Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear weapons

The Legal Case for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

The legal case for abolishing nuclear weapons is only one of many that can and should be made. Nuclear weapons place the future of humanity, indeed of all life, in jeopardy. They are not even weapons in any traditional sense. They kill indiscriminately. They cause unnecessary suffering that affects present and future generations. They have no legitimate use in warfare. They are instruments of genocide that no sane person or society would contemplate using.

The questions that I will address are these: Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal under international law? Is the United States under a legal obligation to eliminate its nuclear arsenal? The answer to both questions is Yes, and it seems to me remarkable that the U.S. media has been nearly silent with regard to these issues.

A small breakthrough in this area occurred in June 1998 when Max Frankel, the distinguished columnist and former editor of the New York Times, wrote in the New York Times Magazine: “If I and other observers had resisted the nuclear club’s double standard and exposed its hollow assumptions about human nature, the world might by now have devised more effective international controls over atomic weapons. The have-nots might have been appeased if they had been given a major voice in a strong international inspection agency and the right to pry even into the monopolists’ stockpiles — including ours. Instead we have wasted the half century since Hiroshima and provoked a chain reaction that is truly prolific.”

Let me offer a syllogism, an expression of logic: All states are subject to international law. The United States is a state. Therefore, the United States is subject to international law.

Unfortunately, not everyone agrees with the logic that our country is subject to international law. Senator Alfonse D’Amato, for example, was recently quoted in the Los Angeles Times as stating, “To hell with international law….You’ve got a choice to make. You’re either with us or against us, and I only hope for your sake you make the right choice.”

One choice is the rule of law. The other is the rule of force. I would argue that the right choice is international law. It is in the interests of our country and all countries to abide by the rule of law. Either way, we can be assured that other countries will follow our lead.

International law is made in two ways — by treaties, which require the agreement of nations, and by such widespread agreement on issues of law that the law is accepted as customary international law. Both means carry the force of law in the international system.

The treaty which is most relevant to the abolition of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. This treaty seeks to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states which did not possess them prior to January 1, 1967. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (U.S., Russia, UK, France and China) are the states recognized in the NPT as possessing nuclear weapons prior to this date.

In return for the non-nuclear weapons states promising not to acquire nuclear weapons, the five nuclear weapons states promised in Article VI of the NPT to pursue good faith negotiations for a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and for nuclear disarmament.

When the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, the nuclear weapons states promised the “determined pursuit…of systematic and progressive efforts” to achieve nuclear disarmament. For most states in the world, as reflected in their votes in the UN General Assembly, the efforts of the nuclear weapons states in this regard have been far from satisfactory.

The customary international law most relevant to the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons is international humanitarian law. This is part of the law of armed conflict, and was developed to set limits on the use of force in armed conflict for humanitarian purposes. The basic premise is that the means of injuring the enemy are not unlimited. Put another way, all is not fair (or legal) in warfare.

Under international law, a state cannot use weapons that fail to discriminate between civilians and combatants. Nor can a state use weapons that cause unnecessary suffering to combatants such as dum-dum bullets.

In December 1994 the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice, the highest judicial body in the world on matters of international law, for an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The exact question asked was: “Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”

The United States, joined by the UK, France, and Russia, argued to the Court that it should not hear the case because this was a political rather than legal issue. The Court, turning aside these arguments, issued its historic opinion on July 8, 1996. It was an opinion of great significance for humanity, but to date it has been largely ignored by the U.S. and its NATO allies. It has also been largely ignored by the U.S. media.

The Court began by unanimously finding that international law does not provide specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Court found that international law did not contain “any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.” Three of the 14 judges — Judge Koroma of Sierra Leone, Judge Shahabuddeen of Guyana, and Judge Weeramantry of Sri Lanka — voted against this position, and issued powerful dissenting opinions.

The Court then went on to state unanimously that any threat or use of nuclear weapons for purposes other than self-defense, in accord with articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter, was prohibited. It followed this statement with the unanimous conclusion that a threat or use of nuclear weapons must also meet the requirements of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

Earlier in its opinion, the Court had referred to “cardinal principles” of humanitarian law as follows: “The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. According to the second principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their suffering. In application of that second principle, States do not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the weapons they use.” The Court also made clear that if a use would be unlawful, the threat of such use would also be unlawful.

Based upon its findings with regard to the application of international law to nuclear weapons, the Court reached an unusual two-paragraph conclusion that began, “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”

The Court continued with a second paragraph stating that the current state of international law and the elements of fact at its disposal did not allow the Court to “conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.” This indetermination by the Court when “the very survival of a state would be at stake,” must be read in connection with the absolute prohibition of violating international humanitarian law. Thus, even in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, it would be necessary to avoid injuring a civilian population and causing unnecessary suffering to combatants. This would not be possible by means of using nuclear weapons for retaliation against a civilian population.

The vote on this two-paragraph conclusion was 7 to 7, with the President of the Court casting the deciding vote, according to the rules of the Court. However, when you analyze who voted against the conclusion you find that the three judges from Western nuclear weapons states were joined by the three judges who found an absolute prohibition on nuclear weapons. The Japanese judge also voted against this conclusion because he opposed the issue coming before the Court. Thus, a better reading of this vote would have ten supporting the conclusion or going further and arguing for an absolute prohibition, and only the judges from the U.S., UK and France opposing it because they found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would not be “generally” illegal.

The Court went on to state unanimously: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” In 1996 and 1997 the United Nations General Assembly passed resolutions urging the nuclear weapons states to fulfill this obligation.

In issuing the Court’s opinion, Judge Bedjaoui, the then president of the Court, referred to nuclear weapons as “the ultimate evil” and declared, “Nuclear weapons can be expected — in the present state of scientific development at least — to cause indiscriminate victims among combatants and non-combatants alike, as well as unnecessary suffering among both categories. The very nature of this blind weapon therefore has a destabilizing effect on humanitarian law which regulates discernment in the type of weapon used.”

Judge Bedjaoui also argued that it would be “quite foolhardy…to set the survival of a State above all other considerations, in particular above the survival of mankind itself.”

I will conclude with a few observations.

First, the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any conceivable circumstance. Therefore, current U.S. and NATO policies relying upon nuclear weapons are illegal under international law.

Second, the U.S. has not been fulfilling its obligation under international law to negotiate the complete elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control.

Third, the likely outcome of this failure of leadership by the U.S. is the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at its year 2000 Review Conference. The nuclear testing by India and Pakistan can be linked to India’s strong opposition to what it has termed “nuclear apartheid,” that is the continued reliance on nuclear weapons by a small group of states that have failed to fulfill their obligations under international law.

Fourth, the U.S. media has not played a constructive role in analyzing this situation, and reporting on it to the American people.

Fifth, current U.S. policies make the American people and the U.S. media unwitting accomplices in policies that threaten the mass murder of hundreds of millions of innocent people. If these weapons are used ever again, by accident or design, history — if there is a history — will judge the American people harshly for not demanding the abolition of these weapons when the opportunity to do so presented itself with the end of the Cold War.

At the outset, I said that the legal case for abolishing nuclear weapons is only one of many that can be made. The legal case is important, but the most important case that can be made is the moral case. To abolish nuclear weapons is to uphold the sanctity of life. I will conclude by quoting Lee Butler, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and an eloquent spokesman for abolishing these weapons. General Butler stated: “We cannot at once keep sacred the miracle of existence and hold sacrosanct the capacity to destroy it. It is time to reassert the primacy of individual conscience, the voice of reason and the rightful interests of humanity.” This cannot be done without the active participation of the media in analyzing and communicating the case for nuclear weapons abolition to the American people.

July 11, 1998
No Time to Think

Reprinted with permission from Himal Magazine, Kathmandu, Nepal, July Anti-Nuke Issue

For decades, military planners in the United States, former Soviet Union, and the other nuclear weapons states have convinced themselves that their nuclear weapons are a deterrent. The nuclear annihilation that would follow if these weapons were used was supposed to make any enemy stop, think, and decide that war was not worth the consequences. To make sure that an enemy had no doubt about these consequences, all the nuclear weapons states created nuclear arsenals designed to fight a nuclear war. Nuclear deterrence was built on assuming that one day the simple fear of nuclear weapons would not be enough and the weapons would have to be used.

The reliance on nuclear weapons that could be used in a real war led each nuclear weapons state to live in perpetual fear of a surprise attack that would make their weapons useless. This fear was greatest during the Cold War, when each side thought the other could not be trusted. The US and Soviet Union addressed their fears by building enormously complex early warning systems that would let them know they were about to be attacked and give them time to launch their nuclear weapons before they were destroyed.

The early warning systems of the superpowers had another crucial role. Since any war would have meant nuclear war, both sides wanted to make sure that war did not begin by accident. Early warning systems created time during which people could make decisions using real information about what was actually happening rather than responding simply on the basis of fears of what might be about to happen.

The US built and still operates the biggest and most sophisticated early warning system. It is based around a missile warning system and works by collecting information from satellites that can detect the launch of missiles from another country and radars around the world that can follow the missiles to see where they are going. The information is transmitted from these satellites and radars to where it can be processed by computers and then analysed and interpreted by people. To make sure that this is done seriously and properly, this assessment is done at several places separately. If the information is determined to be reliable, it is sent to more senior people who are supposed to decide how to respond.

When the satellites and radars say that missiles may have been launched towards the US, there is a Missile Display Conference among the commanders of the places where the analysis of the information is carried out. If they decide that the danger is serious, and not a mistake made by the satellites, or radar, or somewhere along the communication system, or a mistake by one of the people who is supposed to interpret the information, then a Threat Assessment Conference is called. This includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and senior military commanders.

At the same time as a Threat Assessment Conference is called, a state of alert is declared, fighter aircraft take off, nuclear-armed bombers are told to start their engines, and missiles are readied for launch. This is the last step before a Missile Attack Conference. This is where the President is told what has happened, and asked to decide what is to be done.

