Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear weapons policy

  • Comparing the Positions of Senators Obama and McCain on Nuclear Disarmament

    David KriegerNuclear weapons do not and cannot protect their possessors. They can only be used to threaten or carry out massive retaliation. Retaliation does not constitute protection. It constitutes retribution of the worst sort, killing large numbers of innocent people. Further, when powerful states continue to rely upon nuclear arsenals for their security, they create an incentive to nuclear proliferation. When nuclear weapons proliferate to other countries, the chances are increased that they will end up in the hands of terrorist organizations that are suicidal, not locatable, and thus not subject to being deterred.

    A major goal of the next president of the United States should be to achieve a clear path to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This will require making a commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world; bringing US policy in line with this commitment; and convening negotiations with the other nuclear weapon states to achieve this goal.

    Both leading presidential candidates have articulated a commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. Senator Obama has said, “A world without nuclear weapons is profoundly in America’s interest and the world’s interest. It is our responsibility to make the commitment, and to do the hard work to make this vision a reality. That’s what I’ve done as a Senator and a candidate, and that’s what I’ll do as President.”

    On another occasion, Senator Obama stated, “Here’s what I’ll say as President: America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons. We will not pursue unilateral disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we’ll retain a strong nuclear deterrent. But we’ll keep our commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the long road towards eliminating nuclear weapons.” For the United States to keep its commitment under the Non-Proliferation Treaty would mean that it would enter into “good faith” negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Senator Obama asserts that this will be a “long road,” but with the requisite leadership and political will, it need not be so long a road as he now perceives.

    Senator Obama elaborated, “We’ll work with Russia to take US and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert, and to dramatically reduce the stockpiles of our nuclear weapons and material. We’ll start by seeking a global ban on the production of fissile material for weapons. And we’ll set a goal to expand the US-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global.”

    Senator McCain has said, “A quarter of a century ago, President Ronald Reagan declared, ‘our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.’ That is my dream, too.” Having said this, however, Senator McCain made it clear that the goal was not close at hand. He referred to it as “a distant and difficult goal,” one that “we must proceed toward it prudently and pragmatically, and with a focused concern for our security and the security of allies who depend on us.” Again, the requisite leadership and political will would make this a far less “distant and difficult goal.”

    Senator McCain continued, “But the Cold War ended almost twenty years ago, and the time has come to take further measures to reduce dramatically the number of nuclear weapons in the world’s arsenals. It is time for the United States to show the kind of leadership the world expects from us, in the tradition of American presidents who worked to reduce the nuclear threat to mankind. […] I believe we should reduce our nuclear forces to the lowest level we judge necessary, and we should be prepared to enter into a new arms control agreement with Russia reflecting the nuclear reductions I will seek.” Senator McCain’s goal is ambiguous when he talks about “the lowest level we judge necessary….” One might ask: Who is the “we” that judges and what is the criteria for “necessary”?

    Bringing US policy into line with the commitment to obtain a nuclear weapons-free world requires a number of steps to dramatically reduce nuclear risks as well as the size of nuclear arsenals. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has proposed seven steps to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. These will be discussed below, along with the positions of the two major party candidates for US president on each of these steps.

    • De-alert. Remove all nuclear weapons from high-alert status, separating warheads from delivery vehicles. There remain some 3,000 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert in the arsenals of the US and Russia, elevating the risks of accidental launches.

    Senator Obama states on his campaign website that he would “work with Russia to take US and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert.” He has also said, “If we want the world to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons, the United States and Russia must lead by example. President Bush once said, ‘The United States should remove as many weapons as possible from high-alert, hair-trigger status – another unnecessary vestige of Cold War confrontation.’ Six years later, President Bush has not acted on this promise. I will. We cannot and should not accept the threat of accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch.”

    Senator McCain has not stated his position on de-alerting nuclear arsenals.

    • No First Use. Make legally binding commitments to No First Use of nuclear weapons and establish nuclear policies consistent with this commitment. Among the nuclear weapons states, only China and India currently have policies of No First Use. The other states, including the US, maintain the option of using nuclear weapons preemptively.

    Neither candidate has taken a position specifically on No First Use of nuclear weapons. Senator Obama, however, has said that the US should lead an effort to deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons.

    Senator McCain has said, “It’s naïve to say that we will never use nuclear weapons.” If he believes it is naïve to say that nuclear weapons will never be used, it seems unlikely that he would be willing to rule out their first use.

    • No New Nuclear Weapons. Initiate a moratorium on the research and development of new nuclear weapons, such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead. The Bush administration has been pushing for new nuclear weapons, but Congress has wisely resisted this path.

    Senator Obama has said, “We can maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to protect our security without rushing to produce a new generation of warheads. I do not support a premature decision to produce the RRW [Reliable Replacement Warhead].” He has also stated, “We can maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to protect our security without rushing to produce a new generation of warheads.”

    Senator McCain has said, “I would only support the development of any new type of nuclear weapon that is absolutely essential for the viability of our deterrent that results in making possible further decreases in the size of our nuclear arsenal, and furthers our global nuclear security goals. I would cancel all further work on the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a weapon that does not make strategic or political sense.” McCain’s statement leaves a loophole by using language similar to that used by the proponents of the Reliable Replacement Warhead, that is, that the RRW is essential for the viability of the US deterrent and will make possible a decrease in the US nuclear arsenal.

    • Ban Nuclear Testing Forever. Ratify and bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 1999, the Senate with a Republican majority voted along party lines against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the Bush administration has not resubmitted the treaty for further Senate consideration.

    Senator Obama has stated, “I will make it my priority to build bipartisan consensus behind ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.”

