Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear weapons

  • Why Nations Go Nuclear

    Understanding the reasons why a country chooses to go nuclear are complex, variable and speculative, but I would offer as a hypothesis four principal, though often overlapping factors: fear, security, enhancing the country’s bully potential or countering another country’s bully potential, and prestige. North Korea seems to be pioneering a fifth reason: to use the weapons as a bargaining chip to gain security guarantees and financial concessions. Each country that chooses to go nuclear will certainly reflect some or all of these reasons in their decision, although they may be in different combinations or proportions for different states. The reasons that the current nuclear weapons states went nuclear provide insights into these dynamics.

    Existing Nuclear Weapons States

    The first country to develop nuclear weapons was the United States, initiating the world’s first nuclear weapons program in anticipation of US involvement in World War II. President Franklin Roosevelt had been warned by Albert Einstein that a possibility existed for the Germans to develop nuclear weapons. Roosevelt and his advisors were motivated by fear that the German scientists would succeed in their quest for nuclear weapons, and that US nuclear weapons would be necessary to assure the security of the United States and the Allied powers by deterring the Germans from using theirs with impunity.

    Germany never succeeded in developing nuclear weapons and was defeated two months prior to the testing of the first US nuclear weapon. The United States quickly found another use for its nuclear arms, using the bombs against two cities in a nearly defeated Japan. Evidence suggests that this militarily questionable act was also intended to keep the Soviets from playing a larger role in the defeat and occupation of Japan and generally to send a warning message to the Soviet Union. Thus, while fear and security may have been the initial impetus for the US developing nuclear weapons, their use was subsequently overtly justified as saving US and Allied lives and bringing the war in the Pacific to a faster conclusion. At the same time, the US was flexing its muscles before the world, and demonstrating the bully potential of these weapons.

    The next country to develop nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union. Although the US and Soviet Union were allies in World War II, there were early signs that this relationship would not hold in the post-WWII period. The US use of nuclear weapons at the end of the war, when combined with the fact that the US kept the project secret from the Soviet Union, must have created the fear for Soviet leadership that the US would use its new weapons to dominate them. While many US political leaders thought that it might take decades for the Soviet Union to go nuclear, it actually took them only four years. Driven by fear of US domination, they sought security in the deterrence potential of the weapons, while at the same time adding to their prestige and bestowing upon themselves the bully potential of the weapons.

    Despite sharing in the Allied victory in World War II, both Britain and France emerged from the war with less power and prestige than they had going into the war. Britain, as a wartime ally of the US, had played a role in the development of the bomb in the US Manhattan Project, and thus its scientists were privy to the secrets of creating nuclear weapons. First Britain and then France went ahead with developing their own nuclear arms. Both countries could have chosen to remain under the US nuclear umbrella, but both chose instead to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Their reasoning was said to be based on the fear that a US leader would not be willing to sacrifice New York in an exchange with the Soviet Union in order to retaliate against a Soviet attack against London or Paris. Thus, both Britain and France, chose to go nuclear out of fear and a lack of trust in placing their security in the hands of the US. At the same time, they bolstered their waning prestige in the world, and increased their bully power against their remaining colonies and other weaker states.

    China, the final permanent member of the UN Security Council, chose also to go nuclear, fearing that without nuclear weapons its security was threatened by both the US and Soviet Union and that it would remain subject to their bully potential. China announced from the onset of its nuclear status that it did not intend to develop more than a minimum deterrent force and that it would not use nuclear weapons first. It sought only a small but sufficient nuclear retaliatory force to prevent the US or Soviet Union from using nuclear weapons against it. Fear and security appeared to be the driving force in China’s decision to go nuclear, although it enhanced its international prestige in the process and also gave itself some increase in bully power on a regional level.

    These five states – the US, Soviet Union (now Russia), UK, France and China – were the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the five states that were named as nuclear weapons states in the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While other states joined this treaty as non-nuclear weapons states and agreed not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons states promised, among other things, to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice later ruled that these states were obligated by the NPT “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    Today the NPT has become nearly universal. Only four states are outside the treaty structure: Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The first three never joined the treaty, and the latter withdrew from the treaty in 2003. Israel’s official position is the ambiguous statement that it will never be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, but it is widely understood that Israel possesses some 100 to 200 nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Israel has had a troubled existence and has engaged in many wars with its neighbors, all of which it has won with its high-tech military forces. Israel’s decision to go nuclear may be best understood as a desire to enhance its security by implicitly threatening ultimate recourse against hostile neighboring countries, and by reducing or eliminating the bully power that the US or Russia might seek to use to alter Israeli policies. However, by going nuclear, Israel has raised the fear level of its neighbors and their desire to enhance their security, potentially by going nuclear themselves.

    India held the position for many years that it was willing to remain a non-nuclear weapons state, but not in a world where some states continue to possess and refuse to give up their nuclear arms. Indian leaders have used the term “nuclear apartheid” to describe the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” India is thought to have initially secretly tested a nuclear device in 1974. It openly tested nuclear weapons in 1998. While fear and security may have played some role in India’s decision to go nuclear, particularly vis-à-vis China, there was a sense that India was motivated to a large degree by prestige. The country seemed to go wild with celebration in 1998 when India conducted its open nuclear weapons tests, as though this were validation of its emergence into “great power” status.

    India also had some potential to use its nuclear arms to bully Pakistan in their dispute over Kashmir, but this possibility was erased immediately when Pakistan followed India in publicly testing its own nuclear arms. For Pakistan, reasons for going nuclear certainly included fear of India, the desire to enhance its security, and prestige. The people of Pakistan, like those of India, exploded in celebration upon its successful nuclear weapons tests in 1998. A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s bomb, is a national hero in Pakistan, despite being the mastermind of a major international black market nuclear proliferation scheme.

    The final country that claims to have gone nuclear is North Korea. This country again fits the pattern of developing nuclear weapons out of fear of attack, principally by the US, and thus to enhance its security. In the case of North Korea, there is the added element of creating these weapons as a bargaining chip to gain security assurances from the US and also development aid. The long-standing six-party negotiations on North Korea’s nuclear arms point to North Korea’s desire to trade its nuclear arms capability for nuclear energy plants and US security assurances. Thus, for North Korea, prestige and bully potential seem less significant than security promises and development aid.

    Why Nations Do Not Go Nuclear

    There are currently 191 member states of the United Nations. Of these, only nine have chosen to go nuclear. Thus, the overwhelming majority of states in the international system have chosen not to go nuclear. Why nations go nuclear needs to be weighed against why nations do not go nuclear. Among the reasons why nations choose not to go nuclear are the following:

    1. Technological capability. Many nations, particularly poorer nations, lack the technological capability to develop nuclear arms. While this leaves out many states, there are at least 44 states with nuclear reactors on their territory, suggesting potential technological capability and access to nuclear materials for bomb production.
    2. Security Alliances. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provide a nuclear umbrella for member states, and thus act as a disincentive for an alliance member to go nuclear.
    3. Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT is the centerpiece of nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. In joining the treaty, non-nuclear weapons states agree not to develop or acquire nuclear arms. There is, however, a reciprocal pledge by the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and the failure of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill this obligation may be eroding viability of the treaty.
    4. Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ) Agreements. Such regional agreements now cover the entire southern hemisphere of the planet. Such agreements now exist for Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Africa and Southeast Asia.
    5. Perception of Negative Consequences. National leaders may perceive that they would suffer negative consequences by going nuclear, such as a loss of economic support, including development aid, disruption of alliances, and becoming targets of other states’ nuclear arsenals.
    6. National Self-Image. Some states may not have as goals being nuclear weapons states, preferring to provide leadership toward a nuclear weapons-free world.

    Incentives and Disincentives to Going Nuclear

    Among the principal incentives for a state to go nuclear are threats by a current nuclear weapons state or a regional security environment that is uncertain. When the US president named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “axis of evil,” he provided incentive for them to develop nuclear arms. These incentives were enhanced by the leaked 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review that called for developing contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against seven states (Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Syria), five of which were non-nuclear weapons states (although North Korea subsequently chose to go nuclear).

    Four of these states ( Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria) are in the Middle East, one of the most dangerous security environments in the world and an area in which one nuclear weapons state currently exists ( Israel). Since the US Nuclear Posture Review came out, Iraq was attacked and invaded by the US and its “Coalition of the Willing,” and Libya has chosen on its own to give up its nuclear weapons program. Iran and Syria, however, are still viewed as possible regional candidates to develop nuclear weapons, as is Egypt. Like India and Pakistan, these states may choose to go nuclear rather than continue to live with the unbalance and uncertainty of implied and overt threats to their security by the US and Israel.

    The greatest disincentives to these states going nuclear would be to establish a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East or, more broadly, a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, combined with credible pledges by the US and other nuclear weapons states to provide security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states. It seems clear that so long as Israel remains the sole state in the Middle East with nuclear weapons, there will be strong incentives for other states to seek nuclear weapons as an equalizer, much as the Soviet Union sought to do against the US or Pakistan sought to do against India.

    Several states have come into possession of nuclear weapons and chosen to give them up. South Africa clandestinely developed a small nuclear arsenal when it felt beleaguered due to its policy of Apartheid. When South Africa chose to give up its policy and practice of Apartheid, it also made the decision to give up its nuclear arsenal. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus inherited nuclear weapons upon the break up of the Soviet Union, and all chose to turn these weapons over to Russia for dismantlement. This was accomplished with incentives and security assurances from the US and Russia. Argentina and Brazil were two countries that were moving toward developing nuclear weapons, but were dissuaded from doing so by regional security arrangements and gave up their programs. These examples all show that the development or acquisition of nuclear arsenals can be reversed.

