Tag: nuclear weapons

  • Non-Proliferation Treaty Stays Alive – for now

    With the exception of a few cloistered academics, almost no one would seriously argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a safer place. Most individuals, including policy makers, understand that it is essential to future security to keep nuclear weapons from spreading. Based on this understanding, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was put forward and signed by the US, UK and USSR (three countries with nuclear weapons) in 1968. The Treaty entered into force in 1970. Since then the Non-Proliferation Treaty has become the centerpiece of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Currently there are only four countries in the world that have not signed and ratified the NPT: India, Israel, Pakistan and Cuba. The first three of these have nuclear weapons.

    At the heart of the NPT is a basic bargain: the countries without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire or otherwise develop these weapons in exchange for the nuclear weapons states agreeing to engage in good faith efforts to eliminate their arsenals. This bargain is found in Article VI of the Treaty, which calls for “good faith” negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Many of the non-nuclear weapons states have complained over the years that the nuclear weapons states have not upheld their end of the bargain.

    In 1995, when the Treaty was extended indefinitely after powerful lobbying by the nuclear weapons states, these states promised the “determined pursuit” of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of their elimination. Over the next five years, however, these countries continued to rely upon their nuclear arsenals to the dismay of many countries without nuclear weapons.

    When the five-year Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was held in April and May 2000, the parties to the Treaty, including the nuclear weapons states, agreed to take a number of “practical steps” to implement promises under Article VI of the Treaty. Thirteen steps were listed. I would like to highlight just two. The first of these is an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals….” The second is “early entry into force and full implementation of START II [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II] and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons….”

    The “unequivocal undertaking” is language that the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa) has been pressing for, along with practical steps to achieve “the total elimination” of nuclear weapons. In essence this commitment is a reaffirmation of what the nuclear weapons states promised many years ago when they first signed the Treaty in 1968.

    Moving forward with START II and START III are also in the offing. After many years, the Russian Duma finally ratified START II, and President Putin has indicated that he is prepared to proceed with reductions to 1,000 to 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads in START III. The US has responded for inexplicable reasons that it is only prepared to discuss reductions to the 2,500 level at this point, a response hardly in keeping with its promises to pursue good faith efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons globally.

    An even greater problem, however, lies in US determination to deploy a National Missile Defense. It can hardly do this and keep its promise of “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US has been trying unsuccessfully to convince the Russians that the ABM Treaty should be amended to allow the US to deploy a National Missile Defense. However, this is exactly what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent, based on the reasoning that a strong defense would lead to further offensive arms races, and the Russians want nothing to do with altering the ABM Treaty.

    US officials have told the Russians that the National Missile Defense that the US seeks to deploy is aimed not at them, but at “states of concern” (the new US name for states they formerly referred to as “rogue states”). These officials have actually encouraged the Russians to keep their nuclear armed missiles on hair-trigger alert and not reduce the size of their arsenal below START III levels in order to be able to successfully overcome a US National Missile Defense. In their eagerness to promote the National Missile Defense, these officials are actually encouraging Russian policies that will make an accidental or unintended nuclear war more likely. Russia is not buying this, and has made clear that if the US proceeds with deployment of a National Missile Defense, thereby abrogating the ABM Treaty, Russia will withdraw from START II and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    US insistence on proceeding with a National Missile Defense will be even more destabilizing in Asia. The Chinese have made clear that their response to US deployment of a National Missile Defense will require them to further develop their nuclear forces (at present the Chinese have only 20 nuclear armed missiles capable of reaching US territory). Should China increase its nuclear capabilities, India is likely to follow suit and Pakistan would likely follow India. How Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan would respond remain large question marks.

    At the recent Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference the US committed itself to “preserving and strengthening” the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. US plans to move forward with a National Missile Defense are incompatible with this promise. If the US wants to uphold the Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevent the disintegration of this Treaty, it must act in good faith. This means finding another way to deal with potentially dangerous states than building an unworkable, provocative and hugely expensive missile defense system.

    The 2000 NPT Review Conference offered some promise of progress on nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, the fine words Final Document of the Conference notwithstanding, this promise will be dashed if the US continues in its foolhardy and quixotic attempt to put a shield over its head. Such a course will lead only to a leaky umbrella and global nuclear chaos. A far safer course for the US would be to carry out its promise of seeking “the total elimination” of the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without US leadership this will not happen. With US leadership a nuclear weapons free world could become a reality in fairly short order. It is past time for this issue to enter the public arena and move up on the public agenda. The American people deserve to become part of this decision which will so dramatically affect their future and the future of the planet.

  • An Open Letter to the Next U.S. President: Abolish Nuclear Weapons

    The city of Hiroshima’s Peace Declaration on August 6, 2000 stated, “if we had only one pencil we would continue to write first of the sanctity of human life and then of the need to abolish nuclear weapons.” The citizens of Hiroshima have horrendous first-hand knowledge of the devastation of nuclear weapons. They became the unwitting ambassadors of the Nuclear Age.

    If we wish to prevent Hiroshima’s past from becoming our future, there must be leadership to reduce nuclear dangers by vigorous efforts leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons from Earth. This will not happen without US leadership, and therefore your leadership, Mr. President, will be essential.

    Also in the Peace Declaration of Hiroshima is this promise: “Hiroshima wishes to make a new start as a model city demonstrating the use of science and technology for human purposes. We will create a future in which Hiroshima itself is the embodiment of those ‘human purposes.’ We will create a twenty-first century in which Hiroshima’s very existence formulates the substance of peace. Such a future would exemplify a genuine reconciliation between humankind and the science and technology that have endangered our continued survival.”

    With this promise and commitment, Hiroshima challenges not only itself, but all humanity to do more to achieve a “reconciliation between humankind and science and technology.” The place where this challenge must begin is with the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

    At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the US and the other nuclear weapons states made an “unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” This commitment is consistent with the obligation in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and with the interpretation of that obligation as set forth unanimously by the International Court of Justice in its landmark 1996 opinion on the illegality of nuclear weapons.

    In addition to moral and legal obligations to eliminate nuclear weapons, it is also in our security interests. Nuclear weapons are the greatest threat to the existence of our nation and, for that matter, the rest of the world. The American people and all people would be safer in a world without nuclear weapons. The first step toward achieving such a world is publicly recognizing that it would be in our interest to do so. That would be a big step forward, one that no American president has yet taken.

    In the post Cold War period, US policy on nuclear weapons has been to maintain a two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” We have moved slowly on nuclear arms reductions and have attempted (unsuccessfully) to prevent nuclear proliferation. We have not given up our own reliance on nuclear weapons, and we have resisted any attempts by NATO members to re-examine NATO nuclear policy.

    One of the early decisions you will be asked to make, Mr. President, is on the deployment of a National Missile Defense. While this resurrection of the discredited “Star Wars” system will never be able to actually protect Americans, it will anger the Russians and Chinese, undermine existing arms control agreements, and most likely prevent future progress toward a nuclear-weapons-free world. The Russians have stated clearly that if we proceed with deploying a National Missile Defense, they will withdraw from the START II Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This would be a major setback in US-Russian relations at a time when Russia has every reason to work cooperatively with us for nuclear arms reductions.

    In fact, Russian President Putin has offered to reduce to 1,500 the number of strategic nuclear weapons in START III. Well-informed Russians say that he is prepared to reduce Russia’s nuclear arsenal to under 1,000 strategic weapons as a next step. We have turned down this proposal, and told the Russian government that we are only prepared to reduce our nuclear arsenal to 2,000 to 2,500 strategic weapons in START III. This is hard to understand because reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, particularly the Russian nuclear arsenal, would have such clear security benefits to the United States.

