Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear weapons

  • Are Nuclear Weapons Really the U.S.’s Instruments of Peace?

    David KriegerThere are serious problems with communications in a society when mainstream media sources, such as the Washington Post, will publish articles touting nuclear weapons as instruments of peace and ignore serious rebuttals.  The Post recently published an op-ed, “Nuclear weapons are the U.S.’s instruments of peace,” by Robert Spalding, a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.  The title really speaks for itself.  The article can be read here.

    I sent a response to the Washington Post in the form of a letter to the editor, but it was not published by them.  My letter, which is under their 200-word limit, sought to point out some of the fallacies in Mr. Spalding’s op-ed.  Here it is:

    “Robert Spalding’s enchantment with nuclear weapons would keep the US prepared to refight the Cold War for decades.  But nuclear weapons do not make the U.S. more secure.  Rather, they make us targets, and they spur nuclear proliferation.   A major nuclear war would destroy civilization and possibly all complex life on the planet.  A regional nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan using 50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons each on the other side’s cities would put enough soot into the stratosphere to block warming sunlight, shorten growing seasons, cause crop failures and result in a billion deaths worldwide.

    “Nuclear deterrence is not foolproof because we humans, despite our best efforts, are fallible, as convincingly demonstrated at Fukushima.  Spalding is dead wrong.  It is not only through strength that peace can be obtained; it is also through diplomacy, cooperation, international law and a generosity of spirit in our foreign policy.  Nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral and ultimately uncontrollable.  They are a path not to peace, but to catastrophe.  In our own interests, the US should lead in negotiating their elimination from the planet.”

    Nuclear weapons place at risk everyone we love and everything we treasure.  They have no place in a civilized society, and US leaders should be doing all they can to fulfill our obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations for their total elimination from the planet.  But this will not happen if the mainstream media provides a one-sided view that “nuclear weapons are the U.S.’s instruments of peace.”  They are hardly that, and our continued reliance upon them will encourage nuclear proliferation and eventually result in nuclear war by accident or design.

  • Chemical Weapons, Then Nuclear Weapons

    David KriegerEveryone can agree that chemical weapons are terrible weapons.  When used, they kill indiscriminately and cause their victims to suffer and die horrible deaths.  The use of chemical weapons in Syria resulted in US threats to strike the Syrian regime with cruise missiles.  Fortunately, this response to the use of chemical weapons was averted, as it might well have caused even more death, injury and displacement for the Syrian people.  With pressure from their ally, Russia, the Syrian government agreed to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and turn over its stock of chemical weapons for destruction.

    Chemical weapons are dangerous and deadly weapons, but they are not the worst weapons created by humans.  By any measure, the worst weapons are nuclear weapons.  They kill by blast, fire and radiation, and they are capable of causing a nuclear winter and sending the globe into an ice age.  Even the two relatively small nuclear weapons (by today’s standards) used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki each thoroughly destroyed a city.  The nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima killed some 90,000 people immediately and 145,000 by the end of 1945.  The nuclear weapon dropped on Nagasaki killed some 40,000 people immediately and 75,000 by the end of 1945.

    People are continuing to die from the effects of the use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and also from the radiation released by the atmospheric and underground testing of far more powerful nuclear weapons subsequently.  The effects of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either time or space.  They are weapons that cause stillborn births and birth defects in succeeding generations, as well as genetic mutations.  Like chemical weapons, they are weapons that violate international humanitarian law, the law of warfare, because they cannot discriminate between soldiers and civilians and they cause unnecessary suffering.

    So, with last-minute collaboration by the US and Russia, the unexpected outcome was that Syria agreed to give up its chemical weapons.  This demonstrates the power of the US and Russia working cooperatively on solving global problems.  Of course, there are many more such problems to work through, including pollution of the oceans and atmosphere, climate change, human rights abuses, starvation, epidemic diseases and the list goes on.  There is not a single serious global problem that can be solved by any one nation alone, no matter the strength of its military power.