    Unraveling the Nuclear Knot

    What is now needed are disincentives that would unravel the current knot of nuclear weapons states. The greatest disincentive to continue to possess nuclear weapons may be the possibility that other states will also continue to retain their weapons, leading to nuclear weapons or the materials to create them falling into the hands of terrorists. The possibility of a terrorist group in possession of nuclear weapons should give even the most powerful country in the world, the United States, incentive to seek the global elimination of nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible and to bring the materials to make such weapons under strict international control.

    Russia has suggested many times that it is prepared to further reduce its nuclear arsenal by agreement with the United States to under 1,500 nuclear weapons. Thus far, the US has not indicated an interest in reducing the number of its deployed strategic weapons to under 1,700 to 2,200 weapons. Further, the US has failed to accept its obligation to move forward on the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Under the Bush administration the leadership for progress in achieving nuclear disarmament has been severely lacking.

    It would seem that only the United States, due to its military and economic power, has the capability and convening power to bring together the nuclear weapons states and lead them in creating a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would set forth obligations for phased nuclear disarmament with adequate provisions for verification and international control. We can only hope that such leadership will be forthcoming before nuclear weapons proliferate to other countries and are again used.

    Although the United States may be needed for the actual implementation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, the world cannot wait for the US to take action on this issue, particularly knowing of the Bush administration’s hostility to fulfilling its obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the steps set forth in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While US initiative remains dormant, other states must fill this void with innovative collective measures to move ahead with a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This idea has been most seriously embraced by civil society groups, such as the Abolition 2000 Global Network and the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons by the year 2020.

    With the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to make any progress and the failure of the 2005 High-Level Summit meeting at the United Nations to reach any agreement on nuclear disarmament issues, both due to US opposition, the world stands at a deadlock on nuclear disarmament issues. The United Nations Conference on Disarmament has not addressed nuclear disarmament issues for eight years, also largely due to US opposition.

    There are only two possibilities to change this situation. The first is the awakening of the American people to put pressure on their government to cease being an obstacle to nuclear disarmament efforts and start being a leader in these efforts. The second is for the international community to unite in putting pressure on the US from outside. At this point in time, neither of these possibilities appears promising, and thus we drift toward nuclear the “unparalleled catastrophes” that Einstein warned would occur unless we can change our thinking.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons. This paper was prepared for The Istanbul Workshop on Nuclear Dangers in the Middle East, 17-21 November 2005.

  • The Abolition of Nuclear Weapons and War: The Responsibility of Scientists

    The abolition of nuclear weapons and war requires a leap in our thinking. How do we get from the world we live in to one without nuclear weapons and war? How do we even muster the optimism to believe that such a world is possible? How do we contribute to making a difference in achieving such a world? And what is the responsibility of scientists in this endeavor, I would say, this noble endeavor?

    Perhaps there are more questions than answers. But the starting point in our thinking should be the necessity of change. The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since Hiroshima and Nagasaki is not predictive that they will not be used again.

    The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have long said, “Human beings and nuclear weapons cannot co-exist.” Over time, certain consequences are inevitable if nuclear weapons are relied upon for security: first, more countries will desire these weapons, and they will proliferate; second, these weapons or the materials to make them will find their way into the hands of terrorists; third, the weapons will be used again, by accident or design; fourth, cities will be destroyed, causing untold suffering and harm; and fifth, there will be no winners in a nuclear war.

    Scientists can play an important role in preventing nuclear war, because they have the training to comprehend the magnitude of the resulting destruction. Scientists, and especially those that brought nuclear weapons into the world or who have worked on developing or improving them, have particular responsibilities to awaken the public to the dangers of the continuing nuclear threat to humanity and all life. Scientists possess voices of authority and can be influential by taking a strong moral stance, speaking out publicly and condemning their colleagues who continue to work on the development and improvement of nuclear arms.

    Scientists have played a pivotal role in every aspect of the initiation and development of nuclear weapons, and as advocates or opponents of their use. It was scientists who proposed the atomic bomb project to President Roosevelt. Leo Szilard went to Albert Einstein in 1939 and expressed his justified fears that the Germans might develop an atomic bomb and use it to prevail in World War II. Einstein, who hated war and militarism, signed a letter to Roosevelt warning of this danger. Roosevelt then set up a small uranium research project that would eventually become a full-scale bomb project involving thousands of scientific and technical workers.

    The onset of the Nuclear Age makes clear that scientists cannot maintain control of their destructive creations. The scientists on the US atomic bomb project, the Manhattan Project, worked hard to create a nuclear weapon in order to deter a potential German nuclear weapon. But by the time the US project succeeded, the Germans had already been defeated by the Allies. Thus, the original purpose of creating the weapons no longer existed when the first nuclear device was exploded. Nonetheless, the weapon was used just three weeks after its first test at Alamogordo, New Mexico on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, and then three days later on Nagasaki.

    Only one scientist on the Manhattan Project left when he became aware that the Germans would not succeed in creating an atomic weapon and, therefore, in his mind the justification for developing a such a weapon no longer existed. His name was Joseph Rotblat, and he was a moral giant in the field of science. He resigned from Los Alamos and returned to London, never to work again on a weapons project. Ten years later, he became the youngest signatory of the mid-twentieth century warning to humanity, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, as well as a founder and leader of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Rotblat would spend the rest of his life working to abolish nuclear weapons.

    A second scientist, Leo Szilard, an important figure in the creation of the atomic bomb, stayed in the Manhattan Project, but tried by all means available to him to convince the US President not to use atomic weapons on Japan. Szilard urged US policymakers to demonstrate the power of these weapons to leaders of the world by exploding an atomic device in an uninhabited area. To this end, Szilard drafted another letter to President Roosevelt and had his friend Albert Einstein draft a cover letter for him. Unfortunately, Roosevelt died before Szilard could meet with him and argue his case.

    Szilard then sought a meeting with President Truman, but Truman sent him to see his Senate mentor, Jimmy Byrnes, who Truman would soon appoint to be Secretary of State. Szilard argued that the use of the atomic weapons against Japan was likely to start a dangerous nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union. Byrnes was dismissive of him. Szilard then organized a petition of Manhattan Project scientists to President Truman, but the petition didn’t reach Truman until after the bombs were used. Szilard would work for the rest of his life for the elimination of nuclear weapons, founding several organizations for this purpose, including the Council for a Livable World.

    J. Robert Oppenheimer was one of four key scientists that advised the Interim Committee that recommended to Truman the use of the weapons against Japan. The other three were Enrico Fermi, Arthur Compton and Ernest Lawrence. Oppenheimer, who had led the scientific team that created the bomb, wanted to use it against Japan, as did the other three, believing that its use might improve “international prospects.” A few years later, when Oppenheimer would oppose developing thermonuclear weapons, his loyalty to the United States was attacked, and the government held hearings and took away his security clearance.

    Albert Einstein, the greatest scientist of his era, hated war. He once said, “That a man can take pleasure in marching in fours to the strains of a band is enough to make me despise him. He has only been given his big brain by mistake; unprotected spinal marrow was all he needed. This plague-spot of civilization ought to be abolished with all possible speed. Heroism on command, senseless violence, and all the loathsome nonsense that goes by the name of patriotism – how passionately I hate them! How vile and despicable seems war to me! I would rather be hacked to pieces than take part in such an abominable business.” Yet, despite these strongly held views, when in 1939 his friend Leo Szilard urged him to write to President Roosevelt warning about the potential German atomic threat, Einstein complied.

    Einstein never worked on the Manhattan Project, and was deeply dismayed when he learned of the first bomb being used against Hiroshima. He would work for the rest of his life for the elimination of these omnicidal weapons. One of his most famous and important comments on the subject of nuclear weapons is: “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

    The most important and famous statement of scientists was the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, released on July 9, 1955. The Manifesto, authored by Bertrand Russell with assistance from Joseph Rotblat, and containing many of Einstein’s publicly stated views, was the last public document signed by Einstein before his death. It was additionally signed by nine other leading scientists, including Joseph Rotblat. The Manifesto was a warning to all humanity that nuclear weapons placed before us the risk of “universal death.” The Manifesto called not only for the abolition of nuclear weapons, but of war itself. It stated:

    “No doubt in an H-bomb war great cities would be obliterated. But this is one of the minor disasters that would have to be faced. If everybody in London, New York, and Moscow were exterminated, the world might, in the course of a few centuries, recover from the blow. But we now know, especially since the Bikini test, that nuclear bombs can gradually spread destruction over a very much wider area than had been supposed.

    “It is stated on very good authority that a bomb can now be manufactured which will be 2,500 times as powerful as that which destroyed Hiroshima. Such a bomb, if exploded near the ground or under water, sends radio-active particles into the upper air. They sink gradually and reach the surface of the earth in the form of a deadly dust or rain. It was this dust which infected the Japanese fishermen and their catch of fish.

    “No one knows how widely such lethal radio-active particles might be diffused, but the best authorities are unanimous in saying that a war with H-bombs might possibly put an end to the human race. It is feared that if many H-bombs are used there will be universal death, sudden only for a minority, but for the majority a slow torture of disease and disintegration.”

    The Manifesto concluded: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

    Among the nine signers of the Manifesto, in addition to Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, was the great chemist Linus Pauling. In the late 1950s, concerned about the health hazards of radiation from nuclear testing, Pauling and his wife, Ava Helen Pauling, organized a petition among scientists calling for an end to such testing. There were 9,235 scientists from around the world who signed the petition, which Pauling presented to the United Nations. The petition stated, in part: “An international agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs now could serve as a first step toward a more general disarmament and the ultimate effective abolition of nuclear weapons, averting the possibility of a nuclear war that would be a catastrophe to all humanity.”