    Senator McCain was among the Senators voting against ratification of the Treaty in 1999. He has indicated that he would reconsider his earlier decision, stating that he would take another look “to see what can be done to overcome the shortcomings that prevented it from entering into force.”

    • Control Nuclear Material. Create a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty with provisions to bring all weapons-grade nuclear material and the technologies to create such material under strict and effective international control. In a world with few or no nuclear weapons, it is essential to have strong international controls of nuclear materials that could be used for developing nuclear weapons.

    Senator Obama has said, “I will work to negotiate a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material.” He has further stated, “I will secure all loose nuclear materials around the world in my first term.”

    Senator McCain has stated that the US “should move quickly with other nations to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty to end production of the most dangerous nuclear materials.”

    • Nuclear Weapons Convention. The Non-Proliferation Treaty requires “good faith” negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Such good faith negotiations should be applied to reaching a multilateral international treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. This treaty would set forth a confidence-building roadmap to a world free of nuclear weapons.

    Neither candidate has spoken about negotiating a new treaty for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, although both have talked about the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Both candidates have called for reductions in nuclear arsenals. While reductions can be taken unilaterally or bilaterally with the Russians, the critically important step of a Nuclear Weapons Convention will require multilateral negotiations with all of the world’s states.

    Senator Obama’s website states that he will “seek dramatic reductions in US and Russian stockpiles of nuclear weapons and material.” He has also promised to “seek deep cuts in global nuclear arsenals.”

    Senator McCain has said, “I believe we should reduce our nuclear forces to the lowest level we judge necessary, and we should be prepared to enter into a new arms control agreement with Russia reflecting the nuclear reductions I will seek.”

    • Resources for Peace. Reallocate resources from the tens of billions currently spent on nuclear arms to alleviating poverty, preventing and curing disease, eliminating hunger and expanding educational opportunities throughout the world. Plans should be made for reallocating the large sums of money currently used to maintain and improve nuclear arsenals.

    Senator Obama has said that he will “cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending,” giving as an example that he will “cut investments in unproven missile defense systems.”

    Senator McCain has not stated his position on reallocating resources from the defense budget in general or nuclear weapons programs in particular to meeting human needs.

    The Candidates’ Positions on Other Key Issues Affecting Nuclear Disarmament

    An important issue affecting the US ability to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons is the tension created between the US and Russia over US implementation of missile defenses, particularly in Eastern Europe. The US missile defense program has been viewed as a threat by Russia since the US unilaterally abrogated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002. The Russians have viewed US missile defenses as threatening their deterrent capability despite US assurances to the contrary, and if this issue is not resolved it could be a deal breaker for further progress on nuclear disarmament. An important step in clearing the path with Russia for major reductions in nuclear weapons would be for the US to reverse course on deployment of missile defenses and open negotiations with the Russians to reinstate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

    Senator Obama has said, “I will cut investments in unproven missile defense systems.”

    Senator McCain voted Yes on deploying National Missile Defense in 1999, and more recently stated, “The first thing I would do is make sure that we have a missile defense system in place in Czechoslovakia (sic) and Poland, and I don’t care what his [Putin’s] objections are to it.”

    Another potential stumbling block is space weaponization. Russians and the Chinese have both promoted a draft treaty to reserve outer space for peaceful purposes, including a ban on space weaponization. The US has not been willing to even discuss such a ban, and was the only country in the United Nations to vote against such a ban in the 2007 UN General Assembly. The US should join with the other countries of the world in assuring that space is reserved for peaceful purposes only.

    Senator Obama has said flatly, “I will not weaponize space.”

    Senator McCain has stated, “Weapons in space are a bad idea. A treaty that increases space security is a good idea, but it is likely to take a long time to negotiate. There is a simpler and quicker way to go: a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations. One key element of that Code must include a prohibition against harmful interference against satellites.”

    Another concern in bringing US policy in line with a commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world is the control of the spread of nuclear power. While the promotion of nuclear power is a tenet of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it adds significantly to the complications of controlling nuclear materials and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear power and research reactors, as Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea have demonstrated, are a pathway to nuclear weapons, and the US should shift its policy of promoting these nuclear materials factories. Even more dangerous are facilities to enrich uranium or separate plutonium, which could be used in weapons programs.

    Senator McCain has sponsored legislation that would provide subsidies for the nuclear power industry. McCain has said that “nuclear power, for all kinds of reasons, needs to be part of the solution.” In a speech on the environment, Senator McCain referred to nuclear energy as “a proven energy source that requires zero emissions.” After referencing the plans of China, Russia and India to build new nuclear reactors, he asked, “And if they have the vision to set and carry out great goals in energy policy, then why don’t we?” McCain is calling for the construction of 45 new nuclear reactors in the US by the year 2030.

    Senator Obama has adopted a far more cautious approach to nuclear energy. In his energy plan on his website, it states, “Nuclear power represents more than 70 percent of our non-carbon generated electricity. It is unlikely that we can meet our aggressive climate goals if we eliminate nuclear power from the table. However, there is no future for nuclear without first addressing four key issues: public right-to-know, security of nuclear fuel and waste, waste storage, and proliferation.” Although Senator Obama does not seem to have directly said so himself, Senator McCain has said that Senator Obama “doesn’t support new nuclear plants.” Possibly Senator McCain was extrapolating from the difficulty of the nuclear power industry providing satisfactory solutions to the four key issues that Senator Obama raised.