    Further, the unexpected success in Syria opens the door to moving from chemical weapons to nuclear weapons.  There is an obstacle, though, with nuclear weapons, and that is that the foxes are guarding the nuclear hen houses.  The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, Russia, France and China) are the initial five states to develop nuclear arsenals, to test these weapons and to threaten their use.  They are also the five nuclear weapon states designated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that have agreed to negotiate in good faith for a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

    Understanding that the US and Russia aren’t pursuing their own nuclear disarmament obligations with the same vigor that they are pursuing Syria to give up its chemical weapons, it makes sense that they need pressure from below, from their citizens as well as from people throughout the world, to take the lead in ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity.  Join us at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in putting pressure on the US and Russia to lead the world in negotiating in good faith for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention) to ban nuclear weapons and set forth a plan for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons.

    On the way to that goal, and as a follow-up to their success with Syria, it would be a large step forward for the US and Russia to throw their weight behind a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, long a goal of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    The possibilities for US-Russian cooperation for a more decent world order are exciting.  We owe it to ourselves and to future generations to fan these sparks of hope.

    This article was originally published by Truthout.

  • UN Meeting Offers Chance for Disarmament Progress

    Douglas RocheAn unprecedented high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament will be held at the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 26.

    For the first time in the 68-year history of the UN, heads of government or at least foreign ministers will devote their attention to “the complete elimination of nuclear weapons” as “essential to remove the danger of nuclear war.”

    Though the UN resolution setting up the meeting was adopted nearly unanimously, the United States, United Kingdom and France abstained (Russia and China voted yes). Given this lack of enthusiasm by the three Western nuclear powers, what is this special meeting likely to achieve?

    With world attention riveted on Syria, nuclear disarmament does not rate high in polls of public concerns. But as Syria showed with the actual use of chemical weapons, public outrage will skyrocket if an aggressor ever launches a nuclear device of some sort. Every informed observer knows that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of all 17,000 of such weapons still remaining.

    While the international spotlight has been on Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons, the heart of the nuclear weapons problem remains the intransigence of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the same five original members of the nuclear weapons club, who each possess a veto and who could not agree on Syria.

    Even though calls for nuclear disarmament escalated through the years, the nuclear weapons states have consistently dodged any real efforts for nuclear disarmament. This year alone, they boycotted a Norway government conference attended by 127 states on the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of the use of nuclear weapons, and ignored three special inter-government meetings in Geneva called to do preparatory work for negotiating the end of nuclear weapons.

    The US and Russia have engaged in bilateral rounds of reductions, but the trumpeting of lower numbers has masked their continued modernization of warheads, delivery systems and infrastructure. The 2013 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute states that the nuclear weapons powers, which continue to deploy new nuclear weapons and delivery systems, “appear determined to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely.”

    A double standard has deeply conflicted NATO, which continues to claim that the possession of nuclear weapons provides the “supreme guarantee” of the security of its 26 member states. At one and the same time, the NATO states reaffirm their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty goal of nuclear disarmament and their NATO dependence on nuclear weapons.

    The policies are incoherent. The US, UK and France drive NATO and have made it the world’s biggest nuclear-armed alliance. The continued deployment of US tactical nuclear bombs on the soil of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey, though resisted by growing numbers of people in those countries, is a standing provocation to Russia, which is consequently disinclined to lower its own huge numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. Russia is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons while it is virtually surrounded by an expanding NATO.

    US-Russia bilateral negotiations for deeper cuts are stalled over such issues as the US’s proposed missile defence system in Europe, the militarization of space, and the US intention to militarily dominate air, land, sea, space and cyberwarfare. Nuclear disarmament is inevitably caught up in geopolitical tensions. US President Barack Obama, who in 2009 convened the first Security Council meeting devoted to the issue, has tried to move nuclear disarmament forward, but received little support from his allies.

