both World War I and II?

    BADHAM: He learned to fly in WWI.

    KAZEL: Did you also serve in the military?

    BADHAM: I did. I was in the Air Force from 1964 to 1970, some active duty and some National Guard – California National Guard.

    KAZEL: Did you actually fly?

    BADHAM: No, I was a medic. My father was all for me going to Officer Candidate School, and so on. But I had other thoughts – directing theater and directing movies. I think for a brief while I disappointed him until he started coming to my sets and saying, “Well, I guess the kid may survive after all.”

    KAZEL: So, you’ve said before that Dr. Strangelove is one of your favorite movies. I was wondering what made it such a great film to you, and also what you thought of Kubrick’s decision to make it a very funny, black comedy instead of his original idea to do it as a serious suspense film.

    BADHAM: Was that his original idea?

    KAZEL: Yes, then he rewrote the script.

    BADHAM: Well, once you got involved in the casting of Peter Sellers, that starts to twist it right there. You know, it [farce] is almost unavoidable. But, it certainly happens with films. My friend, the late Frank Pierson, who wrote the screenplay for Cat Ballou, said that what he was given to rewrite was a very serious piece. A serious Western. He kept going to the producers and saying, “Guys, it keeps coming out funny. I don’t know what to tell you.” Maybe they [the writers of Dr. Strangelove] started to think it was more accessible and less grim if they were to approach it in this way – that they would get the message across clearly without totally alienating an audience. As interesting as Fail-Safe is, it’s a tough one to take.

    KAZEL: You have said before that you really disliked Fail-Safe, actually.

    BADHAM: The reality of it is so heavy. It’s hard to enjoy that movie. (Laughs.) I don’t dislike it  — you know, Sidney Lumet doesn’t do anything that you can really dislike. But the tone of it can sometimes be a downer.

    KAZEL: Leonard Goldberg [producer of WarGames] said the idea, the goal of WarGamesfrom the start was just to create entertainment. In fact, as you know, when the script was first developed, it wasn’t even about nuclear war. It was just about a kid who was a genius. I think the title was “The Genius.”

    BADHAM: That’s right.

    KAZEL: When you were making the film, did you have any political goals in mind?

    BADHAM: I’m one of those people who believe you tell the story, not the message. The old Broadway saying is, if you want to send a message, use Western Union. Now, I guess you could tweet it. (Laughs.) Walter Kerr, the drama critic for the Times, used to say, “They sold the play for a pot of message” – you know, a funny old Biblical reference. So, the message comes out of the subject matter. In this particular case, we’re talking about a very strong character of a little boy who starts in playfully, playing [computer] games and gets in way over his head. Out of it…you begin to see the other terrifying possibilities as we continue to automate our [military] system.

    But a strong story about a character is what caught my attention, and that led you to something else entirely – which was made very accessible by the playfulness of this little boy and the almost black-comic situation he found himself in. There’s certainly a lot of influence from Dr. Strangelove coming to me, though I tried not to think about it while I was doing WarGames because that was not a place to go. But certainly the humor that’s sprinkled liberally throughout comes from the perception that as frightening as this is, it’s also kind of funny.

    [Under the original director] they were treating it, in every scene I saw, in the tone of Fail-Safe. The actors, the lighting, the direction – it was extremely dark. The Matthew Broderick character was seen as a dark, rebellious kid lurking up in his room doing God-knows-what. I said to Leonard [Goldberg], if I could do that in high school – show a girl how I could change her grade [using a home computer], I would be peeing in my pants with excitement. I mean, good God, could you imagine how terrific that would be? You’d feel just on top of the world.

    I took the script and changed the character of The General [commander of NORAD] to someone who had a great, funny Southern sense of humor, based a lot on my father.

    KAZEL: To me, it seems a strong difference between what you did, and what Kubrick did, is you didn’t want to make the military or the government officials seem like idiots or clowns, or crazy. Some of the adults in your movie were eccentric or strange, but they were very earnestly trying to prevent World War III – something that the kid had started.

    BADHAM: I think it’s easy to kind of write off the danger when you’re looking at people who are being portrayed as idiots. As much as I love Peter Sellers’ portrayal of the crazy scientist in the wheelchair with the arm that won’t behave, you have a tendency to write them off. A lot of what WarGames is talking about is technology taking over on us, and even though we may have good intentions and are trying to do our best, it could bulldoze us.

    Of course we see evidence of this all the time. Larry Lasker and Walter Parkes, the screenwriters, and I, started talking back in those early days about the possibilities of cyber war, and what could happen if what was then innocent hacking became really serious stuff. Of course, that’s what we’re watching now. I don’t think we were prescient. I just think we were letting our imaginations say, “Where could this go to?”

    KAZEL: Even though the movie seems dated in some ways, as you’re saying, in other ways — the threat of cyber warfare and the idea that unauthorized people could tap into a nuclear defense system — seems even more possible now than in the ‘80s.

    BADHAM: Right. We’re seeing it. Our government’s going in and messing with Iran’s system. The Chinese government is coming in and tapping the New York Times’ addresses. It is sort of spooky. We’re in that age. Information is just flying everywhere, with nobody able to control it the way they’d like to control it.

    KAZEL:  Do you think that your film appeals to audiences of today? Can young people take something away from it?

    BADHAM: Well, yes. It’s still very appealing to young film watchers because of the characters they can relate to. Once they get past the ancient, dated [home computer] equipment…it’s still fun for them to relate to it. At the end, I think, as you see what could catastrophically go wrong, it’s as clear as a bell.

    KAZEL: The nuclear freeze movement was reaching its height right around the time that the movie came out. Do you think the context of what was happening in the world had a lot to do with drawing people to see WarGames, or would it have been popular with a youthful audience regardless of the events of the time?

    BADHAM: I think the concept was just appealing. We’re talking about a 16-year-old boy who suddenly breaks into NORAD and almost starts [a war]? And, a very appealing young character. You know, the movie was in the Top 10 of the year, I think, and yet there’s not a star in it. Dabney Coleman was our big name. (Laughs.) And advertising was not necessarily great. There was just something about the package that seemed like this would be fun. People don’t really want to go to the theater to be lectured to, or frightened in a real way. They like to be frightened by Jaws because they’re not going in the water. … We were walking a fine line in that movie between how threatening and frightening would we make it.

    KAZEL: Do you think a movie such as WarGames – about the danger of nuclear war, and deterrence theory, games theory – could be made today? Would there be any audience, or would studios be interested in it?

    BADHAM: Well, at the time, nobody wanted to make WarGames. Leonard [Goldberg] managed to get it set up with United Artists…. It was tough to make, and the attitude of the studios was, “It’s about some kid with a computer, and who believes that?” Nobody got it. And yet, lots of imitations came out – lots of films trying to copy it afterwards, about kid geniuses running around.

    KAZEL: Is it your impression that your film changed the way any leaders thought about nuclear weapons? It seems President Reagan may have thought that the movie was, in some ways, factual. Reagan biographer Lou Cannon has written that Ronald and Nancy Reagan screened the film before its release, and at a meeting with some Democratic congressmen to talk about the MX missile, he put aside his notes and started talking in a very excited way about WarGames and how it showed that a kid with a computer could break into NORAD.

    BADHAM: Well, he certainly had a history, as an actor, of being able to suspend his disbelief and think about the possibilities: Could this happen and wouldn’t it be interesting? People have told me that maybe the Star Wars [strategic missile defense] initiative was bolstered by his seeing WarGames. … It definitely got some people thinking about it. I know we did a running in Washington that I attended, at the Motion Picture Association, where Dr. Helen Caldicott, who ran [Physicians for Social Responsibility] and Sen. Alan Cranston came. There definitely was an effort on MGM and United Artists’ part to get politicians aware of the film.

    KAZEL: I think many people who saw WarGames when they were young still have strong memories of it. Also, there’s a page on Facebook dedicated to the movie, and a lot of people post messages saying they’ve discovered it for the first time and that it’s one of their favorite films. When you were making it, did you have any clue it would endure as long as it has?

