Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear weapons

  • Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons

    Section 1: 99.9% Safe Maneuvers

    Let’s face it, nuclear weapons are the elephant in the room that no one likes to talk about. So let’s approach the issue from the less threatening perspective of the awesome picture below.

    Figure 1

    Figure 1: A glider executing a high speed low pass.

    The glider looks like it’s suspended above the runway, but in reality it’s screaming toward the photographer at 150 mph in a maneuver known as a high speed low pass. The pilot starts about 2000 feet high and a mile from the runway. He then dives to convert altitude into speed and skims the runway. Next, he does a steep climb to reconvert some of that speed into altitude so he can turn and land.

    Given that the glider has no engine, you might wonder how the pilot can be sure he’ll gain enough altitude in the climb to safely turn and land. The laws of physics tell us exactly how altitude is traded for speed and vice versa. While there is a loss due to the air resistance of the glider, that is a known quantity which the pilot takes it into account by starting from a higher altitude than needed for the landing phase.

    But it’s important to read the fine print in that guarantee provided by the laws of physics. It only applies if the air is stationary. If there’s a slight wind the difference is negligible, but if the air movement is unusually strong all bets are off – which is what happened to a friend of mine who had safely executed the maneuver many times before. But this time he hit an unusually strong, continuous downdraft. The laws of physics still applied, but the model of stationary air was no longer applicable and he had no way of knowing his predicament until he approached the runway with much less speed than needed for a safe landing. He managed to land without damage to himself or his glider, but was so shaken that he no longer does that maneuver.

    While most experienced glider pilots sometimes do low passes (and some race finishes require them), I’ve opted not to because I regard them as a 99.9% safe maneuver – which is not as safe as it sounds. A 99.9% safe maneuver is one you can execute safely 999 times out of a thousand, but one time in a thousand it can kill you.

    Even though they are clearly equivalent, one chance in a thousand of dying sounds a lot riskier than 99.9% safe. The perspective gets worse when it’s recognized that the fatality rate is one in a thousand per execution of the maneuver. If a pilot does a 99.9% safe maneuver 100 times, he stands roughly a 10% chance of being killed. Worse, the fear that he feels the first few times dissipates as he gains confidence in his skill. But that confidence is really complacency, which pilots know is our worst enemy.

    A similar situation exists with nuclear weapons. Many people point to the absence of global war since the dawn of the nuclear era as proof that these weapons ensure peace. The MX missile was even christened the Peacekeeper. Just as the laws of physics are used to ensure that a pilot executing a low pass will gain enough altitude to make a safe landing, a law of nuclear deterrence is invoked to quiet any concern over possibly killing billions of innocent people: Since World War III would mean the end of civilization, no one would dare start it. Each side is deterred from attacking the other by the prospect of certain destruction. That’s why our current strategy is called nuclear deterrence or mutually assured destruction (MAD).

    But again, it’s important to read the fine print. It is true that no one in his right mind would start a nuclear war, but when people are highly stressed they often behave irrationally and even seemingly rational decisions can lead to places that no one wants to visit. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted to teeter on the edge of the nuclear abyss during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but that is exactly what they did. Less well known nuclear near misses occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and NATO’s Able Archer exercise of 1983. In each of those episodes, the law of unintended consequences combined with the danger of irrational decision making under stress created an extremely hazardous situation.

    Because the last date for a nuclear near miss listed above was 1983, it might be hoped that the end of the Cold War removed the nuclear sword hanging over humanity’s head. Aside from the fact that other potential crises such as Taiwan were unaffected, a closer look shows that the Cold War, rather than ending, merely went into hibernation. In the West, the reawakening of this specter is usually attributed to resurgent Russian nationalism, but as in most disagreements the other side sees things very differently.

    The Russian perspective sees the United States behaving irresponsibly in recognizing Kosovo, in putting missiles (albeit defensive ones) in Eastern Europe, and in expanding NATO right up to the Russian border. For our current purposes, the last of these concerns is the most relevant because it involves reading the fine print – in this case, Article 5 of the NATO charter which states that an attack on any NATO member shall be regarded as an attack on them all. It is partly for that reason that a number of former Soviet republics and client states have been brought into NATO and that President Bush is pressing for Georgia and the Ukraine to be admitted. Once these nations are in NATO, the thinking goes, Russia would not dare try to subjugate them again since that would invite nuclear devastation by the United States, which would be treaty bound to come to the victim’s aid.

    But, just as the laws of physics depended on a model that was not always applicable during a glider’s low pass, the law of deterrence which seems to guarantee peace and stability is model-dependent. In the simplified model, an attack by Russia would be unprovoked. But what if Russia should feel provoked into an attack and a different perspective caused the West to see the attack as unprovoked?

    Just such a situation sparked the First World War. The assassination of Austria’s Archduke Ferdinand by a Serbian nationalist led Austria to demand that it be allowed to enter Serbian territory to deal with terrorist organizations. This demand was not unreasonable since interrogation of the captured assassins had shown complicity by the Serbian military and it was later determined that the head of Serbian military intelligence was a leader of the secret Black Hand terrorist society. Serbia saw things differently and rejected the demand. War between Austria and Serbia resulted, and alliance obligations similar to NATO’s Article 5 then produced a global conflict.

    When this article was first written in May 2008, little noticed coverage of a dispute between Russia and Georgia [Champion 2008] reported that “Both sides warned they were coming close to war.” As it is being revised, in August 2008, the conflict has escalated to front page news of a low-intensity, undeclared war. If President Bush is successful in his efforts to bring Georgia into NATO, and especially if the conflict should escalate further, we would face the unpleasant choice of reneging on our treaty obligations or threatening actions which risk the destruction of civilization. A similar risk exists between Russia and Estonia, which is already a NATO member.

    Returning temporarily to soaring, although I will not do low passes, I do not judge my fellow glider pilots who choose to do them. Rather, I encourage them to be keenly aware of the risk. The pilot in the photo has over 16,000 flight hours, has been doing low passes at air shows for over 30 years, will not do them in turbulent conditions, ensures that he has radio contact with a trusted spotter on the ground who is watching for traffic, and usually does them downwind so that he only has to do a “tear drop” turn to land. The fact that such an experienced pilot exercises that much caution says something about the risk of the maneuver. The danger isn’t so much in doing low passes as in becoming complacent if we’ve done them 100 times without incident.

    In the same way, I am not arguing against admitting Georgia to NATO or suggesting that Estonia should be kicked out. Rather, I encourage us to be keenly aware of the risk. If we do that, there is a much greater chance that we will find ways to lessen the true sources of the risk, including patching the rapidly fraying fabric of Russian-American relations. The danger isn’t so much in admitting former Soviet republics into NATO as in becoming complacent with our ability to militarily deter Russia from taking actions we do not favor.

    Section 2: Substates

    Part of society’s difficulty in envisioning the threat of nuclear war can be understood by considering Figure 2 below:

    Figure 2
    Figure 2. An overly simplified model

    The circle on the left represents the current state of the world, while the one on the right represents the world after a full-scale nuclear war. Because World War III is a state of no return, there is no path back to our current state. Even though an arrow is shown to indicate the possibility of a transition from our current state to one of global war, that path seems impossible to most people. How could we possibly transit from the current, relatively peaceful state of the world to World War III? The answer lies in recognizing that what is depicted as a single, current state of the world is much more complex. Because that single state encompasses all conditions short of World War III, as depicted below, it is really composed of a number of substates – world situations short of World War III, with varying degrees of risk:

    Figure 3
    Figure 3. A more accurate model

    Society is partly correct in thinking that a transition from our current state to full-scale war is impossible because, most of the time, we occupy one of the substates far removed from World War III and which has little or no chance of transiting to that state of no return. But it is possible to move from our current substate to one slightly closer to the brink, and then to another closer yet. As described below, just such a sequence of steps led to the Cuban Missile Crisis and could lead to a modern day crisis of similar magnitude involving Estonia, Georgia, or other some other hot spot where we are ignoring the warning signs.

