Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear weapons

  • The Real Problem on the Indian Sub-continent

    In May 1998, India stunned the world when it successfully conducted nuclear tests in Pokhran, a desert site in the western state of Rajasthan. The tests were reciprocated by its traditional rival, Pakistan , dramatically raising the stakes in the stand-off over Kashmir , one of the world’s longest-running feuds.

    Subsequently, in mid-1999, India fought a brief but bitter conflict with Pakistani-backed forces that had infiltrated Indian-controlled territory in the Kargil area close to the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. The confrontation between the two countries, just over a year after the nuclear tests, confirmed that the nuclear status didn’t remove the danger of conflict between India and Pakistan; rather, it has increased the stakes if war is to ever occur. Both countries were in an advanced state of nuclear readiness during the entire period of the Kargil conflict. Never before can I remember the tensions within both countries being so high.

    Yet, in a statement in 2001, President Abdul Kalaam of India , continuing to promote and defend the further development of nuclear weapons, asked, “When was the last war with Pakistan? That both sides are nuclear capable has helped not engage in a big war.” 1 However, Kalaam blatantly ignored the fact that tensions escalated during the Kargil conflict due to the nuclearization of the sub-continent. With blinkers on, both President Musharraf of Pakistan and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of India are pressing on to develop more advanced nuclear arsenals. Despite limited resources, in a region where there is chronic social and economic problems with hunger and disease rampant in every corner of each country, India and Pakistan continue to reiterate their commitments to develop and deploy nuclear weapons as part of their national security programs.

    But what is needed, right now more than ever, is a realistic consideration of the problems that lie in the internal sphere of each country. Socio-economic, socio-religious, sectarian, and caste conflict in several parts of the two countries are epidemic. The chaos in Karachi including several street riots, ethno-nationalist insurgencies in Assam and Nagaland in Northeast India continue to claim over a hundred lives every year and the recent Hindu-Muslim riots that killed over a thousand innocent people in the western state of Gujarat in India all point to the increasing threats within each country’s domestic sphere. Nuclear weapons are not the answer to these social problems. Furthermore, more than four million in both India and Pakistan live in abject poverty – that is more than half of the combined population of both countries. Mass unemployment and illiteracy are on the rise. The internal debt figures in India alone have more than tripled. There is a lack of basic needs such as clean drinking water and sanitation facilities. Infrastructure and the quality of education continue to rapidly diminish. There are rising number of suicides by farmers in the southern Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Unbridled drug and arms trafficking in Pakistan are becoming more common and widespread. Spending inadequate financial resources on nuclear weapons is not the way out of these pressing socio-economic problems.

    Additionally, incidents of terrorism within both countries have also increased to include suicide attacks on not only the Indian military and para-military but also on their families. Recent bomb blasts in commercial areas in Karachi are proof that Pakistan isn’t immune from terrorism, well within its own borders, either. Nuclear weapons cannot offer a solution to these flagrant acts of terror. Moreover, there is an increasing criminalization and corruption of politics in India and Pakistan. The degradation of politics is starting to question the credibility of both countries. Nuclear weapons provide no real answer to this range of domestic issues, yet this lesson remains unlearned.

    What is needed from both countries right now is a commitment to the welfare of their populations and a firm plan for decreasing poverty, eradicating disease and death from hunger and starvation. Spending limited resources – financial or otherwise on developing a more complete range of nuclear weapons is not going to help the people of India, Pakistan or, for that matter, the people of Kashmir. Providing basic needs such as drinking water, safe infrastructure and hygienic sanitation facilities is what is urgently required. Increasing the quality of education, decreasing the level of illiteracy and paving the way for increasing youth employment are the needs of the hour. Both India and Pakistan have traditionally focused on threats on their borders. It is now time for each country to look inward and form a strong resolve to solve these deep rooted issues within each society.

    Archana Bharath an is a senior at the University of Michigan and was a Lena Chang Intern at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in Summer 2004.

  • Senator Feinstein Takes Commendable Stand Against New Nukes

    Concerned citizens from all over the US have been writing their Congressional representatives in opposition to the Bush administration’s plans to research and develop dangerous new nuclear weapons. Elected officials are feeling the heat from their constituents . Some members of Congress are taking commendable stands on this important issue . Sen ator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) in particular has been struggling to eliminate funding for new nuclear weapons. Below is a copy of a letter she is sending constituents in response to their letters.

    If you haven’t already, please take a moment to write to the President and your Members of Congress using the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Action Center.

    —

    Thank you for your letter regarding the development and use of nuclear weapons. I appreciate hearing from you on this important issue. I am deeply concerned by the Bush Administration’s renewed emphasis on the development of so-called “low-yield” nuclear weapons. This policy includes the possible repeal of prohibitions on developing “low-yield” bombs and deep-penetration “bunker-busters.” Even more troubling is the fact that the Administration is contemplating giving nuclear armaments a role in the new doctrine of preemption. I believe that this is taking our Nation in exactly the wrong direction.

    There is no question that a full range of policy options for dealing with new and uncertain threats should be on the table.

    Nevertheless, I am concerned that the development of nuclear weapons by the United States would blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear forces, and in turn, diminish our ability to dissuade other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons.

    Again, thank you for your letter. Please know that I am closely monitoring these developments and will do what I can to limit the development of new nuclear weapons by our country. If you have additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact my Washington, DC office at (202) 224-3841.

    Sincerely yours,

    Dianne Feinstein
    United States Senator

    http://feinstein.senate.gov

    Further information about my position on issues of concern to California and the Nation are available at my website http://feinstein.senate.gov . You can also receive electronic e-mail updates by subscribing to my e-mail list athttp://feinstein.senate.gov/issue.html

  • ‘Nuclear Terrorism’: Counting Down to the New Armageddon

    Nuclear Terrorism The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe by Graham Allison
    263 pp. Times Books/ Henry Holt & Company. $24.

    Terrorists are striving to acquire and then use nuclear weapons against the United States. Success, as defined by Osama bin Laden, would be four million dead Americans. Mounting evidence makes this much abundantly clear. Documents discovered in Afghanistan seem to reveal Al Qaeda’s detailed knowledge of nuclear weaponry, while intelligence confirms the terrorists’ attempts to acquire nuclear material on the black market.

    In reaction, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry are giving pride of place to catastrophic terrorism in their foreign policy platforms. Both proclaim it the nation’s No. 1 security challenge. Meanwhile, policy analysts have urgently recommended preventive measures in a flurry of reports, books, journal articles and Congressional testimony.

    Now the Harvard scholar Graham Allison is sounding his own warning in ”Nuclear Terrorism” — a well-written report for general readers on the threat and what it will take to reduce it. He addresses all the big questions: who could be planning an attack; how they might acquire and deliver the weapons; when they might launch the first assault. Allison touches on chemical and biological dangers, but he separates out the far more lethal nuclear threat for special attention. Nonnuclear radioactive (”dirty”) bombs and chemical or biological devices would kill in the thousands. A 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, delivered to Times Square by truck and then detonated, could kill up to one million New Yorkers.

    Some experts think a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons is already unstoppable. Allison disagrees — up to a point. He argues that prevention is still possible, and he gives the Bush administration some credit for several post-9/11 initiatives meant to tighten the security of nuclear weapons and material. However, he calls for far bolder measures, more money and forceful American leadership to improve what is at present rather lax international cooperation. His bottom line is blunt: anything less will make nuclear terrorism inevitable.

    Allison blames both the White House and the Congress for falling short of meeting the challenge. To take one example, since 9/11 the rate of funding has hardly changed for the Nunn-Lugar program, which was established to destroy or secure Russia’s enormous stockpile of fissile material and nuclear weapons. Much remains to be done. Of special concern is Russia’s large supply of suitcase-size nuclear bombs, which terrorists could smuggle into the United States in cargo containers or as airline baggage. The safeguards on these weapons are loose at best. (In 1997, Russia acknowledged that 84 of some 132 such weapons were missing.)