    BADHAM: Quite honestly, I don’t think about things like that. I can only judge my initial reaction, which on reading that script was a very powerful reaction to the characters and the situation they found themselves in. A similar thing happened to me with Saturday Night Fever. I just loved that script. I had an amazingly strong reaction to it. Other people did not. Studio executives just dismissed it as a little movie. People asked me afterward, did I know that Saturday Night Fever was going to be this giant hit? No, I didn’t know. I just knew I really liked it and thank goodness, for once, my taste and the public’s tastes were in sync.

    KAZEL: For WarGames, could a movie of its type have had anything other than a happy ending? At the end, everyone is smiling and hugging and the NORAD officers are throwing papers into the air. The final music is very lighthearted and breezy. There was very little criticism of the movie, but some critics have said there wasn’t even a glimmer of anything menacing at the end, or that nuclear weapons were still a huge danger.

    BADHAM: That was definitely the ending that everybody wanted. I did not have a good idea at the time of [implying] that there is still something lurking in the background, that [the risks] haven’t gone away, as a little dangling thing to put out there. We were under the gun in delivering this to the theaters because it had been promised and we had started late. So we flew through post-production, and everybody was very happy with that kind of ending – though I absolutely understand what you’re telling me, and that criticism is very fair. It might have added a whole layer of extra texture and meaning to the film.

    KAZEL: They [studio executives] wanted it entertaining instead of dark because the demographics of theater audiences had changed since the days of Fail-Safe?

    BADHAM: Yeah. You can look at Fail-Safe and say, that really didn’t go anywhere. People who liked films, maybe, saw it. Here [with WarGames, we said,] “We’re going to spend a lot of money on a dodgy subject. Let’s at least make it entertaining.”

    Badham, 73, now teaches would-be directors in the film program at Chapman University in Orange, Calif. Historically, he says, he’s refused to read critics’ reviews of his films, good or bad, so he was unaware that Chicago Tribune movie maven, the late Gene Siskel, in 1983 wrote glowingly of his nuclear-brink hit. “Who is to say that WarGames won’t have the same connection to this generation of moviegoers that the wicked burlesque of Strangelove had to a generation earlier,” Siskel asked. In particular, the critic lauded the film’s spotlight on the growing role of computers in military systems, writing that “we have come to trust our computers more than ourselves, thus allowing our own personal responsibility for the future to be taken out of our hands and placed on autopilot.”

    In WarGames, the teenage protagonist finds that no one understands or appreciates hackers, who haven’t appeared on the country’s radar screens yet. He’s arrested by the FBI, which accuses him of espionage. Much has changed. Today, the government is giving young hackers jobs. According to Fast Company magazine, the Pentagon believes cyber attacks on U.S. computer networks soared 17-fold between 2009 and 2011. Last year, the National Security Agency said it was supplying government-designed curriculums to four U.S. universities so that college computer hackers can be fast-tracked into cyber-security jobs, not only at the NSA but at such places as the CIA and nuclear weapons labs.

    The curriculum recommended by NSA would be right at home on David Lightman’s bookshelf: Applied Cryptography, The Basics of Hacking and Penetration Testing, Practical Malware Analysis.

    At one of the colleges that have adopted the coursework, the government-run Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., cyber-warfare students also take part in a special 11-week project: War games.

    Robert Kazel is a Chicago-based freelance writer and was a participant in the 2012 NAPF Peace Leadership Workshop.
  • Compassion, Wisdom and Courage: Building a Global Society of Peace and Creative Coexistence

    To download the full 2013 Peace Proposal, click here.

    Synopsis

    Efforts are currently under way to define a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with a target date of 2030. As we debate these goals, we must face head-on the underlying ailments of human civilization in order to ensure that efforts to improve the human condition are more than mere stopgap measures—that they enable people struggling in the face of dire threats to recover the hope and strength needed to lead lives of dignity.

    For this we need a spiritual framework that will bring into greater clarity those things we cannot afford to ignore, while ensuring that all that we do contributes to the larger objective of a global society of peace and creative coexistence.

    If we picture such a society as an edifice, the ideals of human rights and human security are key pillars that hold it up, while the foundation on which these rest is respect for the dignity of life. For this to be a meaningful and robust support for other endeavors, it must be felt and experienced palpably as a way of life.

    To this end, I would like to propose the following three commitments as guidelines for action:

    • The determination to share the joys and sufferings of others
    • Faith in the limitless possibilities of life
    • The vow to defend and celebrate diversity

    I believe that the social mission of religion in the twenty-first century must be to bring people together in an ethos of reverence for life’s inherent dignity and worth.

    One pressing threat to the dignity of far too many people in our world today is poverty. The pervasive stress of economic deprivation is compounded when people feel that their very existence is disregarded, becoming alienated and being deprived of a meaningful role and place within society. This underlies the need for a socially inclusive approach focused on the restoration of a sense of connection with others and of purpose in life.

    Regardless of circumstance, all people inherently possess a life-state of ultimate dignity and are in this sense fundamentally equal and endowed with limitless possibilities. When we awaken to our original worth and determine to change present realities, we become a source of hope for others. Such a perspective is, I believe, valuable not only for the challenges of constructing a culture of human rights, but also for realizing a sustainable society.

    To forestall the further fissuring of society and enable a culture of peace to take root in the world, dialogue based on the celebration of our diversity is indispensable.

    Outlawing nuclear weapons as inhumane

    There has been a growing movement to outlaw nuclear weapons based on the premise that they are inhumane. It is my strong hope that an expanding core of NGOs and governments supporting this position will initiate the process of drafting a treaty to outlaw these weapons in light of their inhumane nature.

    Japan, as a country that has experienced nuclear attack, should play a leading role in the realization of a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). Further, it should undertake the kind of confidence-building measures that are a necessary predicate to the establishment of a Northeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and to creating the conditions for the global abolition of nuclear weapons.

    The SGI’s efforts to grapple with the nuclear weapons issue are based on the recognition that the very existence of these weapons represents the ultimate negation of the dignity of life. At the same time, nuclear weapons serve as a prism through which to perceive new perspectives on ecological integrity, economic development and human rights. This in turn helps us identify the elements that will shape the contours of a new, sustainable society, one in which all people can live in dignity.

    Toward this end, I would like to make three concrete proposals:

    • Making disarmament a key theme of the Sustainable Development Goals. Halving world military expenditures relative to 2010 levels and abolishing nuclear weapons and all other weapons judged inhumane under international law should be included as targets for achievement by the year 2030.
    • Initiating the negotiation process of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The international community should engage in active debate to broadly shape international public opinion, with the goal of agreement on an initial draft by 2015.
    • Holding an expanded summit for a nuclear-weapon-free world. The G8 Summit in 2015, the seventieth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would be an appropriate opportunity for such a summit.

    Fostering a culture of human rights

    To enhance United Nations efforts to promote a culture of human rights, I propose that the promotion of human rights be a central element of the SDGs for the year 2030, including the following two specific targets.

    Every country should set up a Social Protection Floor (SPF) to ensure that those who are suffering from extreme poverty are able to regain a sense of dignity. Some thirty developing countries have in fact already started implementing plans for minimum income and livelihood guarantees. Such guarantees are a necessary condition for sustainability and a culture of human rights.

    Every society should promote human rights education and training. Alongside the legal system of guarantees and remedies, efforts to raise awareness of human rights through education and training could serve as a catalyst for the social interaction and support that provides a sense of connection and helps people regain hope and dignity. Regional centers for human rights education and training could be established within the framework of the United Nations University, along the lines of the centers currently promoting education for sustainable development.

    Today’s children will inevitably play a crucial role in the work of constructing a culture of human rights. To protect them and improve the conditions under which they live, it is crucial that all countries ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols, and pass the domestic legislation needed to fulfill the treaty obligations.

    Strengthening Sino-Japanese relations

    Improving relations between China and Japan—currently said to be at their worst since World War II—is an essential element in building a global society of peace and coexistence.

    Political and economic relations between these two countries are constantly impacted by the ebb and flow of the times. This is why, faced with a crisis, it is important to adamantly uphold the two central pledges in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (1978): To refrain from the use or threat of force, and not to seek regional hegemony.

