Tag: nuclear weapons

  • Creating a Peaceful Society Without Nuclear Weapons

    (Mr. Hiroo Saionji) I’d like to start off with a question about the purpose of your visit to Japan this time. We hear that you are going to attend the fourth Nagasaki Global Citizens’ Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

    (Dr. David Krieger) I’ve just come from the Nagasaki Global Citizens’ Assembly. That was the principal purpose for my visit to Japan. It was a very extraordinary conference. The idea of holding a Global Citizens’ Assembly was very appealing to me. I believe that citizens need to be awakened and become engaged in the issue of eliminating nuclear weapons. Until they are, it’s not likely that we are going to see real progress toward eliminating nuclear weapons. What happened in Nagasaki is a model for what could happen in many other places.

    (Saionji) I was told that you were only 21 years old, Dr. Krieger, when you visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the very first time. At that time you visited the museums to see the devastation of those cities, and since then you have been involved in trying to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    I do pay my deepest, deepest respect to many years of your endeavors, but I’d like to know how you felt when you first visited Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Since then you’ve been working on this very topic for, I take it, more than 40 years? And how do you feel now as well?

    (Krieger) When I first visited the museums, I gained a different perspective. It was very different from what I’d learned about using the Bomb in my schooling in the United States. Basically what I’d learned in the U.S. was that the United States dropped those Bombs because it was necessary to achieve the Japanese surrender and to win the war. That’s the perspective from which the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are taught in American schools, and that was the education that I had. When I went to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I realized the extent of human suffering and death that was involved in the atomic bombings. Visiting the Peace Memorial Museums made it far more real to me. Also, it showed the other side of the story.

    What I came to understand was that American way of educating about the Bomb was from a perspective of being above the Bomb. The perspective was that we made use of this new technology and we won that war. At the museums at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, you could gain perspective from under the Bomb. I found that a far more compelling perspective and far more human perspective. I realized that what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki could happen anywhere. It was not acceptable as means of warfare to have the mass killing of civilians. It was a very strong experience for me to visit those cities and their museums. It was an awakening.

    (Saionji) I see. Since having gone through that experience, I take it this has motivated you to be very active in trying to eliminate the weapons for the next 40 plus years. As a result, you have established the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation so as to educate people. Very, very briefly, would you let me know the activities of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation?

    (Krieger) We have three major goals: 1) to abolish nuclear weapons; 2) to strengthen international law; and 3) to empower new peace leaders, particularly young peace leaders. The three goals are interrelated. It’s unlikely we will be able to succeed in abolishing nuclear weapons if we don’t make international law a stronger presence in our lives. And without a new generation of peace leaders, there won’t be anybody to carry on the struggle for a nuclear weapon-free world. To achieve these goals, we do a great deal of public education through lectures, conferences, speeches, books, newspaper and magazine articles, a great deal of outreach.

    We also have links with like-minded groups around the world. We were involved in the establishment of the Abolition 2000 Global Network in 1995. We are one of the eight international organizations in the Middle Powers Initiative, trying to encourage middle-power governments to play a greater role in seeking the abolition of nuclear weapons.

    We also give awards and hold contests. Most recently, we established a new short video contest on topics of peace and disarmament. We’ve recently started a new program, our Peace Leadership Program, in which we are trying to teach young people the skills of leadership related to building a peaceful world.

    We have a long-standing contest in peace poetry, in which we encourage poets in three categories – adults, teenagers, and children – to submit poems related to peace and the human spirit. That’s been a very successful project involving the arts.

    In addition to education, we also engage in advocacy, for example, with our Action Alert Network. We ask people to send messages to government leaders, primarily in the United States. We try to awaken interest, raise awareness and help people to become more active and engaged in critical issues of peace and disarmament.  

    Those are some of the things that we are doing at this time.

    (Saionji) Well, having listened to that, I must say that there are close similarities in the direction that our Foundation is seeking with yours. And the approaches are very similar. At the Goi Peace Foundation, we’ve strived to realize peace inclusive of the activities you’ve mentioned. I’m struck by so much similarity both in the direction we are trying to head to as well as the approaches taken.

    (Krieger) I hope we can find ways to cooperate more in the future.

    (Saionji) Exactly, I feel the same.

    As a grand premise, what is the most important in educating the people is to have the people know the truth, the reality that is in front of them.

    This is related to former Vice President Al Gore’s book, An Inconvenient Truth, which is about global warming. You say, Dr. Krieger, that there’s something that’s far more important than global warming, which is the nuclear issue. So in order to educate the general public, what do you think is the very first thing that everybody should be aware of? And, at the same time, it seems that there could be a most important truth that many people are misunderstanding. Could you refer to those two points briefly?

    (Krieger) The most important truth about nuclear weapons, or about the Nuclear Age in general, is that we’ve created weapons that are capable of destroying everything. I often refer to the term omnicide, a term coined by philosopher John Somerville, that means the death of all. With suicide, a person takes his or her own life. With genocide, the lives of a specific group are targeted. Nuclear weapons have created a possibility of omnicide.

    I find that a powerful warning. We’ve created the tools of our own destruction. By our ingenuity as a species, we’ve created the devices that could destroy everything that’s been created, including all the efforts of over ten thousand years of civilization. And actually it’s more than that, because it’s not only humans and civilization that would be destroyed, but most complex life forms. I believe that if people really understood what is at stake and took that simple truth into their hearts, they would fight for a world without nuclear weapons.

    Most people in the world are confused by the experts who talk about national security and make the issue very complex. The issue isn’t as complex as they make it and people don’t really need to defer to experts to know that nuclear weapons can destroy everything. In reality, nuclear arms are not even weapons. They are devices of annihilation and shouldn’t exist. So it’s our challenge as human beings to end this threat to human and other forms of life on our planet.

    (Saionji) Well, you said that we don’t need to listen to the opinions of experts. But some of those experts say that nuclear weapons are going to be deterrents. How would you respond to those experts who say that these weapons are necessary as a deterrent?

    (Krieger) Nuclear deterrence is at the heart of the problem. Nuclear deterrence has as a foundational understanding that an opponent will be rational. It requires rationality. In effect, deterrence is the threat of nuclear retaliation. A rational person would say, “All right, I don’t want to be attacked, so I won’t attack you.” But, we should ask the question, “Are all leaders rational at all times?” I think the answer to that question is clearly “No”. All leaders are not rational at all times. Deterrence doesn’t take this into account. That’s a major problem with deterrence. In fact, I think the theory of deterrence is irrational for exactly the reason that it relies upon rationality. It also doesn’t take into account the possibility of accidents or inadvertent use of the weapons.

    Earlier I talked about a perspective from above the Bomb and from below the Bomb. I think there is a parallel here. Experts try to use complex, even mathematical, models to predict human behavior. But human behavior is extremely complex, even more complex than human experts can model. The so-called experts are trying to predict and provide advice that’s based on human behavior that is not completely understood and is out of their control. On the other hand, people should understand that nuclear weapons cannot really protect them. All they can do is to threaten to kill other people. If people really understood this, would they want to base their security on threatening to kill tens of millions or hundreds of millions of innocent people? Doesn’t it make sense that a better solution would be to eliminate the weapons and not face that dilemma?

    (Saionji) I agree that the capability of nuclear weapons serving as a deterrent would work if the countries are going to be viewed as a country, but our world at present is becoming globalized, so that many of the issues we have at present cannot be resolved by looking at individual nations. We need a global perspective.

    Compared to the time when A-bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the existing nuclear weapons have far more destructive capability. It’s said that they can destroy humankind several times over.

    So what we need to think is not based upon individual countries, but upon the whole Earth. Maybe the theory of the deterrence could have had some place in the 20th century, but now we are in the 21st century, and in this 21st century as well as into the future I believe that the theory of deterrence is no longer meaningful.

    (Krieger) I agree with your latter premise that the deterrence is no longer meaningful, but I am not sure if deterrence really was helpful in the 20th century. I tend to think that we survived the nuclear threat in the 20th century more by great good fortune than by the effectiveness of deterrence. As you know, we had many close calls and came very near to nuclear disaster. I think we were extremely fortunate and we cannot rely on that good fortune to last indefinitely.

    But I agree with you totally on your main point that we are now entering into a global age. There are many problems confronting humanity, including poverty, hunger, health care, environmental degradation, and issues of terrorism. There is not one of these problems that can be resolved without global cooperation. No matter how powerful any single country is, it cannot solve global problems by itself. No country can rely upon nuclear weapons to protect it in an island of prosperity in the midst of a world with the kinds of serious problems that our world faces.

    (Saionji) I agree exactly with what you said. I wasn’t trying to justify that deterrence was that effective in the 20th century, but more to contrast that now in the 21st century it is far more meaningless compared to the 20th century. I was not trying to justify that in the 20th century deterrence was working.

    Coming back to deterrence once again, some say that a very, very rich person would build a nuclear shelter for themselves so that they themselves would be protected. What an absurd story that is!

    (Krieger) I’m glad you clarified your remarks with regards to deterrence in the 20th century. The reason I raised that point was exactly because there are many policy makers in the United States and other places who say we need to move toward a nuclear weapon-free world, because deterrence is not as valuable now as it was in the 20th century. I think this position only justifies their own behavior during the time when they were policy makers. And I think it’s appropriate to challenge that position. Deterrence was problematic in the 20th century and remains so now.

    (Saionji) Let me continue a story about a shelter. It is in Voluntary Simplicity written by Duane Elgin. He talks about the activist Dr. Helen Caldicott, because she said what would happen if the nuclear weapons were used, what tragedy is going to follow.