    The Chinese currently have some 20 nuclear weapons capable of reaching US territory. If we deploy a National Missile Defense, they have forewarned us that they will expand their nuclear capabilities. This would be easy for them to do, and it will certainly have adverse consequences for US-Chinese relations. Additionally, it could trigger new nuclear arms races in Asia between China and India and India and Pakistan.

    North Korea has already indicated its willingness to cease development of its long-range missile program in exchange for development assistance which they badly need. We should pursue similar policies with Iraq, Iran and other potential enemies. We should vigorously pursue diplomacy which seeks to turn potential enemies into friends.

    Rather than proceeding with deployment of a National Missile Defense, we should accept President Putin’s offer and proceed with negotiations for START III nuclear arms reductions to some 1,000 to 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons on each side. Simultaneously, we should provide leadership for multinational negotiations among all nuclear weapons states for a Comprehensive Treaty to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons. This would be a demonstration of the “good faith” called for in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    In addition to these steps, there are many more positive steps that require US leadership. Among these steps are de-alerting nuclear forces, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, providing assurances of No First Use of nuclear weapons, establishing an accounting for all nuclear weapons and weapons grade materials in all countries, withdrawing nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, and providing international monitored storage of all weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    The United States is a powerful country. It will have enormous influence, for better or for worse, on the future of our species and all life. Continuing on with our present policies on nuclear weapons will lead inevitably to disaster. Millions of Americans know that we can do better than this. Because these weapons are in our arsenal now does not mean they must always be, if we act courageously and wisely.

    We need to set a course for the 21st century that assures that it will be a peaceful century. The lack of leadership to end the nuclear threat to humanity’s future is unfortunately augmented by other unwise policies that we pursue. Our country must stop being the arms salesman to the world, the policeman for the world, and the chief trainer for foreign military and paramilitary forces.

    We need to become an exporter and promoter of democracy and decency, human rights and human dignity. If these values are to be taken seriously abroad, we must demonstrate their effect in our own society. To do this, we need to reduce rather than increase military expenditures. We are currently spending more on our military than the next 16 highest military spending countries combined. This is obscene and yet it goes unchallenged. It is another area where presidential leadership is necessary.

    We live in a world in which borders have become incapable of stopping either pollution or projectiles. Our world is interconnected, and our futures are interlinked. We must support the strengthening of international law and institutions. Among the treaties that await our ratification are the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Landmine Prohibition Treaty, the Treaty on the Rights of the Child, the Treaty on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Treaty for an International Criminal Court.

    Mr. President, I have watched many of your predecessors fail to act on these issues. You have the opportunity to set out on a new path, a path to the future that will bring hope to all humanity. I urge you to accept the challenge and take this path. Be the leader who abolishes nuclear weapons. It would be the greatest possible gift to humanity.

  • China’s Concern over National Missile Defence

    Understanding Ballistic Missile Defence

    Ballistic missile defence has drawn heated debate in the international community in the recent years. On the one hand, the US has made it a national policy to develop a limited ballistic missile defence program, with a key decision to be made this year regarding whether to deploy the system. On the other hand, the US missile defence build-up has been much criticised by other countries. It is often argued that missile defence would, if unchecked, tilt the balance of power and therefore affect the international political and security order.

    To be honest, there is indeed a genuine concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other types of delivery means. Coupled with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile proliferation presents a major challenge to international security and stability. This was manifested during the second Gulf War of 1991, when Scuds fired against Saudi Arabia and Israel took on great psychological importance. Ever since then, more and longer-range missile flight tests, in South Asia and Northeast Asia, have been reported.[1] While the countries concerned may have quite reasonable grounds to acquire missiles for their defensive purposes, such a trend of proliferation does not bode well for global as well as regional stability.

    Ballistic missile proliferation has thus raised concern among states. There have been three kinds of responses. First, denying the intention of those who would seek such delivery vehicles. This would require the creation of a more secure environment in order to reduce the incentive to acquire them. Second, denying the missile-related technology available through transfer, if denial of intention fails to work. Third, establishing a certain level of ballistic missile defence as a protection against incidental and/or unauthorised attack, or a limited intentional attack with ballistic missiles.

    In this context, it is not impossible to understand the need for a limited missile defence, especially for a global power as the United States, which has vast overseas presence and interests, often in turn a reason to invite attack.

    In fact, the US has never given up its attempt to build various missile defence systems. The US set out to build sentinel antiballistic-missile program in 1967 against China’s nascent nuclear deterrent when it first came into being.[2] For the last two decades, the US government has persistently pursued missile defence. The Reagan Administration launched its Strategic Defense Initiative, a land- and space-based multi-layer missile defence system which was never successfully developed. The Bush Administration converted the Star War dream into Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). The Clinton Administration has decided to continue ballistic missile defence, with components of both National Missile Defence (NMD) and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

    This paper will address China’s position on missile non-proliferation regime, and its concern on National Missile Defence. It is suggested that the US and China should address their respective security concerns and seek a win-win solution in missile non-proliferation and missile defence issues.

    China and Missile Non-proliferation Regime

    Over the last decade, China has been increasingly exposed to a missile-proliferation-prone peripheral environment. Key neighbouring states either have a formidable missile arsenal, a significant missile programme, a fast developing missile capability or an alliance with a nuclear superpower. As such, missile proliferation has clearly affected China’s international environment.

    Therefore, the PRC has taken a series of steps addressing this problem through joining international missile non-proliferation efforts. It has been cautious concerning the transfer of missiles, adopting strict and effective controls over the export of missiles and related technology. Beijing has committed to missile non-proliferation and kept its obligation.[3]

    In February 1992, China committed to observing the then guidelines and parameters of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[4] With the enhanced dialogue which emerged between China and the US in the missile area, the two countries signed a joint statement in October 1996, reaffirming China’s promise and obligation of not exporting ground-to-ground missiles inherently capable of reaching a range of 300 kilometres with a payload of 500 kilograms.[5]

    Although China has not joined the MTCR’s formulation and revision, it has signalled that it would study the feasibility of joining the regime. This came as a result of the Jiang-Clinton Beijing summit of 1998, reflecting their effort to cultivate a constructive partnership. It is understood that China has conditioned its joining the MTCR on the question of the US arms sales to Taiwan, especially US TMD development and deployment in this part of the world.

    The two countries were engaging on this matter until their talks on non-proliferation, arms control and international security were, unfortunately, suspended in the aftermath of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999. Their arms control talk is not resumed till July 2000, following their security consultation in Beijing in February.

    NMD Undermining Russia and China’s Security

    On 17 and 18 March 1999 respectively, the US Senate and House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved National Missile Defence System legislation, stating “That it is the policy of the United States to deploy a national missile defence”.[6] This has evoked tremendous repercussions around the world, drawing negative responses from all other nuclear weapons states and even US allies in NATO.[7]

    According to the NMD plan, the US will deploy 100 interceptors in Alaska in its first configuration. Assuming a 1 in 4 rate of interception, the US could at most hit 25 incoming missiles, a more than sufficient capability to take care of the alleged threat from those “rogue” states’ said to be developing long-range ballistic missiles with which to target America. At later stages, the US would deploy further kinetic kill vehicles in North Dakoda in order to provide nationwide missiles defence.