    I urge Japan and China to set up a high-level forum for dialogue aimed at preventing any worsening of the situation. Its first order of business should be to institute a moratorium on all actions that could be construed as provocative. This should be followed by an analysis of the steps by which the confrontation evolved in order to facilitate the development of guidelines for more effective responses to future crises.

    I suggest that Japan and China institute the practice of holding regular summit meetings, similar to those established through the Élysée Treaty that regularly brought together French and German Heads of State and Government. I further propose that Japan and China together launch an organization for environmental cooperation in East Asia. This would help lay the foundations of a new partnership focused on peace and creative coexistence and joint action for the sake of humanity.

    The key to realizing all these goals ultimately lies in the solidarity of ordinary citizens. The year 2030 serves as a major goal in the effort to promote cooperation in the international community, and will also mark the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Soka Gakkai. Working with all those committed to a global society of peace and creative coexistence, we will continue to foster solidarity among the world’s people as we look ahead to that significant milestone.

    Daisaku Ikeda is President of Soka Gakkai International.
  • Abolishing Nuclear Arms: It Can Be Done

    This article was originally published on CNN Opinion

     

    When President Obama called for a world free of nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic, this spring, many dismissed this part of his speech as idealistic rhetoric.

    But the abolition of nuclear weapons is not an unrealistic fantasy. It is a practical necessity if the American people are to have a secure future. President Obama should use his Nobel speech this week to reaffirm his commitment to this essential and obtainable goal.

    It is essential because a world armed with nuclear weapons is simply too dangerous for us to countenance. Since the end of the Cold War we have tended to act as though the threat of nuclear war had gone away. It hasn’t. It is only our awareness of this danger that has faded. In fact, there are some 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world today; 95 percent of them are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia.

    Just this past weekend, the START treaty limiting the number of U.S. and Russian warheads expired. Negotiators in Geneva, Switzerland, have not yet been able to work out the details of a follow-up treaty.

    We must hope they will be able to agree to deep reductions. A recent study by Physicians for Social Responsibility showed that if only 300 of the weapons in the Russian arsenal attacked targets in American cities, 90 million people would die in the first half hour. A comparable U.S. attack on Russia would produce similar devastation.

    Further, these attacks would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which the rest of the population depends for survival. In the ensuing months the vast majority of people who survived the initial attacks in both countries would die of disease, exposure and starvation.

    The destruction of the United States and Russia would be only part of the story. An attack of this magnitude would lift millions of tons of soot and dust into the upper levels of the atmosphere, blocking out sunlight and dropping temperatures across the globe.

    In fact, if the entire Russian and U.S. strategic arsenals were involved in the fighting, average surface temperature worldwide would fall 10 degrees Centigrade to levels not seen on Earth since the depth of the last ice age 18,000 years ago.

    For three years there would not be a single day in the Northern Hemisphere free of frost. Agriculture would stop, ecosystems would collapse and many species, perhaps even our own, would become extinct. This is not just some theoretical scenario; it is a real and present danger.

    On January 25, 1995, we came within minutes of nuclear war when Russian military radar mistook a Norwegian-U.S. scientific rocket for a possible attack on Moscow. President Yeltsin, a man reportedly suffering from alcoholism and other major medical problems, was notified and given five minutes to decide how to respond.

    Then as now, both the United States and Russia maintained a policy of “launch on warning,” authorizing the launch of nuclear missiles when an enemy attack is believed to be under way. We don’t know exactly what happened in the Kremlin that morning, but someone decided not to launch Russian missiles and we did not have a nuclear war.

    January 25, 1995, was five years after the end of the Cold War. There were no unusual crises anywhere in the world that day. It was a relatively good day in a time much less dangerous than our own. And we almost blew up the world. That was 15 years ago and the United States and Russia still maintain more than 2,000 warheads on high alert ready to be launched in 15 minutes and to destroy each other’s cities 30 minutes later.

    Nuclear weapons are the only military threat from which U.S. armed forces cannot protect us. It is urgently in our national security interest to eliminate these instruments of mass annihilation from the arsenals of potential adversaries. If we have to get rid of our own nuclear weapons to achieve this, it is a deal well worth making.

    Make no mistake, the elimination of nuclear weapons is an attainable goal. These bombs are not some force of nature. They are the work of our hand. We built them and we can take them apart.

    Some governments falsely see these weapons as safeguards of their security. It will not be easy to convince them that true safety requires that we abolish them. Nor will it be easy to design the verification regime needed to assure that the weapons are dismantled and that no new weapons are built. Yet national security experts in the United States and around the world say that it can be done and it must be done.

    If politics is the art of the possible, then statesmanship is the art of the necessary. And if ever there was a time that cried out for statesmanship it is now.

    There are many important issues that demand our attention — health care reform, energy policy, creating more jobs — but none is as urgent as eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

    Ira Helfand, MD, is a past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, the U.S. affiliate of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.
  • Is the Obama Administration Abandoning Its Commitment to a Nuclear-Free World?

    This article was originally published by the History News Network.

    In a major address in Prague on April 5, 2009, the newly-elected U.S. President, Barack Obama, proclaimed “clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”  On January 24, 2013, however, Senator John Kerry, speaking at Senate confirmation hearings on his nomination to become U.S. secretary of state, declared that a nuclear weapons-free world was no more than “an aspiration,” adding that “we’ll be lucky if we get there in however many centuries.”  Has there been a change in Obama administration policy over the past four years?

    There are certainly indications that this might be the case.

    During the 2008 presidential election campaign, Obama made his support for nuclear weapons abolition quite clear on a number of occasions, most notably in Berlin.  Speaking on July 24 before a vast, enthusiastic crowd, the Democratic presidential candidate promised to “make the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy.”  He argued that “this is the moment to secure the peace of the world without nuclear weapons.”

    Obama certainly seemed to follow through with this program during his first year in office.  His Prague speech of April 5, 2009 — the first major foreign policy address he delivered as president — was devoted entirely to building a nuclear weapons-free world.  In September of 2009 he became the first American president in history to chair a meeting of the UN Security Council — one dealing with nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.  The upshot was unanimous Security Council support for Resolution 1887, which backed the goal of nuclear abolition and an action plan to reduce nuclear dangers.  Obama’s promotion of a nuclear weapons-free world played a key role in the announcement that October that he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize.

    The anti-nuclear momentum, however, slowed somewhat in 2010.  In April of that year, the White House released its Nuclear Posture Review, which did reorient U.S. policy toward less reliance on nuclear weapons.  But the policy shifts were fairly minor and smaller than anticipated.   Soon thereafter, the U.S. and Soviet governments announced the signing of the New START treaty, which set lower limits on the number of deployed nuclear warheads and deployed delivery systems for the two nations.  Although the U.S. Senate ratified New START by a vote of 71 to 26, the reductions in all types of nuclear weapons held by the United States and Russia were actually rather modest.  Consequently, the two nations continued to possess about 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.

    Much worse, from the standpoint of nuclear disarmers, was the fact that strong Republican opposition to the treaty led to an Obama administration retreat on the issue of building a nuclear-free world.  The most obvious indication was the White House pledge to provide roughly $214 billion over the next decade for modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and infrastructure.  Apparently offered in an attempt to buy GOP support for the treaty, this pledge set the U.S. government on a course that totally contradicted its talk of disarmament.  In addition, the administration withdrew plans to submit the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996) for Senate ratification, did not even begin negotiations for further nuclear arms reductions with Russia, and — with the exception of mobilizing other nations against the possibility of Iran joining the nuclear club — let nuclear arms control and disarmament vanish from the policy agenda.  In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked dismissively that a nuclear weapons-free world would be attained “in some century.”  President Obama’s January 2013 inaugural address did not discuss a nuclear-free world, or even specific arms control and disarmament measures.