    The Cuban Missile Crisis surprised President Kennedy, his advisors, and most Americans because we viewed events from an American perspective and thereby missed warning signs visible from the Russian perspective. Fortunately, that view has been recorded by Fyodr Burlatsky, one of Khrushchev’s speechwriters and close advisors, as well as a man who was in the forefront of the Soviet reform movement. While all perspectives are limited, Burlatsky’s deserves our attention as a valuable window into a world we need to better understand:

    In my view the Berlin crisis [of 1961] was an overture to the Cuban Missile Crisis and in a way prompted Khrushchev to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba. … In his eyes [America insisting on getting its way on certain issues] was not only an example of Americans’ traditional strongarm policy, but also an underestimation of Soviet might. … Khrushchev was infuriated by the Americans’ … continuing to behave as if the Soviet Union was still trailing far behind. … They failed to realize that the Soviet Union had accumulated huge stocks [of nuclear weapons] for a devastating retaliatory strike and that the whole concept of American superiority had largely lost its meaning. … Khrushchev thought that some powerful demonstration of Soviet might was needed. … Berlin was the first trial of strength, but it failed to produce the desired result, [showing America that the Soviet Union was its equal] . [Burlatsky 1991, page 164]

    [In 1959 Fidel Castro came to power and the U.S.] was hostile towards the Cuban revolutionaries’ victory from the very start. … At that time Castro was neither a Communist nor a Marxist. It was the Americans themselves who pushed him in the direction of the Soviet Union. He needed economic and political support and help with weapons, and he found all three in Moscow. [Burlatsky 1991, page 169]

    In April 1961 the Americans supported a raid by Cuban emigrees … The Bay of Pigs defeat strained anti-Cuban feelings in America to the limit. Calls were made in Congress and in the press for a direct invasion of Cuba. … In August 1962 an agreement was signed [with Moscow] on arms deliveries to Cuba. Cuba was preparing for self-defense in the event of a new invasion. [Burlatsky 1991, page 170]

    The idea of deploying the missiles came from Khrushchev himself. … Khrushchev and [Soviet Defense Minister] R. Malinovsky … were strolling along the Black Sea coast. Malinovsky pointed out to sea and said that on the other shore in Turkey there was an American nuclear missile base [which had been recently deployed]. In a matter of six or seven minutes missiles launched from that base could devastate major centres in the Ukraine and southern Russia. … Khrushchev asked Malinovsky why the Soviet Union should not have the right to do the same as America. Why, for example, should it not deploy missiles in Cuba? [Burlatsky 1991, page 171]

    In spite of the similarity between the Cuban and Turkish missiles, Khrushchev realized that America would find this deployment unacceptable and therefore did so secretly, disguising the missiles and expecting to confront the U.S. with a fait accompli. Once the missiles were operational, America could not attack them or Cuba without inviting a horrific nuclear retaliation. (The Turkish missiles had a similar purpose from an American point of view.) However, Khrushchev did not adequately envision what might happen if, as did occur, he was caught in the act.

    With respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the substates of Figure 3 which brought us to the brink of nuclear war can now be identified as:

    • conflict between America and Castro’s Cuba;
    • Russia demanding to be treated as a military equal and being denied this status;
    • the Berlin Crisis;
    • the Bay of Pigs invasion;
    • the American deployment of IRBM’s in Turkey; and
    • Khrushchev’s deployment of IRBM’s in Cuba

    The actors involved in each step did not perceive their behavior as overly risky. But compounded and viewed from their opponent’s perspective, those steps brought the world to the brink of disaster. During the crisis, there were additional, fortunately unvisited substates that would have made World War III even more likely. As just one example, the strong pressure noted by Burlatsky to correct the Bay of Pigs fiasco and remove Castro with a powerful American invasion force intensified after the Cuban missiles were discovered. But those arguing in favor of invasion were ignorant of the fact – not learned in the West until many years later – that the Russians had battlefield nuclear weapons on Cuba and came close to authorizing their commander on the island to use them without further approval from Moscow in the event of an American invasion.

    Section 3: Risk Analysis

    I have been concerned with averting nuclear war for over twenty-five years, but an extraordinary new approach only occurred to me last year: using quantitative risk analysis to estimate the probability of nuclear deterrence failing. This approach is a bit like Superman disguised as mild-mannered Clark Kent but, before I can explain why it is extraordinary, we need to explore what it is and overcome a key mental block that helps explain why no one previously had thought of applying this valuable technique.

    To understand this mental block, imagine someone gives us a trick coin, weighted so heads and tails are not equally likely, and we need to estimate the chance of its showing heads when tossed. What do we learn if we toss the coin fifty times and it comes up tails every time? Statistical analysis says we can be moderately confident (95% to be precise) that the chance of heads is somewhere between zero and 6% per toss, but that leaves way too much uncertainty.

    Thinking of the fifty years that deterrence has worked without a failure as the fifty tosses of the the coin, we are moderately confident that the chance of nuclear war is somewhere between zero and 6% per year. But there is a big difference between one chance in a billion per year and 6% per year, both of which are in that range. At one chance in a billion per year, a few more years of business as usual would be an acceptable risk. But 6% corresponds to roughly one in 16 odds, in which case our current nuclear strategy would be the equivalent of playing nuclear roulette – a global version of Russian roulette – once each year with a 16 chambered revolver.

    Just as the overly simplified two-state model of Figure 2 hides the danger of a nuclear war, the coin analogy hides the possibility of teasing much more information from the historical record – the two-sided coin corresponding to Figure 2’s two states. Breaking down one large state of Figure 2 into Figure 3’s smaller substates illuminated the danger hidden in the two state model. In the same way, risk analysis breaks down a catastrophic failure of nuclear deterrence into a sequence of smaller failures, many of which have occurred and whose probabilities can therefore be estimated.

    Modern risk analysis techniques first came to prominence with concerns about the safety of nuclear reactors, and in particular with the 1975 Rasmussen Report produced for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In Risk-Benefit Analysis, Wilson and Crouch note “[The Rasmussen report] used event tree analysis … This new approach originally had detractors, and indeed the failure … to use it may have contributed to the occurrence of the Three Mile Island Accident. If the event tree procedure … had been applied to [the reactor design used at Three Mile Island] … probably the Three Mile Island incident could have been averted.” [Wilson and Crouch 2001, pp. 172-173]

    An event tree starts with an initiating event that stresses the system. For a nuclear reactor, an initiating event could be the failure of a cooling pump. Unlike the catastrophic failure which has never occurred (assuming we are analyzing a design different from Chernobyl’s), such initiating events occur frequently enough that their rate of occurrence can be estimated directly. The event tree then has several branches at which the initiating event can be contained with less than catastrophic consequences, for example by activating a backup cooling system. But if a failure occurs at every one of the branches (e.g., all backup cooling systems fail), then the reactor fails catastrophically. Probabilities are estimated for each branch in the event tree and the probability of a catastrophic failure is obtained as the product of the individual failure probabilities.

    Applying risk analysis to the catastrophic failure of nuclear deterrence, a perceived threat by either side is an example of an initiating event. If either side exercises adequate caution in its responses, such an initiating event can be contained and the crisis dies out. But the event tree consisting of move and counter-move can fail catastrophically and result in World War III if neither side is willing to back down from the nuclear abyss, as almost happened with the 1962 Cuban crisis. Each branch or partial failure corresponds to moving one or more substates toward disaster in Figure 3.

    Because nuclear deterrence has never completely failed, the probability assigned to the last branch in the event tree (the final transition in Figure 3) will involve subjectivity and have more uncertainty. Confidence in the final result can be increased by incorporating a number of expert opinions and using a range instead of a single number for that probability, as well as providing justifications for the different opinions.