    Analysis

    On the issue, so critical to humanity’s future, of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons, there is much we still don’t know about the candidates’ positions. Both state in general terms that they favor the goal. Neither of them, however, has discussed seeking to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a treaty that would set forth a roadmap for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Between the two candidates, Senator McCain’s positions seem more cautious. He has defined the goal as “distant.” He has also used language that could leave open the door to developing new nuclear weapons, if they meet certain criteria. A most serious obstacle to Senator McCain achieving progress is his strong support for missile defenses, which have led the Russians to consider backtracking on nuclear disarmament by, for example, bolstering its offensive nuclear capabilities and pulling out of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Further, McCain has stated that it is “naïve to say that we will never use nuclear weapons,” which seems to suggest that he would not support ruling out First Use of nuclear weapons.

    Senator Obama has articulated a more detailed position on achieving the goal of a nuclear weapons free world than has Senator McCain. Senator Obama has said that he wants to be the President that leads the way to a nuclear weapons-free world, although he, too, sees it as a “long road.” He has come out in favor of removing US nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, not developing new nuclear weapons, ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, achieving a verifiable global ban on the production of new nuclear weapons material and making deep cuts in global nuclear arsenals. He is also more cautious about nuclear energy, seeks to cut funds from unproven missile defense systems, and opposes the weaponization of space.

    The World Set Free

    In the seventh decade of the Nuclear Age, there is a glimmer of hope that new leadership in the United States may pave the way forward toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Such leadership would be a great gift to the people of the United States and to the world. If humans together can rid the world of its greatest human-created threat, we can also join together to accomplish other great feats – eliminating poverty, hunger and disease, protecting the environment and averting the potential disasters arising from climate change, and opening new channels of creativity and communication that can bind us all closer together in peace, justice and human dignity.

    ***This article is for educational purposes. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-partisan organization and does not support particular candidates or political parties.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a councilor of the World Future Council.
  • At the Nuclear Tipping Point

    At the Nuclear Tipping Point

    The latest Wall Street Journal article by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” published on January 15, 2008, has a greater sense of urgency than their first joint article a year earlier. They express grave concerns that we are at a nuclear “tipping point” with “a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.” As if these weapons are not already in dangerous enough hands. The former policy makers and Cold Warriors are warning us that, without change, nuclear dangers will worsen. They leave to our imaginations what will happen in a world in which “deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.”

    As the former Cold Warriors soberly suggest, we can no longer count on the threat of retaliation with overwhelming nuclear force to prevent those unnamed “dangerous hands” from detonating nuclear weapons in our cities or the cities of our friends and allies. In other words, our nuclear weapons cannot be relied upon to prevent nuclear attacks against us. It is not like the tense days of the Cold War, when at least we knew who the enemy was and where he was located. Now we have shadowy and slippery enemies and our thermonuclear weapons provide no defense against such enemies.

    Actually, thermonuclear weapons never did provide a defense, even during the Cold War. Deterrence is not defense – it is only a psychological pseudo-barrier, a wish and a prayer. Against nuclear weapons, there is no defense, not even so-called missile defenses, which are easily overcome. Even Henry Kissinger gets it now and is speaking out, or at least lending his name, to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Zero nuclear weapons. None for anyone, including us. The US must lead the way, must convene the other nuclear powers. There are steps that must be taken, which the former policy makers outline. Their suggestions are sensible, although they do not go far enough, nor is there any real hope that Washington under the Bush administration will respond to them rapidly enough. The situation may be even more urgent than the former Cold Warriors grasp.

    Nuclear weapons do not make us safer. They leave us more exposed. They are military equalizers. Minor foes, terrorist groups and small countries, can inflict horrendous damage on even the most powerful states. What is to be done? The former Cold Warriors offer the following: Work with Russia to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons by saving the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty of 1991; pursue further reductions in nuclear arms than agreed upon in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty; increase warning and decision times for the launch of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles; discard Cold War plans for massive attacks; develop cooperative multilateral ballistic missile defense and early warning systems; secure nuclear weapons, including those designed for forward deployment, and weapons-grade nuclear materials; strengthen monitoring of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force.

    The former Cold Warriors also call for broadening the dialogue on an international scale. Here they will find that many countries without nuclear weapons have been trying to send a message to the nuclear weapons states for a long time, urging them to do all that Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn seek and more. Progress has been blocked since the end of the Cold War by the lack of political will of US leaders. That is where it continues to be blocked. The Bush administration’s approach to a world free of nuclear weapons is to place as many obstacles in its way as possible.

    As the former Cold Warriors point out, “Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal.” They have made that statement. It is doubtful, though, if it will have any effect on the current US administration, perhaps the darkest, most criminal administration in US history. Mr. Kissinger and his colleagues must look beyond George W. Bush, and hope for a new president of the United States who will be prepared to climb the mountain with them, rather than trying to blow it up. But they are absolutely right to speak up now, and to continue to strongly promote the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. As Albert Camus said immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima, “Before the terrifying prospects now available to humanity, we see even more clearly that peace is the only battle worth waging.” Wage on, Henry Kissinger!

    To read the 2008 Wall Street Journal article by the aforementioned authors, click here.

    To read their 2007 Wall Street Journal article, click here.

    To read David Krieger’s “A Bipartisan Plea for Nuclear Weapons Abolition,” click here.

    David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • No Nukes, No Proliferation

    The rising anxieties about nuclear weapons are rooted in two major and parallel developments: a renaissance of nuclear power and a resurgence of old-fashioned national security threats that supposedly had ebbed with the end of the Cold War.

    After the well publicized accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979 and Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986, opposition to nuclear power was so strong that many reactor plants were shut down, plans for new ones were canceled and virtually no new reactor was built over the past decade. With the spiraling price of oil caused by a spike in demand and disruptions to supply, the economics of nuclear power has changed. With the accelerating threat of global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions, the balance of environmental risk has shifted. Adding technological developments, the politics of constructing and operating nuclear power reactors has also altered.