    Maybe the nuclear powers won’t do much at the extraordinary meeting on Sept. 26, but this is definitely an opportunity for non-nuclear weapons states to make their views heard. They should demand that the long-awaited Middle East conference on removing all weapons of mass destruction from the region take place. Had this preventive diplomacy action been taken in a timely manner, the Syrian crisis might never have erupted.

    In 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon suggested that the international community start work on a nuclear weapons convention or a framework of instruments to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. This work would amount to a global legal ban on all nuclear weapons.

    This brings us to Canada’s role at the Sept. 26 meeting. In 2010, both the Senate and the House of Commons unanimously adopted a motion calling on the government of Canada to support Ban Ki-moon’s proposals and to launch “a major worldwide Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of preventing nuclear proliferation and increasing the rate of nuclear disarmament.”

    This Parliamentary action was spurred by a campaign by members of the Order of Canada, now numbering 700, who signed an appeal for the government to act on building a global ban on nuclear weapons. Many parliamentarians and Order of Canada members have united in calling on Canada to host a meeting in Ottawa of like-minded states to push this work forward. The Middle Powers Initiative, a civil society organization working with middle power states on this issue, convened such a meeting in Berlin earlier this year.

    Canada has an opportunity on Sept. 26 to make an important contribution to the verified elimination of nuclear weapons, before the world experiences another crisis over weapons of mass destruction. It should be remembered that Foreign Minister John Baird was, at the time, the government house leader who pushed through Parliament the unanimous motion calling for action.

    This article was originally published by Embassy.

  • Eliminating Nuclear Weapons is Just as Important as Eliminating Chemical Weapons

    Lawrence WittnerThe apparent employment of chemical weapons in Syria should remind us that, while weapons of mass destruction exist, there is a serious danger that they will be used.

    That danger is highlighted by an article in the September/October 2013 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Written by two leading nuclear weapons specialists, Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Federation of American Scientists, the article provides important information about nuclear weapons that should alarm everyone concerned about the future of the planet.

    At present, the article reports, more than 17,000 nuclear warheads remain in the possession of nine nations (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea). Over 90 percent of that inventory consists of U.S. and Russian warheads. These weapons, of course, are incredibly destructive, and almost all of them can massacre populations far more effectively than did the atomic bomb that obliterated the city of Hiroshima. Indeed, a single one of these weapons can slaughter hundreds of thousands of people.

    Although U.S., Russian, British, and French stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been declining since the end of the Cold War, those of the five other nuclear nations have been growing. Consequently, as Kristensen and Norris observe, with the possible exception of North Korea, all of these countries “have sufficient numbers of warheads and delivery systems to inflict enormous destruction over significant ranges with catastrophic humanitarian and climatic consequences in their regions and beyond.”

    Furthermore, many of these deadly weapons stand ready for almost instant use. As the authors state, “roughly 1,800 U.S. and Russian warheads are on high alert atop long-range ballistic missiles that are ready to launch 5 to 15 minutes after receiving an order.”

    But surely these terrible weapons are being phased out, aren’t they? After all, the major nuclear powers, plus most nations, have formally committed themselves to building a nuclear weapons-free world. And it is certainly true that the number of nuclear weapons on the world scene has dropped very significantly from the roughly 70,000 that existed in 1986.

    Even so, there are numerous signs that the nuclear disarmament momentum is slowing. Not only have nuclear disarmament negotiations between the United States (with 7,700 nuclear warheads) and Russia (with 8,500 nuclear warheads) apparently run aground, but none of the nuclear powers seems to take the rhetoric about a nuclear weapons-free world seriously. Kristensen and Norris note: “All the nations with nuclear weapons continue to modernize or upgrade their nuclear arsenals, and nuclear weapons remain integral to their conception of national security.”