    The Cuban Missile Crisis provides a good example of how to estimate that final probability. President Kennedy estimated the odds of the crisis going nuclear as “somewhere between one-in-three and even.” His Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, wrote that he didn’t expect to live out the week, supporting an estimate similar to Kennedy’s. At the other extreme McGeorge Bundy, who was one of Kennedy’s advisors during the crisis, estimated those odds at 1%.

    In a recently published preliminary risk analysis of nuclear deterrence [Hellman 2008] I used a range of 10% to 50%. I discounted Bundy’s 1% estimate because invading Cuba was a frequently considered option, yet no Americans were aware of the Russian battlefield nuclear weapons which would have been used with high probability in that event. As an example of faulty reasoning due to this lack of information, Douglas Dillon, another member of Kennedy’s advisory group, wrote, “military operations looked like they were becoming increasingly necessary. … The pressure was getting too great. … Personally, I disliked the idea of an invasion [of Cuba] … Nevertheless, the stakes were so high that we thought we might just have to go ahead. Not all of us had detailed information about what would have followed, but we didn’t think there was any real risk of a nuclear exchange.” [Blight & Welch 1989, page 72]

    The sequence of steps previously listed as leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of an event tree that nearly led to a catastrophic failure, and reexamining those steps in the light of similar current events will show that, contrary to public opinion which sees the threat of nuclear war as a ghost of the past, the danger is lurking in the shadows, waiting until once again it can surprise us by suddenly leaping into clear view as it did in 1962:

    Step #1: conflict between America and Castro’s Cuba:

    The current conflicts between Russia and a number of former Soviet client states are similar. For example, as noted earlier, President Bush is pushing for Georgia to become a NATO member even though Russia and Georgia just fought an undeclared war over still unresolved issues

    Step #2: Russia demanding to be treated as a military equal and being denied this status:

    The same is true today. Even though Russia has 15,000 nuclear weapons, America sees itself as the sole remaining superpower, leading even Mikhail Gorbachev to say recently, “there is just one thing that Russia will not accept … the position of a kid brother, the position of a person who does what someone tells it to do.” [Tatsis 2008] Repeated American statements that we defeated Russia in the Cold War add fuel to that fire since the Russians feel they were equal participants in ending that conflict.

    Steps #3 and #4: The Berlin Crisis and the Bay of Pigs invasion:

    Several potential crises are brewing (e.g., Chechnya, Georgia, Estonia, and Venezuela) which have similar potential.

    Step #5: The American deployment of IRBM’s in Turkey:

    A missile defense system we are planning for Eastern Europe bears an ominous similarity to those Turkish missiles. While these new missiles are seen as defensive and a non-issue in America, the Russians see them as offensive and part of an American military encirclement. In October 2007, Putin warned, “Similar actions by the Soviet Union, when it put rockets in Cuba, precipitated the Cuban Missile Crisis.” [Putin 2007] Two months later Gorbachev questioned America’s stated goal of countering a possible Iranian missile threat, “What kind of Iran threat do you see? This is a system that is being created against Russia.” [Gorbachev 2007]

    Step #6: Khrushchev’s deployment of the Cuban missiles:

    While there is not yet a modern day analog of this step, serious warning tremors have occurred. In July 2008 Izvestia, a Russian newspaper often used for strategic governmental leaks, reported that if we proceed with our Eastern European missile defense deployment then nuclear-armed Russian bombers could be based on Cuba [Finn 2008]. During Senate confirmation hearings as Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz countered that “we should stand strong and indicate that is something that crosses a threshold, crosses a red line.” [Morgan 2008] While the Russian Foreign Ministry later dismissed Izvestia’s reports as false [Rodriguez 2008], there is a dangerous resemblance to events which led to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

    The fact that we are not yet staring at the nuclear abyss is little cause for comfort. In terms of the sequence of events that turn a 99.9% safe maneuver into a fatal accident, we are already at a dangerous point in the process and, as in soaring, need to recognize complacency as our true enemy.

    Section 4: How Risky Are Nuclear Weapons?

    Even minor changes in our nuclear weapons posture have been rejected as too risky even though the baseline risk of our current strategy had never been estimated. Soon after recognizing this gaping hole in our knowledge, I did a preliminary risk analysis [Hellman 2008] which indicates that relying on nuclear weapons for our security is thousands of times more dangerous than having a nuclear power plant built next to your home.

    Equivalently, imagine two nuclear power plants being built on each side of your home. That’s all we can fit next to you, so now imagine a ring of four plants built around the first two, then another larger ring around that, and another and another until there are thousands of nuclear reactors surrounding you. That is the level of risk that my preliminary analysis indicates each of us faces from a failure of nuclear deterrence.

    While the analysis that led to that conclusion involves more math than is appropriate here, an intuitive approach conveys the main idea. In science and engineering, when trying to estimate quantities which are not well known, we often use “order of magnitude” estimates. We only estimate the quantity to the nearest power of ten, for example 100 or 1,000, without worrying about more precise values such as 200, which would be rounded to 100.

    In this intuitive approach I first ask people whether they think the world could survive 1,000 years that were similar to 20 repetitions of the last 50 years. Do they think we could survive 20 Cuban Missile Crises plus all the other nuclear near misses we have experienced? When asked that question, most people do not believe we could survive 1,000 such years. I then ask if they think we can survive another 10 years of business as usual, and most say we probably can. There’s no guarantee, but we’ve made it through 50 years, so the odds are good that we can make it through 10 more. In the order of magnitude approach, we have now bounded the time horizon for a failure of nuclear deterrence as being greater than 10 years and less than 1,000. That leaves 100 years as the only power of ten in between. Most people thus estimate that we can survive on the order of 100 years, which implies a failure rate of roughly 1% per year.

    On an annual basis, that makes relying on nuclear weapons a 99% safe maneuver. As with 99.9% safe maneuvers in soaring, that is not as safe as it sounds and is no cause for complacency. If we continue to rely on a strategy with a one percent failure rate per year, that adds up to about 10% in a decade and almost certain destruction within my grandchildren’s lifetimes. Because the estimate was only accurate to an order of magnitude, the actual risk could be as much as three times greater or smaller. But even ⅓% per year adds up to roughly a 25% fatality rate for a child born today, and 3% per year would, with high probability, consign that child to an early, nuclear death.

    Given the catastrophic consequences of a failure of nuclear deterrence, the usual standards for industrial safety would require the time horizon for a failure to be well over a million years before the risk might be acceptable. Even a 100,000 year time horizon would entail as much risk as a skydiving jump every year, but with the whole world in the parachute harness. And a 100 year time horizon is equivalent to making three parachute jumps a day, every day, with the whole world at risk.

    While my preliminary analysis and the above described intuitive approach provide significant evidence that business as usual entails far too much risk, in-depth risk analyses are needed to correct or confirm those indications. A statement endorsed by the following notable individuals:

    • Prof. Kenneth Arrow, Stanford University, 1972 Nobel Laureate in Economics
    • Mr. D. James Bidzos, Chairman of the Board and Interim CEO, VeriSign Inc.
    • Dr. Richard Garwin, IBM Fellow Emeritus, former member President’s Science Advisory Committee and Defense Science Board
    • Adm. Bobby R. Inman, USN (Ret.), University of Texas at Austin, former Director National Security Agency and Deputy Director CIA
    • Prof. William Kays, former Dean of Engineering, Stanford University
    • Prof. Donald Kennedy, President Emeritus of Stanford University, former head of FDA
    • Prof. Martin Perl, Stanford University, 1995 Nobel Laureate in Physics

    therefore “urgently petitions the international scientific community to undertake in-depth risk analyses of nuclear deterrence and, if the results so indicate, to raise an alarm alerting society to the unacceptable risk it faces as well as initiating a second phase effort to identify potential solutions.” [Hellman 2008]

    This second phase effort will be aided by the initial studies because, in addition to estimating the risk of a failure of nuclear deterrence, they will identify the most likely trigger mechanisms, thereby allowing attention to be directed where it is most needed. For example, if as seems likely, a nuclear terrorist incident is found to be a likely trigger mechanism for a full-scale nuclear war, then much needed attention would be directed to averting that smaller, but still catastrophic event.

