Tag: nuclear weapons

  • Thermonuclear Monarchy and a Sleeping Citizenry

    Thermonuclear Monarchy and a Sleeping Citizenry

    This is a transcript of the 18th Annual Frank K. Kelly Lecture on Humanity’s Future, delivered by Elaine Scarry on May 9, 2019 in Santa Barbara, California. A video of the lecture is available here.

    It’s a tremendous pleasure to be a guest of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the group of people who run it—David, Rick, Richard Falk, Rob Laney, Sandy, Sarah, and others—and I’m also very grateful to all of you for coming out tonight. It’s a special honor to be talking in terms of humanity’s future, and because that’s the title, I thought that I would begin by just mentioning the fact that when I work on nuclear disarmament, I’ve often noticed that one of the groups of people that is most worried about nuclear weapons is composed of astronomers and astrophysicists. When I first noticed this I was kind of surprised by it, because whereas the rest of us is are thinking all the time about the Earth, I take it that astronomers are often thinking about worlds way beyond the Earth, like other galaxies outside the Milky Way. This one galaxy, for example, contained several hundred billion stars, many of which have planets. So it seemed remarkable that astronomers should care about this little piece of ground in the universe.

    This next particular photograph—although it’s showing a very tiny piece of the sky—contains thousands of galaxies, just within one galaxy cluster, and each of those galaxies has billions of stars. When I asked somebody named Martin Reese, who’s a royal astronomer of Britain, why he was so concerned about it, given that he spent so much of his mental life outside of our own terrain, he said that if you’re an astronomer looking at that other world, you actually care more about the Earth because you realize that what we have here is nowhere else to be found in the universe. That there is no life, certainly no intelligent life, elsewhere in the universe, so the miracle of it being back here seems especially precious.

    I also asked another astronomer at the Hubble telescope, Mario Livio, the same question. And he gave the same answer: how extraordinary it was to be always having once mental life projected out into this world of other universes, and to find again and again that there was no other life, or certainly intelligent life, out there. Mario Livio went on to explain that several decades ago a famous scientist named Fermi pointed out that it’s almost incomprehensible, given the number of planets that recreate the conditions necessary for life, that we haven’t yet encountered other life. This has come to be known in science as Fermi’s paradox—the fact that there are so many millions of places that ought to be showing us life, and yet we haven’t found it. Mario Livio said that different explanations are given for this, and one is that very early in the history of life on a planet, a bottleneck occurs, in particular a bottleneck that occurs in going from one-cell organisms to multi-cell organisms.

    On our own planet, one cell organisms appeared almost the moment the Earth was created—almost the moment it cooled down enough to support life—but multi-celled creatures only occurred millions of years later. It may be that the jump from one cell to multi-cell is just too hard to get through. We luckily got through it, but Mario Livio said there’s also another bottleneck that occurs not at an early moment, but in a late moment. This, by the way, is the reason that most people speculate why we’re not finding life on other galaxies. The explanation is that any group of creatures intelligent enough to have interstellar communication will also be smart enough to blow themselves up. They will, and they have—it is almost certain that other civilizations have existed and have not made it through the particular eye of the needle that we’re trying to get through right now. It’s for that reason that everybody on Earth—all our resources on Earth—all our ingenious scientists, and humanists, and theologians should be working together to get our planet through something that other planets haven’t gotten through, rather than working at odds.

    Now, I don’t know what the weapons system looked like on these other planets, but this is what it looks like on our planet. The screen isn’t perfect here, but I have just a couple of key things to say about it. Each of the little icons has to be multiplied by five. The total arsenal on Earth is over 14,000 right now, so if this were representing each of the warheads you’d have to take this number and multiply it by five, it would go away beyond any piece of paper that could hold it—we can just multiply it in our minds.

    The key thing to know is that the United States and Russia together own 93% of all the missiles. Everything from about three o’clock around to about seven o’clock is owned by the United States, and everything from there up to one o’clock is owned by Russia. That little wedge you see between one and two o’clock are the other seven nuclear states. The other thing to know about that is that countries that we’re always hearing about are not on there. Iraq isn’t on there, because Iraq doesn’t have nuclear weapons. Iran isn’t on there, because Iran doesn’t have nuclear weapons. North Korea is on there, but it’s the country with the smallest arsenal. Some people put North Korea’s estimates as high as 60, but the most reliable estimates say that it’s 20 or fewer. Comparatively, the United States right now has over 6,000.

    It is a specific kind of architecture that is most to the credit (or discredit) of the United States and Russia, who have one third of their arsenals on hair trigger alert. Now, the next thing to know about is this particular physical architecture. Tonight I’m going to be talking about both the physical architecture of nuclear weapons, and the mental architecture that keeps that physical architecture in place, but for a few minutes I’m just going to be talking about the physical architecture.

    We’ve started with the simple fact that every weapon has two ends: the end from which it’s fired, and the end to which it does the injury. That’s true of a gun: there’s one person injured at this end, and there’s one person firing at this end. Sometimes things are slightly out of ratio, for example, if it’s a machine gun, there’s one person firing at this end, and there might be 50 people who are injured at this end.

    Nuclear weapons are extraordinary at both ends of the weapon, because there is a catastrophically high number of people who are being injured. And not just people, but plants, animals, birds, and bio-plankton in the oceans, that are being slaughtered by the weapon. The most recent estimates on nuclear winter say that if even a tiny fraction of the world arsenal is used, and the fraction that used is 1/100th of 1% of the total blast power that you saw pictured there, 44 million people will be casualties on the first afternoon, and 1 billion people will die within the first month. The level of injury is extraordinary. Now, the firing end of the weapon is also extraordinary, because it’s done by one person. We only think that in this country we came close with the Cuban missile crisis because that was the only crisis that was made public, but we know that Eisenhower twice considered using nuclear weapons—once in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and once in Berlin in 1959. John Kennedy, according to Robert McNamara, three times—not once in Cuba, but three times—came within a hair’s breadth of all out nuclear war. Lyndon Johnson considered dropping a nuclear weapon in China in order to prevent it from getting a nuclear weapon. Nixon has said that he four times considered dropping a nuclear weapon. By “considered using a nuclear weapon”, he doesn’t mean just a stray thought that went through his mind. In Nixon’s case, he sent 18 B-52s loaded with nuclear weapons out over Russia, and back again. In his mind it was a feint—an exercise—but it could have led to utter disaster.

    I begin by stressing this because the language we use tends to underscore only the first fact—the fact that an extraordinary number of people are killed—and we need language like “Weapons of Mass Destruction” that registers the fact that there is this outrageous level of injury posed by these weapons.

    Yet we also have to look at the extraordinary, and almost equally obscene, fact that one person in our own country stands ready to launch the weapons. That’s of course true of Trump, but it’s also true of every president who’s been in the Nuclear Age. If we were to go back two slides to the chart, and if we took this whole thing as the weapon, were that whole arsenal to be used the Earth would be completely destroyed, and all creatures on it. How many people would be responsible for the launch? There are nine nuclear states, and so it would be close to nine individuals, but it might even go as high as 20 or 30 people in some cases. For example, in the UK, we know that the prime minister has a sealed envelope that tells their submarine captains—if they can’t reach them in a nuclear exchange—whether they should go ahead and obliterate Russia or not. So now maybe we have to not just count the Prime Minister, but also the submarine captain—but maybe 30 people. If you imagine that on another planet, and you imagine there were billions of people on that planet, wouldn’t you think the billions of people there could come up with something to get the 30 people to go into a room, sit them down, and say to them: “You’re not coming out until you figure out how to dismantle these things.” Something like that is what we probably need to do.

    The other reason I wanted to start by emphasizing the fact that a nuclear weapon, or any weapon, has both the end from which it’s fired, and the end to which it’s injured, is because the laws that address this, and that can help us get rid of these things, fall into two categories. This a slight overstatement, but I still think it’s true. By and large, international law addresses the injuring side of the weapon. International law, like the current ban on nuclear weapons that is being ratified country by country, is addressed to the humanitarian consequences of these weapons, and to the illegality, in terms of international law, of that kind of suffering. In 1995, when there was a case at the International Court of Justice where 78 countries went to the court to ask that nuclear weapons be declared illegal, the international legal rules that were used all addressed the suffering end of the weapon. For example, the Geneva protocols, The Hague, and the conventions against genocide were all things that said you’re not allowed to cause disproportionate suffering, or you’re not allowed to cause suffering that that passes over the boundaries of a country into a neutral country, or you’re not allowed to destroy the ozone layer, or you’re not allowed to destroy the environment. Those are all crucial international laws, and the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has done an amazing thing by working to get states to support this international ban. California is the first, and so far the only state that has signed on in support of the ban and it’s got a crucial chance of doing some real good.

    The national laws, and the ones I’m going to speak about, address the other side of the weapon. They they address the agency side—the firing end of the weapon. They essentially prohibit the kind of arrangement that we currently have, which is a thermonuclear monarchy. It’s one person who was empowered to not just carry out a war, but to carry out acts of genocide without getting anyone else’s okay about it. It’s wholly illegal, and it’s wholly incompatible with our own Constitution—the two are mutually exclusive. Because they’re mutually exclusive, the Atomic Age, or the Nuclear Age, has just put the Constitution aside.

    As I talk about it, one thing to be aware of is that my basic point is that we need both international and national law converging on this problem, and that the together they may help us. You can’t walk up one side of a building, but if you’ve got two sides of a building, you can use them both to get up. There’s a real difference between the two in that the injuring end of the weapon has overt ethical content. We get it. You can’t have that kind of disgraceful injury caused to a foreign population. What could these people have done that would ever mean they had deserved such a thing?

    The other one—the Constitutional law—seals it; you can’t break these rules. Yet I’m going to try to ask you to understand that they have the same magnificent ingenuity. Centuries– actually Millennia—of thinking has gone into this thing called the “social contract”, that resulted in our own constitution and the constitutions of other countries. Whereas one seems to have overt ethical content, and the other seems procedural, in fact both of them have dramatic ethical content. The constitutional one even has one slight advantage, in that international law is something that US citizens have a hard time getting traction on—that they can state their support of it, but don’t directly have a claim for demanding that it be stopped right away. The national one is an actual prescriptive requirement; the laws are already in place that can be used to say these things are illegal. In other words, the one is more aspirational, the other is more prescriptive, and together they may be able to have the force of disabling these things.

    The US Constitution essentially says this: you cannot injure a foreign population unless you have gotten a huge portion of your own population to agree that this is something necessary to do. In other words, social contracts try to put brakes on the act of injuring other people, but they allow for us to override the brakes if people are really persuaded that it is necessary. But you have to persuade many people.

    Let’s say for example, that it’s the beginning of World War II. It’s often said of World War II that essentially the whole adult American population was involved, because there were people working in factories, and people monitoring the coastlines, etc. Today, the adult population is 250 million. We have one person who stands ready to do a nuclear launch that can massacre 44 million people on one afternoon, whereas when we had conventional weapons, it would have taken, today, 250 million people to do a much lower level of injury. Or even if we went back to a much earlier war, like the 17th century. In the 17th century, people estimate that maybe only 3% of the population was involved, but 3% of our population is 9 million people. There’s nothing like that kind of democratic consultation.

    What our constitution says is you don’t just injure another population, you don’t injure another population unless two things are in place. There are two provisions that are going to possibly sound mysterious to you, because in the whole Nuclear Age–for seven decades—they have been desecrated, tarnished, and misrepresented. The first break on going to war is the requirement for a Congressional declaration of war. I’ll come back and talk about that in a few minutes. The second break on war was the right to bear arms, which today we wildly misunderstand. What the Second Amendment said was, however much injuring power our country has, it has to be equally divided among every one of us. Each of us will oversee our own small portion of it and we’ll say yes or no on it. At the time of the founding of the Constitution—of course they talked only in terms of men, which was later changed—it was inclusive, as it had to be men of all ages. It had to be man of all wealth classes. It had to be man of all geographies in the United States. Otherwise it was it was deeply unfair. You couldn’t have just some people overseeing questions of going to war or not. I’ll come back and talk about this because I know that with the tremendous misunderstanding of the right to bear arms today, it’s hard to assimilate.

    I’m going to talk for a few minutes about the first one, the Constitutional requirement for a declaration of war, which is utterly incompatible with the present arrangements we’ve had for seven decades that allows one person to initiate nuclear war. I’m going to do that by contrasting the quality of deliberation that happens in Congressional deliberation, with the quality of non-deliberation that occurs when Presidents have deliberated whether to drop an atomic weapon. In making that description, I’m drawing on a study I made on the five cases where we’ve had a Congressional declaration of war. That’s the War of 1812, the 1846 Mexican-American War, the 1898 Spanish-American War, and WWI and WWII. There has not been a declaration of war since the invention of nuclear weapons–we’ve only had authorizations of force and things like that—because presidents think, as Nixon said, “I can go into the next room, pick up the telephone, and in 25 minutes, 70 million people will be dead. Why, if I have that power, do I have to get authorization merely to invade this or that country with conventional arms?”