    Even a very, very rich person with a beautiful nuclear shelter, if his city is a target of a bombing, even if he is in a shelter, there will be flames that would eat up all the oxygen, so whoever is in a shelter is going to die because of suffocation. Even if the bombing struck far away in the community, and he makes it to run into the shelter, he would have to stay there for at least two weeks. Otherwise there will be very strong radiation that he would be exposed to.

    But if you have to stay for more than two weeks, he is going to lose his mental senses. Even let’s say he survives the first two weeks, and comes out good, there will be no doctors, no hospitals, no food, and water will be highly irradiated and contaminated. Maybe the ozone layer itself is destroyed, so he is going to have third-degree burns if he is exposed for three minutes. Thus, the whole earth is going to be burned out, and in order to avoid all of that, they will have to stay underground for five years. But even so, he is probably going to have leukemia or he is going to have typhoid fever or polio or all the other diseases which more or less have been eradicated so far.

    So it’s not a matter of who is the enemy or who is your ally. This is so powerful a weapon that once it’s used, it’s not only that individual or state that is the victim. It is going to destroy the whole Earth. That’s something we have to have everybody be aware of.

    (Krieger) I have a personal experience I’d like to share with you. This happened during the 1950s. I remember very clearly sitting around the dinner table with my parents. We were discussing bomb shelters, and my mother said, “I would rather die than go into a bomb shelter.” That was very surprising for me to hear at that time. But she said that’s no way to live. It’s no way to live, in fear and in a little shelter underground. At that time, people were talking about needing guns to keep neighbors out of their shelters. Looking back, I think my mother was quite wise. There are some ways of living that aren’t worth living. If you have to shoot your neighbors, and have an illusion that you can survive underground from nuclear weapons, that’s completely the wrong approach. Anybody who thinks the bomb shelters will save them is delusional. They are certainly not rational. The better strategy for those people and for everyone is to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons, rather than just trying to save themselves.

    (Saionji) I agree with you exactly. I think we are showing the common understanding that we have no other point that we want to pursue but to eradicate nuclear weapons. Then comes the issue of how do we approach that. That’s an issue on which I would like to exchange some opinions.

    Why don’t you start, Dr. Krieger, by telling us the vision, or what are the steps you intend to take to eliminate nuclear weapons? Of course, we do know what your Foundation is up to on these activities, but probably you could share how you would like to go by looking at different nations, different legal systems, and other systems as to how you can attain the goal of abolition.

    (Krieger) I think there are three levels that we have to think about. At the highest level, the goal needs to be a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible, and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. That’s the goal. At that level, states do need to come together and agree upon what’s included in the phases, how the verification system works, how to make it irreversible, and how to make it transparent, while still maintaining the security of all states in a process. So that’s one level.

    But getting to that level involves dealing with various states as you suggested. I think we have to first require the nuclear weapon states to give an accurate accounting of their nuclear forces. Second, I would require states to prepare environmental and human impact statements that would reveal to the public what will happen to other human beings and to the environment if their nuclear weapons are used. Third, I think we should require each state with nuclear weapons to prepare its own roadmap for going to zero. In other words, what would they need to go to zero. That’s the second level, dealing with individual nuclear weapon states and with the states that have a capability to develop nuclear weapons.

    The third level, the most foundational level, involves people all over the world. That’s the level where we work the most. We can suggest a vision of what needs to be done, but until there is a strong citizens’ movement throughout the world for the elimination nuclear weapons I don’t think political leaders will feel the necessary pressure to move with the sense of urgency toward a nuclear weapon-free world.

    We try to continue refining the vision of how global nuclear disarmament can come about, but the most important work we should do is educating people everywhere about the necessity of eliminating nuclear weapons and encouraging their engagement in pressing in an active way for the goal of abolition.

    I don’t mean to imply that this needs to be a very long process. Technologically, nuclear weapons could be dismantled and eliminated within a period of 10 years. What’s missing is the political will to change, and that’s where a large number of people need to enter into the discussion, and engage in political action to achieve that goal.

    (Saionji) I cannot agree more with what you said. With regard to the first two levels of the three levels you’ve referred to, even if you are successful in coming out with the Convention, a law or social system that is going to be better than we have, there’s no guarantee whatsoever that people are going to honor them all the way into the future. Therefore, I would say the most important is your third level, which is to change the awareness and the mentality of each and every one of us who lives on this Earth.

    I do recall that Dr. Krieger you have written about this somewhere, looking at the activities of democratization like the example of the Berlin Wall in the former East and West Germany. It was the change in the mentality of each German who came together to achieve the major change in destroying the Berlin Wall.

    So the democratization type of campaign and activities are necessary. To take another example of the non-smoking movement, even though there were dozens of reports that smoking induced lung cancer, not the federal government nor the state government nor the city government take any action. Of course, we know that there was strong pressure from the cigarette companies.

    But why has the country changed? It is because there have been changes in the awareness of the people towards smoking. That was at a basis of the foundation to change the position of the government. If you really wanted to have the nuclear-free world, what we need to do is to change the awareness and mentality of the people. Otherwise, it will not be assured for eternity into the future.

    (Krieger) I completely agree. The idea of the necessity of changing thinking has honorable routes, going back to Albert Einstein who made his famous statement that “[t]he unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” This statement was made early in the Nuclear Age, and I think it is very prescient and very wise. Until there’s a shift in thinking among large numbers of people, we probably won’t see the change that we are seeking.

    The challenge that we have, and I think that humanity has, is to how to bring about a change in thinking. Basically, it is a matter of education and persistence. Sometimes there’s a shift in thinking beneath the surface, and it’s only when circumstances are right that the shift in thinking becomes apparent. This was the case with the Berlin Wall, with the break up of the Soviet Union, and with the ending of Apartheid in South Africa. Those things didn’t just happen on the spur of the moment. There was a lot of work that was going on, like an underground stream, which eventually broke to the surface. The power for change was there beneath the surface. In a sense, that’s an act of faith. Doing this work is an act of faith, because we don’t know what the results will be, but we do know that the problem is serious enough that it demands our attention. I often feel that the work that we do to achieve a world without nuclear weapons will eventually succeed, but it’s necessary for me not to expect immediate results and to keep working in the belief that those results will come.

    (Saionji) How do we change the way of thinking? Of course, there are different ways like education, public awareness campaigns and such. However, if we think of how we can really change the mentality and way of thinking of the people, we need to go back to the fact of how much money has been spent to prepare for wars as well as for the military budget. In a year, more than $1 trillion U.S. dollars is spent for military budgets around the world.

    Is this $1 trillion plus being used for the sake of mankind? No, I think it’s a negative expenditure, because all that money that’s spent on military budgets to prepare for war is not serving the interests of mankind.

    If you look at my diagram, you can look at the society and the economic aspects, those on macro and micro levels, as well as towards science, medicine and effects toward human beings, both direct and indirect, for the physical as well as for the mental and spiritual, as well as the effects towards environment, in regard to the oxygen, pollution, toxic substances as well as ecology. In short, if we look at more than $1 trillion being spent to prepare for war and for military budgets, I don’t think a single cent is being used for the benefits of mankind. That is something that everybody should be aware of, that so much money is being spent for a negative purpose.

    If the $1 trillion is not going to be used for military budgets, that means we can eradicate the negative side of the story. But let’s turn the story around, so that the funds are going to be used positively for the welfare of mankind. They could be used for education, eradication of poverty, food, clean water and disaster relief. Let’s say the soldiers are going to be unemployed, but they can be turned around to be engaged in relief activities or to rehabilitate the damaged environment, and so on. And the welfare expenses will be utilized for medicine and education. As a result, we abate the negative use and use it positively. If you are able to do so, that goes to providing so much help in resolving the major issues that we face. I think we need to take that kind of macroscopic view. What I wanted to add is that as long as we take the macroscopic view, mankind is facing so many varied issues. However, we do have the way to solve them.

    (Krieger) I completely agree with your analysis. When you look from a macro point of view, nuclearism is the problem, but it is embedded in the larger problem of militarism. Nuclear threats are one manifestation of it. Nuclearism happens to be a manifestation that can destroy humanity, so it has special importance.

    But in terms of changing thinking, I think it is a very good idea to focus on the extraordinary amounts of money that are largely being wasted throughout the world for military purposes. Actually, the figure that I’ve heard is closer to $1.5 trillion. I saw some statistics recently that said if we took only between five to ten percent annually of what is spent globally on the military, we could meet all eight of the Millennium Development Goals’ targets for the year 2015. There is no doubt that we are using our resources for the wrong purposes.  

    If we want to think about security, we shouldn’t be thinking only about military security. Primarily we should be thinking about human security, which would require a reallocation of resources from a model of military security to a model of security threatened in various ways by illness, pollution, poverty, hunger, etc. There is a way we can solve those problems and provide security if we use some of our resources on them.

    I think it’s fair to say that where we put our resources is where our values reside. It is important to help people everywhere understand that allocating all that money to the military reflects values that don’t honor human rights. First of all, the military is primarily a killing machine. Second, you have missed the opportunity of helping people who really need help now.

    One of the figures that is worth noting is that the United States alone spent $7.5 trillion on its nuclear weapons and delivery systems from the beginning of the Nuclear Age. This enormous amount of money has been diverted from socially beneficial programs into making weapons that hopefully will never be used again.

    (Saionji) I would like to come up with something like a textbook, or part of a textbook, a part which could be put, and edited into a textbook, in which it could be a joint collaboration with you, Dr. Krieger. Because of all the “inconvenient truths,” we would need to do a good job of accurately analyzing the situation, and expressing it in a way that is easy to understand, whether by the children or just ordinary plain people.