    The US has stated clearly that China has not figured in its NMD calculations. However, China views the situation differently and remains strongly suspicious of the US intentions in terms of NMD development. From China’s perspective, it is untenable that the US would spend 60-100 billion dollars on a system which has only “rogue” states in mind.

    Such capability of intercontinental strike by ballistic missile owned by “rogue” states does not yet exist. Excluding the P5, only Israel, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran are currently believed to have medium-range missiles with ranges above 1,000km. Only four of these states, India, Pakistan, DPRK and Iran, may also have active programmes to develop intermediate-range missiles with ranges of over 3,000km.[8] It is highly unlikely that any of them will acquire an ICBM capability within a decade or so. The CIA’s classified 1998 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Missile Development recognised that the ICBM threat to the United States from so-called rogue states is unlikely to materialise before 2010, with the possible exception of DPRK.[9]

    Only Russia and China currently have the capability to hit the United States with nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles. However, this is not a new phenomenon. Both the US and Russia have maintained their nuclear arsenals of thousands of deployed nuclear weapons. Their nuclear arsenals are at basically comparable levels in terms of quality and quantity. It is the ABM Treaty signed in 1972 that has prevented the US and the former Soviet Union from embarking on unlimited strategic arms race.

    The ABM Treaty does allow the US and the former Soviet Union (now Russia as its sole legitimate successor) to deploy limited anti-strategic ballistic missiles capability for the sake of incidental and/or unauthorised launches. It has doubly served strategic stability. First, for limited nuclear attack due to incidental/unauthorised launch, it permits limited capability to intercept. Second, for an all-out nuclear attack and counterattack, it assures the rivals of their mutual destruction. Indeed, the Treaty has helped dissuade the two nuclear weapons superpowers from further escalating their strategic offensive build-up.

    With Russia’s ongoing social and economic disruption, its military capability has been affected significantly. In the context of strategic offence-defence relationship, Russia is being pressed three-fold. First, a significant amount of Russia’s strategic force is ageing and has to be phased out. Therefore, Russia needs deep bilateral nuclear weapons reductions with the US, but it refuses to do this at the expense of revising ABM, permitting the change of balance of power in favour of the US. Second, START II would eliminate Russia’s land-based MIRVs. At a time of the US rhetoric of abrogating ABM anyway, the Russia has to reconsider the necessity to disarm its MIRVed weapons. Third, Russia’s missile defence, permitted under ABM, is eroding as its early warning satellite system can no longer provide full coverage.[10]

    As such the world is experiencing a double danger. Russia cannot properly execute its launch-on-warning of strategic force as it is unable to fully track missile launch and flight. Russia’s refusal to cut its nuclear force, when it has to cut it, also creates difficulty in nuclear disarmament. However, the latter issue is a result of the US missile defence build-up in violation of ABM Treaty.

    Consequently, the US NMD build-up will be harmful to US-Russia relations. It presses Russia to be hesitant in continuing strategic nuclear disarmament, and may force Moscow to strengthen its offensive capability. By revising or even abandoning the ABM Treaty, the US will seek absolute security regardless its negative effect on the security of other countries.

    From China’s perspective, the US national missile defence would cause even worse strategic relations between Beijing and Washington. Though China has not publicly made its nuclear capability transparent, its CSS-4 ICBM force, capable of reaching the US with a range of 13,000 kilometres, is largely believed by the Western strategic analysts to number around 20.[11]

    China’s concern over the US national missile defence in violation of ABM has been expressed through various channels many times.[12] Primarily China is concerned about two issues. One is that the NMD will destabilise the world order, and harm the international relations. The other is that NMD will undermine China’s strategic deterrence, undermining China’s confidence in its strategic retaliatory capability.

    A limited anti-ballistic missile capability, as allowed by the existing ABM Treaty, would be enough to defend the strategic assets of the US against potential missile threats from outside the P5. Indeed the one-site base of anti-ballistic missile deployment under ABM framework cannot immunise the whole US from being hit. It is exactly this reason that has given Russia (as well as other nuclear weapons states) a confidence that they retain a credible nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the US. Theoretically, part of the US would thus be exposed to some missile threat from “rogue” states. However, either that threat has been too remote, or the overwhelming strength of the US in both nuclear and conventional weapons will be powerful enough to deter potential adversaries from initiating hostilities.

    Also the envisaged NMD cannot stop an all-out Russian nuclear attack, considering the thousands of strategic weapons at Russia’s disposal. Therefore, Beijing can only take the view that US NMD has been designed to effectively neutralise China’s strategic deterrence.

    Given the reported level of China’s full-range ICBM force (CSS-4), the NMD plans requiring ABM revision would (if successfully implemented as advertised) compromise China’s strategic capability in two respects. Geographically, it will protect the whole US from being deterred. Numerically, even interceptors deployed on a single site may be enough to knock out all Chinese CSS-4s.[13] Hence China’s national security interest is greatly endangered.

    To hold the US credibly deterred is just to reciprocate, to a much lower extent, what the US has long done against China during the nuclear age. In fact, it was US nuclear threats to PRC on a number of occasions that prompted Beijing to start its nuclear weapons programme.[14]

    Though the US has the most formidable nuclear arsenal and most powerful and sophisticated conventional arsenal, it retains the option of a first-strike with nuclear weapons as its deterrence policy. Now the US would even revise or abolish the ABM which assures nuclear weapons states of their mutual security.

    The PRC has one of the smallest nuclear arsenals and least advanced conventional weaponry among all the nuclear weapons states, but it still adopts a nuclear no-first-use policy, and a nuclear no-use policy against non-nuclear weapons states or nuclear weapons free zones.

    The PRC’s national security thus rests with what ABM provides. The US indeed can develop and deploy anti-strategic weapons capability, as permitted by the ABM, in order to gain certain sense of security against incidental and/or unauthorised attack by nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it ought to take into account the common security of all nuclear weapons states. When the US improves its own security at a time of ballistic missile proliferation, it should mind not to undermine the national security of others. Indeed there is an internationally acceptable limit that the US can pursue, i.e. developing its NMD capability in compliance with the Treaty.

    Addressing China’s Concern

    The US can argue that it is its sovereign rights to develop and deploy NMD beyond ABM Treaty. However, if the US were to go ahead regardless of the other states, it certainly would not create a win-win situation. Indeed, it would be counterproductive in terms of US interests.

    Some in the U.S. have been indifferent of the negative security impact the revision of AMB would bring upon other states. In this theory the US shall at most care to some extent Russia’s concern. As ABM involves the business between US and Russia, there seems no need to address China’s concern.

    The US shall understand the ABM is both a balancer of power between US and Russia, and, more fundamentally, a cornerstone of global security. In the latter context, China’s security is affected by the standing of ABM. The PRC has expressed its interest in multilateralising ABM, in the hope of expanding ABM membership.[15] This reflects Beijing’s interest in maintaining ABM by raising the stake of altering a multilateral treaty. Being a member of the ABM, Beijing would be situated in a better strategic position to enhance world stability.

    There have thus far been two interception tests of NMD systems. The first was carried out on 2 October 1999 and was found to have flaws.[16] The second test on 18 January 2000 was a complete failure due to a “plumbing leak”.[17] The US has self-imposed a deadline for making a decision on NMD deployment in June/July, after one more test. Even though future tests could be more or less “successful”, it would be still quite irresponsible to make a decision to go ahead.[18] It will be in neither America’s ultimate interest, nor the interest of the rest of the world.