    While definitive statements about the risk we face must await the results of the proposed in-depth studies, for ease of exposition the remainder of this article assumes the conclusion reached by my preliminary study – that the risk is far too great and urgently needs to be reduced.

    Section 5: The Positive Possibility

    In the mid 1970’s Whit Diffie, Ralph Merkle and I invented public key cryptography, a technology that now secures the Internet and has won the three of us many honors. Yet, when we first conceived the idea many experts told us that we could not succeed. Their skepticism was understandable because a public key flew in the face of the accumulated wisdom of hundreds of years of cryptographic knowledge: How could the key be public if its secrecy was all that kept an opponent from reading my mail? What was missed is that “the key” might become “two keys,” a public key for enciphering and a secret key for deciphering. Everyone could encipher messages using my public key, but only I could understand them by deciphering with my secret key.

    Just as many cryptographic experts thought we couldn’t split the key and used arguments based on years of accumulated wisdom that were not applicable to the new possibility, most people have difficulty envisioning a world in which the nuclear threat is a relic of the past. While there is no guarantee that a similar breakthrough exists for ending the threat posed by nuclear weapons, this section provides evidence that our chances for survival are greater than we think.

    First Figure 3 must be modified by adding a third state in which the risk of nuclear catastrophe has been reduced thousands of times from its present level, so that it is at an acceptable level.

    Figure 4
    Figure 4. Adding hope to the model

    For the risk to truly be acceptable, this new state also must be a state of no return – its risk would not be acceptable if the world could transition back to our current state with its unacceptable risk. In this new figure, our current substate is near the middle of the current state of the world. We are not close to World War III, but neither are we close to an acceptable level of risk.

    Much as people had difficulty envisioning public key cryptography before we developed a workable system, they also have difficulty envisioning a world that is far better than what they have experienced in the past. The evolution of the movement to abolish slavery in the United States provides a good illustration of that difficulty. In 1787 slavery was written into our Constitution. In 1835 a Boston mob attacked the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison and dragged him half naked through the streets. In Illinois in 1837 a mob killed another abolitionist, Elijah Lovejoy. The next year, a Philadelphia mob burned the building where an antislavery convention was held [Goldsmith 1998, pages 11, 29]. In that environment or substate, few people could envision the end of slavery within thirty years, much less that citizens of Massachusetts, Illinois and Pennsylvania would give their lives to help bring about that noble goal.

    Figure 5
    Figure 5. Substates leading to a positive end state

    While it was almost impossible to envision in 1787 – or even in the 1830’s – we now know that, as depicted in Figure 5 above, there was a sequence of substates that led to a new state in which slavery not only was abolished, but had no possibility of returning. The anti-abolitionist riots of the 1830’s – probably seen by most at that time as evidence of the insurmountable barriers to ending slavery – were actually a sign that a new substate had been reached and change was beginning to occur. There were no such riots in 1787 because the abolitionist movement was almost non-existent. By the 1830’s abolition was beginning to be seen as a serious threat to the supporters of slavery, resulting in the riots.

    History shows that people have tremendous difficulty envisioning both negative and positive possibilities that are vastly different from their current experience. Therefore, even if I had a crystal ball and could predict the sequence of substates (steps) that will take us to the state of acceptable risk depicted in Figure 4, very few would believe me. As an example of the difficulty imagine the reaction if someone, prior to Gorbachev’s coming to power, had predicted that a leader of the Soviet Union would lift censorship, encourage free debate, and not use military force to prevent republics from seceding from the union. At best, such a seer would have been seen as extremely naive.

    I had a milder version of that problem in September 1984 when I started a project designed to foster a meaningful dialog between the American and Soviet scientific communities in an attempt to defuse the threat of nuclear war, which was then in sharp focus. I was aware of the limitations that Soviet censorship imposed, but believed there still was some opportunity for information flow, primarily unidirectional. It had been eight years since my last trip to the Soviet Union and this visit was an eye-opening experience. While I did not know it at the time, I was meeting with people who were in the forefront of the nascent reform movement which would bring Gorbachev to power six months later, with some of them directly advising him.

    Censorship was still the law of the land, so the scientists with whom I met could not agree with those of my views that contradicted the party line. But neither did they argue. I sensed something very different was brewing, but on returning to the U.S. I was often seen as extremely naive for believing that meaningful conversations were possible with persons of any standing within the Soviet system.

    The steps leading to a truly safe world in Figure 4 would sound similarly naive to most people today. It is therefore counterproductive to lay out too explicit a road map to that goal. But how can one garner support without an explicit plan for reaching the goal? Until I realized the applicability of risk analysis, I didn’t see how that could be accomplished, but risk analysis provides an implicit, rather than an explicit map. No single step can reduce the risk a thousand-fold, so if the risk analysis approach can be embedded in society’s consciousness, then one step after another will have to be taken until a state with acceptable risk is reached. Later steps, which today would be rejected as impossible (which they probably currently are) need not be spelled out, but are latent, waiting to be discovered as part of that process.

    The first critical step therefore is for society to recognize the risk inherent in nuclear deterrence. If you agree, please share this article – or whatever approach you favor – with others. Email is particularly effective since friends who agree can then relay your message to others. This article, a sample email, and other tools can be found on the resource page at NuclearRisk.org. “Just talking” might not seem to accomplish much, but as graphically depicted in Figure 4 and as noted by the ancient Chinese sage Lao Tzu, “The journey of a thousand miles starts with a single step.” If you have not already done so, I hope you will take the first step.

    References

    This article was originally published at NuclearRisk.org

    Martin Hellman is a co-inventor of public key cryptography, the technology that secures communication of credit card and other sensitive information over the Internet. He has worked for over twenty-five years to reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons and his current project is described at NuclearRisk.org. He is a glider pilot with over 2,600 hours in the air.

  • A World Free of Nuclear Weapons

    To the Editor:

    Re “New and Unnecessary” (editorial, Oct. 13):

    A big decision about nuclear weapons facing the next president will be “to build or not to build,” but there’s more to this story.

    The new president will need to decide whether to keep thousands of American nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired at a moment’s notice, or to eliminate this potentially catastrophic cold war posture.

    He must decide whether to retain the option of environmentally devastating nuclear testing, or to encourage the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He must decide whether to perpetuate the system of nuclear haves and have-nots, or to commence good-faith negotiations to achieve the phased, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

    The next president must, for the sake of humanity’s future, make a world free of nuclear weapons an urgent priority and assure the United States’ leadership to realize this goal.

    Rick Wayman
    Director of Programs
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
    Santa Barbara, Calif.

    This letter to the editor was originally published in the New York Times

    Rick Wayman is Director of Programs at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Creating a World Without Nuclear Weapons

    Creating a World Without Nuclear Weapons

    We are in the seventh decade of the Nuclear Age and there remain more than 25,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nine nuclear weapons states. The list of countries possessing nuclear weapons is headed by the US and Russia, which between them have more than 95 percent of the total on the planet. These two countries still maintain a few thousand nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired within moments of an order to do so. The other countries with nuclear weapons are the UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea.

    An important question that every concerned individual should ask is: Do these weapons make a country and its citizens more secure? The answer to this question is that they do not; nuclear weapons provide no physical protection against a nuclear attack. They do not and cannot provide physical protection against other nuclear weapons.