    The net result is plans for building several reactors to add to the 435 reactors in 30 countries that provide 15 percent of the world’s electricity today. Asia will account for 18 of the 31 planned new reactors. The spurt in Chinese and Indian demand is a function of booming economic growth and population. In Japan and South Korea interest in nuclear power arises from lack of indigenous oil and gas resources and the desire for energy security and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.

    This throws up three clusters of concern:

    • How do we ensure that the plants are operated with complete safety?
    • How do we secure the plants against theft, leakage and attacks of weapons-sensitive material, skills and knowledge?
    • How do we build firewalls between civilian and weapons-related use of nuclear power?

    These concerns extend also to the international trade in nuclear material, skills and equipment. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, observed in 2004 that “Nuclear components designed in one country could be manufactured in another, shipped through a third, and assembled in a fourth for use in a fifth.”

    The challenge on the national security front is fourfold. First, the five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty-licit nuclear powers–Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States–have ignored their NPT obligation to disarm. Instead they are busy enlarging, modernizing and upgrading their nuclear arsenals and refining nuclear doctrines to indicate retention and expanded use of these weapons for several decades yet. The lesson to others? Nuclear weapons are indispensable in today’s world and becoming more useful for dealing with tomorrow’s threats.

    Second, three states outside the NPT–India, Israel and Pakistan–have been accepted, more or less, as de facto nuclear weapons powers.

    Third, as an intergovernmental agreement, the NPT doesn’t cover nonstate groups, including terrorists, who might be pursuing nuclear weapons. The turmoil in Pakistan, with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf playing the “loose nukes” card to retain U.S. backing, highlights the related danger of links between rogue elements of security forces and extremists.

    Fourth, some countries may be cheating on their NPT obligations and seeking nuclear weapons by stealth. The drumbeats of war being sounded in Washington on Iran bring back memories of 2002-03. This is a story we’ve heard before. We didn’t like the ending the first time and are unlikely to like it any better the next time round.

    The disquieting trend of a widening circle of NPT-illicit and extra-NPT nuclear weapons powers in turn has a self-generating effect in drawing other countries into the game of nuclear brinksmanship. The renaissance of nuclear power cannot be explained solely by the interest in nuclear energy for civilian uses.

    What might be the solution? Of the 27,000 nuclear weapons in existence today, 12,000 are deployed and ready for use, with 3,500 on hair-trigger alert. To begin with, some practical and concrete measures are long overdue: Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force; negotiating a verifiable fissile materials treaty; retrenching from launch-on-warning postures, standing down nuclear forces. That is, reviving, implementing and building on agreements for reducing the role, readiness and numbers of nuclear weapons in defense doctrines and preparations.

    But these amount to tinkering, not a bold and comprehensive vision of the final destination. What we need are rules-based regimes on the principles of reciprocity of obligations, participatory decision-making and independent verification procedures and compliance mechanisms.

    U.S. presidential hopeful Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., declared, “America seeks a world in which there are no nuclear weapons.” In January, three former U.S. secretaries of defense and state–George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger–and Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, called on Washington to take the lead in the abolition of nuclear weapons. The national security benefits of nuclear weapons, they argued, are outweighed by the threats posed to U.S. security by uncontrolled proliferation.

    The symbiotic link between nonproliferation and disarmament is integral to the NPT, the most brilliant half-successful arms control agreement in history. The number of countries to sign it–188–embraces virtually the entire family of nations. But the nuclear arsenals of the five NPT nuclear powers expanded enormously. With almost four decades having elapsed since 1968, the five NPT nuclear powers are in violation of their solemn obligation to disarm, reinforced by the advisory opinion of the World Court in 1996 that the NPT’s Article 6 requires them to engage in and bring to a conclusion negotiations for nuclear abolition.

    Despite this history and background, a surprising number of arms control experts focus solely on the nonproliferation side to demand denial of technology and materiel to all who refuse to sign and abide by the NPT, and punishment of any who cross the threshold. The term “nonproliferation ayatollahs” is applied pejoratively to them. The latest episode in this long-running and tired serial is the United States, Britain and France threatening Iran with war to stop it from acquiring–not using, merely acquiring–nuclear weapons. From where do the leaders of nuclear-armed Britain and France derive the moral authority to declare that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable?

    Nuclear weapons could not proliferate if they did not exist. Because they do, they will. The policy implication of this logic is that the best guarantee of nuclear nonproliferation is nuclear disarmament through a nuclear weapons convention that bans the possession, acquisition, testing and use of nuclear weapons, by everyone. This would solve the problem of nonproliferation as well as disarmament. The focus on nonproliferation to the neglect of disarmament ensures that we get neither. If we want nonproliferation, therefore, we must prepare for disarmament.

    Too many, including the government of Japan, have paid lip service to this slogan, but not pursued a serious program of action to make it a reality. The elegant theorems, cogent logic and fluent reasoning of many authoritative international commissions, including the Tokyo Forum, have made no discernible dent on the old, new and aspiring nuclear powers. A coalition between nuclear-armed and nonnuclear countries, led perhaps by India–which has crossed the threshold from a disarmament leader to a hypocritical nuclear power–and Japan, the only country to have suffered an atomic attack, might break the stalemate and dispel the looming nuclear clouds.

    Time is running out for the hypocrisy and accumulated anomalies of global nuclear apartheid. Either we will achieve nuclear abolition or we will have to live with nuclear proliferation followed by nuclear war. Better the soft glow of satisfaction from the noble goal realized of nuclear weapons banned, than the harsh glare of the morning after of these weapons used.