    If the US insists on hurting the national interests of Russia and medium nuclear weapons states, it is hard to see how it will be possible to gather international support for non-proliferation initiatives in other fronts. The Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FissBan) is an obvious example. Were the US to break the ABM Treaty, medium nuclear weapons states would be unlikely to give up their option of retaining the right to re-open production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, if they feel their deterrence is eroded.

    It should also be pointed out that there are ample means to defeat a missile defence.[19] Various means such as submunitions, high as well as low altitude countermeasures, balloon decoys, chaff and missile fragment decoys can all be considered. MIRVing and ASAT approaches might also be tempting. It goes without saying that if a state is able to independently develop a strategic missile capability, it should also be able to develop a capability to cost-effectively defeat missile defence.[20]

    Some argue that there is a growing threat from China as it is modernising its strategic forces. Looking at the CSS-4 force developed and China’s sea-based deterrence, one can hardly reach this conclusion. A land-based strategic force of about two dozens of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a very small submarine-based missile force, is hardly any match for those of the United States.

    As China intends to adopt a no-first-use strategy, it serves China’s interest to keep a moderate force. However, China has a need to modernise its force as its defensive policy requires to do so, and as all other countries are doing the same. This is especially true at an age of precision-guided weaponry. An ICBM force of some two dozens of missile does not justify the US to revise or abolish ABM Treaty. Quite to the opposite, China’s moderate strategic force and moderate modernisation play a key role in assuring the US adequate security, which serves a stabilising role in terms of China-US relations, and world security.

    In sum, the United States does have legitimate concern over missile proliferation. That concern is shared by Chinese side. Major powers of the world, along with other countries, should work together to address such international problems, and to find solutions which serve both international stability and their respective national interests. Moving along the lines provided for by the ABM Treaty provides such a way forward. On the contrary, going ahead with damaging ABM and other countries’ interests can only be counterproductive.

     

    * Dingli Shen is a professor and Deputy Director of Fudan University’s Centre for American Studies, as well as Deputy Director of University Committee of Research and Development. He co-founded and directs China’s first university-based Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan. The views presented in this chapter are purely of his own. This piece is adopted and updated from a longer version, “BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE AND CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY”, Jane’s Special Report, May 2000.

    [1] For instance, India has tested Agni and Prithvi, and Pakistan has tested Ghauri ballistic missiles a number of times in the 1990s. DPRK is alleged to have developed and tested No-dong and Taepo-dong intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Reportedly some other countries are developing their ballistic missile capabilities.
    [2] Edward N. Luttwak, “Clinton’s Missile Defense Goes Way Off Its Strategic Target”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 14, 2000, p.2.
    [3] “China’s National Defence”, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, July 1998.
    [4] MTCR was set up in April 1987, and modified in July 1993 to target missiles capable of delivering any type of weapons of mass destruction.
    [5] “Joint United States-People’s Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation”, Washington, D.C., 4 October 1994.
    [6] The House version, sponsored by Curt Weldon (R-PA), was a bill of one-sentence as quoted in the text.
    [7] Joseph Fitchett, “Washington’s Pursuit of Missile Defense Drives Wedge in NATO”, International Harold Tribune, 15 February 2000, p.5.
    [8] “The Missile Threat: An Intelligence Assessment”, Issue Brief (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 10 February 2000.
    [9] Craig Cerniello, “CIA Holds to Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to US”, Arms Control Today, October 1998, p.24.
    [10] David Hoffman, “Russia’s Missile Defense Eroding: Gaps in Early-Warning Satellite Coverage Raise Risk of Launch Error”, Washington Post, 10 February 1999, p.A1.
    [11] CIA put the number as about 20, see Craig Cerniello, “CIA Holds to Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threat to US”, Arms Control Today, October 1998, p.24, and, SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armament, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p.555; IISS estimated it as 15-20, see The Military Balance 1999-2000 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999), p.186. The Natural Resources Defense Council estimated the number in 1993 as 4, see Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume 4: Britain, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Westview Press: Boulder, 1994), p.11.
    [12] For instance, Sha Zhukang, “International Disarmament on A Crossroad”, World Affairs (Beijing), February 2000, p.17; Gao Junmin and Lü Dehong, “A Dangerous Move”, PLA Daily, 24 January 1999, p.4.
    [13] Assuming China has 20 CSS-4s, the 100 interceptors deployed on a single ABM site will be more than enough to hit all of them under a 1 in 4 interception ratio.
    [14] See, Dingli Shen, “The Current Status of Chinese Nuclear Forces and Nuclear Policies”, Princeton University/Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies Report No. 247, February 1990; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (Random House: New York, 1988).
    [15] See luncheon speech of Ambassador Shu Zhukang at Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference: Repairing the Regime, 11-12 January 1999, Washington, D.C.
    [16] James Glanz, “Flaws Found In Missile Test That U.S. Saw As A Success”, New York Times, 14 January 2000, p.1.
    [17] Robert Suro, “Missile Defense System Fails Test”, Washington Post, 19 January 2000, p.1; Bradley Graham, “Plumbing Leak Foiled Anti-Missile Test”, Washington Post, 8 February 2000, p.A1.
    [18] However, Richard Garwin has pointed out that “the proposed NMD system would have essentially zero capability against the most likely emerging threat – an ICBM from North Korea”. See, “Effectiveness of Proposed National Missile Defense Against ICBMs from North Korea”, http://www.fas.org/rlg/990317-nmd.htm.
    [19] See description in Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel ed., The Last 15 Minutes: Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective (Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger: Washington, D.C, 1996); Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies Program), April 2000.
    [20] See cost analysis in Dingli Shen, “Security Issues Between China and the United States”, IFRI Report (Institut Fran¹ais des Relations Internationales, Paris), to be published.

    Paper presented at the International Conference on “Challenges for Science and Engineering in the 21st Century” Stockholm, Sweden, June 14-18, 2000, Session D3

  • It’s Time to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat

    The US and Russia have made progress in reducing nuclear weapons from their Cold War highs, but we still have a long way to go. There remain some 35,000 weapons in the world, and 4,500 of these are on “hair-trigger” alert.

    If a single nuclear weapon were accidentally launched, it could destroy a city but that’s not all. With current launch-on-warning doctrines, an accidental launch could end up in a full-fledged nuclear war. This would mean the end of civilization and everything we value – just like that. The men and women in charge of these weapons could make a mistake, computers or sensors could make a mistake – and just like that our beautiful world could be obliterated. We can’t let that happen.

    Along with Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Marian Wright Edelman, Mohammad Ali, Harrison Ford, and many others, I have signed an Appeal to World Leaders to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity. This Appeal calls for some sensible steps, such as de-alerting nuclear weapons. Just this step alone would make the world and all of us much safer from the threat of an accidental nuclear war while we pursue a world free of nuclear weapons.

    President Clinton recently said, “As we enter this new millennium, we should all commit ourselves anew to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.” I think the American people need to encourage the President and our representatives in Congress to assert US leadership in achieving such a world. We owe it not only to ourselves, but to our children, grandchildren and all future generations.

    But what should we do?

    First, the Russians have proposed cutting the number of US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons down to 1,000 to 1,500 each. We have responded by saying that we are only prepared to go to 2,000 to 2,500 weapons. But why? Isn’t it in the security interests of the American people to decrease the Russian nuclear arsenal as much as possible? We should move immediately to the lowest number of nuclear weapons to which the Russians will agree.