    The hearings on Senator Kerry are revealing.  As the Republicans were eager to have him leave the Senate and open up his seat for a Republican (then presumably former Senator Scott Brown), Kerry had a very easy time of it, and used his newfound popularity to defend the more controversial Chuck Hagel, the administration’s nominee for secretary of defense.  When the Republicans raised the issue of Hagel’s support for Global Zero, a group advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons, Kerry responded that he did not believe Hagel wanted to completely eliminate them.  Kerry added that, personally, he favored a policy of nuclear deterrence and believed that “we have to maintain” the U.S. nuclear stockpile.  “We have to be realistic about it,” Kerry explained, “and I think Senator Hagel is realistic about it.”  Kerry’s remarks about the “many centuries” it would take to eliminate nuclear weapons emerged in this context.

    Of course, actions can speak much louder than words.  Kerry’s remarks might represent no more than soothing pabulum for GOP hawks.  The real test of the Obama administration’s commitment to a nuclear-free world will be its actions in the coming years.  Will it reduce expenditures for modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons and facilities, promote Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiate a treaty with Russia for deeper weapons reductions, and take actions that do not require Senate ratification (for example, join with Russia to remove nuclear weapons from high alert status)?  Above all, will it begin to negotiate a treaty for the verifiable, worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons?  We shall see.

    In the meantime, people interested in removing the dangers posed by over 17,000 nuclear weapons around the globe might want to press the administration to honor its commitment to seek a nuclear-free world.

    Dr. Lawrence Wittner (http://lawrenceswittner.com) is Professor of History emeritus at SUNY/Albany. His latest book is Working for Peace and Justice: Memoirs of an Activist Intellectual (University of Tennessee Press).
  • The Man in the TNT Vest

    This article was originally published at the Nuclear Risk website

    Imagine a man wearing a TNT vest were to come into the room and, before you could escape, managed to tell you that he wasn’t a suicide bomber. He didn’t have the button to set off the explosives. Rather, there were two buttons in very safe hands. One was with President Obama and the other was with President Medvedev, so there was nothing to worry about. You’d still get out of that room as fast as you can!

    Just because we can’t see the nuclear weapons controlled by those two buttons, why do we stay in this room? As we would if confronted by the man in the TNT vest, we need to be plotting a rapid escape. Instead, we have sat here complacently for roughly 50 years, trusting that because Earth’s explosive vest hasn’t yet gone off, it never will.

    Before society will look for an escape route, we have to overcome its mistaken belief that threatening to destroy the world is somehow risk free. Changing societal thinking is a huge task, but as with achieving the seemingly impossible goals of ending slavery and getting women the vote, the first step in correcting this misperception is for courageous individuals to speak the truth: The nuclear emperor has no clothes — except for that stupid vest!

    You have an advantage that the abolitionists and the suffragettes did not. You can propagate the needed message to all your friends merely by emailing them a link to this page http://nuclearrisk.org/email21.php, or whatever you think would be most effective. While communicating with friends may seem trivial compared to the immense task we face, as explained in the resource section below, at this early stage of the process it is the essential action. I hope you will consider doing that, so that Earth’s explosive vest can become but a distant nightmare to future generations.

     

    Illustration is ©2009 NewsArt.com

    Martin E. Hellman is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and Professor Emeritus at Stanford University. His current project applies risk analysis to nuclear deterrence, and is described in detail at NuclearRisk.org.
  • Indefensible: David Krieger on the Continuing Threat of Nuclear Weapons

    This article was originally published by The Sun Magazine.

    In 1963 the prospect of war was on many Americans’ minds. The U.S. was increasing its military presence in South Vietnam and had come to the brink of a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union a year earlier, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. David Krieger was fresh out of Occidental College with a degree in psychology. Wanting to experience a foreign culture, he traveled to Japan, where he visited the sites of the World War II atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The experience left an indelible impression on the future nuclear-disarmament activist. “In the U.S. we viewed the bomb as a technological achievement that shortened the war,” he says. “The Japanese, however, viewed the atomic bombings as humanitarian catastrophes. It brought home to me the ways in which our government — perhaps any government — develops a narrative to justify its actions.”

    After he returned to the States in 1964, Krieger was drafted into the army and got permission to join the reserves so that he could attend graduate school at the University of Hawaii. In 1968, having earned his PhD in political science, he was called to active duty, and a year later he was ordered to Vietnam. Convinced that the war was immoral and illegal, he applied for conscientious-objector status. When his application was denied, Krieger sued in federal court and won. It was another turning point for him. He’d learned that one could successfully challenge powerful institutions, even the U.S. government.

    Krieger went on to become a professor and to work for think tanks and international organizations that supported nuclear disarmament. He also earned a law degree from the Santa Barbara College of Law in California and served as a temporary judge for the Santa Barbara County courts. In 1982 he cofounded and became president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), where he has remained for thirty years, working for a world free of nuclear weapons. The organization currently has fifty-six thousand members, and Krieger has appeared on cnn and msnbc and is a frequent contributor to national print media. He is the author or editor of more than twenty books, most recently The Path to Zero: Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers, coauthored with Richard Falk.

    Although Krieger has opposed nuclear weapons primarily through educational and advocacy efforts, in February 2012 he was arrested — along with his wife, Carolee, Daniel Ellsberg, Cindy Sheehan, Father Louis Vitale, and ten other activists — for engaging in civil resistance at a test of the Minuteman iii nuclear-missile system at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Asked how he felt after his arrest, Krieger said, “Exhilarated.”

    For this interview Krieger met with me at his office in a converted two-story Victorian house on a tree-shaded street in downtown Santa Barbara. In person he is disarmingly calm, even-tempered, and optimistic. Though he views current U.S. policy as a threat to humanity’s future, he reveals no bitterness, anger, or haste. He is engaged in this struggle for the long haul and believes that most people, once they understand the dangers, will join him.

    Goodman: How many nuclear weapons are there in the world today?

    Krieger: Far too many. Nine countries have a total of almost twenty thousand nuclear weapons. More than 90 percent are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. The remaining weapons are divided among the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

    The U.S. has far more nuclear weapons deployed — 1,800 — than there are reasonable targets, especially considering that Russia is more than nominally our friend and China is one of our major trading partners. And we retain thousands more in reserve.

    Goodman: Why so many?

    Krieger: You’d have to ask the U.S. government, which has been reluctant to commit to a nuclear-weapons ban because it has found the arms useful for imposing its will on other nations. We can threaten, “Do as we say, or else.” I see this as an extraordinarily dangerous gambit, however, as we may be challenged to make good on our threat. The potential consequences of using nuclear weapons are so horrendous that any risk of their use is too high.

    Goodman: The number of nuclear weapons has fallen from a peak of seventy thousand in 1986. Are the numbers still going down?

    Krieger: Yes, they are still going down. The world has shed fifty thousand nuclear weapons since the 1980s. That’s a terrific accomplishment. But it’s not enough, especially given that the U.S. and its nato allies made no commitment to further nuclear-arsenal reductions when they met in 2012. And nato reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear weapons at its 2012 summit in Chicago.

    The only number that is truly significant is zero, and, more than twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the nuclear-armed countries still have no real plan to get there.

    Gandhi, when asked about the U.S. using nuclear weapons against Japan, said that we could see the effect on the cities that were destroyed, but it was too soon to know what effect the bomb would have on the soul of the nation that used it. In many respects the soul of America has been compromised. We can’t go on developing ever more powerful weapons indefinitely. Those of us born at the onset of the nuclear age are challenged in ways unknown to previous generations, because we grew up in a world in which humans have the capability to destroy everything. If the taboo on nuclear use in warfare, which has existed since 1945, is broken, the consequences could be eight thousand years of civilization coming to an end and a radio­active planet. One nuclear weapon dropped on New York City could be sufficient to destroy the U.S. as a functioning nation. But it’s not too late. We still have the capacity to walk back from the brink.

    Goodman: Why is there not a greater sense of urgency today about the need to reduce nuclear arsenals?

    Krieger: Nuclear weapons have been sold to the public as a necessary protection against nuclear attack. People have bought into the theory of deterrence — the idea that the fear of nuclear retaliation will keep the peace between the nuclear-armed powers. But a terrorist organization could still use a nuclear weapon and leave no way to retaliate because it has no discernible territory. And if just having nuclear weapons actually protects us, then why do we design so-called missile-defense systems to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles? We are planning for nuclear war as if it were winnable, not unthinkable. That is not rational.

