Tag: nuclear weapons

  • We Owe an Allegiance to Humanity

    This interview was held with Joseph Rotblat, the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate, when he visited Santa Barbara to receive the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s 1997 Lifetime Achievement Award for Distinguished Peace Leadership. Professor Rotblat was interviewed on October 29, 1997 by Foundation President David Krieger.

    Krieger: Having worked for more than 50 years for the elimination of nuclear weapons, how would you assess the progress that’s been made toward achieving a nuclear weapons free world?

    Rotblat: I believe that we have made significant progress. Perhaps hopes were a bit too optimistic that, with end of the Cold War, very quickly we could get rid of all nuclear weapons because their purpose, if there was any purpose, certainly ceased to exist. We hoped that particularly the United States would then take drastic steps to get rid of the weapons. Steps have been taken; a certain amount of the dismantlement of weapons has taken place with a number of treaties, stopping testing, etc. But I am disappointed that the progress is not greater, particularly that the nuclear powers still stick to the same way of thinking they did during the Cold War – that nuclear weapons are needed for security. As long as this thinking exists, there is not much hope that there will be an agreement by the nuclear powers to get rid of the weapons. I believe, however, that we’re gradually winning the logical argument against the retention of nuclear weapons. What is needed at the present is a push from the mass media and from mass movements to support the suggestions made in a number of recent studies. I believe that if this is done and specific ideas put forward which could easily be implemented, it will start the process of elimination of nuclear weapons which could be achieved in about two decades.

    Krieger: What do you think is needed to achieve the sort of mass movement for abolition that you are calling for?

    Rotblat: I think two things – a positive and a negative. The negative one is to point out that the problem with nuclear weapons has not been solved – that the progress which started the world toward disarmament has come to a halt. There is now a real danger that the nuclear arms race will start again and more nations will acquire nuclear weapons. People must realize that the nuclear issue must be put on the agenda because of the real threat that we will go back to the dangers that existed during the Cold War. People should be aware there is a danger.

    And then, following out of this, we must put forth specific proposals which will start the whole disarmament process over again. In my opinion, among several proposals like de-alerting of nuclear weapons, separating warheads from the missiles, all of which will make the world safer, we also need something which will enable us to go ahead to the actual elimination of nuclear weapons. One such step is a No First Use Treaty, providing that the nuclear weapons states will agree among themselves that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack and nothing else. Once they’ve agreed to this, if they agree to such a treaty, then I see the way directly open to the final step to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Krieger: What will have to happen for the nuclear weapons states to take such a significant step?

    Rotblat: They will have to be pushed towards it. And I said there are two things. One is to present the logical argument which is really unassailable. There’s no need for nuclear weapons today. It’s been shown that the world can live in better safety without nuclear weapons than with nuclear weapons. So the first thing is to convince the nuclear weapons states from the professional’s point of view, and then they’ll have to feel the pressure from the people because, after all, they are subject to election. They can’t ignore the voice of the people. If we can build up a real mass movement – people demonstrating, writing petitions, writing to member of Parliament, etc. – if we can just build up to a real crescendo, then I think the nuclear weapons states will have to accept it.

    Krieger: What you are calling for is a campaign to educate the people on the one hand and to educate the leaders on the other hand. Is that correct?

    Rotblat: You cannot start a mass movement without telling people what they are trying to achieve. Therefore, when I speak about starting a mass movement, of course, it has to start by educating the people. Give them the facts. They should not just believe they are living in a world where nuclear weapons don’t matter. The truth now is that many people think that the danger is over completely, and this is the reason why the nuclear issue is no longer on the agenda. The first thing is to inform the people that the process is not complete, and in fact it may reverse. Give them facts. Groups like yours, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, have a big task in this mass movement campaign for the abolition of nuclear weapons, part of the Abolition 2000 program.

    Krieger: Do you believe that we will achieve a nuclear weapons free world in a reasonable period of time?

    Rotblat: I don’t know what is reasonable. I would like to see it in my lifetime, at least the beginning. What is important is for the nuclear weapons states to get away from the mode of thinking that nuclear weapons are needed for security. This I believe could be achieved very quickly. It could be done before the end of the century. It could be done next year. I believe that if this were achieved, if leaders really accepted a No First Use Treaty, which would mean a breakthrough in their thinking, from then on it would be largely a technical matter how to ensure that a convention banning nuclear weapons will not be violated. I believe this can be done. The main thing is to start the process. If the process is started, which I hope will happen soon, then it would take another two decades until a nuclear weapons free world is completely achieved.

    Krieger: This way of thinking that you’re talking about, do you believe this is what Einstein meant when he made his famous statement that “the splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking”?

    Rotblat: What he meant was a new way to approach the problem of security – away from national security to global security. This is a new way of thinking. Many people have adopted it, but not yet the decision-makers. We still need a new way of thinking. It is still the most important issue at the present time.

    Krieger: You mentioned Abolition 2000 – the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to be agreed to before the year 2000. Can you share some of your thoughts on this Abolition 2000 campaign?

    Rotblat: It is a much needed mass movement campaign. It will be, I believe, the deciding factor in whether the nuclear decision makers will accept abolition or not. But I feel that we need something more than has been done up to now. Additional aspects need to be added to the present movement, that is, to explain to people that they have to do something about the danger and then point to a number of events and pull out specifically one event that we can get very quickly. In my opinion this would be a No First Use Treaty. I think that with this there is a good chance that we shall be successful.

    Krieger: You’re almost 89 years old and you’ve worked hard over the course of your life to eliminate nuclear weapons and to engender more responsibility by scientists as well as citizens in general. What gives you hope for the future?

    Rotblat: My hope is based on logic. Namely, there is no alternative. If we don’t do this, then we are doomed. The whole existence of humankind is endangered. We are an endangered species now and we have to take steps to prevent the extinguishing of the human species. We owe an allegiance to humanity. Since there is no other way, then we must proceed in this way. Therefore, if we must do it, then there is hope that it will be done.

    Krieger: I know that you have a great concern for young people and for life. If you could give one message to the young people of today, what would it be?

    Rotblat: My message would be: “You have a duty. You enjoy many fine aspects of life, better perhaps than your parents had. We have bequeathed to you many of the things which we ourselves have inherited and have tried to improve on, to ensure that you have a happy life. I think it is your duty to ensure that this goes on to your children and your grandchildren so that human life on this planet will continue to be enriched all the time.”

    Krieger: Thank you.

  • From Arms Control to Abolition: Global Action for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

    During the Cold War, nuclear arsenals were rationalized on the basis of deterrence, and the nuclear weapons states developed military strategies of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Since it was recognized that attacks and counter-attacks with nuclear arsenals would be without precedent in their destructiveness, even to the point of destroying human civilization and most life on Earth, the acronym MAD seemed particularly appropriate. During the Cold War period, leaders tried to bring some modicum of sanity to an otherwise insane situation by engaging in arms control discussions and occasionally reaching agreements regarding the control of nuclear arsenals.

    The two most important arms control agreements during the Cold War were reached in the 1960s. The first was the Partial Test Ban (PTB) Treaty, which was signed and entered into force in 1963. This treaty prohibited nuclear testing in the oceans, atmosphere, and outer space. The PTB was achieved under considerable pressure from citizens throughout the world who objected to the dangerous health effects associated with atmospheric nuclear testing. Among the leaders in the protest against atmospheric nuclear testing were Linus Pauling, the great scientist, and his wife Ava Helen Pauling, who organized a petition signed by 9,235 scientists, which Pauling delivered to U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold on January 15, 1958. The document was entitled, “Petition to the United Nations Urging that an International Agreement to Stop the Testing of Nuclear Bombs Be Made Now.”

    The PTB did not put an end to nuclear testing, and thus to the development of new and more efficient nuclear weapons. Rather, it resulted in moving nuclear testing underground. In this sense, the treaty was more an environmental treaty than an arms control treaty. The only thing that the treaty disarmed was public outrage at the health risks related to atmospheric nuclear testing. The treaty contained the promise of “seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,” which was widely recognized as a critical step in ending the nuclear arms race. Unfortunately, the goal of ending nuclear testing remained essentially dormant for the next 33 years until a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally adopted by the United Nations and opened for signatures in 1996.

    The second important arms control agreement during the Cold War was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. This treaty sought to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials to states not in possession of nuclear arsenals as of January 1, 1967. The treaty recognized two classes of states: nuclear weapons states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China), and non-nuclear weapons states (all other states). The nuclear weapons states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials to the non-nuclear weapons states, and the non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to receive or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    When the NPT was negotiated, the non-nuclear weapons states recognized the unequal nature of the treaty, and argued for two concessions from the nuclear weapons states. First, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was described in the treaty as an “inalienable right,” and nuclear weapons states promised to help the non-nuclear weapons states in developing nuclear power plants. Second, the non-nuclear weapons states objected to the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” created by the treaty, and negotiated Article VI of the treaty which called for good faith negotiations to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Article VI of the NPT, despite its carefully crafted language, is one of the most important, if not the most important, of all commitments made by nuclear weapons states in arms control agreements.

    In exchange for not attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapons states had a reasonable expectation under Article VI that the nuclear weapons states would proceed with good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, to rid the world of the terrible threat of nuclear holocaust. Until the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear weapons states had made scant progress toward nuclear disarmament, and were widely viewed by states from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as being in violation of their Article VI commitment. In fact, at the end of the Cold War, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states were considerably larger than they were when the NPT was signed in 1968.

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the rationale for retaining nuclear arsenals has evaporated. Deterrence was always a questionable theory, but without the threatened attack of an enemy, it clearly makes no sense at all. Nuclear weapons can be more clearly recognized in the aftermath of the Cold War as “instruments of genocide” that serve no reasonable purpose. Since the end of the Cold War, increasing pressure has mounted for the nuclear weapons states to fulfill the promise under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    START I, START II, and START III

    Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in the early 1990s resulted in two treaties agreeing to the reduction of the numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the United States and former Soviet Union. START I, which was signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Bush in 1991, called for reductions to approximately 6,500 deployed strategic weapons on each side. START II, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in 1993, called for further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 3,000 to 3,500 on each side by January 1, 2003. START II was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996, but has yet to be ratified by the Russian Duma, many members of which have expressed deep concerns over the U.S.-led efforts to expand NATO eastward. In September 1997, the U.S. and Russia agreed to extend the date for achieving START II reductions for five years to the end of 1997.

    However, even if START II is successfully completed, there will still be as many deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the two major nuclear weapons states as there were when the NPT was signed in 1968. This has led many of the non-aligned states to question the sincerity and good faith of the nuclear weapons states in fulfilling their Article VI promises.

    Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have had preliminary discussions regarding START III, and have suggested that this agreement could reduce nuclear arsenals to 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side by the year 2007. This advance, however, is uncertain due to the Russian opposition to the proposed expansion of NATO. Even more significant is that the proposed START III agreement is simply more incrementalism. It lacks a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, and simply reduces the overkill ratio to a somewhat lower level. It is consistent with maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” indefinitely. It misses the tremendous opportunity that currently exists to move from arms control to abolition.

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference

    A NPT Review and Extension Conference was called for by the terms of the treaty 25 years after the treaty entered into force. The purpose of this conference, which was held in 1995, was to determine whether the treaty should be extended indefinitely or for a period or periods of time. The nuclear weapons states, which saw the treaty as advantageous to themselves, argued for an indefinite extension of the treaty. Many non-aligned states, though, questioned the good faith of the nuclear weapons states, and suggested that the treaty should be extended for periods of time and re-extended contingent upon sufficient progress toward fulfillment of the Article VI promise of nuclear disarmament.

    At the conference the nuclear weapons states and their allies (primarily the NATO states) exerted considerable pressure on the non-aligned states and finally prevailed in having the treaty extended indefinitely. However, at the insistence of the non-aligned states, certain non-binding agreements were attached to the indefinite extension which called for, among other steps, the following:

    “(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

    “(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

    “(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

    Abolition 2000 Global Network

    At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, an Abolition Caucus — composed of representatives of citizen action groups from throughout the world — was organized to share information and to join in lobbying the delegates. From this caucus an 11-point plan, calling for nuclear weapons abolition was drafted and agreed to. This document was called the Abolition 2000 Statement. The Statement called for a treaty by the year 2000 for the prohibition and elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework.

    The Abolition 2000 Statement became the basis for the establishment of the Abolition 2000 Global Network, which has now grown to over 700 citizen actions groups from six continents. It is a dynamic citizen network committed to the goal of achieving a nuclear weapons free world.

    The World Court Project

    The World Court Project (WCP) was initiated by three major international citizen action groups: the International Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and the International Peace Bureau (IPB). The purpose of the project was to obtain an opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Through intensive lobbying of delegates to the World Health Organization and the United Nations General Assembly, the WCP was successful in having both of those bodies request an opinion from the Court.

    The question posed by the World Health Organization (WHO) focused on use of nuclear weapons: “In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?” The question posed by the General Assembly also included the threat of use: “Would the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance be permitted under international law?”

    The Court received considerable written and oral argument from states. On July 8, 1996, the Court issued its opinion on the question posed by the U.N. General Assembly. At the same time, the Court declined to issue an opinion on the question posed by WHO, stating that their question failed to meet the criteria of arising within the scope of WHO’s activities. In response the General Assembly, the Court issued a 37 page opinion, and each of the 14 judges on the Court issued a separate statement with the opinion. The Court found that any threat or use of nuclear weapons must conform with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. This means that nuclear weapons cannot be threatened or used in such a manner as to fail to discriminate between civilians and combatants, and that they must not cause unnecessary suffering to combatants. Based primarily upon this finding, the Court then found that any threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally illegal.

    The Court was unable to determine, however, whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal or illegal “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.” The Court’s opinion went a long way toward shutting the door on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but it left open this narrow possibility in the case of the very survival of a state. Some of the judges pointed to the irony of leaving open the possibility of using nuclear weapons in conditions in which the survival of a state was at stake, since such use could result in escalation endangering the survival of all life.

    Given what the Court found to be an ambiguity in international law involving an “extreme circumstance of self-defence,” it reviewed Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and concluded: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The Court’s ruling on the Article VI commitment clarifies that nuclear disarmament must be complete, that it must be disarmament “in all its aspects,” and that it is not tied to conventional disarmament or other security issues.

    The nuclear weapons states have argued that the Court’s opinion is advisory only, and they have not acted on it. While the opinion is, in fact, advisory in nature, it is still the pronouncement of the highest Court in the world on an issue of utmost importance. The significance of the opinion has not been lost on the states in the non-aligned movement that have been pressing for complete nuclear disarmament. Nor has the significance of the opinion been lost on citizen action groups around the world, such as the Abolition 2000 Global Network, that have been pressing the case for the abolition of nuclear arsenals.

    The Canberra Commission Report

    In response to French nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific, the Australian government established a prestigious commission of eminent individuals to examine the case for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Participants in the Commission included General Lee Butler, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command; Robert McNamara, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense; Michel Rocard, a former French Prime Minister; Field Marshall Micheal Carver, a former British Chief of Defence Staff; Jacques Cousteau, the late ocean explorer and advocate for future generations; and Joseph Rotblat, founder and president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate.

    The Report of the Canberra Commission stated: “Nuclear weapons pose an intolerable threat to humanity and its habitat, yet tens of thousands remain in arsenals built up at a time of deep antagonism. That time has passed, yet assertions of their utility continue…. A nuclear weapon free world can be secured and maintained through political commitment, and anchored in an enduring and binding legal framework.”

    The Report called for some immediate steps to reduce the nuclear threat:

    • Taking nuclear forces off alert;
    • Removal of warheads from delivery vehicles;
    • Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
    • Ending nuclear testing;
    • Initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals; and
    • Agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states.

    These steps would take us a long way toward reducing the immediate risks of nuclear warfare, but as yet the nuclear weapons states have resisted their implementation. The only exception is the signing of the CTBT and, even in this case, at least one of the nuclear weapons states, the United States, is continuing to conduct “sub-critical” nuclear tests which undermine the spirit of the treaty.

    The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was finally opened for signatures in September 1996, but it has yet to enter into force and the procedures for entry into force make it unlikely that this will occur. Entry into force requires the ratification of all 44 nuclear capable states, and India has made it clear that it will not sign or ratify the treaty so long as there is no firm commitment by the declared nuclear weapons states to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. India’s position is that it is unwilling to give up the option of conducting nuclear tests in a world in which the declared nuclear weapons states, which have already tested extensively, refuse to make a firm commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and thus continue to rely upon them for their security. While India has been widely criticized for this position, one must admit that this position is not without logic.

    The CTBT has been marred by the insistence of the U.S. that “sub-critical” tests fall within the framework of the treaty. The U.S. has already begun a series of such tests, and it is likely that other nuclear weapons states will follow its lead. The U.S. is also planning a Stockpile Stewardship Program, on which it plans to spend some $45 billion over the next ten years. This program includes the development of new and expensive structures for laboratory testing of nuclear weapons. Again, it is likely that other nuclear weapons states will follow the U.S. lead by continuing to test by other means that circumvent the spirit if not the letter of the CTBT.