    For example, the United States is modifying its existing nuclear warheads while planning production of warheads with new designs. Russia is phasing out its Soviet-era missiles and submarines and deploying newer missiles, as well as additional warheads on its missiles. France is deploying new nuclear missiles on its fighter-bombers and submarines. China is upgrading its missile force, while India and Pakistan are locked in a race to deploy new types of nuclear weapons. Although Israel is the most secretive of the nuclear powers, rumors are afloat that it is equipping some of its submarines with nuclear-capable cruise missiles. North Korea reportedly lacks operational nuclear weapons, but its hungry citizens can take heart that it is working to remedy this deficiency.

    In addition, of course, it is quite possible, in the future, that other nations will develop nuclear weapons, terrorists will obtain such weapons from national stockpiles, or existing nuclear weapons will be exploded or launched accidentally.

    In these very dangerous circumstances, surely the safest course of action would be to have the international community agree on a treaty requiring the destruction of all existing stocks of nuclear weapons and a ban on their future production. Nuclear disarmament discussions along these and other lines have recently been concluded by a UN Open Ended Working Group, and will be continued in late September by a UN High Level Meeting and later this fall by the UN General Assembly First Committee.

    But, to judge from past government behavior, it does not seem likely that disarmament discussions among government officials will get very far without substantial public pressure upon them to cope with the nuclear weapons menace. And it is a menace — one at least as dangerous to the future of world civilization as the existence of chemical weapons. So pressing world leaders for action on nuclear disarmament seems thoroughly appropriate.

    The alternative is to throw up our hands and wait, while power-hungry governments continue to toy with their nuclear weaponry and, ultimately, produce a catastrophe of immense proportions.

    This article was originally published by History News Network.

  • Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

    United States Draft

    UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

    The Security Council,

    PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

    PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

    PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

    PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

    PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

    PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

    PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

    PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

    PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

    PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

    PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

    PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

    PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

    PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),

    PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

    PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,

    PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,

    PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

    PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

    PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

    PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

    1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

    2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under
    the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

    3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;

    4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

    5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;

    6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;

    7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

    8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

    9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty;

    10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

    11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

    12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

    a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

    b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

    c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

    13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

    14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

    15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

    16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

    17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

    18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

    19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

    20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

    21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

    22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

    23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

    24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

    25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

    26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

    US President Barack Obama will chair a special meeting of the UN Security Council on September 24 to discuss nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

  • Learning from World War I

    David KriegerWe are approaching the 100th anniversary of the onset of World War I.  One of the lessons of that horrendous war was that chemical weapons cause inhumane suffering and death and that they are not reliable weapons.  Their effectiveness depends on which way the wind is blowing, a situation subject to change.  After the war, the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare was banned by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.   More recently, the Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force in 1997, and today 189 countries are parties to this treaty.

    But the deadliness and unreliability of chemical weapons were not the only lessons of World War I.  A far more important lesson is that a war can take on a life of its own.  No one expected that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria Hungary would lead to a world war, but that is the way it worked out.  The assassination set in motion a chain of events leading to all-out war, in which national leaders felt bound to their allies and were unwilling to back down.  It was a war that no one wanted, but one that took four years to halt and resulted in 37 million casualties, including 16 million deaths.

    The Syrian civil war has been going on since spring 2011, but suddenly it has taken on new potential for morphing into a regional or global conflagration.  President Obama said that the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government would be the crossing of a red line.  When leaders of superpower countries say such things, they are to be taken as warnings to less powerful states to behave accordingly or face serious consequences.  Someone in Syria appears to have used chemical weapons, and the US government is expressing certainty that it was the Syrian government.  Thus, for US leaders, the red line has been crossed.

    What does this mean?  It means, if true, that a tacit code of international behavior has been violated.  A weaker state, rather than accepting the warning of the superpower state, committed a prohibited act.  From the perspective of the superpower state, someone must be punished or the superpower’s credibility will be destroyed.  The crossing of red lines must be punished by military means, or so goes the argument of President Obama and his administration.  Are they right?

    There are serious problems with this argument.

    First, it is not confirmed that the offending party that used the chemical weapons was the government of Syria.  The Russian government has suggested that the chemical warfare agents were used by Syrian opposition forces.  President Obama was initially rushing to a US military attack and not taking the necessary time and caution to assure that the offending party was the party it warned.