    Another reason for the seeming lack of concern is that too many people defer to experts. I think it is important for the public to reclaim the issue, as happened in 1982, when a million people gathered in New York’s Central Park to support a freeze on nuclear buildup.

    Goodman: What is the difference between long-range nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons? Are the two kinds equally important to eliminate?

    Krieger: Long-range weapons are also called “strategic” nuclear weapons and have intercontinental-delivery capabilities. They can be launched from silos, submarines, or aircraft. Tactical nuclear weapons are smaller, with a limited range and generally less explosive power. Strategic weapons can do the most damage, but tactical weapons are more likely to get into the hands of terrorist organizations.

    The U.S. has already eliminated most of its tactical arsenal, but it retains some 180 tactical nuclear weapons in five European countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Russia still has some three to four thousand of them. I believe that strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are equally important to eliminate. My goal is zero nuclear weapons on the planet.

    Goodman: What message does the U.S. send the rest of the world by maintaining such a large arsenal of nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: As long as the U.S. and other powerful nations claim to need nuclear weapons for security, it encourages additional countries to do the same. If the most powerful nation on the planet needs nuclear weapons, why wouldn’t every country need them? The more nuclear weapons there are, the greater the chance that they will end up in the hands of extremist groups or an irrational leader who will one day decide it is in his or her country’s national interest to use them.

    Goodman: Is the U.S. likely to use nuclear weapons again?

    Krieger: I certainly hope not, but so long as the weapons exist in the U.S. arsenal, there remains the possibility that they will be used. Most Americans would probably be surprised to discover that the U.S. has never had a policy of “no first use.” We have given some countries “negative security assurances” — that is, promises that we won’t attack them with nuclear weapons — but we give this only to nations that do not have nuclear weapons and that we believe are in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, a treaty that aims, in part, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Countries that possess nuclear weapons or that the U.S. believes are out of compliance do not receive such assurances.

    Goodman: So we say that nuclear weapons are too dangerous to use, but we will not commit to not using them.

    Krieger: Actually, we don’t officially say that nuclear weapons are too dangerous to use. U.S. leaders reserve the right to use them under certain circumstances. If the U.S. were to adopt a no-first-use policy — and then get all the nuclear-armed countries to make the same pledge, with legal consequences for violation — it would be a significant step toward nuclear disarmament. But that doesn’t fit the policy of deterrence.

    General George Lee Butler, who was once in charge of all U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, writes, “Nuclear deterrence was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence, and fragile human relationships.” This is a denunciation of the very principle by which countries justify their possession of nuclear weapons.

    The policy of mutual assured destruction may have been successful during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but it came close to ruinous failure. The decision makers in the Cuban Missile Crisis have said on many occasions that there was an enormous amount of misinformation and misunderstanding. They were later shocked to discover how much they didn’t know and how fortunate we were to avoid a full-out nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

    Goodman: Still, there has been no use of nuclear weapons for sixty-seven years.

    Krieger: We should not take too much comfort in that, because it’s a relatively short period in human history. That rationalization is analogous to a man who, having jumped from the top of a hundred-story building and fallen sixty-seven stories without a problem, thinks everything is fine.

    Also, you can’t prove that nuclear deterrence is the reason there hasn’t been a war. I could say with just as much certainty that the reason there hasn’t been a nuclear war is because people drink Coca-Cola. Correlation is not causation. We don’t know if both the U.S. and the Soviet Union having nuclear weapons prevented nuclear war. What we do know is that we came close to having a nuclear war on at least one occasion.

    Goodman: But the nuclear era is the longest period of peace between great powers in history.

    Krieger: It has resulted in numerous proxy wars, however. During the Cold War, conflicts were sparked by the power rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and after the fall of the Soviet Union, the major nuclear powers’ continued pursuit of hegemony in critical regions of the world has caused much violence. Millions of people, primarily in poorer countries, have been the principal victims. Consider the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, among many others.

    Goodman: What are your biggest fears in regard to nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: I worry that humanity is stumbling toward its own extinction, and that the U.S. is leading the way. Americans don’t want to have to deal with the serious implications of our nuclear policy. We like to stay “above the fray,” which is the position of a pilot who drops the bomb. We want to keep the discussion on a technological or intellectual level and not deal with the terrifying possibility of the extinction of the human species and other complex forms of life on the planet. We don’t want to consider what it means to live in a society that bases its security on threatening to murder hundreds of millions of innocent people.

    Goodman: How many detonations would it take to end all life on the planet?

    Krieger: I don’t think anyone can answer that with certainty, but surely the U.S. and Russia each have enough thermo­nuclear weapons to accomplish it, should either country use them by accident or intention. Scientists have modeled what would happen if there were a relatively “small” nuclear war between India and Pakistan, involving fifty Hiroshima-sized bombs each on the other side’s cities. Those hundred nuclear weapons would, in addition to the destruction of the cities, put enough soot into the upper stratosphere to reduce the sunlight reaching the earth’s surface, decreasing temperatures, shortening growing seasons, causing crop failures, and leading to hundreds of millions of deaths, perhaps a billion, by starvation caused by famine. Using all or most of the deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, perhaps even some smaller number of these weapons, could reduce temperatures to below freezing on most of the agricultural land in the northern hemisphere and result in the extinction of humans and other forms of complex life.

    Goodman: If terrorists were to detonate a single nuclear bomb in a major U.S. population center, how might it affect life in the entire country?

    Krieger: Hundreds of thousands, even millions, of people would die from the blast, more would die from the fires the blast would cause, and still more would die from the radiation poisoning, as happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The detonation of a single nuclear bomb in New York City could be a thousand times worse than the 9/11 tragedy. It’s difficult to imagine the full psychological impact, but people throughout the country would be stunned and frightened about which city might be next. The long-term cleanup and reconstruction would be overwhelming. What would we do in response? Would we pick a country we felt was responsible and destroy one or all of its cities? And we are talking here about only one bomb setting all of this in motion.

    Goodman: How great is the risk of an accidental nuclear war?

    Krieger: It’s above zero, and any number other than zero is too great a risk. I also know that the more countries that develop nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of inadvertent nuclear war. Accidents happen, no matter how careful we are. The Russians thought they had control of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The operators were going through a routine exercise, and before they knew it, they had a meltdown on their hands. The Japanese thought they had control at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant before the tsunami hit. Human fallibility and natural disasters are always with us. A computerized training program could lead to the false belief that we are really under attack, as has happened before. Or a nuclear submarine could lose communication with the command structure or misinterpret a command. In 1995 a U.S.-Norwegian launch of a weather satellite was mistaken by the Russians as a missile attack aimed at Moscow. Boris Yeltsin was awakened in the middle of the night and told Russia was under attack. He had only a few minutes to decide whether or not to launch a “counterattack” against the U.S. Fortunately, Yeltsin took longer than the time allotted to him, and it became apparent that the satellite was not a rocket aimed at Moscow.

    There are many other examples of accidents that could have triggered nuclear detonations but didn’t. There have been midair refueling problems where nuclear weapons have fallen from planes, and planes have crashed with nuclear weapons onboard.

    Goodman: I presume we don’t fly nuclear-armed airplanes over foreign soil.

    Krieger: I believe that is our policy, but such incidents have occurred inadvertently. I can’t say with certainty whether it’s the policy of other nuclear-armed nations.

    Goodman: As a young adult you spent nearly a year in Japan and visited the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How do you respond to the common belief that the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in August 1945 saved lives by ending the war?

    Krieger: It’s interesting that, after the war, the number of lives supposedly saved by the bomb kept going up and up. At first they talked about 250,000. Within a relatively short time it was up to a million: I would say that’s a myth. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, published in 1946, concluded that, even without the atomic bombs, and even without the Soviet Union entering the war in the Pacific, the fighting would have ended in 1945 without an Allied invasion of Japan. Japan had put out feelers to surrender, and the U.S. had broken Japan’s secret codes and knew about its desire to surrender, but we went ahead and bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki anyway. Admiral William D. Leahy, the highest ranking member of the U.S. military at the time, wrote in his memoir that the atomic bomb “was of no material assistance” against Japan, because the Japanese were already defeated. He went on to say that, in being the first to use the bomb, the U.S. “had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”

    It’s interesting that, after the war, the number of lives supposedly saved by the bomb kept going up and up. At first they talked about 250,000. Within a relatively short time it was up to a million.