    The Statement by International Generals and Admirals*

    In December 1996 some 60 retired generals and admirals from around the world issued statements calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. U.S. Generals Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster issued a statement at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. Their statement called for “pursuit of a policy of cooperative, phased reductions with serious commitments to seek the elimination of all nuclear weapons.”

    As a separate statement, 58 of these retired generals and admirals argued “the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.” The generals and admirals called for the following three steps:

    “First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

    “Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states; and

    “Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”

    A Nuclear Weapons Convention

    In December 1996 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (51/45M) expressing appreciation to the International Court of Justice for responding to its request. It underlined the Court’s unanimous conclusion that an obligation exists “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.” The resolution called for “commencement of multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.”

    In order to demonstrate that drafting a nuclear weapons convention was a technically feasible possibility, two citizens action groups — the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) — prepared a draft model Nuclear Weapons Convention. This draft was made public in April 1997 at the PrepCom for the NPT Review Conference.

    From Arms Control to Abolition

    Arms control has been a method of maintaining strategic balance between the key nuclear weapons states, while at the same time maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” In other words, arms control has been in part a dangerous game to maintain special privilege played at the precipice of nuclear holocaust. It has been a game of high stakes, both financially and militarily. In the end, it caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the jury is still out on what its ultimate effects will be on the United States, the one nation that has used nuclear weapons in warfare.

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, it is now a particularly propitious time to move forward with the abolition of nuclear weapons. To do so will require a change in mindset of decision-makers in the nuclear weapons states, many of whom seem determined to hold on to their nuclear arsenals. The International Court of Justice has spoken on the obligation to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. The Canberra Commission has offered positive proposals for eliminating the immediate threat. The international generals and admirals have argued the case for the security benefits of eliminating nuclear arsenals.

    Citizen action groups around the world have joined together in the call for achieving a treaty by the year 2000 calling for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons within a timebound framework. They have called for achieving this treaty by the year 2000 so that the people of the world can enter the 21st century with a treaty in place leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework.

    Unfortunately, the leaders of the nuclear weapons states do not seem to have heard or understood the arguments for eliminating their nuclear arsenals. They are expending their efforts on arms control proposals, like the CTBT, which they try to evade in practice. These leaders do not seem to have grasped that this is not a game, and that “superiority” cannot be realized by arsenals of genocidal weapons. They are still thinking in old ways that are no longer appropriate in the Nuclear Age. Their thinking could pull us into the vortex of nuclear conflagration, by accident or design.

    Einstein argued that “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” The new way of thinking that Einstein called for must take into account the tremendous destructive power of the “instruments of genocide” in the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states. If we oppose genocide, we must also oppose basing our security on nuclear weapons.

    When enough people speak out and demand that government leaders change their ways of thinking, then these leaders will change. Until enough people demand such change, government officials will likely continue to tread old paths of the mind. We need a united effort of people everywhere to demand that the goal of a nuclear weapons free world be realized, and that we enter the 21st century with a treaty in place that will lead to elimination of nuclear weapons within a timebound framework.

    Bibliography

    Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996, United Nations General Assembly, A/51/218, 15 October 1996

    Model Nuclear Weapons Convention 1997, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York

    Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 1996 National Capital Printers, Canberra, Australia [http://www.dfat.gov.au/dfat/cc/cchome.html]

    Evan, William and Ved Nanda (eds.) 1995 Nuclear Proliferation and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, University Press of America, Inc., Lanham, Maryland

    Pauling, Linus 1983 No More War!, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York

    Roche, Douglas, Unacceptable Risk: Nuclear Weapons in a Volatile World 1995 Project Ploughshares and Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Ontario

    Rotblat, Joseph, et.al. (eds.) A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Desirable? Feasible? 1993 Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado

    Ruggiero, Greg and Stuart Sahulka (eds.) 1996 Critical Mass, Voices for a Nuclear-Free Future, Open Media, Westfield, New Jersey

    INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ADVISORY OPINION

    ON THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    July 8, 1996 Paragraph 105. For these reasons, THE COURT,

    (1) By thirteen votes to one, Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;

    In Favour. President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;

    Against: Judge Oda.

    (2) Replies in the following manner to the question put by the General Assembly:

    A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;

    B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such;

    In Favour: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;

    Against: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma.

    C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 is unlawful;

    D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;

    E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote, It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law,

    However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;

    IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereschetin, Ferrari Bravo;

    AGAINST: Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins.

    F. Unanimously, There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

    Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six, in two copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

    (Signed) Mohammed Bedjaoui, President.

    (Signed) Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar.

    President Bedjaoui, Judges Herczegh, Shi Vereshchetin and Ferrari Bravo append declarations to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

    Judges Guillaume, Ranjeva and Fleischhauer append separate opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

    Vice-President Schwebel, Judges Oda, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma and Higgins append dissenting opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

  • Peace Declaration

    It was 52 years ago today that a single atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima. The skies flashed brighter than a thousand suns and a huge mushroom cloud rose above the city. Untold numbers perished in the sea of flames that followed, and the survivors still suffer from radiation’s debilitating aftereffects.

    This event engendered profound distrust of the scientific civilization that has made such dramatic progress over the last hundred years. Science and technology have spawned many conveniences and made our live more comfortable, yet they have also been employed to create the weapons of mass destruction used over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Not only do nuclear weapons imperil humanity’s future, the civilization that created them gravely impacts the whole of the global ecosystem.

    We in Hiroshima are outraged that nuclear weapons have yet to be abolished and banished from the face of the earth, and we are very uneasy about the future of civilization.

    In signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the international community agreed to put a halt to all nuclear explosions, but much remains to be done before the CTBT can go into force. This was the situation when the United States conducted a subcritical test which it contends is not banned by the CTBT language. On the one hand, the U.S. promises to reduce its stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and on the other hand it obstinately maintains its nuclear testing program. This attitude is utterly devoid of the wisdom needed if all peoples are to coexist. We implore the global community to recognize that nuclear weapons stand at the very apex of all the violence that war represents.

    The Fourth World Conference of Mayors for Peace through Inter-city Solidarity currently meeting in Hiroshima seeks a nuclear-free world and is deliberating calling upon all governments and international institutions to conclude a pact banning the use of nuclear weapons and to expand nuclear-weapons-free zones. Hiroshima specifically calls upon the government of Japan to devise security arrangements that do not rely upon a nuclear umbrella.

    Japan and other countries differ in language, religion, and customs, and there are also some differences of historical perspective, particularly with our neighbors. All the more do we hope that candid dialogue among all the peoples of the world will result in a shared vision of a brighter tomorrow.

    With the world in tumultuous transition, we intend to take every opportunity at home and abroad to convey not only the terrible violence, destruction, and death the atomic bomb wrought but also the inspiring beauty of human life striving toward the future despite experiencing abject despair. The culture of peace generated in the process of Hiroshima’s rebirth is a beacon of hope for all humanity, just as the Atomic Bomb Dome, now designated a World Heritage site, stands as a symbol of hope for all who reject nuclear weapons.

    Along with paying our utmost respects to the souls of those who died, we pledge ourselves anew on this Peace Memorial Day to pressing for compassionate assistance policies grounded in reality for the aging hibakusha wherever they may live.

    “Since wars begin in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.” This thought from the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) Constitution must be indelibly etched in our hearts, and I hereby declare it Hiroshima’s resolve.

  • Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism

    The greatest nuclear danger that I am concerned with is not the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, though that is a grave danger. Of even greater concern is the invidious belief of policy makers in a small number of states that they have a right to maintain nuclear weapons indefinitely, and that in their hands nuclear weapons do not constitute a threat either to their own citizens or to the remainder of humanity. This is a foolish belief that discounts the principle that if something can go wrong it will go wrong. It is also a belief that is likely to encourage proliferation to other states and possibly to terrorist groups as well.

    There is no reason to be assured that nuclear weapons in the hands of the current nuclear weapons states will not result in tragedy surpassing all imagination. One can only wonder what it is that makes most citizens of nuclear weapons states so complacent under these circumstances. Clearly, for the most part, otherwise normal people have learned to live with the terror of nuclear weapons and, in doing so, have become accustomed to condoning terrorism at a national level.

    It is this situation that compounds the danger because without the vigorous protests of citizens in the nuclear weapons states, there is no impetus to change the status quo. And if the status quo with regard to reliance on nuclear weapons does not change, there will surely be proliferation and it will be only a question of time until nuclear weapons are again used in warfare.

    Due to the intransigence of the nuclear weapons states, there has been virtually no progress toward nuclear disarmament in the past five years. The START II Treaty, which was agreed to by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993, called for reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500 on each side by January 1, 2003. Since then, Presidents .Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed to move this date back five years to December 31, 2007.

    The total number of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia at the completion of START II, if it is completed, will be around 10,000 on each side.

    For decades India has made it clear that it supports complete nuclear disarmament, but that it is not willing to live in a world of “nuclear apartheid.” Indian leaders have stated that if all states will renounce nuclear weapons and agree to go to zero, India will happily join them. On the other hand, Indian leaders have said that if the nuclear weapons states insist on maintaining nuclear arsenals, India will do so as well.

    As we know, India gave the world a wake-up call in May when it tested nuclear weapons, followed a few weeks later by Pakistan’s tests. In light of the testing by India and Pakistan, I would like to offer five propositions.

    My first proposition is that the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan does not constitute nuclear proliferation. Both states have long had nuclear weapons. India first tested a nuclear device, which it said was for peaceful purposes, in 1974. The world largely ignored the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan by referring to them, along with Israel which also has a nuclear arsenal, as “threshold states.” This was simply a euphemism to perpetuate the denial that nuclear proliferation had already occurred.

    It is interesting to note the reactions to the recent nuclear testing in South Asia. President Clinton responded to the Indian tests by stating, “To think that you have to manifest your greatness by behavior that recalls the very worst events of the 20th century on the edge of the 21st century, when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind, is just wrong. And they clearly don’t need it to maintain their security.”

    There are several points worth noting in President Clinton’s response. Haven’t the United States and the other nuclear weapons states sought to manifest their greatness in just this way? Isn’t this the basis for UK’s or France’s claim to great power status, whatever that is, at this point in time? Where is the evidence that “everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind”? Certainly it is almost impossible to find that evidence in President Clinton’s own record. And if India does not need nuclear weapons to maintain its security, wouldn’t that argument be even stronger for the United States and other countries infinitely more militarily powerful than India?

    Referring to this reaction by President Clinton, Henry Kissinger, who many would argue should rank among the greatest war criminals of the latter part of the 20th century, stated, “But he [Clinton] destroys the U.S. case by using hyperbole that cannot be translated into operational policy: by claiming a special insight into the nature of greatness in the 21st century; by the dubious proposition that all other nations are trying to leave the nuclear world behind (what about Iran, Iraq and North Korea?), and by the completely unsupported proposition that countries with threatening nuclear neighbors do not need nuclear weapons to assure their security.”

    Mr. Kissinger has perhaps always felt that only he has “special insight into the nature of greatness.” Unfortunately for humanity, the United States has allowed him an operational platform on which to act upon his insights in Chile, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Clearly all other states are not trying to leave the nuclear world behind, but why does he pick out only Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? What about the nuclear weapons states themselves? And their NATO allies that join in a common nuclear strategy? What about Japan accumulating tons of reprocessed plutonium suitable for making nuclear weapons? What about Israel?

    Kissinger’s final point about countries with threatening nuclear neighbors needing nuclear weapons to assure their security is a clear recipe for proliferation as well as disaster. Would he advise the countries of the Middle East to develop nuclear arsenals in response to Israel having done so? Perhaps Mr. Kissinger has calculated that the nuclear weapons of the United States and its allies are not threatening. Other states, with other experiences, may view U.S. nuclear weapons and those of its allies somewhat less benignly.

    My second proposition is that proliferation of nuclear weapons is virtually assured given the continuation of present policies by the nuclear weapons states. So long as the nuclear weapons states maintain that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security, we can expect that other countries will desire to have these weapons. Statements condemning proliferation by leaders of nuclear weapons states, like Mr. Clinton’s response to India’s testing, will not be taken seriously so long as the U.S. continues its current policy of maintaining its nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future.

    There is only one way to prevent nuclear proliferation. That is for the nuclear weapons states to make an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to take steps, such as de-alerting their arsenals, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, and so on, to show that they are serious about their commitment. Short of moving rapidly in this direction and bringing all nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons materials under strict international controls, nuclear proliferation is assured.

    My third proposition is that nuclear weapons do not provide security. If you possess nuclear weapons, you will be the target of a threatened nuclear weapons attack. I wonder if the citizens of nuclear weapons states really understand the jeopardy in which they are placed by their governments’ policies. Of course, there is also the risk to the security of the world. By the obscenely large arsenals created and maintained by the U.S. and Russia, the entire world is jeopardized — the future of humanity, the future of most forms of life. It always amazes me that many people calling themselves environmentalists don’t seem to understand that nuclear weapons pose a manmade environmental threat that exceeds all bounds of reason.

    Deterrence is simply a theory. It is not a shield. One cannot prove that a nuclear war has not occurred because of deterrence. There is no clear cause and effect linkage. In fact, it is not possible to prove a negative — that because of one thing, something else does not happen. We may be just plain lucky that a nuclear war has not occurred since two or more countries have been in possession of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, countries that have warred three times in the past 40 years, will certainly put additional strain on the theory of deterrence.

    My fourth proposition is that arms control agreements have served largely as a “figleaf” of respectability for maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty actually enshrines the proposition that there are two classes of states — those that possessed nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 as one class, and everyone else as the other class. The only way around this situation is for the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament as set forth in the treaty. Unfortunately, the nuclear weapons states have not done this despite the strong reinforcement of this treaty provision by the World Court in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the general illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

    The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may also be viewed as a treaty that supports the favored position of the nuclear weapons states. After conducting over 2,000 nuclear tests, the nuclear weapons states agreed to stop testing. However, they have interpreted this prohibition as not applying to so-called “sub-critical” tests that use conventional explosives around a nuclear core but do not result in a sustained nuclear chain reaction. The U.S. has already conducted three sub-critical tests, and Russia has announced that it also has plans to conduct such tests this year.

    My fifth and final proposition is that terrorism has become an accepted and integrated part of the national security policies of the nuclear weapons states. Terrorism is the threat to injure or kill innocent people unless the terrorist’s demands are met. Nuclear weapons threaten to injure or kill innocent people. That is what they are designed to do. That is what they did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is what the nuclear weapons states threaten to do with them as a matter of policy. The nuclear weapons states, no matter how they argue their intentions, have become terrorist states. They have made their citizens either willing or unwilling accomplices in acts of terrorism. In time, if nothing is done to alter the present situation in the world, other states or criminal groups will obtain nuclear weapons and they too will act as terrorists.

    The current situation is fraught with danger. There seems to be a loss of moral bearing in the world. What is most tragic is that an opportunity to abolish nuclear weapons is being squandered in the nuclear weapons states by leaders with a lack of vision and citizens caught in an amoral drift of complacency. In order to change the world before it is too late, these citizens must awaken to their responsibilities as members of the human species and demand change from their governments. Otherwise significant progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is unlikely to occur, and the result will be increased nuclear proliferation and terrorism and, as a certainty, disastrous consequences.

    *David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. You can contact him at Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1187 Coast Village Road, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794. The quotes by Clinton and Kissinger were in an op-ed by Henry Kissinger, “Hyperbole Is Not a Nonproliferation Policy,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1998.

  • Nuclearism and Its Spread to Asia

    Introduction

    At its core, nuclearism is the belief that nuclear weapons and nuclear power are essential forms of progress that in the right hands will protect the peace and further the human condition. Nuclearism is a dangerous ideology — as dangerous as the technologies it has unabashedly and unreservedly promoted. In this belief system, “the right hands” have generally been synonymous with one’s own country, and “to further the human condition” has generally been synonymous with benefit to oneself, one’s country or one’s corporation. The key elements of nuclearism are:

    1. The belief that nuclear weapons keep the peace, and are a necessary evil. 2. The belief that nuclear power is a safe, reliable and inexpensive source of energy, and that the nuclear power industry is an absolute good. 3. The belief that, despite the expansion of the nuclear power industry, the diversion of nuclear materials from the nuclear fuel cycle to military uses can be prevented.

    The ideology and the technologies it has supported have created extraordinary dangers for all life on Earth. While the dangers posed by nuclear weapons are potentially more immediate and cataclysmic in scope, the insidious dangers posed by nuclear power reactors and their radioactive waste products are now already harming humankind, other forms of life, and the environment and this threat will continue for thousands of generations. Believers in nuclearism, to the extent that they acknowledge these dangers, argue that nuclear technology brings benefits that more than compensate for its inherent dangers.