    Second, if the US were to attack Syria with missiles, as President Obama initially intended to do, it would not be in accord with international law and would thus be illegal.  All countries have a responsibility under the United Nations Charter to act in accord with international law.  The Charter prohibits the use of force, such as missile strikes, except in self-defense against an actual attack, or unless authorized by the UN Security Council.  The proposed US missile attack against the Syrian government fits neither of these criteria.

    Third, it puts the perceived credibility of a superpower leader, no matter how ill-advised, ahead of the importance of maintaining peace or, as the UN Charter states, “ending the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind….”

    Fourth, US missile strikes against Syria are unlikely to improve conditions for the Syrian people and are likely to cause them serious harm.

    Fifth, there are other means of punishing the Assad regime for the use of chemical weapons (if this is proven) that do not require the use of military force.  One such means would be organizing an international boycott on the sale or transfer of military equipment to the government of Syria.  Another means would be to refer the evidence on the use of chemical weapons to the International Criminal Court, an institution that can impose criminal liability on national leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

    Once acts of war are commenced, all promises become subject to being broken.  US leaders are promising “no boots on the ground,” but can they keep that promise or will they if things start to go very wrong?  What if a US attack on Syria results in a Syrian attack on US warships or US embassies in the region?  What if it results in a Syrian or Iranian attack on Israel?  What if it brings Russia into the war on the side of Syria, and pits the US and Russia, both nuclear-armed giants, against each other?

    Is it possible that attempting to assure the credibility of President Obama, a Nobel Peace Laureate, through military strikes, could lead to stumbling into a new world war?  No one knows what may happen.  The Middle East is a tinder box.  Throwing a lighted match or a missile strike into that incendiary environment for reasons of credibility is an act of hubris, which could have fiery and tragic consequences that no one wants and none of our experts or political leaders can foresee, just as was the case when Archduke Franz Ferdinand was stuck down by assassination in 1914.

    For now, we must consider it most fortunate that Secretary of State Kerry made a seemingly offhand remark to a reporter’s question about what could lead the US to refrain from a military attack.  Kerry responded that a US military attack could be avoided if Syria were to turn over its stocks of chemical weapons for disposal.  Russian leaders quickly pursued this course of action and convinced Syrian President Assad to commit to turning over his chemical weapons stocks.  Thus, diplomacy may have averted the far more dangerous and deadly resort to acts of war by the US and, at the same time, reinforced international law and prevented the possibility of future chemical weapons use by the Syrian government.  Such a path makes the march to an unintended world war far less likely.

    This article was originally published by Truthout.

  • Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

    Below is a link to the full text of the working draft of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

    http://fissilematerials.org/library/fmct-ipfm-sep2009.pdf

  • Non-Proliferation Treaty

    The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

    Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

    Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

    In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

    Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

    Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

    Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

    Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

    Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

    Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

    Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

    Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

    Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

    Have agreed as follows:

    Article I

    Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

    Article II

    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

    Article III

    1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

    2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

    3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

    4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

    Article IV

    1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

    2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

    Article V

    Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

    Article VI

    Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

    Article VII

    Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

    Article VIII

    1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

    2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

    3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

    Article IX

    1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

    2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

    3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

    4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

    5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

    6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

    Article X

    1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

    2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1

    Article XI

    This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

    DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

  • Nukes Are Nuts

    When asked by a reporter why nuclear weapons are useless, Colin Powell, former US secretary of state and four-star general said: “Because they’re such horrible weapons. And so no sane leader would ever want to cross that line to using nuclear weapons. And, if you are not going to cross that line, then these things are basically useless.” In other words, one could say, nukes are nuts.