    (Krieger) I’d be happy to collaborate with you on such a project. This takes us back to some of our earlier comments on common sense. Everything that you are talking about here is common sense. It should be easy for people to understand. Also, using An Inconvenient Truth as a model, it might be a good idea to also prepare a video so that it’s easier for people to get the information.

    (Saionji) Yes, we can think of many other media, in terms of how to distribute the message. But what I would want to stress is that I would want as many people as possible to have an accurate understanding of what we call common sense, the simple common sense. That’s why I have referred to it as a textbook. It could be video, or it could take other form as well. Also, I serve as mentor of Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, so we could probably collaborate with them as well. It would be the mission to diffuse the message to as many people as possible, especially to the children, the importance of the common sense we share.

    One of the pillars of UNESCO’s activities is to carry out ESD, which is its Education for Sustainable Development program, and that’s the basic education that they like to render in order to create the sustainable Earth – sustainable in terms of peaceful, and would include all subjects we’ve talked about. If you talk about sustainable society, all the problems we’ve discussed would be included. I believe that’s a basic message that we need to communicate to all the people.

    (Krieger) I agree.

    (Saionji) Yes, when we were talking about the education of children earlier, you mentioned “peace leaders.” Could you elaborate a bit about “peace leaders”?

    (Krieger) We are trying to reach as many people as possible, particularly young people, and teach them about peace and about leadership. When I say peace, I mean it in a broad sense, because peace requires justice and human security. We want young people to have a sense that they can contribute to making a better world. There are things they can do and things that they need to know in order to make a contribution.

    In addition to education about the issues, we are also trying to teach leadership skills. Most young people don’t have any training for leadership. There is no place for learning how to lead in school, so we are trying to encourage young people to develop skills such as organizing, goal setting, public speaking and public outreach – various skills that are required for leadership.

    One of the things we observe is that most leadership is hierarchical. In the military or in a corporation, there are very hierarchical leadership methods. Such leadership is very easy to implement when a higher ranking person tells a lower ranking person what to do. But with peace leadership, you don’t have any hierarchy. It’s a harder form of leadership, because you cannot order somebody to do something, and you cannot fire them if they don’t do it. You have to convince them from your heart that something is worth doing. You have to sustain the interests of the people you want to follow. It is very challenging to help people to develop leadership skills in working for peace. But that’s our goal.

    It’s very interesting that we have a young person who is leading our program who was a West Point graduate. West Point is the United States Military Academy. He went through West Point and served in the army for seven years after graduating. During that period, he wrote and published a book on peace titled Will War Ever End? He has written a second book on peace that’s going to be published soon. We think we are very fortunate to have that young man, who has leadership training in the military but wants to apply that training to the challenge of developing peace leaders.

    (Saionji) Yes, we do put importance in education, so here again is another area that we would like to further step up our collaboration, especially in the Peace Leadership Program you have mentioned. I hope that we shall be able to share and exchange more information about the Peace Leadership Program, and activities that we do as well. It would be very nice if the young man you have referred to, who is a graduate of West Point, would come to Japan one day and speak to the people here in Japan.

    (Krieger) I would love to see that happen.

    (Saionji) You have been working to eliminate nuclear weapons for the last 40 years. But I don’t think the elimination of nuclear weapons in itself is an ultimate goal that you have set forth. When I read your books and other articles you have written, it is clear that just by eradicating nuclear weapons it is not going to make the world perfect or end up in a nice peaceful world. So what’s your image of a peaceful world? And how would you set that as your vision?

    (Krieger) That’s a great question. First of all, I totally agree that a world free of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a peaceful world, although I believe it would be a better world. By eliminating nuclear weapons in the world, we would have eliminated the most urgent threat to humankind and to the future of life. But, of course, that’s not the end. We need to build a world that is fair for all people, that gives all the people a chance to live their lives fully. We need to create a world in which there are not a few people living in extraordinary luxury, as at the present, while billions of people are living without enough food, without safe drinking water, without health care, without education. There’s something terribly wrong with our humanity if we allow those conditions to continue.

    We can readily identify one of the primary areas that needs to change if we are going to solve the problem of gross inequality in the world. That is redistributing the large military budgets to positive uses. I strongly believe that we have to keep working for a more just and decent world. That’s an obligation of all of us on our planet. If you have the privilege to live in a place where you are not wanting for food, where your human rights are being protected, where you already have a decent life, there is responsibility to help others who are less fortunate on our planet.

    We need to take our responsibilities, learn to think globally, become better world citizens, and speak out on these issues of inequities and injustice, and not allow them to be buried from view. We need to make these issues transparent, and we need to work to change them. Eliminating nuclear weapons is getting rid of a big threat hanging over humanity. Then we can concentrate on the many things we need to change in a positive direction.

    (Saionji) I just want to share with you the Declaration for All Life on Earth, that is by our Foundation, in which people, animals, and plants all have the responsibility to support the Earth. Furthermore, we have four guiding principles: 1) reverence for life; 2) respect for all differences; 3) gratitude for coexistence with all of nature; and 4) harmony between the spiritual and material, in which regardless of different ethnicity, or countries, there are common values that could be shared by all the people on Earth.

    I know we are running out of time, so this will be the last question. Having had the discussion this morning, I would like you to refer to what each individual can do in order so that he or she shall make a contribution to creating a world free of nuclear weapons.

    (Krieger) In looking at this Declaration for All Life on Earth, I appreciate its overall sentiments. What particularly catches my interest is the Age of the Individual, not in the sense of egoism, but an age in which every individual is ready to accept the responsibility. That’s something I have believed in for a long time – along with rights, go responsibilities. I am happy to see that responsibility is there.

    What responsibility can individuals take with regard to nuclear weapons? I think responsibility lies primarily with the citizens of nuclear weapon states, the countries that have nuclear weapons. But in broader sense it’s a problem for all humanity. People need to cut through the seeming layers of complication, and get to the level of understanding that these weapons do not promote life and are really instruments of death on a massive scale, a scale beyond anything that we can easily imagine.

    One of the challenges is just to imagine what nuclear weapons are capable of. Beyond that, people need to speak out, they need to communicate with their political leaders, they need to not accept simplistic solutions from political leaders, but rather to challenge reliance upon these weapons.

    Individuals need to themselves become agents of change. First, they need to learn, then they can teach other people, their friends and acquaintances. The last thing, I think is the need to persevere and persist in seeking the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. I think everybody has different talents. Some people are fine singers, some people can write, some people can teach. Whatever a person’s talent happens to be, I would like to see them use their creativity to put that talent to work for a nuclear weapon-free world. I cannot tell them how to use their talents, but I know everyone has some talent that they can use. My main point is that people need to raise the priority of the nuclear issue, and understand the urgency of solving this problem, so we can move on and solve the many other serious problems that deserve our attention.

    (Saionji) Thank you very much. It was a very wonderful discussion, and thank you so much for your contribution to our Foundation.

    (Krieger) Thank you, it was a pleasure talking with you.

    Hiroo Saionji is President of the Goi Peace Foundation (www.goipeace.or.jp) founded in Japan in 1999. The Foundation is dedicated to supporting the evolution of humanity toward a peaceful and harmonious new civilization by promoting consciousness, values and wisdom for creating peace, and by building cooperation among individuals and organizations across diverse fields, including education, science, culture and the arts. Mr. Saionji is the great-grandson of Prince Kinmochi Saionji, who was twice Prime Minster of Japan during the Meiji Period. He also serves as the president of the World Peace Prayer Society, a member of the Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, an Ambassador of the World Wisdom Council, and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation for Cultural Heritage and Art Research, among others. In 2007, he was awarded the Cultural Prize of the Dr. Lin Tsung-i Foundation of Taiwan, in recognition of his contributions to world peace. He also received the Philosopher Saint Shree Dnyaneshwara World Peace Prize of India along with his wife Masami Saionji in 2008.

  • President Obama Is on the Right Track

    This article was originally published on the National Journal Experts’ Blog

    President Obama is on the right track with his multiple efforts to reduce nuclear dangers.  I only wish that it were a faster track and reflected a greater sense of urgency.  His policies take account of some important current realities: The Cold War has ended (20 years ago); the greatest threat confronting the US and the world is no longer all-out nuclear war, but nuclear proliferation and nuclear-armed terrorists; and the United States has obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to engage in “good faith” negotiations to achieve total nuclear disarmament. 

    The Obama administration made a smart move by ruling out using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  It could have gone further, though.  While the administration surely sees its posture as a useful threat for states not in compliance, this is a two-edged sword.  Such threats also send a message to the rest of the world that the US still finds nuclear weapons useful and is willing to threaten their use.  This continued reliance on nuclear weapons reinforces the current double standards of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” which in the long run will not hold.  Some states may be encouraged, as was North Korea, to pursue nuclear weapons capabilities in the belief that they can deter an attack by a more powerful adversary.

    The nuclear weapons reductions in the New START agreement are modest and leave more than enough capability on each side to destroy civilization, but they are a step forward and they do extend the important verification provisions of the first START agreement.  They should be seen as a platform from which to continue the downward movement in nuclear arms to zero.  Ultimately, zero is the only safe, secure and stable number of nuclear weapons in the world. 

    The US has enormous conventional force capability.  While this allows us to reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons, it also creates problems with the Russians in achieving further nuclear reductions.  Russia has repeatedly expressed concerns with our missile defense deployments, our unwillingness to curtail space weaponization, and our Prompt Global Strike program that would entail putting conventional warheads on ICBMs.  To get to substantially lower levels of nuclear arms and finally to zero, we are going to have to meet the concerns of the Russians and other countries that we are not simply making the world safe for US conventional weapons superiority.