    And I’m going to contrast that quality of deliberation with the kind of deliberation that occurred when Eisenhower considered dropping a bomb on the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954, and again, with the kind of non-deliberation that occurred when he considered dropping a nuclear weapon in 1959. These are the differences among them: first, Congressional deliberation is visible to the public today with radio and television. We watch it or listen to it as it occurs, but before there was radio and television, the record of what had taken place in the debate would be immediately written up, published, and distributed.

    In contrast with presidential deliberation, Eisenhower’s papers were released only 30 years after he contemplated using nuclear weapons. That’s true of the other examples I gave you as well. There’s a big time lag. Did anybody consider using atomic weapons on 9/11, when Bush stopped at Offutt Air Force Base, which was the central nervous system of our nuclear retaliation against both states and terrorists? Were they thinking about atomic weapons?

    Well, we’ll only find out 30 years from now, and by then people will say, “Well, that was long ago, I guess we don’t need to worry about that.” So one of them is public immediately. The other is considered none of the citizenry’s business or responsibility. Second, in the Congressional declaration, there’s a set of sentences that everybody during the deliberation understands is the thing that they’re thinking about. It says, “Be it enacted, in Congress, but in the House and Senate assembled, that we hereby declare that we are at war.” That’s the set of sentences they’re agreeing on. There’s no clear statement of action in the presidential deliberations.

    In the congressional deliberations, there’s a conspicuously staged vote. After the deliberations, people are called on to walk to the microphone and say yes or no. We know, to this day, that Jeanette Rankin is the one person who voted against going to war against Japan and against Germany, just as we know all the yes votes in that case. There’s a fixing of responsibility—there’s a taking of responsibility, and a vote. There’s no vote in the case of the Presidential deliberation. In the Congress, people consider themselves equal, and so they’re willing to fight with each other, and they may have the most noble of reasons. They want to get to the truth, they want to say what they think on the issue, or maybe they just want to show off. But even if they just want to show off, it gives them a motive for testing and contesting what the side that wants to go to war is saying. In the Presidential deliberation, the participants consider themselves subordinate to the president, and they don’t say anything.

    This leads to the most important difference between them—that’s the final item there—that in the Congress there’s constant testing, and contesting, and dissent. Because Congress hasn’t enacted so nobly in recent years you might find this hard to believe, but when you read the Congressional deliberations of the past, there’s a lot to be admired in the quality of deliberation. I can go into it in more detail later if you wish. In the Presidential deliberation, there is no dissent whatsoever.

    In order to bring that point home, I’ll give you the thing that is the closest to an act of dissent. In 1954, in the Taiwan Straits crisis, the Secretary of the Treasury named Humphrey says to Eisenhower, “Aren’t we going to have a hard time explaining to the American people why islands with names they’ve never even heard of, like Quemoy and Mazu, were so important that we dropped an atomic weapon?” Eisenhower reprimands and he says, “Amir, look at the maps on the wall. We’ll convince you of the strategic importance of these islands.” End of dissent. Humphrey doesn’t say anything more; no one else sitting at the table says anything more. Furthermore, two months earlier when this debate was originally going on, Eisenhower himself had said, you know, I might have a hard time convincing the American people why islands with names they’ve never heard of were important enough that I used an atomic weapon. Essentially, Humphrey had just done his homework and read the previous notes, and probably thought he was agreeing with the President. Whether we should call it an act of dissent is unclear, but for sure there was no follow up.

    In 1954, Eisenhower said that he thought he would be impeached if he dropped a nuclear weapon, but that he was willing to be impeached. He was willing to do his duty and drop the atomic weapon even though he’d be impeached. Why did he think he’d be impeached? Because he knew that the Constitution requires a Congressional Declaration of War. By 1959, e had kind of decided that if he just included a couple of Congressmen at the table, maybe that will kind of count as a Congressional participation in declaration. There was a Senator there named Senator Fulbright, a name many of you will know. At a certain point, Senator Fulbright says, “I just want to make sure I understand what’s being said here. Are we saying that the GDR, or East Germany, might take out the roadways in West Berlin, and that we might, for example, begin to repair the road? Then, that maybe a soldier on the East German sidewall shoot a rifle at the repairman—and then we’ll drop an atomic bomb?” Eisenhower said, “Well, we’re not exactly sure of the steps that will lead to the dropping of the atomic bomb.” He doesn’t say, “Senator Fulbright, you’ve lost your mind, what a ridiculous scenario!” He accepts it and the discussion proceeds, and yet again, there’s no additional dissent.

    This idea that the President acts without being tested, and without there being a kind of evaluation and rigor in trying to understand if what is being really does warrant so terrible an injury, has led, in the Nuclear Age, to even the celebration of presidents for being incomprehensible. For example, according to Arthur Schlesinger, Roosevelt came to be celebrated for the feature of inscrutability. Now we have somebody who’s able to drop an atomic weapon, and we are even okay with the fact that we don’t have a clue why he’s doing what he’s doing. He’s inscrutable—that’s the way thermonuclear monarchs are.

    If you think of George Bush (the younger George Bush) when he was President, you might remember the moment when he said, “I’m the commander. See, I don’t need to explain. I do not need to explain why I say things.” That’s also why, when constitutions were being written, they considered, “Should we give the power to declare war to the president?” They decided no. “Should we give it to the Senate?” They decided no. They decided to give it to the biggest governing body there was—today that would be roughly 535 people—because it meant that you had the greatest participation and deliberation.

    When we go to the right to bear arms, just as a moment ago I said that the Constitutional Convention wanted the largest possible body, when the Constitution went out for ratification, the States said, “Wait a minute, there’s something missing from the constitution.” That was the thing we call the Bill of Rights—the first 10 Amendments—and one of the most important was the right to bear arms. The idea of the right to bear arms is that, on a theoretical level from the point of view of social contract theory, it introduces many intervening layers of possibly resistant humanity. In other words, the Congress can declare war, but only if people agree to fight. Will there actually be a conventional war? Only if people agree to fight—is the declaration actually going to be carried out? It’s essentially a distributive amendment that gives to all of us oversight on whether we do indeed want to go to war, and it means that the arguments by of what this other country has done have to be convincing. We’re not just going to go in and slaughter people in Iran, or slaughter people in North Korea,  and not even be given an argument about what on Earth people think they’ve done to deserve that. Not with the leaders have done, but what the people have done, because it’s the people who are going to be slaughtered by it.

    Do soldiers dissent? Yes, soldiers do dissent, and wars are only fought when soldiers agree to go. There are many examples of this; Vietnam of course is a famous example. As late as 1971 there were 33,000 Vietnam war soldiers who had deserted. In the Iraq war in 2004, 2,300 soldiers deserted. By two years later, within the first six months, that number was doubled, and the Department of Defense took down the figures from their website. There are many other examples, for example, the Civil War. We now know that the north won, because 250,000 soldiers on the Southern side deserted. James C. Scott talks about that in his book, Weapons of the Weak, and a wonderful Civil War historian, a woman named Ella Lonn, writing in the 1920s, documents this. Robert E. Lee wrote dispatches saying “50 more soldiers deserted! 20 more soldiers deserted! I look behind me, and there was no one there.” The soldiers said no, and we don’t usually hear about this. We don’t hear about the fact that at the end of WWI, Churchill wanted to get soldiers to go with him into Russia to stand with the Whites against the Reds, but the soldiers wouldn’t let him. Churchill writes to Lloyd George, “I wanted to go into Russia, but the soldiers wouldn’t let me.” There were soldiers strikes all over England, and also in Canada and India to a lesser extent, and again, the soldiers acted as a break. They said enough, we’re not doing additional things.

    When I first started working on this, I wrote and published on it in a University of Pennsylvania law review. I happened to be at a research center in Berlin in 1989 or 1990, which is the year the Wall came down, and I gave a lecture about this. Of my colleagues listening to the lecture, some of whom were German, some were Americans, and some were from other countries, all of them wanted to argue that soldiers just blindly obey and blindly follow what they’re told to do. Just that year, a few months later when the Wall opened, East German soldiers, which until that point had been seen as the most disciplined army in Europe, went from 180,000 to 90,000 by desertion in six months. In the Ceausescu regime in Romania, it was soldiers brought down the regime. In Lithuania, 2000 soldiers were ordered to fire on their own populations, and they not only refused to do it, but they went into the Parliament and signed their names as saying they wouldn’t do it. It simply is not the case that soldiers blindly obey. They don’t. They think about whether the thing for which they’re being asked to fight for is really worth fighting for, and they dissent when they have to.

    It is an idea that of course is supported by militarists; Maribou in the French Revolution said you can’t have an aristocratic elite who has weapons, and the population doesn’t have weapons—that’s not fair. It’s also something that is supported by pacifists; Gandhi said of all the evil deeds committed by England against India, the worst was the disarming of the population. Give us back our arms, and we’ll tell you whether we’re going to use them or not. Gandhi’s desire was that they not be used, because he was a pacifist. He had served in the military as a young man, but he of course became a great pacifist. But his point was, you don’t even have the power to demand a pacific outcome if you’ve given up all your military rights.

    Everybody in this country right now has been deprived of their military rights. Not only have we lost the capacity for self-defense, because I don’t think anyone here thinks you can defend yourself against an incoming missile, nor can you exercise mutual aid by helping one another. The right of self-defense is the right that underlies every other right. The reason we want to have freedom of speech—there are many reasons to want freedom of speech—but the first and foremost is that it increases my ability to defend myself. I want a fair trial for many reasons, but it enables me to defend myself. We want a fair press for many reasons, but the main reason is it enables me to defend myself. So if we’ve lost the right of self-defense, that’s a big right.

    Civic stature in the United States has always followed from military stature. The 15th amendment gave blacks the right to vote primarily on the basis that 180,000 blacks had served in the Civil War, and having served militarily they had to be given the right to vote as well. The 19th Amendment gave the right to vote to women, and in suffrage pageants and plays the argument was made that women can defend themselves, and they can help defend the country. It was not as clear and tight and argument as in the case of African Americans, but it was still a very prominent thing that you can see in suffrage pageants. The 26th amendment lower the voting age from 21 to 18. What was the basis for it? The basis was that 18 year olds had served in Vietnam, and 18 year olds had argued on college campuses about the rightness or wrongness of Vietnam, and they had therefore—and I’m using Congressional language, this isn’t my language—earned for themselves and all subsequent generations the right to vote at a younger age. Civic stature follows very directly from military stature.

    Now with either of these two Constitutional rules, if I had more time I would try and convince you that these are great inventions. They’re ingenious, they should be honored and should be brought back. They’ve both been trashed in the Nuclear Age, so that we just look on them as nearly laughably empty assertions, or in the case of the right to bear arms, kind of wildly dangerous things that let people shoot school children, which is about as far from the meaning of the right to bear arms as could be. Each of them is hugely important and ingenious, but together they’re even better because they provide a double break. It means you have to get through the break of Congress, which is hard, and then you also have to get through the break of the population, and actually get them to agree to serve if they’re drafted or called upon to serve. They’re crucial because these things are so fundamental to the social contract, quite apart from the local example of the United States.

    By the way, I don’t want to minimize the importance of the US Constitution. Thomas Paine once said that the US Constitution is to human rights or democracy what an alphabet is to language. The US Constitution had the basic building blocks of what democracy is, and the two provisions we’ve just been talking about were, for centuries, seen as the most important ones. For example, Justice Story, one of our great Justices from the 19th Century, said the Constitutional requirement for a Congressional declaration of war is the cornerstone of the constitution; it’s what Congress is there to do. It does all of this other stuff, but it’s main thing is to safeguard our entry into wars. The same goes with the right to bear arms, that was repeatedly referred to as the Palladium of Liberty, but is now something very far from that.

    Because this is such an essential part of what our social contract is, it’s not surprising that these same provisions show up in the constitutions of other states. I read through the constitutions of the other nuclear states, and in the French constitution, Article 35 says to go to war you have to have Parliament’s authorization to go to war. In the Indian Constitution, Article 246 says it’s up to the Parliament to oversee matters of the country’s defense. The Russian Federation says that the leader of the country can act to defend the country up to its own borders if it’s been invaded, but if it’s going to go one step over the border, if it’s going to begin to hurt someone outside its borders, it has to have the authorization of the body that is the equivalent of our Senate. Amazingly, the Russian Federation even has a constitutional provision that looks a lot to me like the right to bear arms. What it says is, if Russia goes to war, every adult citizen of Russia is responsible for helping to defend the country. That’s also what the meaning of the right to bear arms was.