    There are innumerable global security issues that need to be addressed, some of which are poverty, terrorism, the climate crisis, pollution of the oceans, loss of biodiversity and forest depletion. Not one of these issues can be addressed with nuclear weapons. In fact, nuclear weapons draw much-needed resources away from solving these global problems. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons are justified by their possessors for nuclear deterrence, but nuclear deterrence is only a hypothesis about human behavior. While “no sane leader would ever want to cross that line,” even the best of political and military leaders can be less than rational at times, particularly when they are under stress. Nuclear deterrence is only as sound as the craziest political or military leader with a finger on the nuclear button. Does the name Kim Jong-un raise any concerns? Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons are weapons of vast overkill. They are equal-opportunity destroyers of men, women and children. The radioactive effects of these weapons cannot be contained in time or space. They affect not only the living, but generations yet to be born. Their radioactive material will affect countless future generations. Even a small regional nuclear war could result in a global nuclear famine, killing a billion people. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons can destroy everything we hold dear and love most. They can destroy every special thing, every sacred thing that has ever been created. Nuclear weapons are anti-human weapons: they threaten us all, even their possessors, and place all of humanity at risk of annihilation. But they also place all of complex life at risk of destruction. The possession of these weapons makes us irresponsible stewards of our environment and of all the creatures dependent upon our stewardship. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons are extremely costly, with anticipated global expenditures for the next decade at over $1 trillion. The US plans to modernize its B61 bombs, which it deploys in five European countries, at a cost that is more than two times that of building them out of solid gold. Nuclear weapons take away resources from the education of the world’s children, medical treatment from the world’s sick and infirm and food from the world’s hungry. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons divide us when we need to unite to find cooperative, diplomatic and nonviolent solutions to the great global issues of the 21st century. Only nine countries have nuclear weapons and, of these, only two countries, the US and Russia, possess more than 90 percent of the more than 17,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Nukes are not useful, nor are they status symbols. Nukes are nuts.

    Every man, woman and child on the planet can understand that nukes are nuts. So, if we understand that, what are we going to do about it? My answer is to wage all-out peace with a sense of urgency until the last nuclear weapon is eliminated from the planet. We would be nuts to settle for anything less.

    This article was originally published on Truthout.

  • Buenos Aires Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament

    The Senior Officials of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), having met on August 20, 2013 in the city of Buenos Aires, Republic of Argentina, aware of the historical commitment of the Community towards nuclear disarmament, issued the following Declaration:

    1. Highlighted the relevance and full validity of the Special Communiqué on the Complete Elimination of Nuclear Weapons adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the CELAC, on December 3, 2011 in Caracas, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  In this context, they reiterated their grave concern at the threat that the ongoing existence of nuclear weapons and their potential use or threat of use poses for mankind.

    2. Highlighted also the full validity of the Declaration of the 33 Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), adopted in September 2011, reaffirming, inter alia, the urgent need to advance towards the primary goal of nuclear disarmament and achieve complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons, and in this regard, agreed to join the efforts of the International Community in making progress towards the negotiation of a universal and legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons.

    3. Reaffirmed that the region grants the highest priority to the achievement of a complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament and reiterated that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination.

    4. Reiterated that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, and of the Charter of the United Nations.

    5. Highlighted the importance of active participation by CELAC Member States in drafting concrete proposals to achieve universal nuclear disarmament, in accordance with a multilaterally agreed clear, irreversible, and verifiable timeframe.

    6. Identified as a legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States, which includes all CELAC Member States, the unequivocal and legally binding assurance by nuclear weapon States against the use or threat to use such weapons.  CELAC Member States called for a start to the negotiation and adoption, as soon as possible, of a universal and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

    7. Called on all States, in particular Nuclear Weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their doctrines, military strategies and security policies or as a prospective approach for the management of conflicts in order to achieve the total elimination of this armament regardless of its type or geographical location.

    8. Stressed that the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones strengthens international peace and security as well as the non-proliferation regime, and is an important contribution to nuclear disarmament.

    9. Expressed Latin America and the Caribbean’s pride in being the first densely populated area in the world to be declared a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Reaffirmed that the establishment of a NWFZ in the Latin American and Caribbean region has contributed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as to regional and global peace and security.