    Realists such as former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger support the new nuclear posture of the Obama administration.  Critics such as Senators Jon Kyl and John McCain are playing nuclear politics with loaded barrels, pursuing outdated nuclear policies that are MAD in all senses, not only policies of Mutual Assured Destruction but policies based upon Mutual Assured Delusions.  We cannot continue to base our security on nuclear weapons without running the risk of massive and catastrophic disaster.  

    I would urge President Obama to move rapidly in building on the progress he has made to this point.  There is no scenario that would justify US use of nuclear weapons again.  Nuclear deterrence is unstable and dangerous.  Deterrence is a theory and it cannot be proven to be effective under all conditions in the future.  It came close to failing on various occasions during the Cold War.  Deterrence relies upon rationality, and it remains a dangerous assumption that all leaders will act rationally at all times.  Deterrence is subject to human fallibility, and human fallibility and nuclear weapons are a flammable mixture.

    A stronger indication that President Obama is indeed committed to seeking “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” would be a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons, coupled with taking the weapons off hair-trigger alert and continuing to work with the Russians and soon other nuclear weapon states on major reductions in arsenals.  We should be pursuing a new treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons.  US leadership for this will be essential.

  • How to Build on the Start Treaty

    This article was originally published by The New York Times

    This has been a remarkable time for the Obama administration. After a year of intense internal debate, it issued a new nuclear strategy. And after a year of intense negotiations with the Russians, President Obama signed the New Start treaty with President Dmitri Medvedev in Prague. On Monday, the president will host the leaders of more than 40 nations in a nuclear security summit meeting whose goal is to find ways of gaining control of the loose fissile material around the globe.

    New Start is the first tangible product of the administration’s promise to “press the reset button” on United States-Russian relations. The new treaty is welcome. But as a disarmament measure, it is a modest step, entailing a reduction of only 30 percent from the former limit — and some of that reduction is accomplished by the way the warheads are counted, not by their destruction. Perhaps the treaty’s greatest accomplishment is that the negotiations leading up to its signing re-engaged Americans and Russians in a serious discussion of how to reduce nuclear dangers.

    So what should come next? We look forward to a follow-on treaty that builds on the success of the previous Start treaties and leads to significantly greater arms reductions — including reductions in tactical nuclear weapons and reductions that require weapons be dismantled and not simply put in reserve.

    But our discussions with Russian colleagues, including senior government officials, suggest that such a next step would be very difficult for them. Part of the reason for their reluctance to accept further reductions is that Russia considers itself to be encircled by hostile forces in Europe and in Asia. Another part results from the significant asymmetry between United States and Russian conventional military forces. For these reasons, we believe that the next round of negotiations with Russia should not focus solely on nuclear disarmament issues. These talks should encompass missile defense, Russia’s relations with NATO, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, North Korea, Iran and Asian security issues.

    Let’s begin with missile defense. Future arms talks should make a serious exploration of a joint United States-Russia program that would provide a bulwark against Iranian missiles. We should also consider situating parts of the joint system in Russia, which in many ways offers an ideal strategic location for these defenses. Such an effort would not only improve our security, it would also further cooperation in dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat, including the imposition of consequential sanctions when appropriate.

    NATO is a similarly complicated issue. After the cold war ended, Russia was invited to NATO meetings with the idea that the country would eventually become an integral part of European security discussions. The idea was good, but the execution failed. NATO has acted as if Russia’s role is that of an observer with no say in decisions; Russia has acted as if it should have veto power.

    Neither outlook is viable. But if NATO moves from consensus decisions to super-majority decisions in its governing structure, as has been considered, it would be possible to include Russia’s vote as an effective way of resolving European security issues of common interest.

    The Russians are also eager to revisit the two landmark cold war treaties. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty enabled NATO and Warsaw Pact nations to make significant reductions in conventional armaments and to limit conventional deployments. Today, there is still a need for limiting conventional arms, but the features of that treaty pertaining to the old Warsaw Pact are clearly outdated. Making those provisions relevant to today’s world should be a goal of new talks

    Similarly, the 1987 treaty that eliminated American and Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles was a crucially important pact that helped to defuse cold war tensions. But today Russia has neighbors that have such missiles directed at its borders; for understandable reasons, it wants to renegotiate aspects of this treaty.

    Future arms reductions with Russia are eminently possible. But they are unlikely to be achieved unless the United States is willing to address points of Russian concern. Given all that is at stake, we believe comprehensive discussions are a necessity as we work our way toward ever more significant nuclear disarmament.

  • Nuclear Security

    This article was originally published by the International Herald Tribune

    The 47 heads of state who will assemble in Washington next week for the world’s first Nuclear Security Summit should focus like a laser beam on the biggest potential threat to civilization.

    Psychologically, it is almost impossible to imagine terrorists exploding a nuclear bomb that devastates the heart of Moscow or Mumbai, New York or Cairo. Analytically, however, there’s only one difference between Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack that extinguished the lives of 3,000 people in New York, or the 11/26 attack that killed nearly 200 in Mumbai, and a nuclear Mumbai or 9/11 that could kill hundreds of thousands in a single blow. That difference is terrorists getting a nuclear bomb.

    No one who has examined the evidence has any doubt that terrorist groups — including Al Qaeda, Chechen separatists and Lashkar-e-Taiba — have shown serious interest and undertaken substantial efforts to acquire material and equipment for this purpose. The highly enriched uranium required to make an elementary nuclear bomb could be hidden inside a football.

    The big insight that motivates the summit is that the leaders assembled there have in their power the ways and means to successfully prevent nuclear terrorism. The key to success is to deny terrorists the means to achieve their deadliest aspirations.

    Fortunately, physics provides a syllogism that says: no fissile material, no mushroom cloud, no nuclear terrorism.

    All that the members of the international community have to do to prevent this ultimate catastrophe is to lock up all nuclear weapons and materials as securely as gold in Fort Knox or treasures in the Kremlin Armory. This is a big “all” — but it consists of actions we know how to take and can afford. Other powerful radioactive sources should be equally protected.

    How can this be done? The leaders who convene will address an issue the international community has so far been dragging its feet on — implementing the obligation states have already committed themselves to in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, to adopt “effective, appropriate measures to secure all nuclear materials.”

    In confronting this challenge, those assembled can apply many of the lessons learned by the United States and Russia over the past 18 years in their cooperative threat-reduction program, as well as the best practices and technologies developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    The bottom line by which the summit should be scored is whether as a result of this effort, states take specific actions, including the allocation of resources to make the world safer from a nuclear explosion by an extremist group.

    A number of states will announce actions that they have already taken in preparation for the summit. Others, we hope, will make unambiguous commitments to take observable actions. We trust these actions will be supported by every state, reflecting a global recognition that a nuclear explosion anywhere is a nuclear explosion everywhere.

    This Nuclear Security Summit focuses on the most urgent dimension of nuclear danger. But this is only one part of a larger, more complex agenda. The “New START” arms control agreement between the United States and Russia takes another step on the path to eliminating all nuclear arsenals. Next month, the Nonproliferation Review Conference will provide a further opportunity for international cooperation in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

    To address the array of nuclear threats and specifically the specter of a nuclear bomb exploding in one of our cities with consequences that will fundamentally change our lives and our world, the supreme requirement is for meaningful, sustained international cooperation.

    We applaud the leaders for their initiative in focusing on this grave challenge. Still, as with many international summits that have gone before, we will withhold judgment until we see what leaders actually do measured in terms of the challenge we face.

  • Reaching Zero

    This article was originally published by The Nation

    What is the purpose, if any, of the nuclear bomb, that brooding presence that has shadowed all human life for sixty-five years? The question has haunted the nuclear age. It may be that no satisfactory answer has ever been given. Nuclear strategic thinking, in particular, has disappointed. Many of its pioneers have wound up in a state of something like despair regarding their art. For example, Bernard Brodie, one of the originators of nuclear strategy in the 1940s, was forced near the end of his life to realize that “nuclear strategy itself–the body of thoughts that he himself had helped formulate–was something of an illusion,” according to historian Fred Kaplan. In the introduction to The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Lawrence Freedman airs the suspicion that the phrase “nuclear strategy” may be a “contradiction in terms.” Henry Kissinger, a leading figure in nuclear strategizing for a half-century, has expressed a similar feeling of futility. In a remarkable reconsideration, amounting to an oblique recantation of his past thinking, he has written recently in Newsweek:

    The basic dilemma of the nuclear age has been with us since Hiroshima: how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapons into some moral or political relationship with the objectives that are being pursued. Any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign-policy objectives. Efforts to develop a more nuanced application have never succeeded, from the doctrine of a geographically limited nuclear war in the 1950s and 1960s to the “mutual assured destruction” theory of general nuclear war in the 1970s.

    Now a new moment, full of fresh promise but also with novel perils, has arrived in the nuclear story, and all the old questions have to be asked again. As if responding to some secret signal sent out by a restless zeitgeist, the globe is seething with events large and small in the nuclear arena. Here in the United States, certainly, all the policy pots on the nuclear stove are at a boil. Soon, the Obama administration will complete its overdue Nuclear Posture Review, a statement that Congress requires of the president every four years on the disposition of the country’s nuclear forces.

    It will give the administration’s answer to the key questions: What nuclear forces should the United States deploy? Why? What, if anything, does the United States propose to do with them? On April 8 the United States and Russia will sign a new Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement, which will reduce warheads to 1,550 on each side and restrict delivery vehicles to 800 apiece. Also in early April, President Obama will hold a Nuclear Security Summit with the heads of state of forty-four other nations to consider measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear weapon materials into unauthorized hands. In early May will come the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which is a kind of nuclear posture review for the entire world. Decisions on passage of the long-rejected Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as a resurrected Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty are also likely very soon.