    At present, it will take 13 years, in Allison’s estimation, to secure Russia’s fissile material. Allison’s position, adopted by the Kerry campaign, is to spend whatever dollars are necessary to complete the job in four years, though achieving this objective would also require elimination of Congressionally imposed impediments to Nunn-Lugar and overcoming Russian resistance to intrusion into their facilities.

    We face many vulnerabilities — limited intelligence of the terrorists’ plans; poorly protected ports, borders and nuclear power plants. But the most urgent danger is that terrorists could acquire the fissile material with which to construct a nuclear weapon in a relatively short period of time. Russia presents the greatest problem; 90 percent of all existing fissile material outside the United States is stored within the former Soviet Union. Still, it’s not the only region we need to focus on. At least 32 countries possess weapons-grade fissile material.

    Allison would round up all fissile material and ban the creation of any more. This is a daunting task. Allison himself observes that there are some 200 locations around the world where nuclear weapons or fissile material could be acquired, and he pinpoints the most dangerous — Russia because of its huge supplies, shaky safeguards and extensive corruption; Pakistan because of its indiscriminate spreading of nuclear know-how and equipment; North Korea because of its history of selling missile systems and its apparent nuclear development program; and lastly, the research reactors (some 20-odd) with significant quantities of bomb-grade uranium located in developing countries.

    Allison’s other remedies — like imposing intrusive nuclear power plant inspections and sanctioning violators — may also prove difficult to implement in the real world of suspicious governments and corrupt officials. Because the United States is widely viewed with hostility these days, it may not be able to marshal the international support needed to shut down black markets or block the emergence of new nuclear weapons states. And then there is the question of money. Governments are reluctant to spend lavishly on prospective threats when tax-conscious citizens have not yet experienced any consequences.

    As a champion of the idea that nuclear terrorism is preventable, Allison emphasizes the elements of an offense — improved intelligence, tighter treaties, more transparency and intrusion. But a stronger homeland defense is also needed in case prevention by offense fails. And currently, homeland security is getting short shrift. For the 2005 budget, Congress has allotted $7.6 billion to improve the security of military bases but only $2.6 billion to protect the nation’s vital infrastructure. Within the Department of Defense, $10 billion is spent annually on missile defense, compared with only a few billion on all other counterproliferation programs.

    Homeland security becomes an even higher priority if one broadens one’s thinking about the potential damage from nonnuclear weapons to include more than simply the number who would die. Allison is less concerned with biological and chemical weapons and so-called dirty bombs because they kill in the thousands, not millions. But these unconventional arms can still cause mass disruption; a few anthrax incidents, after all, virtually shut down the Congress. The release of pathogens in a public space, or a biological attack on the food supply system, or a dirty bomb set off in a seaport could have enormous economic consequences. Large-scale government efforts are needed to minimize the danger of such attacks.

    What makes the job of prevention all the more difficult is that the threat of nuclear terrorism is growing at the same time as the need for nuclear-generated electricity. Allison points out that all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are permitted to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium to make fuel for peaceful power reactors, provided they declare what they are doing and submit to periodic inspections. In other words, states can come to the brink of nuclear weapons capability without explicitly violating the treaty. Then, without penalty, they can withdraw from the treaty and turn enriched uranium or plutonium into bombs.

    This is a loophole that both Iran and North Korea have sought to take advantage of. Allison and other experts argue that the United States should not discard the treaty but take the lead in fixing it. Their preferred solution is to distinguish ”fuel cycle” states from ”user states.” Those states where fuel-producing facilities already exist would provide enriched fuel to other states that wish to generate electricity from nuclear reactors. Coupling this with stiffer inspection provisions and penalties for withdrawal from the treaty would return the nonproliferation treaty to an important (if limited) role in countering proliferation.

    Nuclear dangers come in several forms, those that might be mounted by states and those from terrorists that cannot be contained by treaties alone, no matter how strict. Allison covers all the potential eventualities but might have been clearer in setting priorities, since resources are limited. Rogue states, capable of launching nuclear-tipped missiles, may ultimately be a threat. But the evidence indicates that the danger currently lies elsewhere. The urgent threat is nuclear terrorism, and funds need to be freed up to fill the considerable holes remaining in our counterterrorism programs.

    Allison’s comprehensive but accessible treatment of this vital subject is a major contribution to public understanding. In turn, an informed public could spur the government to complete the counterterrorism agenda. Only then, as Allison argues, will nuclear terror against America prove preventable.

    James Hoge is the editor of Foreign Affairs magazine.

  • Nagasaki Peace Declaration

    How many people in the world now remember that fateful day? At 11:02 a.m. on August 9, fifty-nine years ago, the city of Nagasaki was instantly transformed into ruins by a single atomic bomb dropped from an American warplane, killing some 74,000 people and wounding 75,000. Today, Nagasaki ‘s verdant cityscape attracts visitors from around the world, and its residents maintain a distinctive set of traditions and culture. Nevertheless, the city’s increasingly elderly atomic bomb survivors continue to suffer from the after-effects of the bombing as well as from health problems induced by the stress of their experience. We the citizens of Nagasaki call upon the world with a renewed sense of urgency, even as we reflect upon the intense suffering of those who have already perished.

    We call upon the citizens of the United States to look squarely at the reality of the tragedies that have unfolded in the wake of the atomic bombings 59 years ago. The International Court of Justice has clearly stated in an advisory opinion that the threat of nuclear weapons or their use is generally contrary to international law. Notwithstanding, the US government continues to possess and maintain approximately 10,000 nuclear weapons, and is conducting an ongoing program of subcritical nuclear testing. In addition, the so-called mini nuclear weapons that are the subject of new development efforts are intended to deliver truly horrific levels of force. In terms of the radioactivity that such weapons would release, there would be no difference compared to the bomb dropped on Nagasaki . So long as the world’s leading superpower fails to change its posture of dependence on nuclear weapons, it is clear that the tide of nuclear proliferation cannot be stemmed. People of America : The path leading to the eventual survival of the human race unequivocally requires the elimination of nuclear arms. The time has come to join hands and embark upon this path.

    We call upon the peoples of the world to recognize how scant is the value repeatedly being placed on human life, evidenced by events such as the war in Iraq and outbreaks of terrorism. Wisdom must prevail, and we must join together in enhancing and reinforcing the functions of the United Nations in order to resolve international conflicts, not by military force, but through concerted diplomatic efforts. Next year will be the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings, coinciding with the 2005 NPT Review Conference to be held at UN headquarters. With the approach of the coming year, let there be a convergence among the citizens of the world, NGOs, and all concerned parties who desire peace, so that the way may be opened for the elimination of those symbols of inhumanity known as nuclear weapons.

    We call upon the government of Japan to safeguard the peaceful underpinnings of its constitution, and, as the only nation ever to have experienced nuclear attack, to enact into law the threefold non-nuclear principle. The combination of the threefold non-nuclear principle with nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula will pave the road towards the creation of a Northeast Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone. At the same time, the specifics of the Pyongyang Declaration must be agreed upon, while Japan itself must also pursue an independent security stance that does not rely on nuclear arms.

    We call upon the world’s youth to study the reality of the atomic bombings and to internalize a sense of respect for life, as our young people are doing in Nagasaki . The enthusiasm and hope manifested by youth who have considered the requirements of peace and are acting accordingly will serve to enlighten an increasingly confused world. Individuals who arise to take action close at hand can and will foster the realization of world peace and the abolition of nuclear weapons.

    We in Nagasaki will continue to share our experiences of the atomic bombing of our city, and will work to make Nagasaki a center for peace studies and peace promotion. It is our hope that we will thus be able to form bonds of friendship and solidarity with people throughout the world.

    Today, on the 59th anniversary of the atomic bombing, as we pray for the repose of those who died and recall to mind their suffering, we the citizens of Nagasaki pledge our commitment to the realization of true peace in the world, free from nuclear weapons.