    Second, we should be upholding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty instead of seeking to amend it. By limiting the number of defensive interceptor missiles, as the ABM Treaty does, we prevent a return to an offensive nuclear arms race. An effective missile defense system may work in the movies, but experts say it has very little chance of working or of not being overcome by decoys in real life. I certainly wouldn’t bet the security of my children’s future on building an expensive missile defense system that would violate the long-standing ABM Treaty.

    Third, we should declare a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons. There is no conceivable reason for attacking first with nuclear weapons or any other weapon of mass destruction and that should be our policy.

    Fourth, we should be engaging in good faith negotiations with Russia and the other nuclear weapons states to achieve a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons. That’s what we promised in the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recently reaffirmed at the 2000 Review Conference for this Treaty. If we want the non-nuclear weapons states to keep their part of the non-proliferation bargain and not develop nuclear weapons, we’d better keep our part of the bargain.

    When President Clinton goes to Moscow in early June to meet with President Putin, I’d like to see him come back with an agreement to dramatically reduce nuclear dangers by taking our respective nuclear arsenals off “hair-trigger” alert, by re-affirming the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, by agreeing on policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons, and by beginning negotiations in good faith on an international treaty for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. If Presidents Clinton and Putin would take these steps, they would be real heroes of our time. And we could use some real life heroes.

     

  • The Irrationality of Deterrence: A Modern Zen Koan

    “The sound of one finger pressing the button is the sound of a deeper silence, brought about by unrelenting apathy”

    What is the sound of one hand clapping? What is the sound of one finger pressing the button? Surely the concept of deterrence is more enigmatic and perplexing than a Zen Koan!

    The concept of deterrence, which underlies the nuclear weapons policies of the United States and other nuclear weapons states, presupposes human rationality in all cases. It is based upon the proposition that a rational person will not attack you if he understands that his country will be subject to unacceptable damage by retaliation.

    What rational person would want his country to be exposed to unacceptable damage? Perhaps one who miscalculates. A rational person could believe that he could take action X, and that would not be sufficient for you to retaliate. Saddam Hussein, for example, believed that he could invade Kuwait without retaliation from the United States. He miscalculated, in part because he had been misled by the American Ambassador to Iraq who informed him that the US would not retaliate. Misinformation, misunderstanding, or misconstruing information could lead a rational person to miscalculate. We don’t always get our information straight, and we seldom have all of the facts.

    Deterrence is a Fool’s Game

    Even more detrimental to the theory of deterrence is irrationality. Can anyone seriously believe that humans always act rationally? Of course not. We are creatures who are affected by emotions and passions as well as intellect. Rationality is not to be relied upon. People do not always act in their own best interests. Examples abound. Almost everyone knows that smoking causes terrible diseases and horrible deaths, and yet hundreds of millions of people continue to smoke. We know that the stock markets are driven by passions as much as they are by rationality. The odds are against winning at the gambling tables in Las Vegas, and yet millions of people accept the odds, believing that they can win despite the odds.

    Nuclear deterrence is based on rationality — the belief that a rational leader will not attack a country with nuclear weapons for fear of retaliation. And yet, it is clearly irrational to believe that rationality will always prevail. Let me put it another way. Isn’t it irrational for a nation to rely upon deterrence, which is based upon humans always acting rationally (which they don’t), to provide for its national security? Those who champion deterrence appear rational, but in fact prove their irrationality by their unfounded faith in human rationality.

    With nuclear deterrence, the deterring country threatens to retaliate with nuclear weapons if it is attacked. What if a country is attacked by nuclear weapons, but is unable to identify the source of the attack? How does it retaliate? Obviously, it either guesses, retaliates against an innocent country, or doesn’t retaliate. So much for deterrence. What if a national leader or terrorist with a nuclear weapon believed he could attack without being identified? It doesn’t matter whether he is right or wrong. It is his belief that he is unidentifiable that matters. So much for deterrence. What if a leader of a country doesn’t care if his country is retaliated against? What if he believes he has nothing more to lose, like a nuclear-armed Hitler in his bunker? So much for deterrence!

    It takes only minimal analysis to realize that nuclear deterrence is a fool’s game. The unfortunate corollary is that those who propound nuclear deterrence are fools in wise men’s garb. The further corollary is that we have entrusted the future of the human species to a small group of fools. These include the political and military leaders, the corporate executives who support them and profit from building the weapons systems, and the academics and other intellectuals like Henry Kissinger, who provide the theoretical underpinnings for the concept of deterrence.

    The Immorality of Nuclear Weapons

    Eleven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, we continue to live in a world in which a small number of nations rely upon the theory of deterrence to provide for their national security. In doing so, they threaten to kill tens of millions or perhaps hundreds of millions of innocent people by retaliation should deterrence fail. To perhaps state what should be obvious, but doesn’t appear to our leaders to be: This is highly immoral. It also sets an extremely bad example for other states, whose leaders just might be thinking: If the strongest nations in the world are continuing to rely upon nuclear weapons for their national security, shouldn’t we be doing so also? Fortunately, most leaders in most countries are concluding that they should not.

    There is only one way out of the dilemma we are in, and that is to begin immediately to abolish nuclear weapons. This happens also to be required by international law as stated in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and as decided unanimously in the 1996 opinion of the International Court of Justice: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Morality, the law, and rationality converge in the need to rid the world of nuclear weapons. This is the greatest challenge of our time. The will of the people on this issue is being blocked by only a few leaders in a few countries. As the world’s most powerful nation, leadership should fall most naturally to the United States. Unfortunately, the policies of the United States have been driven by irrationality to the detriment of our own national security and the future of life on our planet. This is unlikely to change until the people of the United States exercise their democratic rights and demand policies that will end the nuclear threat to humanity. These include: negotiating a multilateral treaty for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control; de-alerting nuclear weapons and separating warheads from delivery vehicles; making pledges of No First Use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances; stopping all nuclear testing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; reaffirming the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and applying strict international safeguards to all weapons-grade fissile materials and agreeing to no further production of such materials.

    A Call to Action

    The sound of one hand clapping is silence. That is the sound of most people in most places in response to the nuclear weapons policies of the nuclear weapons states. While they do not applaud these policies with both hands, they also do not raise their voices to oppose them.

    The sound of one finger pressing the button is the sound of a deeper silence, brought about by unrelenting apathy. It is the sound of the silence before a more final silence. It is an unbearable silence `for its consequences are beyond our power to repair. It is a silent death knell for humanity. We must raise our voices now with passion and commitment to prevent this pervasive silence from becoming the sound of our world.

  • State of the Nuclear Age

    Can you remember where you were when the Berlin Wall crumbled? Watching CNN in our global living room, we shared a hope that the end of the Cold War signaled an end to the madness of the nuclear arms race and we were on our way to a more peaceful world. I, like many here tonight, dreamed of building a nuclear weapons free world from the debris on the streets of Berlin.

    More than ten years later we stand instead on the verge of a new nuclear nightmare. India and Pakistan have the Bomb. The Russian economy, a new form of Russian roulette, makes safeguarding nuclear materials nearly impossible. Iraq ignores UN weapons inspectors and North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship challenges international agreements. And to the shock of most everyone in this room, the United States Senate defeated ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall we are on a dangerous backslide. The awful possibility of a nuclear accident and the threat of nuclear weapons continue to form a backdrop for our everyday lives.

    With your help, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation stays in the fight. It exerts bold leadership to educate the public about the dangers of the Nuclear Age. We are providing leadership in Abolition 2000, a network of some 1,800 civic groups and municipalities in 93 countries; we are one of eight leading organizations in The Middle Powers Initiative; and we are launching a Campaign to Alert America.