    Goodman: How close is Iran to developing nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: Iran’s nuclear program has been under scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea), and there is no evidence at this point that the Iranians have a nuclear-weapons program. They are enriching uranium to 20 percent u-235. You must enrich uranium to higher levels — 80 to 90 percent u-235 — to have the fissile material necessary for constructing nuclear weapons. But they could enrich to that level in the future, so it’s important to keep an eye on the situation. It would be reprehensible, however, to initiate an attack against Iran simply because it could potentially create highly enriched uranium.

    There’s been a subtle shift in the way information about Iran is being conveyed to the American people. The government has gone from talking about the danger of Iran “obtaining” nuclear weapons to talking about the danger of Iran having nuclear-weapons “capability.” Many countries have nuclear-weapons capability without possessing nuclear weapons. Germany and Japan are two. The Scandinavian countries, as well as Brazil and Argentina, probably have the means to make nuclear weapons, but they don’t have them.

    U.S. foreign policy might actually be pushing Iran toward a nuclear-weapons program. Iranians may view threats from the U.S. and Israel as dangerous to their sovereignty and well-being. George W. Bush described an “Axis of Evil” composed of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Iraq gave up its nuclear-weapons program, and the U.S. invaded, overthrew its government, and executed its leader. Meanwhile North Korea developed nuclear weapons, and the U.S. continues to negotiate with its leaders. If you were the leader of Iran and observed what’s gone on with the other two members of the so-called Axis, which path would you take?

    Goodman: Iran is led by a fundamentalist regime that many view as being of dubious sanity. Shouldn’t we worry about their having even nuclear-weapons capability?

    Krieger: They may be of dubious sanity, but that can be said of many regimes. There have been many leaders, in the U.S. and elsewhere, who have acted irrationally at times. If, in fact, Iranian leaders are insane and irresponsible, of course they should not have nuclear weapons. But they also should not have them even if they are perfectly sane. No one should.

    By the way, the Iranian situation points out a problem in the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. A nuclear-power program gives a nation the ability to produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons, but Article iv of the Non-Proliferation Treaty refers to nuclear power as an “inalienable right.” Is there really such a “right” to nuclear power? How can we promote nuclear power and nuclear disarmament simultaneously? Personally, I would like to see us rethink the role of nuclear power in the world, because there is such a close connection between the nuclear fuel cycle and the ability to make nuclear weapons.

    Goodman: What should U.S. policy be toward Iran?

    Krieger: First, we should propose that Iran put the enriched uranium created by its nuclear plants under the safeguards of international inspectors. I think Iranians would accept this. Really, any process that creates fissile materials should be put under strict international control. That includes nuclear power in the U.S.

    Second, we should continue to apply sanctions to Iran if it does not allow full inspections of its nuclear fuel cycle.

    Third, U.S. policy needs to be in accord with the promise we made in 1995 to pursue a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, and we cannot have that without the participation of Israel. It is almost universally believed that Israel has a relatively large nuclear arsenal, even though it does not admit to it.

    There are successful nuclear-weapons-free zones in a number of regions: Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia and Mongolia. Virtually the entire southern hemisphere is composed of nuclear-weapons-free zones. There have been calls for such a zone in Northeast Asia, to include North and South Korea, Japan, parts of China, and the U.S. fleet in the region. But nuclear weapons are a global problem, and regional solutions will not be sufficient. We need to have a global set of negotiations to achieve a new treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible, and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Goodman: Why do we need a new treaty? What’s wrong with the existing one?

    Krieger: The existing Non-Proliferation Treaty calls for nuclear disarmament, but that goal hasn’t been effectively pursued by its nuclear-armed member states — the U.S., Russia, the UK, France, and China — nor pursued at all by the other four nuclear-armed countries that are not parties to the treaty: Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In fact, North Korea withdrew legally from the treaty in its “supreme interests.” We need a treaty that bans the possession of nuclear weapons and provides a road map by which we can move to a world without them.

    A starting point would be a commitment by all nuclear-armed nations to a no-first-use policy. Step two would be major reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia — down to, say, two or three hundred weapons on each side. This is still far too many, but it would bring those nations into rough parity with the other nuclear powers in the world. After that, a new treaty to ban nuclear weapons could be negotiated.

    I hope the leadership to move toward a nuclear-free world will come from the U.S. It appeared there was potential for this when President Obama said in Prague in 2009 that America seeks “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

    But even if we have leaders who are ready to lead on this issue, there will still need to be broad public support. Many Americans remain convinced that nuclear weapons provide security when, in fact, they act as a dangerous provocation and an incentive for proliferation.

    The path to security doesn’t lie in keeping a stash of nuclear weapons for ourselves and preventing other countries from getting any. It’s hypocritical to say that the U.S. should have these weapons and Iran shouldn’t. It also creates resentment and a greater desire to possess them. The path to security can only be through total nuclear disarmament. We cannot indefinitely maintain a world of nuclear haves and have-nots, and we cannot go attacking every country that we think might be on the path to making a bomb.

    Goodman: Do you think the U.S. will go to war with Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons?

    Krieger: The U.S. isn’t prepared for the consequences of attacking Iran. Iran is much bigger and better organized than Iraq, where our troops fought for nine years. There is no telling how long it would take to subdue Iran or to deal with the consequences throughout the Middle East — and the world.

    If we attacked Iran, it would harden the resolve of its leaders and those of other countries to develop nuclear ar­senals so they wouldn’t be attacked in the future. Remember our bellicose behavior toward Iraq and our conciliatory behavior toward North Korea. And Iran is a proud country; probably nothing would be more effective in uniting Iranians around their current regime than a U.S. or Israeli attack against them.

    An attack would also be viewed as a violation of international law, an act of “aggressive warfare.” In the Nuremberg trials after World War ii, aggressive warfare was one of the three crimes for which the leaders of the Axis powers were tried and convicted. Many were hanged. U.S. leaders committed the same crime in Iraq, and I would say in Afghanistan too.

    Goodman: And in Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen with drone attacks?

    Krieger: If some country sent drones to attack our leaders or citizens, I’m sure we would call that “aggressive warfare.” But when we do it, for the most part it goes unremarked upon in the mainstream media. Few Americans are clamoring for accountability from our leaders.

    Goodman: We have already proven we are not afraid to institute regime change, as we have done in Iraq and as we did in Iran in the 1950s. Is that our intention in Iran today?

    Krieger: That would not be the intention of saner minds. Iran is in the mess it’s in now as a result of our meddling in Iranian affairs sixty years ago by overthrowing its democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. When you overthrow regimes, there are always unintended consequences. Iran and Iraq were frequent rivals and fought a long war in the 1980s. By overthrowing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, we shifted the power balance in the Middle East toward Iran. If we overthrow Iran’s regime, there may be something worse in store for us.

    The U.S. should do what it can to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, but it shouldn’t do it by military means. That would only undermine our own security.

    Goodman: Is total disarmament realistic? Assuming we can’t put an end to war, isn’t it natural for all sides to want the biggest and best weapons?

    Krieger: Not necessarily. Imagine you are one of our early human ancestors, and you have a choice among several sizes of club. You don’t want one that is too thin and will break, but, at the same time, a fallen oak tree will be too big to handle. You want a piece of wood the right size to carry around and use.

    Today the U.S. military needs weapons that can be used efficiently and that don’t destroy indiscriminately. For quite some time there have been laws of warfare against weapons that fail to discriminate between soldiers and civilians. International humanitarian law also forbids weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, such as bullets that expand inside the body and rip out organs, and chemical and biological weapons.

    Goodman: Are there any examples from history of a country voluntarily giving up its military advantage?