    Just so you know that these things have practical consequences, you may know that right now there are two bills in Congress, the Markey-Lieu Bill and the Warren-Smith Bill, that say this Presidential first-use of nuclear weapons has to be dismantled. Many people in the United States think that these weapons are for defense. No, during the whole Nuclear Age, we have had a Presidential first-use policy, while some of the other nuclear states do not. These are two bills that try to dismantle Presidential first use, and they do it on a Constitutional basis that it’s Congress who has to oversee our entry into war. This is something that any of us can work on very directly. For example, right now the Markey-Lieu Bill has 13 co-sponsors in the Senate, 55 cosponsors in the House.

    In my own state of Massachusetts, although both Senators are cosponsors, only two of the state’s nine representatives in the House have so-far co-sponsored it. In your state, California, only one of the two California’s Senators have co-sponsored it, and only 18 (I say “only” now—actually California has the highest number of representatives of any state cosponsoring it, but still you have a long way to go) of California’s 53, representatives have done it.

    That’s all to talk about the physical architecture of nuclear weapons, this gigantic architecture of weapons that are in place and ready to go. They are utterly incompatible with the constitution—they’re mutually exclusive—so we just got rid of the Constitution. They are utterly incompatible with the single most important role of the congress, so we just got rid of Congress, and it’s utterly incompatible with the citizenry, so we just got rid of the citizenry. That is, we no longer want to have a draft where people are called on to serve and give their opinion about what they think of the war. There was a little bit too much opinion-giving among all the people about Vietnam, so we just closed that down. Now we’ll use drones and weapons that can go right from what the President thinks to an assassination, illegal by international law. But I want to go on now and talk about the silence of the citizenry, and the mental architecture that keeps the physical architecture in place.

    I think that there are basically six answers. There are probably a lot of other answers, but here are six. Maybe one of them will strike you, and when you talk to relatives, or siblings, or colleagues about trying to enlist their help in this, it might be that one of these will be the thing that you have to approach. One of the things is that in general, the public isn’t given much information. If you ask people in the United States, “who has nuclear weapons?”, many people get the list of countries wildly wrong. Some people even think the United States doesn’t have weapons! I think the average that’s given by most people in the United States is something like 200 rather than in the thousands. The New York Times, that didn’t used to pay attention to our own weapons, but fortunately has begun to do so, recently asked the question of how many of our nuclear weapons would be needed to decimate Libya. Then they asked how many would be needed to decimate Syria, then Iraq, then Iran, then North Korea, then Russia, then China.

    They then went to how many would be leftover? 70% of the arsenal, after we massacred a quarter of the population (they use the word “decimate”, which would seem to be one in 10, but they specifically meant that it was a quarter of the population), this is how many would be leftover. Of course, this just stands for hundreds and hundreds of pieces of information that the public isn’t given—it simply isn’t talked about.

    Another big one is people in the United States think that we kind of have weapons, and we kind of have enemies, but they’re just kind of loosely connected. No, that’s completely wrong. The weapons are assigned to the cities—weapon by weapon, city by city—they are assigned. In fact until the Clinton administration, when nuclear missiles were loaded onto Ohio class submarines— I should stop and say that we have 14 Ohio class submarines, each of which carries the equivalent of 4,000 Hiroshima bombs. Each can destroy a continent single-handedly. There are only seven continents on Earth; we have 14 Ohio class submarines and we’re making 12 new ones right now. When the missiles were loaded onto nuclear submarines, it used to be that the longitude and latitude was already programmed into the nuclear weapon. During the Clinton administration, they got worried because they were afraid that a hacker would be able to launch it, and it would go to whatever city it was designated for. So they changed the longitude and latitude to open ocean targeting—someplace where they hoped nobody would be. This is an amazing fact. This change was made not because all of us demanded that they stopped putting the line of longitude and latitude of actual cities in. It was not because the Congress did, and not because the Supreme Court did, but because of the fear of hackers. I’m afraid of hackers too, but I have to say that in this case, the hackers brought about a good result. I read Cheney’s autobiography, and he said that when he was Vice President he would hear these references to these missiles being assigned, and so he asked his people, “How many warheads are going to hit Kiev?”—just taking Kiev as an example. It was a difficult question to answer, because I don’t think anybody had ever asked it before. But finally he got a report back that said under the current targeting plan, we had literally dozens of warheads targeted on this single city. That is just indicative of the situation that we’ve had.

    I want to go to the next, item on our list of possible reasons: the false justification of deterrence, where too many people in the United States accept the argument that nuclear weapons somehow keep us safer because they deter nuclear war. It would seem that the fastest way to avoid nuclear war would be to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide, but instead we’re given this argument that actually, the way you avoid nuclear war is to have nuclear weapons.

    If this were really true, then it would be a reason why every country should get nuclear weapons. Certainly, it’s why North Korea thinks that it has to have nuclear weapons to try and deter the United States from firing them. The illogic of this kind of the falsity of the deterrence theory just stands for the fact that people are made to believe that this would defend us. If I had more time, I would explain to you, and you could probably explain to me all the ways in which the idea that these could defend us is falsely given. But I’ll just stay for now with deterrence. If we go to the next slide, this is a statement made by General Lee Butler, who was Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Command of Nuclear Weapons. If you read his account of deterrence, he says, “The nuclear priesthood extolled its virtues and bowed to its demands,” and then if you skip to the last sentence, “it was premised on a litany of unwarranted assumptions, unprovable assertions, and logical contradictions.” That’s from somebody who had complete control of the nuclear arsenal saying, “Please, we should get down on our knees and weep for the horror of this thing we’ve created that has this deeply false justification of deterrence at the center of it.”

    I think the third thing that keeps people from doing anything is the belief that what is future is unreal. So people think that that it’s somehow, possibly sometime in the future this could happen, but there will be time to intervene, and they confuse this fact of his being future with being unreal. But here’s the reality of the situation. If it takes 10,000 steps to put a nuclear arsenal into place (obviously it takes many more than 10,000, but let me just say 10,000), it takes 10,000 steps to put a nuclear arsenal into place. 9,999 of them have been done. They are in place. They are present tense. There’s only one step left that hasn’t been done. And that’s the launch. So people have to understand that the 9,999 steps are present tense right now, and that only the last step is future. We know that that last step takes a matter of about 10 minutes, so there isn’t time, of course, to intervene later on. Interestingly, people who believe this are kind of aligning themselves, unknowingly, with our own Department of State and Department of Defense in that 1995 International Court of Justice case that I alluded to earlier, when all these countries went and asked the court to declare these things illegal. The litigants had mentioned Geneva protocols, St. Petersburg, the Hague, Genocide Convention, Ozone protection, etc., etc.

    We went systematically through every one of those, and showed why those things did not make our nuclear weapons illegal. They did not make our weapons illegal, they did not make our use of weapons illegal, they did not make our use of the weapons first illegal, did not make our threat of the use of them illegal. They had specific arguments for each of those international protocols, but the one they used over and over again was: it’s all in the future, therefore it’s unreal. Therefore, it’s just speculation, despite the fact that they’re spending billions of dollars to keep it in a present-tense state of readiness.

    I thought I would put in here some way in which we can grasp the present-tense reality of this invisible architecture that we can’t see. That is the infrastructure of our own country that has been deteriorating because all our money is being spent on weapons. The American Society of Civil Engineers has reviewed our bridges and given them the grade of C-plus (this is on their website, you can look at it). This is not an impressionistic grade. They actually enumerate the total number of bridges, which is 614,000 bridges, and they say that 188 million trips are made across structurally deficient bridges every day. This is the highest grade (the C-plus), and they give our roads a D. They say that one out of every five miles of highway pavement is dangerously deteriorated, with potholes and so forth, in a way that is increasing accidents. They give our transit a D-minus, and our levies a D. Again, these are not impressionistic grades. They give all the facts and figures and they give the amount of money that’s going to have to be spent to reclaim these things.

    Now we will go onto the fourth argument: the difficulty of imagining other people’s pain. I think that this is one of the reasons to why if our fellow citizens see something about the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, they may not get why that might matter. By the way, sometimes people say, “Well, you know, this has been an issue that’s been around for a long time. We’ve been hearing about this for decades.” When you hear that argument, here’s an analogy: imagine somebody in 1860 saying that the reason that they didn’t care about abolishing slavery was because they’d been hearing about this since 1820, and they thought it was a stale subject. We will never give people in the past a pass for not attending to something like that because they thought it was a stale subject.

    Anyway, onto this subject—the difficulty of imagining other people’s pain. Here, I think a statement by a very wonderful physician named Hugh McDermott, who was a physician of public health at Cornell medical school, is fitting. He pointed out the difference between narrative compassion and statistical compassion. Narrative compassion is something that asks us to care about and understand what’s happening to one person or two people or three people, and he says, we could be better at it, but we’re pretty good at it and we get practice at it all the time. We’re listening to stories by our siblings, we’re listening to our neighbors, and we’re reading literature that asks us to have narrative compassion. He contrasts this with statistical compassion, at which we’re horrible. We’re incapable of statistical compassion. Furthermore, we don’t get any practice. We don’t do anything to help ourselves begin to get hold of what it means to be responsible to millions of people to whom we’re responsible in political life. What does it mean to have these people of a foreign state talked about so blithely as recipients of our nuclear weapons, or what does it mean to just shrug when you hear that 44 million people will be killed on the first afternoon if one 100th of 1% of our current arsenal is used? Well, it means that people have just kind of searched their heart and soul, and they look inside and say, “Nope, nothing in there of statistical compassion.”

    I think that one place to start would be just understanding what happened in Nagasaki and Hiroshima. In this country, we actually haven’t begun to come to terms with what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With a colleague of mine, Joseph Gerson of the American Friends Service Committee, we together decided to do an exhibit at one of the libraries in the town where I live, Cambridge, Massachusetts. And this library very kindly agreed to let us dedicate a month to an exhibit, with books and pictures. We also had films and we had a lecture each week. We put up the exhibit the first night, and by the next morning when we came in, any photograph that showed injury had been taken down. Now on one level I understand this, because people coming into the public library aren’t prepared for seeing something like that. But even in cases where people are prepared, they’re not allowed to see it. For example, in 1994, the Smithsonian was going to have an exhibit on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and it caused such controversy that they had to cancel it, and the only thing they allowed to be exhibited was the Enola Gay—the airplane that delivered the bomb. I think that one reason why people from Japan—not just people who were there and suffered, but generations of people in Japan—are much more alert to this is because they are educated about the situation. For example, there was one march in New York where I and other people tried for about three months to get people from the Cambridge/Boston area to go to New York, and we got about a hundred people to go to the march in New York. That morning, 1,000 people arrived from Japan, and their trips had been paid for by 6 million people who signed the petition that they delivered.

    If you’ve been to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and have been to one of the atomic bomb museums, you almost certainly would find yourself among school children. They take in a lot of things that are hard to take in, and this next slide is just one example of what they’re asked to look at, which is the burns of people, who did survive. It might be one place to start in exercising our capacity for statistical compassion.

    The fifth reason that I think people are not attentive to this. That is the population’s false belief that once nuclear weapons are made, they can’t be unmade. This is so untrue. They’re easy to unmake. I don’t mean there aren’t problems, of course is an incredible problem of where to store all the fuel, and so forth. But in terms of disarming them, it’s the simplest thing in the world. Compare it to global warming, where we all agree things need to be done, but it’s hard to get a hold of what the solutions are. This one’s very easy. There was a study done in Scotland, by someone named John Ainslee, that looked at the amount of time it would take take to completely dismantle the UK’s nuclear arsenal. Some parts of it would take hours—that is dismantling the nuclear triggers. Other parts would take a matter of days, such as the weapons deployed at sea to come into port. Other parts would take longer, but the whole thing could be done in two to four years. Now our arsenal is much, much huger and would take longer, but still it would be a finite amount of time.

    Another piece of evidence that we have that it is possible to have a world without nuclear weapons is shown by the whole Southern hemisphere, which is blanketed by nuclear weapons free zones brought about by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Pelindaba, the Treaty of Bangkok, the Treaty of Rarotonga, and so forth. This next slide shows the nuclear states in red, and the nuclear free weapons treaty signers in blue. When you see that nuclear weapons are a North-South architecture; the North has nuclear weapons and the South has the freedom from nuclear weapons.

    If we go to the last reason, Circularity, as I said before Constitutions and nuclear weapons are mutually exclusive. Right now we’ve taken away the Constitutional provisions. Congress and nuclear weapons are incompatible, so we’ve taken away Congress’s single most important job of overseeing our entry into war. Citizenry and nuclear weapons are incompatible, so we’ve infantilized our whole citizenry by telling them that they should just turn on the TV if they want to find out if we’re at war. But it also means that if we bring back Constitutions, you can only do it by getting rid of nuclear weapons. If you bring back Congress, you can only do it by getting rid of nuclear weapons because they’re mutually exclusive. And if you bring back the citizenry, you’ll get rid of nuclear weapons. And yet in the time when these things were gotten rid of, they’ve been diminished in our eyes. They’ve been sullied in our eyes. We think of the citizenry as not much use. We think of Congress as a bunch of overtalking fools—there are many books on how Congress is dead, or dying or something like that. And we think of Constitutions as just a piece of paper, because that’s the result of the Nuclear Age. That’s what it means to destroy a Constitution, and a citizenry, and Congress. And we have to take it on trust that when those things come back, the scale of their power will be visible to us once more. But I just refer this as the Circularity Problem. The fact that the very things that would save us, by being eliminated, now look kind of pathetic, and therefore we don’t see that they have tremendous power to do the work. If we see our actions, not just in terms of our own planet, but in terms of the universe—a universe it appears that has never gotten through the problem that we’re now facing—and if we see that we can use Constitutional tools in their international covenants, we can see that these legal documents actually have some of the technicolor beauty of the galaxies themselves.