    Ramesh Thakur, distinguished fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and professor of political science at the University of Waterloo in Canada, is the author of The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2006).

  • US Nuclear Weapons Policy Under the Bush Administration

    Professor of Economics, Political Science, and Policy Studies, UCLA
    Senior Fellow, The Milken Institute and The Gorbachev Foundation of North America
    A Presentation to the GRAD Conference on “Regional Cooperation and Global Security”
    International Business School, Budapest 30 June – 4 July, 2004

    1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

    There have been remarkable recent changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy under the current Bush administration that were announced in 2001, 2002 and 2003 in three official documents but are not widely known or adequately discussed and critiqued. They constitute a new doctrine, the Bush doctrine, ending the security system and policies of the Cold War and thus representing a discontinuous sea change in the international security system that calls for discussion, debate, and analysis, which have not occurred. The bipolar world has been replaced by a unipolar world with the U.S. as the dominant power or sole superpower. Alliance systems that had existed in the earlier epoch have been replaced by unilateral U.S. actions. Arms control has been replaced by unilateral U.S. arms initiatives.

    The purpose of this paper is to present these new concepts related to nuclear weapons doctrine, to evaluate them, and to consider an alternative approach, that of global security. The new concepts as well as alternatives, such as global security, call for a wide-ranging debate both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, this has not happened, possibly due to the concern over the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that were, ironically, examples of the new policies put into action. Both the new policies and their underlying goals should be subjects of intense scrutiny.

    2. BACKGROUND TO THE NEW BUSH POLICY

    The background to these new nuclear weapons doctrines include the end of the Cold War in 1989; the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; the Project for a New American Century established in 1997 “to promote American global leadership” by a group of individuals who eventually took major leadership positions in the Bush Administration in 2001; the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; and the declaration by this administration of a “War on Terrorism.

    3. CHANGES IN POLICY ANNOUNCED IN THREE MAJOR POLICY DOCUMENTS

    These changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy were announced in three official documents that were released by the administration in 2002. The first of these documents is the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in January 2002. It is a classified document that is mandated by law and produced periodically, the last one having been that of the Clinton administration in 1994. The latest version was leaked in March 2002 by the Los Angeles Times. According to the NPR, “A combination of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century.” It is a wide-ranging analysis of the requirements for deterrence in the 21st century. It states that it does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning. Rather, it states that the Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the U.S. and its allies in order to deter such attacks in the first place. It does, however, refer to the “Possible use of nuclear weapons in an Arab-Israeli conflict, in a war between China and Taiwan, or in an attack from North Korea on the South.” It also refers to the use of nuclear weapons against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, in retaliation for attacks by nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or “in the event of surprising military developments.” It also states that the administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

    Overall, according to the NPR, nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. The NPR states that these “nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important strategic and political objectives.”

    The second of these documents is the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) that was issued by the Office of the National Security Advisor to the President in September 2002. It is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House web site. According to the NSS, there are plans to ensure that no nation could rival U.S. military strength. The emphasis is on defeating rogue states and terrorists, noting that deterrence will not work against such enemies. It proclaims the doctrine of U.S. preemption, where it “Cannot let our enemies strike first” and gives arguments for preemption. For example, it notes that, “For Centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.” It further states that, “The U.S. has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.” It might be noted, however, that the U.S. did not preempt in most of the recent wars it has fought, including the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, while its attempt at preemption in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was a failure. Far from there being historical precedents, this new policy represents a fundamental shift from a U.S. policy of reaction to one of initiation. It is too early to say that this policy of preemption in the Iraq War was a success. The NSS notes that “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary act preemptively.” Such a policy of preemption is, of course, a violation of the UN system that was set up in large part to prevent precisely such preemption, as in Hitler’s invasion of Poland or Japan’s invasion of China. The UN Charter forbids a member state from taking military action against another member state unless it has itself been attacked or it has the authorization of the Security Council. The U.S. acted preemptively in the Iraq War, which was consistent with the NSS policy, but a violation of the UN Charter. In terms of international law, the U.S. was as much an outlaw in its attack on Iraq as Saddam Hussein was in his attack on Kuwait.

    President Bush’s West Point Commencement Speech of June 2002 articulates many of the points in the NPR and the NSS. In fact, this speech set the stage for the NSS, which quotes at length from it.

    The third of these documents is the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that was issued by the White House in December 2002. As in the case of NSS, WMD is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House web site. It notes that WMD, including nuclear biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of states hostile to the U.S. or terrorists represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the U.S. It notes that an effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the U.S. It states that, as in the war on terrorism, the strategy for homeland security, and the new concept of deterrence, the new approach to WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. It notes that the highest priority is accorded to protection of the U.S. and its allies from the threat of WMD. The three pillars it announces are counterproliferation to combat WMD use, strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use. Among the policies it discusses are interdiction of WMD, new methods of deterrence with threats of overwhelming force, and defense and mitigation, including the destruction of an adversary’s WMD before their use, as well as traditional nonproliferation approaches.

    4. TARGETS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    According to the NPR the U.S. reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, thereby possibly breaking the taboo against their use that has existed since 1945. They are treated like other weapons with no sharp distinction from non-nuclear weapons. Nuclear targeting discussions have been a part of U.S. military strategy for some time, but the leak of the NPR provides the first time that an official “hit list” of targets for nuclear weapons has come to light.

    The NPR lists seven nations as possible targets for U.S. nuclear weapons. First are the two “old” enemies of Russia and China. Second are the three countries listed as members of the “Axis of Evil” in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union speech, namely Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Third are two countries that are listed by the U.S. as terrorist states: Syria and Libya.