    Pauling concluded the petition with these words: “We have in common with our fellow men a deep concern for the welfare of all human beings. As scientists we have knowledge of the dangers involved and therefore a special responsibility to make those dangers known. We deem it imperative that immediate action be taken to effect an international agreement to stop the testing of all nuclear weapons.” For his efforts, Pauling would receive a Nobel Peace Prize in addition to his Nobel Prize for Chemistry.

    When Linus Pauling received a Lifetime Achievement Award from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in 1991, shortly after the onset of the Persian Gulf War, he offered this syllogism: “To kill and maim people is immoral. War kills and maims people. War is immoral.”

    In 1995, the 50 th anniversary year of the bombing of Hiroshima, Hans Bethe, a Nobel Laureate physicist who had been a senior Manhattan Project scientist, called for all scientists to cease from aiding in efforts to develop, improve or manufacture weapons of mass destruction. He stated:

    “Today we are rightly in an era of disarmament and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. But in some countries nuclear weapons development still continues. Whether and when the various Nations of the World can agree to stop this is uncertain. But individual scientists can still influence this process by withholding their skills.

    “Accordingly, I call on all scientists in all countries to cease and desist from work creating, developing, improving and manufacturing further nuclear weapons – and, for that matter, other weapons of potential mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons.”

    Later in that year, Joseph Rotblat received the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize. In his Nobel Lecture, he quoted Hans Bethe’s plea, and also called for scientific guidelines in the form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath:

    “The time has come to formulate guidelines for the ethical conduct of scientists, perhaps in the form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath. This would be particularly valuable for young scientists when they embark on a scientific career. The US Student Pugwash Group has taken up this idea – and that is very heartening.

    “At a time when science plays such a powerful role in the life of society, when the destiny of the whole of mankind may hinge on the results of scientific research, it is incumbent on all scientists to be fully conscious of that role, and conduct themselves accordingly. I appeal to my fellow scientists to remember their responsibility to humanity.”

    Scientists today must follow the advice of Einstein, Szilard, Pauling, Rotblat and Bethe, and become more effective in working against weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Scientists need to become more assertive in speaking out for peace and the need to eliminate nuclear weapons, and more effective in organizing. International organizations like the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, Pugwash and the Union of Concerned Scientists must grow in size and outreach and become a moral and political force for social change.

    Scientists who give their talents to the military-industrial complex should be stigmatized, so that it becomes socially unacceptable for them among their peers to work on genocidal weaponry. The training of scientists should include moral, legal and ethical dimensions as these pertain to working on weapons of mass destruction.

    The bubble of respectability surrounding scientists who work on such weapons needs to be pierced, not only within the scientific community, but with the public at large. In the end, the problems that we face are not questions of scientific responsibility so much as they are questions of human responsibility. Due to their knowledge, skills and intellect, scientists should be at the forefront of educating humanity about the dangers of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and should lead by example. Scientists need to tell the public directly that our weapons have become too dangerous to any longer tolerate the institution of war.

    It is time for all scientists to take the advice of Hans Bethe and other great scientists who led efforts for nuclear disarmament, and cease to work in any fashion on developing, improving or manufacturing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, while providing leadership and support toward their abolition.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and the deputy chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility. His most recent book is Hold Hope, Wage Peace.

  • Bush Abandons Plan for New Nukes

    Confronted with strong opposition from disarmament groups and from Congress, the Bush administration has abandoned its plan to develop a nuclear “bunker buster.”

    This new weapon, formally known as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, became the symbol of the Bush administration’s plan to build up the U.S. nuclear arsenal and wage nuclear war. The administration alleged that the bunker buster was necessary to destroy deeply buried and hardened enemy targets, and that—thanks to the fact that it would explode underground—it would produce minimal collateral damage. But critics charged that, with more than 70 times the destructive power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima, a single bunker buster might kill millions of people. This contention was reinforced by an April 2005 report from a National Academy of Sciences panel, which claimed that such a device, exploded underground, would likely cause the same number of casualties as a weapon of comparable power exploded on the earth’s surface.

    In addition, building the weapon symbolized the Bush administration’s flouting of the U.S. government’s commitments to nuclear arms control and disarmament. Under the terms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the nuclear powers—including the United States—agreed to move toward elimination of their own nuclear arsenals. And, in fact, after much hesitation, this is what they began to do, through treaties and unilateral action, over the ensuing years. Therefore, it came as a shock to the arms control community when the Bush administration pulled out of the ABM Treaty, opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and pressed Congress for funding to build new nuclear weapons, including “mini-nukes” and bunker busters.

    Given the symbolic, high-profile status of the bunker buster, groups like the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Council for a Livable World, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and Peace Action worked hard to defeat it—mobilizing public opposition and lobbying fiercely against congressional funding. Last year, their efforts paid off, when Congress, despite its Republican majority, refused to support the weapon’s development. A key opponent was Representative David Hobson, the Republican chair of the House Energy and Water Appropriations Committee, who insisted that the U.S. government could hardly expect other nations to honor their NPT commitments if it ignored its own.

    With the Bush administration determined to secure the new weapon, bunker buster funding came to the fore again this year. Debate on the proposal was intense. U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) insisted that building the bunker buster “sends the wrong signals to the rest of the world by reopening the nuclear door and beginning the testing and development of a new generation of nuclear weapons.” Ultimately, both the Senate and the House rejected the administration measure. The administration’s only remaining hope lay in pushing through a scaled-back version of its plan, for $4 million. Championed by U.S. Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM), long an avid supporter of nuclear weapons development in his home state, the bill passed the Senate but was again blocked in the House, where Representative Hobson once more led the way. In recent months, a House-Senate conference committee grappled with the legislation, but without making a decision on it.

    Finally, on October 25, Senator Domenici pulled the plug on the funding proposal, announcing that it was being dropped at the request of the Energy Department. An administration official explained that a decision had been made to concentrate on a non-nuclear bunker buster. Naturally, the arms control and disarmament community was overjoyed. According to Stephen Young, a senior analyst with the Union of Concerned Scientists, “this is a true victory for a more rational nuclear policy.” Although the reason for the administration’s abandonment of its new nuclear weapon program remains unclear, it does appear that it resulted from public pressure, Democratic opposition, and a division on the issue among Republicans.

    Of course, much more has to be done before the world is safe from the nuclear menace. Some 30,000 nuclear weapons remain in existence, with about 10,000 of them in the hands of the U.S. government.

    But the story of the bunker buster’s defeat illustrates that, even in relatively unpromising circumstances, it is possible to rein in the nuclear ambitions of government officials.

    Dr. Wittner, a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Associate, is Professor of History at the State University of New York, Albany. His latest book is Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford University Press).

    Originally published by the History News Network.

  • More Than 470 Physicists Sign Petition To Oppose US Policy on Nuclear Attack

    More than 470 physicists, including seven Nobel laureates, have signed a petition to oppose a new U.S. Defense Department proposal that allows the United States to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

    The petition was started by two physics professors at the University of California, San Diego, Kim Griest and Jorge Hirsch, who said they felt an obligation to speak out about the nuclear policy change because their profession brought nuclear weapons into the world 60 years ago.

    They and other prominent physicists who signed the petition—which will be delivered to members of Congress, scientific professional societies and the news media—object to the new policy because it blurs the sharp line between nuclear weapons and conventional, chemical and biological weapons.

    “While it has long been a U.S. policy to use nuclear weapons in order to respond to a nuclear attack,” said Hirsch, “the new policy allows the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against states that do not have nuclear weapons and for a host of new reasons, including rapid termination of a conflict on U.S. terms or to ensure success of the U.S. forces.”

    “Humanity has gone more than half a century without using nuclear weapons, in large part because of the success of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” said Griest. “The U.S. use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states will destroy the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and give strong incentive for other countries to develop and use nuclear weapons, thus making nuclear war more likely. As physicists we feel we need to bring this to the attention of policy makers and the public, in order to engender discussion, debate, and hopefully repudiation of the new policy.”

    The two physicists began their grass roots petition last month following reports in The New York Times and Washington Post that the federal government was in the final process of adopting a new U.S. policy that would permit the use of nuclear weapons against an adversary for the following reasons:

    • For rapid and favorable war termination on U.S. terms.
    • To ensure success of U.S. and multinational operations.
    • To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of weapons of mass destruction.
    • Against an adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against US, multinational, or alliance forces.

    Griest and Hirsch put their petition on the internet at http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/, invited their colleagues to sign and quickly received an avalanche of responses.

    The petition is signed by two past presidents of the American Physical Society, the premier professional organization for U.S. physicists—George Trilling of UC Berkeley and Jerome Friedman of MIT. Friedman, who is also a Nobel laureate, was joined on the petition by six other Nobel Prizewinners in physics—Philip Anderson of Princeton University, Anthony Leggett of the University of Illinois, Douglas Osheroff of Stanford University, Daniel Tsui of Princeton University, Steven Weinberg of the University of Texas and Frank Wilczek of MIT.

    Other prominent physicists on the petition include Fields Medal winner Edward Witten of the Institute for Advanced Study, Wolf Prize laureates Michael Fisher of the University of Maryland and Daniel Kleppner of MIT, and Leo Kadanoff of the University of Chicago, a recipient of the National Medal of Science and president-elect of the American Physical Society.

    “We point out in the petition that nuclear weapons are on a completely different scale than other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and that the underlying principle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is that in exchange for other countries forgoing the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon states will pursue nuclear disarmament,” said Hirsch. “Instead, this new U.S. policy dramatically increases the risk of nuclear proliferation and, ultimately, the risk that regional conflicts will explode into all-out nuclear war, with the potential to destroy our civilization.”

    The physicists hope to gain additional supporters before a meeting of the executive board of the American Physical Society on November 18 and a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency on November 24.