Both the US and the Soviet Union, now Russia, had these multiple levels of decision making because they had the time to check, and double check, to make sure that they knew what was happening. Their satellites and early warning radar systems gave them information within one and a half minutes of the possible launch of a missile. They took about two and a half minutes to work out what was happening from this information. A meeting could be called and a threat determined a few minutes after this. In other words within about six or seven minutes, it was possible to decide if a nuclear attack may have started. Since the missiles would have taken about 25 minutes to travel from the US to the Soviet Union or in the other direction, there was still time for a final confirmation that the missiles were real. There was even time left to find out if there had been an accidental launch of the missiles, and to decide what to do.

False Alarms

Given the terrible consequences of nuclear war, enormous financial and technical resources were invested in setting up and running these early warning systems, and trying to make them fool-proof. However, history shows that these systems failed. Not once, or twice, but frequently. There is no real history of all the failures. It is known, however, that between 1977 and 1984 the US early warning system showed over 20,000 false alarms of a missile attack on the US. Over 1000 of these were considered serious enough for bombers and missiles to be placed on alert.

Some of these incidents give terrifying insights into how easily even the most carefully designed and technologically advanced warning systems can go wrong. Two instances will suffice. In November 1979, the US missile warning system showed that a massive attack had suddenly been launched. Jets were launched, and a nuclear alert declared. There was no attack. There were no missiles. The warning was due to a computer that had been used to test the warning system to see how it would behave if there was an attack. Somebody had forgotten to turn off the computer after the exercise.

A second example was even more dramatic. In June 1980, the early warning systems showed that two missiles had been launched towards the US. This was followed by signals that there were more missiles following the first two. A Threat Assessment Conference was called. The situation was considered to be sufficiently serious that the President’s special airplane was prepared for take-off. Again there was no attack, nor any missiles. The reason for the mistaken signals, and interpretations, was eventually traced to a computer chip that was not working properly. The repeated failures of the US early warning system led at one time to an official enquiry which reported that the system “had been mismanaged… by the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defence”. In other words, every institution assigned to make sure the system worked had failed in its task.

It was not just the US system that failed. While there is little information yet on how the Soviet Union managed its nuclear weapons warning systems, there is at least one example from recent years that suggests it cannot have worked any better than the US system. On 25 January1995, a Norwegian rocket was launched to take scientific measurements. The Norwegian government told the Russian government in advance that this would happen. Nevertheless, when the rocket was picked up by Russian radar it was treated as a possible missile attack. It seems a warning was sent to the Russian defence minister’s headquarters, the Russian military leadership, and to the commanders of Russian missiles that an attack may be underway. A message was then sent to Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, and an emergency conference called with nuclear commanders over the telephone. Boris Yeltsin has confirmed that such an emergency conference did take place.

Fear and Paranoia

The lessons for India and Pakistan are obvious. Experience shows that in any real crisis involving the two, fear and paranoia soon become overwhelming. One need look no further than the recent panic about a possible pre-emptive attack on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities by India. The fear was there despite a nearly ten-year-old agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities. In the absence of basic trust, generals on each side will always assume those on the other side might want to launch a surprise attack, and will want, in turn, to be prepared to respond with nuclear weapons.

The need for early warning systems is therefore clear. But, even if Pakistan and India had the technology for early warning, and even if it worked reliably, they could not use it, geography has made sure of that. The time to take decisions will not be available to either Pakistan or India. Instead of the 25 minutes that the US and the Soviet Union had, it would take a Prithvi missile somewhere between three and five minutes to reach almost anywhere in Pakistan. It would take the Ghauri missile about five minutes to reach Delhi. In such a short time, an early warning system could give warning of what might be happening, a meeting could be called, and then time would run out. There would be no time to decide whether the warning was real, or a mistake. The decision would have to be made on either launching the missiles immediately or taking the risk of the missiles being destroyed before they could be used.

In order to avoid such a situation, some people may suggest that India and Pakistan find a way to create time for the generals to make sure they know what is happening in any future crisis. It may be possible to create such time by an agreement whereby each side would keep its warheads stored separately from missiles and airplanes and let the other side check to make sure this was indeed the case. Any nuclear attack could then only come after the warheads were taken out of storage and then loaded onto missiles or planes, and an attempt to do so would be detected.

But this is, at best, a desperate measure. The lack of trust is so great that making sure a agreement was being honoured would require an extraordinary system of allowing inspections of each other’s missile and airforce bases and nuclear facilities. There is no prospect of that happening. But, any agreement without such inspections would mean the generals on each side, fearing their counterparts had secretly hidden a few nuclear warheads with some missiles, would do the same. The nuclear dangers would remain despite an agreement, and might actually become greater.

The alternative is simple. No nuclear weapons mean no nuclear crises. No nuclear crises mean no danger of nuclear war.

July 11, 1998
My A-bomb Experience and the Spirit of Hiroshima

In the past, Japan inflicted indescribable suffering and deep sorrow on China and other countries of Asia. Fundamentally, responsibility for war damage inflicted by Japan clearly lies with the Japanese government. I believe that we as individual human beings, however, should not neglect to reflect on this matter. Though I was only a youth, I believe it is essential for me, as a Japanese who was alive at the time, to fully reflect on and etch in my mind the lessons of Japan’s invasion and war and our colonial rule of the Korean peninsula.

August 6, 1945, I was fourteen years old, in my second year of middle school. I was standing in the schoolyard 1.4 kilometers from the hypocenter with about 150 other students. Suddenly, with a tremendous roar, everything went pitch black. At length, the smoke cleared and I could see the schoolyard again. I had been blown backward about 10 meters by the blast. My classmates toohad been blown forward, backward, left or right. They were fallen and scattered all around. The school building was a low pile of rubble. The surrounding houses had also vanished. Except for a few large buildings in the distance everything had vanished. For an instant I thought, “The whole city’s gone!”

As I came to my senses, I examined my own body. My uniform was burned to shreds. I had serious burns on the back of my head, my back, both arms, and both legs. The skin of both of my hands had peeled off and was dangling down on strips, revealing raw, red flesh underneath. Pieces of glass were protruding from my body in several places. Suddenly, I was attacked by an unfamiliar sense of horror. In a matter of minutes I was heading for the river as fast as I could go. Not long on my way, I heard someone calling my name. Looking around, I saw my classmate Tatsuya Yamamoto. We used to walk to school together every day. Now, he was seeking help, crying, “Mama, Mama…help me!” I said, “Stop crying! We just have to get out of here!” And with me alternating between scolding and encouraging, we fled together toward the river.

I saw a line of survivors looking dazed, dragging their legs wearily and pressing toward me. Their peeled arms dangled oddly in front of them, and their clothes were in tatters. Many were virtually naked. I couldn’t even see them as human; I felt I was watching a grotesque procession of ghosts. I saw one man with hundreds of glass shards piercing his body from the waist up. The skin of another man had peeled off his entire upper body, exposing a mass of red flesh. A woman was covered in blood, one eyeball grotesquely dangling out of its socket. Next to a mother whose skin had completely peeled off lay a loudly crying baby, its entire body burnt. Corpses were scattered everywhere. A dead woman’s internal organs had burst out onto the ground around her. It was all so utterly gruesome, a living hell indescribable in words. We continued to head resolutely for the river.

But all the streets and pathways leading to the riverbank were blocked by the wreckage of toppled houses. It often seemed impossible to get through. In a mindless state of utter desperation we crawled on all fours over and through the ruins until at last we managed to find the river. Luckily, just where we emerged on the bank we found a small wooden bridge that had miraculously withstood the blast.

Then it happened, just as we were stepping out onto the bridge. Tongues of fire burst violently out from the collapsed houses on both sides of the street. As we stood and gaped, the whole riverside transformed into a sea of fire. Crackling loud as thunder, towering pillars of fire shot up towards the heavens, like the eruption of a volcano. Fortunately we were beyond the reach of the conflagration, but my friend Yamamoto had somehow vanished.

Finally I escaped to the other side of the river where there wasn’t any fire. Having reached relative safety, the intensity of my flight subsided somewhat, and I was suddenly aware that my whole body was burning hot. To ease the pain I went down to the river, dipping myself three times. The cool water of the river was to my scorched body an exquisite, priceless balm. “Ah, I’m saved!” And with that thought, for the first time, my tears flowed and would not stop. I came up from the river and was guided to a temporary relief station hastily set up in a bamboo grove. There I received some minimal first aid and rested a while. As I sat there it started to rain, the first black rain I had ever seen. Huge drops that made a big noise when they fell. I just watched, bewildered, thinking, “Is there really such a thing as black rain?” I waited for it to stop, then started walking home.

After a while, again I heard someone calling my name. I turned and saw Tokujiro Hatta, another friend who used to walk to school with Yamamoto and me. “Takahashi, help me! Take me home with you!” he begged, groaning. For some reason, the soles of his feet were burned so badly that the skin had peeled, revealing the red flesh beneath. He certainly couldn’t walk. Though I myself was seriously burned, I was not the sort to abandon a friend and continue on my way alone. I decided immediately to take Hatta along with me. But how? Luckily, though his feet were burned, the rest of his body had escaped serious burns or cuts. After considering the possibilities for a while, I decided there were two ways to get him home without having his feet touch the ground: one was to have him crawl on his hands and knees; the other was to lean him back on his heels while I supported him. Thus we began our trek, alternating between these two methods. Plodding along slower than cows, step after agonizing step, somehow we managed to help each other along. At one point, overcome by fatigue, we were forced to sit by the road and rest. For no particular reason I looked back over my shoulder. “Hey! Isn’t that my great aunt and uncle? They’re coming this way!” I used every ounce of strength I could muster to shout to them, and they stopped. They were on their way home from a memorial service in the country. Our meeting was a complete coincidence. With their help we made it home.