    Of these seven nations that could be targets of U.S. nuclear weapons, three are non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, namely Iran, Syria, and Libya (Iraq has been invaded and defeated while North Korea has pulled out of the NPT). The U.S. along with other nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT gave so-called “negative assurances” to non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT, stating that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear stages unless they were allied with nuclear powers. Thus, targeting these three with nuclear weapons would be a violation of these U.S. negative assurances that were an inducement for these states to join the NPT and that were reiterated at the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

    The NPR also calls for lesser reliance on the massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to attack, with greater reliance on precision-guided weapons to deter attacks. It states that because of improvements in precision-guided weaponry, as demonstrated in the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military can now rely more on powerful, highly accurate conventional bombs and missiles that could provide an inducement to start a war.

    5. A NEW TRIAD

    According to the NPR there is a new triad. The old triad consisted of three different basing modes for nuclear weapons: long-range bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles.

    By contrast, the NPR refers to a new triad with three component parts of the U.S. strategic system. First are offensive strike weapons, nuclear and non-nuclear, including all three components of the old triad. Second are defenses, both active and passive, including the new national missile defense system. Third is a revitalized defense infrastructure that could “design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements and maintain readiness to resume underground testing if required.”

    The Bush administration has recently obtained agreement from Congress to lift its ban on designing new nuclear warheads, and there are plans to develop two new weapons. One is a low-yield weapon that could potentially be used as a weapon in regional conflicts thus possibly changing the role of nuclear weapons from that of deterring war to that of instruments of war. The other is a “bunker buster” that can destroy underground facilities, including missile silos in Russia and elsewhere. The administration has already started to construct a missile defense system at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and the Secretary of Defense has asked his Science Board to look into the possibility that the new system will use nuclear-tipped interceptors. Such interceptors would be much more effective in destroying incoming missiles than the more conventional hit-to-kill interceptors that are being testing now, and they could even neutralize the Russian second-strike deterrent.

    Thus, the NPR is a strategy for indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons with plans to improve the capabilities of the existing arsenal and to revitalize the infrastructure for improving US nuclear forces in the future. It promotes a nuclear strategy of maximum flexibility as opposed to measures for irreversible nuclear disarmament as agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    6. PREEMPTION AND ITS DANGERS

    The NSS places major emphasis on preemption and calls for preemption rather than deterrence as the fundamental basis of national security. The Afghanistan and Iraq Wars are the initial cases of such preemption, with the U.S. retaining the right to preempt in defending its vital interests.

    Such a policy of preemption requires massive defense spending, and the U.S. now spends about $400 billion annually on defense, more than the rest of the world combined. In addition to its costs, there are significant dangers of preemption. First, it creates antagonism toward toe U.S. and possible terrorist attacks. Second, it sends a message to the rest of the world, that they should not attempt to fight the U.S. with conventional weapons, leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Third, this policy sets a precedent for other nations to also engage in preemption, including China in Taiwan and India in Pakistan. Fourth, there are dangers stemming from U.S. hubris after its quick defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq, with the next step possibly being an invasion of the other nations on President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” list: Iran and North Korea or possibly others on the NPR nuclear hit list, such as Syria or Libya, or yet others, such as Sudan or Cuba. These nations will see such a possibility as looming and try to protect themselves, possibly by building nuclear weapons, as has already happened in North Korea.

    7. A NEW PROLIFERATION AGENDA

    The new proliferation agenda included “old approaches” such as controls on materials and technology and “new approaches” such as reserving the right to destroy facilities used to make WMD. A precedent for the latter was the Israeli destruction of the Baghdad reactor before it could be used to make nuclear weapons. Many nations criticized Israel for this action that was in violation of international law, including the U.N. Charter, given that the Security Council did not authorize it. Similar criticisms could be directed at the U.S. if it engaged in such acts. Furthermore, if the U.S. claims a right to such acts other nations could also make such a claim, creating very dangerous situations. For example, India might claim the right to destroy Pakistani nuclear facilities using the same logic or China could claim a right to destroy the nuclear infrastructure of Taiwan. Such policies and actions would make the world a much more dangerous place.

    One could also argue that the “old” problem of proliferation was that of nations acquiring nuclear weapons, while the “new” problem is one of terrorist groups acquiring such weapons. More should be done on a cooperative international basis to deny such weapons to terrorist organizations or subnational groups in general. This should be done under the auspices of the U.N. as a truly international cooperative effort. As to the old problem, involving such nations as Iran and North Korea, a case could be made that their acquiring such weapons could be stabilizing rather than destabilizing if the effect is to deter the U.S. from using its nuclear weapons against these nations. The world has noted that the U.S. invaded and occupied two non-nuclear nations, Afghanistan and Iraq, but did not invade North Korea and Iran, possibly since the former already has nuclear weapons while the latter could possibly acquire them in the near future.

    8. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: GLOBAL SECURITY

    There is an alternative to the policies that are enunciated in the NPR and the NSS, namely global security. The concept refers to security for the planet as a whole to replace the concept of national security, which is outmoded. National security, which defined up to certain well-defined borders, makes little sense given the globalization that has occurred. The goal of global security would be that of protecting the planet as a whole from threats to its vital interests. This approach recognizes the value of global cooperation, in particular, the value of cooperative efforts among the current great powers of the U.S., the E.U., Japan, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and others. It recognizes the need to create a new global system comparable to the creation of a new world system after World War II, one that would encompass not only security but also economics, politics, and other issue areas. This new global system would treat problems of security, both military and non-military, through strengthening existing international institutions or creating new global institutions. These new institutions could be built, in part, on the UN system and its components. They would involve supranational decision making and authority, with enforcement capabilities, transparency, and accountability and with global perspectives and responses. Participation in the global decision making process would be through cooperation. There would be a prohibition against preemption by any one nation, no matter how powerful, in favor of collective action. Such a system of global security should be preferred to the current system of the U.S. as a hegemonic global power.