    Petition by physicists on nuclear weapons policy September 2005

    As physicists we feel a special responsibility with respect to nuclear weapons; our profession brought them into existence 60 years ago. We wish to express our opposition to a shocking new US policy currently under consideration regarding the use of nuclear weapons. We ask our professional organizations to take a stand on this issue, the Congress of the United States to conduct full public hearings on this subject, and the media and public at large to discuss this new policy and make their voices heard.

    This new policy was outlined in the document Nuclear Posture Review delivered to Congress in December 2001, part of which has been made public, and is further defined in the unclassified draft document Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations dated March 15, 2005, which is in the final stages of being adopted and declared official policy by the US government, according to reports in the Washington Post and the New York Times (9/11/05). It foresees pre-emptive nuclear strikes against non-nuclear adversaries, for purposes which include the following (Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Page III-2):

    • For rapid and favorable war termination on US terms.
    • To ensure success of US and multinational operations.
    • To demonstrate US intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.
    • Against an adversary intending to use WMD against US, multinational, or alliance forces.

    The Nuclear Posture Review document states that:

    • US nuclear forces will now be used to dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends.
    • Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack

    This dangerous policy change ignores the fact that nuclear weapons are on a completely different scale than other WMD’s and conventional weapons. Using a nuclear weapon pre-emptively and against a non-nuclear adversary crosses a line, blurring the sharp distinction that exists between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, and heightens the probability of future use of nuclear weapons by others. The underlying principle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is that in exchange for other countries forgoing the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapon states will pursue nuclear disarmament. Instead, this new U.S. policy conveys a clear message to the 182 non-nuclear weapon states that the United States is moving strongly away from disarmament, and is in fact prepared to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear adversaries. It provides a strong incentive for countries to abandon the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons themselves and dramatically increases the risk of nuclear proliferation, and ultimately the risk that regional conflicts will explode into all-out nuclear war, with the potential to destroy our civilization.

    We urge members of Congress, professional organizations and the media to raise public awareness and promote discussion on these issues, and we express our repudiation of these dangerous policies in the strongest possible terms.

  • Awakening America – Before It Is Too Late

    “The shaft of the arrow had been feathered with one of the eagle’s own plumes. We often give our enemies the means of our own destruction.” — Aesop’s Fables

    America has been warned in every conceivable fashion that its nuclear weapons will bring it to a bad end.

    It was warned by scientists on its own atomic bomb project, even before it bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and it was warned by the destruction of those cities.

    It was warned by Mahatma Gandhi that it was too early to see what nuclear weapons would do the soul of the attacking nation.

    It was warned by Albert Einstein that we must change our modes of thinking or face “unparalleled catastrophe.”

    It has been warned by Nobel Laureates, by generals and admirals, by small countries and large ones.

    It was warned by Bertrand Russell, J. Robert Oppenheimer and Linus Pauling.

    It was warned by the Cuban missile crisis, and by other near disasters.

    It was warned by the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that human beings and nuclear weapons cannot co-exist.

    It has been warned by religious leaders that nuclear weapons jeopardize creation.

    It was warned by head of the US Strategic Command, General Lee Butler, that “we cannot at once keep sacred the miracle of existence and hold sacrosanct the capacity to destroy it.”

    It was warned by the mayors of cities and by earnest citizen groups.

    It was warned by drop drills, fall-out shelters and false alerts.

    It has been warned and warned until the sirens should be screaming in the White House and in the halls of Congress.

    But we live in a time of political leaders lacking a moral compass, of political leaders unable to change their thinking or to shed their hubris.

    Since nuclear weapons are the most cowardly weapon ever created, we live in a time of leaders marked by a significant courage-deficit.

    All signs suggest that we are headed toward disaster, toward a world in which America itself will be sacrificed at the altar of its hubris.

    We have become too attached to our double standards, to a world of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.”

    We spend on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems what it would cost to feed the world’s hungry, shelter the world’s homeless, care for the world’s sick and infirm, and educate the world’s children.

    In our comfortable reliance on our military might, we have failed to grasp that nuclear weapons are a far more powerful tool in the hands of the weak than in the hands of the strong.

    We have failed to grasp that America cannot afford to again use nuclear weapons, but extremist groups are eager to obtain these weapons and use them against us.

    We have failed to grasp that there is no defense against nuclear weapons, as we throw money into missile defenses like a helpless giant.

    America stands at increasing risk that its great cities will be destroyed by nuclear weapons.

    Our cities, our economy and our pride will fall together.

    When this happens, America will bellow and flail, flames will shoot from its nostrils, and the survivors will wonder how America was brought so low.

    Looking back, some will remember with dismay the many, many warnings. Others will say that it was karma.

    This is a glimpse into our future, yet another warning. The worst has not yet happened.

    It is not too late for America to wake up, to fulfill its obligations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to lead the world to a nuclear weapons-free planet.

    It is late, but it is not too late. America may still wake up, and if it does it will be because people like all of us have not given up on America or on a human future.

    It will be because ordinary Americans do not have the courage-deficit that our leaders have so readily and consistently displayed.

    It will be because the voices of the people rise up and demand change and because we become the leaders we have been waiting for.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the author of a recent book of peace poetry, Today Is Not a Good Day for War.

  • The 2005 Nobel Peace Prize

    The 2005 Nobel Peace Prize

    In this 60th anniversary year of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Nobel Committee chose to again focus its award, as it had in 1985 and again in 1995, on abolishing nuclear weapons. The Nobel Committee announced that its Peace Prize for 2005 will go to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei. Ten years ago, the Prize went to Joseph Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and ten years before that to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

    The Nobel Committee is right to focus on nuclear dangers and the need to abolish these weapons, and Mohamed ElBaradei has been courageous in speaking out for both sides of the non-proliferation bargain: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament. He has repeatedly pointed to the hypocrisy of the nuclear weapons states for their double standards and their failure to move resolutely in fulfilling their nuclear disarmament obligations.

    ElBaradei has argued, for example, “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security – and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.” For his outspokenness, he earned the wrath of the Bush administration, which tried unsuccessfully to block his appointment to a third four-year term at the IAEA.

    In making their announcement of the 2005 prize, the Nobel Committee stated: “At a time when the threat of nuclear arms is again increasing, the Norwegian Nobel Committee wishes to underline that this threat must be met through the broadest possible international cooperation. This principle finds its clearest expression today in the work of the IAEA and its Director General. In the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is the IAEA which controls that nuclear energy is not misused for military purposes, and the Director General has stood out as an unafraid advocate of new measures to strengthen that regime. At a time when disarmament efforts appear deadlocked, when there is a danger that nuclear arms will spread both to states and to terrorist groups, and when nuclear power again appears to be playing an increasingly significant role, IAEA’s work is of incalculable importance.”

    Mr. ElBaradei is deserving of the Nobel for his clear and persistent challenge to the policies of the nuclear weapons states. The Nobel Committee, however, sends the wrong message to the world in making the award to the IAEA. The IAEA is an international agency that serves two masters. On the one hand, it seeks to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. But, on the other hand, it seeks to promote nuclear energy. Although these dual goals are enshrined in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they are not compatible. The spread of nuclear reactors carries with it the potential for the spread of nuclear weapons.

    Nuclear reactors have always been, and remain, a preferred path to nuclear weapons. It was the path taken secretly by Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa. It is the path once pursued by Brazil, Argentina, Iraq and Libya, and which now raises concerns with Iran. It is the path that has made Japan a virtual nuclear weapons state.

    The Nobel Committee had another and, in my view, better choice before it than the IAEA to promote the abolition of nuclear weapons. Also nominated for this year’s Nobel Peace Prize was the Nihon Hidankyo, the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations. By selecting Nihon Hidankyo, along with Mr. ElBaradei, the Committee could have chosen to shine a light on the hibakusha, the aging victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who have devoted much of their lives to seeking to assure that no one in the future will ever again suffer their fate.

    In a letter sent in December 2004, I wrote to the Nobel Committee: “As individuals and collectively, the hibakusha, survivors of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have reflected the spirit of peace in turning their personal tragedies into an enduring plea to rid the world of these most terrible weapons of mass destruction. To honor them with the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize in the 60th anniversary year of the bombings would, in a sense, be to honor all victims of war who fight for peace, but it would have special meaning for the aging hibakusha. It would recognize the human triumph in their alchemy of turning despair and bitterness into hope on the path to nuclear sanity and disarmament.”

    Once again, the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been passed over for the world’s most prestigious peace prize. When the Nobel Committee chooses to make its award to the hibakusha, it will be a sign that there is an expanding recognition that the only safe number of nuclear weapons in the world is zero and that the fate of the world depends upon eliminating these omnicidal weapons as rapidly as possible. It will also recognize the truth of the oft-repeated position of the hibakusha that “human beings and nuclear weapons cannot co-exist,” and that we must eliminate these weapons before they eliminate us.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the author of a recent book of peace poetry, Today Is Not a Good Day for War.

  • North Korea Deal: Better Late Than Never

    The welcome nuclear framework agreement with North Korea signed in Beijing yesterday is a belated triumph of pragmatism over ideology, and suggests a way ahead on a deal with Iran.

    The preliminary deal provides an outline for a more detailed agreement to be negotiated between North Korea and the other five parties – the United States, Russia, China, South Korea, and Japan — to the still precarious nuclear talks. The main elements of the deal are essentially the same as the agreement nearly concluded at the end of the second Clinton term, and gift wrapped for the first Bush administration.

    President Bush and his most influential advisors spent the next five years denigrating that deal, and dissing Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, who favored it. The basic concept, “more for more,” combined greater concessions from the North (verified abandonment of its nuclear weapons and program) in exchange for broader security guarantees and economic ties and assistance from the United States and others, including a no-attack pledge from Washington and an affirmation of South Korea’s non-nuclear status.