    The dangers of nuclear technology may be summarized as follows:

    1. Nuclear deterrence is only a theory. It may fail causing many times more casualties and suffering than were experienced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 2. Nuclear weapons may be used by accident or miscalculation as well as by intention. The nuclear destruction of one city by one bomb could result in millions of deaths and casualties. A large-scale nuclear exchange could result in the annihilation of humankind and most other forms of life on Earth. 3. Nuclear weapons or the materials for making them may find their way into the hands of terrorists or irrational leaders of countries. 4. Nuclear power reactors are subject to catastrophic failures such as occurred at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and nearly occurred at Three Mile Island in the United States. Such failures could occur as a result of accident, human error, terrorist activity, or destruction by an enemy in time of war. 5. The spent fuel storage pools located at nuclear power reactors are particularly vulnerable to the release of radioactive materials as a result of terrorist or military attack. 6. Accidents occurring during the transportation of nuclear materials by highway, railway, ship, or air could result in hazardous releases of radioactive materials. 7. No long-term means of storage of radioactive waste materials currently exists to protect the environment and human health against the dangers of radiation release.

    Despite these dangers, the proponents of nuclearism have succeeded in many countries in obtaining large amounts of public funding to support the development, testing, deployment, and maintenance of nuclear weapons and/or the development and subsidization of the nuclear power industry. The costs of nuclear technology have included:

    1. Over $8 trillion spent on nuclear weapons and delivery systems by the nuclear weapons states over the past half century. 2. The diversion of generations of scientists and technologists to work on weapons of mass destruction rather than on projects of positive value to humankind. 3. The widespread contamination of the environment by radioactive pollutants created in the process of building and testing nuclear warheads over a fifty year period. Cleanup costs are estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars, and it is understood that some areas of contamination will never be adequately restored to safe use. (In the United States, such areas are referred to as “national sacrifice zones.”) 4. Nuclear power reactors, once thought to be relatively inexpensive to build, now cost some $5 billion per 1000 megawatt reactor. This cost has priced nuclear reactors out of competitiveness in the United States despite enormous government (that is, taxpayer) subsidies. 5. Radioactive wastes generated by the military and nuclear power industry will need to be stored to prevent environmental pollution and subsequent health problems for tens of thousands of years. The bulk of this burden will fall to future generations.

    In this paper, I will review the development of nuclearism in the West, its roots in military technology, its linkage to commercialism, attempts to place a boundary between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and the spread of nuclear weapons to Asian countries. I will then review the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its reference to nuclear energy as an “inalienable right,” return to the nuclearist view that nuclear weapons are a necessary evil and nuclear power an absolute good, and discuss the need for new thinking about nuclear technologies, as called for by Albert Einstein. I will then review nuclearism in Asia, global nuclearism, and finally the pressing need and important opportunity that now exists to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

    Nuclearism Is a Western Ideology

    Nuclearism is an ideology that originated in the West. The primary proponents of nuclearism have been the United States, Britain, France, and the former Soviet Union (now replaced by Russia). The “East-West” struggle of the Cold War described the division of Europe with Western Europe and the United States on one side of the divide, and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on the other side. Both sides were proponents of nuclearism. Both sides believed that their nuclear deterrent forces prevented nuclear war and thereby kept the peace. Despite a lack of objective evidence that there was a causal connection between nuclear arsenals and the absence of a nuclear war, each side credited its expanding nuclear arsenal with keeping the peace. To underline this, the United States during the Reagan presidency named some of its powerful nuclear armed missiles “peacekeepers.”

    Both nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are products of the West. Nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the ideology of nuclearism developed in the West and have spread throughout the world.

    Nuclearism Originated As a Military Technology

    Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States with the aid of European refugee scientists during World War II. The initial impetus for the U.S. effort was the fear that the Germans might develop similar weapons, and that these weapons would be necessary to deter the Germans from using theirs. However, by the time that the first U.S. nuclear weapons were developed, the Germans had already surrendered without having succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon.

    The first U.S. nuclear weapon test took place on July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The war in the Pacific was still going on at that time, although the United States was aware that the Japanese were seeking to negotiate terms of surrender.(1) Just three weeks after the initial successful test of the weapon, it was used at Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945, and three days later at Nagasaki, Japan. At Hiroshima some 90,000 persons, mostly civilians, were killed immediately, and a total of some 140,000 persons died as a result of the bombing by the end of 1945. At Nagasaki some 40,000 persons, again mostly civilians, were killed immediately, and a total of some 70,000 persons died as a result of the bombing by the end of 1945. The suffering of the survivors, the hibakusha, continues to the present. The people of Japan were the first victims of this powerful new technology.

    The decision to use the newly developed weapon against the Japanese was made by U.S. President Harry Truman. When Truman received confirmation of the “success” of the use of the nuclear weapon dropped at Hiroshima, he is reported to have said, “This is the greatest day in history.”(2) One can imagine that the response to the devastation and mass killing of civilians was viewed somewhat differently in Japan.

    In the United States certain myths developed around the use of nuclear weapons.(3) The weapons were credited with ending the war and saving American lives. They were, therefore, generally perceived in a positive light. In Japan, these weapons were seen from the perspective of the victims, and the Japanese developed what has been described as a “nuclear allergy.” At the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park it says, “Never again! We shall not repeat this evil.”

    With these tragic events the United States brought the world into a new era, the Nuclear Age. Its hallmark was a determined effort that involved the subordination of science and technology to military purpose. The effort resulted in harnessing the power of the nucleus of the atom, and releasing a destructive force far greater than had previously been possible by manmade means. The Nuclear Age was born of a scientific enterprise with a military purpose — the creation of nuclear weapons — that was organized, funded and controlled by government. In this new age the destruction of cities by a single weapon became not only a possibility, but a reality. The destruction of humankind became imaginable and possible.

    Nuclearism and Commercialism

    While nuclearism may have begun as a military-based ideology, it soon also developed a commercial aspect related to the use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power. Thus, nuclearism became an ideology with two intertwined aspects, one aligned with military ends and one aligned with peaceful ends. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower took the lead in promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for generating electricity with his “Atoms for Peace” speech at the United Nations in 1953.(4)

    The promise of “Atoms for Peace” was virtually free and unlimited electric energy to power the world and provide the benefits of electric energy to the poor of the Earth. From this technology of death would come, Eisenhower prophesied, electricity so inexpensive that it would not need to be metered. It was the promise of something too good to be true, and in fact it was not true. It was the promise of creating virtually free electrical power for everyone everywhere. Nuclearism, like a modern alchemy, promised to convert the evil of a city-destroying weapons technology to a tool for powering the future.

    The promise of nuclear power would prove to be largely hyperbole based upon wishful thinking or outright fraud. The hope and dream of “Atoms for Peace” became, however, a central tenet of the ideology of nuclearism. By adopting this tenet of nuclearism, developed states were able to shift to taxpayers the financial responsibility for research and development of the so-called peaceful atom. Huge taxpayer subsidies authorized in the United States, Western European nations, and later Japan made possible the development and implementation of the nuclear power industry.

    The nuclear power industry continues to operate in the United States only due to Congressional legislation, the Price-Anderson Act, which transfers the majority of liability for a major accident from the corporations operating nuclear power plants to the taxpayers. Even so, there has been no nuclear power plant built in the United States since the early 1970s. In the early 1970s, the U.S. nuclear industry was forecasting 1000 nuclear power plants for the country by the year 2000. Today, however, there are only 110 such plants, and there are no plans to build more.

    Costs have been the major roadblock to the continued expansion of nuclear power in the United States. Initially it was estimated that the capital costs for building a 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant would be a few hundred million dollars. By the early 1970s the costs had risen to approximately $5 billion per reactor.

    In true Cold War competitive style, the former Soviet Union raced ahead with its version of the “peaceful atom” by building nuclear power plants that would prove to be among the most dangerous in the world. This was dramatically demonstrated by the major accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This accident had serious consequences in Ukraine, Belarus, many parts of Europe, and even the United States.(5)

    Nuclearism Draws an Artificial Boundary Between Military and So-Called Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

    Advocates of nuclearism have generally tried to walk a narrow line between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the one hand, they have sought to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. On the other hand, they have tried to promote the spread of nuclear energy to other states for research and commercial purposes. Since the knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons is readily available and the nuclear materials needed for this purpose may be derived from the nuclear power industry, advocates of nuclearism needed to establish at least a facade of control over the nuclear power industry. They accomplished this goal through the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with promoting nuclear energy internationally while providing safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. It is, of course, a clear conflict of interest to give promotional functions to a regulatory agency.

    The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

    The United States would have preferred to have maintained its early monopoly over nuclear technology. It was recognized from the outset, however, that this would not be possible. The U.S. scientific establishment badly miscalculated the length of time it would take the Soviet Union to develop nuclear weapons. Truman was advised that the development of nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union could take some twenty years, and in fact it occurred in just four years.

    The very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly called for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission that would develop a plan for the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments.(6) But early efforts and proposals to achieve international control of nuclear weapons failed, and by July 1946 the United States, then the only nuclear weapons state in the world, began an atmospheric testing program in the Pacific. Radioactivity from the testing spread throughout the world, but brought the greatest harm to the people of the Pacific.

    Until 1949, when the former Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon, the U.S. remained the sole nuclear weapons state in the world. From 1949 forward, until the end of the Cold War, the United States and former Soviet Union vied with each other for “nuclear supremacy,” a concept that some would define as beyond the bounds of reason. These two states would subsequently be joined by the United Kingdom, France, and China as declared nuclear weapons states. China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and became the first Asian nation to possess nuclear weapons. A decade later, in 1974, India tested its first nuclear weapon, which it claimed was only for peaceful purposes. Subsequently, Pakistan is thought to have developed a nuclear weapons capability. Israel is the third of the threshold or undeclared nuclear weapons states.

    China is thought to have developed its nuclear weapons capability in response to being threatened by nuclear weapons by the United States during the Korean War in 1954 and again during the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1958.(7) India is thought to have developed its nuclear weapons capability in response to China doing so, and Pakistan is thought to have developed its capability in response to India doing so. Thus, there have been security concerns that have led to the spread of nuclear weapons into Asia. China did not want to find itself, as had Japan, the victim of nuclear weapons delivered by the United States or later by the Soviet Union. India feared the possibility of attack by China; Pakistan feared the possibility of attack by India. This is the faulty logic of deterrence, which has grave built-in dangers.

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty: An “Inalienable Right” to Nuclear Energy?

    It was the general understanding by the U.S., former USSR, and the UK that the spread of nuclear weapons created a more dangerous world. These states considered it acceptable and reasonable that they would maintain their nuclear arsenals, but believed it to be too dangerous for other countries to follow their lead in developing and maintaining such arsenals. This led these leading nuclear weapons states to initiate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.(8) This treaty created two categories of states, those that had nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 1967, and all other states. In the category of nuclear weapons states were the United States, former Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China. France and China, however, did not become parties to the NPT until the early 1990s.

    In the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states pledged not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear weapons states pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons or otherwise help non-nuclear weapons states to develop nuclear arsenals. On its face, this would appear to be an uneven and perhaps even unreasonable bargain. The nuclear weapons states, however, did sweeten the offer by agreeing in Article VI to have good faith negotiations on a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The nuclear weapons states also agreed that they would help other countries develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; the treaty even refers in Article IV to peaceful nuclear energy as an “inalienable right.” Thus, in attempting to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, the treaty actually promotes the use of nuclear technology for generating energy. The dual purpose nature of nuclear technology has opened a back door to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a number of countries have sought to walk through it.

    India and Pakistan were both able to develop their nuclear weapons through nuclear reactor programs that were purportedly being used for peaceful purposes. Iraq also came close to developing nuclear weapons in this way. What is needed to accomplish this, in addition to nuclear reactors for energy or research purposes, are facilities for enriching uranium or separating plutonium from spent fuel. Two countries in Asia with this capability are North Korea and Japan. North Korea is thought to possess enough plutonium for constructing one or two nuclear weapons. Japan has some 13,000 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium, enough to potentially manufacture more than a thousand nuclear weapons.(9) South Korea and Taiwan have tried to acquire the necessary plutonium reprocessing technologies to develop nuclear weapons, but they have been kept from doing so by the United States.

    Nuclearists View Nuclear Weapons as a Necessary Evil and Nuclear Power an Absolute Good

    In the ideology of nuclearism, nuclear weapons are accepted as a necessary evil to maintain the peace. This evil, however, can only be tolerated in certain countries that can be trusted to control the weapons. Nuclear weapons were seen by the West as a threat in the hands of the former Soviet Union, but at least it was understood that they would take necessary steps to control their weapons. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union is viewed by many as a serious danger to world security due to the potential spread of nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials to unstable national leaders or terrorists. Apparently, though, it has not been considered a serious enough danger by the United States and its allies to make the control of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union a matter of highest priority with appropriate funding. Some funding has been provided, but the amounts are insufficient to the nature of the danger.

    In the view of nuclearists, world peace can be maintained by nuclear arms, which would be used only as a last resort. This intention, of course, could dramatically fail if weapons from the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union or any other state fell into the hands of unstable national leaders or terrorists.

    It is also the view of nuclearists that nuclear power is an absolute good. They envision world markets being expanded by building highly capital intensive nuclear power plants throughout the developing world. It is a vision that encompasses the entire world, bringing the promise of nuclear power to rich and poor countries alike. It is unfortunately a vision that primarily benefits its promoters while bringing serious dangers to all who accept the technology.

    The public relations arm of the nuclear power industry, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, has painted the promise of safe, reliable, and inexpensive energy in glowing terms (pun intended), while skimming over the high capital costs, the need for huge subsidies, the danger of accidents, the added risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the unsolved problems of nuclear waste storage. These are the considerations borne from experience that have dampened enthusiasm for nuclear energy in the United States, Sweden, and other technologically advanced countries. The nuclear power industry has painted a picture of the benefits of nuclear energy that has attracted substantial interest from developing countries, many in Asia — countries that are eager to light their cities with this high-tech solution that they believe will be cheap and environmentally benign. Beneath the surface of the glittering promises, there is some sense that dangers are lurking, but these are easily overlooked in the hope of a quick fix for economies badly in need of inexpensive energy sources.

    Need for New Thinking

    Einstein, who had at first encouraged Franklin Roosevelt to establish a U.S. government project to develop nuclear weapons, was utterly distraught by what had occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He warned, “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Einstein’s reflection remains the central challenge of the Nuclear Age.

    What will it take to change our modes of thinking with regard to nuclearism? One source of encouragement is that nuclearism does not seem to be an ideology with widespread support among the people of the world. It appears to be largely concentrated among those who stand to profit from it, and their supporters in government.

    The nature of nuclearism has been revealed in starker terms in the aftermath of the Cold War. Despite the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the end of communism as a state ideology in Russia, the West has continued to rely upon nuclear arsenals and to pursue policies of maintaining these arsenals, although at lower levels than in the Cold War period. But these arsenals do not assure global security, and many experts have argued that the breakup of the former Soviet Union has created serious dangers of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of unstable national leaders or terrorists.

    In the West, nuclearism and militarism have forged a strong link. Most Western European countries have become partners of the United States, Britain, and France in relying upon nuclear weapons for security. Russia has also been reliant upon its nuclear arsenal, and recently has announced that it has adopted a first-use doctrine, similar to that of NATO countries, if it is threatened by attack.(10) Eastern European countries, that formerly fell under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, are now seeking to join NATO and place themselves under the NATO nuclear umbrella. NATO recently voted to admit Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.

    This proposed expansion of NATO has placed Russia on the defensive, and could have the result of stopping all progress in the reduction of nuclear armaments. The nationalistic Russian Duma may not ratify START II if NATO is expanded eastward closer to Russia’s borders. George Kennan, an elder statesman of United States foreign policy and former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, has referred to the expansion of NATO as “the most fateful error in U.S. policy in the entire post Cold War era.”(11)

    The linkage of nuclearism and militarism has had huge financial implications. The United States alone has spent some $4 trillion on its nuclear arsenal and its delivery and command and control systems since the early 1940s. The former Soviet Union is thought to have spent nearly a like amount, which ultimately was a key factor in its economic collapse and disintegration.

    Nuclearism in Asia Today

    There is some hope, albeit slim, that from the geographic East, from Asia, there will be leadership for an end to nuclearism. The Japanese people, as the most prominent victims of nuclearism, have always opposed nuclear weapons. Their government, however, has been content to rely upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and has also accumulated many tons of weapons-grade plutonium that could be fashioned into a sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal. The Japanese government has also built up a substantial nuclear power industry to reduce Japan’s reliance on imported oil. The Chinese have always had a better position on nuclear disarmament than their Western counterparts. The Indians and the Pakistanis argued for a universal commitment to complete nuclear disarmament in connection with the drafting of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but they were rebuffed by the West.

    Can Asian nations resist the temptations to nuclearism? Are they already too Westernized? Or, is there some aspect of Asian culture that is capable of rejecting nuclearism and leading the world back from the insane policies that were pursued during the Cold War and that continue to be relied upon today? These questions are worth exploring throughout Asia. If they can awaken new possibilities to dull the gleaming but false promises of nuclearism, they may help reverse recent historical trends that have the world on a collision course with disaster. A review of nuclearism in major Asian nations follows.