    10. Emphasized that the Tlatelolco Treaty and the OPANAL have constituted a political, legal and institutional reference in the establishment of other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in different regions of the world. Today OPANAL’s experience, together with that of the other four existing NWFZs and Mongolia as a single State unilaterally declared free of nuclear weapons, constitutes an important heritage of the international community to inspire the establishment of new NWFZs and advance towards the goal of a nuclear weapons free world.

    11. Urged nuclear powers to withdraw all interpretative declarations to the Protocols I and II of the Tlatelolco Treaty that constitute actual reservations prohibited by this Treaty, thus contributing to eliminate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against the countries of the region. Expressed their commitment to continue working with those States Parties to the Protocols in order to convince them to withdraw or modify such declarations.

    12. Regretted the failure to implement the agreement on the convening in 2012 of an International Conference for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Reiterated that the convening of this Conference is an important and integral part of the final outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Expressed that the outcomes of this Conference will be an important contribution to achieve the nuclear disarmament goal and reiterated their firm conviction that the establishment of said Zone would represent a significant step towards the peace process in the Middle East region. Urged the convening of this Conference as soon as possible.

    13. Urged Nuclear-Weapon States to fulfill their commitments under Article VI of the NPT, and to advance towards the complete elimination of those weapons.  Urged them to fully and immediately implement the thirteen (13) practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, as well as the Plan of Action adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

    14. Reaffirmed the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the NPT.  Reiterated the commitment of all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

    15. Expressed their total rejection to the enhancement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which is inconsistent with the obligation of complete nuclear disarmament.

    16. Called on all States to refrain from nuclear weapon test explosions, other nuclear explosions or any other relevant non-explosive experiments, including subcritical experiments, for nuclear weapons development purposes. Such actions are contrary to the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), its spirit, if not the letter, undermining its desired impact as a nuclear disarmament measure.

    17. Reiterated the demand for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and urged those States in Annex II whose ratification are essential for the entry into force of the CTBT to accelerate the process of signing and/or ratifying this instrument, as a matter of priority and an indication of their political will and commitment to international peace and security.

    18. Reaffirmed the importance of initiating negotiations for an international legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons and commitment towards this primary goal.

    19. Recalled that the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD-I) established the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. Urged the CD to demonstrate the necessary political will in order to ensure the commencement without delay of substantive work through the adoption and implementation of a balanced and comprehensive program of work that advances the agenda of nuclear disarmament.

    20. Recognized the work of the Open-ended Working Group established by Resolution A/RES/67/56 of the United Nations General Assembly, with the mandate to put forward proposals to foster multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as well as the proposals and contributions made in this Group by the CELAC Member Countries.

    21. Reiterated the firm commitment of the CELAC to work on convening an International High-Level Conference as soon as possible to identify ways and methods to eliminate nuclear weapons, aimed at agreeing on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific timeframe.  This program would ban the development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and stipulate their destruction.

    22. Emphasized the intention of CELAC Member States to actively participate in the High-Level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament to be held in New York on September 26, 2013, as well as in the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held in New York in 2014.

    23. Expressed their greatest concern at the humanitarian impact of vast proportions and global effects of any accidental or intentional nuclear detonation. Called upon the International Community to reiterate its concern on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons whenever the debate on this type of weapons takes place. Welcomed the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in March 2013, and, in this regard, called all States to participate in the Second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons to be held in Mexico, on February 13-14, 2014.

    24. Agreed to continue coordinating positions and contributing to the implementation of practical actions as a follow-up to the above mentioned High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly, including the adoption of a resolution on the matter in the First Committee, during the 68th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.

    25. Agreed to distribute this Declaration as an official document of the High-Level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament and as an official document of the OPANAL General Conference.

    26. Expressed appreciation to the Government and People of the Republic of Argentina for the warm hospitality and the successful organization of the Meeting.