    It has taken a combination of the grind of war in Iraq and the devastation of Katrina, plus a Secretary of State who knows how to play the inside game, finally to turn this around. The major changes in the US position commit Washington to nothing. The agreement includes but does not endorse Pyongyang’s stance on its nuclear rights: “The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” It also makes an open ended statement about the possibility of future talks on suspended plans to build a proliferation-resistant reactor for the North: “The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactor [sic] to the DPRK.”

    Despite the vague nature of these commitments, they were a bitter pill for the Bush administration, which has opposed the very idea of negotiations with the North, or with Iran. The administration’s motto has been: better to ignore bad behavior than risk being perceived as rewarding it. The ignorance-is-bliss policy rests on the false premise that regime change was in the offing in both North Korea and Iran. Both of these regimes, however, have turned out to be durable. The cost of waiting Kim Jong-Il out has been as many as a half dozen more nuclear weapons which, hopefully, now will be dismantled. Time is also the enemy in Iran, where bureaucratic momentum continues to build for a nuclear program supported by “hardliners” and “reformers” alike.

    The hope now is that the administration’s low-cost concessions to North Korea will be applied to Iran to stanch its nuclear program. Now, however, the administration and the EU 3 will have to deal with a new Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is tilting Iran’s policy to the east, and seems less willing to compromise to gain favor with Europe or the United States.

    Lee Feinstein is senior fellow and deputy director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. An international lawyer and specialist in national security affairs, he was Principal Director of Policy Planning under Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and a senior advisor for peacekeeping policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Feinstein’s areas of specialization include weapons of mass destruction, international law and institutions, and foreign policy process. He has written widely on US foreign policy and national security and co-directed the CFR-Freedom House Task Force on Enhancing US Relations with the UN.

  • The Role of US Nuclear Weapons New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge

    A nuclear draft doctrine written by the Pentagon calls for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pre-emptively if necessary.

    The doctrine, the first formal update since the Bush administration took office, is entitled “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations”[1] and has been strongly influenced by the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other directives published by the Bush administration since 2001. A final version is expected later this fall.

    The draft doctrine and editing comments were freely available on the Internet until recently, providing a rare glimpse into the secret world of nuclear planning in the post-Cold War era.

    Foremost among the doctrine’s new features are the incorporation of pre-emption into U.S. nuclear doctrine and the integration of conventional weapons and missile defenses into strategic planning. The Bush administration claims that it is significantly reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

    Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the updated doctrine falls far short of fulfilling the administration’s claim. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, the new doctrine reaffirms an aggressive nuclear posture of modernized nuclear weapons maintained on high alert. Conventional forces and missile defenses merely complement—instead of replace—nuclear weapons.

    The new doctrine continues the thinking of the previous version from 1995 in its reaffirmation of nuclear deterrence. It differs in three other key elements: the threshold for nuclear use, nuclear targeting and international law, and the role of conventional and defensive forces.

    What’s New?

    The importance of the new doctrine is less about what it directs the military to do, and more about what it shows U.S. nuclear policy has become. It has changed considerably from the 1995 version. A new chapter has been added on theater nuclear operations, a discussion of the role of conventional and defensive forces, and an expanded discussion on nuclear operations.

    The addition of a chapter on theater nuclear operations reflects the post-Cold War preoccupation of U.S. nuclear planners on finding ways of deterring regional aggressors (i.e., rogue states) armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It also reflects a decade-old rivalry between the regional combatant commanders and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) over who “owns” regional nuclear-strike planning.

    Yet, the new doctrine’s approach grants regional nuclear-strike planning an increasingly expeditionary aura that threatens to make nuclear weapons just another tool in the toolbox. The result is nuclear pre-emption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time, where the objective no longer is deterrence through threatened retaliation but battlefield destruction of targets.

    Another highly visible change is the incorporation of a discussion of the role of conventional weapons and defensive forces into the sections describing the purpose, planning, and employment of nuclear forces. What is most striking is the extent to which conventional and defensive capabilities are woven into the fabric of nuclear planning.

    Reaffirmation of Deterrence

    In the foreword to the 2001 NPR report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the review “puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy.” In Rumsfeld’s testimony to Congress and numerous statements made by other officials, the Bush administration portrayed the NPR as reducing the role of nuclear weapons, lowering the readiness requirement for the nuclear forces, and increasing the role of non-nuclear and missile defense capabilities.

    Yet, the “major change” in the role of nuclear weapons is difficult to find in the new doctrine. Instead, the new nuclear doctrine presents an emphatic defense for nuclear deterrence with sustaining and modernizing nuclear forces maintained on high alert. “To maintain their deterrent effect,” the doctrine states, “U.S. nuclear forces must maintain a strong and visible state of readiness…permitting a swift response to any no-notice nuclear attack against the United States, its forces, or allies.”

    For the authors of the new doctrine, the logic behind such an aggressive posture is simple: military strength automatically strengthens deterrence. Therefore, stronger nuclear capabilities also benefit national security. Indeed, defending the nation against its enemies is best achieved, the new nuclear doctrine declares, through “a defense posture that makes possible war outcomes so uncertain and dangerous, as calculated by potential adversaries, as to remove all incentives for initiating attack under any circumstances.”

    This nuclear dogma is by no means new to deterrence theory, but the new nuclear doctrine fails to explain, even illustrate, why deterrence necessarily requires such an aggressive nuclear posture and cannot be achieved at lower levels without maintaining nuclear forces on high alert. A deterrence posture can also be excessive, with capabilities far beyond what is reasonably needed. Threatening nuclear capabilities may in theory deter potential enemies but may just as well provoke other countries and undercut other vital aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The end result may be decreased security for all.

    Nor does the new nuclear doctrine spell out why the Pentagon ultimately settled on the force that it did. It says that the basis of its decision is a vague and unspecific invention called “capability-based planning” that the Pentagon says “focuses on the means and how adversaries may fight; not a fixed set of enemies or threats.” This hardly seems to be a new development, as U.S. military planning has always focused on how adversaries might fight. Even capability-based planning must identify a set of enemies and threats that is, for all intents and purposes, fixed. Still, the new doctrine repeats the NPR’s decision that a force level of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads is “the lowest possible number” that the United States can maintain while maintaining a credible deterrent. Just how the 1,700-2,200 warhead level was decided remains a mystery.

    The mystery is even greater because the Pentagon claims that the force-sizing is “not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia.” Yet, in 1996 when STRATCOM examined force structure options in preparation for the 1997 Helsinki agreement—when Russia was an immediate contingency—the bottom-line force level was also 2,000 warheads.[2] Keith Payne, who co-chaired the Deterrence Concepts Advisory Group that drafted the NPR and subsequently served as deputy assistant secretary of defense from 2002 to 2003, recently explained:

    In general, the NPR’s recommended force structure and number of deployed nuclear warheads was calculated to support not only the immediate requirements for deterrence, but also to contribute to the additional goals of assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential opponents from choosing the route of arms competition or military challenge, and providing a hedge against the possible emergence of more severe, future military threats or severe technical problems in the arsenal.[3]

    The only item on that list that is new, and only partially so, is “dissuading potential opponents from choosing the route of arms competition or military challenge.” Deterring enemies, assuring allies, and hedging are all elements of U.S. nuclear planning that are as old as the post-Cold War era; the first two are even as old as the nuclear age itself.

    Even so, under the headline “New Thinking for a New Era,” the new nuclear doctrine describes capability-based planning as “a major break from Cold War thinking” that “allows the United States to take the lead in reducing nuclear stockpiles rather than rely on protracted arms control negotiations.” That claim overlooks the first Bush administration’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, both of which took the lead without protracted negotiations well before the current Bush administration presented its “new thinking.” The claim also overlooks that not one of the strategic nuclear reductions announced by the 2001 NPR was conceived by the Bush administration. All, without exception, implemented decisions made in the 1990s.

    Lowering the Bar for Nuclear Use

    So what does the Pentagon mean when it refers to capability-based planning? One indication comes from the claim made in the new nuclear doctrine and by government officials during the past couple of years that a major break has occurred in nuclear planning. A break does seem to have occurred but is not about reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Granted, the number of weapons have been reduced, but the major break is about transforming nuclear plans and capabilities to enable destruction of targets anywhere in the world more efficiently. In that transformation lays a subtle belief that nuclear deterrence will fail sooner or later, and before it does, U.S. nuclear forces and war plans need to be ready and capable of striking, even pre-emptively.

    The signs of this development are evident throughout the new nuclear doctrine in its description of the need for responsive nuclear forces that can “rapidly respond” to threats anywhere. It even defines a new category of nuclear planning, Crisis Action Planning, as “the time-sensitive development of joint operations plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis.” It is different from highly structured Deliberate Planning and flexible Adaptive Planning:

    Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. It is distinct from adaptive planning in that emerging targets are likely to have no preexisting plans that could be adapted. Success in engaging these types of targets depends heavily upon the speed with which they are identified, targeted, and attacked.

    The basis for this drive for speed and responsiveness is the perception of the threat that faces the United States and its allies in the 21st century. It has become almost a mantra in national security discussions and analysis to portray today’s multipolar security environment as more unpredictable and dangerous than even the Soviet threat during the Cold War. The new nuclear doctrine enshrines that hype into nuclear doctrine.

    Although today’s threats from “rogue” states and terrorists are serious indeed, it is healthy to keep in mind, especially when discussing nuclear weapons policy, that they are on a completely different scale than the global nuclear standoff that characterized the Cold War. Then, the human race and life on the planet was held at nuclear gunpoint for four decades, only 30 minutes away from global annihilation. Today’s nuclear strategy often operates on a far different scale: incorporating the far more limited threat from hostile states and even terrorists.