  • Report on Trip to Europe by NAPF President

    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation president David Krieger was in Europe from July 2nd to July 9th. He was there to attend meetings of the International Council and Executive Committee of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES), where he serves as deputy chair of INES, and to give several talks. He gave the keynote address at the 40th anniversary meeting of the International Peace Research Association, spoke to some 150 participants from throughout Europe at the International Summer Academy of the Schlaining Peace Center, and gave a talk to the International Institute for Peace in Vienna.

    Two of the speeches by David in Europe (“Nuclear Disarmament in a Time of Globalization” and “US Policy and the Quest for Nuclear Disarmament”) can be found on the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s web site at www.wagingpeace.org.On July 7th, David went to the Schlaining Peace Center, which is housed in an old castle in the Austrian countryside. His speech there the next morning was on “The US Peace Movement in a Time of ‘War against Terrorism.’”That afternoon he was taken to Vienna , where he did a radio interview and then spoke in the evening at the International Institute for Peace on “US Policy and the Quest for Nuclear Disarmament.” He was introduced by the president of the Institute, Erwin Lanc, a former Foreign Minister of Austria.The main topics of the INES workshop were: Responsibility and Education (The Duality of Science and the Social Responsibility of Scientists; Ambivalence of R & D in Modern Biotechnology; Peace Education; Whistleblowers); War and Weapons (New Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Strategy; Uranium Weapons); Peace and Sustainability (Energy and Peace; Water and Peace; Climate Change and Energy Conflicts); War Politics and Peace Promotion (Nuclear Targeting and the Non-Proliferation Treaty); Disarmament (International Control of Nuclear-Usable Materials; Chemical Disarmament); and a session focusing on problems specific to Europe (Space Militarization from a European Point of View; Environmental Problems in the Danube Area; Europe under Construction; and Problems of Chemical Safety in Europe).Following the two-day INES Council and Executive Committee meetings, INES put on a two-day workshop that ran parallel to the meeting of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), which allowed for networking with many members of this worldwide association. David gave the keynote address to IPRA on “Nuclear Disarmament in a Time of Globalization.”The INES meetings were held in Sopron, Hungary , a small town near the border of Austria. The participants in INES are a strongly engaged group of scientists and engineers, and their work supports and complements that of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. There were representatives at the meeting from throughout Europe as well as from Russia and Latin America. Future plans of INES include organizing for the International Einstein Year 2005, in which it is playing a leading role. Starting this November, INES will begin a series of meetings on Einstein’s views on peace, disarmament and social responsibility. In 2006, INES plans to focus on the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl , looking at the continuing dangers of nuclear power. In 2007/2008, INES will organize another major international congress. These activities are in addition to their ongoing work on ethics in science, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, their opposition to both missile and missile defense developments and a variety of other projects.

  • A Safer Form of Deterrence and Security

    Proliferation Brief, Volume 7, Number 9

    The following are excerpts from remarks by Sam Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, to the 2004 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, June 21, 2004 . To read the full text, and for video and audio of the remarks, visit www.ProliferationNews.org.

    Nuclear weapons nations must visibly and steadily reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons, and today they are not. The presidents of the United States and Russia should urgently undertake a new nuclear initiative and end their nations’ Cold War nuclear force postures by removing all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger status.

    Today, the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear weapon is unacceptably high. We are running the irrational risk of an Armageddon of our own making. It is time to find a safer form of deterrence and security. If both the United States and Russia remove nuclear weapons from hair-trigger status, we can immediately eliminate the threat of rapid assured destruction and dramatically reduce the chance of an accidental, mistaken, or unauthorized launch. By taking this step, we will de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons and make them less relevant.

    Keeping our nuclear weapons on hair trigger now increases the risk it was designed to reduce. President Bush knows this: In the summer of 2000, Presidential candidate George W. Bush said: “The Clinton-Gore administration has had over seven years to bring the U.S. force posture into the post-Cold War world. Instead, they remain locked in a Cold War mentality.”

    Later in the same speech, Mr. Bush said: “The United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status – another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation. Preparation for quick launch – within minutes after warning of an attack – was the rule during the era of superpower rivalry. But today, for two nations at peace, keeping so many weapons on high alert may create unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch. So, as president, I will ask for an assessment of what we can safely do to lower the alert status of our forces.”

    I have a proposal. Candidate Bush said we should remove “as many weapons as possible” from hair-trigger status. I propose that today “as many weapons as possible” should mean “all of them.” I urge the president of the United States and the president of Russia to order the military and defense officials of each country to present to the presidents, within six months, a set of options for removing all nuclear weapons of both countries from hair-trigger status. These officials should jointly:

    1. Determine what threats posed by the other side justify keeping any nuclear weapons on hair-trigger status.
    2. Determine what steps the other side must take to remove those threats and thus end the justification for hair-trigger status.
    3. Integrate these findings into proposed nuclear force postures that can assure the survivability of nuclear forces and end the need for quick launch capacity by either the U.S. or Russia.

    The presidents should then jointly adopt an approach and a timetable to get the job done and challenge other nuclear nations to follow this lead. If the defense establishments say they cannot, we need clear and convincing answers why not. The burden of proof must shift to those who insist on maintaining the hair-trigger posture in Russia and in the United States .

    Removing all nuclear weapons from hair trigger alert would move towards a nuclear posture where the decision to launch will be slower, more deliberate and far less likely. This is an essential first step in coming out from under the shadow of Mutual Assured Destruction toward an expanded doctrine of “Mutual Assured Safety” – an idea first advanced by former Defense Secretary Bill Perry – where both the U.S. and Russia would shift their nuclear weapons doctrine from one that “seeks security by threatening destruction” toward one that “seeks security by threat reduction.”

    There are a number of possible options for beginning the removal of all nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, including:

    1. Immediately ordering that the warheads from each side scheduled to be taken out under the 2002 Treaty of Moscow be taken off alert;
    2. Limiting the number of hair-trigger status warheads each side can deploy to several hundred;
    3. A reciprocal approach where the U.S. would remove all land-based missiles from hair-trigger alert, and Russia would do the same for its sea-based missiles.

    If the United States and Russia de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in our security, it would: immediately reduce the danger we pose to each other; give us more standing to encourage other nations to dismiss the nuclear option; and help build the international cooperation required to apply pressure on nations still seeking the nuclear option – nations like Iran and North Korea – and rally the world to take essential steps in preventing catastrophic terrorism

  • Nuclear Disarmament in a Time of Globalization

    Nuclear Disarmament in a Time of Globalization

    Keynote Address to the International Peace Research Association
    Sopron, Hungary

    Nuclear weapons occupy the highest rung on the ladder of military cowardice. They are long-distance devices of mass annihilation. They destroy indiscriminately – men, women and children. They draw no lines between soldiers and civilians. Those who make the weapons, who deploy them, who order their use and who press the buttons to send the missiles on their way have virtually no connection with the victims. They are simply human instruments in a chain of activities leading to massive devastation.

    The only arguably sane use of nuclear weapons is deterrence, and deterrence is largely an unproven theory. General George Lee Butler, a former commander-in-chief of the United States Strategic Command, who was in charge of all US nuclear weapons, has expressed his deep concerns about deterrence. “Nuclear deterrence,” he wrote, “was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence and fragile human relationships.” When one examines carefully the shortcomings of nuclear deterrence – its requirements of near-perfect communications, rational behavior in a time of crisis and willingness to commit mass murder – it is reasonable to conclude that reliance on nuclear deterrence for security is as insane as the threat to destroy civilization with nuclear weapons.

    In recent times, there has been a high degree of concern for nuclear terrorism, but nuclear terrorism has been practiced by the nuclear weapons states for decades. If terrorism is the threat or use of violence to achieve political goals – especially if it results in injuring or killing innocent people – then the nuclear weapons states are by definition terrorists. It is ironic that nuclear weapons are more potent tools in the hands of non-state actors than in the hands of powerful countries. Non-state actors in possession of a nuclear weapon would not be constrained by threats of retaliation. If terrorists are suicidal and cannot be located anyway, they certainly cannot be deterred from initiating a nuclear attack. In this sense, nuclear weapons are a great equalizer in the hands of extremists, and for this reason it is clear that the nuclear weapons states must do everything in their power to prevent these weapons, or the materials to make them, from falling into the hands of such extremists. The nuclear weapons states, however, appear more committed to maintaining their own nuclear arsenals than to assuring that nuclear weapons do not proliferate to non-state terrorist groups that could cause them irreparable harm.