Once home, I collapsed in a coma and remained unconscious for three weeks. Later, I was treated by a doctor–an ear, nose, and throat specialist–who came to our house morning and night to see me. Ordinarily, severe burns would not be treated by an otolaryngologist, but with nearly all the doctors and nurses in the city either dead or incapacitated, I was extremely fortunate to receive treatment from any sort of doctor at all. I battled my burns and disease for a year and a half, hovering between life and death. A Japanese saying goes, “Nine deaths for one life, ” and that was precisely my experience. My friends passed from this world with acute radiation sickness: Tokujiro Hatta two days later, and Tatsuya Yamamoto after one month-and-a-half.

I have survived these many years, but my right elbow and the fingers of my right hand except for my thumb are bent and immobile. Keloid scars remain on my back, arms and legs. The cartilage in my ears deteriorated from the blood and pus that collected there, leaving my ears deformed. I continue to grow a “black nail” from the first finger of my right hand. (You may have seen two samples of this “black nail” that fell off and are on display at the Peace Memorial Museum.) Further, I am afflicted with chronic hepatitis, a liver infection that is a nationally recognized aftereffect of the bomb. I have been hospitalized ten times since 1971. Besides my liver problem, I am afflicted with numerous other ailments and cannot help but constantly worry about my health.

While struggling with this frail and damaged body, I have often wondered in despair, “Do I really need to live with all this pain?” But each time I have answered, “But you’ve already come so far.” And that thought has kept me going. Of my sixty classmates that day, fifty were cruelly slaughtered by the atomic bomb. To date, I have confirmed the survival of only thirteen of us; I am one of the very few still alive.

“I cannot let the deaths of my classmates be in vain. I must be the voice conveying their silent cries to the generations to come. As a survivor, this is my mission and my duty.” These ideas are engraved on my heart, and I have lived to this day repeating such words to myself continually. My friends were helplessly sacrificed to the atomic bomb without ever reaching adulthood. They died writhing in agony. Their short, young lives abruptly ended. Such enormous sorrow. Such horrible frustration.

Among humankind’s abilities, it is said imagination is the weakest and forgetfulness the strongest. We cannot by any means, however, forget Hiroshima, and we cannot lose the ability to abolish war, abolish nuclear weapons, and imagine a world of peace. Hiroshima is not just a historical fact. It is a warning and lesson for the future. We must overcome the pain, sorrow, and hatred of the past, we must conquer the argument that the damage inflicted and the damage incurred in the name of war were justifiable, we must conquer the logic that the dropping of the atomic bomb was justifiable. We must convey the Spirit of Hiroshima– the denial of war and hope for the abolition of nuclear weapons–throughout Japan and throughout the world. I sincerely hope you have understood the Spirit of Hiroshima. I will always be praying for your steadfast efforts and progress toward the abolition of nuclear weapons.

July 11, 1998
British Medical Association Calls for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

On July 8, 1998 in Cardiff the British Medical Association passed a resolution stating:

“That this meeting considers it a duty to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons which are a worldwide threat to public health

1) by condemning the development, teting, production, deployment, threat, and use of nuclear weapons;

2) by requesting that governments refrain from all these activities and work in good faith for their elimination;

3) by calling for commencement of negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention similar to those for biological and chemical weapons.”

July 8, 1998
Joint Statement Against Nuclear Tests and Weapons By Retired Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Armed Forces Personnel

The following Joint Statement Against Nuclear Tests and Weapons signed by sixty-three Retired Pakistani, Indian and Bangladeshi Armed Forces Personnel is hereby submitted to:

The Secretary General of the United Nations
To the Prime Minister of Pakistan
To the Prime Minister of India
To the President of the United States of America
To the President of France
To the Prime Minister of U.K.
To the President of China
To the President of the Russian Federation

Recent developments in South Asia in the field of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery are a serious threat to the well being of this region. The fact that India and Pakistan have fought wars in the recent past and do not as yet enjoy the best of relations, makes this development all the more ominous. The signatories of this statement are not theoreticians or arm-chair idealists; we have spent many long years in the profession of arms and have served our countries both in peacetime and in war. By virtue of our experience and the positions we have held, we have a fair understanding of the destructive parameters of conventional and nuclear weapons. We are of the considered view that nuclear weapons should be banished from the South Asian region, and indeed from the entire globe. We urge India and Pakistan to take the lead by doing away with nuclear weapons in a manifest and verifiable manner, and to confine nuclear research and development strictly to peaceful and beneficient spheres.

We are convinced that the best way of resolving disputes is through peaceful means and not through war – least of all by the threat or use of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan need to address their real problems of poverty and backwardness, not waste our scarce resources on acquiring means of greater and greater destruction.
Signed by:
Air Marshal Zafar A. Chaudhry (Pakistan)
Admiral L. Ramdas (India) [Ex. Chief of the Indian Navy]
Lt. Gen Gurbir Mansingh (India)
Brigadier John Anthony (India)
Brigadier Madhav Prasad (India)
Commodore Norman Warner (India)
Major Vijai Uppal (India)
Lt Col G.J. Eduljee (India)
Air Commodore A.K. Banerjee (India)
Air Commodore A.K. Venkateshwaran (India)
Commodore K.K. Garg (India)
Major General M A Mohaiemen (Bangladesh)
Air Vice Marshal Saeedullah Khan (Pakistan)
Air Vice Marshal M. Ikramullah (Pakistan)
Air Vice Marshal M. Y. Khan (Pakistan)
Air Vice Marshal C. R. Nawaz (Pakistan)
Air Commodore S. T. E. Piracha (Pakistan)
Air Commodore Rafi Qadar (Pakistan)
Air Commodore Ejaz Azam Khan (Pakistan)
Air Commodore Qamarud Din (Pakistan)
Air Commodore Habibur Rahman (Pakistan)
Air Commodore G. Mujtaba Qureshi (Pakistan)
Air Commodore A. Aziz (Pakistan)
Air Commodore Wahid A. Butt (Pakistan)
Wing Commander N. A. Siddiqui (Pakistan)
Wing Commander M. Yunus (Pakistan)
Wing Commander Shajar Hussain (Pakistan)
Flight Lieutenant M. A. Mannan (Pakistan)
Group Captain N. A. Sheikh (Pakistan)
Group Captain Amir Shah (Pakistan)
Group Captain M. Amin (Pakistan)
Group Captain G. M. Siddiqi (Pakistan)
Group Captain Khalid Jalil (Pakistan)
Group Captain Sirajud Din Ahmed (Pakistan)
Major Saeed A. Malik (Pakistan)
Dr. Capt. Tariq Rahman (Pakistan)
Brigadier Rao Abid Hamid (Pakistan)
Major Ishtiaq Asi (Pakistan)
Wing Commander Aameen Taqi (Pakistan)
Brig Izzat M. Shah (Pakistan)
Sqn Ldr Ihsan Qadir (Pakistan)
Lt Col Abdur Rehman Lodhi (Pakistan)
Maj Amjad Iqbal (Pakistan)
Maj Ishtiaq Asif (Pakistan)
Lt. Col. Nadeem Rashid Khan (Pakistan)
Brig Shahid Aziz (Pakistan)
Brig Bashir Ahmad (Pakistan)
Capt Omar Asghar Khan (Pakistan)
Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan (Pakistan) [Ex-C-in-C Pakistan Air Force]
Lt. Col. Ahsan Zaman (Pakistan)
Lt. Col. Azhar Irshad (Pakistan)
Brig Jahangir Malik (Pakistan)
Lt. Col. S. Imtiaz H. Bokhari (Pakistan)
Maj.Gen. Syed Mustafa Anwar Husain (Pakistan)
Brig Humayun Malik (Pakistan)
Brig A. Wahab (Pakistan)
Maj. Naim Ahmad (Pakistan)
Brig SE Jivanandham (Pakistan)
Brig Luqman Mahmood (Pakistan)
Lt. Gen Sardar F.S. Lodi (Pakistan)
Lt. Col. Ernest Shams (Pakistan)
Lt. Col. Aijazulhaq Effendi (Pakistan)
Brig Mir Abad Hussain, ex Ambassador (Pakistan)

July 1, 1998
Resolution on Nuclear Testing by India and Pakistan

The European Parliament,

-having regard to its previous resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing and the work of the Canberra Commission for a nuclear weapon-free world,

-having regard to the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

-having regard to the terms of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),

-having regard to the statements made by the Council of the European Union, the G7, the UN Security Council and the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council,

A. whereas the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty have committed themselves to the objective of the elimination of all nuclear weapons,

B. whereas over the past decades the two main nuclear powers have reduced the number of their nuclear warheads and envisage continuing this reduction through a number of bilateral agreements,

C. whereas these reductions do not, as yet, point to rapid progress towards full elimination of these weapons,

D. noting with great concern that India carried out five nuclear tests during the period 11-13 May 1998,

E. noting with great concern that Pakistan then carried out six nuclear tests during the period 28-30 May 1998,

H. noting that a number of countries, including some EU Member States, the United States and Japan, have decided to impose sanctions on both countries in response to these nuclear tests,

I. noting that both countries already allocate a disproportionate part of both their GNP and their budget on military spending and on military, nuclear research and development,

J. whereas the nuclear tests are likely to damage both the Pakistani and Indian economies, in view of their effect on foreign loans and investment, which in turn will affect the already low social condition of the population,

K. emphasizing that in order to strengthen stability and security in the region and in the world as a whole it is necessary for India and Pakistan on the one hand to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without any modification thereof, and on the other hand to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thus facilitating its entry into force,

L. noting the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there is an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control,

1. Condemns the recent nuclear tests carried out in May 1998 by India and then by Pakistan and expresses its deep concern about the danger to peace, security and stability in the region and in the world as a whole provoked by these tests; remains convinced that the NPT and the CTBT are the cornerstones of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential bases for progress towards nuclear disarmament;

2. Urges the Indian and Pakistani governments to refrain from any further nuclear tests, to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty without any modification of this Treaty and to adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally;

3. Calls on the Indian and Pakistani governments to give a commitment immediately not to assemble or deploy nuclear weapons and devices, and to halt the development of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

4. Calls on the Indian and Pakistani Governments to start talks immediately to reduce tension in the region, to establish a framework for reconciliation and cooperation and thus to promote peace, security and stability in South Asia and throughout the continent; calls on the Council and the Member States to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan, where necessary and possible, in this process of reconciliation and cooperation, possibly by (co-)sponsoring a regional conference on security and confidence-building measures;

5. Calls on the Council and the Member States to prevent the export of equipment, materials and/or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of carrying such weapons;

6. Calls on Member States which have not yet done so to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty immediately, in order to facilitate its entry into force as soon as possible;

7. Calls on the five nuclear weapons states to interpret their Treaty obligations as an urgent commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons;

8. Asks the Council and the Commission to examine ways and means to promote further progress towards the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons and calls on the Council to present a regular progress report to Parliament;

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the UN Security Council, the governments of the Member States and the governments and parliaments of India and Pakistan.