    The Foundation is home for the Coalition Against Gun Violence, The Renewable Energy Project, the Nuclear Files, The Peace Education Project, and Artists for Peace. We publish a highly respected journal, Waging Peace Worldwide, and we now receive over two million hits a year on our web sites, www.wagingpeace.org and www.NuclearFiles.org.

    Dreams have crumbled but are not crushed. Our first ever two-day Peace Leadership Training for Youth, this year was led by the brightest young people I know: Marc and Craig Kielburger and Roxanne Joyal, Carah Ong of Abolition 2000, and Zack Allen of the newly created Institute for Global Security. Santa Barbara’s young people will be offered tools to build the dream of a nuclear weapons free and peaceful future. I believe that the training of a new generation of peace leaders would be an accomplishment that this year’s recipient of the foundation’s Distinguished Peace Leader award, King Hussein, would applaud.

    While we work at training this new generation, we will also be doing everything in our power to assure that we fulfill the greatest responsibility of any generation – to preserve our world intact for the next generation.

  • How Countries Can Work Together to Rid the World of Its Greatest Danger

    The US and Russia each have about 2,000 powerful nuclear weapons set for hair-trigger release. The enormous nuclear overkills of these weapons present the greatest danger to all countries.1 While groups working to rid the world of nuclear weapons such as Abolition 2000 are growing in size and number of supporters, still, much more remains to be done to achieve a nuclear free world. Hopefully, as more nations whose leaders become aware of what is the greatest danger to all countries, then the more they will work toward eliminating nuclear weapons. Their leadership could be invaluable.

    Nuclear Weapons Overkills

    The US and Russia each maintain enormous nuclear weapons overkills. A massive nuclear attack, whether intentional or accidental, by Russia or the US or both, could destroy all countries by turning the world into a dark, cold, silent, radioactive planet. Russia and the U.S. have more than 90 percent of the world’s strategic nuclear weapons.2

    Explosive Power – A nuclear warhead can be far more destructive than is generally realized. One average size U.S. strategic nuclear warhead on an Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles is:

    • Equal to 250,000 tons of dynamite (250 kilotons).3
    • Or 50,000 World War II type bombers each carrying 5 tons of bombs.
    • Or 20 Hiroshima size nuclear warheads.
    • One average size Russian strategic nuclear warhead has an explosive power equal to 400,000 tons of dynamite or 80,000 bombers each carrying 5 tons of bombs. The terrorists’ truck bombs that exploded at the NY World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City each had an explosive force equal to about 5 to 10 tons of dynamite.4

    Out Of Touch With Reality – When General Lee Butler (USAF Ret.1994) first became head of the US Strategic Air Command, he went to the Omaha headquarters to inspect the list of targets in the former Soviet Union. Butler was shocked to find dozens of warheads aimed at Moscow (as the Soviets once targeted Washington). At the time that the target list was contrived, US planners had no grasp of the explosions, firestorms and radiation effects from such an overkill. We were totally out of touch with reality. Butler said, “The war plan, its calculations, and consequences never took into account anything but cost and damage. Radiation was never considered.” 5

    If one average sized strategic nuclear bomb hit Washington DC today, in a flash it could vaporize Congress, the White House, the Supreme Court, the Pentagon, and destroy many federal programs like Social Security. If another nuclear bomb hit New York City, it could vaporize the United Nations headquarters, international communication and transportation centers, the New York Stock Exchange, etc. And that would only take two of the more than 2,000 warheads that Russia has ready for hair-trigger release.

    One Percent Is Too Much – General Butler said, “..it is imperative to recognize that all numbers of nuclear weapons above zero are completely arbitrary; that against an urban target one weapon represents an unacceptable horror; that twenty weapons would suffice to destroy the twelve largest Russian cities with a total population of twenty-five million people — one-sixth of the entire Russian population; and therefore that arsenals in the hundreds, much less in the thousands, can serve no meaningful strategic objective.” 6

    Twenty nuclear warheads is less than one percent of the nuclear weapons that the US has set for hair-trigger release.

    Nuclear Winter – A nuclear exchange between Russia and the U.S. could destroy all 192 nations in the world by filling the sky with very dense smoke and fine dust thereby creating a dark, cold, hungry, radioactive planet. The late Dr. Carl Sagan and his associates estimated that a nuclear winter could be created with a nuclear explosive force equal to 100 million tons of dynamite. Such a force could ignite thousands of fires.7

    The US and Russia each have a nuclear explosive force many times more powerful than that needed to create a very dark, global nuclear winter. Nuclear explosions can produce heat intensities of 3,000 to 4,000 degrees Centigrade at ground zero. Nuclear explosions over cities could start giant flash fires leaving large cities and forests burning with no one to stop them. Nuclear explosions can lift an enormous quantity of fine soil particles into the atmosphere, more than 100,000 tons of fine, dense, dust for every megaton exploded on a surface.8

    Why Nuclear Overkill

    It is hard to believe that nations would build a defense on something as crazy as the huge nuclear overkills that exist. One factor that allows the creation of suicidal overkills is that most people do not like to think about the possibility of mass destruction. While this reluctance is readily understandable, it allows the following factors to dictate humanity’s drift toward extinction: building and maintaining nuclear weapons provides profits and wages; nuclear weaponry is a complex technical subject; much of the nuclear weapons work is done in secrecy; and the end of the Cold War has given some the idea that the danger is past.

    Hopefully, if the leaders of governments and their staff start widely discussing the danger, and progress is made in getting rid of nuclear weapons, the world will be glad to join in supporting further agreements to rid the world entirely of nuclear weapons.

    Accidental Nuclear War

    The danger of launching based on a false warning could be growing. During a major part of each day Russia’s early warning system is no longer able to receive warnings. It has so decayed that Moscow is unable to detect US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches for at least seven hours a day, US officials and experts say. Russia also is no longer able to spot missiles fired from US submarines. At most, only four of Russia’s 21 early-warning satellites were still working.

    This means Russian commanders have no more than 17 hours — and perhaps as little as 12 hours — of daily coverage of nuclear-tipped ICBMs in silos in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Wyoming. Against Trident submarines, the Russians basically have no warning at all.9

    What makes the current situation so dangerous is that in the heat of a serious crisis Russian military and civilian leaders could misread a non-threatening rocket launch or ambiguous data as a nuclear first strike and launch a salvo.

    There have been at least three times in the past that the US and Russia almost launched to false warnings. Each time they came within less than 10 minutes of launching before learning the warnings were false. In 1979, a US training tape showing a massive attack was accidentally played.10 In 1983, a Soviet satellite mistakenly signaled the launch of a US missile.11 In 1995, Russia almost launched its nuclear missiles because a Norwegian rocket studying the northern lights was mistakenly interpreted as the start of a nuclear attack.12

    False warnings are a fact of life. During an 18-month period in 1979-80, the US had 147 false alarms in its strategic warning system. Two of those warnings lasted three minutes and one lasted six minutes before found to be false.13 How is Russia handling false alarms today? There is no certain nor reassuring answer.