    The only way to assure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda is to take dramatic steps to reduce nuclear arsenals, dismantle the nuclear weapons, and place the remaining weapons and weapons-grade fissile materials under strict and effective international controls. The nuclear weapons states have not been bold in attempting to control the spread of nuclear weapons; they have acted as though time is on their side rather than on the side of those committed to waging war against them. The irony of this is that the nuclear weapons states, even with arsenals of nuclear weapons that number in the thousands, cannot deter a group such as Al Qaeda from using nuclear weapons against them. Their only hope is to prevent such groups from obtaining these most destructive of all weapons.

    Nuclearism and Globalization

    Nuclearism is one of the early manifestations of globalization. The United States went global with its nuclear threat almost from the day it first created nuclear weapons. Within three weeks of testing the first nuclear weapon on July 16, 1945 , the US used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki . It did so not only to destroy those cities and punish Japan , but also to send a message to the world and particularly to the Soviet Union . The message was, “This is what we are capable of doing and willing to do with our devastating new weapons; don’t cross us or we could use them on you.” It was a powerful message, and also an incentive to nuclear proliferation. It would take the Soviet Union just four years to test its first nuclear device.

    Very early in the Nuclear Age, the US began testing nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, including in the Trust Territories that had been assigned to it by the United Nations. In doing so, it continued the pre-war pattern of colonial dominance. Over the decades of the Nuclear Age, all of the nuclear weapons states have performed their nuclear testing on the lands of indigenous peoples, leaving the hazardous radioactive residue of testing in their backyards.

    Another dimension to the globalization of the nuclear threat was the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), allowing for the destruction of nearly any place on the globe in 30 minutes or many places simultaneously. Even today, the US and Russia each still have some 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Of these, some 2,250 each are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments.

    The US and USSR , now Russia , as well as other nuclear weapons states, also appropriated the global commons for their nuclear forces. The nuclear weapons states continue to use the oceans, humankind’s great common heritage, for their submarine-launched nuclear forces. They agreed not to place nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, but with the availability of submarines, the ocean floor is clearly not a necessary or even useful option for them.

    Another aspect of the globalization of nuclearism is the spread of the US nuclear umbrella to its allies throughout the world, particularly in Europe , Asia and the Pacific. By extending its nuclear umbrella, the US has made many more countries complicit in relying upon nuclear weapons for their security, albeit reliant upon US nuclear weapons rather than developing their own.

    Nuclear Proliferation

    Nuclear proliferation is the flip-side of nuclear disarmament. It is also the globalization of nuclear arsenals. The existing nuclear weapons states have nearly all justified their development of nuclear weapons on the basis of nuclear deterrence. The US created nuclear weapons because it was concerned about deterring a possible Nazi nuclear bomb. The Soviet Union developed its nuclear arsenal to deter the US . The UK and France developed their nuclear arsenals to have independent deterrent forces against the Soviet Union . China sought to deter both the Soviet Union and the US . India sought to deter China , and Pakistan sought to deter India . North Korea would undoubtedly justify its nuclear weapons, if indeed it has them, as being necessary to deter the US . South Africa , which faced global hostility due to its policies of Apartheid, developed a nuclear arsenal to deter the US and Russia . It subsequently gave up its nuclear weapons. Israel , which continues to face both regional and global hostility, developed a nuclear arsenal to give it greater degrees of freedom in relation to the US and Russia and well as to deter hostilities by non-nuclear weapons states in its region.

    The US-led war against Iraq was justified initially on the basis that Iraq might be developing a nuclear arsenal and could potentially transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Although it turned out not to be true that Iraq was developing a nuclear arsenal or even that it had links to Al Qaeda, this fear provided the justification for the first counter-proliferation war in history.

    US Double Standards Have Stimulated Proliferation

    From the outset of the Nuclear Age, the US has had a double standard when it comes to nuclear weapons. It has always relied on these weapons for its own security, yet sought to deny these weapons to other states except when it suited its purposes. In the

    late 1960s and early 1970s, Israel developed a nuclear arsenal. At best it can be said that the US turned a blind eye to this development. In sharp contrast to the US attacking and invading Iraq because it might have nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, the US , in line with its geopolitical strategies, has never even criticized Israel for its nuclear proliferation. This double standard has created an impetus to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the volatile Middle East .

    India ‘s position, for decades, was that it would not develop nuclear weapons if the nuclear weapons states fulfilled their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to achieve nuclear disarmament. India made clear pronouncements that it was not willing to live without nuclear weapons in a world of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”. Three years after the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 and there was still no significant breakthrough by the nuclear weapons states toward achieving nuclear disarmament, India conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests and announced that it was developing a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan followed immediately in doing the same.

    When Mr. Bush named Iraq , Iran and North Korea as part of an Axis of Evil, he put these states on notice that they were in the sights of the US . When he then went on to attack and invade Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, Bush’s actions sent a message to Iran and North Korea, among others, that they had better consider developing a nuclear deterrent force against the US. They may have already had such thoughts before the Axis of Evil speech, but there can be no doubt that such provocative language, coupled with military action, can only act as a stimulant to develop a strong deterrent force. The Bush posture toward the states designated as an Axis of Evil stands in strong contrast to the manner in which his administration virtually ignored the nuclear proliferation activities of Pakistani nuclear physicist A.Q. Khan. Khan, whose activities have been described as a nuclear Walmart, received only a slap on the wrist from the Pakistani government, allied with the US in the so-called war against terrorism.

    Nuclear Disarmament

    In the post-Cold War period, there has been some progress toward nuclear disarmament, but it has been excruciatingly slow as measured by the need, obligation and opportunity. Current global nuclear stocks are down from a Cold War high of some 70,000 nuclear weapons to approximately 30,000. The vast majority of these, some 97 percent, are in the arsenals of the US and Russia .

    The need to dramatically reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons lies in the danger of these weapons proliferating to other states or falling into the hands of non-state extremist actors. The enormous danger of these weapons in the hands of groups like Al Qaeda should be sufficient to motivate serious efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. So far it has not done so. The need does not exist to maintain large nuclear arsenals or, for that matter, any nuclear weapons in a world where nuclear weapons states are trading with each other rather than threatening war.

    The obligation of the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament is set forth in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, when the treaty was extended indefinitely, the parties agreed to “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.” Five years later, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties agreed on 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These steps included ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, making disarmament measures irreversible, and an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

    The opportunity to achieve nuclear disarmament in the post-Cold War world has been largely squandered. Bill Clinton was presented with the greatest opportunity of any leader in the post-World War II period to put an end to the dangers of the Nuclear Age. Clinton didn’t seem to grasp the opportunity that had been laid at his feet. He was largely indifferent to the issue, and this resulted in only minimal progress during his eight years in office. He did, however, support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and did hold negotiations with Russia on ST AR T III, but these negotiations did not result in a new treaty.

    If the Clinton approach to nuclear disarmament can be described as benign indifference, the US under the Bush administration can be thought of obstructionist in its approach to nuclear disarmament. It has been an obstacle to virtually all of the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The Bush administration has opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, put up barriers to negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (in order to pursue missile defenses and space weaponization), and entered into an agreement with the Russians that makes nuclear reductions completely reversible. This agreement, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Agreement (SORT), specifies reductions of the US and Russian deployed strategic arsenals from levels of about 6,000 each to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by the year 2012. However, the treaty doesn’t require that the weapons taken off deployed status be irreversibly dismantled. As a result, many US weapons will go into storage and be available for redeployment in the future. It is likely that the Russians will do the same, and these weapons will also be available for possible theft by terrorist groups. The reductions do not have a timeline and only need to be completed by 2012. After that year, the treaty will no longer be in effect. So far as it impacts nuclear disarmament, the treaty is largely fraudulent. It gives the appearance of disarmament, but the substance isn’t there.