    The Limits of Deterrence

    These weapons of mass annihilation can only be used to threaten retaliation against an attacker. But the threat of retaliation, known as nuclear deterrence, is not foolproof. Deterrence relies upon beliefs and effective communications. For deterrence to work, a country’s leaders must believe in the intent as well as the capacity of an opponent to retaliate. Such a threat may be doubted since it implies a willingness to slaughter millions, perhaps hundreds of millions, of innocent people.

    Another issue with deterrence is that of rationality: whether an opponent will always act rationally, even in times of severe crisis. The evidence does not support the proposition that all political leaders are rational at all times. Another problem with deterrence is that the threat of retaliation is essentially meaningless when it comes to terrorist groups, since they are often suicidal and cannot be located to retaliate against.

    Weapons of the Weak

    There are many good reasons to doubt that nuclear deterrence makes a country more secure. One perceived exception to this may be that nuclear weapons provide added security for a weaker country in relation to a stronger one. For example, George W. Bush, early in his presidency, branded Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” He then proceeded to attack Iraq on the false charge that it had a nuclear weapons program, overthrow its leadership and occupy the country. With North Korea, a country suspected of having a small arsenal of nuclear weapons, Bush was much more cautious and engaged in negotiations. This has sent a message to Iran that it would be more secure with a nuclear arsenal. This is surely not the message that the US wishes to send to the world, nor to countries such as Iran.

    For weaker countries, nuclear weapons may be thought of as “military equalizers.” They may make a stronger country think twice about attacking. But this is a dangerous game of Russian roulette. The greater the number of countries with nuclear weapons, the greater the danger that these weapons will be used by accident, miscalculation or design.

    Because of the perceived power that nuclear weapons bestow upon their possessors, they may seem to some to be desirable, but in fact possessors of nuclear weapons are also targets of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons can destroy cities, countries, civilization, the human species and most life on our planet. As Mikhail Gorbachev has pointed out, they are weapons of “infinite and uncontrollable fury,” far too dangerous to be “held in the hands of any mere mortal ever again, for any reason.” Nuclear weapons could cause irreversible damage, not to the planet which is capable of recovery despite the worst we can do to it, but to humanity and to the human future.

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    The 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the countries that were then in possession of nuclear weapons (US, Soviet Union, UK, France and China) to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament in return for other countries agreeing not to acquire nuclear weapons. This agreement on the part of the nuclear weapons states has not been kept and unfortunately the country that has been the principal obstacle to nuclear disarmament has been the United States.

    Another aspect of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is that it refers to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an “inalienable right.” For many reasons, this moves the world in the wrong direction. The most important of these reasons is that nuclear energy provides a pretext for the creation of fissile materials for nuclear weapons through uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technologies. Once commerce is established in such bomb materials, the prospects of nuclear proliferation, even to terrorists, increase dramatically.

    Changing Our Thinking

    Nuclear weapons pose a unique existential challenge to humanity. If global warming is an “inconvenient truth,” nuclear weapons are an even greater and more acute problem for humanity. We need to shift our thinking if we are to confront the serious dangers to the human future posed by nuclear weapons. As Albert Einstein warned early in the Nuclear Age, “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” The needed change in thinking will require a major shift in our orientation toward nuclear arms.

    These weapons must be viewed as the immoral and illegal weapons that they are, as opposed to just another, albeit more powerful, weapon of war. The International Court of Justice considered the issue of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and unanimously concluded: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” People everywhere must understand that the weapons themselves are the enemy and must be committed to their elimination.

    The Need for US Leadership

    The United States, as the world’s most powerful country, must lead in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The US, however, seems unmindful of this responsibility and continues to send exactly the wrong message by its reliance on nuclear weapons. Two distinguished former US diplomats, Thomas Graham Jr. and Max Kampelman, have called US leadership “essential”: “The road from the world of today, with thousands of nuclear weapons in national arsenals to a world free of this threat, will not be an easy one to take, but it is clear that US leadership is essential to the journey and there is growing worldwide support for that civilized call to zero.” US leaders must understand that for the country’s own security and for global security, nuclear weapons abolition is necessary, but won’t be possible without US leadership.

    The Role of Citizens

    The people of the US and other nuclear weapons states must put pressure on their governments to act on ridding the world of nuclear weapons. Pressure must come from below to change the thinking and the actions of political leaders. Among the steps that individuals can take to make a difference on this issue are the following:

    1. Learn more. Visit the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s website at www.wagingpeace.org.
    2. Keep abreast of the issues. At www.wagingpeace.org you can sign up for The Sunflower, a free monthly e-newsletter on current nuclear weapons issues.
    3. Share your knowledge. Tell your family and friends about the importance of current nuclear weapons issues and encourage their involvement.
    4. Communicate with the media. Follow the news and write letters to your local newspaper.
    5. Write your representatives in Congress. Sign up for the Turn the Tide Action Alerts at www.wagingpeace.org, and we’ll make it easy for you to communicate with your Congressional representatives.
    6. Support and build nuclear abolition organizations. It may take a village to raise a child, but it will take strong, committed and enduring organizations to assure we achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons for all the children of the world.
    7. Never give up. It will take extraordinary perseverance to achieve the goal. No one should give up because the task is difficult.

    Each generation has a responsibility to pass the world on intact to the next generation. Those of us alive today are challenged as never before to accomplish this. Technological achievement does not necessarily make us stronger. It may simply make us more vulnerable, and our old ways of thinking may seal our fate. The alternative to waiting for a nuclear catastrophe to occur is to join others who are committed to preserving a future of the human species, and act to rid the world of this most terrible of all human inventions.

    David Krieger is a founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and has served as its president since 1982. He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.
  • The US-India Deal: When Geopolitics Meets Principle

    The US-India Deal: When Geopolitics Meets Principle

    When geopolitics comes up against principle in the US Congress, it is generally principle that is forced to give way. In the case of the US-India nuclear deal, originally proposed by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005, the deal would involve transferring nuclear technology and material from the US to India. Geopolitically, it would strengthen the relationship between the two countries, but it would do so at the expense of the principle of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    India is not a party to the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It never joined because its leaders believed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty promoted nuclear apartheid with its two classes of states: nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” By not signing the treaty, India, like Pakistan and Israel, held open the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear device, what it called a “peaceful nuclear device.” In 1998, India conducted multiple tests of nuclear weapons, and was followed almost immediately by a series of Pakistani nuclear tests.

    The United States, unlike India, is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Like all other parties to the treaty, it promised in Article I of the treaty “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.” India is a “non-nuclear-weapon State” by the treaty’s definition. By providing nuclear materials and technology to India, the US will be assisting India to develop a larger nuclear arsenal than it already has developed. Thus, the US will be in violation of its treaty obligations.

    India has agreed to allow its civilian nuclear reactors to be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but not its military reactors. By supplying nuclear material and technology to India, it will allow India to use all of the uranium and plutonium from its military reactors, which are not subject to inspection, to be used for increasing the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal. This will, in turn, promote nuclear arms races with Pakistan and China.

    Earlier this month, the US applied pressure to the 45 member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive their rules and allow nuclear material and technology transfers to India. Many of the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group were as eager as the United States at the opportunity for their big corporations to cash in on selling nuclear reactors to India.

    With the Nuclear Suppliers Group having signed off on the deal, it left only the US Congress to reconsider the matter before giving the green light to the deal. The first step in getting the deal through Congress was gaining the approval of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In this Committee, Senator Russ Feingold introduced an amendment to the bill calling on the administration to reach an agreement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group that there will be no transfers of uranium enrichment or plutonium separation technologies to a country that is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    Since India is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Feingold amendment would have prohibited transfers of these technologies for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials to India. It is an amendment that upholds the principle that transfers of nuclear technology should not assist in the development of nuclear weapons. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its eagerness to see the US reap perceived geopolitical and financial advantages, threw principle to the wayside and voted 15 to 4 against the amendment. The four principled Senators voting for the amendment were Feingold, along with Barbara Boxer, Robert Casey and Jim Webb.