    Thank you.


    For more information on the Frank K. Kelly Lecture on Humanity’s Future, including links to prior years’ lectures, click here.

  • Nuclear Weapons Use in South Asia

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    My topic is nuclear weapons in South Asia. The United States was the first nation to build nuclear weapons, and the US first use of nuclear weapons was itself their first ever use. The United States was not under imminent threat of attack when they used nuclear weapons on Japan. The US explained the atomic bomb to the world as a weapon of awesome power that was harnessing the power of the sun and as the future of warfare. No wonder others wanted it. If the United States could use this weapon and claim that it turned the tide of war, then they wanted it too. This lesson took root in South Asia and today both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons.

    The image above was taken by an astronaut. The bright yellow line snaking up the middle is the border between India on the right and Pakistan on the left. The bright shiny spot way at bottom left is the city of Karachi, population roughly 20 million. Imagine the distance from that city of 20 million people to the border with India (it is at most a few hundred miles). It would take a missile three hundred seconds to fly from an Indian military base to a target in Pakistan and vice versa. By the time Pakistan or India knows that the missile is coming, the better part of a hundred seconds is already gone. That leaves you two hundred seconds to figure out what’s happening. Is it real? What do we do? Who decides? Two hundred seconds. You can almost hold your breath for that long. Almost.

    The Indians and the Pakistanis have tried to put in place systems to manage decision-making about nuclear weapons, but those systems are completely removed from reality. On paper, they have very proper procedures about who will be the members of the committee that will decide whether to launch a nuclear attack. Those committees are chaired by prime ministers or their designated appointees; they include cabinet ministers and generals who are supposed to decide collectively. But could you gather them together or even on the phone in two hundred seconds in the middle of the night in a crisis situation?

    In the Pakistani case, the fantasy of having a prime minister chair the committee that will decide about the use of nuclear weapons beggars belief. In any committee where the prime minister of Pakistan and the chief of the army sit at the same table, it will not be the prime minister who gets to decide. Pakistan has had three periods of military dictatorship, and those periods of military dictatorship saw the beginnings of nuclear program in the 1950s and 1960s, the achievement of a rudimentary nuclear weapons capability in the early 1980s, and the establishment of a large nuclear arsenal with an array of missiles in the early 2000s. The Pakistan army is used to being in charge of everything that matters when it comes to warfare, and prime ministers know to get out of the way.

    The Pakistani plan for the use of nuclear weapons is the first use of nuclear weapons as a deliberate strategy. Their nuclear strategy is that if they are in a war with India, they will turn a conventional war into a nuclear war as soon as they fear they are losing the conventional war. And Pakistani decision-makers expect to lose, unless there is international intervention, because the Indians have more soldiers and more tanks. The Indian response to this has been that if Pakistan uses nuclear weapons against their soldiers anywhere, including on the Indian side of the border, then they will launch massive retaliation. The Indian position is not that they will use nuclear weapons first, but that if those weapons are used against them, the Indian response will not be proportionate. If you attack our soldiers, then we destroy your cities.

    I recently debated a retired Indian vice admiral who had been in charge of India’s nuclear weapons and asked him about the following scenario. Suppose that Pakistan uses a nuclear weapon against some Indian soldiers and tanks in the desert because Pakistan thinks they are going to lose the battle here. Is India going to massively retaliate against Pakistani cities? Is India going to kill millions upon millions of civilians because Pakistan kills some soldiers and destroys some tanks? (Nuclear weapons, by the way, are not very good at destroying tanks.) He said, yes, we will destroy Pakistani cities because that is the only way to deter.

    Where did this insanity come from? It began when the United States was trying to recruit allies in the Cold War. Indian leaders said no. The US then asked Pakistan’s leaders to become allies, and they agreed, in exchange for guns and funds. The US sent both. In the 1950s, the US expected the next war to be against the Soviet Union and to go nuclear. The US military sent a Nuclear Warfare Team to Pakistani military training academies to teach them how to fight a nuclear war. American military planning in the 1950s for the fighting of the next war envisaged the early use of tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces, because of the belief that the Soviets would overwhelm the US in any conventional war.

    Little has changed. Now, instead of relying on American nuclear weapons, the Pakistanis have built their own and plan to use them based on the lessons that the Americans taught them so long ago. The Pakistani military will control decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Because India has overwhelming conventional force, its stated policy is against first use of nuclear weapons. The Indian military by and large doesn’t particularly like this idea. They want to be able to go first. But Indian politicians have held the line against first use, at least so far.

    Until the United States changes how it thinks about nuclear weapons, it’s very hard to imagine any other nuclear-weapons state rethinking its position on their use. If you are an anti-nuclear activist talking to leaders in Pakistan or in India they will tell you, look, if the Americans think they need nuclear weapons, surely we do; if the Americans think that they need to use nuclear weapons first, then surely we should be able to do so too. The future of nuclear decision-making in all the other nuclear-weapons states hinges on how the United States begins to think about changing its policy.

    There is now a new international treaty open for signature to prohibit nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. The world believes by and large that the use of nuclear weapons is not acceptable (122 countries out of the 192 members of the United Nations supported the new treaty). The debate about the use of nuclear weapons needs to begin with the understanding that the threat and use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity and a crime in international law. Any policymaker willing to make the decision to use nuclear weapons or threaten their use should be considered an international war criminal.

  • International Law and First Use of Nuclear Weapons

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    John BurroughsInternational law is part of the law of the land in the United States under the Constitution and decisions of the Supreme Court. The Department of Defense acknowledges that military operations must comply with the international law of armed conflict. The question of how international law applies to first use of nuclear weapons is therefore highly pertinent.

    The use of force of any kind is permitted under the United Nations Charter—a treaty to which the United States is a party—in only two circumstances: when directed or authorized by the UN Security Council or in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense in response to an armed attack. It is worth stressing that Security Council resolutions regarding the North Korean situation contain no hint of an authorization of use of force. On the contrary, they emphasize the primacy of diplomacy backed by sanctions.

    Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has also had a doctrine permitting preemptive attacks in self-defense against serious threats, particularly threats related to weapons of mass destruction. This is essentially a doctrine permitting preventive war, although its proponents tend to avoid that term. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter and international law, the extent to which preemptive attacks are permitted is controversial. At the most, globally the majority opinion is that they are legal when in response to the early stages of an armed attack by the enemy. Anything beyond that is in my view an illegal preventive war.

    Is the first use of nuclear weapons legal under international law? I begin my analysis with broad requirements of necessity and proportionality, applying particularly to the initiation of war but also throughout its conduct. Those requirements are inherent in a rational and lawful approach to war, an approach that seeks to avoid conflict and, when it occurs, to limit its extent and to make possible the restoration of peace.

    The requirement of necessity in a sense speaks for itself. Military action must involve the application of the least amount of force required for purposes of self-defense. If a less destructive option is available for responding to an attack, it must be chosen. This has obvious implications for the choice between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons.

    Under the requirement of proportionality, the force employed in responding to an attack must not be excessive in relation to the scale of that attack. It must also be rationally related to the purposes of self-defense. When it comes to nuclear weapons, it is especially important that the risk of escalation is part of the proportionality calculus, as the International Court of Justice held in its 1996 Advisory Opinion. The implications are clear for first use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed enemy.

    Next, consider legal requirements applicable to particular military operations. A 2013 Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy submitted to Congress by the secretary of defense stated: “The new guidance makes clear that all plans must also be consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict. Accordingly, plans will, for example, apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects. The United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects.”

    It is certainly to the good that the United States accepts that under the principle of distinction, civilians and civilian infrastructure may not be attacked. But what is missing is an acceptance of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks. The essentials of that prohibition are well stated in a 2007 Joint Chiefs of Staff publication: “Attackers are required to only use those means and methods of attack that are discriminate in effect and can be controlled.” (my emphasis).

    The omission of the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks in the above-cited 2013 guidance probably reflects the fact that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for nuclear weapons to be used in a way that is “discriminate in effect” and “controlled.” That consideration played a key role in the International Court of Justice’s 1996 Advisory Opinion, which stated that under the fundamental principle of distinction, states must “never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets.” The Court found that “in view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons,” their use “seems scarcely reconcilable with respect” for that requirement.

    In addition to distinction, the 2013 Defense Department guidance also accepts the requirement of proportionality. This should be understood as the requirement of proportionality in attack, as distinguished from the general requirement of proportionality in the exercise of self-defense I discussed earlier. The requirement of proportionality in attack essentially requires that the collateral injury and damage caused by an attack not be disproportionate to the expected military advantage.

    Because it involves a balancing of costs and benefits, the requirement of proportionality in attack as such may not be understood to rule out all possible uses of nuclear weapons. Imagine a situation in which an enemy is believed to be on the verge of launching nuclear forces and it is believed that only a preemptive nuclear attack can prevent or limit such a launch.

    This scenario first of all demonstrates why nuclear-armed states must avoid going to war. From a legal standpoint, it remains the case that even if a proportionality calculus is believed to justify use of nuclear weapons, it is unlawful under the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.

    Let me mention other rules significant in this context. They are included in the preamble to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted at a UN Conference in July 2017. The preamble states that the parties base themselves on “rules of international humanitarian law,” which is at the core of the law of armed conflict. In addition to the ones I have discussed, these include the rules on “precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment.” The preamble also reaffirms that “any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.” Those are factors with legal value in international law. The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which is very good at advocacy, has emphasized “principles of humanity” in explaining the prohibition of use.

    The nuclear-weapons-prohibition treaty will enter into legal force when 50 states have ratified it, probably in the next year or two. It will gain increasing authority as a statement of international law binding all states, including nonparties, as its number of parties grows over the years.

    In conclusion, the first use of nuclear weapons is at least generally contrary to international law. I say “at least generally” to acknowledge that skeptics love to trot out marginal scenarios where use arguably could be justified, as against a rogue nuclear-armed submarine. First use is also irrational—regardless of the particularities of a given situation—because it would open the door to further uses in other situations and promote proliferation.

    The rules I have discussed here also apply to second use of nuclear weapons. It is sometimes asserted that second use would be justified under the doctrine of reprisals. But what that doctrine permits is more restrictive than is generally understood.

    The most far-reaching conclusion, which I endorse, is that use of nuclear weapons should never be contemplated in a conflict situation. A more conservative conclusion, in line with existing US doctrine, is that there should be an extremely high threshold for even considering use of nuclear weapons, including with respect to the option of second use. Further, in determining such matters as targets and lethality requirements, minimization of civilian casualties should be an overriding factor, for example by selecting targets in nonurban areas in any second use scenario.

    What are the implications for presidential first use? I support the approach of requiring congressional approval, both for engaging in war generally and for first use of nuclear weapons. I suggest that the requirement of complying with international law be written into the legislation.

    In an ongoing conflict, where there may be pressures for quick decisions, as in a preemption situation, involvement of the entire Congress may be viewed as impractical. So additional approaches should be considered: for example, a body including the president, some officials, and some members of Congress that would make decisions when speed is deemed necessary. Provision should be explicitly made for the involvement of lawyers charged with upholding compliance with international law.

  • Nuclear Weapons and the Deep State: Can Bureaucracy Constrain Nuclear Weapons?

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    I’m naturally inclined toward apocalyptic thinking, so I find it all too easy to imagine scenarios involving catastrophic nuclear conflict. Mistake, misunderstanding, unintended escalatory spirals, culminating in mass death and environmental disaster: it’s still a fearful and quite real possibility. In January 2018, escalating tensions between the US and North Korea led the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to move the hands of the symbolic nuclear “Doomsday Clock” forward by 30 seconds, to 11:58 p.m.: two minutes to midnight.

    That same month, in Hawaii and Japan, false alarms about incoming ballistic missiles led to brief public panics, and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention sponsored a workshop on “public health responses to a nuclear detonation.” If you’re a normal human being, you should be feeling thoroughly rattled—and perhaps inclined to browse through listings of hardened underground bunkers for sale in your region.