    In addition, the Bush administration has been pressing for research on new nuclear weapons that will be more usable, a new bunker busting nuclear weapon (the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator) and mini-nukes (low-yield nuclear weapons) that are about one-third the yield of the Hiroshima bomb. They have also begun deployment of missile defenses that have led Russia to pull out of the ST AR T II agreement. Despite their funding of research on new nuclear weapons and their opposition to the 13 Practical Steps, a US delegate to the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, John Bolton, told the assembled parties to the treaty that they shouldn’t focus their attention on Article VI of the treaty with its nuclear disarmament provisions. “We cannot divert attention from the violations we face,” he said, “by focusing on Article VI violations that do not exist.”

    Need for US Leadership

    The world currently faces a tragic dilemma: preventing nuclear terrorism requires significant nuclear disarmament and international control of nuclear weapons and materials, but to achieve this will require US leadership, which is currently non-existent. Since the US continues to rely upon its own arsenal of nuclear weapons for security, it cannot effectively provide leadership toward nuclear disarmament. In the Bush administration’s secret, but leaked, 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, they stated: “Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States , its allies and friends. They provide credible options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and large-scale conventional force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.”

    Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament

    At the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation , we are initiating a campaign to chart a new course in US nuclear policy that we call Turn the Tide. It is an Internet-based campaign that seeks to awaken US citizens to the need to change US nuclear policy and spur them to communicate with their Congressional representatives and candidates as well as the president and presidential candidates and to cast their ballots based on positions on nuclear disarmament issues. The campaign is based on the following call to action:

    1. Stop all efforts to create dangerous new nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
    2. Maintain the current moratorium on nuclear testing and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
    3. Cancel plans to build new nuclear weapons production plants, and close and clean up the toxic contamination at existing plants.
    4. Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No Use of nuclear weapons against any nation or group that does not have nuclear weapons.
    5. Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nations possessing nuclear weapons.
    6. Cancel funding for and plans to deploy offensive missile “defense” systems which would ignite a dangerous arms race and offer no security against terrorist weapons of mass destruction.
    7. In order to significantly decrease the threat of accidental launch, together with Russia , take nuclear weapons off high-alert status and do away with the strategy of launch-on-warning.
    8. Together with Russia , implement permanent and verifiable dismantlement of nuclear weapons taken off deployed status through the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
    9. Demonstrate to other countries US commitment to reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons by removing all US nuclear weapons from foreign soil.
    10. To prevent future proliferation or theft, create and maintain a global inventory of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials and place these weapons and materials under strict international safeguards.
    11. Initiate international negotiations to fulfill existing treaty obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the phased and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.
    12. Redirect funding from nuclear weapons programs to dismantling nuclear weapons, safeguarding nuclear materials, cleaning up the toxic legacy of the Nuclear Age and meeting more pressing social needs such as education, health care and social services.

    While this campaign is essential, it is a strategy from within the country. It is also necessary to bring pressure to bear on the US and other nuclear weapons states from the international community. The countries of the New Agenda Coalition ( Brazil , Egypt , Ireland, Mexico , New Zealand , South Africa and Sweden ) have been doing admirable work on this at the United Nations and at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee meetings. These countries were largely responsible for putting forward the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. I should also mention the Middle Powers Initiative, a coalition of eight international non-governmental organizations, which has provided strong support and encouragement to the New Agenda countries.

    Another important new initiative to move forward the nuclear disarmament agenda is the Emergency Campaign of the Mayors for Peace. Under the leadership of the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , this campaign has set forth a Vision 2020, calling for the initiation of negotiations for complete nuclear disarmament in 2005, the completion of these negotiations in 2010 and the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

    Breaking the Silence

    Nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity’s future, and yet most of us are silent in the face of this danger. It would not be possible to research, develop, deploy, threaten and use nuclear weapons if so many were not silent. The threat of nuclear genocide, even omnicide, has become global. Before the spread of the weapons themselves becomes global, we must break the culture of silence and conformity that allows the continuation of the nuclear threat to all humanity.

    In some ways, we have attributed god-like characteristics to nuclear weapons. Their power far exceeds that of ordinary weapons. They are credited in the US with bringing World War II to an end. It is hard to forget the emotional celebrations that took place in the streets in India and Pakistan when they tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Here is a poem in which I have tried to capture the sense of the godliness that has been ascribed to nuclear weapons by many people in the nuclear weapons states.

    WHEN THE BOMB BECAME OUR GOD

    When the bomb became our god
    We loved it far too much,
    Worshipping no other gods before it.

    We thought ourselves great
    And powerful, creators of worlds.

    We turned toward infinity,
    Giving the bomb our very souls.

    We looked to it for comfort,
    To its smooth metallic grace.

    When the bomb became our god
    We lived in a constant state of war
    That we called peace .

    But nuclear weapons certainly are not gods, nor are their possessors. These weapons are false idols, and they threaten their possessors as well as their targets. They may be powerful, but their power is only that of destruction. They have neither the power of creativity nor of construction. They threaten the future of humanity, and they corrode the souls of their possessors.

    We are approaching the 60th anniversary of the creation and first use of nuclear weapons. Time is not on our side, and we can take little comfort in the fact that nuclear weapons have not been dropped on other cities since they were used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki . In this era of globalization, the threat of nuclear annihilation is itself global. To counter this threat, we must globalize prohibitions in law and morality to the possession, threat and use of the nuclear weapons. We must end the double standards that suggest that some may have nuclear weapons while others may not. There are no safe hands in which nuclear weapons may be placed.

    The singular threat that nuclear weapons pose can only be ended by people everywhere breaking the silence and demanding that the nuclear weapons states fulfill their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the total elimination of these weapons, and persisting in their demands until the goal is achieved.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org ). He is the author of many books and articles on peace in the Nuclear Age

  • Why Shouldn’t Iran Seek Nuclear Weapons?

    It now seems difficult to dispute that the Iranian government is developing nuclear weapons, lying about it, and intent on continuing both come hell or high water. Why? Because the temptation for Iran to develop a nuclear arsenal of its own — driven by the contradictions of George Bush’s foreign and nuclear policies — is simply too seductive to resist.

    On Friday, June 18th, the IAEA strongly rebuked Tehran , saying: ” Iran ‘s cooperation has not been as full, timely, and proactive as it should have been.” The next day Iran ‘s top nuclear official, Hassan Rowhani, objected bitterly to the IAEA’s statement, reiterated his insistence that Tehran ‘s nuclear program is intended to generate electricity rather than warheads, and said that Tehran now would resume some of the nuclear activities it had previously suspended.

    In addition, the chair of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, Ala’eddin Borujerdi, said the same day that the Majlis might now reject the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which allows unannounced and unfettered inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. Under both international and Iranian law, the Additional Protocol cannot take effect without Majlis approval.

    Then, on Monday, June 21st, in a development difficult to believe wholly unrelated, Iran seized 3 British naval vessels and 8 British sailors — after Britain , along with France and Germany , had spearheaded the IAEA censure.

    Consider the outside world as viewed from Tehran . George Bush delivers his 2002 State of the Union address, and of all the countries in the world he singles out three as constituting an “axis of evil.” He announces his intent to instigate unilateral preemptive war against any nation that his Administration subjectively determines to be a potential threat. Defying almost universal world opinion, he actually commences such a war against one of those three — decapitating its regime, killing the supreme leader’s sons, and driving that leader himself into a pathetic hole in the ground. And he surrounds Iran on all four sides with bristling American military power — Iraq to the west, Afghanistan to the east, sprawling new American bases in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia to the north, and the unchallengeable U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf to the south.