    Following the defeat of the amendment, the Committee, in its embarrassing rush to line up behind a Bush policy that substantially undermines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime, voted 19 to 2 in favor of the deal. The only two Senators on the Committee to stand on principle and vote against the deal were Russ Feingold and Barbara Boxer.

    If the House Foreign Affairs Committee follows its colleagues in the Senate, it is almost assured that the Congress of the United States will vote in favor of this ill-conceived deal, and the prospects of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons will have been dealt a near fatal blow. The US will have demonstrated that perceived short-term geopolitical gain, with an unhealthy dose of potential financial profit thrown in, is more than enough to defeat even the most important of security-related principles. The Bush administration will have succeeded in making the Congress complicit in blowing a hole the size of a nuclear explosion through the principle of safeguarding the country and the world against the spread of nuclear weapons.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a councilor of the World Future Council.
  • Congress Has the Last Chance to Say No to the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal

    Congress Has the Last Chance to Say No to the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal

    India never joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, it developed and tested nuclear weapons. It is a known nuclear proliferator. India is now thought to have an arsenal of some 60 nuclear weapons, and India’s first nuclear test in 1974 led Pakistan to also develop and later test nuclear weapons. India’s 1974 nuclear test also led to the formation of a Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of 45 countries that agreed to ban nuclear technology transfers that would make nuclear proliferation more likely, particularly to countries such as India and Pakistan that were outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    Despite the obvious implications for nuclear proliferation, George W. Bush put forward a plan in 2005 to transfer nuclear technology and materials to India. For this plan, which is best characterized as the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal, a special waiver was needed from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, requiring the consent of all members. This deal ran into trouble when Austria, Ireland and New Zealand initially sought to uphold the obligations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and held out for tighter proliferation controls, at a minimum a commitment by India that it would conduct no further nuclear tests. Although India would not make this commitment – only going so far as to say it would engage in a voluntary moratorium on testing – arm-twisting diplomatic pressure from the US caused these last hold-outs against proliferation to capitulate. The only barrier remaining to this Nuclear Proliferation Deal going through is the US Congress.

    The Bush administration has given three justifications for pursuing this deal with India. First, it will forge a strategic partnership with the world’s largest democracy. Second, it will help India meet its increasing energy demand in an “environmentally friendly” way. Third, it will open a market for the sale of billions of dollars of nuclear technology to India.

    Forging a strategic partnership with India is fine, but why do it on a foundation of nuclear weapons proliferation? Surely, other countries will be looking at this Nuclear Proliferation Deal as a model that will serve their own interests as well. If the US can do it with India, why not China with Pakistan? Or Russia with Iran? Or Pakistan with Syria? The possibilities for nuclear proliferation are endless, and this deal makes them more likely.

    It is also fine for the US to help India to meet its growing energy demand in an environmentally friendly way, but it is absolute hypocrisy to classify nuclear energy “environmentally friendly.” No one knows what to do with the long-lived radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants – not the US, not anyone. And these wastes are truly long-lived. In the case of the highly toxic and leukemia causing by-product of nuclear power production, plutonium 239, the wastes will gradually decline in danger over a period of 240,000 years. Not the best gift to bestow on future generations.

    There are other reasons as well to be skeptical of nuclear power plants. They are capital intensive, subject to accidents and tempting targets for terrorists. They also require large societal subsidies, such as the underwriting of liability insurance. The uranium used in these plants, if highly enriched, not a technologically difficult feat, provides the basic ingredients for nuclear weapons. The plutonium generated in these plants, if reprocessed, also not difficult technologically, provides another fissionable material for nuclear weapons. Why not support India to produce truly environmentally friendly energy sources, such as wind or solar energy?

    The third reason for the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal sounds to me like the real one – that it will open a market to sell billions of dollars of nuclear technology to India. There will be a small number of corporations and their chief executives that will profit big-time from this deal, but they will be doing so at a heavy cost to the people of the world. This Nuclear Proliferation Deal has “double standards” written all over it. Can you imagine the US pushing the same deal with Iran, Iraq or North Korea? Of course not! This deal puts a hole the size of a nuclear explosion through the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    Very soon the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal will be back before the US Congress for a final vote. If the Congress approves the deal as it stands, it goes through. If Congress votes it down, it doesn’t go through. This deal, initiated and promoted heavily by the Bush administration, will undermine the security of the American people and people everywhere, if Congress allows it to go through.

    The Bush administration was able to pressure the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but the American people should not allow Mr. Bush to proceed with this final cynical act to enrich the few at the expense of national and global security. If you care about the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation, it’s time for action. Let your representative in Washington know that you expect a No vote on the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Assessing Nuclear Dangers 63 Years Later

    Sixty-three years ago this month, the United States was the first (and only—so far) nation to use nuclear weapons, detonating two warheads in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. Tens of thousands of people were killed instantly. By the end of 1945, more than 200,000 more were dead from radiation-related ailments.

    This somber anniversary provides an opportunity to assess the range of nuclear threats bedeviling international relations and threatening the future. The moment is even more salient given the recent military probe of Georgia into its breakaway province of South Ossetia, the Russian military’s apparent overreaction, and the Bush administration’s subsequent rhetorical bluster threatening to reignite the Cold War, as well as ongoing U.S. attempts to establish antimissile deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic, a development provoking concern and defensiveness in Russia.

    There is some good news. In a dramatic display, North Korea destroyed a cooling tower at its Yongbyon nuclear complex on June 28. Closer to home, the U.S. Congress refused to fund the administration’s demand for a new nuclear weapon system, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which would have upgraded most of the U.S.’s current nuclear warheads. (The existing warheads will remain frighteningly effective for many years, according to a preponderance of scientists and military theorists.)

    Now the bad news. We face a stalled disarmament process, tens of billions of dollars that the U.S. is still pumping into a vast nuclear weapons complex, and the horrifying possibility of nuclear terrorism.

    In 2002, George W. Bush and his Russian counterpart, now former president Vladimir Putin, agreed to sharp reductions in nuclear stockpiles by 2012. (Even under this agreement, however, the “decommissioned” weapons could be easily and quickly re-commissioned.) More than half the allotted time has passed, yet this key post-Cold War priority has faltered.

    Furthermore, the Bush administration has decreased funding directed toward the critically important goal of securing “loose nukes” in Russia to keep them from the hands of terrorists.

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) established the framework under which nuclear weapon states, included the U.S., committed to disarm. Nonnuclear signers of the treaty pledged not to develop a nuclear weapons capability in exchange for assistance in acquiring peaceful nuclear technology. The NPT’s delicate balance has now been overturned: Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and India have all built nuclear weapons stockpiles outside the treaty. They have pointed—accurately—to the implicit double standard of the original five nuclear weapons states, “led” by the U.S., which have failed to take any meaningful steps toward their own disarmament.

    At the same time, the U.S. is irresponsibly inconsistent with other countries. The Bush administration has given India a special path to nuclear legitimacy despite its development of nuclear weapons outside of international law. India is close to accepting a deal giving it access to nuclear fuel and technology for power plants, in exchange for opening only part of its nuclear fuel cycle to inspections.

    The U.S. at the same time threatens to attack Iran for thinking nuclear thoughts. The most recent National Intelligence Estimate, in fall 2007, found that Iran ceased pursuit of nuclear weapons in 2003, while continuing to attempt mastery over uranium enrichment, maintaining that its current program is for peaceful energy uses, as permitted under the NPT. The Bush administration continues to use an “all options are on the table” threat—code for “nuclear weapons could be used in military strikes”—against Iran, which, all parties agree, has no nuclear weapons. The Bush White House is the first U.S. administration in history to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear nations, a startling and parlous policy.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency asserts that 20-30 countries have the intent or capability to pursue new nuclear weapons programs. And large quantities of highly enriched uranium and plutonium remain scattered at poorly secured sites throughout the world.