    China

    The major nuclear weapons state in Asia is China, which is thought to have some 400 nuclear weapons, of which some 250 are thought to be strategic weapons.(12) The remaining 150 weapons are thought to be tactical weapons for battlefield use. Since China’s nuclear weapons program has been conducted in great secrecy, it is possible that the size of their arsenal is considerably larger. It remains a relatively small arsenal, however, by comparison with those of the United States and Russia, which are each thought to currently contain some 10,000 nuclear weapons.(13)

    China has always said that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is the only one of the declared nuclear weapons states to make this pledge. China has also repeatedly called for nuclear disarmament, and said that it would go to zero nuclear weapons if the other nuclear weapons states would do so as well. There is no reason to doubt that China is serious about these pledges as they would appear to be strongly in their interests given the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals.

    China also appears intent upon expanding its nuclear energy program. Today it has three nuclear power plants, and has expressed intentions of expanding to 100 nuclear power plants by the middle of the next century.(14)

    Japan

    Japan relies upon the U.S. nuclear “umbrella” for its defense. The close relationship that has existed between the U.S. and Japan in the post World War II period has allowed the U.S. to adopt a very lenient posture toward the Japanese accumulation of weapons-grade plutonium. While Japan does not have nuclear weapons, it has the materials, technological capability, and facilities to produce them rapidly in large numbers. This capacity has been referred to as “virtual deterrence.”(15)

    The Japanese government has consistently expressed its three non-nuclear principles — that it will not manufacture, nor possess, nor allow the bringing in of nuclear weapons. In actual fact, however, the position of the government with regard to future Japanese possession of nuclear weapons seems to be more ambiguous than the position of the Japanese people, which is solidly opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state.

    In Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the state renounces the right to make war:

    “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

    “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”(16)

    Despite this Constitutional provision, however, Japan now has the third largest military expenditures in the world, behind only the U.S. and Russia. Japan is now spending some $50 billion per year on its military.(17) It has a very highly trained and well equipped military force, which it calls its “Self-Defense Forces.”

    Japan also has the largest concentration of nuclear power reactors in Asia with 53 units. These reactors supply some 28 percent of Japan’s energy. Japanese officials are seeking to increase this amount to 42 percent by 2010 in an effort to reduce the country’s dependence on imported oil and gas.(18) The Japanese have been developing fast-breeder reactors, which produce more nuclear fuel than they consume. This has provided the rationale for the country to accumulate large amounts of plutonium that could also be used for weapons. The Japanese have developed reprocessing facilities that give them the capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. They also have agreements with France for the French to reprocess their spent fuel and provide them with reprocessed plutonium.

    A series of accidents at nuclear power plants over the past few years, including one at the Monju fast-breeder reactor, have undermined confidence in nuclear power among the people of Japan. This confidence was also undermined by the Kobe earthquake, and the knowledge that Monju and other reactors were built on earthquake faults. The Japanese government has tried to allay fears about nuclear power with a cartoon character, “our little friend Pluto,” who tells children that plutonium is safe enough to drink.(19)

    There is a growing anti-nuclear movement in Japan directed against nuclear power plants. In August 1996 Japanese voters in Maki, about 200 miles from Tokyo, participated in the first referendum in Japan on building a nuclear power plant. The Maki voters overwhelmingly rejected the plant with 61 percent voting against it.(20)

    The Japanese people have always strongly opposed nuclear weapons. In the international community the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have remained powerful and eloquent spokespersons for the victims of the bombings in those cities.

    North Korea

    North Korea, like Japan, has reprocessing facilities to create weapons-grade plutonium. It also has indigenous uranium supplies. It is thought that North Korea may have developed 12 to 15 kilograms of separated weapons-grade plutonium, enough for one or two nuclear weapons. Concern over this possibility led to an agreement in December 1995 in which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two 1000 megawatt light water nuclear reactors, to be financed by Japan and South Korea, and various other incentives.

    A top level defector from North Korea was recently quoted as saying that “North Korea could turn the capitalist South into a sea of flames and scorch Japan in a nuclear attack.”(21)

    South Korea

    South Korea has an active nuclear power program with ten reactors generating over 9000 megawatts of electricity. Forty percent of its electricity is provided from these plants. There are plans for an additional 15 reactors in the future.(22) South Korea has tried since the 1970s to acquire uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing facilities which would give it the capability to develop nuclear weapons, but it has been forestalled in these efforts by the United States.

    For many years the U.S. is thought to have maintained tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but it is now believed that these weapons have been withdrawn. Of course, the continued U.S. military presence in South Korea creates the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in a potential conflict with North Korea.

    Taiwan

    Taiwan, like South Korea, has an active nuclear power program, and has tried to acquire facilities for uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing, but has not been successful in doing so. Also like South Korea, it has the technological competence to develop nuclear weapons if it obtained the materials to do so. Given its uneasy relationship with China, Taiwan would probably like to have a nuclear deterrent force against China’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

    Taiwan meets one-third of its energy needs by means of nuclear power. It has six nuclear power plants supplying some 5,000 megawatts of electricity.(23)

    India and Pakistan

    The Indian subcontinent presents one of the greatest dangers of nuclear war. Although both India and Pakistan deny it, they are both thought to have nuclear arsenals. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, and is thought to have a few dozen nuclear weapons. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear weapon, but is thought to possess a similar number or somewhat less than India. Both countries consider the other an enemy, and they have clashed many times over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

    India has ten nuclear power reactors generating less than 2000 megawatts of electricity, while Pakistan has only one nuclear power reactor generating 125 megawatts of electricity. In 1991 the two countries signed an agreement not to preemptively strike each other’s nuclear facilities.(24)

    Global Nuclearism

    Nuclearism in Asia is clearly embedded in global nuclearism. It cannot be separated out and treated for its symptoms without also treating the systemic disease of global nuclearism. It is certain that China will not give up its nuclear arsenal while the U.S. and Russia retain their arsenals. Nor will Japan give up its nuclear option while China retains its nuclear weapons. The same is true of India, and it is equally certain that Pakistan will not give up its nuclear weapons capability while India maintains its capability. It is fair to say that Asian nuclearism has been a reaction to the West. The United States demonstrated what may be viewed as the “usefulness” of nuclear weapons in warfare and its willingness to use these weapons. But it is a far different scenario to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear armed opponent that is already virtually defeated, as the U.S. did in Japan, than it is to use nuclear weapons against an opponent in possession of nuclear weapons or one that could quickly develop a nuclear weapons arsenal.

    It is becoming abundantly clear that nuclear weapons can serve only one reasonable purpose, and that is to deter another state from using nuclear weapons. Once one state has used nuclear weapons against a nuclear armed opponent or the ally of a nuclear armed opponent, retaliation is likely, and this would make any first use untenable. If the only purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence, then it is clear that as long as any state has nuclear weapons other states will want to maintain theirs or acquire such weapons as a means of deterrence. Therefore, there are only two choices: proliferation and eventual use of nuclear weapons, or the elimination of all nuclear weapons. General Lee Butler, the former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, has found that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.(25) How are we to proceed in this direction?

    Achieving a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

    In 1994 the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, for an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted under international law under any circumstances. Oral hearings on this question were held at the end of 1995. The three declared Western nuclear weapons states (U.S. UK, and France) and Russia all argued before the Court that the Court should decline to answer the question but, if it did choose to answer, it should find that under certain circumstances the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal. Some NATO allies of these nuclear weapons states supported their position. China chose not to participate in the hearings.

    Many non-aligned states argued before the Court that the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be considered illegal under all circumstances. They argued that international humanitarian law did not permit any use of nuclear weapons because such law prohibited the use of excessively injurious weapons (and surely nuclear weapons fit this category) and that nuclear weapons cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Nuclear weapons, in fact, have been targeted at civilian populations in policies known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

    After receiving written and oral testimony from states, the Court deliberated extensively, and released its opinion on July 8, 1996.(26) The Court found unanimously that the rules of international humanitarian law apply to any threat or use of nuclear weapons. They also found in a split vote, decided by the President of the Court, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be illegal under the international law of armed conflict. The Court indicated that it was unable to determine one way or the other whether or not the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be allowed in an extreme case of self-defense in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. With regard to this point, the President of the Court, M. Bedjaoui stated in his separate declaration, “I cannot sufficiently emphasize the fact that the Court’s inability to go beyond this statement of the situation can in no manner be interpreted to mean that it is leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”(27) He also referred to nuclear weapons as the “ultimate evil.”(28)

    The Court also interpreted Article VI of the NPT to the effect that the nuclear weapons states are under an obligation to complete good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. The Court stated: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”(29)

    Responding to the Court’s opinion, the United Nations General Assembly expressed its appreciation to the Court and called for the good faith negotiations to begin in 1997 for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons.(30) (See Appendix A.)

    Thus far, the nuclear weapons states have ignored the Court and the United Nations General Assembly. But the pressure is building around the world to force the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In December 1996, 58 generals and admirals from 17 nations released a statement calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. They stated: “We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continued existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.”(31) The generals went on to urge that “long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”(32) (See Appendix B.)

    At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, representatives of citizen action groups from around the world gathered in New York to lobby the delegates for nuclear abolition. An Abolition Caucus was formed and drafted an important statement known as the Abolition 2000 Statement. (See Appendix C.) This statement calls for the nuclear weapons states to enter into a treaty by the year 2000 to eliminate nuclear weapons in a timebound framework. Based upon this statement an Abolition 2000 Global Network was formed that now has participation by over 700 citizen action groups around the world. It is a growing citizens movement advocating the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.(33)

    A Sunflower Story

    In June 1996 Ukraine, which had inherited nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, transferred the last of its nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. The defense ministers of Ukraine and Russia met with the Secretary of Defense of the United States at a former Ukrainian missile base which once housed 80 SS-19 missiles aimed at the United States. They celebrated the occasion by scattering sunflower seeds and planting sunflowers. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said: “Sunflowers instead of missiles in the soil would insure peace for future generations.”(34)

    The sunflower has become the symbol of a world free of nuclear weapons. It is a simple symbol that powerfully suggests the difference between a flower that is bright and beautiful and whose seeds provide nutrition on the one hand, and a missile that is armed with nuclear warheads that can incinerate the inhabitants of entire cities on the other hand. There should be no doubt that the sunflower is the right choice. It represents life rather than death, and the sun’s abundant radiant energy that can be used to benefit rather than destroy humanity.

    Conclusion

    Momentum is building throughout the world for the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to counter the logic of death and destruction, the logic of the Cold War that ended many years ago, with a logic of hope for the future of humanity. If we are to give hope meaning in our time, we must seize the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War and move surely and rapidly to denuclearize our planet. Asia has an important role to play in this movement, which must be primarily a movement of people that will become so powerful that no government can stand in its way. Opposition to nuclearism provides an opportunity for humanity to unite around a common theme of assuring a future for our children and grandchildren. The time to act is now. There is far too much to do that is positive rather than to continue to spend our human, our scientific, and our financial resources on weapons of mass annihilation and nuclear power reactors that create radioactive poisons that will endanger the Earth for thousands of generations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been enough of a lesson for the world to learn. There is no need to wait until more cities are added to this unfortunate list. East and West, North and South face the common problem of nuclear terror. We can end that terror once and for all if enough of us will stand up, speak out, and demand an end to nuclearism. It is time to reject both nuclear weapons and the dangerous technology of nuclear energy with which weapons production is so intimately intertwined.

    * Paper prepared for conference, “Human Security and Global Governance,” sponsored by the Toda Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 5-8, 1997. The author would like to thank Lori Beckwith for her research assistance.

    ** David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He can be contacted at Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; Fax: 805 568 0466; Web Site: https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com.

    ENDNOTES

    1. See, for example, President Truman’s personal journal, July 18, 1945. “Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in….”

    2. Wyden, Peter, Day One, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 289. Also quoted as “It is the greatest thing in history” in Udall, Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, p. 23.

    3. For a good review of these myths, see: Udall, Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994.

    4. Speech given by Dwight Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953.

    5. Yaroshinskaya, Alla, Chernobyl, The Forbidden Truth, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995. See also “Chernobyl spawns crisis in Belarus,” by Angela Charlton, The Honolulu Advertiser, March 26, 1996.

    6. United Nations General Assembly Resolution I (1), January 24, 1946.

    7. Mack, Andrew, Proliferation in Northeast Asia, Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 28, July 1996, p. 6.

    8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161.

    9. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 2.

    10. “Russia Adopts ‘First Strike’ Nuclear Tactic,” Santa Barbara News Press, May 26, 1997.

    11. Kennan, George, “A Fateful Error, Expanding NATO Would Be a Rebuff to Russian Democracy,” New York Times, February 5, 1997.

    12. “British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1996, p. 64.

    13. Arkin, William M. and Robert S. Norris, “Nuclear Notebook,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1997 and May/June 1997.

    14. Farley, Maggie, “Asia and the Atom: Willing and Wary.” Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1996.

    15. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 17.

    16. Asai, Motofumi, “Japan at the Crossroads: ‘Redefinition’ of the U.S.-Japan Security System,” Pacific Research, May 1996, p. 11.

    17. Mann, Jim, “Clinton Second Term Resembles Ike Redux,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1997.

    18. Watanabe, Teresa, “In Historic Vote, Japanese Town Rejects Nuclear Plant,” Los Angeles Times, August 6, 1996.

    19. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.

    20. Watanabe, Teresa, Loc. Cit.

    21. “Defector Suggests N. Korea Has Atom Arms, Paper Says,” Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1997.

    22. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.

    23. Pollack, Andrew, “Reactor Accident in Japan Imperils Energy Program.” New York Times, February 24, 1996.

    24. Kapur, Ashok, “Western Biases,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1995.

    25. General Lee Butler speaking at the National Press Club, Washington D.C., December 4, 1996.

    26. “Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,” United National General Assembly A/51/218, October 15, 1996.

    27. Ibid., 40.

    28. Ibid., 42.

    29. Ibid., 37.

    30. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 M, December 10, 1996.

    31. “Statement on Nuclear Weapons By International Generals and Admirals,” December 5, 1996.

    32. Ibid.

    33. For more information on Abolition 2000, contact the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; (805)965-3443; e-mail: wagingpeace@napf.org. Information is also available on Worldwide Web at www.napf.org.

    34. “Sunflower Seeds Sown at Ukrainian Missile Site,” New York Times International, June 5, 1996.

     

    ——————————————————————————–

    Appendix A

    United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45M on Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons December 10, 1996

     

    Recalling its resolution 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, in which it requested the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is permitted in any circumstances under international law,

    Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

    Recalling its resolution 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, in which it called upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework,

    Recalling also the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,

    Recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again, Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

    Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and welcoming every effort towards this end, Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum,

    Noting the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the General Assembly in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996,

    Regretting the absence of multilaterally negotiated and legally binding security assurances from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states,

    Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth.

    Expresses its appreciation to the International Court of Justice for responding to the request made by the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

    Takes note of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996 (A/51/218);

    Underlines the unanimous conclusion of the Court that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”;

    Calls upon all States to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

    Requests the Secretary-General to provide necessary assistance to support the implementation of the present resolution;

    Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session an item entitled “Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion on the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

    Sponsors:

    Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lesotho, Libyan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe

     

    Appendix B

    Statement On Nuclear Weapons By International Generals And Admirals December 5, 1996

     

    We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

    Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

    We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever-unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

    The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

    Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these results.

    Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United States and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a “reversible nuclear potential.” However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.

    It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

    First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

    Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states;

    Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.

    The United States and Russia should-without any reduction in their military security-carry forward the reduction process already launched by START-they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The other three nuclear states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.

    The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program or surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapons materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage. An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.

    The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear- free world. The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

    The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war-in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging-cannot be determined. It is clear, however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

    It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forego acquisition it the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

    Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal.

    We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear- weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

    The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative.