    Krieger: It depends what you mean by “military advantage.” The countries that signed the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention saw greater military advantage in all countries giving up the weapons than in retaining the weapons for themselves. Many countries have agreed to a ban on land mines and cluster munitions, although the U.S. has not.

    Goodman: Let’s say we do achieve total nuclear disarmament, but then a rogue nation builds a nuclear weapon. Wouldn’t this destabilize global relations?

    Krieger: No, any treaty that would get us to zero would have safeguards against a country breaking out. To go from twenty thousand to zero nuclear weapons we’ll need a verifiable process based on inspections in all countries. After we finally reached zero, the act of developing a nuclear weapon would be akin to breaking a taboo, and the countries of the world would rise up in protest and retaliation against the treaty breaker. And one nuclear bomb would not be sufficient to defeat a country like the U.S., even if the U.S. had no nuclear weapons, because our conventional forces are so powerful.

    To have an effective disarmament plan, we will also need to institute nonmilitary ways of resolving conflicts so that the elimination of nuclear weapons does not create a world that is safer for conventional warfare. All countries want security, and the strongest guarantee of security is a system in which conflicts are resolved without violence. This is what is set forth in the United Nations Charter. The use of force, except in cases of self-defense or upon authorization of the UN Security Council, is prohibited. Unfortunately the permanent members of the Security Council have not fulfilled their responsibilities to keep the peace. Nor have they fulfilled their responsibilities to pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear disarmament.

    Goodman: Does the 2010 New START treaty with Russia effectively reduce nuclear stockpiles or is it just a pr tactic?

    Krieger: It’s both. It is not reducing our stockpile much more than the Moscow Treaty did, which George W. Bush signed in 2002. The New START treaty will reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons to 1,550 on each side and the number of deployed delivery vehicles to 700 on each side. But it also allows for modernizing the arsenals. It is a means of managing nuclear arms rather than a commitment to achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

    Whether it is going to be an effective stepping stone to further cuts is questionable, particularly because the U.S. has been pursuing the deployment of antiballistic missile defenses up to the Russian border in Eastern Europe, and the Russians are very upset about this.

    Goodman: What are antiballistic missiles?

    Krieger: They are missile defenses that theoretically can take down offensive nuclear missiles in the air before they reach their targets. If only one side has them, that nation could believe it’s able to launch a preemptive first strike and then use its defense missiles to avoid retaliation. It’s really imagining a worst-case scenario, but that’s the way military planners think.

    For thirty years we had an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Russians, signed by Richard Nixon, which limited the number of antiballistic missiles that either side could deploy. That treaty was unilaterally abrogated by George W. Bush in 2002. In 2012 the U.S. made attempts to place missile defenses in Eastern Europe along the Russian border, supposedly to guard against an Iranian attack. It’s as if the Russians put their missile-defense system on the U.S.-Canadian border and said to the U.S., “Don’t worry. It’s aimed at Venezuela.” We would not be reassured.

    Goodman: What is the cost of maintaining our current nuclear arsenal?

    Krieger: Through the middle of the last decade, the U.S. had spent $7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The annual figure now is $50 to $60 billion for the U.S. and $100 billion for all nuclear-weapons states. So the world is currently spending about $1 trillion a decade on modernizing and maintaining nuclear arsenals.

    Clearly, with our federal debt crisis and the extent of global poverty, we can’t afford to spend this money. Nuclear weapons are relics of the Cold War. What possible scenario would require us to have a few thousand nuclear weapons ready to be fired at a moment’s notice?

    Goodman: Tell me about your civil resistance in February 2012.

    Krieger: I have worked for peace and nuclear disarmament for most of my adult life, but it was only recently that I joined in civil resistance to a Minuteman iii missile launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base. These unarmed test launches aren’t publicized much, but they occur regularly. I joined others in protesting at Vandenberg because the Minuteman iii missile is a first-strike weapon. The 450 Minuteman iii missiles in the U.S. arsenal are always on high alert, ready to be fired within moments. In a period of extreme tensions between the U.S. and Russia, each side would have an incentive to launch such land-based missiles so that they could not be destroyed in their silos. This is a dangerous and thoughtless carry-over from the Cold War. It was foolish then, and it is even more so now.

    The routine missile test launches from Vandenberg use the Marshall Islands as targets. Imagine if the situation were reversed and the Marshall Islands tested missiles in the ocean off the California coast, putting our marine habitats and cities at risk. The Marshall Islands were our trust territories after World War ii, and we abused that trust by conducting sixty-seven atmospheric and underwater nuclear tests there over a period of twelve years. It was the equivalent of exploding one and a half Hiroshima-sized bombs daily for those twelve years. The Marshallese people still suffer serious health problems from those tests, and they have not been compensated fairly for the wrongs done to them. By contaminating their islands with radiation, we have taken from them not only their health and well-being but their sacred land.

    Goodman: The web address for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is www.wagingpeace.org. What does “waging peace” mean to you?

    Krieger: “Waging peace” means that peace is active, not passive. You can’t sit back and wait for peace to come to you. You must work for it. You must shake off your apathy and demand it. This is not always easy in a culture of war, such as we have in the U.S., but it is necessary.

    It is clear that war makes great demands on its participants. We need to think of peace in the same way. Peace is not the absence of war or the space between wars; it is a goal to be achieved by actively demanding that the world’s governments find nonviolent means of settling disputes.

    Goodman: Hasn’t war been with us since the beginning of humanity?

    Krieger: There is no good anthropological evidence that war existed before the advent of agriculture. At the dawn of human history, it took all the able-bodied adults in a tribe to hunt and gather food. Agriculture enabled specialization, and with specialization came organization and hierarchy and leaders who wanted to increase their territory and wealth through military means. So civilization opened the door for warfare. Military service was encouraged through a system of rewards; soldiers received a portion of the spoils for doing the bidding of the leaders — if they didn’t die in battle. Smart politicians tell soldiers that they are fighting for a noble cause, no matter how ignoble it actually is, and smart military leaders reward their soldiers well to maintain their loyalty and thus increase their own power. Warfare is a socially conceived way of settling disputes, or expanding territory, or gaining riches without working for them.

    Goodman: So you don’t believe human beings are warlike by nature?

    Krieger: I don’t. Humans have a fight-or-flight instinct that resides in the reptilian portion of our brains. When threatened or trapped, we can go berserk. But the vast majority of the time we don’t behave this way. We must be taught to be warlike. It isn’t easy to get humans to kill each other in war. It requires considerable training, the primary goal of which is to get young people to identify with their fellow soldiers. It also takes considerable societal propaganda to dehumanize the enemy. Militarized societies take advantage of the loyalty and trust of recruits and turn them into killers.

    Goodman: You emphasize the need for peace leadership training. Why is it important?

    Krieger: Many Americans are complacent because they feel helpless to bring about change. We need to train and empower people. If someone wants to be a soldier, there are institutions that will train that person for war — the rotc, military academies, the army, navy, and air force — but if you want to work for peace, there are few places to obtain training. We need more institutions to provide opportunities for people to make a career of peace.

    Peace leadership is not based on hierarchy. It must be leadership by example. A peace leader must demonstrate kindness and compassion, resolving conflicts nonviolently. Peace leadership also requires organizing, research, public speaking, working with the media, and expressing oneself with sincerity. The most important trait of a peace leader, though, is a passion for achieving peace, because that passion will be reflected in all that one says and does. It will attract others to the cause. Great peace leaders, such as Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., were also courageous.

    Wars could not exist without the support of the people, particularly the young people who must fight in them. The old antiwar slogan “What if they gave a war and no one came?” reminds us of this. If young people would not participate in wars, there could be none. I don’t think there are contemporary political leaders anywhere who would go out and fight wars themselves. They rely upon the young to do the killing and dying.

    Goodman: Is the nuclear threat a greater threat than climate change?

    Krieger: That’s like asking if you’d rather be executed by a firing squad or an electric chair. Both nuclear war and climate change can destroy human civilization.

    Goodman: You often quote physicist Albert Einstein, who said that human survival in the nuclear age requires us to change our “modes of thinking.” What do you think he meant?