    Low Awareness of the Danger

    There is a great need to increase public awareness of the danger in order to provide broad, long-term understanding and support for arms agreements that would rid the world of nuclear weapons. The following actions by the US and Russia show low awareness of the current danger. Only 71 out of 435 US Congressional representatives signed a motion calling for nuclear weapons to be taken off of hair-trigger alert.14 Former President Boris Yeltsin said on Dec. 10, 1999 when pressured about the Chechnya conflict, “It seems Mr. Clinton has forgotten that Russia is a great power that possesses a nuclear arsenal.”15 The US Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October 1999.16 Moscow leaders say that the US arguments for changing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty will provoke an arms race.17

    Despite US and Russian nuclear weapons presenting the greatest danger to all nations, reference to them in the mass media is not commensurate with the magnitude of the danger. Acting Russian President Putin signed into law a new national security strategy in January that lowers the threshold on first-use of nuclear weapons.18 And at arms control talks in Geneva this January, the US opposed a Russian suggestion that each country cut the size of its nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads. James Runis, a US State Department spokesman, said a lower warhead figure would meet opposition from US generals, who would have to adjust their nuclear doctrine.19

    How confident should we be with defense planners who have not taken into consideration the self-destructive consequences of their current strategies?

    Drawing Attention To The Danger

    One way to draw the world’s attention to overkill danger is for the leaders of nations to ask the following questions of the US and Russia:

    “Why does Russia and the U.S. each maintain far more nuclear weapons than either can use without destroying all countries including their own?”

    “Can they refute any of the consequences of nuclear weapons use described above?”

    “If not, what are they doing to reduce the possibility of the accidental destruction of all?”

    The more that countries ask the US and Russia these questions, the more difficult it will be for the US and Russia to ignore them. This could be especially so if each nation’s leaders share copies of their questions and the answers they receive with the news media.

    General George Lee Butler has said that the world can immediately and inexpensively improve security by taking nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert.20This action could also stop sending the message that we do not trust each other and could provide a better atmosphere for reaching an agreement in all nuclear arms reduction talks.
    ——————————————————————————–

    Reference and Notes

    1.Blair, Bruce C., Feiveson, Harold A. and Huppe, Frank.. “Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert,” Scientific American, Nov 97, p.78.

    2. Norris, Robert S. and Arkin, William, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,” Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists, July/Aug 96. (The percent of all nuclear weapons that belong to the U.S. and Russian was calculated from this source.)

    3. Ibid.

    4. Babst, Dean. “Preventing An Accidental Armageddon,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, California, Sep 99.

    5. Grady, Sandy. “Can Nuclear Genie Be Stuffed Back In The Bottle,” San Jose Mercury News, Dec.8, 1996.

    6. Butler, Lee. Talk at the University of Pittsburgh, May 13, 1999, p. 12.

    7. Sagan, Carl. The Nuclear Winter, Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Boston, MA, 1983. 8. Ibid

    9. Russia Update, The Sunflower No. 32 Feb 00, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif..

    10. Phillips, Alan E. “Matter of Preventive Medicine,” Peace Research, August 1998, p 204.

    11. “Twenty Minutes From Nuclear War,” The Sunflower, No. 17 Oct 98, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif.

    12. Blair, Op. Cit.

    13. Hart, Senator Gary and Goldwater, Senator Barry; Recent False Warning Alerts from the Nation’s Missile Attack Warning System, a report to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, 9 October 1980, pp. 4&5.

    14. The Sunflower, No. 31 Jan 00, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, Calif.

    15. Burns, Robert. “U.S., Russian relations get chillier,” Contra Costa Times, Dec. 10, 1999.

    16. The Sunflower, No. 31 Jan 00, Op. Cit.

    17. Gordon, Michael R. “Russia rejects call to amend ABM treaty,” Contra Costa Times, Oct. 21, 1999.

    18. “New Russian Defense Plan Lowers Threshold for First Use,” The Sunflower No. 32 Feb 00, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Santa Barbara, Calif.

    19. “U.S. Opposes Extra Russian Arms Cut, ” Reuters News Service, Jan. 28, 2000.

    20. Schell, Jonathan, “The Gift Of Time,” The Nation, Feb. 9, 1998, p. 56.

     

  • A Nuclear Crisis

    This article appeared in the Washington Post, Editorials and Opinions Section.

    Every five years, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) comes up for reassessment by the countries that have signed it. This is the treaty that provides for international restraints (and inspections) on nuclear programs. It covers not only the nuclear nations but 180 other countries as well, including Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya. An end to the NPT could terminate many of these inspections and open a Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation in states that already present serious terrorist threats to others.

    Now it is time for the 30-year-old NPT to be reviewed (in April, by an international assembly at the United Nations), and, sad to say, the current state of affairs with regard to nuclear proliferation is not good. In fact, I think it can be said that the world is facing a nuclear crisis. Unfortunately, U.S. policy has had a good deal to do with creating it.

    At the last reassessment session, in 1995, a large group of non-nuclear nations with the financial resources and technology to develop weapons–including Egypt, Brazil and Argentina–agreed to extend the NPT, but with the proviso that the five nuclear powers take certain specific steps to defuse the nuclear issue: adoption of a comprehensive test ban treaty by 1996; conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and “determined pursuit” of efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them.

    It is almost universally conceded that none of these commitments has been honored. India and Pakistan have used this failure to justify their joining Israel as nations with recognized nuclear capability that are refusing to comply with NPT restraints. And there has been a disturbing pattern of other provocative developments:

    • For the first time I can remember, no series of summit meetings is underway or in preparation to seek further cuts in nuclear arsenals. The START II treaty concluded seven years ago by presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin has not been seriously considered for ratification by the Russian parliament.
    • Instead of moving away from reliance on nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, both the United States and NATO have sent disturbing signals to other nations by declaring that these weapons are still the cornerstone of Western security policy, and both have re-emphasized that they will not comply with a “no first use” policy. Russia has reacted to this U.S. and NATO policy by rejecting its previous “no first use” commitment; strapped for funds and unable to maintain its conventional forces of submarines, tanks, artillery, and troops, it is now much more likely to rely on its nuclear arsenal.
    • The United States, NATO and others still maintain arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons, including up to 200 nuclear weapons in Western Europe.
    • Despite the efforts of Gens. Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster, Adm. Stansfield Turner and other military experts, American and Russian nuclear missiles are still maintained in a “hair-trigger alert” status, susceptible to being launched in a spur-of-the-moment crisis or even by accident.
    • After years of intense negotiation, recent rejection by the U.S. Senate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was a serious blow to global nuclear control efforts and to confidence in American leadership.
    • There is a notable lack of enforcement of the excessively weak international agreements against transfer of fissile materials.
    • The prospective adoption by the United States of a limited “Star Wars” missile defense system has already led Russia, China and other nations to declare that this would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which has prevailed since 1972. This could destroy the fabric of existing international agreements among the major powers.
    • There is no public effort or comment in the United States or Europe calling for Israel to comply with the NPT or submit to any other restraints. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge what a powerful incentive this is to Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt to join the nuclear community.
    • The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has been recently abolished, removing an often weak but at least identifiable entity to explore arms issues.

    I believe that the general public would be extremely concerned if these facts were widely known, but so far such issues have not been on the agenda in presidential debates.

    A number of responsible non-nuclear nations, including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden have expressed their disillusionment with the lack of progress toward disarmament. The non-proliferation system may not survive unless the major powers give convincing evidence of compliance with previous commitments.

    In April, it is imperative that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty be reconfirmed and subsequently honored by leaders who are inspired to act wisely and courageously by an informed public. This treaty has been a key deterrent to the proliferation of weapons, and its unraveling would exert powerful pressures even on peace-loving nations to develop a nuclear capability.

    All nuclear states must renew efforts to achieve worldwide reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it requires no further negotiations for leaders of nuclear nations to honor existing nuclear security agreements, including the test ban and anti-ballistic missile treaties, and to remove nuclear weapons from their present hair-trigger alert status.