    Signed,

    CANADA Johnson, Major General V. (ret.) Commandant, National Defense College DENMARK Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (ret.) former Chief of Defense Staff FRANCE Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (ret.) former Chief of Staff, French Fleet GHANA Erskine, General Emmanuel (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief and former Chief of Staff, UNTSO (Middle East), Commander UMFI (Lebanon) GREECE Capellos, Lt. General Richard (ret.) former Corps Commander Konstantinides, Major General Kostas (ret.) former Chief of Staff, Army Signals INDIA Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (ret.) former military advisor to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold and U Thant Surt, Air Marshal N. C. (ret.) JAPAN Sakoijo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security Shikata, Lt. General Toshiyuki (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security JORDAN Ajelilat, Major General Sahfiq (ret.) Vice President Military Affairs, Muta University Shiyyab, Major General Mohammed K. (ret.) former Deputy Commander, Royal Jordanian Air Force NETHERLANDS van der Graaf, Henry J. (ret.) Director Centre Arms Control & Verification, Member, United National Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters NORWAY Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (ret.) former Representative to NATO, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic PAKISTAN Malik, Major General Ihusun ul Haq (ret.) Commandant Joint Services Committee PORTUGAL Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief, Army; former President of Portugal RUSSIA Belous, General Vladimir (ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhinsky Military Academy Garecy, Army General Makhmut (ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR Armed Forces General Staff Gromov, General Boris, (ret.) Vice Chair, Duma International Affairs Committee, former Commander of 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan, former Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia Koltounov, Major General Victor (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Larinov, Major General Valentin (ret.) Professor, General Staff Academy Lebed, Major Alexander (ret.) former Secretary of the Security Council Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (ret.) former Deputy Chief Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (ret.) Deputy Chief, Komibyshev Engineering Academy Medvodov, Lt. General Vladimir (ret.) Chief, Center of Nuclear Threat Reduction Mikhailov, Colonel General Gregory (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Nozhin, Major General Eugeny (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Rokhilin, Lt. General Lev, (ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee, former Commander Russian 4th Army Corps Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Simonyan, Major General Rair (ret.) Head of Chair, General Staff Academy Surikov, General Boris T. (ret.) former Chief Specialist, Defense Ministry Teherov, Colonel General Nikolay (ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Vinogadov, Lt. General Michael S. (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Operational Strategic Center, USSR General Staff Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy SRI LANKA Karumaratne, Major General Upali A. (ret.) Silva, Major General C.A.M.M. (ret.) USF, U.S.A. TANZANIA Lupogo, Major General H.C. (ret.) former Chief Inspector General, Tanzania Armed Forces UNITED KINGDOM Beach, General Sir Hugh (ret.) Member U.K. Security Commission Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (ret.) Commander-in-Chief of East British Army (1967-1969), Chief of General Staff (1971-1973), Chief of Defense Staff (1973-1976) Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (ret.) former Director, Air Staff Briefing UNITED STATES Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (ret.) Burns, Maj. General William F. (USA) (ret.) JCS Representative, INF Negotiations (1981-88), Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Dismantlement (1992-93) Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (ret.) Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (ret.) Commander, I Corps (ROK/US) Group (Korea) (1976-78) Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-1992) Gayler, Admiral Noel (USN) (ret.) former Commander, Pacific Horner, General Charles A. (USAF) (ret.) Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert Storm (1991) former Commander, U.S. Space Command James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (ret.) Odom, General William E. (USA) (ret.) Director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute Deputy Assistant and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (1981-1985), Director, National Security Agency (1985-1988) O’Meara, General Andrew (USA) (ret.), former Commander, U.S. Army Europe Pursley, Lt. General Robert E. USAF (ret.) Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (ret.) former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command Rogers, General Bernard W. (USA) (ret.) former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (1979-1987) Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (ret.) former Director Army Control and Disarmament Agency Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (ret.) Director, Center for Defense Information Smith, General William Y. (USAF) (ret.) former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command, Europe Wilson, Vice Admiral James B. (USN) (ret.) former Polaris Submarine Captain

    Appendix C

    Abolition 2000 Statement April 25, 1995

    Statement of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Abolition Caucus at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference

    A secure and livable world for our children and grandchildren and all future generations requires that we achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty years of nuclear weapons testing and production.

    Further, the inextricable link between the “peaceful” and warlike uses of nuclear technologies and the threat to future generations inherent in creation and use of long-lived radioactive materials must be recognized. We must move toward reliance on clean, safe, renewable forms of energy production that do not provide the materials for weapons of mass destruction and do not poison the environment for thousands of centuries. The true “inalienable” right is not to nuclear energy, but to life, liberty and security of person in a world free of nuclear weapons.

    We recognize that a nuclear weapons free world must be achieved carefully and in a step by step manner. We are convinced of its technological feasibility. Lack of political will, especially on the part of the nuclear weapons states, is the only true barrier. As chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, so must nuclear weapons be prohibited.

    We call upon all states(particularly the nuclear weapons states, declared and de facto(to take the following steps to achieve nuclear weapons abolition. We further urge the states parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared nuclear weapons states to implement these measures:

    1) Initiate immediately and conclude by the year 2000 negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time- bound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.*

    2) Immediately make an unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

    3) Rapidly complete a truly comprehensive test ban treaty with a zero threshold and with the stated purpose of precluding nuclear weapons development by all states.

    4) Cease to produce and deploy new and additional nuclear weapons systems, and commence to withdraw and disable deployed nuclear weapons systems.

    5) Prohibit the military and commercial production and reprocessing of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.

    6) Subject all weapons-usable radioactive materials and nuclear facilities in all states to international accounting, monitoring, and safeguards, and establish a public international registry of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.

    7) Prohibit nuclear weapons research, design, development, and testing through laboratory experiments including but not limited to non-nuclear hydrodynamic explosions and computer simulations, subject all nuclear weapons laboratories to international monitoring, and close all nuclear test sites.

    8) Create additional nuclear weapons free zones such as those established by the treaties of Tlatelolco and Raratonga.

    9) Recognize and declare the illegality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, publicly and before the World Court.

    10) Establish an international energy agency to promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources.

    11) Create mechanisms to ensure the participation of citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of nuclear weapons abolition.

    A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non- proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. Our common security requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.

    * The convention should mandate irreversible disarmament measures, including but not limited to the following: withdraw and disable all deployed nuclear weapons systems; disable and dismantle warheads; place warheads and weapon-usable radioactive materials under international safeguards; destroy ballistic missiles and other delivery systems. The convention could also incorporate the measures listed above which should be implemented independently without delay. When fully implemented, the convention would replace the NPT.

  • Betrayal

    It’s as safe as mother’s milk, they’ll say When wanting to assure you that it’s all O.K. But mother’s milk can be a deadly dish If mom, a downwinder, eats Columbia River’s fish, Or consumes white snow – garden salads on the spot Then mother’s milk can become a deadly lot.

    So I fed poison to my nursing son With radioactive iodine-131. Just because we lived in the wrong place I maimed my babe for that nuclear race.

    This was written by a woman who has lived all of her life in Eastern Washington and remembers consuming local milk and produce around the Hanford Nuclear Reservation. Her husband loved to fish the Columbia River downstream from Hanford. Her name withheld by request. She says, “When [my youngest son] was seven – and again when he was eight years old – I had two surgeries for thyroid cancers. I didn’t tell people because it would be hard on our children….

    “In 1985 my husband died quite suddenly. Early in 1986 word got out that radioactive iodine-131 and other pollutants had been released in large amounts by the government just to see what would happen to us downwinders from the nuclear plant at Hanford, Washington.

    With the injuries from my thyroid cancers and the worry over my husband’s bladder and bone cancers, I was very angry and felt betrayed by my government. They used us as guinea pigs but we weren’t even that good because the government never followed up to see what did happen to us downwinders. I write poems, but they are all too mild for my anger at my government.” [Reprinted from the Hanford Health Information Network.]

    This atrocity against all people is once again in the news.

    In an extraordinary but not surprising statement, the Department of Energy has admitted that an explosion of a toxic radioactive waste container at the plant on May 14, 1997 exposed workers and released toxic materials into the atmosphere, including plutonium. This from the supposedly “closed” plant, the former flagship of the Department of War’s nuclear bomb plants (that’s what the Defense Department used to be called until the name was changed after World War II – it makes easier to get money from the taxpayers when you are asking for a “defense” budget rather than a “war” budget). Hanford may now rival Chernobyl as the most toxic site on planet Earth, with cleanup costs (if cleanup is even possible for such a site) estimated in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The site promises to be toxic for tens of thousands of years.

    The May 14th explosion and series of errors is just part of the legacy of this nightmarish place. We as human beings must be angry about that place and what it represents. We must learn what is going on there and use our power to get something done about it.

    Since 1943 when 600 square miles of land in Washington State was legally condemned and 1,500 residents of the towns of Richland, Hanford, and White Bluffs were ordered to leave their homes within 30 days, Hanford has released hundreds of thousands of curies of radioactive iodine-131 and other radioactive by-products into the atmosphere. Between 1944 and 1972, Hanford released as much as 740,000 curies of iodine-131 into the air!

    For comparison, the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant partial core meltdown in 1979 released 15 curies of radioactive iodine-131 into the air; the Chernobyl accident released 35 million to 49 million curies of iodine-131 in 1986.

    Thousands of lives have been adversely affected by this subtle, insidious, and mostly intentional radiation poisoning. Only today are some of these victims realizing what has given them cancer, killed their mates and children, and so horribly affected their lives. This information was kept secret until February 1986, when public pressure resulted in the release of 19,000 pages of U.S. Department of Energy documents under the Freedom of Information Act.

    During the 30 years of Hanford’s operation, a staggering 440 billion gallons of radioactive toxic wastes were dumped into the ground! Underground nuclear waste tanks have leaked hundreds of thousands of gallons of waste. No complete records of the exact contents of these waste containers were kept, so the clean-up teams don’t even know what they are dealing with most of the time.

    But the Cold War is over, you may say, right? Is it really. Is there anything behind the talk we hear of peace from our leaders? Has much of anything changed? It doesn’t appear so. In fact, it could be argued that things are much worse. Things are different, but the building of our nuclear arsenal has not stopped.

    Did you know that in 1990, the amount of plutonium in the civilian sector of the world was 654 metric tons and in the military was 257 metric tons? By the year 2010, the amount of military plutonium is expected to remain the same while the civilian plutonium will grow to 2,100 metric tons! Civilian plutonium is plutonium produced in power generating nuclear reactors. Plutonium is a by-product of these reactors and many countries are planning to use this deadly material to power other reactors. This plutonium could conceivably be used to make a nuclear bomb.

    We still spend over a trillion dollars world-wide on the military. Countries all over the world are building nuclear weapons stockpiles. The U.S continues to test nuclear weapons – they call them “sub-critical tests” to get around the current moratorium on testing – because the military wants to build a new generation of smaller, more powerful nuclear bombs. Scotland, of all places, is estimated to have as many as 266 Trident submarine warheads, many purchased from the U.S., each one a powerful nuclear weapon. It is estimated that Britain builds a new nuclear bomb every 8 days!

    Five countries have nuclear-powered naval vessels: Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and China. Even India is currently building a nuclear sub! The submarines of the Western countries typically have only one reactor on board, whereas two reactors power most Russian submarines. Excluding Russia, these nations have 132 nuclear submarines. Russia has 109 nuclear subs in its fleet. Britain has 13 nuclear subs, France has 11, and China has 6. The United States, the country of “peace,” has a staggering 101 nuclear submarines. Two hundred and forty one nuclear subs in the world!

    At least 20 nuclear bomb-carrying U.S. subs are at sea 24 hours a day, each ready to fire on virtually any target in 15 minutes. One U.S. Trident submarine carries the explosive power of 1,000 Hiroshima bombs. The locations of these subs is the most closely guarded of secrets.

    And we are still building more! Nine nuclear submarines are under construction in the U.S. alone. So much for the end of wartime.

    “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing,” said Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe and later President of the United States, referring to the atomic bomb dropped on Japan.

    And we must remember the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two cities murdered by the U.S. But we had to do this to end the war, didn’t we? Well, diaries and documents released since then tell a different story. It seems that President Truman and his senior staff did not believe that we needed to drop the bomb on Japan to end the war. They believed that Japan would surrender without an invasion. In fact, diplomatic contacts and decoded Japanese wireless transmissions proved that surrender was imminent. So why was the bomb used?

    Records suggest that Truman and his advisors believed that if they showed the world that they were willing to use the bomb, it would aid them in negotiating with Stalin over the future of Eastern and Central Europe. There was also a pervasive, racist disregard for Japanese life. The bomb was used to literally burn a memory into the minds of communist and non-European nations of an image of scientific and technological superiority for the Allied countries.

    So, for the sake of image and to test the effects of our new weapons, 200 000 human lives were horribly ended and since 1945, more than 680,000 people have died or have been affected by the radiation released in those blasts.

    These are sobering revelations. I wonder personally what to do with all this awareness. During an Environmental Science class I taught yesterday, I was trying to share environmental awareness with people who had never considered these issues before. Three of my students were police officers who, in the course of their duties, have witnessed the aftermath of illegal toxic spills and see the effects of a disconnected world daily. They fight each day for personal survival, let alone have the time for global thinking. I sometimes feel deflated at the daunting task of opening my fellow travelers’ eyes. But we must go on. We must love the beauty of this world and work towards stopping the folly.

    Nuclear madness must stop. We can stop it. Everyday, we should do these things:

    1. E-mail or write our elected representatives (the Resources section below will tell you how) and tell them to stop this nuclear madness.
    2. Not support nuclear power in any form. Governments and corporations cannot be trusted with that power. There is no way that the relatively small amount of electrical power that is produced can justify the nuclear waste, the excess plutonium, or the temptations to make bombs.
    3. Insist that our elected representatives do something NOW about those who are suffering from the effects of Hanford and all the other bomb-making plants in the country. Insist that they stop all the studies and simply use the abundant money available in the world to help these people. We must stop letting them whine about who should be responsible and simply make them take responsibility. (Still think that money is an issue? See the Resources section below.)
    4. All nuclear testing must stop. Now. The U.S. must show the world that it is willing to take the first step.
    5. The U.S. must get out of the arms business. We sell our weapons of destruction to other nations. This is nuts and it must stop.
    6. All nuclear submarines should come home NOW. Set them up in ports around the country, build impenetrable “caskets” around them (NASA has the technology to build these cases – they do for their deep space probes) as museums so that people can learn of how insane we can be.
    7. Refuse to trade with any country with nuclear war technology.

    But there are so many other horrors in our world? How can we invite this awareness into our lives and survive? I think we can, every day.

    • We must surround ourselves with this knowledge and awareness and get very very angry. Feel the obscenity of these numbers, feel the horror of these events.
    • Then, feel your feet firmly on the ground and take a deep breath. Center yourself. You have work to do.
    • Look at your own personal priorities. What does your day look like? Do you take the time to nurture yourself – take a bath, do something creative, take a nap, exercise? Do you take the time to spend meaningful moments with those in your life that you love? Or do you feel hopelessly driven from one activity to another, not really in control of your own time?
    • Change your priorities. Make the time for nurturing activities and communication with loved ones. Don’t wait for someone or something to come into your life that will allow this to happen. Do it now.
    • Decide what is important to you. What values do you want to have? What values do you want the world to have? What do you want to be remembered for when you are gone? What do you want children to think of you?
    • Make “mindfulness moments” part of your every day, time when you will fully allow the awareness horrors in the world to come in. Visualize the starving child, the suffering and frustrated person poisoned by Hanford, the homeless, the nuclear stockpiles, the Trident submarines traveling at sea, waiting to strike, and whatever else you have chosen to care about.
    • Take an action of some kind every day. Teach someone about what you know. Send e-mail messages to your elected representatives making your demands clear. Choose to not buy something from a socially irresponsible company and write them a note telling them about it. Use your power every day.
    • Allow yourself an occasional “day-off.” Bring your vision for change to mind in some quiet moments, pray for peace, and then go do something for yourself or your loved ones. After a while, you won’t need a day-off.
    • Look at each day as a precious, vital collection of moments that must be savored, for they will never occur again.

    Awareness does not have to be feared. Your day can include walking around the block in the morning, loving your partner, going to work, taking time to see the trees at lunch or wishing there were some, writing an e-mail message to your senator, and having dinner. We can make the desire for change a daily part of our life rather than a feared, unfulfilled dream.

    We must take our power now. Hanford will always be there to remind us of what can happen when people believe the unbelievable – that those in Washington have anything other than a personal agenda of terror and greed. And those nuclear subs will continue to sail – until we say STOP!

    Please, dear mother Earth, Help me to stand firm on my own two feet Drawing on the solid earth below me Help me to know the constancy of your strength the power that is you, oh dear mother earth Help me to walk with the blood of rivers in my veins and the dark crumbling soil of earth in my flesh let my muscles be strong as tree trunks that rise up out of your belly To dance in the sky and sing praises to the life all around Beating, pulsing, rich and full with your sweet energy. Oh dear mother earth live in this body today. Sing loudly in every breath I take Stretch wildly and flow freely with all the directions I move and come home with me, come home to my belly live deep in my soul oh mother earth, SING!

    — Stephanie Kaza

    Ah, not be cut off, not through the slightest partition shut out from the law of the stars. The inner – what is it? if not intensified sky, hurled through with birds and deep with the winds of homecoming.

    — Ranier Maria Rilke

    * Jackie Giuliano is a Professor of Environmental Studies for Antioch University, Los Angeles, the University of Phoenix, and the Union Institute College of Undergraduate Studies. He is also the Educational Outreach Manager for the Ice and Fire Preprojects, a NASA program at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to send space probes to Jupiter’s moon Europa, the planet Pluto, and the Sun.

  • The Illegality of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons

    The following notes summarise what we in the World Court Project (UK) believe are the strongest arguments flowing from the Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which can be used in exposing the illegality of NATO’s nuclear policy.

    It is important to recognise that none of our arguments will guarantee success in court. However, we are convinced that what we have to say is plausible and carries conviction.

    As a general point, it is important to emphasise that the ICJ found threat and use to be indivisible. Whatever is illegal about use is also illegal about threat. This relates directly to nuclear deterrence.