June 19, 1998
Nuclear Fears, Nuclear History

Published in Communalism Combat, Bombay

Atul Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif have two things in common. Both of them have ordered five nuclear tests, and both of them justified their orders by claiming that their nuclear weapons are defensive. This argument was invented by the Americans to justify their nuclear weapons, after the Soviet Union started to build its own nuclear weapons. It was such a convenient argument that all the nuclear states started to use it once they built nuclear weapons. Now every country with nuclear weapons claims that its weapons are defensive, it is just other countries’ nuclear weapons that are a threat.

How are nuclear weapons a threat? The first answer given is that an enemy may threaten to use nuclear weapons as way to intimidate or blackmail and so win a war. As the most destructive weapons ever made, nuclear weapons should make states that have them invincible. They should be able to win all their wars. In fact, no one should want to fight such states because they have nuclear weapons.

The facts of the last fifty years tell another story. Nuclear weapons states have elected to fight wars on many occasions. They have lost many of them. Britain fought and lost at Suez, even though they it had already developed nuclear weapons. The United States suffered significant defeats during the Korean war and the war ended with a stalemate. The French lost Algeria, even though they had their nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear weapons did not help against Vietnam. The most famous examples are of course the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan despite having enormous numbers of nuclear weapons. In all these cases, a non-nuclear state fought and won against a nuclear armed state.

Another fact from the last fifty years is that having nuclear weapons offers no protection against nuclear threats. During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union made nuclear threats numerous times, with the United States making around twenty such threats and the Soviet Union making five or six. Even though both sides had nuclear weapons, this did not change the fact they were threatened by the other side. If a state with nuclear weapons is going to make a threat, it will do so regardless of whether the state being threatened has nuclear weapons of its own.

The only other use for nuclear weapons that has ever been claimed is that nuclear weapons are supposed to deter attacks by other nuclear weapons and so prevent war between nuclear armed states. This is what is usually meant by nuclear deterrence. The normal example of nuclear deterrence that is used is between the superpowers during the Cold War. The absence of war between them is widely attributed to both sides having nuclear weapons. This cannot however be proven. All that can be said is that the absence of war coincided with both sides having nuclear weapons. It is not logical to deduce that nuclear weapons prevented a war that would otherwise have taken place. The absence of war between the United States and the Soviet Union may simply have been due to neither side wanting a war. The experience of total war in World War II was so terrible that this may have been sufficient to prevent a major war. It is worth remembering over 20 million Soviets were killed in that war.

The history of the Cold War is in fact the history of the elusive search for deterrence. As the years passed and became decades, the amount of destructive power needed to create deterrence kept on increasing. From a few simply atom bombs, it became hundreds of bombs, then thousands and then came the hydrogen bomb, with a destructive power a hundred times greater than an atom bomb. But, even having a few such hydrogen bombs was not enough. McGeorge Bundy, who was an advisor in the White house during both the Cuban Missile Crisis, has argued that deterrence works only if “we assume that each side has very large numbers of thermonuclear weapons [hydrogen bombs] which could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible pre-emptive attack.” It is this kind of nuclear arsenal that is credited by Bundy, and other American supporters of deterrence as being responsible for maintaining the Ñnuclear peaceâ between the United States and Soviet Union. The urge to have weapons that could survive a pre-emptive attack is why both sides developed nuclear submarines and specially hardened silos for missiles. This effort to create deterrence cost the United States at least $4 trillion ($,4000,000,000,000) to develop, produce, deploy, operate, support and control its nuclear forces over the past 50 years.

The Americans were not alone in thinking that large numbers of hydrogen bombs that could survive a nuclear attack were necessary for deterrence.

All five of the established nuclear weapons state have tried to achieve this kind of nuclear arsenal. None of them has stopped developing their arsenals once they built simple nuclear weapons. they have not even relied on large numbers of such simple weapons. They have gone on to build weapons tens if not hundreds or thousands of times more destructive. Even the smallest nuclear arsenal, belonging to Britain, has 200 thermonuclear weapons with a collective destructive power two thousand times greater than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima.

There are, however, some important dissenting voices who say that deterrence never worked. General George Lee Butler, who until a few years ago actually commanded all of the United States strategic nuclear weapons has said the world survived the Cuban missile crisis no thanks to deterrence, but only by the grace of God. If General Butler is right, and even the fear created by “very large numbers” of hydrogen bombs was not enough to stop two nuclear states getting ready to go to war then what purpose is served by this fear? What this fear can do is stop peace. Even though the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union gone, the nuclear weapons are still there. The US still has over 10,000 and Russia about as many. The fear now is not the other state, but the others nuclear weapons. As long as there are nuclear weapons there cannot be real peace.

History teaches that nuclear fears cannot be calmed with nuclear weapons. The simple truth is that there has never been a weapon that can offer a defense against being afraid. The only defense against fear is courage and courage needs no weapons to make its presence felt.

June 15, 1998
G8 Foriegn Ministers Communique on Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests
London

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of eight major industrialised democracies and the Representative of the European Commission, held a special meeting in London on 12 June 1998 to consider the serious global challenge posed by the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. Recalling the statement issued by our Heads of State or Government on 15 May, and emphasising the support of all of us for the communiqué issued by the P5 in Geneva on 4 June and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, we condemn the nuclear tests carried out by India on 11 and 13 May 1998 and by Pakistan on 28 May and 30 May. These tests have affected both countries’ relationships with each of us, worsened rather than improved their security environment, damaged their prospects of achieving their goals of sustainable economic development, and run contrary to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

2. The negative impact of these tests on the international standing and ambitions of both countries will be serious and lasting. They will also have a serious negative impact on investor confidence. Both countries need to take positive actions directed towards defusing tension in the region and rejoining the international community’s efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Urgent action is needed both to halt an arms race on the Sub-Continent, which would divert resources from urgent economic priorities, and to reduce tension, build confidence and encourage peaceful resolution of the differences between India and Pakistan, so that their peoples may face a better future.

3. With a view to halting the nuclear and missile arms race on the Sub-Continent, and taking note of the official statements of the Indian and Pakistani Governments that they wish to avoid such an arms race, we consider that India and Pakistan should immediately take the following steps, already endorsed by the United Nations Security Council:
- stop all further nuclear tests and adhere to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating its early entry into force;
- refrain from weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons and from the testing or deployment of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and enter into firm commitments not to weaponise or deploy nuclear weapons or missiles;
- refrain from any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and participate, in a positive spirit and on the basis of the agreed mandate, in negotiations with other states in the Conference on Disarmament for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Convention with a view to reaching early agreement;
- confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials and technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them, and undertake appropriate commitments in that regard.
We believe that such actions would be strongly in the interest of both countries.

4. With a view to reducing tension, building confidence and encouraging peaceful resolution of their differences through dialogue, India and Pakistan should:
- undertake to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, including infiltrations or hot pursuit, or other provocative acts and statements;
- discourage terrorist activity and any support for it;
- implement fully the confidence- and security-building measures they have already agreed and develop further such measures;
- resume without delay a direct dialogue that addresses the root causes of the tension, including Kashmir, through such measures as early resumption of Foreign Secretary level talks, effective use of the hot-line between the two leaders, and realisation of a meeting between Prime Ministers on the occasion of the 10th SAARC Summit scheduled next month;
- allow and encourage progress towards enhanced Indo-Pakistani economic cooperation, including through a free trade area in South Asia.
We encourage the development of a regional security dialogue.

5. We pledge actively to encourage India and Pakistan to find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems and stand ready to assist India and Pakistan in pursuing any of these positive actions. Such assistance might be provided, at the request of both parties, in the development and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

6. The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan do not change thedefinition of a nuclear weapon state in the NPT, and therefore, notwithstanding those tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear weapon states in accordance with the NPT. We continue to urge India and Pakistan to adhere to the NPT as it stands, without any conditions. We shall continue to apply firmly our respective policies to prevent the export of materials, equipment or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.

7. It is our firm view that the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan reinforce the importance of maintaining and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of the non- proliferation regime and as the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. We all, nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states alike, reiterate our determination to fulfil the commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. These commitments were reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and included the determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. We note the progress already made in this direction and welcome the firm intention both of the United States and of the Russian Federation to bring START II into force, and to negotiate and conclude a START III agreement at the earliest possible date. We also note contributions made by other nuclear weapon states to the reductions process. We call upon all states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty rapidly to ensure its entry into force, and welcome the determination of the member governments of the G8 that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date. We continue to look for the accession to the NPT of the remaining countries which are not yet parties to it.

8. We call on all the member states of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on the immediate opening of the Cut-Off negotiation at the CD.