    Iran , of course, cannot hope to take on the United States in any kind of direct military confrontation. But it can aspire to deter what must seem to them to be a quite real threat, someday, of American military aggression. How? By developing the capability to inflict unacceptable catastrophic damage on American interests or military forces abroad, on the American fleet in the Persian Gulf , or even on the American homeland itself. And by holding out even the mere possibility that it would respond to any American assault by employing that capability immediately, before it became too late, following the traditional military maxim of “use em or lose em.”

    There is, of course, only one thing that can provide Iran with that kind of deterrent capability. Hint: it’s not nuclear electricity.

    It is probably the case that for Tehran the perceived danger of a U.S. invasion is lower today than it might have been in 2002 or 2003. It is difficult to envision any U.S. president in the foreseeable future launching another unilateral preemptive first strike in the wake of the fiasco in Iraq . Imagine the political firestorm — even after a Bush reelection — if the Administration began contemplating another preemptive war, this time on Iran .

    But Tehran has no reason to believe that that shift in geostrategic dynamics has become permanent. It has resulted, after all, from external circumstances rather than from an internal American change of heart (or regime). On the contrary, it probably provides the mullahs with all the more reason to press ahead, in order to obtain the Great Deterrent before the Great Satan has a chance to regroup and refocus.

    Looming over Iran ‘s immediate perception of American threat is the nuclear double standard that so many other nations so resent. George Bush insists that selected other countries have no right to possess nuclear weapons, while at the same time making abundantly clear that we intend to retain thousands in perpetuity. To the rest of the world this is sanctimonious and self-righteous, suggesting that in our view we can be “trusted” with these weapons while others cannot. Such a position is factually questionable. It is morally indefensible. And it is utterly politically unsustainable.

    On Monday, June 21st, IAEA chief Mohamed El-Baradei delivered a blistering speech blaming this posture for much of his difficulty stemming nuclear proliferation in Iran and elsewhere. The time has come, he said, to “abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue nuclear weapons but morally acceptable for others to rely on them.”

    This is especially true when the original Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is understood in its original context. The NPT was not just a framework to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It was, instead, a grand bargain — where the great many “nuclear have-nots” agreed to forego nuclear weapons while the few “nuclear haves” agreed eventually to get rid of theirs. Moreover, the United States recommitted itself to this covenant at the 30-year NPT Review Conference in spring 2000, where the NPT’s nuclear signatories pledged “an unequivocal undertaking . to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”

    But the Bush Administration, rather than moving toward total elimination, is instead pursuing perpetual possession. Its Strangelovian nuclear war fighting posture contains plans for bunker busting “mini-nukes” — an oxymoron if there ever was one. (Just this June 15th the U.S. Senate — in a move probably not unnoticed in Tehran — endorsed new funding to study the development of such weapons.) It broadens the scope of military scenarios in which the U.S. might actually initiate a nuclear first-strike. It envisions new generations of strategic nuclear missiles in 2020, 2030, and 2040! Yet it says not one word about any “unequivocal undertaking” toward abolition.

    It is not just Tehran that, in all likelihood, is violating the NPT by pursuing a nuclear weapon capability. It is also Washington that is violating the NPT — by insisting on retaining our own nuclear weapon capability apparently for time everlasting.

    Earlier this month the Bush Administration announced plans to reduce our active nuclear inventory to no more than 2200 by 2012 (though thousands more would still be maintained “in reserve”). This would place us in compliance with the Moscow Treaty of 2002. But it would do almost nothing to reduce the actual dangers posed by nuclear weapons today. How does simple bean counting reduce the risk of nuclear terror, or a fatal nuclear miscalculation in a hot political crisis, or accidental atomic apocalypse? (Nuclear weapons, after all, are the prototypical example of the adage: “it only takes just one.”) Why don’t the Moscow Treaty or the latest plan say anywhere that these reductions are part of a larger vision, to be followed by further steps toward zero? How does an intention to reduce our nuclear inventory to 2200 by 2012 make Iran feel safer today (or, for that matter, in 2012)?

    Sadly for both the principles of the Democratic Party and the prospects for nuclear non-proliferation, Senator John Kerry has also conspicuously failed to question the nuclear status quo. He did release a plan to safeguard nuclear materials and reduce the risk of nuclear terror on June 1st, calling it his “number one security goal.” But while his plan said a great deal about nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in the hands of “shadowy figures,” it said very little about those in the hands of ourselves.

    Kerry did condemn Bush’s mini-nuke initiative. But it is one thing to oppose the development of new types of nuclear weapons, another to put the thousands we already possess on the table. Candidate Kerry may have grand plans to reduce the threat of nuclear terror. But he apparently has no plans to confront what can only be called America ‘s nuclear hypocrisy.

    The paradox of such an American nuclear posture is that the one country most insistent about retaining its nuclear weapons is the one country that needs them the least. The paramount geostrategic reality of the early 21st Century is America ‘s unchallengeable conventional military superiority over any conceivable combination of adversaries. Iran needs nuclear weapons to be able to inflict unacceptable catastrophic damage on a potential aggressor — and thereby hopefully deter any potential aggression. But Washington , unlike anyone else, can inflict unacceptable catastrophic damage on any country in the world with our conventional capabilities alone. If any country can deter any attack and repel any enemy without resorting to an atomic arsenal, it is us.

    Our nuclear weapons, in fact, are worse than useless for the real threats to Americans at the dawn of the 21st Century. Our armies and air forces didn’t protect us on 9/11. Our 13 aircraft carrier battle groups (no other country has even one) didn’t protect us on 9/11. And the thing that protected us the least on 9/11 was our bloated nuclear stockpile, our arsenal of the apocalypse. What could a single nuclear warhead have done to stop Mohammed Atta, or to have apprehended him, or even to have deterred him? How can all our nuclear bombers and missiles and submarines put together prevent some odious creature from smuggling a single nuclear warhead into an American city, and committing the greatest act of mass murder in all of human history?

    Nuclear weapons pollute the psyche with the arrogance of insuperable power. They create delusions of domination. With their calculations of mass casualties, they dehumanize our adversaries … and consequently ourselves. And in the age of American hyperpower, they provide American decisionmakers with very few additional policy options or political/military benefits. Yet their costs and risks approach the infinite.

    As Jonathan Schell has persuasively argued, the great irony of the Bush era is that both the Iraq war specifically and the preemption doctrine generally were supposed to be directed at curtailing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Instead, in all likelihood, they have exacerbated — in both frequency and intensity — the quest by others to acquire them. Isaac Newton’s laws of action and reaction do not apply solely to billiard balls. George Bush’s greatest historical legacy may be the phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy.

    It is difficult not to conclude that the foreign policies and nuclear weapons policies of the Bush Administration, far from reducing the WMD danger, are instead leading us on a downward spiral toward immediate nuclear proliferation and eventual nuclear disaster. The only long-term choice is between a world of many dozen nuclear weapon states — where the detonation of a nuclear warhead in some great city of the world will become only a matter of time — or a world of zero nuclear weapon states. The United States can state unambiguously that we intend to walk down an irreversible path toward the light of a nuclear weapon free world. Or we can expect Iran and many others to join us on the road to a darker destination.

    Tad Daley served as National Issues Director for the presidential campaign of Congressman Dennis Kucinich.

  • The Role of the United States in Nuclear Disarmament

    An Address to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Symposium
    “Charting a New Course for U.S. Nuclear Policy” Santa Barbara , California

    I approach the subject of the United States’ performance in the nuclear disarmament debate with great respect for the country and a dedication to the facts of nuclear weapons.

    For eight years I lived in this great country and, in fact, three of my children were born here. I have had the opportunity in my professional life of travelling through or visiting all 50 states, and I understand well the energy and creativity of the American people in the arts and sciences, commerce, and outreach to the world. The aspirations for freedom and liberty have been a beacon for the world.

    There are many wonderful things I could say about the United States . But regrettably that is not my task tonight. I have been asked to speak on the United States and nuclear weapons. Here it is not easy to be complimentary.