    References

    Gaddis, John Lewis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy 133 (2003): 50-57.
    Gould, Robert M. and Patrice Sutton, “Global Security: Beyond Gated Communities and Bunker Vision,” Social Justice 29.3 (2002): 1.
    Guoliang, Gu, “Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption,” The Washington Quarterly 26.2 (2003): 135.
    Heisbourg, Francois, “A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,” The Washington Quarterly 26.2 (2003): 75.
    Hoffman, Stanley, “The High and the Mighty: Bush’s National Security Strategy and the New American Hubris,” The American Prospect 13.24 (2003): 28.
    Intriligator, Michael D., “Global Security After the End of the
    Cold War,” Presidential Address, Peace Science Society (International), Conflict Management and Peace Science, 13(2) (1994), 1-11.
    MccGwire, Michael, “Shifting the Paradigm (Western Ideology of the Cold War),” International Affairs 78.1 (2002): 1.
    O’Hanlon, Michael E., “The New National Security Strategy and Preemption,” Brookings Institution (2002.
    U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, The Pentagon, January, 2002.
    U.S. Office of the National Security Advisor, The National Security Policy of the United States of America, The White House, September, 2002.http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
    U.S. Office of the President, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House, December 2002. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf

  • US Presidential Elections: An Opportunity For Debate On US Nuclear Weapons Policy

    US Presidential Elections: An Opportunity For Debate On US Nuclear Weapons Policy

    In the post 9/11 world there has been strong concern about nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or “rogue” states. The pretext for the initiation of the US war against Iraq was the concern that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, including a suspected program to develop nuclear weapons, posed an “imminent threat” to the United States. While it turned out that Iraq had neither such weapons nor programs, the United States continues to maintain a large nuclear arsenal as a matter of long-standing national policy. Whether US nuclear weapons policies serve to promote prospects for world peace and national security, or conversely to undermine them, is a question that begs for serious public debate.

    US nuclear weapons policy should be a subject of concern to every American. Yet there exists some kind of taboo that prevents the subject from being debated in public forums, in the media, or in Congress. The US presidential elections provide an important opportunity for national discussion and debate on this issue. With the US nuclear arsenal of some 10,000 nuclear weapons, along with policies to research more usable nuclear weapons while ignoring international obligations for nuclear disarmament, there are critical issues that require public attention and informed debate.

    Throughout the Cold War, the US and USSR built up their nuclear forces so that each threatened massive retaliation in a standoff of mutually assured destruction. This was a high-risk strategy. In the event of an accident, miscalculation or miscommunication, the world could have been engulfed in an omnicidal conflagration. While today the US and Russia are on friendly terms, each continues to base its nuclear policy, in major part, on the potential threat posed by the other.

    Despite the enormous changes in the world in the aftermath of the Cold War, there has not been a serious public debate in the United States about nuclear weapons policy that takes into account changes in the global security environment. To the extent that there has been consideration of nuclear weapons policy, it has been almost entirely about preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states and to non-state actors, with virtually no consideration of how US nuclear policy affects US and global security.

    Current US Nuclear Weapons Policy

    US nuclear policy affects the security of every person on the planet, including, of course, every American. Current US nuclear weapons policy, under the Bush administration, sends a message to other states that the US intends to rely upon nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.

    The major outlines of current US nuclear weapons policy are as follows:

    • The US continues to rely upon its nuclear arsenal to threaten retaliation against a nuclear attack, and has extended this threat of nuclear retaliation to chemical and biological weapons attacks or threats of attacks on the US, as well as its troops or allies, wherever they are located in the world.
    • Despite previous promises not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, the US has developed contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against five non-nuclear weapon states: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya. (It is possible, but still not certain, that North Korea has now developed a small nuclear arsenal.)
    • The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, in order to develop missile defenses, making way for the development of space weapons, despite promising to preserve and strengthen this treaty.
    • The US has not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, despite making commitments to do so. While it still adheres to the nuclear testing moratorium, except for sub-critical tests and computer simulations, it has allocated funds to reduce the time needed to ready the Nevada Test Site to resume testing.
    • The US has entered into the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with the Russians to reduce the deployed long-range nuclear weapons on each side to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012, but has failed to make these reductions irreversible in accord with the consensus agreement at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Additionally, the treaty terminates in 2012 unless extended. Despite this agreement, each side continues to keep some 2,250 nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, poised to attack the other at a moment’s notice.
    • The US has ended a decade-long Congressional ban on research and development of nuclear weapons under 5 kilotons (mini-nukes), and allocated funds to perform research on the development of such weapons, increasing the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons and blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons.
    • The US has allocated funds for researching more powerful Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator weapons, another way of making nuclear weapons more usable and therefore more likely to be used.
    • The US has allocated funds to create a facility to produce some 450 plutonium pits annually that could only be used for new nuclear weapons. This suggests to other nations that the US is planning to further develop new nuclear weapons and to possess and rely upon nuclear weapons for the indefinite future.
    • The US has not adhered to the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to in the year 2000 by the states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the five declared nuclear weapon states.
    • The US has not challenged the reliance on nuclear weapons by our allies, including Israel, UK and France, and has made no attempt to provide leadership for broad-based nuclear disarmament.