    Yet, the new doctrine ignores this distinction and instead lowers the crisis intensity level needed to potentially trigger use of U.S. nuclear weapons by replacing “war” with “conflict.” The change may seem trivial, but its implication is important and deliberate. The change was proposed by STRATCOM, which explained that “[r]eplacing the word ‘war’ with ‘conflict involving the use of’ emphasizes the nature of most conflicts resulting in use of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear war implies the mutual exchange of nuclear weapons between warring parties—not fully representative of the facts.”

    During the Cold War, a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have involved both countries launching nuclear weapons at each other. Yet, in the post-Cold War era a conflict may involve only one or a few nuclear weapons being used and not necessarily by both warring countries in an exchange. The new doctrine predicts that terrorists and “rogue” states armed with weapons of mass destruction “will likely test U.S. security commitments to its allies and friends.”

    To be sure, some parts of this approach are not new: the 1995 doctrine also considered a role for nuclear weapons against terrorists despite serious questions about the credibility of such a role. Put together, however, the rhetoric in the new doctrine indicates that military planners anticipate that U.S. nuclear weapons might be used in much less intense crises than envisioned previously.

    For example, the new nuclear doctrine states that an adversary might detonate a nuclear weapon high in the atmosphere to damage U.S. military electronic equipment with a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. Whatever the adversary use might be, the new nuclear doctrine makes it clear that the United States will not necessarily wait for the attack but pre-empt with nuclear weapons if necessary. It identifies four conditions where pre-emptive use might occur:

    • An adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations.

    • Imminent attack from an adversary’s biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy.

    • Attacks on adversary installations including weapons of mass destruction; deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons; or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies.

    • Demonstration of U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary WMD use.

    The previous doctrine from 1995 did not describe specific scenarios where the United States might use nuclear weapons pre-emptively, but the new doctrine enshrines the Bush administration’s pre-emption policy into official U.S. nuclear doctrine. It acknowledges that “the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation” but adds that “no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.” In other words, the Pentagon seems to conclude the United States is legally free to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively if it chooses.

    The End of “Nonstrategic”

    The pre-emptive nuclear options are included in the chapter on theater nuclear operations, which traditionally have been associated with nonstrategic nuclear weapons (those with shorter range). The 1995 doctrine described the theater (local or regional) mission with nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a means of controlling escalation by linking conventional forces to the full nuclear retaliatory capability of the United States. By contrast, strategic weapons historically have included weapons of intercontinental range.

    The separation has always been somewhat blurred, but the new nuclear doctrine does away with a separate theater role for nonstrategic nuclear forces. Instead, it assigns all nuclear weapons, whether strategic or nonstrategic, support roles in theater nuclear operations. The theater mission will be further detailed in “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning” (Joint Pub 3-12.1), a secret subdoctrine scheduled for publication by the Pentagon sometime after the release of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.

    Military officials have argued for years that there are no nonstrategic nuclear weapons; all nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era should be seen as strategic because all nuclear use is strategic in nature. Yet, the language in the new doctrine and the elimination of a specific regional role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons hint of a deeper shift: strategic nuclear weapons have increasing regional (theater) roles as nonstrategic nuclear weapons are reduced and guidance and doctrine demand new missions against the capabilities of rogue states and nonstate actors.

    The increasing incorporation of strategic weapons from the global-intensity level into smaller regional conflicts means that the operational distinction between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is being blurred. In a regional deterrence scenario against an adversary armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, all nuclear weapons can be battlefield weapons or strategic weapons, depending on the circumstances. The U.S. pre-emption or retaliation could utilize a B61 nuclear bomb deployed in Turkey or a strategic warhead launched from a Trident submarine patroling near Japan.

    This doctrinal shift has already progressed to the point that STRATCOM has drawn up and implemented a new global strike plan for the use of nuclear and conventional forces in regional scenarios. The new strike plan, called Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 8022, was first put into effect in late 2003, less than a year after the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 17, its strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. CONPLAN 8022 makes operational the Bush administration’s pre-emption policy and the new nuclear doctrine codifies it.

    The Role of Conventional Weapons

    Another new element of the nuclear doctrine is the role of advanced conventional weapons in strategic planning. This was one of the central pillars of the 2001 NPR, and the new doctrine states that “targets that may have required a nuclear weapon to achieve the needed effects in previous planning may be targeted with conventional weapons.” The doctrine describes how “integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide U.S. leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies.”

    Yet, in the same breath the document cautions that “some contingencies will remain where the most appropriate response may include the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.” The objective is still assured destruction of facilities, and it seems clear that the conventional capabilities need to evolve considerably before conventional weapons will be capable of significantly replacing nuclear weapons in the war plans. Indeed, in an acknowledgement that “there are few programs to convert the NPR vision to reality,” the Pentagon in April established a task force aimed in part at better integrating the new triad of nuclear, conventional, and defensive capabilities. Four and a half years after the Bush administration announced its “major change” to strategic targeting, the incorporation of conventional weapons still appears marginal at best.

    Part of the impediment appears to be the challenge of incorporating sufficient accuracy into the two ballistic missile legs of the nuclear triad. The explosive power of conventional weapons also is inherently inferior to the yield of even the smallest nuclear warheads in the stockpile. “It’s more than just precision,” STRATCOM Commander General James Cartwright told Inside the Pentagon in April 2005. “I can’t generate enough [conventional explosive] energy for some of these targets to destroy them. So I’m not leading you down a path that I can get rid of nuclear weapons.”

    Also, there is the issue of command and control for conventional strategic forces. The line of command for nuclear strikes has evolved over many decades, but how will it work when a non-nuclear weapon is used in a strategic strike against an adversary’s nuclear weapons facility? The Air Force, which maintains nuclear ICBMs and bombers, pointed out during the editing of the new nuclear doctrine that, although the president and secretary of defense are required to approve all nuclear targeting, they do not necessarily approve conventional targeting.[4] Presumably, the Bush administration will want to close that hole to ensure 100 percent control of strategic strikes and ensure that other nuclear powers do not misinterpret the intention.

    Finally, but equally important, merging nuclear and conventional warheads on ballistic missiles or on strategic platforms has serious implications for crisis stability. A nuclear-weapon state being attacked by a conventionally armed ballistic missile early in a conflict may conclude that it is under nuclear attack and launch its own nuclear weapons. Merging nuclear and conventional capabilities seems to be a recipe for disaster.

    Missile Defenses

    The second pillar of the 2001 NPR was the role of active defenses in strategic planning, and the new doctrine incorporates the new mission. The previous doctrine from 1995 also described the contribution of missile defense, but this issue is expanded in the new doctrine. Instead of describing how missile defenses can be used to protect people from missile strikes, however, the new doctrine appears to focus on how missile defenses can enhance the survivability of nuclear forces and increase offensive capabilities.

    Focusing on protecting nuclear forces rather than people might not seem so cynical if not for the Bush administration’s emphasis on protecting people in its justification for withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and securing congressional funding for the multibillion-dollar missile defense program. In December 2001, when preparing to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, President George W. Bush stated:

    I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks…. Defending the American people is my highest priority as commander in chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.[5]

    In stark contrast with the president’s priority, the new doctrine describes missile defense as a tool to protect military forces. The doctrine only mentions defense of the population three times and always in a secondary role, after protection of military forces.

    Moreover, the doctrine states that one objective of protecting military forces is to enhance U.S. offensive nuclear strike capabilities. STRATCOM planning seeks to integrate U.S. and allied offensive and defensive forces, the doctrine explains, “in order to exploit the full range of characteristics offered by U.S. strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives.”

    In an operational scenario, limited or insufficient missile defense capabilities could force U.S. decision-makers into a corner where they would have to choose between saving Los Angeles or Vandenberg Air Force Base.

    Nuclear Targeting and International Law

    The new nuclear doctrine’s deepening of the commitment to regional targeting beyond nuclear facilities, and lowering the bar for when nuclear weapons could be used—even pre-emptively—raise important questions about nuclear targeting and international law. During the editing process of the new nuclear doctrine, a debate was triggered among the different commands over which term to use for different types of targeting. Of particular concern was the legal status of countervalue targeting, a targeting methodology that was included in the 1995 nuclear doctrine:

    Countervalue targeting strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected enemy military and military-related activities, such as industries, resources, and/or institutions that contribute to the enemy’s ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy need not be as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because countervalue targets generally tend to be softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.[6]

    During the editing of the new doctrine, STRATCOM declared that it had decided that “countervalue targeting violates” the Law of Armed Conflict. The command therefore suggested changing “countervalue” to “critical infrastructure targeting.” In explaining its decision, STRATCOM stated:

    Many operational law attorneys do not believe “countervalue” targeting is a lawful justification for employment of force, much less nuclear force. Countervalue philosophy makes no distinction between purely civilian activities and military related activities and could be used to justify deliberate attacks on civilians and non-military portions of a nation’s economy. It therefore cannot meet the “military necessity” prong of the Law of Armed Conflict. Countervalue targeting also undermines one of the values that underlies Law of Armed Conflict—the reduction of civilian suffering and to foster the ability to maintain the peace after the conflict ends. For example, under the countervalue target philosophy, the attack on the World Trade Center Towers on 9/11 could be justified.[7]

    Other military commands did not agree with the name change. The argument from European Command was that countervalue should not be changed to critical infrastructure because countervalue has an institutionalized and broadly understood meaning in the academic literature on nuclear warfare and in international security studies in general. “If in doubt on this point,” European Command argued, “insert the word ‘countervalue’ in any electronic search engine and note how many ‘hits’ appear that are directly relevant to nuclear policy.”[8]

    In the end, the commands could not agree and the term “critical infrastructure targeting” was withdrawn to end the discussion. Yet, the term “countervalue” also disappeared and is no longer included in the new nuclear doctrine. The issue was dropped, although targeting appears to continue, and simply changing the terminology obviously does not change the illegal targeting itself.