    Despite calls for disarmament from a cadre of converted Cold Warriors, the Department of Energy is asking for an estimated $150 billion to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons and a more “responsive” production network. This proposal builds on the Bush administration’s quiet surge in nuclear weapons spending: Adjusting for inflation, U.S. spending on nuclear weapons has increased by more than 13 percent since 2001 and is now one-third more than the Cold War average.

    The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has been measuring the danger posed by nuclear weapons since 1947. In January 2007, it moved the clock from seven minutes to nuclear midnight to five minutes to nuclear midnight, due to “the perils of 27,000 nuclear weapons—2,000 of them ready to launch within minutes.”

    In his campaign stump speech, Illinois Sen. Barack Obama warns that nuclear terrorism is one of the gravest threats facing the United States today, highlighting his work on this overlooked issue. During the election season—and in the first months of a new presidential administration and Congress—citizens have an opportunity to insist that nuclear weapons materials from the Cold War be locked down, that nuclear stockpiles be reduced, and that we turn back the clock with real progress toward nonproliferation.

    Steve Daniels, MD, is the Santa Barbara chair of Physicians for Social Responsibility.

  • The Deja Vu of the Cold War

    Historically as a fact and as a chapter in Encyclopedias, the so-called Cold War drew to a close in the last years of the 80’s and the early 90’s.

    To celebrate that epic event, bells were rung, walls were destroyed, books and poems were written, movies were made to announce the beginning of a “new peace era”. Basically, two decades have passed and in the last years, mostly during the present Bush administration, the key elements for the bellicose situation have been revived.

    We are entering into a new nuclear arms race. The sword has been pulled out of the old armoire. The rhetoric of the perennial accusations resounds one more time. “You are the one”, “No, you are the one”. The conditions to deteriorate even more the precarious peace are popping up all over.

    In the most recent events, Mr. Vladimir Putin, the now Prime Minister of Russia accused the US government of orchestrating the rebellion in Georgia for political gains during the US Presidential campaign. For many, these remarks are simply untrue, for others, it is possible. Once again the world starts to be divided into two fronts.

    What is it in human nature that lures us so often and so rapidly to jump from one conflict to the next? Is peace simply a pause between two wars? Is there a real possibility to live in concord?

    What are we teaching our children, when they read the History of Humankind, and they only see wars as the most important events? The military is the most heroic status in society. It is “so cool” to see the parade of war paraphernalia; soldiers, missiles, airplanes, nuclear bombs.

    If you oppose that way of thinking you will be labeled a pacifist. And in the political lexicon that means you are an appeaser. In the era of Rambo and Terminator that is not fashionable.

    As long as we continue piling the nuclear arsenals the world will be playing Russian roulette. Minor quarrels could become major conflicts and will threaten the use of the ultimate weapons of mass destruction.

    We need to convince our governments, those with Nuclear weapons to get rid of the Armageddon weaponry forever. But first, we need to convince ourselves that the elimination of nuclear weapons is not just a dream.

    More than ever we must unite forces, to put to work the best minds looking for real and permanent solutions, not only bandages for deep open wounds.

    The Appeal to the next US President is a powerful tool. Let’s work together and collect all the signatures we can. Let’s flood Washington with names from all over the world.

    Ruben Arvizu is Director for Latin America for the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is coordinating the Appeal to the Next US President campaign in Latin America.

  • NATO Nuclear Weapons: Power Without Purpose

    David KriegerEurope is heavily armed with nuclear weapons. Both Britain and France possess their own nuclear forces and the United States has a long history of keeping nuclear weapons on European soil. Britain’s nuclear force is estimated at under 200 weapons, with approximately 150 deployed on four Vanguard submarines and the remainder kept in reserve. France is thought to have approximately 350 nuclear weapons in its Force de frappe (strike force). The US keeps some 200-350 nuclear weapons in six countries: Belgium, Germany, Holland, Italy, Turkey and the UK. Recent unconfirmed reports indicate that the US has pulled its nuclear weapons out of the UK. If this is correct, approximately 240 US nuclear weapons remain in five European countries.

    On the NATO website, it states, “NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces. Their role is now more fundamentally political, and they are no longer directed towards a specific threat.” This is a rather enigmatic statement, leaving one to ponder how nuclear weapons are used in a “fundamentally political” role. The NATO website adds, “NATO’s reduced reliance on nuclear forces has been manifested in a dramatic reduction in the number of weapons systems and storage facilities. NATO has also ended the practice of maintaining standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans and as a result, NATO’s nuclear forces no longer target any country.”

    Given the fact that NATO does not target any other country with nuclear weapons, one wonders what role they still serve. Again, the NATO website provides an answer, which is “to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to support its strategy of preserving peace and preventing war.” But this still leaves one wondering with whom one is “preserving peace and preventing war.” Although nothing is stated, it would seem that the answer is likely to be Russia. This might explain why NATO has expanded up to the Russian western border, despite earlier US promises to Russia not to do so, and also why the US continues to pursue the placement of missile defense installations in new NATO states Poland and the Czech Republic, despite continuing Russian protests.

    NATO reasoning for maintaining nuclear weapons seems very flimsy. If there is anything that is clear about nuclear weapons, it is that they cannot protect their possessors. All of the nuclear weapons in Europe cannot protect any European city from a nuclear attack by an extremist organization. Reliance upon these weapons provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation, increasing the possibilities that these weapons will fall into the hands of such an organization and will be used.

    If European nations want to provide true security to the citizens of their countries, they should end NATO’s reliance upon nuclear weapons by taking the following steps:

    • Call for the removal of all US nuclear weapons from Europe.
    • Call for the US to remove its missile defense installations from the Russian border
    • Negotiate the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and the western regions of Russia.
    • Create a global treaty to bring all weapons-grade fissile material under strict and effective international control.
    • Call for the NATO nuclear weapons states (US, UK and France) to fulfill their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.
    • Take a leading role in initiating negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, setting forth a roadmap for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons.
    • Join Russia and China in negotiating a ban on space weaponization.
    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and a councilor of the World Future Council (www.worldfuturecouncil.org).

  • For a Nuclear Weapon Free World

    This article was originally published in Italian by Corriere della Serra

    Dear Editor, an article published in the Wall Street Journal entitled “A
    world without nuclear weapons”, signed by George Schultz and Henry
    Kissinger, former Secretaries of State under Republican Presidents
    Reagan and Nixon, and by Bill Perry and Sam Nunn, the former Defence
    Secretary under President Clinton and the Democratic chairman of the
    Senate Defence Committee, in January 2007 opened up an extremely
    important debate for the future of humanity. In that article, the four
    American statesmen proposed the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
    Their argument, taken up again in a second article in January 2008, is
    that, unless the nuclear-weapon States – and there are now 8 of them –
    and especially the two main ones, United States and Russia, take the
    lead   in launching a process aimed at their total elimination, it will
    become increasingly difficult to prevent other countries from acquiring
    them, with the risk that sooner or later these weapons may be used, and
    that would have catastrophic consequences for the world.