    NATO’s First Use Option

    NATO retains the option of using nuclear weapons first. In paragraph 94 of the Opinion, the ICJ challenged the nuclear States that they had neither specified any legal circumstance for use, nor convinced it that “limited use would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high-yield nuclear weapons.” It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a situation in which using nuclear weapons first would not have such a tendency.

    This is especially applicable to the most likely scenario for the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the NATO nuclear States. The US, UK and France have plans to threaten to use nuclear weapons against even non-nuclear “rogue” States to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or to protect US/UK/French so-called “vital interests” anywhere in the world. For such so-called sub-strategic use, some of the missiles in the currently patrolling UK Trident submarine are fitted with a single, variable lower-yield warhead – because six 100 kiloton warheads on a missile are not a credible deterrent threat to a “rogue” regime or terrorists.

    These scenarios fall far short of those postulated in the ICJ’s only concession, that it could not “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” We can therefore argue that NATO first use would be illegal, whatever the yield of nuclear weapon used.

    Complying with Humanitarian Law

    The ICJ concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal. Indeed, it found no circumstance in which the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not violate humanitarian law.

    Even in extreme circumstances, the threat or use of nuclear weapons must comply with international humanitarian law (paragraph 105D). Thus any use must, for example, discriminate between combatants and non-combatants, must not cause unnecessary or superfluous suffering, and must respect neutral States.

    The NATO nuclear States deploy some, at least, of their nuclear warheads on behalf of the Alliance, and are willing to use them in collective self-defence. Although some of these warheads might be relatively small, the majority are far larger in their yield than the Hiroshima bomb.

    For example, most UK Trident warheads are 100 kilotons – about 8 times larger than Hiroshima; moreover, most UK Trident missiles have six warheads. Such enormous destructive power, combined with the ability to cause untold human suffering and damage to generations to come from radiation effects, makes them incapable of complying with humanitarian law.

    Francis Boyle, a US Professor of International Law who has specialized in nuclear weapon issues, advises that the best way to deal with this question is to apply the language of the Opinion to the specific nuclear weapons system under legal challenge.

    The Nuremberg Connection

    The ICJ’s confirmation that the Nuremberg Charter, as part of humanitarian law, applies to nuclear weapons has serious implications for all involved in implementing NATO’s nuclear policy. For example, military professionals need to be seen to be acting within the law if they are to be distinguished from hired killers or terrorists.

    Military professionals shunned chemical and biological weapons before they were prohibited, because they were too indiscriminate and repulsive. NATO’s plans to use even low-yield nuclear weapons are vulnerable to the ICJ’s finding that the effects of nuclear weapons are unique, and more severe, widespread and long-lasting than those of chemical weapons. In so doing, the ICJ confirmed that nuclear weapons are in the same stigmatised category of weapons of mass destruction as chemical and biological weapons – only in many respects far worse.

    Unanimous Call for Nuclear Disarmament

    The judges’ unanimous call in paragraph 105F for nuclear disarmament went further than Article VI of the NPT, by stating that negotiations should be concluded irrespective of any treaty on general and complete disarmament, behind which hitherto the nuclear States have hidden.

    This challenges the current perception among NATO decision-makers that “nuclear might is right” and lawful, and that NATO nuclear policy is sustainable.

    Although NATO’s nuclear plans are secret, its post-Cold War posture shows that it has no intention of renouncing nuclear weapons; it is determined to maintain a nuclear warfighting capability; and it is prepared to threaten to use low-yield warheads first, backed by massive nuclear strikes when its public stance is one of last-resort, so-called “minimal deterrence” in self-defence.

    NATO as a Nuclear Alliance

    NATO is an alliance which relies on nuclear deterrence doctrine. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group takes collective decisions. Therefore NATO, as an institution as well as its individual members, carries responsibility for its nuclear policy.

    To date, there is no evidence that the NATO Nuclear Planning Group has responded to the implications of the ICJ’s Opinion. The onus is now on NATO to demonstrate that its nuclear plans would:

    1) fit the criteria of extreme circumstance; 2) not violate the humanitarian laws of warfare.

    Our foregoing assessment suggests that NATO should urgently review its nuclear policy in order to comply with the ICJ’s opinion.

    The Authority of the International Court of Justice

    The UK government has consistently argued that the Opinion is not binding and changes nothing. However, on 24 September 1996 in the UN, the UK Foreign Secretary pledged “both moral and material support” to the ICJ, adding that “the more we accept that international law must be the foundation of international relations, the safer we shall all be.”

    The ICJ is the UN’s Court. It can give Advisory Opinions on any question at the request of a UN agency, such as the General Assembly, in order to assist that agency in its duties. These Opinions clarify international law with the highest possible authority. An Advisory Opinion is only given after careful and lengthy deliberation by 15 judges after full hearings involving all interested States and UN agencies. In this case, 43 states – a record number, including the USA, UK and France – filed written submissions and 22 (again including the NATO nuclear States) made oral statements.

    The USA, UK and France have signed the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and have affirmed the Nuremberg Principles. They are therefore bound to abide by these. Thus, the ICJ’s decision that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally violate the Law of War as codified in these conventions and principles means that the NATO nuclear States are under an obligation to respect this.

    It is also worth pointing out that in December 1994, by a comfortable majority, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) requested the Court to deliver its Advisory Opinion on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. On 10 December 1996, an even larger majority of the UNGA adopted Resolution 51/45M which “takes note of” the Opinion and “expresses its appreciation to the ICJ”. The Resolution went on to call for “negotiations in 1997 leading to the early conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention”.

    Conclusion

    By ignoring the ICJ’s decision, NATO is defying the most authoritative view of how international law applies to nuclear weapons; it is opposing the overwhelming majority of world opinion; and it is failing to heed what the UK Foreign Secretary said in the UN on 24 September 1996. This sets an irresponsible example, and augurs ill for the safety of the world.

     

    ******************************************************************* The World Court Project is an international citizens’ network which is working to publicise and have implemented the July 8 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice which could find no lawful circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

    The World Court Project is part of Abolition 2000, a global network to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    World Court Project UK George Farebrother, UK Secretary 67, Summerheath Rd, Hailsham, Sussex BN27 3DR Phone & Fax 01323 844 269, Email geowcpuk@gn.apc.org

  • Chaining the Nuclear Beast

    When I became a private citizen and a businessman two and one-half years ago, it was my intention to close the journal of my military career and never to reopen it…. My decision to step back into public life is prompted by an inner voice I cannot still, a concern I cannot quiet. I am compelled by a growing alarm, born of my former responsibilities, and a deepening dismay as a citizen of this planet, with respect to the course of events governing the role of nuclear weapons after the Cold War.

    Over the last 27 years of my military career, I was embroiled in every aspect of American nuclear policy making and force posturing, from the councils of government to military command centers, from cramped bomber cockpits to the suffocating confines of ballistic missile submarines I have certified hundreds of crews for their nuclear mission and approved thousands of targets for potential nuclear destruction. I have investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces. I have read a library of books and intelligence reports on the former Soviet Union and what were believed to be its capabilities and intentions…and seen an army of “experts” proved wrong. As an advisor to the President on the employment of nuclear weapons, I have anguished over the imponderable complexities, the profound moral dilemmas, and the mind-numbing consequences of decisions which would invoke the very survival of our planet.

    Seen from this perspective, it should not be surprising that no one could have been more relieved than was I by the dramatic end to the Cold War. The reshaping of Central Europe, the democratization of Russia, and the rapid acceleration of arms control agreements were miraculous events SQ events that I never imagined would happen in my lifetime. Even more gratifying was the opportunity as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the United States’ military forces, and then as commander of its strategic nuclear forces, to be intimately involved in recasting our defense posture, shrinking our arsenals, and scaling back huge impending Cold War driven expenditures. Most importantly, I could see for the first time the prospect of restoring a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons.

    Over time, that shimmering hope gave way to a judgment which has now become a deeply held conviction: that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.

    The concern… which compels me to speak frankly… is that the sense of profound satisfaction with which I departed my military career has been steadily eroded in the ensuing months and years. The astonishing turn of events which brought a wondrous closure to my three and one-half decades of service, and far more importantly to four decades of perilous ideological confrontation, presented historic opportunities to advance the human condition. But now time and human nature are wearing away the sense of wonder and closing the window of opportunity. Options are being lost as urgent questions are marginalized, as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War habits and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward into the dark world we so narrowly escaped without a thermonuclear holocaust.

    What, then, does the future hold? How do we proceed? Can a consensus be forged that nuclear weapons have no defensible role, that the political and human consequences of their employment transcends any asserted military utility, that as weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand-fold stronger and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production?

    I believe that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative, and is in fact growing daily. I see it in the reports issuing from highly respected institutions and authors; I feel it in the convictions of my colleagues on the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; it finds eloquent voice in the Nobel prize awarded to Joseph Rotblat and Pugwash; and a strident frustration in the vehement protests against the recent round of nuclear tests conducted by France.

    Notwithstanding the perils of transition in Russia, enmities in the Middle East, or the delicate balance of power in South and East Asia, I believe that a swelling chorus of reason and resentment will eventually turn the tide. As the family of mankind develops a capacity for collective outrage, so soon will it find avenues for collective action. The terror-filled anesthesia which numbed rational thought, made nuclear war thinkable and grossly excessive arsenals possible during the Cold War is gradually wearing off. A renewed appreciation for the obscene power of a single nuclear weapon is taking a new hold on our consciousness, as we confront the nightmarish prospect of nuclear terror at the micro level.

    Where do we begin? What steps can governments take, responsibly, recognizing that policy makers must always balance a host of competing priorities and interests?

    First and foremost is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the attitudes, habits and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints.

    Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.

    Third, with respect to present and prospective arms control agreements given its crucial leadership role, it is imperative for the United States to undertake now a sweeping review, led by the President, of nuclear policies and strategies. The Clinton administration’s 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was an essential but far from sufficient step toward rethinking the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. While clearing the decks of some pressing force structure questions, the Review purposefully avoided the large policy issues. However, the Review’s justification for maintaining robust nuclear forces as a hedge against the resurgence of a hostile Russia is in my view regrettable from several respects. It sends an overt message of distrust in an era when building a positive security relationship with Russia is arguably the United States most important foreign policy concern. It codifies force levels and postures completely out of keeping with the profound transformation we have witnessed in world affairs. And, it perpetuates attitudes which inhibit a willingness to proceed immediately toward negotiation of greatly reduced levels of strategic arms.

    Finally… I want to record my strong conviction that the risks entailed by nuclear weapons are far too great to leave the prospects of their elimination solely within the province of governments. Highly influential opinion leaders like yourselves can make a powerful difference in swelling the tide of global sentiment that the nuclear era must end. I urge you to read the one page statement from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons…. Better still, read the Commission Report in full, reflect on its recommendations, communicate with influential colleagues and with the Canberra Commissioners. Take an active role in debating and supporting the practical steps we set forth in our Report, such as taking nuclear weapons off a hair trigger alert and placing the associated warheads in secure storage.

    These are steps which can be taken now, which will reduce needless risks and terminate Cold War practices which serve only as a chilling reminder of a world in which the principal antagonists could find no better solution to their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction.

    Such a world was and is intolerable. We are not condemned to repeat the lessons of forty years at the nuclear brink. We can do better than condone a world in which nuclear weapons are enshrined as the ultimate arbiter of conflict. The price already paid is too dear, the risks run too great. The nuclear beast must be chained, its soul expunged, its lair laid waste. The task is daunting but we cannot shrink from it.

    The opportunity may not come again.

  • Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons

    Introduction

    The two nuclear fission bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki each released nearly 4,000 times as much explosive energy as chemical high explosive bombs of the same weight. Together they killed more than 200,000 people. The energy released by the splitting of the atomic nuclei in the cores of these bombs was more than 10 million times the energy released by rearrangements of the outer electrons of atoms, which are responsible for chemical changes. For an instant after detonation of the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki, an amount of explosive energy equivalent to a pile of dynamite as big as the White House was contained in a sphere of plutonium no bigger than a baseball.

    This is why, a short time later, Albert Einstein said: “The splitting of the atom has changed everything, save our mode of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Suddenly the destructive capacity accessible to humans went clear off the human scale of things.

    About 10 years later this destructive capacity jumped dramatically again when the United States and the Soviet Union developed hydrogen bombs. By the 1970s, there were five announced members of the nuclear club, and the total number of nuclear warheads in the world had increased to some 60,000.

    Since 1964, when China tested its first nuclear explosive, further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons has been secret or ambiguous or both. India tested a nuclear explosive in 1974, but claimed that is was strictly for peaceful purposes, and has consistently denied that it has any nuclear weapons. Although its government has never admitted that it has nuclear weapons, there is little doubt that Israel has been accumulating a growing stockpile since the 1960s. South Africa announced that it had made a half-dozen or so nuclear weapons, starting in the 1970s, but that it now has eliminated them. Other countries strongly suspected of having at least one nuclear weapon, and the capacity to make more, include Pakistan, North Korea, and Iraq. Commitments have been made by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to turn over to Russia all nuclear weapons on their territories for dismantling. Ukraine completed this transfer on June 1, 1996.

    The immense potential destructive capacity of uranium and plutonium can also be released slowly as energy that can serve the peaceful needs of humans. It took about 10 years after the first nuclear bombs were exploded for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to begin to be practical. Nuclear power has expanded considerably in the last 30 years or so. The two technologies-for destructive uses and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy-are closely connected. I’ll discuss these connections in some detail in this paper.

    Facing the realities of the Nuclear Age as they have become evident these past 50 years has been a difficult and painful process for me, involving many changes of heart in my feelings about nuclear weapons and nuclear power since I first heard of nuclear fission on August 6, 1945. I started with a sense of revulsion towards nuclear weapons and skepticism about nuclear power for nearly five years. Then I worked on and strongly promoted nuclear weapons for some 15 years. In 1966, in the midst of a job in the Pentagon, I did an about-face in my perception of nuclear weaponry, and have pressed for nuclear disarmament ever since. My rejection of nuclear power, because of its connection with nuclear weapons, took longer, and was not complete until about 1980.

    Since that time I have been persistent in calling for the prompt global abolition of all nuclear weapons and the key nuclear materials needed for their production. Since all of the more than 400 nuclear power plants now operating in 32 countries produce large quantities of plutonium that, when chemically separated from spent fuel, can be used to make reliable, efficient nuclear weapons of all types, I have also found it necessary to call for phasing out all nuclear power worldwide. To accomplish this while being responsive to the environmental disruption caused by continued large-scale use of fossil fuels, I also find it necessary to call for intense, global response to opportunities for saving energy and producing what is needed from renewable sources directly or indirectly derived from solar radiation. I shall try in the rest of this paper to explain briefly the convictions that have led me to join others in making these calls with great urgency.

    Latent Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    There are many possible degrees of drift or concerted national actions that are short of the actual possession of nuclear weapons, but that can account for much of what has to be done technically to acquire them. Harold Feiveson has called such activity “latent proliferation” of nuclear weapons.1 A national government that sponsors acquisition of nuclear power plants may have no intention to acquire nuclear weapons; but that government may be replaced by one that does, or may change its collective mind. A country that is actively pursuing nuclear power for peaceful purposes may also secretly develop nuclear explosives to the point where the last stages of assembly and military deployment could be carried out very quickly. The time and resources needed to make the transition from latent to active proliferation can range from very large to very small. Inadequately controlled plutonium or highly enriched uranium, combined with secret design and testing of non-nuclear components of nuclear warheads, can allow a nation or terrorist group to have deliverable nuclear weapons within days, or even hours, after acquiring a few kilograms or more of the key nuclear weapon materials.

    Contrary to widespread belief among nuclear engineers who have never worked on nuclear weapons, plutonium made in nuclear power plant fuel can be used to make all types of nuclear weapons. This “reactor grade” plutonium has relatively high concentrations of the isotope Pu-240, which spontaneously releases many more neutrons than Pu-239, the principal plutonium isotope in “weapon-grade” plutonium. In early nuclear weapons, such as the plutonium bomb tested in New Mexico in 1945, and then used in the bombing of Nagasaki, use of reactor grade plutonium would have tended to cause the chain reaction to start prematurely. This would lower the most likely explosive yield, but not below about 1 kiloton, compared with the 20 kiloton yield from these two bombs. Since that time, however, there have been major developments of nuclear weapons technology that make it possible to design all types of nuclear weapons to use reactor grade plutonium without major degradation of the weapons’ performance and reliability, compared with those that use weapon grade plutonium.2 These techniques have been well understood by nuclear weapon designers in the United States since the early 1950s, and probably also for decades in the other four declared nuclear weapon states.

    Reactor grade plutonium can also be used for making relatively crude nuclear explosives, such as might be made by terrorists. Although the explosive yields of such bombs would tend to be unpredictable, varying from case to case for the same bomb design, their minimum explosive yields could credibly be the equivalent of several hundred tons or more of high explosive.3 Such bombs, transportable by automobile, would certainly qualify as weapons of mass destruction, killing many tens of thousands or more people in some locations.