9. Both India and Pakistan face enormous challenges in developing their economies and building prosperity. However, the recent nuclear tests have created an atmosphere of regional instability which will undermine the region’s attractiveness to both foreign and domestic investment, damaging business confidence and the prospects for economic growth. The diversion of their resources to nuclear and other weapons programmes displaces more productive investment and weakens their ability to pursue sound economic policies. It calls into question the commitment of both governments to poverty reduction and undermines the regional cooperation between SAARC countries on social and economic issues. In line with the approach to development set out in the Naples, Lyon, Denver and Birmingham Communiqués, we call on both governments to reduce expenditure that undermines their objective of promoting sound economic policies that will benefit all members of society, especially the poorest, and to otherwise enhance cooperation in South Asia.

10. We believe it is important that India and Pakistan are aware of the strength of the international community’s views on their recent tests and on these other subjects. Several among us have, on a unilateral basis, taken specific actions to underscore our strong concerns. All countries should act as they see fit to demonstrate their displeasure and address their concerns to India and Pakistan. We do not wish to punish the peoples of India or Pakistan as a result of actions by their governments, and we will therefore not oppose loans by international financial institutions to the two countries to meet basic human needs. We agree, however, to work for a postponement in consideration of other loans in the World Bank and other international financial institutions to India and Pakistan, and to any other country that will conduct nuclear tests.

11. We pledge to convey the common views of our Governments on these matters to those of India and Pakistan with a view to bringing about early and specific progress in the areas outlined above. We plan to keep developments under review and to continue the process of pursuing the goals on which we are all agreed.
June 12, 1998
75 U.S. Catholic Bishops Condemn Policy of Nuclear Deterrence

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Contact: Dave Robinson
814-453-4955 Ext. 235

Erie, PA — Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it’s the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of nuclear weapons, say 73 U.S. Catholic bishops in a report issued today by Pax Christi USA, the national Catholic peace and justice organization. The report, “The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence: An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States,” critiques current U.S. nuclear weapons policy in light of the Catholic Church’s 1983 pastoral statement, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,” which allowed for the morality of nuclear deterrence on the condition that it only be an interim measure tied to progressive disarmament. Further Catholic Church teaching has since called for a concrete policy of nuclear elimination. “With the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, we feel our statement is both timely and prophetic,” says Walter F. Sullivan, Bishop of Richmond, Va. and president of Pax Christi USA. “We hope it will help generate further discussions both within the Catholic community and in the policy-making circles of our government.”

The report recognizes the dramatic changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War and offers a warning. “Because of the horrendous results if these weapons were to be used, and what we see as a greater liklihood of their use, we feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence,” the report states. Coming in the wake of the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, the report calls for the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process that will lead to a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would ban nuclear weapons the way that the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions have banned those weapons.

“What the Indian and Pakistani tests make clear is that the discriminatory nature of current nonproliferation efforts will not free the world of the threat posed by these weapons,” says Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, Mich., and a leading expert on nuclear deterrence in the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. “The choice today is clear. Either all nations must give up the right to possess these weapons or all nations will claim that right. The events in India and Pakistan must be recognized as a sign of what is inevitable. We must act now to avoid a future where the nuclear threat becomes the currency of international security.”

Citing the $60 billion Department of Energy program known as Stockpile Stewardship and Management, as well as current administration policies, the bishops conclude that the United States plans to rely on nuclear weapons indefinitely. “Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test, and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States (and the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new design and testing capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with ‘progressive disarmament’ and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely,” state the bishops.

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The Morality of Nuclear Deterrence
An Evaluation by Pax Christi Bishops in the United States

Issued on the 15th Anniversary of Challenge of Peace,
God’s Promise and Our Response

June 1998

Dear Sisters and Brothers,

We, the undersigned Catholic bishops of the United States and members of Pax Christi USA, write to you on a matter of grave moral concern: the continued possession, development and plans for the use of nuclear weapons by our country. For the past fifteen years, and particularly in the context of the Cold War, we, the Catholic bishops of the United States, have reluctantly acknowledged the possibility that nuclear weapons could have some moral legitimacy, but only if the goal was nuclear disarmament. It is our present, prayerful judgment that this legitimacy is now lacking.

In 1983 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, in our Pastoral Letter The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, grappled with the unique moral challenge posed by nuclear weapons. Fifteen years ago we stated that, because of the massive and indiscriminate destruction that nuclear weapons would inflict, their use would not be morally justified.i We spoke in harmony with the conscience of the world in that judgment. We reaffirm that judgment now. Nuclear weapons must never be used, no matter what the provocation, no matter what the military objective.

Deterrence
Fifteen years ago we concurred with Pope John Paul II in acknowledging that, given the context of that time, possession of these weapons as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by others could be morally acceptable, but acceptable only as an interim measure and only if deterrence were combined with clear steps toward progressive disarmament.

Ours was a strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence. It depended on three criteria:

a) a reliance on deterrent strategies must be an interim policy only. As we stated then, “We cannot consider it adequate as a long-term basis for peace;”

b) the purpose of maintaining nuclear weapons in the interim was only “to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others;” and

c) a reliance on deterrence must be used “not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament.”

In our 10th Anniversary Statement, The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, we further specified that “progressive disarmament” must mean a commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, not simply as an ideal, but as a concrete policy goal

A New Moment
In 1998 the global context is significantly different from what it was a few years ago. Throughout the Cold War the nuclear arsenal was developed and maintained as the ultimate defense in an ideological conflict that pitted what were considered two historical forces against each other — capitalism in the West and communism in the East. The magnitude of that conflict was defined by the mutual exclusivity of each other’s ideology. Nuclear weapons and the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction were accepted as the inescapable context of that particular struggle. Today the Soviet Union no longer exists. The United States is now aiding its democratic successor, the Russian Federation, in dismantling the very nuclear weapons that a short time ago were poised to destroy us. Yet, the Cold War weapons amassed throughout that struggle have survived the struggle itself and are today in search of new justifications and new missions to fulfill.

But, with the end of the Cold War came new hope. World opinion has coalesced around the concrete effort to outlaw nuclear weapons, as it has with biological and chemical weapons and most recently with anti-personnel landmines. As examples of this opinion we note the dramatic public statement of December 1996 in which 61 retired Generals and Admirals, many of whom held the highest level positions in the nuclear establishment of this country, said that these weapons are unnecessary, destabilizing and must be outlawed.vi We also note the historic International Court of Justice opinion of July 1996 that, “The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable to armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.” The Court went on to say, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

Additionally, the Holy See has become more explicit in its condemnation of nuclear weapons and has urged their abolition. We recognize this new moment and are in accord with the Holy See, which has stated, “If biological weapons, chemical weapons and now landmines can be done away with, so too can nuclear weapons. No weapon so threatens the longed-for peace of the 21st century as the nuclear [weapon]. Let not the immensity of this task dissuade us from the efforts needed to free humanity from such a scourge.

Unfortunately the monumental political changes that have occurred in the wake of the Cold War have not been accompanied by similar far reaching changes in the military planning for development and deployment of nuclear weapons. It is absolutely clear to us that the present US policy does not include a decisive commitment to progressive nuclear disarmament. Rather, nuclear weapons policy has been expanded in the post-Cold War period to include new missions well beyond their previous role as a deterrent to nuclear attack. The United States today maintains a commitment to use nuclear weapons first, including pre-emptive nuclear attacks on nations that do not possess nuclear weapons. “Flexible targeting strategies” are aimed at Third World nations, and a new commitment exists to use nuclear weapons either preemptively or in response to chemical and biological weapons or other threats to US national interests.ix This expanded role of the US nuclear deterrent is unacceptable.

A New Arms Race
In order to maintain the necessary credibility required by a continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the United States is today embarking on an expansion of its nuclear weapons complex. The Department of Energy, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, has developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a vast and multi-faceted effort at modernizing the nuclear weapons complex to provide for the continued research, development and testing of nuclear weapons well into the next century. The program will eventually lead to creating computer-simulated nuclear weapons tests that will allow the United States to continue to test nuclear weapons in the event that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (which will ban full-scale underground nuclear testing) enters into force. The cost of this Stockpile Stewardship program is currently estimated at $60 billion over the next dozen years. Such an investment in a program to upgrade the ability to design, develop, test and maintain nuclear weapons signals quite clearly that the United States, (as well as the other nuclear weapons states that are similarly developing these new testing and design capabilities) shows no intention of moving forward with “progressive disarmament” and certainly no commitment to eliminating these weapons entirely.

Instead of progressive nuclear disarmament, we are witnessing the institutionalization of nuclear deterrence. The recent Presidential Decision Directive on nuclear weapons policy, partially made known to the public in December 1997, makes this point clear. The Directive indicates that the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of the nation’s strategic defense, that the role of these weapons has been increased to include deterring Third World non-nuclear weapons states and deterring chemical and biological weapons, as well as other undefined vital US interests abroad.xii Does not this policy, coupled with the huge investments under the Stockpile Stewardship Program, represent a renewed commitment to nuclear deterrence that will affect generations to come? The Department of Energy’s own timetable for the Stockpile Stewardship Program indicates that the United States will continue to develop, test and rely upon a nuclear deterrent through the year 2065. This is clearly not the interim policy to which we grudgingly gave our moral approval in 1983. Rather, it is the manifestation of the very reliance on nuclear nproliferation Treaty.

In Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace we addressed the growing concerns that nuclear weapons might be used against other than nuclear threats: “The United States should commit itself never to use nuclear weapons first, should unequivocally reject proposals to use nuclear weapons to deter non-nuclear threats, and should reinforce the fragile barrier against the use of these weapons.”xv Nuclear deterrence policy, as developed over the past decade, stands in clear contradiction to these goals.