    The importance of their article lies in the fact that, for the first
    time, the issue of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was being
    addressed, in the United States, by politicians who represent the
    mainstream of American stategic policy, from both parties, stressing the
    fact that this is an objective to be pursued in the interests of both
    the nation and the world. Several very important statements followed
    their Op-ed. The two US presidential candidates have substantially
    agreed with this aim, as have the majority of those who, in the past,
    held positions of major responsibility in the USA in this field. In
    Russia, there was a positive reaction by Gorbachev and a more cautious,
    but not negative, reaction by the Government. In Britain, Gordon Brown
    spoke out favourably; the Defence Minister proposed hosting experts from
    United States, Russia, England, France and China in the English nuclear
    labs, in order to establish the methodologies of verification for the
    elimination of nuclear weapons; recently, the Times carried an article
    by another bipartisan quartet, including three former Foreign Ministers
    and a former Secretary General of Nato, expressing agreement.  In
    France, the Defence White Paper indicates that the objective to be
    pursued is the elimination of nuclear weapons. In Australia, the
    Government has established a new international Commission of Experts,
    whose task is to chart the road towards the elimination of all nuclear
    weapons. There have been innumerable positive reactions among
    non-governmental groups.

    We think it is important that Italy, too, should give indications that
    go in that same direction. Our joint signatures, like those on the
    Op-eds in other countries, are evidence of the fact that in both main
    political camps, and in the scientific community, there is a shared
    common opinion on the importance of this issue and this aim. We wish to
    suggest the main steps along this road. The first is the entry into
    force of the Treaty banning all forms of nuclear testing, including
    underground tests, thus enshrining into a treaty the current moratorium.
    The second is to set in motion the stalled negotiations, within the
    Disarmament Conference in Geneva, on the FMCT, which prohibits the
    production of highly enriched uranium and of plutonium with the isotope
    composition necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. Here, too,
    there is a de facto moratorium, but without any formal agreement and
    without verification measures. The entry into force of these two
    Treaties would be appreciated by non-nuclear-weapon States and would
    prepare a more favourable ground for the periodical Conference of the
    Non-Proliferation Treaty planned for 2010, strengthening the world’s
    non-proliferation regime, including the monitoring of the actual
    observance of the commitments – in both letter and spirit – envisaged by
    the NPT.

    We are fully aware that the road that will lead us to the elimination of
    nuclear weapons is long. It will call for certain political conditions.
    The first is an actual improvement in the relations between the nuclear
    superpowers, United States and Russia, who still maintain – despite
    recent reductions – over nine tenths of all nuclear weapons in the
    world. This would help the other nuclear weapon States recognized by the
    NPT – Britain, France and China – to do their part. It is also
    necessary to reduce the tensions in those parts of the world where the
    risk of nuclear weapons actually being used is highest, perhaps even by
    terrorist groups. We refer here to South-east Asia (India and Pakistan)
    and to the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab problem in the Middle East. In both
    these contexts, moves by the nuclear weapons States indicating that they
    are progressing towards a nuclear weapons free world would undoubtedly
    have a positive effect. Italy and Europe can and must do what they can
    to promote the path towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It
    is clear that this final result will be achieved only with the
    commitment of the major protagonists, United States and Russia, and of
    the other nuclear weapon States. But the spread of a new way of thinking
    – of a new “shared wisdom” – is a fundamental step along this path, and
    Italy too must contribute. It is necessary that on these fundamental
    issues for the very survival of humanity, despite our legitimate –
    indeed necessary – political differences, we join together in
    recognizing a superior, common interest.

  • Saving Humanity from the Fiery Threat of Nuclear Annihilation, Through the Power of Women

    In my youth, I wrote stories about the possible destruction of the beautiful planet on which I lived, deceiving readers into thinking that I was an embittered old man. I leaped into the future as far as I could see, and I saw creatures coming from other worlds with the weapons to destroy the world around me. I was haunted by the screams of my father, who had to kill other men in hand-to-hand combat in the global war that ranged from 1914 to 1918.

    In 1943, I was drafted into the American army to stop Hitler and his murderous followers from conquering Europe. I was trained to shoot and stab other men, just as my father had been trained in his generation. I was selected as a war correspondent to write about the atrocities suffered by other men in bloody battles where they had lost their arms and legs, and sometimes their brains and testicles. I lived through glorious days after I came home unwounded, but I had to face the grim realities created by scientists who had acted on the wild possibilities I had envisioned in my science fiction stories.

    In 1932, I had published a story titled “Red April 1965” about a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union—and I was confronted early in April of 1965 by a madman who rushed into my office screaming about the imminent occurrence of such a war on the very date when I had predicted it. The war did not happen then, but I still had a deep fear that atomic bombs would destroy our civilization.

    In 1948, I wrote speeches for President Harry Truman, who had used nuclear weapons on Japan to save the lives of thousands of civilians and end the Second World War as quickly as possible. After his action, the world embarked on a nuclear arms race, which has continued for many years. Life on earth is under the fiery threat of annihilation.

    In 1982, David Krieger asked me to join him in founding the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, a nonprofit educational organization, which has become a voice of conscience for the community, the nation, and the world. Its message is that nuclear weapons threaten the future of all life on our planet, and that it is the responsibility of all of us, working together, to end this threat forever. Nuclear weapons were created by humans, and they must be abolished by us. Peace in a world free of nuclear weapons is everyone’s birthright. It is the greatest challenge of our time to restore that birthright to our children and all future generations.

    In 1983, I was invited to go to Moscow by the Council of Citizens, a nonpartisan organization based in New York. In Russia, I was given an opportunity to speak to 77 Soviet leaders in the Kremlin. I urged them to take the initiative in getting rid of nuclear weapons. I said that I hoped my own government—the U.S. government—would do that, but I was afraid that American leaders would not do it.

    The Soviets listened to me, and my speech was quoted in Pravda. I was interviewed by Radio Moscow, but the Soviets told me that if they discarded their nuclear weapons, they would be regarded as “weak” in many parts of the world. I felt that my mission to Moscow did not have the positive results I had hoped for.

    Now, I believe that a worldwide initiative by women has the best possibilities of ending the nuclear threat. Courageous women are making a difference in all nations; in fact, many countries have elected women to the highest offices in their governments.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has many notable women on its board of directors, its council of advisors, its associates, and staff. Its development and progress is largely due to the generosity and activities of these women.

    The Foundation’s financial survival was largely dependent on the gifts of Ethel Wells, a Santa Barbara resident. In the 1980s, the Foundation coordinated an International Week for Science and Peace. Mrs. Wells reasoned that scientists were at the heart of creating constructive or destructive technologies, so she contributed $50,000 for a prize for the best proposal for a scientific step forward. The winning proposal came from the Hungarian Engineers for Peace and called for the formation of an International Network of Engineers for Peace. A short time later, the engineers joined with a group of like-minded scientists and established the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility. That organization continues to thrive with a large list of supporters.

    In 1995, friends of Barbara Mandigo Kelly, my wife, established an annual series of awards through the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation to encourage poets to explore and illuminate positive visions of peace and the human spirit. These awards are offered to people in three categories—adults, young persons 13 to 18 years old, and youth 12 and under. Thousands of poems have been received from people of all ages, from all over the world. The prize-winning poems have been published in book form, in anthologies and on the Foundation’s website.

    For many years, the Foundation offered prizes, financed by Gladys Swackhamer, awarded for essays by high school students all over the world, who shared their thoughts on nuclear policy and peace issues. Many of these essays have been published in magazines in many places, and the authors include many young women from a wide variety of backgrounds.

    The necessity for cooperative action was highlighted recently in an article published in the Wall Street Journal signed by four men who have served in high positions—George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Senator Sam Nunn. They expressed the belief that “We have arrived a dangerous tipping point in the nuclear era, and we advocate a strategy for improving American security and global security….We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe.” [Emphasis added.]

    I think the time has come for the formation of a Women’s Task Force for Nuclear Peace, composed of leaders of women’s organizations with millions of members around the world. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is prepared to work in cooperation with these organizations to awaken humanity to the urgent need of preserving life on earth.

     

    Frank K. Kelly is a co-founder and senior vice president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).