    But I live in the city of Alexandria, Virginia, right outside of Washington, DC. For those of you who don’t know the DC region’s geography, this means I live in that strange land—part geographical reality, part state of mind—known as “Inside the Beltway.” Outside the Beltway, jittery school children are ducking and covering. Inside the Beltway, bureaucratic familiarity, the exigencies of politics, and the incentive structures of the defense industry combine to create a looking-glass world in which the potential horrors of nuclear conflict are rationalized away.

    Inside the Beltway, it’s routine to hear “experts,” who should surely know better, speak with cavalier dismissiveness about existential threats to human civilization. Inside the Beltway, at think tanks, in government buildings, and in the offices of defense contractors, talk of nuclear catastrophe is brushed aside as so much wacky paranoia—the sort of ridiculous fearmongering indulged in by people who are neither responsible nor knowledgeable.

    “The world has had nuclear weapons for more than 70 years, and we haven’t had a nuclear apocalypse yet,” say the Inside the Beltway Experts. “Ipso facto, this shows that we have successfully learned how to manage nuclear threats.” In fact, this shows only that we haven’t blown ourselves up yet. In the grand sweep of human history, 70 years is the blink of an eye. And as President Donald Trump—the man with the biggest button—is in the process of demonstrating, nuclear peace can’t be taken for granted.

    Trump’s bellicose (and sometimes baffling) pronouncements about nuclear weapons and possible conflict with North Korea have raised anew a question that has rarely been posed since the end of the Cold War: Are there any legal constraints governing presidential decisions on the use of nuclear weapons? Should there be legal constraints? And, whether or not there are meaningful legal constraints, are there any practical constraints—bureaucratic, political, or cultural—on the presidential nuclear power?

    In my view, there are no clear or firm US legal constraints against a presidential “first use” of nuclear weapons. True, the Constitution grants Congress, not the president, the power to declare war; true, the 1973 War Powers Resolution sought to reaffirm Congress’s war-making prerogatives. It’s not hard to make a strong argument, based on text and on history, that the president needs to receive congressional authorization before launching an offensive nuclear strike.

    But inside the Beltway, there are thousands of clever lawyers, many sitting inside the White House, the Justice Department, the Pentagon, and the State Department, whose job it is to find legal arguments that justify executive power. Those arguments are not hard to find, for a clever lawyer. The president is the executive and the commander in chief! The president may need to make a decision in a time frame that precludes congressional consultation! Launching a few nuclear weapons is not the same thing as starting a “war”! The War Powers Resolution applies only to sending US military personnel into overseas combat, not to launching unmanned missiles overseas!

    At the end of the day, the clever lawyers generally prevail. As a practical matter, then, there is no US legal bar to a presidential first use of nuclear weapons.

    If you doubt this, consider the cautionary tale of executive power under President Barack Obama and his 2011 decision to intervene militarily in Libya. The War Powers Resolution seemed designed to prevent a president from doing precisely this sort of thing without notifying Congress or seeking congressional authorization.1 But the Obama administration took the position that military action in Libya didn’t count as “hostilities,” since the US was relying mainly on air strikes from unmanned drones and had no ground combat troops in Libya.

    The administration therefore opted not to provide formal War Powers Resolution notification to Congress—much less seek congressional authorization. On both sides of the aisle, members of Congress complained: President Obama was ignoring what appeared to be the plain meaning of the War Powers Resolution. But nothing changed. The US military intervention in Libya continued. Obama wasn’t impeached.

    International law is even more ambiguous on nuclear weapons, and even less likely to serve as a meaningful constraint than US domestic law. True, international legal rules prohibit aggressive uses of force and require that military force be necessary and proportionate and make appropriate distinctions between civilian and military targets, but in practice these terms become troublingly slippery. In 1996, for instance, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on nuclear weapons, coming to the unsatisfying conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons would “generally be contrary to the rules of international law. … However, … the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance …” In other words: don’t ask us!

    Law is thus a slender reed to lean on in the search for constraints on presidential nuclear powers. This is, of course, a shame and a terrible failure; the purpose of law—of the rule of law—is, most fundamentally, to regulate violence and place constraints on power. What’s more, placing decisions about the use of nuclear weapons in the hands of a single individual is, as Elaine Scarry argues in her book Thermonuclear Monarchy, profoundly undemocratic: how can we claim to have a democracy when we give one individual the power, in effect, to obliterate the whole earth? Prior to the nuclear age, who could have even imagined such awesome destructive power in the hands of one man?

    Granted, nuclear weapons are not the only weapons with profoundly antidemocratic effects. In their recent book, Forged Through Fire, political scientists John Ferejohn and Frances McCall Rosenbluth trace the historical connections between the evolution of democracy, the expansion of the suffrage, and the granting of political rights to large numbers of people, on the one hand, and the existence of manpower-intensive forms of warfare, on the other. When elites need to field mass armies in order to protect themselves from external threat, they are forced to grant rights and some degree of political power to the masses as a means of motivating them to fight.

    By contrast, the ascendance of forms of warfare that are not manpower-intensive—unmanned drones and cyber weapons as much as nuclear weapons—tends to correlate with contractions of democracy. When political leaders believe they can deter or respond to external threats without the need to raise and sustain mass armies, they have little motivation to make decisions in a democratic manner.

    There are, then, few meaningful legal constraints on presidential nuclear powers, much as we may wish it were otherwise. Are there, however, some practical constraints on a presidential first use of nuclear weapons, constraints that arise out of bureaucratic practice or political necessity?

    In the pragmatic realm, there are some constraints, though they are far from sufficient. Remember: the presidential nuclear power is not a magic wand; it works only insofar as we have created an elaborate institutional and physical infrastructure designed to make it work. That is to say: if the President wants to launch one or more nuclear strikes, he needs to have the right missiles in the right launch locations with the right targets programmed into them. Missiles are built and maintained and programmed by human beings.

    The presidential nuclear power is, in this sense, more like the power to order from a menu than the power to instantly produce any cuisine. Historically, the US nuclear arsenal has been designed and maintained to focus on particular threats: Russia, North Korea, Iran, and so forth. Specific target sets associated with these potential adversaries are preprogrammed.

    If a US president wants to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against North Korea, it is a safe bet to assume that the military knows exactly which missiles to fire at which targets, and it is unlikely that anyone in the (short) chain of command would question a presidential order to strike.

    If a US president suddenly decided to launch nuclear weapons against Canada, it would be quite a different story: strike packages and targets would need to hastily be put together, creating the time and space for advisors close to the president to say, “Mr. President, this is not a good idea, let’s talk about this.” Would we suddenly find officers and advisors willing to say, “Wait a minute, Mr. President, I can’t seem to work the lock on the nuclear football, we’d better call the secretary of defense and get him over here to discuss this”? I think we would.

    This is perhaps not terribly consoling. But we should not imagine that building in a more extensive and consultative decision-making process would guarantee wiser decisions. Legislatively or through embedded bureaucratic practice, we could create a system in which the president needs the concurrence of, say, the secretary of defense and the attorney general before launching a preemptive nuclear strike.

    But homogenous groups, particularly in a hierarchical setting where people are habituated to abiding by the decision of the commander in chief, will not necessarily put meaningful brakes on a presidential decision. “Groupthink” led us to the 2003 Iraq War, a catastrophically foolish venture to which hundreds of intelligent “experts” gave their wholehearted support. Even those with serious reservations tend to go along to get along. We are social animals; that’s what we do. Especially inside the Beltway.

    My final point brings me back to where I began: particularly when dealing with the Inside the Beltway crowd, those of us who care deeply about reining in presidential nuclear powers need to draw careful distinctions, and be mindful of the language we use. Those opposed to nuclear weapons have a natural tendency to speak in terms of extremes: we talk about nuclear winters and climate catastrophe, about cataclysmic global conflicts with high-yield nuclear devices capable of destroying the planet earth.

    The language of catastrophe is easily brushed aside by Beltway insiders. In the halls of the Pentagon and the White House, such scenarios just generate dismissive chuckles: “That’s not what we’re talking about,” the “experts” will say. “Nobody would be crazy enough to start an unlimited global nuclear war. Remember, not all nuclear weapons are the same. When we talk about nuclear strikes, we’re talking about designing small, tactical, tailored nuclear weapons. We could control their use; we could ensure that only military targets would be affected; we would only use these low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons in very special circumstances, such as to destroy hardened underground bunkers that we couldn’t get at through conventional weapons.”

    There is, in other words, nothing to worry about, say the Beltway insiders: we can manage and control this fearsome nuclear power. This is foolish. Even a small-scale, “precise” use of tactical nuclear weapons runs a very high risk of deliberate or inadvertent escalation, as well as a high risk of normalizing the use of nuclear weapons, thus opening the door to wider use.

    Those concerned about nuclear weapons use need to confront this false logic head on: to spell out the ways in which “control” over nuclear conflict is inherently illusory.

    Those inside the Beltway have lived with the threat of nuclear weapons for so long that it has stopped seeming like a real threat. The insiders are like those crocodile or grizzly bear tamers who become so habituated to the proximity of a dangerous predator that they convince themselves the danger isn’t real—the bear won’t attack them! Until the bear, being a bear, does attack them.

    Inside the Beltway, we are so used to living in the shadow of nuclear apocalypse that it has stopped frightening us. But we should never forget that we are living with a dangerous predator—only in this case, the predator is us.

  • Protocol for a U.S. Nuclear Strike

    This article is part of a series from the November 2017 Harvard University conference entitled “Presidential First Use: Is it legal? Is it constitutional? Is it just?” To access all of the transcripts from this conference, click here.

    The current US protocol for deciding whether to launch a nuclear strike—developed in the early 1960s, with the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles—has two main functions and virtues: first, it concentrates the power and authority over the use of nuclear weapons in the presidency, at the highest level of the executive branch of the US government, thus keeping it out of the hands of the military and others. Second, it enables the president to respond rapidly and decisively to a nuclear attack by an enemy whose missiles may fly from one side of the planet to the other in 30 minutes; or whose missiles launched from submarines in the oceans may fly to targets in the United States in 15 minutes. It’s critical to have a protocol that allows the president to consider the use of nuclear weapons and, if necessary, to order their use, and to have the process of implementation begin in a very, very short period of time.

    The protocol’s virtues also produce its disadvantages. By virtue of the speed and concentration of authority in this protocol, the president has an opportunity to effectively railroad the nuclear commanders and forces into executing even a very large nuclear strike first—preemptively or preventively. That could lead to a misguided decision based on an impulsive psychology or on other factors that lead to a very bad call.

    The other downside to this protocol, which we used to talk about a lot more than we do today, is that the protocol itself, rooted as it is in speed and concentrated authority, can railroad the president into authorizing, in a hasty way, the use of nuclear weapons based on indications, possibly false, of an attack underway (a strategy known as “launch on warning”). In other words, we might believe we are retaliating when in fact we’re launching first.

    During the Cold War, to my knowledge, a false alarm never led to notification of the president at the beginning of the protocol that I’m about to describe. The false alarms were caught before that happened. Ironically, today, with the proliferation of ballistic missiles over the last decade (there’s been a huge surge in ballistic missile proliferation, and in their testing) you find that recent missile launches—from China, from Iran, from North Korea—have led on multiple occasions to sufficient ambiguity that the presidents have actually been notified about the ongoing event.

    Here are the key features of the current protocol. It begins with an early-warning function: the effort to detect a possible attack against North America and to notify the president and others to begin a process of deliberation. Every single day, the early-warning staffs out in Colorado and Omaha pick up events that require a second look to determine whether we’re under attack. Events they might review include a Japanese satellite launch into space, a North Korean missile test, a US missile test out of California, a wildfire in the southwest US. Most of these are usually dismissed quickly. Once or twice a month, something happens that requires a really close second look. And once in a blue moon, something happens and all hell breaks loose, as in the case of a false alarm concerning a missile launch.

    If these staffs receive any indication that we may be under attack, they have three minutes from the time the first sensor data arrives until they have to provide a preliminary assessment as to whether North America is under attack. If the assessment is of medium or high confidence that there is a threat, they initiate a process that will bring the president and his top advisors into an emergency conference no matter what time of day or night.

    Imagine that the president has decided to initiate a conference with his top advisors to consider the first use of nuclear weapons. The United States does not have a no-first-use policy. Furthermore, under the current review of our nuclear policy, undertaken primarily by the Pentagon, there is an emerging thesis that we should move further away from no first use and consider use of nuclear weapons in a wider variety of contingencies. We are on the verge of modifying our assurance to non-nuclear-weapons countries that we would not use nuclear weapons against them, in contradiction to the position adopted by the Obama administration.

    The emergency meeting of the president and his top advisors will typically include statutory members of the National Security Council: the secretary of defense; the secretary of state; the national security advisor; the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who participates at the discretion and the invitation of the secretary of defense; and a number of key military command centers and personnel, the most important of whom is the commander of strategic forces based in Omaha, Nebraska, who commands all our strategic nuclear weapons.