    To be fair, the new nuclear doctrine emphasizes U.S. abhorrence of unrestricted warfare and U.S. adherence to laws of war. Yet, if the intention of mentioning international law is that it matters, then the doctrine notably ignores that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 ruling on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons could not reach agreement (it was a split vote) that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is lawful, even in an extreme circumstance of self-defense where the very survival of a state is at stake. The ICJ did agree unanimously that international law does not authorize even the threat of use of nuclear weapons.[9] These important nuances are ignored by the new doctrine.

    Conclusion

    Although there has been extensive public debate on whether to build new or modified nuclear weapons, there has been essentially no debate about the doctrine that guides the use of nuclear weapons and influences future requirements. This is ironic given the considerable interest in the Bush administration’s policy on pre-emption. As a result, the rewriting of the nuclear doctrine has occurred with essentially no public debate.

    Still, the doctrine and editing documents reveal a significant contradiction between the Bush administration’s public rhetoric about reducing the role of nuclear weapons and the guidance issued to the nuclear planners. Although the overall number of warheads is being reduced, the new doctrine guiding planning for the remaining arsenal reaffirms an aggressive posture with nuclear forces on high alert, ready to be used in an increasing number of limited-strike scenarios against adversaries anywhere, even pre-emptively. The new doctrine appears to be precipitated by anticipation among military planners that deterrence will fail and U.S. nuclear weapons will be used in a conflict sooner or later.

    For the nuclear planners, it seems so simple: deterrence must be credible, and the way to make it more credible is to increase the capabilities and number of strike options against any conceivable scenario. Ironically, a decade and a half after we should have escaped this nuclear deterrence logic of the Cold War, the planners cling to these old business practices. Instead of drastically reducing the role of nuclear weapons, as the Bush administration told the public it would do, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism seem to have spooked the administration into continuing and deepening a commitment to some of the most troubling aspects of the nuclear war-fighting mentality that symbolized the Cold War.

    US Nuclear Weapons Guidance, War Plans

    The updated Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations reflects how combatant commanders have translated the administration’s attempts to reshape U.S. nuclear policy into operational guidance for military forces. It comes nearly five years after the completion of the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in December 2001 and represents the first revision of basic nuclear doctrine in a decade. The list below describes some of the major milestones that led to the new doctrine and their significance. [1]

    2001

    May: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publishes the Strategic Defense Review. This document, among other things, sets “requirements for the number and types of weapons in the stockpile.”

    December 31: Rumsfeld forwards the NPR report to Congress.

    2002

    June: The White House issues National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 14, “Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance.”

    September 14: The White House issues NSPD 17, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The document states that “[t]he United States will make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including potentially nuclear weapons—to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”

    September 17: The White House issues the “National Security Strategy of the United States.” The document provides the first official public articulation of a strategy of pre-emptive action against hostile states and terrorist groups developing weapons of mass destruction.

    October 1: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a new nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 2002, which translates White House guidance into specific military plans.

    December 10: The White House releases “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” the unclassified version of NSPD 17. The wording in NSPD 17 of using “potentially nuclear weapons” is replaced with “all of our options.”

    December 16: The White House issues NSPD 23, “National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense,” which orders withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and construction of a national ballistic missile defense system.

    2003:

    January 10: Bush signs Change 2 to the Unified Command Plan, which, in addition to maintaining nuclear strike plans, assigns four additional missions to U.S. Strategic Command: missile defense planning, global strike planning, information operations, and global C4ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).

    March: Rumsfeld issues to Congress “Nuclear Posture Review: Implementation Plan, Department of Defense Implementation of the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Report.” The document formally implements the decisions of the 2001 NPR.

    2004

    March 13: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues the “National Military Strategy of the United States,” including the classified Annex B (Nuclear). The document translates the National Security Strategy into specific guidance for military planners.

    April 19: Rumsfeld issues the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. The document states in part that “ U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world.”

    May: The White House issues NSPD 34, “Fiscal Year 2004-2012 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan,” which “directs a force structure through 2012” and cuts the total stockpile “almost in half.”

    May: The White House issues NSPD 35, “Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization,” which authorizes the military to continue deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

    December 31: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a new nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 2005, codifying new global strike and theater nuclear operations guidance and implementing the 2004 Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy.

    2005

    January: In a letter to U.S. Strategic Command, Rumsfeld tasks the command with spearheading the Defense Department’s efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

    January 10: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1, for conducting global strike operations during the “seize the initiative” phase of a conflict (“seconds to days”). Targets include WMD production, storage, and delivery capabilities, critical command and control facilities, anti-access capabilities (radars, surface-to-air missile sites, theater ballistic missile sites), and adversary leadership.

    Fall 2005: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to publish Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.

    ENDNOTES

    1. A chronology of nuclear weapons guidance issued by the Bush administration is available at http://www.nukestrat.com.

    Hans M. Kristensen is co-author of the World Nuclear Forces appendix to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Yearbook and a consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council.

    ENDNOTES

    1. The draft doctrine might be slightly different from the final doctrine, although at this late stage any changes are expected to be cosmetic. Copies of the new doctrine, previous versions, and editing comments are available at http://www.nukestrat.com.

    2. See U.S. Strategic Command, “Post-START II Arms Control,” 1996 (partially declassified).

    3. Keith B. Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 147.

    4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), “JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” December 16, 2004, p. 59.

    5. The White House, “Remarks by the President on Missile Defense,” December 13, 2001.

    6. CJCS, “JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” December 15, 1995, p. II-5.

    7. CJCS, “JP 3-12, Joint Staff Input to JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Second Draft),” April 28, 2003, pp. 34-35.

    8. CJCS, “JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” December 16, 2004, pp. 67-69.

    9. International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” July 8, 1996, items A and E (advisory opinion).

  • The Political Rehabilitation of Joseph Rotblat

    By the time of his death, which occurred on August 31, 2005, Joseph Roblat was a revered figure. A top nuclear physicist, Rotblat received—among many other honors and awards–a British knighthood and, together with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (an organization that he had helped to found), the Nobel Peace Prize (1995). As the president of the Pugwash conferences recalled: “Joseph Rotblat was a towering figure in the search for peace in the world, who dedicated his life to trying to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and ultimately to rid the world of war itself.”

    But Rotblat’s steadfast support for nuclear disarmament and peace did not always receive such plaudits, as I discovered when I conducted two interviews with him and did extensive research in formerly secret British government records.

    Born in Warsaw in 1908, Rotblat moved to Britain in 1939, where he became a promising young physicist. During World War II, when he feared that Nazi Germany might develop the atomic bomb, he came to the United States to work on the Manhattan Project, America’s own atomic bomb program that he—like many other scientists—hoped would deter Germany’s launching of a nuclear war. But, in late 1944, when Rotblat learned that the German bomb program had been a failure, he resigned from the Manhattan project and returned to London to engage in nonmilitary work. This decision, taken for humanitarian reasons, plunged him into hot water with the authorities. Shortly after telling his U.S. supervisor of his plan to leave Los Alamos, he was accused by U.S. intelligence of being a Soviet spy. The charge, totally without merit, was eventually dropped.

    Back in Britain, Rotblat engaged in peaceful research and, in the postwar years, helped to organize the Atomic Scientists’ Association (ASA), which drew together some of that country’s top scientists. Much like America’s Federation of American Scientists, the ASA promoted nuclear arms control and disarmament. However, British government officials, then more interested in building nuclear weapons than in eliminating them, looked askance at its activities. In 1947-48, when the ASA organized an Atomic Train to bring the dangers of nuclear weapons (and the supposed benefits of peaceful nuclear power) to the attention of the British public, Prime Minister Clement Attlee objected strongly to plans for government cooperation with it. In March 1948, when Rotblat invited Attlee to visit the Atomic Train during its stay in London, the foreign secretary and the defense minister advised the prime minister to reject the offer, which he did.

    Rotblat’s relations with the British government continued on a difficult course in the 1950s. Working closely with the philosopher Bertrand Russell, Rotblat signed the Russell-Einstein Manifesto of July 9, 1955, which warned nations that if they persisted in their plans for nuclear war, civilization would be utterly destroyed. This venture, in turn, led to the Pugwash conferences—so named because they began in 1957 at a private estate in Pugwash, Nova Scotia. Designed to bring together scientists on both sides of the “iron curtain” for serious, non-polemical discussions of the nuclear menace, these conferences were low-key operations, with little publicity outside of scientific circles. Nevertheless, British officials were deeply suspicious of the Pugwash conferences and of Rotblat, who did most of the organizational work for them and, in 1959, became Pugwash secretary-general.

    Convinced that “the Communists” wanted to use the 1958 Pugwash conference “to secure support for the Soviet demand for the banning of nuclear weapons,” the British Foreign Office initially sought to promote an attitude of skepticism toward it. But, when Rotblat asked J.D. Cockcroft, a member of Britain’s Atomic Energy Authority, to suggest who might be invited to it, Cockcroft and the Foreign Office decided that a better strategy would be to go with the flow and arrange for the participation of a staunch proponent of the British government’s position in the meeting, which they did.

    Although one British diplomat noted that the conference “passed off quietly enough, and not too unsuccessfully from our point of view,” the British government remained on guard. Learning of plans for another Pugwash conference, in Vienna, the Foreign Office warned of the possibility “that this will be more dangerous from our point of view than its predecessors.” Communist participants might launch “a major propaganda drive against nuclear weapons,” and “the organizing committee consists of Lord Russell and Professor Rotblat.” From the British government’s standpoint, the Pugwash conferences were little better than “Communist front gatherings.”