    In sum, the current US approach to nuclear weapons is to rely upon them for extended deterrence, to research more usable weapons, to indicate that its reliance on these weapons is long-term, to violate treaty agreements, to unilaterally reverse previous commitments, and to fail to provide leadership toward significant and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. In a post Cold War environment, with the United States wielding overwhelming military superiority, there is concern in many parts of the world that the United States could succumb to what has been referred to by Richard Falk, a leading international law professor, as the “Hiroshima Temptation,” to use nuclear weapons against a far weaker enemy without fear of meaningful response.

    US nuclear weapons policy under the Bush administration appears to be rooted in a “do as I say, not as I do” approach. This raises two important questions: Does this policy make the US more secure? Is this a policy that the American people would support if they understood it? I believe the answer to both these questions is No.

    A third question arises. Is it possible that members of the public could raise the issue of US nuclear weapons policy and stimulate a real debate on the current course of the country in this year’s presidential elections? It is of utmost importance that the American people recognize the importance of these issues and raise them with the presidential and congressional candidates, forcing these issues into the public arena.

    Considerations to Guide US Nuclear Weapons Policy

    In the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world there are important considerations that should guide US policy on nuclear arms. These include:

    • Nuclear weapons cannot be used against another country with nuclear weapons without facing retaliation unless a country can deliver a devastating first-strike (preventive) attack that would be calculated – likely wrongly – to destroy nearly all of the other side’s retaliatory force (the remainder would be calculated – likely wrongly – to be stopped with missile defenses or to be “acceptable losses”). Such a first-strike attack would potentially kill tens of millions of innocent people, be highly immoral and unlikely to be successful.
    • The use of nuclear weapons in a first-strike (preventive) attack against a country without nuclear weapons would be both immoral and illegal under international law.
    • The only possible justification for nuclear weapons is their role as a deterrent. But, so long as nuclear weapons threaten other nuclear weapon states, the threatening nation will in turn be threatened, even if it possesses so-called missile defenses.
    • The greater the number of nuclear weapons that exist in the world, the more likely that one or more of these weapons will fall into the hands of non-state extremists that could not be deterred from their use.
    • Russia can no longer be considered an adversary of the United States, and this creates an ideal opportunity to negotiate with them far greater reductions in nuclear arms and to make these reductions irreversible.
    • China can no longer be considered an adversary of the United States (in fact, it is a major trading partner), and US nuclear weapons policy should not provoke China to further develop its current minimal deterrent force. However, US development and deployment of missile defenses is causing China to increase its deterrence capability.
    • By branding nations as part of an “Axis of Evil” and by demonstrating willingness to engage in preventive warfare against Iraq, the US provides incentives to other countries, such as North Korea, to develop nuclear deterrent forces.
    • The greatest threat to US security arises from the possibility of extremists getting their hands on nuclear weapons and using them against a US city. The best way to prevent this possibility is to reduce nuclear weapons globally to a low number and assure that the remaining weapons are kept under strict control, preferably international control. It would also be necessary to establish a global inventory of weapons-grade fissile materials and the facilities capable of producing these materials and to place these under strict international control. The only way for this to happen is for the US to take leadership in promoting this course of action. The US would also have to provide additional funds to help assure the dismantlement and control of the aging Russian nuclear arsenal.
    • India and Pakistan, relatively recent additions to the nuclear weapons club, have indicated that they are willing to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, but not unless all other countries will do so as well. They are not willing to live in a world of nuclear apartheid, further demonstrating that the effort to achieve nuclear disarmament requires US leadership.
    • The widely recognized possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is provocative to other countries in the Middle East. Only the United States, due to the large amount of military aid it provides to Israel, can pressure Israel to forego its nuclear weapons and move forward with peace negotiations to resolve the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians.
    • North Korea has indicated that it is willing to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if it is given security assurances by the US and economic aid. This seems like a solid basis on which to establish an agreement that would benefit both North Korea and the international community.

    Given these considerations and the extent to which current US policy does not reflect them, there needs to be broad public discussion of these issues. This should include, and perhaps be led by, a debate among presidential candidates on the direction of US nuclear policy. The American people should demand that the candidates for the presidency of the United States address these most important security issues facing our country that will affect the future of all Americans.

    A Responsible US Nuclear Weapons Policy

    A responsible US nuclear policy should include the following:

    1. Removing all US nuclear weapons from hair-trigger alert, in conjunction with similar initiatives from Russia.
    2. Ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and supporting a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty that would place all weapons-grade nuclear materials in all countries under strict and effective international control.
    3. Reinstituting US Negative Security Assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
    4. Pledging No First Use of nuclear weapons and making this legally binding.
    5. Making all reductions in nuclear armaments irreversible through treaty agreements and verified inspection procedures.
    6. Putting the development of missile defenses and space weaponization on hold while negotiating for the elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control.
    7. Fulfilling US obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for “a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date” by ceasing to perform research on developing new nuclear weapons.
    8. Fulfilling further US obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on … nuclear disarmament” by adhering to the agreed upon 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament, including “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” The US should convene a meeting of all nuclear weapon states, declared and undeclared, to agree upon a treaty for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Without such changes in US nuclear policy, it is likely that nuclear weapons will again be used by accident or design, including finding their way into the hands of extremists who will not hesitate to use them as a statement of rage against the US or other countries. Additionally, serious US efforts to achieve both regional and global prohibitions on weapons of mass destruction, nuclear and otherwise, will aid the country in resuming the leadership role that it has lost in recent years due to policies of unilateralism, exceptionalism and belligerence, policies reflective of double standards in both law and morality.

    Each of us has a role to play in bringing these policy issues into the US presidential and congressional debates. Candidates should be asked to speak to his or her plan to reduce the security dangers that nuclear weapons continue to pose to the US and to all humanity, indeed to all life on earth.

     

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the co-author of Nuclear Weapons and the World Court.