    Time and circumstances permitting, the commander will brief the president on his nuclear options and their consequences. It will not be a long briefing. He’s going to have to boil this down into very, very brief sound-bites for the president: here are your options and here are the consequences. The commander will then ask the president a couple questions, such as whether he wants to withhold attacks on a particular location, such as a populous city. That briefing, if we are under attack, will be as short as 30 seconds. Of course, if the president is considering the first use of nuclear weapons, the timeline is not nearly as short and that conversation can last for quite a long period.

    If we are under attack, the president is going to have to consider his options in about six minutes, given how this protocol tends to work. If we’re not under attack, he can deliberate longer. Then he makes a decision: What option am I going to pursue? Am I going to decide to attack North Korea, for example? (With the current preprogrammed attack plan, I estimate we would have 80 nuclear aim points in North Korea.)

    Let’s say the president chooses an option. It will be conveyed instantly to the war room at the Pentagon, which probably initiated the presidential conference in the first place. The people in the Pentagon war room are listening in on the conversation and are beginning, as they hear the president moving toward a decision to use nuclear weapons, to prepare a launch order.

    Note that the secretary of defense does not confirm the president’s decision, nor does he or she have a right to veto it, nor does anyone else have the authority to override the decision. This is what Elaine Scarry has identified as, in effect, a “thermonuclear monarchy,” which gives the US president almost carte blanche command over the nuclear forces.

    When the president conveys his decision to the war room, they ask him to authenticate his identity using a special code. It’s referred to colloquially as “the biscuit,” otherwise known more officially as the “gold code.” If that code matches, the war room at the Pentagon, or an alternate, will format a launch order that will be transmitted down the chain of command to the executing commanders of the submarines, land-based rockets, and bombers.

    That launch order is roughly half the length of a tweet. It contains all the information necessary for the crews down the chain of command to launch their forces: the time to fire, the chosen war plan, an unlock code that the crews need to physically unlock their weapons prior to the launch, and special authentication codes that the crews check with the codes in their safes to satisfy themselves that these orders came from the president (those codes are not in the possession of the president, but of the military).

    That takes two minutes: 10 seconds to authenticate, then a minute or two to format and transmit the order. And in two more minutes, from the receipt of that order down the chain of command, missiles could be leaving their silos; it takes only about one minute for a Minuteman crew in the plains states of the Midwest to carry out their launch checklist. This was my job in the 1970s and at the time, it took me one minute. We delayed a little bit, for classified reasons, but that’s how long it took then and that’s how long it takes today.

    After the crews enter the war plan it goes out to all the missiles, which are preprogrammed with what wartime targets to strike. In peacetime, they are aimed at the ocean, but changing their targets to Moscow or any other targets is as easy as changing the channel on your TV set.

    Today, within a minute or two there can be up to 400 high-yield strategic weapons launched out of their silos to their targets, wherever those targets may be. Submarines take about 10 minutes longer because it takes them longer to target their missiles, position the submarine, and get to the proper depth. But even submarines on alert in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans would within 15 minutes be launching missiles out of their tubes, then firing them one at a time every 15 seconds.

    Lastly, the bombers would take 8 to 10 hours to reach their launch points if they were already on alert. They are not normally, today, in peacetime, on alert. They don’t even have bombs on board, so in a crisis they would have to be placed on full alert, with bombs and cruise missiles loaded, before they were usable.

    To sum up: the president wakes up, gives an order through a system so streamlined that there’s almost no gatekeeping, and, within five minutes, 400 bombs leave on missiles launched out of the Midwest. About 10 minutes later, another 400 leave on missiles launched out of submarines. That’s 800 nuclear weapons—roughly the equivalent of, in round numbers, 15,000 Hiroshima bombs.

    Reform of current US launch protocol is long overdue. Layering on new safeguards that strengthen checks and balances on presidential launch authority is necessary to reduce the risk of nuclear first use. Safeguards include the Markey-Lieu Bill, which would prohibit the president from employing nuclear weapons first unless Congress has declared war and provided specific authorization for their use; the Betts/Waxman solution, which would add the secretary of defense and attorney general to the chain of command to certify that a presidential launch order is authentic and legal; and adoption of a no-first-use policy, which would draw a red line that, if crossed, makes the president accountable and even impeachable.

    Regarding a second strike, the United States should eliminate launch on warning and move toward a true retaliatory posture, requiring protection of the president and his successors and providing a large increase in warning and decision time.

  • Ten Myths About Nuclear Weapons

    Nuclear weapons were needed to defeat Japan in World War II.

    It is widely believed, particularly in the United States, that the use of nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was necessary to defeat Japan in World War II.  This is not, however, the opinion of the leading US military figures in the war, including General Dwight Eisenhower, General Omar Bradley, General Hap Arnold and Admiral William Leahy.  General Eisenhower, for example, who was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe during World War II and later US president, wrote, “I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced [to Secretary of War Stimson] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.  It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face’….”  Not only was the use of nuclear force unnecessary, its destructive force was excessive, resulting in 220,000 deaths by the end of 1945.

    Nuclear weapons prevented a war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

    Many people believe that the nuclear standoff during the Cold War prevented the two superpowers from going to war with each other, for fear of mutually assured destruction.  While it is true that the superpowers did not engage in nuclear warfare during the Cold War, there were many confrontations between them that came uncomfortably close to nuclear war, the most prominent being the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.  There were also many deadly conflicts and “proxy” wars carried out by the superpowers in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Vietnam War, which took several million Vietnamese lives and the lives of more than 58,000 Americans, is an egregious example.  These wars made the supposed nuclear peace very bloody and deadly.  Lurking in the background was the constant danger of a nuclear exchange. The Cold War was an exceedingly dangerous time with a massive nuclear arms race, and the human race was extremely fortunate to have survived it without suffering a nuclear war.

    Nuclear threats have gone away since the end of the Cold War.

    In light of the Cold War’s end, many people believed that nuclear threats had gone away.  While the nature of nuclear threats has changed since the end of the Cold War, these threats are far from having disappeared or even significantly diminished.  During the Cold War, the greatest threat was that of a massive nuclear exchange between the United States and Soviet Union.  In the aftermath of the Cold War, a variety of new nuclear threats have emerged.  Among these are the following dangers:

    • Increased possibilities of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists who would not hesitate to use them;
    • Nuclear war between India and Pakistan;
    • Policies of the US government to make nuclear weapons smaller and more usable;
    • Use of nuclear weapons by accident, particularly by Russia, which has a substantially weakened early warning system; and
    • Spread of nuclear weapons to other states, which may perceive them to be an “equalizer” against a more powerful state.

    The United States needs nuclear weapons for its national security.

    There is widespread belief in the United States that nuclear weapons are necessary for the US to defend against aggressor states.  US national security, however, would be far improved if the US took a leadership role in seeking to eliminate nuclear weapons throughout the world.  Nuclear weapons are the only weapons that could actually destroy the United States, and their existence and proliferation threaten US security.  Continued high-alert deployment of nuclear weapons and research on smaller and more usable nuclear weapons by the US, combined with a more aggressive foreign policy, makes many weaker nations feel threatened.  Weaker states may think of nuclear weapons as an equalizer, giving them the ability to effectively neutralize the forces of a threatening nuclear weapons state.  Thus, as in the case of North Korea, the US threat may be instigating nuclear weapons proliferation.  Continued reliance on nuclear weapons by the United States is setting the wrong example for the world, and is further endangering the country rather than protecting it.  The United States has strong conventional military forces and would be far more secure in a world in which no country had nuclear arms.

    Nuclear weapons make a country safer.

    It is a common belief that nuclear weapons protect a country by deterring potential aggressors from attacking.  By threatening massive nuclear retaliation, the argument goes, nuclear weapons prevent an attacker from starting a war.  To the contrary, nuclear weapons are actually undermining the safety of the countries that possess them by providing a false sense of security.  While nuclear deterrence can provide some psychological sense of security, there are no guarantees that the threat of retaliation will succeed in preventing an attack.  There are many ways in which deterrence could fail, including misunderstandings, faulty communications, irrational leaders, miscalculations and accidents. In addition, the possession of nuclear weapons enhances the risks of terrorism, proliferation and ultimately nuclear annihilation.

    No leader would be crazy enough to actually use nuclear weapons.

    Many people believe that the threat of using nuclear weapons can go on indefinitely as a means of deterring attacks because no leader would be crazy enough to actually use them.  Unfortunately, nuclear weapons have been used, and it is likely that most, if not all, leaders possessing these weapons would, in fact, use them.  US leaders, considered by many to be highly rational, are the only ones who have ever used nuclear weapons in war, against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  In addition to these two actual US bombings, leaders of other nuclear weapons states have repeatedly come close to using their nuclear arsenals.  Nuclear deterrence is based upon a believable threat of nuclear retaliation, and the threat of nuclear weapons use has been constant during the post World War II period.  US policy currently provides that the US will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.  Importantly, this leaves out other nuclear weapons states, as well as states not parties to the NPT and states the US determines not to be in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.  US leaders have regularly refused to take any option off the table in relation to potential conflicts.  Threats of nuclear attack by India and Pakistan provide another example of nuclear brinksmanship that could turn into a nuclear war.  Historically, leaders of nuclear-armed countries have done their best to prove that they would use nuclear weapons.  Assuming that they would not do so would be extremely foolhardy.

    Nuclear weapons are a cost-effective method of national defense.

    Some have argued that nuclear weapons, with their high yield of explosive power, offer the benefit of an effective defense for minimum investment.  This is one reason behind ongoing research into lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons, which would be perceived as more usable.  The cost of research, development, testing, deployment and maintenance of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, however, exceeds $7.5 trillion (in 2005 dollars) for the US alone.  The US is planning to spend another $1 trillion over the next three decades modernizing and upgrading every aspect of its nuclear arsenal.  The nine nuclear-armed countries are spending over $100 billion annually on their nuclear arsenals.  With advances in nuclear technology and power, the costs and consequences of a nuclear war would be immeasurable.

    Nuclear weapons are well protected and there is little chance that terrorists could get their hands on one. 

    Many people believe that nuclear weapons are well protected and that the likelihood of terrorists obtaining these weapons is low.  In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, the ability of the Russians to protect their nuclear forces has declined precipitously.  In addition, a coup in a country with nuclear weapons, such as Pakistan, could lead to a government coming to power that would be willing to provide nuclear weapons to terrorists.  In general, the more nuclear weapons there are in the world and the more nuclear weapons proliferate to additional countries, the greater the possibility that nuclear weapons will end up in the hands of terrorists.  The best remedy for keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists is to drastically reduce their numbers and institute strict international inspections and controls on all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials in all countries, until these weapons and the materials for making them can be eliminated.  The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit had a narrow focus on protecting civilian stores of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which accounts for only a very small percentage of the world’s weapons-grade material.

    The United States is working to fulfill its nuclear disarmament obligations.

    Most US citizens believe that the United States is working to fulfill its nuclear disarmament obligations.  In fact, the United States has failed for nearly five decades to fulfill its obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate in good faith for an end to the nuclear arms race at an early date and for nuclear disarmament.  The US is currently being sued in US federal court by the Republic of the Marshall Islands for failing to fulfill its nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT.  Rather than negotiating to end the nuclear arms race, the US is planning to upgrade and modernize all aspects of its nuclear arsenal, delivery vehicles and nuclear infrastructure.  The United States has also failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Further, it has unilaterally withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and thereby abrogated this important treaty.  The New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) between the US and Russia, which was signed in April 2010 and entered into force in February 2011, will reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads on each side to 1,550 by the year 2018.  This is not, however, a fulfillment of the US treaty obligations under the NPT.

    Nuclear weapons are needed to combat threats from terrorists and “rogue states.”

    It has been argued that nuclear weapons are needed to protect against terrorists and “rogue states.”  Yet nuclear weapons, whether used for deterrence or as offensive weaponry, are not effective for this purpose. The threat of nuclear force cannot act as a deterrent against terrorists because they do not have a territory to retaliate against. Thus, terrorists would not be prevented from attacking a country for fear of nuclear retaliation.  Nuclear weapons also cannot be relied on as a deterrent against “rogue states” because their responses to a nuclear threat may be irrational and deterrence relies on rationality.  If the leaders of a rogue state do not use the same calculus regarding their losses from retaliation, deterrence can fail.  As offensive weaponry, nuclear force only promises tremendous destruction to troops, civilians and the environment.  It might work to annihilate a rogue state, but the force entailed in using nuclear weaponry would be indiscriminate, cause unnecessary suffering, and be disproportionate to a prior attack, as well as highly immoral.  It would not be useful against terrorists because strategists could not be certain of locating an appropriate target for retaliation.


    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). Angela McCracken, the 2003 Ruth Floyd intern in human rights and international law at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, was co-author of an earlier version of this article.

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    7/07/03

  • Your Doctors Are Worried

    Your doctors are worried about your health―in fact, about your very survival.