    Twenty years ago, I was appointed Canada ‘s Ambassador for Disarmament, a job which brought me into close contact with my diplomatic counterparts in many countries, including, of course, a lengthy list of American officials. At various times I chaired the meetings of all Western ambassadors and the U.N. Disarmament Committee. I have written extensively on the 1995 indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the general illegality of nuclear weapons, and the 2000 Review of the NPT, in which all States gave an “unequivocal undertaking” towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons through a program of 13 Practical Steps. I have attended all three meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review of the NPT, the last one concluding six days ago.

    It is clear to me that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that is to say the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, is in crisis. To examine how the crisis came about and what to do about it, we must look at the role of the U.S. While the other declared Nuclear Weapons States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China are all also in contravention of their responsibilities to the NPT, it is the U.S. that sets the pace. The U.S. is the leading military power in the world by far, the lynchpin of NATO, and the dominant voice at the United Nations. With 31 members, the U.S. delegation was the largest at the recent NPT PrepComm. U.S. views deeply affect the policies of all Western nations and Russia .

    The U.S. astounded many delegations at the PrepComm by disowning its own participation in the 2000 consensus that produced the “unequivocal undertaking.” It refused to allow the 2000 Review to be used as a reference point for the 2005 Review. The result was turmoil and a collapse of the PrepComm.

    The Treaty can certainly survive one bad meeting, but that is not the point. What delegates from around the world are deeply concerned about is the U.S. attempt to change the rules of the game. At least before, there was a recognition that the NPT was obtained in 1970 through a bargain, with the Nuclear Weapons States agreeing to negotiate the elimination of their nuclear weapons in return for the non-nuclear states shunning the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Adherence to that bargain enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 and the 13 Practical Steps of 2000. Now the U.S. is rejecting the commitments of 2000 and premising its aggressive diplomacy on the assertion that the problem of the NPT lies not in the actions of the Nuclear Weapons States but in the lack of compliance by states such as North Korea and Iran .

    The whole international community, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, is concerned about proliferation, but the new attempt by the Nuclear Weapon States to gloss over the discriminatory aspects of the NPT, which are now becoming permanent, has caused the patience of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement to snap. They see a two-class world of nuclear haves and have-nots becoming a permanent feature of the global landscape. In such chaos, the NPT is eroding and the prospect of multiple nuclear weapons states, a fear that caused nations to produce the NPT in the first place, is looming once more.

    That is the real point of the NPT crisis today. The crisis has been building through the two previous PrepComms, in 2002 and 2003, but a weak façade of harmony was maintained. Now the fuse has blown.

    Brazil bluntly warned:

    “The fulfillment of the 13 Steps on nuclear disarmament agreed during the 2000 Review Conference have been significantly – one could even say systematically – challenged by action and omission, and various reservations and selective interpretation by Nuclear Weapon States. Disregard for the provisions of Article VI may ultimately affect the nature of the fundamental bargain on which the Treaty’s legitimacy rests.”

    But the U.S. vigorously defended its policies, giving no ground to its critics. From the opening speech by John R. Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. representatives insisted that attention not be diverted from the violations of the NPT by would-be nuclear powers “by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist.” In fact, Assistant Secretary of State Stephen G. Rademaker stated, “there can be no doubt that the United States is in full compliance with its Article VI obligations.” Over the past 15 years, he said, the U.S. has:

    • Reduced over 10,000 deployed strategic warheads to less than 6,000 by December 5, 2001 as required by the START Treaty.
    • Eliminated nearly 90 percent of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and reduced the number of types of nuclear systems in Europe from nine in 1991 to just one today.
    • Dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988.
    • Not produced highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 and halted the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988.
    • Not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992.
    • Removed more than 200 tons of fissile material from the military stockpile, enough material for at least 8,000 nuclear weapons.

    These reductions notwithstanding, the U.S. has made clear that nuclear weapons will be maintained to meet “the changing circumstances” in today’s security environment. The Administration is moving ahead with plans to try to convince Congress to approve funding for the development of a new Low-Yield Warhead.

    A March 2004 Report to Congress reveals that the U.S. is employing a double standard concerning compliance with the NPT. Whereas the U.S. wants to move forward into a new generation of nuclear weaponry, it adamantly rejects the attempt of any other state to acquire any sort of nuclear weapon. The U.S. clearly wants to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons; of that there can be no doubt. But it does not want to be questioned on what it regards as its right to maintain enormous stocks (despite numerical reductions) and to keep nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of its military doctrine.

    The U.S. is widely criticized around the world for this double standard. For example, Brazil said at the PrepComm: “One cannot worship at the altar of nuclear weapons and raise heresy charges against those who want to join the sect.” The New Agenda protested imbalanced statements assailing proliferation while remaining mute on the equal responsibility for disarmament by the nuclear powers. South Africa said: “One cannot undermine one part of an agreement and hope that other parts will continue to have the same force, or that others will not in turn attempt to follow the same practice.” New Zealand scorned the present diminishment of the Treaty as a whole and urged the U.S. to at least review its opposition to a nuclear test ban treaty.

    Criticism of U.S. nuclear weapons policies also emanates from important observers within the U.S. A briefing for PrepComm delegates and NGOs was convened by the Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers), which stated that, as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many in Congress “are now so consumed by fear of terrorism that they support policies that would have been unfathomable five years ago.” For example, policies of preemptive nuclear strikes, new “usable” nuclear weapons, and resumption of nuclear testing are now openly discussed in Washington . “The United States finds itself at a crossroads; it stands at the point between re-nuclearization and disarmament.” Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, told the briefing that the crisis of the NPT can be attributed to the expanding role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military policy. He said that if Congress does not rein in the Administration, present trend lines will lead to testing of new weapons and re-deployment of 2,400 strategic nuclear weapons after the Moscow Treaty expires in 2012. It was “troubling” that the U.S. contemplated the use of a nuclear weapon in response to a biological or chemical attack.

    A detailed critique of the stand taken by the U.S. at the PrepComm was published in News in Review , a daily record of the PrepComm published by “Reaching Critical Will,” of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Written by Andrew Lichterman and Jacqueline Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation, the document gave several examples to show that the U.S. is not in compliance with the NPT: more than 2,000 U.S. strategic nuclear warheads remain on hair-trigger alert, and U.S. Trident submarines continue to patrol the seas at Cold War levels, ready to fire hundreds of the most destructive and precise weapons ever conceived on 15 minutes’ notice. Answering the U.S. claim that it is not developing any new nuclear weapons, the document said:

    “Fact: The 2005 budget provides for upgrades to every nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile, requests $336 million to manufacture and certify new plutonium pits, the first stage in a nuclear weapon, requests $28 million for 2005 and $485 million over five years to design a “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” and requests $30 million for Enhanced Test Readiness to reduce the time needed to prepare for and conduct a full-scale underground nuclear test to 18 months.”

    There is no way to reconcile this resurgence of nuclear weapons development ( Germany called it a nuclear “renaissance”) with disarmament. Even as it says it is adhering to the NPT, the U.S. is flouting it. I have come to the conclusion that only a change in attitude by the U.S. Administration can now save the Treaty.

    Many delegations indicated privately that they are waiting to see the future direction of U.S. policy inasmuch as a Presidential election will occur before the 2005 Review. The positions of John Kerry, the presumptive Democratic nominee are being examined. An analysis of his comments shows that Kerry is opposed to the Bush Administration’s plans to develop new nuclear weapons, which Kerry believes “will make America less secure by setting back our country’s longstanding efforts to lead an international non-proliferation regime. It could set off a dangerous new nuclear arms race, while seriously undermining our ability to work with the international community to address nuclear proliferation threats in places like North Korea and Iran .” Instead, Kerry believes the United States should work for the creation of “a new international accord on nuclear proliferation to make the world itself safer for human survival.”