    But British policy gradually began to shift, as the government grew more interested in nuclear arms controls. Asked by Rotblat if he would like to join the advisory body of the British Pugwash committee, Cockcroft referred the matter to the Foreign Office, which responded that he should do so, as it would help prevent Pugwash from “being exploited for propaganda purposes.” Although the Foreign Office did not think he should attend the next Pugwash conference, in Moscow, during 1960, it reversed course that summer and urged him to recruit additional politically reliable scientists to attend. Indeed, it now sought to take over the Pugwash movement for its own purposes. In response to a suggestion by Cockcroft, a Foreign Office official opined that “it would be most helpful if the Royal Society could be persuaded to sponsor British participation . . . and if this were to lead to the winding up of the present Pugwash Committee.”

    But the plans for a takeover failed. When the British government suggested topics for Pugwash meetings and more government officials who should be invited to them, Rotblat resisted, much to government dismay. In October 1963, a Foreign Office official complained that “the difficulty is to get Prof. Rotblat to pay any attention to what we think. . . . He is no doubt jealous of his independence and scientific integrity.” Securing “a new organizer for the British delegation seems to be the first need, but I do not know if there is any hope of this.”

    Nonetheless, despite lingering resentment at Rotblat’s independence and integrity, the British government had arrived at a positive appraisal of the Pugwash conferences. As a British defense ministry official declared in January 1962: Pugwash was “now a very respectable organization.” When the Home Office, clinging to past policy, advised that Pugwash was “a dirty word,” the Foreign Office retorted that the movement now enjoyed “official blessing.” Explaining the turnabout, a Foreign Office official stated that “the process of educating” Soviet experts is “bound to be of some use to us.” Furthermore, “we ourselves may pick up some useful ideas from our own scientists . . . and are not likely to be embarrassed by anything which they suggest.” Finally, “if there is ever to be a breakthrough, it is not inconceivable that the way might be prepared by a conference of this kind.”

    In fact, there soon was a breakthrough: the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963—a nuclear arms control measure that the Pugwash conferences played a key part in generating. The British government had no doubt about the connection, and in 1964 it honored Rotblat with a CBE—Commander of the British Empire—for his organization of the Pugwash conferences.

    And so it goes. Today’s dangerously peace-minded heretic is tomorrow’s hero. Abraham Lincoln—that staunch critic of the Mexican War—became America’s best-loved President. Robert LaFollette—reviled and burned in effigy for his opposition to World War I—emerged as one of this nation’s most respected senators. Martin Luther King, Jr.—condemned for his protests against the Vietnam War—is now honored as this country’s great peacemaker.

    Perhaps today, when governments promise us endless military buildups and wars, opposition politicians should take note of this phenomenon.

    Lawrence S. Wittner, a Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Associate, is Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany. His latest book is Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford University Press). He is a member of POTUS, HNN’s presidential history/politics blog.

  • A Responsible US Nuclear Weapons Policy

    It is good to be back at All Saints. This church represents what a Peace Church should be. I appreciate that Reverend Bacon has gone to Camp Casey in Crawford, Texas in support of Cindy Sheehan and in opposition to the illegal war in Iraq.

    We are still in the season of Hiroshima. Sixty years ago that city was devastated by a single US nuclear weapon, and three days later the city of Nagasaki was devastated by another US nuclear weapon.

    What most Americans don’t know is that in between those two bombings, which took place on August 6th and 9th, 1945, the US and the other Allied powers in World War II agreed to hold the Nuremberg Tribunals at which they held the Axis leaders to account for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Between these two great crimes of slaughtering civilian populations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we agreed to the Nuremberg Tribunals. The most basic principle of these Tribunals is that no one stands above international law, no matter how high his or her position – not presidents, not prime ministers, no one.

    We Americans have a lot of ambiguity about nuclear weapons. We somehow think that they protect us, but they don’t. They make us more vulnerable. So long as the US continues to rely upon nuclear weapons for security, other countries will do so as well, and new countries will find it in their national interests to follow our example. If the most powerful country in the world demonstrates by its policies that it needs nuclear weapons, other countries will choose this route as well.

    The greatest threat, though, lies with terrorists. If they get their hands on a nuclear weapon – a possibility made more likely by our policies of retaining large numbers of these weapons – they will not hesitate to use them against us. Extremist groups cannot be deterred by nuclear threats. You cannot deter those you cannot locate and you cannot deter those who are suicidal. Deterrence has major flaws, and it has zero value against extremist groups.

    The US has not fulfilled its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Back in 1968, we promised good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. Those negotiations have yet to take place. We still have some 10,000 nuclear weapons in our arsenal. We and the Russians still have some 2,000 nuclear weapons each on hair trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments. It is 15 years since the end of the Cold War. Our continued reliance on nuclear weapons is insane. It looks like the reflection of a “death wish” for the planet.

    In the year 2000, the US, along with all other parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, agreed to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. This would be a great step forward, except for the fact that the US has fulfilled none of these, and is now the major obstacle to nearly all of them. The Bush administration does not like to even see mention of nuclear disarmament in international documents. They held up agreement on the agenda for the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference for some ten days because they did not want to see reference to these 13 Practical Steps, nor of any of the components, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and the promise of an unequivocal undertaking to achieve total nuclear disarmament – all points to which the US had previously agreed.

    A Responsible US Nuclear Weapons Policy

    It’s long past time for a responsible US nuclear weapons policy, not only to fulfill our legal obligations and to uphold reasonable moral standards, but also to enhance the security of the US and the world. I would suggest that, at a minimum, a responsible US nuclear policy would include the following Ten No’s and a Yes.

    Ten No’s

    1. No new nuclear weapons
    2. No research and development of new nuclear weapons.
    3. No new plutonium pit production.
    4. No resumption of nuclear testing.
    5. No use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.
    6. No first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances.
    7. No maintaining nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.
    8. No strategy of launch on warning.
    9. No nuclear weapons on foreign soil.
    10. No double standards.

    And a Yes

    Provide affirmative leadership to achieve existing obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament set forth at the treaty’s 2000 Review Conference. Above all, initiate good faith negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, as called for in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control within a reasonable period of time.

    This does not mean unilateral disarmament. It means multilateral disarmament for all states with US leadership. It would constitute a major change of direction in US policy.

    Who Are We?

    I’ve thought a lot about the relationship of the war in Iraq to US nuclear weapons policies. I think what they have in common are these points: arrogance, double standards, disrespect for international law (and therefore the international community), and unilateralism. These characteristics are undermining what is decent and just about us. They are destroying us, and they have the potential to destroy the world.

    We need to ask ourselves the question: Who are we? Have we become people of the bomb? Is the bomb more important to us than our humanity? The Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955, emphasized: “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.” We need to return to our roots and regain our souls. The starting point is remembering our humanity.

    Take Action

    We can’t just recognize the problems intellectually. We must do something about them. We must all become part of the force for change. We can’t just sit back while illegal and immoral actions are committed in our names. We need to take heart and take action. We need to become involved and do our part.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has some resources that may be helpful at our www.wagingpeace.org website.

    First, you can sign up there for our free monthly e-newsletter, The Sunflower. It will keep you up-to-date on nuclear issues and provide action alerts.

    Second, at the website you can become involved in our Turn the Tide Campaign, and send letters to your elected representatives on key nuclear issues.

    Third, we have an excellent Speakers’ Bureau that can help you get the word out.

    Above all, use your creativity and your special talents to help others “remember their humanity” and take part in turning around US nuclear policy.

    Choose Hope

    There are times when the world looks pretty bleak, but we can take heart from all the great peace leaders who have preceded us. Here is my list of Fifty-One Reasons for Hope. I’m sure you can add to it, and I hope that you will.

    1. Each new dawn.

    2. The miracle of birth.

    3. Our capacity to love.

    4. The courage of nonviolence.

    5. Gandhi, King and Mandela.

    6. The night sky.

    7. Spring.

    8. Flowers and bees.

    9. The arc of justice.

    10. Whistleblowers.

    11. Butterflies.

    12. The full moon.

    13. Teachers.

    14. Simple wisdom.

    15. Dogs and cats.

    16. Friendship.

    17. Our ability to reflect.

    18. Our capacity for joy.

    19. The Dalai Lama, Desmond Tutu and Oscar Romero.

    20. The gift of conscience.

    21. Human rights and responsibilities.

    22. Our capacity to nurture.

    23. The ascendancy of women.

    24. Innocence.

    25. Our capacity to change.

    26. Mozart, Beethoven and Chopin.

    27. The internet.

    28. War resisters.

    29. Everyday heroes.

    30. Lions, tigers, bears, elephants and giraffes.

    31. Conscientious objectors.

    32. Tolstoy, Twain and Vonnegut.

    33. Wilderness.

    34. Our water planet.

    35. Solar energy.

    36. Picasso, Matisse and Miro.

    37. World citizens.

    38. Life.

    39. The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    40. The King of Hearts.

    41. Rain.

    42. Sunshine.

    43. Pablo Neruda.

    44. Grandchildren.

    45. Mountains.

    46. Sunflowers.

    47. The Principles of Nuremberg.

    48. A child’s smile.

    49. Dolphins.

    50. Wildflowers.

    51. Our ability to choose hope.

    It is our ability to choose hope, even in dark times, that can keep us going. I urge you to never stop fighting for a more decent world. We will not attain peace by making war, and we will not end the nuclear weapons threat to humanity by continuing to rely upon these most destructive and cowardly of all weapons for our security.

    Nothing will change if we are complacent and accept the status quo. We need to rise to our full stature as human beings, and exert our full human powers to change the world and create a more decent future for ourselves and for those who follow us on this miraculous life-supporting planet.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the author of a recent book of anti-war poetry, Today Is Not a Good Day for War.