    No, they’re not necessarily your own personal physicians, but, rather, medical doctors around the world, represented by groups like International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).  As you might recall, that organization, composed of many thousands of medical professionals from all across the globe, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985 for exposing the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons.

    Well, what seems to be the problem today?

    Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People At Risk?The problem, as a new IPPNW report indicates, is that the world is showing growing symptoms of a terminal illness.  In a nuclear war involving as few as 100 weapons anywhere in the world, the report noted, the global climate and agricultural production would be affected so severely that the lives of more than 2 billion people would be in jeopardy.  Even the use of the relatively small nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan could cause terrible, long lasting damage to the Earth’s ecosystems.  The ensuing economic collapse and massive starvation would throw the world into chaos.

    And this is just a small portion of the looming nuclear catastrophe.

    Today, some 17,300 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of nine nations, and their use would not only dramatically exacerbate climate disruption, but would create almost unbelievable horrors caused by their enormous blast, immense firestorms, and radioactive contamination.

    The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), founded by IPPNW in 2007, reports that a single nuclear weapon, detonated over a large city, “could kill millions of people in an instant.”  Subsequently, many additional people would die of burns and other injuries, disease, and cancer.

    Residents of the United States and Russia, two nations currently engaged in an international brawl, might be particularly interested in the fact that their countries possess over 16,000 nuclear weapons.  About 2,000 of them on hair-trigger alert, ready for use within minutes.  According to the ICAN report, if only 500 of these weapons were to hit major U.S. and Russian cities, “100 million people would die in the first half an hour, and tens of millions would be fatally injured.  Huge swaths of both countries would be blanketed by radioactive fallout.”  Furthermore, “most Americans and Russians would die in the following months from radiation sickness and disease epidemics.”

    These unnerving reports from IPPNW and ICAN are reinforced by warnings from the World Health Organization (WHO).  “Nuclear weapons constitute the greatest immediate threat to the health and welfare of mankind,” that respected international organization has reported.  “It is obvious that no health service in any area of the world would be capable of dealing adequately with the hundreds of thousands of people seriously injured by blast, heat, or radiation from even a single one-megaton bomb.”  The WHO went on to declare:  “To the immediate catastrophe must be added the long-term effects on the environment.  Famine and diseases would be widespread, and social and economic systems would be totally disrupted.”

    Despite the warnings from the medical profession that, in the words of ICAN, “nuclear weapons are the most destructive, inhumane, and indiscriminate instruments of mass murder ever created,” the nine nuclear powers seem in no hurry to get rid of them―or at least to get rid of their own.  The United States has possessed nuclear weapons for almost 69 years; Russia for almost 65.  Despite their repeated promises, in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 and in later circumstances, to engage in nuclear disarmament, they still possess about 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons.  Both countries, in fact, are now engaged in nuclear “modernization” programs, with the Obama administration proposing to upgrade nuclear weapons and build new nuclear submarines, missiles, and bombers at an estimated cost of somewhere between $355 billion and $1 trillion over the next 30 years.

    Although the other kinds of weapons of mass destruction are banned by treaty, there are no plans by the nuclear powers to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons.  Indeed, given the current U.S.-Russia confrontation, it seems unlikely that there will be progress on much smaller-scale arms control and disarmament agreements.

    That’s the bad news from your doctors.

    The good news is that you and other people around the world aren’t dead yet and that there’s still time to change the destructive behavior of your national leaders.  Actually, some opportunities are opening up along these lines.  At a February 2014 conference in Mexico drawing official representatives from 146 nations (but boycotted by the nuclear powers), there was strong support for a treaty banning nuclear weapons, and the Austrian government will host a follow-up conference later this year.  Also, an international NPT Preparatory Conference will begin in late April and an international NPT Review Conference will be held the following spring.  Meanwhile, two pieces of legislation have been introduced in the U.S. Congress―the SANE Act in the Senate and the Rein-In Act in the House―that would cut the bloated U.S. nuclear weapons budget by $100 billion over the next ten years.  So who knows?  If you and others take some preventive action, you might even avoid the terminal illness that now awaits you.

    Anyway, good luck with it.  You deserve a chance to survive.  In fact, we all do.

    Dr. Lawrence Wittner is Professor of History emeritus at SUNY/Albany.  His latest book is a satirical novel about university corporatization and rebellion, What’s Going On at UAardvark?

  • April – This Month in Nuclear Threat History

    April 1, 1961 – The approximate date, after President Dwight Eisenhower signed the formal authorization on December 2, 1960, that the first U.S. SIOP – Single Integrated Operational Plan – went into effect.  According to Eric Schlosser’s 2013 book, “Command and Control:  Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident, and the Illusion of  Safety” (New York:  Penguin Press), the SIOP featured 3,720 targets grouped into more than 1,000 ground zeros that would be struck by 3,423 nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Eastern Europe.  Eisenhower’s order was kept secret from the American people, the Congress, and even the NATO military alliance.  The President later confided to his naval aide Pete Aurand that the casualty estimates, the sheer number of targets, the redundant bombs for each, “frighten the devil out of me.” (Source:  Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick.  “The Untold History of the United States.” New York:  Gallery Books, 2012, p. 287.)

    April 7, 1989 – The 6,400-ton Soviet nuclear submarine, the Komsomolets (K-278) became the fourth nuclear vessel of the U.S.S.R. to sink during the Cold War (1945-1991).  42 sailors were lost, as well as two torpedoes equipped with nuclear warheads, when the ship sank into mile-deep water in the Barents Sea.  A 1994 expedition detected some plutonium leakage from one of the nuclear-tipped torpedoes.  Dozens of warheads and nuclear reactors lie at the bottom of Earth’s oceans from predominantly American and Soviet submarines, aircraft, and other naval vessels constituting a long-term radioactive environmental and public health threat to the globe.  (Source:  Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew.  “Blind Man’s Bluff:  The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage.”  New York:  Public Affairs, 1998, p. 243.)

    April 8, 2009 – Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Ivan Oelrich released a report entitled, “From Counterforce to Minimum Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council Occasional Paper No. 7 which argued that the United States needs only 500 nuclear weapons for deterring all possible global adversaries.  A group of high-ranking U.S. Air Force officers, including James Wood Forsyth, Jr., Colonel B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary Schaub, Jr. in the Spring 2010 issue of the journal Strategic Studies Quarterly (Vol. 4, No. 1 – page 82), were even more optimistic calling for a total minimum deterrence force of only 311 U.S. nuclear weapons.   Today, there exists over 10,000 nuclear weapons, including strategic, tactical, and reserve warheads, in global nuclear arsenals.   (Source:  Eric Schlosser.  “Command and Control:  Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident, and the Illusion of Safety.” New York:  Penguin Press, 2013, pp. 476-77, 483, 582)

    April 21, 1964 – NASA’s Transit 5bn satellite failed to reach orbit after its launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida dispersing 2.1 pounds of plutonium (half-life:  24,400 years) from its SNAP-RTG – Radio Isothermic Generator – into Earth’s atmosphere.  This is just one of many examples of inadvertent and usually underreported incidents of manmade radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, surface, and oceans due to the activities of U.S. and other military and civilian space agencies.  Although considered essential for deep space missions, where use of solar power is problematical, such as Pioneer 10 and 11, Voyager 1 and 2, Galileo, and Cassini, RTGs powered by plutonium or similar dangerous radioactive materials do constitute a definable risk to human populations.  A more notable example is the RTG-equipped Apollo 13 lunar module, used as a lifeboat by the three astronauts after an explosion destroyed oxygen and vital supplies in the command module, jettisoned into the South Pacific Ocean in the vicinity of the Tonga Trench in April of 1970.  (Source:  Day of the Week.org and Dr. Karl Grossman’s BeyondNuclear.org)

    April 26, 1986 – A fire in the core of the No. 4 unit and a resulting explosion that blew the roof off the reactor building of the Chernobyl Nuclear Complex located about 130 kilometers (80 miles) north of Kiev, capital of the then Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of the U.S.S.R., resulted in the largest ever release of radioactive material from a civilian reactor with the possible exception of the Fukushima Dai-chi accident of March 11, 2011 in northeast Japan.  Two were killed and 200 others hospitalized, but the Soviet government did not release specific details of the nuclear meltdown until two days later when Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and other European neighbors detected abnormally high levels of radioactivity.  8,000 died and 435,000 people were evacuated from the region in the ensuing weeks, months, and years.   Although West Germany, Sweden, and other nations provided assistance to the Soviet Union to deal with the deadly, widespread radioactive fallout from the accident, some argue today that the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, and other nations should establish a permanent, multilateral civilian-military-humanitarian response force to quickly address such serious nuclear and natural disasters in a time-urgent, nonpartisan manner.  (Sources:  “Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year for 1987.”  Chicago:  Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1987, pp. 61, 168 and “The Untold History of the United States.” 2012, p. 450.)

    April 30, 1976 – Chicago Sun-Times’ reporter Robert R. Jones, after conducting an extensive series of interviews with nuclear experts and Atomic Energy Commission (now known as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) representatives, concluded that, “Licensee and AEC officials agree that a security system at a licensed civilian nuclear power plant could not prevent a takeover or sabotage by a small number of people, perhaps as few as two or three.”   Today despite reported efforts by the Department of Homeland Security to shore up such defenses, the strong threat of nuclear terrorism reinforces the belief that U.S., as well as global civilian nuclear reactors, should be phased out and shut down by the year 2025, if not sooner.  (Source:  Louis Rene Beres.  “Apocalypse:  Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics.”  Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 1980.)

  • Human Radiation Experiments in the Pacific

    ” . . . protect the inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources; protect the health of the inhabitants . . .” (1)

    According to Marshallese folklore a half-bad and half-good god named Etao was associated with slyness and trickery.  When bad things happened people knew that Etao was behind it.  “He’s dangerous, that Etao,” some people said.  “He does bad things to people and then laughs at them.”(2)  Many in the Marshall Islands now view their United States patron as a latter day Etao.

    Castle-Bravo

    Castle Bravo Nuclear ExplosionSixty years ago this month the American Etao unleashed its unprecedented  fury at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands.  It was nine years after the searing and indelible images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that the world first learned about the dangers of radioactive fallout from hydrogen bombs that use atomic Hiroshima-sized bombs as triggers.

    Castle-Bravo, the first in a series of megaton-range hydrogen bomb tests at Bikini Atoll on March first of 1954, was nicknamed “the shrimp” by its designer – Edward Teller – because it was the first deliverable thermonuclear weapon in the megaton range in the U.S. nuclear holster.  We had beaten the Soviets in this key area of nuclear weapons miniaturization when the Cold War was hot and the United States did not need to seek approval from anybody, especially the Marshallese entrusted to them through the U.N.

    At fifteen megatons – 1,000 times the Hiroshima A-bomb – the Bravo behemoth was a fission-fusion-fission [3-F] thermonuclear bomb that spread deadly radioactive fallout over an enormous swath of the central Pacific Ocean, including the inhabited atolls of Rongelap, Rongerik and Utrik in the Marshalls archipelago.  The downwind people of Rongelap [120 miles downwind of Bikini] and Utrik [300 miles east of Bikini] were evacuated as they suffered from the acute effects of radiation exposure.

    As an international fallout controversy reached a crescendo, a hastily called press conference was held in Washington in mid-March 1954 with Eisenhower and AEC chair Admiral Lewis [“nuclear energy too cheap to meter”] Strauss, his Administration’s top lieutenant in nuclear matters.

    Adm. Lewis Strauss:  “I’ve just returned from the Pacific Proving Grounds of the AEC where I witnessed the second part of a test series of thermonuclear weapons .  .  . For shot one [Bravo] the wind failed to follow the predictions, but shifted south of that line and the little islands of Rongelap, Rongerik and Utrik were in the edge of the path of the fallout . . . The 236 Marshallese natives appeared to me to be well and happy . . .The results, which the scientists at Los Alamos and Livermore had hoped to obtain from these two tests [Bravo and Union] were fully realized.  An enormous potential has been added to our military posture.”  Strauss added the caveat that “the medical staff on Kwajalein have advised us that they anticipate no illness, barring of course, diseases which may be hereafter contracted.” (3)

    Even former Sec. of State Henry Kissinger took note of the significance of Bravo and the new perils associated with widespread radioactive fallout contamination from megaton sized H-bombs, as might happen if the Soviets dropped The Big One on our nation’s capital and the fallout headed up the Eastern Seaboard.  Writing about nuclear weapons and foreign policy in 1957, Kissinger wrote:  “The damage caused by radiation is twofold:  direct damage leading to illness, death or reduced life expectancy, and genetic effects.”(4)

    Almira Matayoshi was one of the Rongelap “natives” referred to by Adm. Strauss.  When I interviewed her in 1981 in Majuro she recounted her experience with Bravo:

    The flash of light was very strong, then came the big sound of the explosion; it was quite a while before the fallout came.  The powder was yellowish and when you walked it was all over your body.  Then people began to get very weak and bean to vomit.  Most of us were weak and my son was out of breath.