Inherent Dangers
The policy of nuclear deterrence has always included the intention to use the weapons if deterrence should fail. Since the end of the Cold War this deterrent has been expanded to include any number of potential aggressors, proliferators and so-called “rogue nations.” The inherent instability in a world unconstrained by the great-power standoff present throughout the Cold War leads us to conclude that the danger of deterrence failing has been increased. That danger can become manifest if but one so-called “rogue state” calls the deterrent bluff. In such a case the requirements of deterrence policy would be the actual use of nuclear weapons. This must not be allowed. Because of the horrendous results if these weapons should be used, and what we see as a greater likelihood of their use, we now feel it is imperative to raise a clear, unambiguous voice in opposition to the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Moral Conclusions
Sadly, it is clear to us that our strict conditions for the moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence are not being met. Specifically, a) the policy of nuclear deterrence is being institutionalized. It is no longer considered an interim policy but rather has become the very “long-term basis for peace” that we rejected in 1983.

b) the role of nuclear deterrence has been expanded in the post Cold War era well beyond the narrow role of deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others. The role to be played now by nuclear weapons includes a whole range of contingencies on a global scale including countering biological and chemical weapons and the protection of vital national interests abroad.

c) although the United States and the republics that made up the former Soviet Union have in recent years eliminated some of their huge, superfluous stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our country, at least, has no intention, or policy position of eliminating these weapons entirely. Rather, the US intends to retain its nuclear deterrent into the indefinite future.

Gospel Call of Love
As bishops of the Church in the United States, it is incumbent on us to speak directly to the policies and actions of our nation. We speak now out of love not only for those who would suffer and die as victims of nuclear violence, but also for those who would bear the terrible responsibility of unleashing these horrendous weapons. We speak out of love for those suffering because of the medical effects in communities where these weapons are produced and are being tested. We speak out of love for those deprived of the barest necessities because of the huge amount of available resources committed to the continued development and ongoing maintenance of nuclear weapons. We recall the words of another Vatican message to the United Nations, that these weapons, “by their cost alone, kill the poor by causing them to starve.”xvi We speak out of love for both victims and the executioners, believing that “the whole law is fulfilled in one statement, namely, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself’” (Gal. 5-14).

It is out of this love that we raise up our voices with those around the world in calling for an end to the reliance on nuclear deterrence and instead call upon the United States and the other nuclear weapons states to enter into a process leading to the complete elimination of these morally offensive weapons. Indeed, in taking his position we are answering the call of Pope John Paul II, whose Permanent Representative to the United Nations stated in October 1997:

“The work that this committee (1st Committee of the United Nations) has done in calling for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention must be increased. Those nuclear weapons states resisting such negotiations must be challenged, for in clinging to their outmoded rationales for nuclear deterrence they are denying the most ardent aspirations of humanity as well as the opinion of the highest legal authority in the world. The gravest consequences for humankind lie ahead if the world is to be ruled by the militarism represented by nuclear weapons rather than the humanitarian law espoused by the International Court of Justice. “Nuclear weapons are incompatible with the peace we seek for the 21st century. They cannot be justified. They deserve condemnation. The preservation of the Nonproliferation Treaty demands an unequivocal commitment to their abolition. “This is a moral challenge, a legal challenge and a political challenge. That multi-based challenge must be met by the application of our humanity.”

We recognize the opposition that our message will meet. We are painfully aware that many of our policymakers sincerely believe that possessing nuclear weapons is vital for our national security. We are convinced though, that it is not. Instead, they make the world a more dangerous place. They provide a rationale for other nations to build a nuclear arsenal, thereby increasing the possibility that they will be used by someone.

Not only are they not vital for national security, but we believe they actually contribute to national insecurity. No nation can be truly secure until the community of nations is secure. We are mindful of Pope John Paul II’s warning that “violence of whatever form cannot decide conflicts between individuals or between nations, because violence generates more violence.”

On this, the 15th anniversary of The Challenge of Peace the time has come for concrete action for nuclear disarmament. On the eve of the Third Millennium may our world rid itself of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and the constant threat they pose. We cannot delay any longer. Nuclear deterrence as a national policy must be condemned as morally abhorrent because it is the excuse and justification for the continued possession and further development of these horrendous weapons. We urge all to join in taking up the challenge to begin the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons now, rather than relying on them indefinitely.

May the grace and peace of the risen Jesus Christ be with us all.
Anthony S. Apuron, OFM, Cap.
Archbishop of Agana, Guam

Victor Balke
Bishop of Crookston, MN

William D. Borders
Archbishop of Baltimore, MD (ret.)

Joseph M. Breitenbeck
Bishop of Grand Rapids, MI (ret.)

Charles A. Buswell
Bishop of Pueblo, CO (ret.)

Matthew H. Clark
Bishop of Rochester, NY

Thomas J. Connolly
Bishop of Baker, OR

Patrick R. Cooney
Bishop of Gaylord, MI

Thomas V. Daily
Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

James J. Daly
Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY (ret.)

Nicholas D’Antonio, OFM
Bishop of New Orleans, LA (ret.)

Joseph P. Delaney
Bishop of Fort Worth, TX

Norbert L. Dorsey, C.P
Bishop of Orlando, FL

Joseph A. Ferrario
Bishop of Honolulu, HI (ret.)

John J. Fitzpatrick
Bishop of Brownsville, TX (ret.)

Patrick F. Flores
Archbishop of San Antonio, TX

Joseph A. Fiorenza
Bishop of Galveston-Houston, TX

Raphael M. Fliss
Bishop of Superior, WI

Marion F. Forst
Bishop of Dodge City, KS (ret.)

Benedict C. Franzetta
Auxiliary Bishop of Youngstown, OH (ret.)

Raymond E. Goedert
Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

John R. Gorman
Auxiliary Bishop of Chicago, IL

F. Joseph Gossman
Bishop of Raleigh, NC

Thomas J. Gumbleton
Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI

Richard C. Hanifen
Bishop of Colorado Springs, CO

Edward D. Head
Bishop of Buffalo, NY (ret.)

Joseph L. Howze
Bishop of Biloxi, MS

Howard J. Hubbard
Bishop of Albany, NY

William A. Hughes
Bishop of Covington, KY (ret.)

Raymond G. Hunthausen
Archbishop of Seattle, WA (ret.)

Joseph L. Imesch
Bishop of Joliet, IL

Michael J. Kaniecki, S.J.
Bishop of Fairbanks, AK

Raymond A. Lucker
Bishop of New Ulm, MN

Dominic A. Marconi
Auxiliary Bishop of Newark, NJ

Joseph F. Maguire
Bishop of Springfield, MA (ret.)

Leroy T. Matthiesen
Bishop of Amarillo, TX (ret.)

Edward A. McCarthy
Archbishop of Miami, FL (ret.)

John E. McCarthy
Bishop of Austin, TX

Lawrence J. McNamara
Bishop of Grand Island, NE

John J. McRaith
Bishop of Owensboro, KY

Dale J. Melczek
Bishop of Gary, IN

Donald W. Montrose
Bishop of Stockton, CA

Robert M. Moskal
Bishop of St. Josaphat in Parma, OH

Michael J. Murphy
Bishop of Erie, PA (ret.)

P. Francis Murphy
Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

William C. Newman
Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore, MD

James D. Niedergeses
Bishop of Nashville, TN (ret.)

Edward. J. O’Donnell
Bishop of Lafayette, LA

Albert H. Ottenweller
Bishop of Steubenville, OH (ret.)

Donald E. Pelotte, S.S.S.
Bishop of Gallup, NM

A. Edward Pevec
Auxiliary Bishop of Cleveland, OH

Michael D. Pfeifer, O.M.I.
Bishop of San Angelo, TX

Kenneth J. Povish
Bishop of Lansing, MI (ret.)

Francis A. Quinn
Bishop of Sacramento, CA (ret.)

John R. Roach
Archbishop of St. Paul /Minneapolis, MN (ret.)

Frank J. Rodimer
Bishop of Paterson, NJ

Peter A. Rosazza
Auxiliary Bishop of Hartford, CT

Joseph M. Sartoris
Auxiliary Bishop of Los Angeles, CA

Walter J. Schoenherr
Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, MI (ret.)

Roger L. Schwietz, OMI
Bishop of Duluth, MN

Daniel E. Sheehan
Archbishop of Omaha, NE (ret.)

Richard J. Sklba
Auxiliary Bishop of Milwaukee, WI

John J. Snyder
Bishop of St. Augustine, FL

George H. Speltz
Bishop of St. Cloud, MN (ret.)

Kenneth D. Steiner
Auxiliary Bishop of Portland, OR

Joseph M. Sullivan
Auxiliary Bishop of Brooklyn, NY

Walter F. Sullivan
Bishop of Richmond, VA

Arthur N. Tafoya
Bishop of Pueblo, CO

Elliot G. Thomas
Bishop of St. Thomas, VI

David B. Thompson
Bishop of Charleston, SC

Kenneth E. Untener
Bishop of Saginaw, MI

Loras J. Watters
Bishop of Winona, CA (ret.)

Emil A. Wcela
Auxiliary Bishop of Rockville Centre, NY

__________________________________

1 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response, NCCB, 1983, No. 150.
2 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 186
3 Ibid., Challenge of Peace, No. 185 & 188 (1)
4John Paul II, “Message to the United Nations Special Session On Disarmament, 1982,” #8
5 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13.
6 New York Times, December 6, 1996, Statement on Nuclear Weapons by 61 International Generals and Admirals.
7 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the (Il)legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996.
8 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997.
9 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.10
10 President William J. Clinton, Letter of Transmittal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the United States Senate, Sept. 22, 1997.
11 Western States Legal Foundation, A Faustian Bargain: Why “Stockpile Stewardship” is Incompatible with the Process of Nuclear Disarmament, March 1998.
12 Reported in the Washington Post, December 7, 1997, p. 1. 13 Information shared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Senior NIF Scientist, William J. Hogan with Pax Christi USA Delegation to LLNL, October 7, 1997.
14 British American Security Information Council, Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US Nuclear Strategy, March 1, 1998. p.9.
15 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, NCCB, 1993, p. 13.
16 Giovanni Cheli, Permanent Representative for the Holy See Observer Mission to the United Nations, United Nations 1st Special Session on Disarmament, 1976.
17 Archbishop Renato Martino, United Nations Permanent Observer of the Holy See, Statement to the United Nations’ 1st Committee, Oct. 15, 1997.
18 Pope John Paul II, Address to Pax Christi International, May 29, 1995.