    Just as American policy is to blame for many of the problems, so can our influence help resolve the nuclear dilemma that faces the world.

  • Questions to Ask US Political Candidates — Presidential or Congressional — in this Election Year

    Where do you stand on these issues?

    1. Do you favor or oppose reductions in spending for defense?
    2. Do you favor or oppose deployment of a ballistic missile defense for the US?
    3. Do you favor or oppose the sale of military weapons to countries that violate the human rights of their citizens?
    4. Do you favor or oppose US leadership to achieve a treaty for the worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons?
    5. Do you favor or oppose US initiation of reciprocal unilateral steps to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal?
    6. Do you favor or oppose giving increased financial support to Russia to help control its nuclear arsenal?
    7. Do you favor or oppose the US signing and ratifying the international treaty to ban landmines?
    8. Do you favor or oppose US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
    9. Do you favor or oppose US participation in an International Criminal Court to hold individuals accountable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity?
    10. Do you favor or oppose full and timely payment of US dues to the United Nations?
  • The Most Important Moral Issue of our Time

    There are many reasons to oppose nuclear weapons. They are illegal, undemocratic, hugely expensive, and they undermine rather than increase security. But by far the most important reason to oppose these weapons is that they are profoundly immoral.

    Above all, the issue of nuclear weapons in our world is a deeply moral issue, and for the religious community to engage this issue is essential; for the religious community to ignore this issue is shameful.

    I have long believed that our country would become serious about providing leadership for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the world only when the churches, synagogues and mosques became serious about demanding such leadership.

    The abolition of nuclear weapons is the most important issue of our time. I do not say this lightly. I know how many other important life and death issues there are in our world. I say it because nuclear weapons have the capacity to end all human life on our planet and most other forms of life. This puts them in a class by themselves.

    Although I refer to nuclear weapons, I don’t believe that these are really weapons. They are instruments of mass annihilation. They incinerate, vaporize and destroy indiscriminately. They are instruments of portable holocaust. They destroy equally soldiers and civilians; men, women and children; the aged and the newly born; the healthy and the infirm.

    Nuclear weapons hold all Creation hostage. In an instant they could destroy this city or any city. In minutes they could leave civilization, with all its great accomplishments, in ruins. These cruel and inhumane devices hold life itself in the balance.

    There is no moral justification for nuclear weapons. None. As General Lee Butler, a former commander in chief of the US Strategic Command, has said: “We cannot at once keep sacred the miracle of existence and hold sacrosanct the capacity to destroy it.”

    That nuclear weapons are an absolute evil was the conclusion of the President of the International Court of Justice, Mohammed Bedjaoui, after the Court was asked to rule on the illegality of these weapons.

    I think that it is a reasonable conclusion – the only conclusion a sane person could reach. I would add that our reliance on these evil instruments debases our humanity and insults our Creator.

    Albert Einstein was once asked his opinion as to what weapons would be used in a third world war. He replied that he didn’t know, but that if there was a third world war a fourth world war would probably be fought with sticks and stones. His response was perhaps overly optimistic.

    Controlling and eliminating these weapons is a responsibility that falls to those of us now living. It is a responsibility we are currently failing to meet.

    Ten years after the end of the Cold War there are still some 36,000 nuclear weapons in the world, mostly in the arsenals of the US and Russia. Some 5,000 of these weapons remain on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched on warning and subject to accident or miscalculation.

    Today arms control is in crisis. The US Senate recently failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the first treaty voted down by the Senate since the Treaty of Versailles. Congress has also announced its intention to deploy a National Missile Defense “as soon as technologically feasible.” This would abrogate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of arms control. The Russian Duma has not yet ratified START II, which was signed in 1993.

    Efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons are also in crisis. There is above all the issue of Russian “loose nukes.” There is no assuredness that these weapons are under control. There is also the new nuclear arms race in South Asia. There is also the issue of Israel possessing nuclear arms — with the implicit agreement of the Western nuclear weapons states — in their volatile region of the world.

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty is also in crisis. This will become more prominent when the five year Review Conference for the treaty is held this spring. Most non-nuclear weapons states believe that the nuclear weapons states have failed to meet their obligations for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. More than 180 states have met their obligations not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. The five nuclear weapons states, however, have failed to meet their obligations for good faith efforts to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

    The US government continues to consider nuclear weapons to be “essential” to its security. NATO has referred to nuclear weapons as a “cornerstone” of its security policy.

    Russia recently proposed that the US and Russia go beyond the START II agreement and reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,500 weapons each. The US declined saying that it was only prepared to go down to 2,000 to 2,500 weapons each. Such is the insanity of our time.

    Confronting this insanity are four efforts I will describe briefly.

    • The New Agenda Coalition is a group of middle power states – including Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa — calling for an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states for the speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. UN Resolutions of the New Agenda Coalition have passed the General Assembly by large margins in 1998 and 1999, despite lobbying by the US, UK and France to oppose these resolutions.
    • A representative of the New Agenda Coalition recently stated at a meeting at the Carter Center: “A US initiative today can achieve nuclear disarmament. It will require a self-denying ordnance, which accepts that the five nuclear weapons states will have no nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. By 2005 the United States will already have lost the possibility of such an initiative.” I agree with this assessment. The doors of opportunity, created a decade ago by the end of the Cold War, will not stay open much longer.
    • The Middle Powers Initiative is a coalition of eight prominent international non-governmental organizations that are supporting the role of middle power states in seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Middle Powers Initiative recently collaborated with the Carter Center in bringing together representatives of the New Agenda Coalition with high-level US policymakers and representatives of civil society. It was an important dialogue. Jimmy Carter took a strong moral position on the issue of nuclear disarmament, and you should be hearing more from him in the near future.
    • Abolition 2000 is a global network of more than 1,400 diverse civil society organizations from 91 countries on six continents. The primary goal of Abolition 2000 is a negotiated treaty calling for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons within a timebound framework. One of the current efforts of Abolition 2000 is to expand its network to over 2000 organizations by the time of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference this spring. You can find out more about Abolition 2000 at www.abolition2000.org
    • A final effort I will discuss is the establishment of a US campaign for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has hosted a series of meetings with key US leaders in the area of nuclear disarmament. These include former military, political, and diplomatic leaders, among them General Lee Butler, Senator Alan Cranston, and Ambassador Jonathan Dean.

    I believe that we have worked out a good plan for a Campaign to Alert America, but we currently lack the resources to push this campaign ahead at the level that it requires. We are doing the best we can, but we are not doing enough. We need your help, and the help of religious groups all over this country.

    I will conclude with five steps that the leaders of the nuclear weapons states could take now to end the nuclear threat to humanity. These are steps that we must demand of our political leaders. These are steps that we must help our political leaders to have the vision to see and the courage to act upon.

    • Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.
    • De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.
    • Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.
    • Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and reaffirm commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
    • Reallocate resources from the tens of billions of dollars currently being spent for maintaining nuclear arsenals to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

    The future is in our hands. I urge you to join hands and take a strong moral stand for humanity and for all Creation. We do it for the children, for each other, and for the future. The effort to abolish nuclear weapons is an effort to protect the miracle that we all share, the miracle of life.

    Each of us is a source of hope. Will you turn to the persons next to you, and tell them, “You give me hope,” and express to them your commitment to accept your share of responsibility for saving humanity and our beautiful planet.

    Together we will change the world!