    I have pains and much fear of the bomb.  At that time I wanted to die, and we were really suffering; our bodies ached and our feet were covered with burns and our hair fell out.  Now I see babies growing up abnormally and some are mentally disturbed, but none of these things happened before the bomb.  It is sad to see the babies now.(5)

    A persistent puzzle surrounds the question of intentionality.  In a 1982 New York Times interview, Gene Curbow (the former weather technician during Bravo) confessed that the winds did not “shift” according to the official U.S. explanation for the massive contamination during Bravo.  “The wind had been blowing straight at us for days before the test,” said Curbow.  “It was blowing straight at us during the test, and straight at us after the test.  The wind never shifted.”  When asked why it had taken so long to come forth with this important information, Curbow replied “It was a mixture of patriotism and ignorance, I guess.”(6)

    The late Dr. Robert Conard, head of the Brookhaven/AEC medical surveillance team for the islanders, wrote in his 1958 annual report on the exposed Marshallese: “The habitation of these people on Rongelap Island affords the opportunity for a most valuable ecological radiation study on human beings . . . The various radionuclides present on the island can be traced from the soil through the food chain and into the human being.”(7)

    In reference to the exposed Marshallese after Bravo, AEC official Merrill Eisenbud bluntly stated during a NYC AEC meeting in 1956, “Now, data of this type has never been available.  While it is true that these people do not live the way westerners do, civilized people, it is nonetheless also true that they are more like us than the mice.”(8)

    At present, the atoll communities of Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap remain sociologically disrupted and uncertain about their future as their contaminated islands and lagoons have yet to be fully repatriated and restored for permanent human habitation.

    Kwajalein

    Following 67 A- and H-bombs at Bikini and Enewetak between 1946-58, the U.S. was not about to let go of its island capture, terminate the AEC-Brookhaven long-term human radiation studies at Rongelap and Utirk,  nor forfeit the valuable “catcher’s mitt” at Kwajalein for monthly incoming ICBMs from Vandenberg air base in California and Kauai.  In 1961 – following a polio outbreak on Ebeye, Kwajalein – Pres. Kennedy ordered a comprehensive review of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by his Harvard economist friend Anthony M. Solomon, head of the New York Reserve Bank.

    Correspondingly, JFK’s National Security Action Memorandum 145 of April 18, 1962 called for the movement of Micronesia into a permanent relationship with the U.S.(9)

    Through legerdemain and the inherent asymmetry of the relationship, the U.S. took every conceivable  advantage of its island wards, thus setting the stage for the ongoing human and ecological radiation studies and other Pentagon activities in perpetuity.

    To this end the Solomon Report recommended a massive spending program just prior to a future status plebiscite being planned for Micronesia.  “It is the Solomon Mission’s conclusion that those programs and the spending involved will not set off a self-sustaining development process of any significance in the area.  It is important, therefore, that advantage be taken of the psychological impact of the capital investment program before some measure of disappointment is felt.”(10)

    As the Pentagon and AEC used the isolated isles of the Marshalls to perfect its Cold War nuclear deterrent – replete with human subjects for longitudinal radiation studies – let us not forget the Pentagon’s ongoing project of missile defense, aka “Star Wars” at Kwajalein Atoll encompassing the world’s largest lagoon bull’s eye.

    Characterized as “hitting a bullet with a bullet,” ballistic missile defense has always had a reputation for fantasy and wish fulfillment, sold to Pres. Reagan with an exciting and glitzy video designed to parallel the then-sensation called  “Star Wars.”   Kwajalein and the fiction of Ballistic Missile Defense has tragically dumped good money after bad, notwithstanding the huge profits by Boeing, Raytheon, Northrup Grumman,  MIT’s Lincoln Lab, Aerojet, Booz Allen et al.  Between 1962 and 1996 the U.S. spent $100 billion.  And between 1996 and 2012 the total comes to $274 billion and still counting.(11)

    And what do we have to show for our nearly $300 billion missile defense boondoggle?  Last July 4th was also the planned launch date for a test of the BMD program.  The Ground Based Missile Defense system at Kwajalein Atoll failed again, despite the fact that the test was manipulated: “The intercept team knew ahead of time when to expect the incoming missile and all its relevant flight parameters. Such luxury is obviously not available in real-life combat. But even if the $214 million ‘test’ had worked it would not prove much.”(12)

    The collateral damage known as Ebeye Island at Kwajalein is infamously tagged throughout the region as the “slum of the Pacific.”  The appalling conditions on Ebeye for its 15,000 cramped residents and pool of cheap labor for the adjacent missile base are in stark contrast to the southern California-like setting on ten times as large Kwajalein Island for the 3,000 Americans manning the missile base.

    Likening it to South African apartheid, I recall my first encounter with Kwajalein and Ebeye as a young Peace Corps volunteer in 1976:

    Having spent the afternoon on Kwajalein yesterday left me feeling ashamed to be an American citizen.  The overt segregation of the American civilian and military employees on Kwajalein Island, and the cheap labor pool of Marshallese living on nearby Ebeye Island, makes me realize that racism is not confined to the American south.(13)

    And just to insure the longevity of the asymmetry, the American Etao embedded a little-noticed caveat into the 1963 Limited [Atmospheric] Test Ban Treaty that allows the U.S. to unilaterally resume nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, despite assurances to the contrary during the 1986 Compact status negotiations.  Safeguard “C,” as the provision is known, also calls for the readiness of Johnston Atoll and Kauai in the Hawaiian archipelago, and Enewetak Atoll in the Marshalls under the auspices of the DOE’s Pacific Area Support Office in Honolulu.(14)

    Several formerly inhabited atolls remain off limits due to lingering radioactivity decades after the last H-bomb shattered the peace on Bikini and Enewetak.  Imagine if the U.S. finally saw fit to do the right thing and pay their past-due $2 billion nuclear legacy bill, a small morsel of the annual Star Wars budget.(15)

    The recently discovered Mexican refugee fisherman on Ebon Atoll in the Marshall Islands drew world attention to these obscure coral formations atop extinct and submerged volcanoes where a continuous culture has survived and nearly thrived for the past two thousand years. And even though Jose Salvador Alvarenga said he had no idea where he was, Uncle Sam has always known where these tiny islands are, strategically located stepping stones in the bowels of the northwestern Pacific leading to Asia’s doorstep, now in the era of the pending Trans Pacific Partnership.

    Undoubtedly the legendary Etao is somewhere lurking in these once-pacific isles savoring the work of its American protégé . . .

    [Addendum:  PBS is sitting on an important 90-minute film about the radiation experiments in the Marshall Islands titled “Nuclear Savage:  The Islands of Secret Project 4.1” by Adam Horowitz.  Please contact PBS and urge them to air “Nuclear Savage,” a documentary film they funded and are keeping from the public’s view.  Also, please see these additional articles about the Marshall Islands: http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/06/01/nuclear-savages and PBS’ attempt to suppress this film.

    Endnotes

    1. United Nations.  Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.  Trusteeship Agreement. URL:  http://www.fsmlaw.org/miscdocs/trustshipagree.htm.  New York.  1947.  Article VI.
    2. Grey, Eve.  Legends of Micronesia.  Book Two. The sly Etao and the sea demon.   1951.  Honolulu:  Office of the High Commissioner.  TTPI, Dept. of Educations.  Micronesian Reader Series.  Pages 35-36.
    3. Adm. Lewis Strauss, chair-AEC.  Press conference about Bravo with Pres. Eisenhower, March 12, 1954, Washington, D.C.  The archival footage may be viewed in this clip @ 1:00-4:30 in Part 3 of O’Rourke’s Half Life.
    4. Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.  Council on Foreign Relations.  Harper Bros.:  New York.  1957.  Page 75.
    5. Interview with Almira Matayoshi conducted by Glenn Alcalay in Feburary 1981 in Majuro, Marshall Islands.  This interview is online: http://archive.is/M5aH
    6. Judith Miller.  “Four veterans suing U.S. over exposure in ’54 atom test.”  New York Times.  Sept. 20, 1982.
    7. Robert Conard, M.D., et al.  March 1957 medical survey of Rongelap and Utrik people three years after exposure to radioactive fallout.  Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, N.Y.  June 1958.  Page. 22.
    8. Merrill Eisenbud.  Minutes of A.E.C. meeting.  U.S.A.E.C. Health and Safety Laboratory.  Advisory Committee on Biology & Medicine.  January 13-14, 1956.  Page 232.
    9. Report by the U.S. Government Survey Mission to the TTPI by Anthony M. Solomon, October 9, 1963.  Page 41.  The Solomon Report is online:  https://archive.org/stream/TheSolomonReportAmericasRuthlessBlueprintForTheAssimilationOf/micronesia3_djvu.txt
    10. Report by the U.S. Government Survey Mission to the TTPI by Anthony M. Solomon, October 9, 1963.  Pages 41-42.  The Solomon Report is online:  https://archive.org/stream/TheSolomonReportAmericasRuthlessBlueprintForTheAssimilationOf/micronesia3_djvu.txt
    11. Stephen Schwartz.  “The real price of ballistic missile defenses.” The Nonproliferation Review.  April 13, 2012.
    12. Yousaf Butt.  “Let’s end bogus missile defense testing.”  Reuters.  July 16, 2013.
    13. Glenn Alcalay.  Journal entry of January 21, 1976.  Aboard the MV Militobi.  Peace Corps Journal, Marshall Islands 1975-77.
    14. David Evans.  “Safeguard ‘C’: U.S. spending millions on plan to re-start Pacific nuclear tests.”  Chicago Tribune.  August 26, 1990.
    15. Giff Johnson.  “At 60, legacy of Bravo still reverberates in Marshall Islands.”  Editorial.  Marshall Islands Journal.  February 28, 2014.
  • March: This Month in Nuclear Threat History

    March 1, 1954 – In the Pacific Ocean’s Marshall Islands, the U.S. military conducted the BRAVO nuclear weapons test, one of thousands conducted by Nuclear Club Members, in the atmosphere, on the ground, and underground, during the Cold War and Post-Cold War period.  The yield, of approximately 15 megatons from the solid fuel lithium deuteride fusion warhead, was 2-3 times what was expected and unusual prevailing winds carried the radioactive fallout to unexpected places including a Japanese fishing trawler, Lucky Dragon sailing outside the exclusion zone.  All 23 Japanese crewmen were later hospitalized and one of the unfortunate men died as a result of radioactive exposure from an immense blast that produced a fireball four miles wide and a mushroom cloud 60 miles wide.  (Source:  Chuck Hansen.  “The Swords of Armageddon.”  Chuklea Publications:  Sunnyvale, CA, 2007.)

    March 4, 1969 – MIT and 30 other universities called for a national research stoppage to alert the public to how the “misuse of science and technology knowledge presents a major threat to the existence of mankind.”  Concerns not only about nuclear weapons, radioactive and chemical toxic leaks from U.S. military and civilian nuclear production and bombmaking sites but also about Agent Orange, and biological/chemical WMDs led scientists and academics to sign on to this pledge.  (Source:  Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick.  “The Untold History of the United States.”  New York:  Gallery Books, 2012.)

    March 11, 2011 – After a historically large earthquake and tsunami struck northeast Japan, three of the six nuclear reactors at Tokyo Electrical Power Company’s Fukushima Dai-chi facility suffered partial meltdowns resulting in the evacuation of tens of thousands of nearby residents.  The accident was the worst nuclear meltdown since the April 1986 Chernobyl Incident.  Nearly three years later, large volumes of radioactive-contaminated water continue to spill into the Pacific Ocean from the plant site as a long-term solution to the crisis has yet to be reached. (Source:  Various news media reports including Democracy Now, 2011-2014).

    March 22, 1963 – At a broadcast press conference, President John F. Kennedy speaks about the possibility that by the 1970s “…of the U.S. having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons…I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”  While those fears were not quite realized, it is nevertheless true that nuclear proliferation in Iran, North Korea, and elsewhere remains a deadly serious problem in the 21st century.  Some experts believe that only by phasing out nuclear power in the next few decades, can the world head off the actualization of our 35th President’s worst fears.
    (Source:  Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick.  “The Untold History of the United States.”  New York:  Gallery Books, 2012.)

    March 23, 1983 – In a nationally televised speech, President Ronald Reagan expressed the desire to “make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete” by committing the U.S. to develop a national missile defense system based on the ground and in outer space.   Media critics derisively referred to the plan as “Star Wars” and hundreds of billions of dollars were spent on attempts to deploy modest theater and national missile defenses in the coming decades.  In 2001, President George W. Bush withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty with Moscow signaling a new destabilizing, uncertain strategic defensive arms race that continues today.  (Source:  Bradley Graham.  “Hit to Kill:  The New Battle Over Shielding America From Missile Attack.”  New York:  Public Affairs, 2001.)