June 10, 1998
Why Nuclear Deterrence Is A Dangerous Illusion

In the January-February 1997 issue of the New Zealand International Review, an article by Ron Smith – Director of Defence and Strategic Studies in the Department of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Waikato, New Zealand – argued against the growing tide in favour of the abolition of nuclear weapons. On the following point I have no dispute with him. He wrote:

“The crucial issue is that of the value of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary world. If it still has value, then that value must be measured against what we take to be the value of a nuclear weapons-free world… We cannot discuss the elimination of nuclear weapons without discussing nuclear deterrence.”

What if nuclear deterrence has no value? I will argue that this is in fact the case; and that the whole doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a dangerous illusion.

Flying With The Bomb
I served in the Royal Navy for twenty years from 1962-82. As a Fleet Air Arm Observer (navigator and weapon system operator), I flew in Buccaneer carrier-borne nuclear strike jets from 1968 to 72; and for the next five years in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters equipped with the WE-177 Nuclear Depth Bomb (NDB). As one of four nuclear crews in a Buccaneer squadron, my pilot and I were assigned a target from NATO’s Single Integrated Operational Plan, and were ordered to plan to attack it with a free-fall WE-177 thermo-nuclear bomb.

Nuclear Versus Conventional Deterrence Between States
NDBs were withdrawn from the Royal Navy in 1992. By then, new conventional ASW weapons had been developed which were able to neutralise all currently envisaged naval targets. Indeed, as far as the USA is concerned, Ron Smith rightly stated:

“There is nothing it could do with nuclear weapons that it cannot do with modern conventional weapons.”

Therefore conventional deterrence – which is credible – is the military answer to his fear that, without nuclear deterrence, “disastrous wars between the major powers are likely to occur again.”

Modern industrial States, increasingly interdependent on multinational conglomerates, the globalisation of trade and sensitive to public opinion, are increasingly constrained from going to war with each other. But even if this argument is not accepted, there is a fundamental logical objection to relying on nuclear deterrence. Although the risk of conventional deterrence failing is greater, the damage would be confined to the belligerent States – and the environmental damage would usually be reparable. What is at stake from deterrence failing between nuclear weapon States is the devastation and poisoning of not just the belligerent powers, but potentially of all forms of life on the planet. Meanwhile, retention of nuclear arsenals encourages proliferation of the problem, and with it this unacceptable risk.

Falklands War
In my last appointment as Staff Officer (Intelligence) to Commander-in-Chief Fleet, I helped to provide round-the-clock intelligence support to British forces in the Falklands War. I know what a close-run thing that war was. If Argentine aircraft had sunk one of the main troopships before the landing force had got ashore, the British might have had to withdraw. What would Thatcher have done? Polaris had clearly not deterred Galtieri from invading. With victory in his grasp, it is doubtful that he would have believed even Thatcher would have seriously threatened a nuclear strike on Argentina. Yet rumours abounded that a Polaris submarine had been moved south within range of Buenos Aires. If she had so threatened, my assessment was that he would have very publicly called her bluff and relished watching Reagan try to rein her in. And in the last resort, it is likely that the Polaris Commanding Officer would have either refused the order or faked a malfunction, and returned to face the court martial.

Gulf War
My scepticism over nuclear deterrence grew when the Berlin Wall came down; but it took the Gulf War to make me break out of my pro-nuclear brainwashing. As the first ex-RN Commander with nuclear weapon experience to speak out against them, it was very traumatic.

In the run-up to the Gulf War, my military intelligence training warned me that the US-led coalition’s blitzkrieg/punitive expedition strategy would give Saddam Hussein the pretext he needed to attack Israel – an undeclared nuclear weapon State. If thereby Israel was drawn into the conflict, this might split the coalition. If not, he still stood to gain widespread Arab support for being the first Arab leader for years to take on the Israelis.

My greatest fear was that the Iraqi leader would be provoked enough to attack Israel with chemical-headed Scud missiles. Knowing that West German technical support was involved in the warhead design, Israel’s Prime Minister Shamir would come under massive pressure to retaliate with a nuclear strike on Baghdad. Iraq had the best anti-nuclear bunkers Western technology could provide; but even if Saddam did not survive, what would happennext? With Baghdad a radiated ruin, the entire Arab world would erupt in fury against Israel and her friends: there would be terror bombings in every allied capital; Israel’s security would be destroyed forever; and Russia would be sucked in.

The first Scud attack hit Tel Aviv on the night of *18* January 1991. For the first time, the second most important city of a de-facto nuclear State had been attacked and its capital threatened. Worse, the aggressor did not have nuclear weapons. The rest of the world still waits to learn what Bush had to promise Shamir for not retaliating – fortunately, the warhead was conventional high explosive, and casualties were light. The Israeli people, cowering in gas-masks in their basements, learned that night that their nuclear “deterrent” had failed in its primary purpose. Some 38 more Scud attacks followed.

Meanwhile, in Britain the IRA just missed wiping out the entire Gulf War Cabinet with a mortar bomb attack from a van in Whitehall. They were not deterred by Polaris – yet a more direct threat to the government could barely be imagined.

Nuclear Deterrence Won’t Work Against Terrorists
To my surprise, in 1993 the British Secretary of State for Defence agreed with me. In a keynote speech on 16 November at the Centre for Defence Studies in King’s College, London entitled “UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?”, Malcolm Rifkind almost agonised over the problem:

“… I have to say that it is difficult to be confident that an intended deterrent would work in the way intended, in the absence of an established deterrent relationship… Would the threat be understood in the deterrent way in which it was intended; and might it have some unpredictable and perhaps counter-productive consequence? Categoric answers to these questions might be hard to come by, and in their absence the utility of the deterrent threat as a basis for policy and action would necessarily be in doubt… it is difficult to see deterrence operating securely against proliferators.”

By an “established deterrent relationship” presumably he meant the unstable, irrational balance of terror between two trigger-happy, paranoid power blocs – otherwise known as the Cold War. Its inherent instability was evidenced by the inevitable struggle for “escalation dominance”. More than 50,000 nuclear warheads was the ridiculous result; while health, education, and other services that make up civilised society deteriorated on both sides through lack of resources.

With the break-up of the Soviet Union and an unchecked arms trade, it is only a matter of time before terrorists get a nuclear weapon. They are the most likely “proliferators”, because nuclear blackmail is the ultimate expression of megalomania and terrorism. Yet nuclear deterrence cannot be relied upon against such threats.

*What If Terrorists Try Nuclear Blackmail?
The first rule is that on no account should the threat of nuclear annihilation be used to try and oppose them. They will just call your bluff – because targeting them with even a small nuclear weapon would be impossible without incurring unacceptable collateral damage and provoking global outrage. Indeed, they would relish taking as many others with them as they could. So nuclear weapons are worse than useless in such a crisis.

My advice would be to emulate how the French authorities dealt with a man with explosives wrapped around his chest who hijacked a class of schoolchildren and threatened to blow them up if his demands were not met. They exhausted him by lengthy negotiations while installing surveillance devices to determine his condition and location. At an optimum moment Special Forces moved in and shot him dead with a silenced handgun.

The most important underlying point to make here is that the surest way to minimise the chances of a nuclear hijack is to stop treating the Bomb as a top asset in the security business and the ultimate political virility symbol.*

This nightmare will intensify as long as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council insist on the Bomb to “guarantee” their ultimate security – when in fact it does the exact opposite – while trying to deny it to other States. Such a policy of nuclear apartheid is hypocritical and un-sustainable.

Nuclear Deterrence Undermines Security
The Falklands and Gulf Wars taught me that competing for unilateral security leads to more insecurity, both for others and ultimately oneself. We need a new understanding of security: one that sees it as a safety net for all, not a “win or lose” military game which leaves the underlying problems which caused the war unresolved, and feeds the arms trade. True security lies in fostering a just, sustainable world order.

The Bomb directly threatens security – both of those who possess it and those it is meant to impress. Indeed, it is a security problem, not a solution. This is because it provokes the greatest threat: namely, the spread of nuclear weapons to megalomaniac leaders and terrorists – who are least likely to be deterred.

Nuclear Deterrence Undermines Democracy
Democracy depends on responsible use of political and military power, with leaders held accountable to the will of the majority of the people. If a democratic nation is forced to use State-sanctioned violence to defend itself, its leaders must stay within recognised moral and legal limits.

*Morality. The policy of nuclear deterrence inevitably involves an actual intention to use nuclear weapons under certain – admittedly extreme – circumstances. Michael Dummett, Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford took up the argument in a speech on 19 October 1993:

“We have to ask ourselves, ‘Is it wrong to have an intention to do what is wrong?’ Plainly it is. So, ‘Is it wrong to have a conditional intention to do what would be wrong?’ There is a seductive argument which goes: ‘The point is to prevent the condition from arising in which I am threatening to use nuclear weapons.’ What is wrong about that is not any consequence of forming that intention; it is that you give your will, albeit conditionally, to the act intended. The strategy of deterrence requires a conditional intention to commit a monstrously wicked act: to annihilate entire cities and all the people living in them. It is therefore a strategy which no government should use and no citizen should support.”

Legality. That is where democracy and Nuremberg come in. On 8 July 1996 at the Peace Palace in The Hague, I was present when the International Court of Justice gave its Advisory Opinion on the following question put to it by the UN General Assembly in December 1994:

“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons under any circumstance permitted under international law?”