    Krieger: Einstein worried that we would remain stuck in our old warlike modes of thinking, which, in the nuclear age, would lead to “unparalleled catastrophe.” He believed that nuclear weapons made it necessary to abolish warfare altogether and find nonviolent means of resolving our differences. Nations can no longer solve their problems in a warlike manner; they need to use cooperative means.

    Goodman: You have said that investing our defense dollars in foreign aid would make us safer. Can we really buy friends that way?

    Krieger: Calling it “buying friends” sounds patronizing to me. It trivializes the miserable conditions that much of the world lives in — without adequate food, water, shelter, education, and healthcare. You call it “buying friends,” but a better word for it is justice. And, yes, I think it is a far more effective strategy for national security than threatening or killing people in war. Moreover, it is the humane and ethical thing to do. Because we spend hundreds of billions of dollars building up our military, we use force when a conflict comes along, rather than being generous with our resources and trying to help people. Large numbers of humans live in dire poverty while a small percentage live with obscene riches. If we want to prevent war and ensure the survival of the human species, we need to change this.

    We could also prevent war by improving education and reducing poverty in this country. Many young people who join the military do so to get an education or find a better livelihood. If they had more alternatives, fewer of them would turn to the military. Some enlist out of a sense of patriotism, of course, so we also need to teach children that we are members of a single species. We should pledge our allegiance to humanity itself and to our incredible planet. This is the key to creating peace and bringing the nuclear age to an end.

  • What Obama Did and Did Not Say

    This article was published on the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s blog Waging Peace Today

    President Obama’s first speech to a joint session of Congress on Tuesday was all about the economy. Even when he was talking about education, national security or energy, he was talking about the economy.
    There were two things that really struck me in his speech: one thing that he said, and one thing that he didn’t say.
    The president recognizes that we need to slash the bloated Pentagon budget, though whether he’ll adopt Rep. Barney Frank’s (D-MA) plan to cut the Pentagon budget by 25% or more is unlikely. But, on Tuesday, Obama said, “We’ll…reform our defense budget so that we’re not paying for Cold War-era weapons systems we don’t use.”
    This statement was sufficiently vague to keep all but the most rabid militarists from immediately criticizing his position. I think that some proof of what exactly Obama was referring to came today in the draft 2010 Department of Energy budget: ZERO dollars for new nuclear weapons (currently called the Reliable Replacement Warhead program).
    The other thing that really struck me in his speech was the very noticeable omission of nuclear power as a critical part of our energy future. Solar? Check. Wind? Check. Efficiency? Check. “Clean” coal? Um…check. Nuclear power? No thanks.
    Let’s ignore for a moment that “clean coal” is about as asinine as calling nuclear power “clean, safe and reliable.” Barack Obama comes from the state of Illinois, the state with the most nuclear power plants and arguably the strongest base of the nuclear power lobby. Obama accepted campaign money from nuclear power pushers. He campaigned on an energy platform that included nuclear power as part of the energy mix.
    What has he discovered in his first 40 days in office? Hopefully all of the following:

    • There is still no “permanent” solution to the nuclear waste problem, and there is no solution in sight;
    • The nuclear power industry cannot survive without massive government subsidies;
    • New nuclear power plants take so many years to approve and construct that they cannot help us to meet our immediate carbon reduction requirements;
    • Once you take into account the lifecycle carbon footprint of nuclear power (uranium mining, construction, operation, waste storage, decommissioning), it doesn’t look so carbon-free;
    • Investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency are more economically sensible and will eliminate CO2 emissions more effectively.

    With continued public pressure, it is possible for the evil twins of the 20th century, nuclear power and nuclear weapons, to be eliminated for good.

     

    Rick Wayman is Director of Programs at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Cut the Nuclear Weapons Budget

    The Honorable John Boehner
    The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
    The Honorable Harry Reid
    The Honorable Mitch McConnell


    Dear Congressional Leaders,


    Our bloated nuclear weapons budget defies fiscal reality.  Our oversized nuclear weapons arsenal fails to reflect historical reality.  Our spending on radioactive relics of the past requires a reality check.  We won the Cold War.  The Berlin Wall fell.  The threats we face today have dramatically changed in the past two decades.  At a time when our need for fiscal responsibility has never been greater, we must cut our nuclear weapons budget.


    Unchecked spending on nuclear weapons threatens to push us over the fiscal cliff.  It imperils both our national and economic security.   It makes us less safe by preventing investment in the systems that our soldiers need most.  It jeopardizes our future by forcing cuts to programs that fund life-saving medical research, train teachers, and ensure seniors and the most vulnerable receive essential healthcare.


    The Ploughshares Fund estimates that the U.S. is projected to spend over $640 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs over the next ten years.  At a time when the government must tighten its belt, we cannot continue to spend at these levels.  We can save hundreds of billions of dollars by restructuring the U.S. nuclear program for the 21st century.


    We know there is plenty of waste in the nuclear weapons budget.  We are refurbishing a nuclear bomb that no one wants.  We are building a Uranium processing facility we do not need. We are planning for a new nuclear bomber when the ones we have will last for decades.  In fact, just one nuclear bomb life extension program will cost $10 billion for an estimated 400 weapons.  At that price, we could buy each bomb’s weight in solid gold.  And this would be a better investment.  Gold appreciates, while money spent on this nuclear bomb is money down the drain.


    Cuts to nuclear weapons programs upwards of $100 billion over the next ten years are possible. Specific programs have been identified that can be decreased in scope or eliminated to bring our nuclear forces into better alignment with our 21st century needs.  Such cuts should be included in any final deal to avoid the fiscal cliff.


    Cut Minuteman missiles.  Do not cut Medicare and Medicaid.  Cut nuclear-armed B-52 and B-2 bombers.  Do not cut Social Security.  Invest in the research and education that will drive our future prosperity, not in weapons for a war we already won.


    Sincerely,


    Edward J. Markey

  • We All Have a Role to Play

    Vaya aquí para la versión española.


    David Krieger


    Nuclear weapons are game-changing devices.  They are more than weapons.  They are annihilators, capable of causing catastrophic damage to cities and countries.  They have the destructive power to bring civilization to its knees.  They could cause the extinction of most or all complex life on the planet. 


    One of the great moral leaders of our time, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, wrote: “Nuclear weapons are an obscenity.  They are the very antithesis of humanity, of goodness in this world.  What security do they help establish?  What kind of world community are we actually seeking to build when nations possess and threaten to use arms that can wipe all of humankind off the globe in an instant?”


    Nuclear weapons threaten the very future of humankind.  They are immoral and illegal.  They cause indiscriminate harm and unnecessary suffering.  Their damage cannot be contained in either time or space.  Their existence demands a response from us.  We must unite, as never before, to protect against this overriding technological threat of our own making or face the consequences. 


    But, you may ask, what can you do? 


    First, you can take the threat seriously and recognize that your own involvement can make a difference.  This is not an issue that can be left to political leaders alone.  They have dealt with it for over two-thirds of a century, and the danger persists.


    Second, join with others in working for a more peaceful and nuclear weapon-free world.  The voices of citizens can make a difference, and the aggregation of those voices an even greater difference.  Citizens must stand up and speak out as if the very future depends upon what they say and do, because it does.


    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation provides many ways to amplify the voices of citizens.  We believe that a path to a world free of nuclear weapons lies through US leadership, and the path to US leadership lies through an active and involved citizenry.  You can keep up to date with our monthly Sunflower e-newsletter and you can participate in pressing for change through our Action Alert Network


    Third, become a peace leader, one who holds hope and wages peace.  Never lose hope, and actively work to build a more peaceful world.  Live with compassion, commitment, courage and creativity.  Do your part to build a world you can be proud to pass on to your children and grandchildren and all children of the future, a beautiful planet free of the threat of nuclear annihilation. 


    If you are a painter, paint.  If you are a writer, write.  If you are a singer, sing.  If you are a citizen, participate.  Find a way to give your talents to building a better world in which the threat of war and nuclear devastation does not hang over our common future – a world in which poverty and hunger are alleviated, children are educated, human rights are upheld, and the environment is protected.  These are the great challenges of our time and each of us has an important role to play.