    The key question, of course, is whether the policies and actions will meet the mounting perils of the new situation. What’s needed for success, I will suggest, is a revival precisely of the discredited art of nuclear strategic thinking, which may, with suitable adjustments, yet have something to offer us. Strategy, military thinkers have long told us, is the art of marrying up tactical means with broad political ends. That is exactly what is most sorely missing in nuclear policy today. Certainly, no mere piecemeal examination will suffice. A comprehensive approach is needed.

    The Nuclear Surge

    For taken together, the dangers mark the world’s arrival at a new stage in the evolution of nuclear danger, forcing fundamental decisions on nuclear and nonnuclear powers alike. In a word, the nuclear predicament is coming of age, which is to say that it is fulfilling a potential that every competent scientist has known it possessed since the advent of the bomb in 1945: nuclear technology, no longer the preserve of a few privileged powers, is becoming available on a global basis. This is because of the simple but decisive fact that the bomb is based on scientific knowledge, which is in its nature unconfinable. This spread is at the heart of the growing nuclear peril–a kind of nuclear surge–in today’s world.

    To say that the technology is becoming available to all, however, is not to say that it is possessed by all or even that it will be. It means only that if nations or others want it, they will be able to have it. Japan, for example, does not have a nuclear bomb. But one is available to Japan in short order if it so chooses. According to the State Department, the bomb is thus available to some fifty other countries. This number of potential nuclear powers is destined to grow. If those countries do not build the bomb, the reason can only be a domestic and international political decision that they should not. The more this availability spreads (as it must), the higher and stronger the political barriers against proliferation must become.

    Of course, at a certain point, which may not be far off, availability, if not possession, will spill beyond national confines and reach smaller groups. At that point the political walls will have to be high and strong indeed. Otherwise, a nuclear 9/11 may be upon us.

    Obviously, any deliberate spread of nuclear technology, such as the “renaissance” of nuclear power that has apparently begun, will only accelerate the surge.

    This underlying and irreversible pressure of availability is the backdrop for today’s widespread and well-founded dread that proliferation by just a few countries–above all, North Korea and Iran–will push the world over what the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, a group set up by the Japanese and Australian governments, calls a “tipping point,” precipitating a “cascade” of proliferation that will wash away the current nuclear order. South Asia has of course already gone nuclear, with India and Pakistan engaged in an arms race. India, aping the United States, has planned a triad of air, land and sea nuclear forces while impoverished, crisis-ridden Pakistan struggles to keep up.

    The Middle East and East Asia, led by Iran and North Korea, could become the next regions to travel down this path. According to the Washington Post, A.Q. Khan, the “father” of Pakistan’s bomb and the arch-proliferator of its nuclear technology, has said that Iranian officials asked him in the 1980s to sell them ready-made bombs. Since then Iran has appeared to many to be using its right to develop nuclear power technology as a pathway to building the bomb from scratch. If it does, other countries in the Middle East may well follow suit. More immediately, Iran and nuclear-armed Israel would find themselves in a perilous balance–or rather, extreme imbalance, since Israel already has an undeclared arsenal of perhaps 200 warheads. If North Korea, which already has the bomb, refuses, as seems likely, to give it up under pressure from the world community, then something similar could happen in East Asia, and Japan might indeed produce its own bomb.

    And yet if it’s tempting to some in the United States and elsewhere to define the new nuclear moment solely as a crisis of proliferation, they should be brought up short by a single brute fact: more than 95 percent of the world’s 23,000 or so nuclear warheads remain in the possession of two countries: the United States, with some 9,000, and Russia, with some 13,000.

    If one ineluctable truth of Year 65 of the bomb is that the sources of nuclear danger are destined to be global, another is that the world’s existing arsenals are likewise indivisibly global. They are joined in a kind of unity of hostility. Each nuclear nation (Israel, which has no nuclear adversary, may be the odd man out) cites the arsenal of another or others as the rationale for possessing its own, in multiple chains that link them together into a network of threats and counterthreats. For example, in one such chain, Pakistan fears India, which fears China, which fears Russia, which fears the United States. This network of terror and counterterror underscores another truth of the nuclear age: every possessor of the bomb, by its very existence, teaches possible proliferators a pair of lessons that are the prime (if not the only) motives for proliferation. First, you will be living in a nuclear-armed world; second, if you want to be protected in that world you must have nuclear arms yourself. (In addition, it has of course occurred to many countries, especially North Korea and Iran, that nuclear weapons could deter overwhelming conventional power such as that possessed by the United States.) From national points of view, each arsenal is distinct, but from a global proliferation point of view they are a joint inducement for the further spread of nuclear arms.

    The necessary conclusion is clear: proliferation can’t be stopped unless possession is dealt with concurrently. In the seventh decade of the nuclear age, the time for half-solutions is over. The head of state with his finger on the button of some aging cold war arsenal, the head of state itching to put his finger on such a button, the nuclear power operator, the nuclear smuggler and the terrorist in his hideout dreaming of unparalleled mass murder are actors on a single playing field. In this respect, too, the nuclear dilemma has become indivisibly global.

    This is a truth, however, that the world’s nine nuclear powers do not like to acknowledge, because it has an implication they are reluctant to accept, which is that if they want to be safe from nuclear danger they must commit themselves to surrendering their own nuclear arms.

    Strategic Incoherence

    And yet that is exactly what Barack Obama did in his speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, saying, “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Encouragingly, his commitment has been accompanied by the widest support for nuclear abolition since President Harry Truman sent Bernard Baruch to ask the world in 1946 to choose between “the quick and the dead.” For one thing, a remarkable phalanx of former and current officials, Republican as well as Democratic, have embraced the goal. Their calls originated with the by-now-famous article by the “Gang of Four”–former Secretary of State George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Senator Sam Nunn–who in a January 2007 Wall Street Journal article announced their support for “a world free of nuclear weapons” and called for “working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.” This unlikely foursome harked back to the previously underappreciated fact that Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, at their summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986, had come within an ace of agreeing to nuclear abolition. (The deal foundered because Gorbachev would agree to it only if Reagan dropped his Strategic Defense Initiative, and Reagan would not.) Today, a majority of former secretaries of state and defense support a world free of nuclear weapons.

    A remarkable number of new government and civil panels, commissions and other initiatives have also sprung up to support the goal. Among them is a new group, Global Zero, which proposes abolition by 2030 and is supported by a Who’s Who of international as well as American signatories, including, for example, Gorbachev, Jimmy Carter and former GOP Senator Chuck Hagel. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Henry L. Stimson Center and the Nuclear Threat Initiative all have serious, well-funded programs to scout the path to zero and determine what would be required to stay there. Meanwhile, the traditional antinuclear movement, led by such groups as Peace Action, the American Friends Service Committee and the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, are marshaling support for a nuclear weapons convention.

    If Obama’s commitment to abolition and the movement in support of it were setting the tone and agenda of current nuclear negotiations, the world might now be in the first stage of a final solution (to give that dread phrase a new and positive meaning) of the nuclear dilemma. Each proposal in the negotiations would be weighed in the light of the distance it traveled toward a nuclear-weapons-free world. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. Instead, what have been offered are at best a series of timid makeshifts or, at worst, de facto subversion of the Prague objective. If this trend continues, it is entirely possible that the ultimate mockery will occur: nuclear arsenals will march forward into the future under a banner that reads Ban the Bomb.

    Let us consider two policy arenas: the START agreement and the Nuclear Posture Review.

    Nothing on the nuclear stage today is stranger or less adequately explained than the spectacle, still on view twenty years after the end of the cold war, of the United States and Russia holding each other hostage to nuclear annihilation with arsenals in the thousands poised on alert. The current agreement, which will remain in force until 2020, sets a ceiling of 1,550 warheads on each side that must be reached by 2017. The reduction from the old ceiling of 2,200 is of course welcome. The continuation of a system of inspections is even more welcome. But what are we to make of the 1,550 warheads that remain? After all, the limit on the 1,550 is also a permission for the 1,550. The arrangement indefinitely leaves intact the essential fact that the United States and Russia are poised to blow each other up many times over, as if the cold war had never ended. What is that about?

    If strategy is the art of using tactics to achieve political ends, then the persistence of these arsenals represents its nemesis. What political purpose is served? There is no quarrel between the two nations that would justify deployment of even a single nuclear weapon. An answer is often made that the United States must have such an arsenal because Russia still does–as a “deterrent.” But this begs the question. For today, as in the past forty years, since the beginning of arms control agreements in 1972, the size of the US arsenal has of course been a negotiated figure. The question is not, as is sometimes pretended, whether in the face of a Russian threat the United States needs to protect itself and size its forces accordingly; it is what figure the two sides should jointly set in talks like the ones just concluded. What stopped Hillary Clinton when she went to Moscow from proposing a force on each side of, say, 300 weapons, as has been suggested by a prominent Air Force officer and two Air University professors recently in Strategic Studies Quarterly? For that matter, why not zero? That step admittedly would require bringing the other nuclear powers into the talks. But why not do that–or at least set a time frame for doing so, thereby explicitly linking the current agreement to the president’s announced goal?

    It is here that the strategic deficit becomes most glaring. It’s not just that tactics have lost contact with political goals, it is that nuclear tactics (in this case, deployments) are weighed without any reference to politics whatsoever. Admittedly, the possibility of Russia backsliding into hostilities with the United States is sometimes cited as a reason for strategic “hedging,” but the obvious next question is whether the United States would prefer to be in a nuclear confrontation with a backslid Russia or in a merely conventional confrontation. Has Washington decided that in case of any hostilities nuclear confrontations are preferable to nonnuclear ones?