In the most authoritative declaration of what international law says about the question, the Court highlighted the “unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to come.” Thereby, the Court confirmed that nuclear weapons are in the same stigmatised category of weapons of mass destruction as chemical and biological weapons. Indeed, the effects of nuclear weapons are more severe, widespread and long-lasting than those of chemical weapons of which the development, production, stockpiling and use are prohibited by specific convention regardless of size. Also radiation effects are analogous to those of biological weapons, which are also outlawed by specific convention.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Court could find no legal circumstance for the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Also it endorsed the view that threat and use are indivisible. In deciding that it could not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, the Court left no exception. On the contrary, it challenged the nuclear States that they had not convinced it that limited use of low yield, so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons “would not tend to escalate into the all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons.” Furthermore it confirmed that, as part of humanitarian law, the Nuremberg Charter of 8 August 1945 – paradoxically signed two days after the nuclear strike on Hiroshima and the day before the one on Nagasaki – applies to nuclear weapons.

Though neither directly binding or enforcable, this clearly brings into question the legality of, for example, ballistic missile-firing submarines deployed on patrol. Nuclear deterrence is about threatening the most indiscriminate violence possible, unrestrained by morality or the law. It is therefore a policy of gross irresponsibility, and the antithesis of democratic values.

Stifling Dissent. Furthermore, democracy within a nuclear weapon State is inevitably eroded by the need for secrecy and tight control of equipment, technology and personnel. When I became a nuclear crew in Buccaneers, I was given a special security clearance before being told never to discuss the nuclear role, even with other aircrew in my squadron, let alone my family. It was considered such an honour – only the four best crews were chosen – that no-one questioned it.

As Senior Observer of the Sea King ASW helicopter squadron in the carrier HMS EAGLE in 1973-74, I had to train the other Observers how to use a thermo-nuclear depth bomb (NDB). The speed and depth advantage of the latest Soviet nuclear submarines over NATO air-launched ASW torpedoes was such that it had been concluded that only an NDB could be guaranteed to destroy them. Now this was just to protect our carrier, not last- ditch defence of the motherland. Moreover, the Observer would have had to press the button to release it – not the Prime Minister, as they are so fond of claiming. There was a “Low/High Yield” switch: low yield was about 5 kilotons, and high yield over 10 kilotons – Hiroshima was not much more than that. Worse, this would definitely be a suicide mission, because our helicopter was too slow to escape before detonation. For good measure, such an attack would vaporise a huge chunk of ocean, cause heavy radioactive fallout (both from the NDB and the nuclear submarine reactor and any nuclear-tipped torpedoes it carried), and also cause the underwater sonic equivalent of Electro-Magnetic Pulse – quite apart from escalating World War 3 to nuclear holocaust.

Yet all these concerns were brushed aside when I raised them. I was simply told not to worry, and get on with it. So I did: but I began to realise that nuclear weapons were militarily useless; and that my leaders – both military and political – were placing me in a position where I could fall foul of the Nuremberg Charter. However, the old British military tradition of the Charge of the Light Brigade in the Crimean War, as immortalised by Tennyson, was alive and well: “Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die.”

Nuclear Gunboat Diplomacy? This difficulty has re-emerged recently, with the deployment in Trident of a single, variable lower-yield warhead in some missiles to threaten a “more limited nuclear strike” in order to deliver, in Mr Rifkind’s words, “an unmistakable message of our willingness to defend our vital interests”. He justified this by the need to find an answer to the fact that six 100 kiloton, MIRV’d warheads atop the other missiles are not a credible deterrent threat to “rogue” States threatening British vital interests anywhere in the world.

These vital interests, spelt out in the 1995 Defence White Paper, include British trade, the sea routes used for it, raw materials from abroad, and overseas investments. This has been accompanied by, for example, the following statement in the December 1996 issue of the Royal United Services Institute Journal by Admiral Sir Peter Abbott KCB, then Commander-in- Chief Fleet:

“Within the context of a broad security policy, I anticipate that specific military action may be required in the way of dissuasion, retribution or coercion against those nations, regimes or groupings which pose a threat to our vital interests, project a tangible military threat to our homelands, forces overseas or allies, and those who disrupt the international system.

“Therefore, although part of that framework will include defence in its classic sense of reactive measures consistent with NATO doctrine, it will also have to include more pro-active measures. This will add meaning to new concepts of deterrence, based on dealing with problems as they emerge and whilst the potential adversary is more amenable to persuasion, rather than waiting for them to grow and an adversary to become strong. We will also have to cater for the irrational opponent or those occasions when the threat of nuclear use is not practicable or simply not credible. This can be achieved by dissuasion, which is sustained by a constant demonstration of our military capability and readiness to use it, and retribution which should ensure that if an opponent, whether a pirate or rogue regime, is not dissuaded after warnings, he can expect to suffer considerable, unacceptable, and possibly personal, consequences.

“This implies the possibility of what I would call pre-emptive deterrence. This is a philosophy which has been fashionable in history at certain times – that of establishing waypoints beyond which a state feels threatened and a potential enemy, rational or not, will be subjected to offensive action at an appropriate level. Given my points about deterrence and economy of effort before, we will wish any action to be at a time and place of our choosing so that we can retain the initiative. This is particularly relevant with regard to emerging technological threats based on WMD, ballistic/cruise missiles and terrorism.. This argues for dealing with the problems at source, before any potential aggressor can concentrate in range and in force.”

Entente Nucleaire. Such “power projection” thinking reinforces the secretive collaboration between Britain and France, begun in 1992 with the creation of a Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine. On 30 October 1995, with the row over French nuclear tests as a backdrop, Chirac and Major announced that the Anglo-French nuclear relationship had reached the point where “we do not see situations arising in which the vital interests of either France or the UK could be threatened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened.” Officials played down reports that joint missile submarine patrols were possible. However, the UK Financial Times reported that “agreement had been reached on a broad definition of sub-strategic deterrence: in other words, the use of a low-yield ‘warning shot’ against an advancing aggressor, along with a threat… of a massive nuclear strike unless the attack halts. This warning shot would apparently be fired as soon as either country’s ‘vital interests’ were threatened.” The implication is that such a threat could be made even against a non-nuclear State, notwithstanding British and French negative security assurances – and the fact that such a threat, let alone use, of nuclear weapons is clearly illegal.

Undemocratic Decisions. Meanwhile, the history of the British Bomb shows that every major decision was taken without even full Cabinet knowledge, let alone approval. In 1980 I was a fly on the Whitehall wall when Thatcher insisted on having Trident, despite disagreement among the Chiefs of Staff and without consulting the Cabinet. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach, First Sea Lord at the time, was the first to call it “a cuckoo in the naval nest”. He was supported by Admiral Sir Sandy Woodward, then a Captain as Director of Naval Plans. Richard Sharpe, then also a Captain on the Naval Staff and a former nuclear submarine Commanding Officer, later wrote in the 1988-89 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships (the first under his editorship):

“Because funding for Trident has come mainly from the naval share of the defence budget, it is having an increasingly detrimental effect on the equipment programmes for the rest of the Fleet.”

Adam Raphael, in an Observer article on 11 July 1993 headlined “Megabuck Trident as much military use as Noah’s Ark”, described it as “Thatcher’s macho mistake”. I understand that the Royal Navy is deeply split over Trident for these reasons. And now it is faced with the likelihood that Trident’s deployment on deterrent patrol contravenes international humanitarian law.*

Nuclear Weapons Are Self-Deterring
Fortunately for us all, the one aspect of nuclear deterrence which probably does work is that nuclear weapons are in fact self-deterring. My evidence for this again comes from a British Secretary of State for Defence. In his 16 November 1993 speech, Rifkind said:

“…there is sometimes speculation that more so-called ‘useable’ nuclear weapons – very low-yield devices which could be used to carry out what are euphemistically called ‘surgical’ strikes – would allow nuclear deterrence to be effective in circumstances where existing weapons would be self-deterring.”

He went on to warn against reviving a war-fighting role for them, because this would:

“…be seriously damaging to our approach to maintaining stability in the European context, quite apart from the impact it would have on our efforts to encourage non-proliferation and greater confidence outside Europe. This is not a route that I would wish any nuclear power to go down.”

Unfortunately, he contradicted his own wise words by supporting the replacement of Polaris by Trident; and more specifically by supervising the introduction, mentioned earlier, of a lower-yield, single warhead in the missile load of the Trident submarine currently on patrol.

Any sane potential aggressor intent on acquiring nuclear weapons should heed Churchill’s warning after Dresden: “The Allies risk taking over an utterly ruined land” – and that was conventional bomb damage. Even a low-yield “demonstration” strike (rumoured to be in growing favour among US, UK and French planners searching for roles for their nuclear arsenals) would so outrage world opinion that it would be self-defeating.

For a nuclear State facing defeat by a non-nuclear State, there is evidence that nuclear weapons are again self-deterring. The US in Vietnam, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, preferred withdrawal to the ultimate ignominy of resorting to nuclear revenge.

For all these reasons, I conclude that nuclear deterrence is a dangerous illusion.

From Nuclear Deterrence To Abolition
On 4 December 1996 in Washington, General Lee Butler USAF (Ret’d),Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command from 1992- 94, explained to the National Press Club why he, too, had “made the long and arduous journey from staunch advocate of nuclear deterrence to public proponent of nuclear abolition.” He warned: “Options are being lost as urgent questions are unasked, or unanswered; as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War patterns and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward toward a chilling world where the principal antagonists could find no better solution to their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction.”

As a member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, General Butler had joined Field Marshal Lord Carver, Chief of the UK Defence Staff from 1973-76, in stating:

“The risks of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweigh any possible benefit imputed to deterrence … The end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new opportunity. It must be exploited quickly or it will be lost.”

Their first recommended step towards this is for all nuclear forces to be taken off alert. This would “reduce dramatically the chance of an accidental or unauthorised nuclear weapons launch.” Apart from making the world much safer, it would puncture the myths of nuclear deterrence doctrine once and for all.

June 1, 1998