    All nuclear weapons require plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Some use both. The required amounts vary considerably, depending on the desired characteristics and on the technical resources and knowhow available to those who design and build the weapons. Estimates of the maximum total number of U. S. nuclear warheads and of the total amount of plutonium produced for those warheads correspond to an average of about 3 kilograms of plutonium per warhead.4 The minimum amount of plutonium in a nuclear explosive that contains no highly enriched uranium can be significantly smaller than 3 kilograms.

    Nuclear power plants typically produce a net of about 200 kilograms of plutonium per year for each 1,000 megawatts of electric power generating capacity. Some 430 nuclear power plants, with combined electrical generating capacity of nearly 340,000 megawatts, are now operating in 32 countries. The plants account for about 7% of total primary energy consumption worldwide, or about 17% of the world’s electrical energy. Total net annual production of plutonium by these plants is nearly 70,000 kilograms, enough for making more than 10,000 nuclear warheads per year. 5

    So far about four times as much plutonium has been produced in power reactors than has been used for making nuclear weapons-about 1 million kilograms, most of which is in spent nuclear fuel in storage, compared with about 250,000 kilograms for weapons.6

    Nearly 200,000 kilograms of plutonium have been chemically separated from spent power reactor fuel in chemical reprocessing facilities in at least 8 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, India, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States).7 This is typically stored as plutonium oxide that can relatively easily be converted to plutonium metal for use in nuclear explosives.

    Research and test reactors can also produce significant amounts of plutonium that, after chemical separation, can be used for making nuclear weapons. This has apparently been the route to nuclear weapons followed by Israel and started by North Korea.

    Although use of highly enriched uranium in nuclear power plants has been sporadic and rare, substantial quantities have been used for R&D purposes-as fuel for research and test reactors, and in connection with development of breeder reactors. Principal suppliers have been and now are the five declared nuclear weapon states. It has been estimated that the world inventory of highly enriched uranium for civil purposes is about 20,000 kilograms.8

    Although this is dramatically smaller than the more than 1 million kilograms of highly enriched uranium associated with nuclear weapons, it may be extremely important to some countries that are secretly developing the technology for making nuclear weapons.

    Facilities for enriching uranium in its concentration of the isotope U-235 to the levels of a few percent needed for light water power reactor fuel can be used for further enrichment to high concentrations used for making nuclear explosives. The technology for doing this is proliferating, both in terms of the numbers of countries that have such facilities, and in the variety of different ways to carry out the enrichment.

    The continuing international spread of knowledge of nuclear technology related to nuclear power development is an important contributor to latent nuclear weapon proliferation. Some of the people who have become experts in nuclear technology, whether for military or civil purposes, could be of great help in setting up and carrying out clandestine nuclear weapon design and construction operations that make use of nuclear materials stolen from military supplies or diverted from civil supplies, perhaps having entered a black market.

    An example of highly advanced latent nuclear weapon proliferation is the nuclear weapons development program that started in Sweden in the late 1940s. It remained secret until the mid-1980s, when much detail about the project started becoming publicly available. It included hydronuclear tests of implosion systems containing enough fissile material to go critical but not enough to make a damaging nuclear explosion. The objective of the Swedish nuclear bomb program was to determine, in great detail, what Sweden would need to do if the government ever decided to produce and stockpile nuclear weapons.9 I have no reason to believe that Sweden has ever made that decision. I would not be surprised, however, if many other countries with nuclear reactors or uranium enrichment facilities that could be used to supply needed key nuclear materials have secretly carried out similar programs of lesser or perhaps even greater technical sophistication than Sweden’s.

    Bombardment of Nuclear Facilities

    Another type of latent proliferation that I find especially worrisome is the possible bombardment of nuclear facilities that thereby would be converted, in effect, into nuclear weapons. Military bombardment or sabotage of nuclear facilities, ranging from operating nuclear power plants and their spent fuel storage pools to large accumulations of high level radioactive wastes in temporary or long term storage, could release large quantities of radioactive materials that could seriously endanger huge land areas downwind. Electric power plants and stored petroleum have often been prime targets for tactical and strategic bombing, and sometimes for sabotage. In the case of operating nuclear power plants, core meltdowns and physical rupture of containment structures could be caused by aerial or artillery bombardment, truck bombings, internal sabotage with explosives, or by control manipulations following capture of the facility by terrorists. For orientation to the scale of potential radioactive contamination, consider strontium-90 and cesium-137, two especially troublesome fission products with half-lives of about 30 years. The inventories of these radionuclides in the core of a typical nuclear power plant (1,000 electrical megawatts) are greater than the amounts released by a 20 megaton H-bomb explosion, assuming half the explosion energy is accounted for by fission.

    Inventories of dangerous radioactive materials can be considerably greater in a waste or spent fuel storage facility that has served the needs of many nuclear power plants for many years. In some cases it may not be credible that chemical explosives could release large fractions of such materials and cause them to be airborne long enough to contaminate very large areas. In such situations, however, the explosion of a relatively small nuclear explosive in the midst of the storage area could spread the radioactive materials over huge areas.

    Perhaps the greatest extent of latent proliferation of nuclear weapons is represented by nuclear power fuel cycle facilities that can become enormously destructive nuclear weapons by being bombed by military forces or terrorists.

    Can the Nuclear Power-Nuclear Weapon Connections Be Broken?

    Given the rapidly increasing rate of worldwide latent proliferation of nuclear weapons, what can be done to assure that it does not lead to considerable surges in active proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    Shifts from latent to active nuclear weapon proliferation may be detected or discouraged by application of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) nuclear diversion safeguards. IAEA safeguards are applied to parties of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that are not nuclear weapons states. But the IAEA has authority only to inspect designated (or in some cases suspected) nuclear facilities, not to interfere physically to prevent a government from breaking its agreements under the treaty if it so chooses. Furthermore, a major function of the IAEA is also to provide assistance to countries that wish to develop nuclear power and use it. Thus the IAEA simultaneously plays two possibly conflicting roles-one of encouraging latent proliferation and the other of discouraging active proliferation.

    As we have seen, a nation’s possession of plutonium, whether in spent fuel or chemically separated, or its possession of highly enriched uranium or of facilities capable of producing it, need not depend on a government’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons. Such a decision might be made secretly or openly at any time government leaders conclude that threats to their security or ambitions of conquest warrant breaking safeguard agreements; at that point they can quickly extract the key nuclear materials needed for a few or for large numbers of nuclear weapons.

    Various proposals have been made for developing nuclear power in forms that are less prone to diversion of nuclear materials for weapons than present nuclear power systems. None of these proposals avoid the production of substantial quantities of neutrons that could be used for making key nuclear materials for nuclear weapons, however. And none avoid the production of high level radioactive wastes, the permanent disposal of which is still awaiting both technical and political resolution. Furthermore, such concepts, once fully developed, would require decades for substitution for the present types of nuclear power systems.

    Increasing alarm about global climatic instabilities caused by continued release of “greenhouse gases,” particularly carbon dioxide produced by burning fossil fuels, has stimulated many advocates of nuclear energy to propose widescale displacement of fossil fuels by nuclear power. Such proposals would require building thousands of new nuclear power plants to achieve substantial global reduction in combustion of fossil fuels. This would greatly compound the dangers of destructive abuse of nuclear energy.

    In short, the connections between nuclear technology for constructive use and for destructive use are so closely tied together that the benefits of the one are not accessible without greatly increasing the hazards of the other.

    This leaves us with a key question: If nuclear power technology is too dangerous – by being so closely related to nuclear weapon technology – and fossil fuel combustion must be reduced sharply to avoid global climatic instabilities, what can humans do to meet their demands for energy worldwide?

    Efficient Use of Renewable Energy

    The economically attractive opportunities for using energy much more efficiently for all end uses in any of the wide variety of human settings are now so widely set forth that they need no further elaboration here. Although such opportunities generally exist for use of all kinds of energy sources, their detailed nature can depend on the specific type of energy provided for end use.10

    Among the many possibilities for economical renewable energy is hydrogen produced by electrolysis of water, using solar electric cells to provide the needed low voltage, direct current electrical energy. Recent advances in lowering the production costs and increasing the efficiency of photovoltaic cells make it likely that vigorous international pursuit of this option could allow production and distribution of hydrogen for use as a general purpose fuel, at costs competitive with the cost of natural gas.11

    Solar electric cells can also supply local or regional electric power for general use, using generators or fuel cells fueled with stored hydrogen, or pumped hydrolelectic storage, or windpower to meet electrical demands at night, on cloudy days, or in winter. Using such energy storage or windpower makes it possible to provide and use hydrogen to meet all local demands for energy in any climate.

    A common criticism of direct use of solar energy for meeting most human demands for energy results from a belief that the areas required are so large as to be impractical. This criticism is generally not valid. An overall efficiency of 15%, in terms of the chemical energy stored in hydrogen divided by the total solar radiation incident on the ground area used by solar cell arrays, is likely to be routinely achievable with flat, horizontal arrays. At a world annual average insolation rate of 200 watts per square meter, the total area required to meet the entire present world demand for primary energy of all types (equivalent to an annual average of about 10 trillion watts) would be about 0.4 million square kilometers. This is less than 0.4% of the world’s land area-much less than the annual fluctuations in the area devoted to agriculture, and comparable to the area used for roads. Even in Belgium, with perhaps the world’s highest national energy consumption rates per unit land area and lowest solar radiation availability, present demands could be met by solar hydrogen systems covering less than 5% of the country’s land area. Vigorous response to cost-effective opportunities for saving energy could lower considerably the land area requirements for solar energy anywhere.

    A Global Shift From Fossil and Nuclear Fuels to Renewable Energy

    Consider the benefits of a rapid worldwide shift from dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear power to vigorous pursuit of opportunities for using energy much more efficiently and providing that energy from renewable sources.

    If nuclear power is phased out completely, it will become possible to outlaw internationally the possession of any key nuclear weapon materials, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium that can sustain a fast neutron chain reaction, along with any facilities that could be used for producing them. This would not require a global ban on basic research in nuclear physics nor the use of selected, internationally controlled accelerators for production of radionuclides for medical and industrial applications.

    A global ban on materials capable of sustaining nuclear explosive chain reactions would make it unnecessary to distinguish between alleged peaceful uses of these materials and uses that could be threatening. It would greatly increase the likelihood that violations of a ban on all nuclear weapons would be detected technically and by people who can report violations of the ban, without having to determine the intended uses of the materials and production facilities.

    A complete phaseout of nuclear power would help focus the world’s attention on safeguarding nuclear materials and safe, permanent disposal of all the nuclear wastes and spent nuclear fuel, separated plutonium, or other stockpiles of nuclear weapon materials that had been produced before nuclear power is completely phased out. All such materials could be internationally secured in a relatively small number of facilities while awaiting ultimate safe disposal. Although the quantities of these materials are already very large, applying the needed safeguards to them would be much easier than in a world in which nuclear power continues to flourish worldwide. The job would be finite, rather than open-ended. The costs of safe, environmentally acceptable, permanent disposal of nuclear weapon materials and nuclear wastes-costs that are now unknown, but are very large-would be bounded.

    Concerns about safety and vulnerability of nuclear power plants and their supporting facilities to military action or acts of terrorism would disappear.

    In anticipation of a phaseout of nuclear power and sharp curtailment of combustion of fossil fuels, research, development, and commercialization of renewable energy sources could be greatly accelerated by a shift of national and international resources toward them and away from dependence on nuclear power and fossil fuel systems that are inherent threats to human security and our global habitat.

    Global Nuclear Abolition

    It troubles me more deeply than I can express that my country continues to be prepared, under certain conditions, to launch nuclear weapons that would kill millions of innocent bystanders. To me, this is preparation for mass murder that cannot be justified under any conditions. It must therefore be considered as human action that is out-and-out evil. The threat of nuclear retaliation also is a completely ineffectual deterrent to nuclear attack by terrorists or leaders of governments that need not identify themselves or that are physically located in the midst of populations that have no part in the initial attack or threat of attack. In short, we humans must find alternatives to retaliation in kind to acts of massive and indiscriminate violence.

    These alternatives must focus on ways to deter use of weapons of mass destruction by determining who is responsible for such attacks or threats of attack, and bringing them to justice.

    One hangup that many people have with global nuclear weapon abolition anytime soon is that nuclear technology is already too widely dispersed to allow accurate and complete technical verification of compliance, using currently available verification methods. Another widespread hangup is that malevolent national leaders might threaten to use secretly withheld or produced nuclear weapons to force intolerable demands on other countries if they did not face certain devastating nuclear retaliation to carrying out such threats.

    I agree that no conceivable global verification system or international security force for identifying and arresting violators of an internationally negotiated and codified legal framework for globally banning nuclear weapons and nuclear power can be guaranteed to deter violation of the the ban. But this is a property of any law governing human beings. The question is not about achieving perfect global security against nuclear violence. The question is: Which would be preferred by most human beings-a world in which possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons is allowed for some but forbidden for others, or one in which they are completely outlawed, with no exceptions?

    I believe the time has come to establish a global popular taboo against nuclear weapons and devices or processes that might be used to make them. The taboo should be directed specifically at any action – by governments, non-government enterprises, or individuals – that is in violation of international laws specifically related to nuclear technology.

    I also propose that as the taboo is formulated and articulated vigorously worldwide, both informal and formal negotiations of an international nuclear abolition treaty start immediately in the relevant United Nations organizations. Why not adopt a formal goal of completing the negotiations and the codification of the associated laws and regulations before the start of the next millennium? I would also join others now pressing for actions that would complete the process of actual global nuclear abolition no later than 2010.

    As is the case for many examples of bringing violators of popularly supported laws to justice, there should be frequent official and popular encouragement, including various kinds of major rewards, of “whistleblowers” who become aware of violations and report them to a well-known international authority. Such whistleblowers should also be well protected against reprisals by the violators, including even authorities of their own country’s government. Such actions may be even more important in filling verification gaps than technical verification procedures implemented by an international authority.

    In conclusion, I now have new and strong feelings of hope about the future of humankind. We are collectively facing new choices. We can continue to apply those cosmic forces -which we discovered how to manipulate 50 years ago-to feed the destructive competitive power struggles among humans. Or we can join together to reject those immensely powerful forces-that are much easier to use to destroy than to build-and reach out together to embrace the energy from our sun, which has for a very long time sustained all life on Earth.

    REFERENCES

    1. Harold A. Feiveson and Theodore B. Taylor, “Alternative Strategies for International Control of Nuclear Power,” in Nuclear Proliferation-Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control, Ted Greenwood, H. A. Feiveson, and T. B. Taylor, New York: McGraw Hill, 1977, pp. 125-190. 
    2. J. Carson Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor Grade Plutonium,” Science and Global Security, 1993, Volume 4, pp.111-128. 
    3. J. Carson Mark, Theodore B. Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Merriman, and Jacob Wechsler, “By What Means Could Terrorists Go Nuclear?” in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, eds. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
    Books, 1987, pp. 55-65. 
    4. See, for example, David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1992, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 25-35. 
    5. Ibid, pp. 71-83. 
    6. Ibid, pp. 196-209. 
    7. Ibid, p. 90. 
    8. Ibid, p. 148. 
    9. Lars Wallin, chapter in Security With Nuclear Weapons? Regina Cowen Karp, Ed., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, London: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 360-381.
    10. See, for example, Thomas Johansson, Henry Kelly, Amulya K. N. Reddy, and Robert Williams, eds. Renewable Energy, Washington: Island Press, 1993.
    11. See, for example, J. M. Ogden and R. H. Williams, Solar Hydrogen: Moving Beyond Fossil Fuels, Washington: World Resources Institute, 1989.

     

  • Denuclearization of the Oceans: Linking Our Common Heritage with Our Common Future

    Introduction

    The oceans were nuclearized shortly after the era of nuclear weapons began in 1945. On July 1, 1946, while still negotiating the internationalization of atomic energy at the United Nations, the United States began testing nuclear weapons at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific. Nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific continued through January 1996, when French President Jacques Chirac announced an end to French testing in the region.

    In the 1950s, the United States again led the way in nuclearizing the oceans with the launching of a nuclear powered submarine, the Nautilus. The Nautilus and other nuclear submarines could stay submerged for long periods of time without refueling and cruise throughout the world. During the Cold War the U.S., former USSR, UK, France, and China developed nuclear submarine fleets carrying ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Some of these nuclear powered submarines with their multiple-independently-targeted nuclear warheads were and remain capable of single-handedly attacking and destroying more than one hundred major cities. These shadowy creatures of mankind’s darkest inventiveness remain silently on alert in the depths of the world’s oceans, presumably ready and capable, upon command, of destroying the Earth.

    Our oceans are a precious resource to be shared by all humanity and preserved for future generations. It carries the concept of “freedom of the seas” to absurd lengths to allow those nations with the technological capacity to destroy the Earth to use the world’s oceans in so callous a manner.