    Behind this issue looms a larger unasked strategic question. Are nations in general safer when they aim nuclear weapons at one another (“deter” one another)? Are some pairs safer and others not? Which ones? For example, do Americans think India and Pakistan were wise in 1998 to jointly go nuclear and threaten each other with annihilation? Are they safer today for having taken that step? The refusal of the United States and Russia to show the way by denuclearizing their own relationship is an answer that speaks louder than the Prague commitment and undercuts it. That refusal says that nuclear weapons are useful and do make you safer. But this lesson cuts the legs out from under any serious nonproliferation effort. Wasn’t the need for nonproliferation where we began? Isn’t that now the main professed goal of the United States in the nuclear field? Here is strategic incoherence in its acutest form. Deployments to meet a vanished threat spoil any effort to deal with a current real one.

    What we have heard so far of the Nuclear Posture Review exemplifies the same intellectual debacle. Reportedly, the document will reject the proposal for “no first use.” No first use is the policy of using nuclear weapons only in retaliation for nuclear attacks. All other attacks, including ones with biological or chemical weapons, would be met by conventional forces.

    The rejection of no first use would crystallize, as perhaps nothing else can, the strategic disarray of American nuclear policy. Like the persistence of the forces of mutual assured destruction, it would represent the banishment of politics from strategy (meaning in fact that strategy no longer is strategy). The first-use policy was born in the 1950s, when US leaders believed they could deter perceived Soviet conventional superiority in Europe only by threatening a nuclear response. Is it really necessary to state once again that the cold war is over? Apparently it is, because in this arena, too, news of the geopolitical revolution of 1989-91 has yet to reach the American strategic brain. There, “extended deterrence” seems to be permanently planted on the basis of a kind of incurable nostalgia for the cold war. Fantastically, surreally, the United States is still using nuclear arms to repel a Russian conventional attack on Europe, as if it were 1958. (We might as well say “Soviet attack,” since the threat is imaginary.) This obsolete readiness is symbolically embodied in the deployment even today of some 200 American tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, ready at a moment’s notice to repel Soviet hordes coming through the Fulda Gap. In February, five of the European countries thus “defended” (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway) recommended that the weapons be withdrawn. Washington is still thinking about it.

    More important for today’s concerns is that a no-first-use policy is the sine qua non of any effective nonproliferation strategy. If nuclear weapons are needed not only to counter other nuclear weapons but to repel conventional, chemical and biological attacks as well, then what responsible national leader can afford to do without them? The problem is not merely symbolic. If the nine nuclear powers are ready to use their arms to perform a grab bag of tasks, then the dangers to nonnuclear countries really do multiply, perhaps inspiring them to acquire these devices, evidently so versatile and useful, for themselves.

    Toward a New Nuclear Strategy

    To escape from this scene of halfhearted and ineffectual measures serving unclear or contradictory goals, the United States needs new strategic thinking. In exploring what it should be, perhaps it will be useful to look back at past strategic thought.

    The great intellectual artifact of cold war strategy was the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. It adopted a new aim for military deployments. In the renowned words of Bernard Brodie in 1946, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.” This insight, which was recognized as a basis of policy in the early 1960s by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, marked a true revolution in military affairs. Broadly speaking, war-fighting strategies were replaced by war-not-fighting strategies. Not to fight, according to this policy, was to win. And yet under this policy the way not to fight was nevertheless to plan to fight. The trick was to restrict the plan for fighting to nuclear retaliation, in the hope that that day would never come. Thus was born the paradoxical, or contradictory, policy on which survival in the nuclear age was believed to rest. Safety from nuclear destruction depended not on getting rid of the arms that threatened it but on threats to inflict that same nuclear destruction.

    In retrospect, it seems the doctrine of deterrence has been a true Janus: it has been based on one thoroughgoing absurdity and one profound truth. The absurdity was the idea that you could lastingly and reliably avoid an action–mutual suicide in a nuclear war–by threatening the action. The problem, as many critics noted, was that at any given moment–but especially in a crisis–you did not know whether you would get the nuclear non-use that was the new strategic goal or the use whose threat was the tactical means to achieve the non-use. Strategists and moralists twisted and turned in the coils of this dilemma, even as the world lived (as it still technically lives) on the knife-edge of catastrophe. Moralists pondered the virtue of threatening a crime in order not to commit it; strategists wondered how a threat of “suicide” (McNamara) could be “credible” to the one so threatened. None of them found answers, yet the policy became so deeply ingrained in policy circles that today people refer to the American nuclear arsenal as “our deterrent,” as if the hardware and its alleged purpose were one.

    And yet the doctrine did also rest on one profound truth–its acknowledgment that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” as Reagan and Gorbachev put it in 1985.Implicit in this revolution in military affairs was a strategic revolution. The political gains that governments had pursued through wars were given up, now replaced by a need to preserve the peace, which itself became the only sane strategic objective. You might say that deterrence has pursued a sane goal by insane means–a cleavage manifested in the fact that even as deterrence fought off nuclear use, and in a certain sense fortified what has been called the “nuclear taboo” and the “tradition of non-use,” it at the same time pinioned the world permanently on the brink of such use.

    Is it then possible that abolition can be seen as a rectification and completion of the strategic revolution begun but left unfinished by deterrence? How great, after all, would be the shift from the strategic goal of “non-use,” or the “tradition of non-use,” to the strategic goal of “nonpossession,” to a “tradition of nonpossession”? Doesn’t non-use in a way already cast nuclear weapons on history’s scrap heap?

    It is a peculiarity of deterrence that the weapons themselves, rather than political developments, dictate the strategic aim (non-use). In its pathological form, this peculiarity leads to the divorce of deployments and posture from politics that we see now. But in the benign form of abolition, the strategy dictated by arms and the strategy dictated by policy would coincide. Both would say, with the new Henry Kissinger: there is no quarrel in the world worth a nuclear war, so don’t fight one or arm yourself to do so.

    The conclusion is strengthened when you recall that even at zero, deterrence does not melt away completely. The reason is that the roots of the nuclear dilemma lie in inextinguishable advances in scientific knowledge. For even as this knowledge could permit cheaters to violate an abolition agreement, so it would permit the international community to respond in kind. The point is not to propose overelaborate schemes of nuclear rearmament if a crisis were to occur at zero (the conventional forces of the threatened international community would surely suffice) but to point out that there is no sharp discontinuity, as is often suggested, between the “minimum deterrence” represented by, say, a few hundred weapons and zero. Rather there is a smooth continuity all the way to zero, and even beyond, as political and legal as well as technical arrangements needed to keep the world at zero gradually strengthened. Unfortunately, technical bans are all in principle reversible. It has been otherwise with a few moral and legal revolutions, including the abolition of slavery, and there is reason to hope that the abolition of nuclear arms would be one of these. When that happened, deterrence would have been left finally and completely behind.

    The Architecture of Zero

    The needed change is to turn abolition from a far-off goal into an active organizing principle that gives direction to everything that is done in the nuclear arena–in other words, a strategic goal. The indivisible nuclear surge under way in today’s world can be mastered only with an indivisible program to defeat it. Let us, then, borrowing from Obama in Prague, take “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” as the new strategic objective–the political goal in the pursuit of which all tactics become the means. That goal has two requisites. The first is getting rid of existing nuclear weapons. The tactical means to that goal are of course negotiations among the nuclear powers. The second requisite is building a system that safeguards the world from the recrudescence of nuclear weapons once they are gone. This system will be the true architecture of zero. The tactical means to that goal are negotiating an ever-tightening web of restrictions imposed on all technology usable for nuclear weapons.

    Of the two, the second is more difficult. For while the process of nuclear disarmament will continue for only a limited time, until zero is reached, the architecture of zero must be built to last forever, since the knowledge that underlies nuclear weapons will never disappear. The tactics for reaching this goal only begin with the construction of systems of inspection and enforcement. More important over the long run is building a political and legal order in which the attempt to build a nuclear weapon would be designated a crime against humanity. More important still would be the moral deepening of the taboo.

    The art of strategy–so notably absent in today’s contradictory mélange of policies–is to combine the measures needed to achieve the two goals into a single, coherent, self-reinforcing plan. Above all, the nonproliferation efforts that are the precursors to an architecture of zero are in mortal need of the united planetary political will that can be created only by a clear, credible commitment to a time-bound plan for abolition to which all nuclear powers are formally agreed. It should take the form of a commitment to create the sort of nuclear weapons convention that the antinuclear movement has long advocated–one that, as noted earlier, seeks to ban all weapons of mass destruction.

    To postpone abolition is to postpone nonproliferation. Today arms control and nonproliferation proceed in two parallel negotiating universes–the NPT review on the one side and START talks on the other. The two need to be brought together in a simple bargain that is already implicit in the provisions of the NPT: the nuclear powers will surrender their arsenals on condition that other powers agree not to obtain any.

    Such a strategy would build on the truth underlying deterrence doctrine while gradually retiring its absurd features. It would enable nuclear strategy, at last, to catch up with history. It would deliver Russia and the United States from the weapons-forged hostility that politically no longer exists. It would unify the world around a common goal–one already embraced under the NPT by 184 countries and enshrined in their laws. Nuclear states (as long as they persist as such) would be at one with nonnuclear states in preventing proliferation, even as they all worked together to put in place the architecture of zero that would make the ban permanent and safe. Finally, the strategy would provide a measuring rod for judging the merit of interim steps, such as START and no first use. They would be judged by the specific contribution they made to reaching the common strategic goal. To give some examples: adoption of no first use by all nuclear powers would be highly valued as a way station toward abolition. In principle at least, nuclear weapons would have been completely retired from use, for if no one strikes first, no one can strike in retaliation–thus no one will strike with a nuclear weapon at all, and no one will threaten to do so.