    In terms of concrete measures to advance non-proliferation and disarmament, Kerry supports the CTBT (having opposed Bush’s decision to withdraw), and advocates greater emphasis on securing nuclear stockpiles around the world by extending ongoing American efforts in the former Soviet Union to other countries to ensure fissile materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists. Kerry recognizes the importance of international cooperation in achieving results in non-proliferation, and promotes a multilateral approach, pointing to the shared global interest in preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. This approach should extend to U.S. Missile Defence programs, which Kerry supports, but believes should be developed in accordance with American treaty obligations, ensuring that American foreign relations are not damaged in the process.

    The election of the U.S. President is not my business. I must direct my efforts and the policies of the Middle Powers Initiative toward dealing with the governments that are in place around the world. Thus the MPI advocates the formation of a new coalition of States determined to save the NPT in 2005. A working partnership of important non-nuclear States must occupy the centre of the nuclear weapons debate and exert its strength in 2005. The beginning of such a partnership exists in the New Agenda Coalition, which was largely responsible for the success of the 2000 Review Conference. The leading non-nuclear States of NATO, such as Canada , Germany , Norway , Belgium , the Netherlands and Italy , must now work closely with the New Agenda to lead the international community toward a positive, if still modest, success in 2005.

    They must stop being cowed by the all-powerful NWS; they must speak up forcefully, in the name of humanity, to the United States , a country that has done much good for the world in other contexts but whose nuclear weapons doctrine is a threat to civilizations everywhere.

    Speaking up takes courage and leadership. The middle power States, which by and large stayed out of the U.S.-led Iraq war, are not lacking in either. They have to make prudential judgments on when to give voice to their concerns.

    It is paradoxical that just when the voice of the public is most needed to move governments on nuclear disarmament, it is most difficult to awaken the public. The public is by no means uncaring about war; they just do not see the connection between retention of nuclear weapons and the likelihood of mass destruction ahead.

    An awakening of the public is, of course, a profound concern of the NGOs, stalwart in the dedication they showed to the issue, many traveling to the PrepComm at their own expense and continually deprived of funding by foundations which have turned their attention elsewhere.

    An awakening of the public is precisely the strategy of Mayor Akiba of Hiroshima in his Emergency Campaign for Mayors For Peace. If the people in the municipalities around the world make their voices heard, the national politicians and diplomats will be quick to get the message.

    The recent comments by Mikhail Gorbachev are especially practical in this instance. Gorbachev says, referring to the panoply of human security issues besetting the world, that he is convinced the citizens of the world need a reformulated “glasnost” to invigorate, inform and inspire them to put the staggering resources of our planet and our knowledge to use for the benefit of all.

    The empowerment of peoples is needed to address the dominance of short-term interests and lack of transparency where the planet’s fate is being decided by what to do about nuclear weapons.

    Gorbachev says he has faith in humankind. “It is this faith that has allowed me to remain an active optimist.”

  • New Nukes, Anyone?

    This May, before Congress adjourns for its Memorial Day recess, the Senate and House of Representatives are scheduled to vote on the annual defense authorization bill. This bill is expected to include several provisions in the Bush administration’s budget proposal that make preparations for the building of new nuclear weapons.

    New nuclear weapons? Yes; there is no doubt about it. Armed with only 10,000 nuclear weapons, the U.S. government wants some more.

    The Bush administration has requested $27.6 million to develop a nuclear “bunker buster,” plus another $9 million for “advanced concept initiatives” that seem likely to include work on new, “small-yield” nuclear weapons. The President also proposes an allocation of $30 million toward building a $4 billion “Modern Pit Facility” that would churn out plutonium triggers for the explosion of thermonuclear weapons. And the administration wants another
    $30 million to dramatically reduce the time it would take to prepare for conducting nuclear test explosions.

    Those who have followed the Bush administration’s pronouncements regarding nuclear weapons won’t be surprised by these proposals. The administration’s 2001 Nuclear posture Review widened U.S. nuclear options by suggesting possible use of nuclear weapons against countries that don’t possess them. The following year, the Nuclear Weapons Council, an administration committee, remarked that it would “be desirable to assess the potential benefits that could be obtained from a return to nuclear testing.” In
    2003, the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Security Administration began a study of building a nuclear “bunker buster,” and the head of its nuclear division proposed taking advantage of the White House-prompted repeal of the Congressional ban on research into low-yield nuclear weapons.

    Meanwhile, of course, the administration has scrapped the U.S. government’s long-term commitment to nuclear arms control and disarmament-made in the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and reiterated as late as the NPT review conference in 2000–by withdrawing from the 1972 ABM treaty and refusing to support ratification of the 1996
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    These shifts in nuclear policy are designed to get the U.S. armed forces ready to wage nuclear war. The Nuclear Posture Review made it clear not only that nuclear weapons would continue to “play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States,” but that they would be employed with “greater flexibility” against “a wide range of target types.” Strategic nuclear weapons were fine for deterrence purposes. But their capacity to annihilate vast numbers of people had horrified the public and, thus, had led government officials to write them off as useful war-fighting implements. Battered by popular protest, even the hawkish Ronald Reagan had agreed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” But this abandonment of nuclear options stuck in the craw of the militarists who garrison the Bush administration, who were (and are) determined to build “usable” nuclear weapons.

    “Bunker buster” and low-yield nuclear weapons should be seen in this context. The former is designed to burrow into the ground to destroy military targets protected by rock or concrete. The latter–sometimes called “mini- nukes”–would also have greater utility on the battlefield than would larger nuclear weapons, with their vast, frightening destructiveness.

    In fact, they would still be enormously destructive. Although advocates of the “bunker-buster” have claimed that this nuclear weapon–because it explodes underground–is a “clean” one, in reality it is quite deadly. The nuclear weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki had explosive yields of from 14 to 21 kilotons; by contrast, the “bunker buster” has a yield
    of from several hundred kilotons to one megaton. If exploded underground, its effects would not be contained there. And if exploded in a city, it would create vast devastation through blast, fire, and radiation. As U.S. Senator Jack Reed observed: “These weapons will bust more than a bunker. The area of destruction will encompass an area the size of a city. They are really city breakers.” Even the “mini-nukes” will create huge swathes of destruction
    where they are used, as well as vast clouds of radioactive nuclear debris that will drift for many miles on the wind until this radioactive fallout lands on innocent people below.

    Furthermore, these “usable” nuclear weapons blur the dividing line between conventional war and nuclear war. Indeed, this is just what they are designed to do. And given the Bush administration’s penchant for waging war on the flimsiest of pretexts, it is hard to imagine that these weapons will not be used in the future–for “pre-emptive” wars or worse.

    In addition, by building, testing, and using new nuclear weapons, the U.S. government will encourage other nations to do the same. At the least, building and testing the weapons will put the final nail in the coffin of efforts at nuclear arms control and disarmament. The U.S. government has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and was the leading force behind the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996, signed by President Clinton. When the U.S. government resumes its nuclear test explosions, that will certainly provide the signal for other nations to scrap that treaty and commence their own nuclear buildups.

    Ironically, despite the Bush administration’s professed “war on terrorism,” developing these new weapons will also sharply enhance terrorist dangers. Because of their small size, mini-nukes are relatively easy to steal and transport by terrorists. Indeed, what weapon of mass destruction would be more available and appealing to bloodthirsty fanatics–whether of the domestic or foreign variety–than the new nuclear weapons that the Bush administration plans to develop?

    All in all, then, the Bush plan for building new nuclear weapons is a disaster. That Congress should even consider it seriously shows the degree to which this country has succumbed to the military madness fostered by the Bush administration.

    Even so, all is not lost. In 2003, the Democrats in Congress put up a fairly good fight against the first stages of the Bush administration’s plan for new nuclear weapons–so good that, together with some Republicans, they managed to block a number of the plan’s key features. This forced the administration to go back to Congress this year, to try again.

    So the battle is joined–this month! If you sit it out and tamely let the Bush warriors get ready for nuclear war, you have no one but yourself to blame.

    *Lawence S. Wittner is Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany. His latest book is Toward Nuclear Abolition (Stanford University Press). This article was originally published on ZNet.