    Accidents aboard nuclear submarines have caused a number of them to sink with long-term adverse environmental consequences for the oceans. In addition to accidents, many countries have purposefully dumped radioactive wastes in the oceans.

    With regard to proper stewardship of the planet, it is time to raise the issue of denuclearizing the world’s oceans. To fail to raise the issue and to achieve the denuclearization of the oceans is to abdicate our responsibility for the health and well-being of the oceans and the planet.

    Nuclearization of the Oceans

    Nuclearization of the oceans has taken a variety of forms. The primary ones are:

    1. the oceans have served as a medium for hiding nuclear deterrent forces located on submarines;

    2. nuclear reactors have been used to power ships, primarily submarines, some of which have gone down at sea with their nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons aboard;

    3. increasing use is being made of the oceans for the transportation of nuclear wastes and reprocessed nuclear fuels;

    4. the oceans have been used as a dumping ground for nuclear wastes;

    5. atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, particularly in the Pacific, has been a source of nuclear pollution to the oceans as well as the land; and

    6. underground nuclear weapons testing, such as that conducted by France in the South Pacific, has endangered fragile Pacific atolls and caused actual nuclear contamination to the oceans as well as risking a much greater contamination should the atolls crack due to testing or future geological activity.

    The problems arising from nuclearization of the oceans can be viewed from several perspectives.

    From an environmental perspective, issues arise with regard to nuclear contamination in the oceans working its way up through the food chain. The biological resources of the oceans will eventually affect human populations which are reliant upon these resources.

    The threat of nuclear contamination has diminished with regard to nuclear testing, which has not taken place in the atmosphere since 1980. Moreover, the nuclear weapons states have committed themselves to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which they have promised to conclude by 1996. This treaty, if concluded, will end all underground nuclear testing.

    The dumping of high-level radioactive waste material was curtailed by the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, which entered into force in 1975. A later amendment to this Convention prohibited ocean dumping of all radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter. However, exemptions authorized by the International Atomic Energy Agency and non-compliance remain a concern. Problems can be anticipated in the future when radioactive contaminants already dumped in canisters or contained in fuel or weapons aboard sunken submarines breach their containment.

    Increased use of the oceans to transport nuclear wastes and reprocessed nuclear fuel (between Japan and France, for example) has substantially increased the risk of contamination. Coastal and island states that are on the route of the transportation of nuclear materials stand high risks of contamination in the event of an accident at sea. International law regarding the transportation of hazardous material must be strengthened and strictly enforced by the international community to prevent catastrophic accidents in the future.

    From a human rights perspective, inhabitants of island states in the Pacific have suffered serious health effects and dislocation as a result of atmospheric and underground nuclear weapons testing. In response to assurances by France that their underground testing in the South Pacific is entirely safe, the islanders in Polynesia and throughout the Pacific have retorted: If it is so safe, why isn’t it being done in France itself? The response of the French government has been that French Polynesia is French territory, highlighting the arrogance and abuse that accompanies colonialism.

    Human rights issues also arise with regard to maintaining a nuclear deterrent force that threatens the annihilation of much of humanity. The Human Rights Committee stated in November 1984 in their general comments on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, i.e., the right to life, that “the production, testing, possession, deployment and use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited and recognized as crimes against humanity.” The deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines, therefore, arguably constitutes a crime against humanity, and thus a violation of the most fundamental human right, the right to life.

    From a security perspective, the nuclear weapons states argue that having a submarine-based deterrent force assures their security. Thus, to varying degrees, each of the nuclear weapons states maintains strategic submarines capable of causing unthinkable destruction if their missiles were ever launched. (See Appendix.) Viewed from the self-interests of nearly all the world’s population-except the nuclear weapons states whose leaders appear addicted to maintaining their nuclear arsenals -the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, at sea or on land, poses a frightening threat to continued human existence.

    In 1972 the Seabed Agreement prohibited the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed, ocean floor, or subsoil thereof. This agreement prohibited what was already deemed unnecessary by the nuclear weapons states; placing nuclear weapons on submarines made them less vulnerable to detection and destruction than placing them on or beneath the seabed or ocean floor. The oceans continue to be used by the nuclear weapons states as an underwater shadow world for their missile carrying submarines.

    The United States alone currently has 16 Trident submarines, each carrying some 100 independently targeted nuclear warheads. Each Trident submarine has a total explosive force greater than all the explosive force used in World War II, including at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Britain, with the help of the United States, is replacing its older class of Polaris SSBNs with a fleet of four Trident submarines. France currently has five strategic missile submarines with four more of a superior class to be commissioned by 2005. Russia has over 35 strategic missile submarines with an estimated capacity of 2,350 nuclear warheads. China has two modern ballistic missile submarines. Its Xia class submarine carries twelve 200 kiloton nuclear warheads.

    The total destructive force that day and night lurks beneath the oceans is a chilling reminder of our technological capacity to destroy ourselves. That this threat was created and is maintained in the name of national security suggests a collective madness that must be opposed and overcome if, for no other reason, we are to fulfill our obligation to posterity to preserve human life.

    An ongoing responsibility resides with the nuclear weapons states to fulfill the obligations set forth in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in April and May 1995, the treaty was extended indefinitely after extensive lobbying by the nuclear weapons states. At the same time the nuclear weapons states promised to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996, and to engage in a “determined pursuit” of the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

    Protecting the Common Heritage

    The Law of the Sea Treaty enshrines the concept of the oceans as the common heritage of [hu]mankind. Maintaining the oceans as a common heritage demands that the oceans be protected from contamination by nuclear pollutants; that they not be used in a manner to undermine basic human rights, particularly the rights to life and to a healthy environment; and that the oceans not be allowed to serve as a public preserve for those states that believe their own security interests demand the endangerment of global human survival.

    It is unreasonable to allow our common heritage to be used to threaten our common future. Deterrence is an unproven and unstable concept that is being tested on humanity by a small number of powerful and arrogant states that have turned nuclear technology to its ultimate destructive end. In order to link the common heritage with our common future, the large majority of the world’s nations advocating an end to the threat of nuclear annihilation should seek to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention by the year 2000 that eliminates all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework. The prohibition and conversion of strategic ballistic missile submarines must be part of this accord. Perhaps this will be the final step in achieving a nuclear weapons free world.

    Life began in the oceans and eventually migrated to land. We must not allow the oceans to continue to provide a secure hiding place for nuclear forces capable of causing irreparable damage to all life. This is an inescapable responsibility of accepting the proposition that life itself, like the oceans, is a common heritage that must be protected for future generations.

     

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    APPENDIX: NUCLEAR POWER AT SEA*

    A. Nuclear Weapons

    UNITED STATES

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 16 Building: 2

    Trident: 16 + 2

    There are presently 16 Trident submarines in operation, eight at Sub-Base Bangor and eight at Sub-Base Kings Bay. The schedule is to complete one submarine per year for a total of 18 with the final one becoming operational in 1997.

    In September 1994 it was announced in the Pentagon’s “Nuclear Posture Review” that the Trident force would be cut from 18 to 14. The submarines to be retired are still under review but are believed to be the four oldest in the fleet. They will be preserved, however, in mothballs until the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II Treaty is fully implemented in 2003.

    These submarines carry 24 missiles each. The submarines are armed with Trident-1 missiles (C-4) and the Trident-2 (D-5). In 1991 all strategic cruise missiles (Tomahawks) were removed from surface ships and submarines.

    The C-4 can carry up to eight 100 kiloton Mark-4/W-76 Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). There are currently 192 Trident-1 missiles deployed in eight Trident submarines based at Bangor, Washington with a total of 1,152 Mk-4 warheads. Four of these submarines are to be deactivated and the remaining four are to be converted to carry Trident-2 missiles. Plans are to then base seven of the 14 submarines on each coast.

    The D-4 can carry up to 12 MIRV with Mark-4/W-76 100-kT warheads, or Mark-5/W-88 300-475-kT warheads each. Under START counting rules, a limit of 8 reentry vehicles (RV) was set, but this may be further reduced to four or five if START II is implemented. About 400 Mk-5/W-88 warheads for the Trident-2 missiles were produced before they were canceled because of production and safety reasons. Two new Trident subs fitted with D-4 missiles will be delivered by 1997.

    Under the START Treaties, warheads that are reduced do not have to be destroyed. According to the Nuclear Posture Review the current plan is to remove three or four warheads per missile from Trident Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) to meet the START II ceiling of 1,750 SLBM warheads. Plans are to reduce the C-4 to 1,280 warheads and the D-4 to 400. These warheads will be kept in storage and if it is determined that the SLBMs need to be uploaded, the Pentagon can reuse them.

    RUSSIA

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 39 Building: 0

    The Russian navy is divided into four fleets: the Baltic, Northern, Black Sea and the Pacific. In the Northern and the Pacific fleets, the primary issue is of what to do with the estimated 85 retired nuclear submarines. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it is believed that over half of their nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet has been withdrawn from operational service. These ships are currently moored at various bases with their reactors still on board. The number is growing faster than the money available to remove and store the fuel elements and decontaminate the reactor compartments. Since 1991, there has been a lack of funds to operate the fleet. Consequently, few of the submarines listed as active have actually been at sea.

    In response to President Bush’s September 27, 1991 decision to remove tactical nuclear missiles from ships, President Gorbachev announced that six SSBNs with 92 SLBMs (presumably five Yankee Is and a single Yankee II) were to be removed from operational forces. Russian Fleet Commander Adm. Oleg Yerofeev reports that as of October 20, 1991 all tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the Northern and Pacific fleet ships and submarines.

    The January-February, 1993 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists reports that Russia intends to stop building submarines in its Pacific yards within the next two to three years. Russian President Boris Yeltsin made this announcement during a November 1992 visit to South Korea.

    The Russian (CIS) SLBM stockpile is estimated to be at: 224 SS-N-18 Stingray armed with three warheads at 500-kT, 120 SS-N-20 Sturgeon with ten 200-kT warheads, and 112 SS-N-23 Skiff missiles with four 100-kT warheads. Total warheads are believed to be about 2320.

    According to Pentagon officials, Russia has already reduced its patrols to a single ballistic missile submarine. In contrast, the U.S. Navy continues to patrol with a dozen or so submarines at a time.

    NATO names are used in this listing. Russian names are given in parentheses.

    Typhoon (Akula) Class: 6

    The Typhoon carries 20 SS-N-20 Sturgeon missiles, with six to nine MIRV 200-kT nuclear warheads. The Typhoon can hit strategic targets from anywhere in the world. There are plans to modernize the Typhoons to carry an SS-N-20 follow-on missile which would have improved accuracy. All the Typhoons are stationed in the Northern Fleet at Nerpichya. One was damaged by fire during a missile loading accident in 1992, but has since been repaired.

    Delta IV (Delfin) Class: 7

    The Delta IV carries 16 SS-N-23 Skiff missiles, with four to ten MIRV 100-kT nuclear warheads. These ships are based in the Northern Fleet at Olenya.

    Delta III (Kalmar) Class: 14

    The Delta III is armed with 16 SS-N-18 Stingray missiles. There are three possible modifications for the Stingray. (1) three MIRV at 200-kT, (2) a single 450-kT, (3) seven MIRV at 100-kT. Nine ships are in the Northern Fleet and five are in the Pacific Fleet.

    Delta II (Murena-M) Class: 4

    The Delta II has 16 SS-N8 Sawfly missiles with two possible modifications. The first is with a single 1.2 MT nuclear warhead, the other is with two MIRV at 800-kT. This class of submarine is no longer in production. All four are stationed in the Northern fleet at Yagelnaya and are believed to have been taken off active duty.

    Delta I (Murena) Class: 8

    The Delta I carries 12 SS-N-8 Sawfly missiles, armed with either a single 1.2 MT nuclear warhead or two MIRV 800-kT. Three ships are stationed in the North and the other five are in the Pacific. One of these ships may be converted into a rescue submarine. As with the Delta II’s, all of these ships are believed to have been taken off active duty.

    UNITED KINGDOM

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 4 Building: 2

    Vanguard Class: 2 + 2

    The Vanguard-class is modeled on the United States Trident submarine. It carries 16 Trident II (D-5) missiles with up to eight MIRV of 100-120-kT nuclear warheads. The D-5 can carry up to 12 MIRV but under plans announced in November 1993 each submarine will carry a maximum of 96 warheads. The U.K. has stated that it has no plans to refit their Tridents with conventional warheads, insisting on the nuclear deterrent.

    Resolution Class: 2

    The Resolution-class was initially fitted with 16 Polaris A3 missiles with three multiple reentry vehicles of 200-kT each. Beginning in 1982, the warheads were replaced under the “Chevaline Program.” The Chevaline is a similar warhead, but contains a variety of anti-ballistic missile defenses. The two remaining submarines in this class are both scheduled for decommission.

    CHINA

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 1 Projected: 1

    Intelligence on Chinese nuclear submarines is extremely limited. Experts disagree on whether there is one or two SSBNs in the Chinese fleet. A new class of SSBN is expected to begin construction in 1996 or 1997.

    Xia Class: 1 or 2

    The Xia carries 12 Julang or “Giant Wave” CSS-N-3 missiles armed with a single 200-300-kT nuclear warhead. Approximately 24 of these missiles have been deployed. An improved version of this missile is currently being developed.

    Golf Class (SSB): 1

    Although the Golf is not nuclear driven, it is armed with ballistic missiles. The submarine is outfitted with two Julang missiles.

    FRANCE

    Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

    Active: 5 Building: 3 Projected: 1

    In 1992 France announced that it would cut the number of new Triomphant-class SSBNs under construction from 6 to 4. Robert Norris and William Arkin of the Natural Resource Defense Council estimate that France will produce 288 warheads for the fleet of four submarines, but with only enough missiles and warheads to fully arm three boats. It is estimated that France has 64 SLBMs with 384 warheads.

    Triomphant Class: 0 + 3(1)

    The first submarine of its class, Le Triomphant, recently began conducting trials in the sea and is scheduled to depart on its first patrol in March 1996. The other ships are expected to be operational by 2005. The Triomphant-class is armed with 16 M45 missiles with 6 multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) at 150-kT. There are plans to later refit the submarines with the more powerful M5 with 10-12 MRV around 2010. Testing for these new missiles were recently conducted at the Moruroa and Fangataufa atolls.

    L’Inflexible Class: 5

    L’Inflexible is armed with 16 Aerospatiale M4B missiles with six MRV at 150-kT. The French navy has 80 SLBMs deployed on its five submarines. This class of ships is based at Brest and commanded from Houilles. They patrol in the Atlantic Ocean and the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas. The minimum number of submarines always at sea has been reduced from three to two.

    B. OTHER NUCLEAR POWERED SHIPS

    UNITED STATES

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 86 Building: 4 Projected: 1

    Permit Class: 1
    Benjamin Franklin Class: 2
    Narwhal Class: 1
    Los Angeles Class: 57 + 2
    Sturgeon Class: 25
    Seawolf Class: 0 + 2(1)

    The Seawolf was launched in July 1995, and is scheduled to be commissioned in May 1996.

    Aircraft Carriers (CVN )

    Active: 6 Building: 3

    Nimitz Class: 6 + 3

    Guided Missile Cruisers (CGN)

    Active: 5

    Virginia Class: 2
    California Class: 2
    Brainbridge Class: 1

    RUSSIA

    Cruise Missile Submarines (SSGN)

    Active: 19 Building: 1 Projected: 1

    Echo II Class (Type 675M): 3
    Oscar I (Granit) Classes: 2
    Oscar II (Antyey): 10 + 1(1)
    Charlie II (Skat M) Class: 3
    Yankee Sidecar (Andromeda) Class: 1

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 51 Building: 6 Projected: 1

    Severodvinsk Class: 0 + 3(1)
    Sierra II (Baracuda) Class: 2
    Akula I (Bars) Class: 4
    Akula II (Bars) Class: 8 + 3
    Sierra I (Baracuda I) Class: 2
    Alfa (Alpha) Class: 1
    Victor III (Shuka) Class: 26
    Victor II (Kefal II) Class: 3
    Victor I (Kefal I) Class: 2
    Yankee Notch (Grosha) Class: 3

    Battle Cruisers (CGN)
    Active: 4

    Kirov Class: 4

    UNITED KINGDOM

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 12 Projected: 5

    Trafalgar Class: 7 + (5)
    Swiftsure Class: 5

    CHINA

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 5 Building: 1
    Han Class: 5

    Nuclear attack submarines are believed to be a high priority for the Chinese, but due to high internal radiation levels, production has been suspended.

    FRANCE

    Attack Submarines (SSN)

    Active: 6 Projected: 1

    Rubis Class: 6 + (1)

    The nuclear attack submarine Rubis collided with a tanker on July 17, 1993 and has had to undergo extensive repairs. On March 30, 1994 the Emeraude had a bad steam leak which caused casualties amongst the crew.

    Aircraft Carriers (CVN)

    Active: 0 Building: 1 Projected: 1

    The nuclear powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was launched in 1994, it is expected to be commissioned in July 1999.