    Arms reductions would, of course, have value as steps toward zero; but the inspection regimes accompanying them would be especially prized, not just for their own sake but because an ever-stronger regime of inspection is a sine qua non of life in a world without nuclear weapons.

    Influence would flow from nonproliferation measures to arms control as well. The more nonnuclear-weapons states accepted stringent inspections, the more they permitted transparency of their nuclear facilities and the more they accepted restrictions on withdrawal from the NPT, the more ready would the nuclear powers be, less afraid now of cheating, to surrender their arsenals.

    What would nuclear weapons then be for? They almost tell us themselves. “We are here,” they say, “to abolish ourselves, and–a big bonus–to put up a barrier to major power war forever after into the bargain. For even after you are rid of us, we will hover in the wings, as a potential that cannot ever be removed.” The bomb is waiting for us to hear the message. It has been waiting a long time. If we do not, it can always return to what has always been its plan B, and abolish us. 

  • The New US Nuclear Posture

    In April 2009, President Obama went to Prague and told the world that the United States seeks “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” A year later, his administration is moving forward toward this goal. The Obama administration released its Nuclear Posture Review on April 6, 2010. On April 8, 2010, the president flew back to Prague to sign a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russians.

    In both tone and substance the new Nuclear Posture Review is far more positive and hopeful than that of the George W. Bush administration. The Obama nuclear posture puts its primary focus on preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism. “The threat of global nuclear war has become remote,” it says, “but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.” It views nuclear terrorism as “today’s most immediate and extreme danger.”  

    To prevent terrorists, such as al Qaeda, from obtaining nuclear weapons, the Obama administration seeks to bolster the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and secure all loose nuclear materials globally. It convened a Nuclear Security Summit on April 12-13, 2010 in Washington, with leaders of 46 other countries participating in making plans to prevent nuclear terrorism. The Obama administration is also pursuing arms control efforts, including the New START agreement, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.  

    The administration has been straight forward in stating that it is taking these steps “as a means of strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”  In other words, the Obama administration understands that the US needs to show that it is taking steps to meet its own nuclear disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (something the Bush administration never grasped) if it hopes to have the support of other parties to that treaty for keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists.

    Many advocates of a nuclear weapon-free world, including the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, encouraged the Obama administration to go further and adopt a policy of No First Use; that is, committing to use nuclear weapons only in response to a preceding nuclear attack.  While the administration did not demonstrate this level of leadership, it did consider a policy of making the deterrence of a nuclear attack the “sole purpose” of nuclear weapons. However, it dismissed even this step, while offering some hope that it will work toward this end in the future.  

    The administration did take a smaller step by committing in the new Nuclear Posture Review not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are in compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It referred specifically to North Korea and Iran as countries out of compliance with the treaty. The new nuclear posture will please some advocates of nuclear weapons by leaving open “a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW [chemical or biological weapons] attack against the United States or its allies and partners.”  

    The new Nuclear Posture Review states that the “fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.” This suggests confusion in the policy. If terrorists are, in fact, the greatest threat to the country, and as non-state actors they cannot be deterred, then who exactly are the weapons deterring? The review may be contemplating Russia or China, but it also recognizes that the US is interconnected with these countries and the chances of war with them are very low. Or, it may be contemplating some unknown contingency in the future, but if this is the case then wouldn’t the country be better off moving more rapidly toward the goal of a world without nuclear weapons?  The review makes clear that the US “would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.” This approach, and the vagueness of “vital interests,” will likely be viewed internationally as an unfortunate double standard that other countries may also choose to rely upon.

    In the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the US and Russia will reduce their deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 each and reduce deployed delivery vehicles to 700 each with 100 reserve delivery vehicles each by the year 2017.  It is not a large step forward, but it is a step in the right direction, and the Obama administration is committed to seeking further reductions with Russia.  Together the two countries have some 95 percent of the world’s 23,000 nuclear arms.  The new US nuclear posture indicates that the US “will place importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.”  In the document, however, there are no constraints on the ability of the US to deploy missile defenses.  Since this is a major concern to Russia, it could limit the possibilities for additional progress toward nuclear disarmament.  

    One of the phrases that recurs throughout the new Nuclear Posture Review is “ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness” of nuclear warheads.  Safety and security both make sense.  If we are to retain nuclear weapons, we want them to be both safe from accident and secure from theft.  But what does “effective” mean?  That the weapons will serve the purpose of deterring?  If so, who?  Effectiveness would be impossible to measure unless we can answer the question, “Effective for what?”  In the end, “safe, secure and effective,” appear to be arguments for modernizing the US nuclear arsenal and spending an additional $5 billion on its nuclear weapons laboratories over the next five years.

    The Nuclear Posture Review concludes by looking toward a world without nuclear weapons. It recognizes that certain conditions are necessary for such a world. These include halting nuclear proliferation, achieving greater transparency into nuclear weapons programs, improving verification methods, developing effective enforcement measures, and resolving regional disputes. The review states that such conditions do not exist today. However, with the requisite political will, these conditions could be developed in the process of negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention – a treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. While pausing to celebrate the incremental steps in arms reductions and the limitations on nuclear weapons use that are being made now, we should also recognize that a policy of No First Use and a commitment to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention would move us far more rapidly toward the peace and security of the nuclear weapon-free world envisioned by President Obama.  

  • A New Start with START

    This article was originally published by YES! Magazine

    The United States and Russia reached agreement on a new START treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) to lower their count of deployed atomic warheads from 2,200 each to between 1,500 and 1,675. They would also cut their stocks of strategic bombers and land- and sea-based missiles from a current level of 1,600 each to 800. The treaty replaces the 1991 START agreement, which expired last December. Since each country still has about 10,000 weapons, mostly undeployed and in storage, the new START is a modest step forward. It is, however, a down payment on improved U.S.-Russia relations and a possible prelude to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Presidents Obama and Medvedev will sign the new treaty in Prague, the site of President Obama’s groundbreaking speech one year ago in which he set out a vision for a nuclear free world.

    There are 23,000 nuclear bombs on the planet, all but 1,000 of them in the U.S. and Russia. To convince the other nuclear weapons states (the U.K., China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea) to join negotiations for their total elimination, it is imperative that the U.S. and Russia cut their enormous arsenals first.

    Obama and Medvedev pledged to negotiate these weapons cuts as a step towards “a nuclear free world.” The talks almost ran aground when the U.S. announced it was putting new missile defenses in Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland, after it had canceled plans to site them in the Czech Republic. Russia views the expansion of U.S. missile defenses as a threat to the integrity of its nuclear arsenal. The parties agreed to finesse their differences by settling for language in the treaty’s preamble—which the U.S. argues is not binding—acknowledging that the size of offensive arsenals must be tied to the number of anti-missile defenses.

    Powerful forces are arrayed against Obama’s vision. Forty-one Republican senators wrote to him warning that they would not ratify the START treaty if the president made any moves to cut back on the U.S. missile defense program. They have also exacted a stiff price by requiring an increase in the nuclear weapons budget, including plans for a new facility to manufacture plutonium cores for new bombs. And the nuclear weapons labs are raising questions about the soundness of the nuclear arsenal without further money spent on testing and weapons development.

    Nevertheless, international expectations for progress in eliminating nuclear weapons are on the rise. In addition to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s proposal to begin negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention to ban the bomb, the German Bundestag has just passed a motion urging major steps towards nuclear abolition—including removing U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Germany and beginning international talks on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    In May, the UN will host a conference to review the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which contains a promise from the nuclear powers to give up their nuclear weapons in return for a pledge from all the other states not to acquire them. Tens of thousands of citizen activists will march from Times Square to the UN headquarters in New York, calling for nuclear abolition. Strategy sessions to develop next steps are planned by the Abolition 2000 Network and the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space. On June 5th, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons is organizing in communities all over the world to urge negotiations to ban the bomb.  While President Obama qualified his call for a nuclear free world by saying it might not be achieved “in my lifetime,” his very articulation of the vision has unleashed the aspirations of people all over the world, making the abolition of nuclear weapons an idea whose time has come.

  • Zero Nuclear Weapons for a Sane and Sustainable World

    This is a transcript of the 2010 Frank K. Kelly Lecture on Humanity’s Future, delivered by Max Kampelman on February 25, 2010 at Santa Barbara City College.

    It will take time, patience, pain and good fortune, but our welfare as human beings, indeed the survival for many, must be based on more than the threat of nuclear retaliation.  A balance of nuclear terror is not an adequate basis for our survival as human beings or as a country, or for our country’s strategic policy, although it did recently serve to permit the United States and Russia to substantially reduce the number of our strategic nuclear weapons.  What does remain and cannot be ignored, however, is the existence of active rogue and terrorist forces in the world seeking nuclear capabilities for their dangerous purposes.  I am convinced that zero nuclear weapons, urged by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and others, must be our immediate civilized goal.

    Where are we heading?  Are democracy and liberty our human destiny, as suggested by Francis Fukiyama?  Or do we face an inevitable violent clash of civilizations on perhaps a worldwide scale, as suggested by Samuel Huntington?  

    Let me point out that during my childhood, one lifetime, strange as it may appear to the young among us, there were no vitamin tablets, no antibiotics, no televisions, no dial telephones, no refrigerators, no FM radios, no synthetic fibers, no dishwashers, no electric blankets, no airmail, no transatlantic airlines, no instant coffee, no Xerox, no air conditioning, no frozen foods, no contact lenses, no birth control pills, no ballpoint pens, no transistors.  The list can go on.

    In my lifetime, medical knowledge available to physicians has increased perhaps more than tenfold.  I am told that more than 80 percent of all scientists who ever lived are alive today.  The average life span of the human being keeps steadily increasing.  We now have complicated computers, new materials, new biotechnological processes and more, which are altering every phase of our lives, deaths, and even reproduction.  

    We are living in a period of information power with the telefax, electronic mail, the super computer, high definition television, the laser printer, the cellular phone, the optical disc, video conferences, the satellite dish – instruments which still appear to my eyes to be near miracles.  No generation since the beginning of the human race has experienced or absorbed so much change so rapidly – and it is probably only the beginning.  As an indication of that, more than 100,000 scientific journals annually publish the flood of new knowledge that pours out of the world’s laboratories.

    These developments are stretching our minds and our grasp of reality to the outermost dimensions of our capacity to understand them.  Moreover, as we look ahead we must agree that we have only the minutest glimpse of what our universe really is.  We also barely understand the human brain and its energy; and the endless horizons of space and the mysteries found in the great depths of our seas are still virtually unknown to us.  Our science today is indeed still a drop, and our ignorance remains an ocean.

    It has been said that necessity is the mother of invention.  I suggest the corollary is also true; invention is the mother of necessity.  Technology and communication are necessitating basic changes in our lives.  Information has become more accessible in all parts of our globe, putting authoritarian governments at a serious disadvantage.  The world is very much smaller.  There is no escaping the fact that the sound of a whisper or a whimper in one part of the world can immediately be heard in all parts of the world – and consequences follow.  And yet, the world body politic has not kept pace with the world of scientific and technological achievements.  Just as the individual human body must adjust to the climate in which it lives, so is it necessary for governments and administrations to examine the atmosphere in which they live as new directions and changes become apparent.

    It is important for the human race to seek security without associating it with destruction.  Nuclear terror is not an adequate foundation for strategic policy.  President Obama has made that clear during his political campaign and in his later appearances at the United Nations where he and President Medvedev of Russia called for zero nuclear weapons.

    It is increasingly evident that the developing constructive relationship between the United States and Russia should realistically reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons.  Indeed it provides the opportunity for more than prudent and even deep reductions.  The developing constructive relationship between the United States and Russia permits both of us to lead the world toward an enforceable United Nations General Assembly agreement that the development and possession of nuclear weapons is considered to be an international punishable crime.  The UN Security Council should then be charged by the UN General Assembly with the responsibility to eliminate nuclear cheating.  This could be accomplished by the creation of a UN Bank to purchase all active nuclear military materials and convert that material into civilian nuclear power for energy starved areas.  Violations of zero should result in political, economic and social world isolation.  

    The task of the UN General Assembly is to establish a civilized “ought” for the world and the task of the UN Security Council is to create the machinery of civilization necessary to achieve the goal of zero, to prevent cheating and to provide for political, economic and social isolation as a price for cheating.  

    The United Nations has been understandably disappointing to many, but it is alive and should be utilized.  At the opening session that created the United Nations, President Truman welcomed its presence in the United States, and in his formal greeting called for the abolition of nuclear weapons on behalf of the United States government.  He greeted the delegates from around the world and said that “there is nothing more urgent confronting the people of all nations than the banning of all nuclear weapons under a foolproof system of international control.”  It is time to remember that goal.

    It is time once again for the United States to lead the world towards that goal and sanity.  It is also time to achieve that goal of zero and to demonstrate that the United Nations is alive, that its goals are civilized and clear and that it can begin to earn civilized respect.  

    President Obama recently reminded us of the historic Truman message to the United Nations.  He was joined by our Russian colleague, President Medvedev, as they both declared a commitment to a nuclear free world.  In addressing the UN delegates from around the world, our President said: “there is nothing more urgent confronting the people of all nations than the banning of all nuclear weapons under an international set of agreements. . . .”

    The President’s message is clear.  And yet we all appreciate that until that zero goal is reached, problems must be met and resolved.  This reality should not be permitted to replace or postpone the goal we have set for ourselves as a nation.  I note this here because of understandable reactions by our highly trained and committed officials who are inclined to emphasize reductions in nuclear weapons more clearly than those of us who aspire and call for zero nuclear weapons.  

    The time for us to achieve our goal of zero is now!  

  • Moving from Omnicide to Abolition

    Nuclear weapons present humankind with an immense challenge, one far greater than most people understand.  Many people realize, of course, that nuclear weapons are dangerous and deadly, and that in the past they were used to destroy the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with a single weapon demolishing each city.  But few people have grappled with the proposition that these weapons are omnicidal; they go beyond suicide and genocide to omnicide, the death of all.  

    In a cataclysmic strike, resulting in the destruction of present life forms on the planet, these weapons would also obliterate the past and future, destroying both human memory and possibility.  They would obliterate every sacred part of being, leaving vast ruin and emptiness where once life, love, friendship, decency, hope and beauty had existed.

    Despite the omnicidal capacity of nuclear weapons, leaders of a small number of countries continue to maintain and develop nuclear arsenals and rely upon these weapons for national security.  They justify this reliance on the basis of nuclear deterrence, arguing that the weapons prevent war by the threat of retaliation with overwhelming destructive force.  This argument has many flaws, the most important being that deterrence is only a theory and is subject to human fallibility.  

    Deterrence theory posits rational decision makers, but it is highly unlikely that all political leaders will act rationally at all times, particularly under conditions of high stress.  Deterrence is also widely understood to be ineffective against non-state actors, such as extremist groups, which cannot be located and whose members are suicidal.  In other words, deterrence may fail, and such failure would be catastrophic.

    Unfortunately, leaders of the major nuclear weapon states are continuing to drag their feet on nuclear disarmament, sometimes rhetorically expressing the vision of a nuclear weapon-free world, but resisting serious actions toward the abolition of their arsenals that would provide assurance of their commitment.  For example, in his much heralded Prague speech in April 2009, President Obama said, “I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”  But he quickly followed this visionary statement with a lowering of expectations.  “I’m not naïve,” he said.  “This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime.  It will take patience and persistence.”  

    President Obama is a relatively young man, who is likely to have a long life.  He is to be commended for his vision of a nuclear weapon-free world, but his lack of urgency in seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons opens the door to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and their potential use.  There are still some 23,000 nuclear weapons in the world, far more than are needed to end civilization, the human species and other forms of complex life on the planet.  

    The next major international event at which the subject of nuclear weapons will be before the international community is the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which will take place in May 2010.  This treaty calls for both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.  In their deliberations, the states parties to the treaty should bear in mind the following points in seeking a comprehensive solution to the omnicidal threat of nuclear weapons:

    • Nuclear weapons continue to present a real and present danger to humanity and other life on Earth.
    • Basing the security of one’s country on the threat to kill tens of millions of innocent people, perhaps billions, and risking the destruction of civilization, has no moral justification and deserves the strongest condemnation.
    • It will not be possible to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons without fulfilling existing legal obligations for total nuclear disarmament.
    • Preventing nuclear proliferation and achieving nuclear disarmament will both be made far more difficult, if not impossible, by expanding nuclear energy facilities throughout the world.
    • Putting the world on track for eliminating the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons will require new ways of thinking about this overarching danger to present and future generations.  

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation supports the following five priority actions for agreement at the 2010 NPT Review Conference:

    1. Each signatory nuclear weapon state should provide an accurate public accounting of its nuclear arsenal, conduct a public environmental and human assessment of its potential use, and devise and make public a roadmap for going to zero nuclear weapons.
    2. All signatory nuclear weapon states should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies by taking all nuclear forces off high-alert status, pledging No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapon states and No Use against non-nuclear weapon states.
    3. All enriched uranium and reprocessed plutonium – military and civilian – and their production facilities (including all uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technology) should be placed under strict and effective international safeguards.
    4. All signatory states should review Article IV of the NPT, promoting the “inalienable right” to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in light of the nuclear proliferation problems posed by nuclear electricity generation.
    5. All signatory states should comply with Article VI of the NPT, reinforced and clarified by the 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion, by commencing negotiations in good faith on a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and complete these negotiations by the year 2015.

    The most important action by the 2010 NPT Review Conference would be an agreement to commence good faith negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.  Such an agreement would demonstrate the needed political will among the world’s countries to move forward toward a world without nuclear weapons.  If the United States fails to lead in convening these negotiations, I would urge Japan to do so.  Regardless of which countries provide the leadership, however, I would propose that the opening session of these negotiations be held in Hiroshima, the first city to have suffered nuclear devastation, and the final session of these negotiations be held in Nagasaki, the second and, hopefully, last city to have suffered atomic devastation.

    If agreement could be reached to begin these negotiations for a new treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, we would be on a serious path toward a nuclear weapon-free world, one that would allow the hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to know that their pleas have been heard.

    If climate change is an “inconvenient truth,” as Al Gore argues, then the potentially omnicidal consequences of nuclear weapons are an even more critical inconvenient truth.  Perhaps the greatest contemporary challenge confronting humanity in the 21st century is urgently ending the nuclear weapons era.  To move from omnicide to abolition will require a major outpouring of support from people everywhere.  The task cannot be left to political leaders alone.  Without a strong foundation of public support, political leaders are unlikely to be courageous and persistent in seeking to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.  Ordinary citizens must overcome their disempowerment and propensity to defer to experts in order to act for the benefit of all humankind and demand the change they seek, in this case the abolition of nuclear weapons.