Tag: nuclear waste disposal

  • Obama Goes Nuclear

    This article was originally published on Counterpunch.

    Is there any chance that President Barack Obama can return to his long-held stand critical of nuclear power? Is he open to hearing from scientists and energy experts, such as Amory Lovins, who can refute the pro-nuclear arguments that have apparently influenced him?

    Obama’s declaration in his State of the Union speech on January 27 about “building a new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this country” marked a significant change for him. His announcement Tuesday on moving ahead on $8.3 billion in federal government loan guarantees to build new nuclear plants and increasing the loan guarantee fund to $54.5 billion was a further major step. Wall Street is reluctant to invest money in the dangerous and extremely expensive technology.

    Before taking office, including as a candidate for president, Obama not only was negative about atomic energy but—unusual for a politician—indicated a detailed knowledge of its threat to life.

    “I start off with the premise that nuclear energy is not optimal and so I am not a nuclear energy proponent,” Obama said at a campaign stop in Newton, Iowa on December 30, 2007. “My general view is that until we can make certain that nuclear power plants are safe, that they have solved the storage problem—because I’m opposed to Yucca Mountain and just dumping…in one state, in Nevada particularly, since there’s potentially an earthquake line there—until we solve those problems and the whole nuclear industry can show that they can produce clean, safe energy without enormous subsidies from the U.S. government, I don’t think that’s the best option. I am much more interested in solar and wind and bio-diesel and strategies [for] alternative fuels.”

    As he told the editorial board of the Keene Sentinel in New Hampshire on November 25, 2007: “I don’t think there’s anything that we inevitably dislike about nuclear power. We just dislike the fact that it might blow up…and irradiate us…and kill us. That’s the problem.”

    Yes, that’s the big problem with splitting the atom—one that has existed since the start  of nuclear power and will always be inherent in the technology. Using the perilous process of fission to generate electricity with its capacity for catastrophic accidents and its production of highly toxic radioactive poisons called nuclear waste will always be unsafe. And it is unnecessary considering the safe energy technologies now available, from solar, wind and other clean sources.

    Just how dangerous it is has been underlined in a book just published by the New York Academy of Sciences, Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment. Written by a team of scientists led by noted Russian biologist Dr. Alexey Yablokov, using health data that have become available since the 1986 accident, it concludes that the fatality total “from April 1986 to the end of 2004 from the Chernobyl catastrophe was estimated at 985,000 additional [cancer] deaths.” This is in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and other countries where Chernobyl’s poisons fell. The toll, they relate, continues to rise.

    Chernobyl was a different design from the nuclear plants which the U.S., France and Japan seek now to build but disasters can also happen involving these plants and they, too, produce the highly toxic nuclear waste poisons. The problem is fission itself. It’s no way to produce electricity.

    Obama has been aware of this. As he stated at a Londonderry, New Hampshire town meeting on October 7, 2007: “Nuclear power has a host of problems that have not been solved. We haven’t solved the storage situation effectively. We have not dealt with all of the security aspects of our nuclear plants and nuclear power is very expensive.”

    He still left the door open to it. His Energy Plan as a candidate stated: “It is unlikely that we can meet our aggressive climate goals if we eliminate nuclear power from the table. However, there is no future for expanded nuclear without first addressing four key issues: public right-to-know, security of nuclear fuel and waste, waste storage, and [nuclear weapons] proliferation.”

    In his first year as president, nuclear power proponents worked to influence him. Among nuclear opponents, there has been anxiety regarding Obama’s two top aides, both of whom have been involved with what is now the utility operating more nuclear power plants than any other in the United States, Exelon.

    Rahm Emanuel, now Obama’s chief of staff, as an investment banker was in the middle of the $8.2 billion merger in 1999 of Unicom, the parent company of Commonwealth Edison of Chicago, and Peco Energy to put together Exelon. David Axelrod, now a senior Obama advisor and formerly chief campaign strategist, was an Exelon consultant. Candidate Obama received sizeable contributions from Exelon executives including from John Rowe, its president and chief executive officer who in 2007 also became chairman of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the U.S. nuclear industry’s main trade group.

    It’s not only been nuclear opponents who have seen a link between Exelon and the Obama administration. Forbes magazine, in its January 18th issue, in an article on John Rowe and how he has “focused the company on nuclear,” displayed a sidebar headlined, “The President’s Utility.”  It read: “Ties are tight between Exelon and the Obama administration,” noting Exelon political contributions and featuring Emanuel and Axelrod with photos and descriptions of their Exelon connections.

    The Forbes article spoke of how last year “Emanuel e-mailed Rowe on the eve of the House vote on global warming legislation and asked that he reach out to some uncommitted Democrats. ‘We are proud to be the President’s utility,’ says Elizabeth Moler, Exelon’s chief lobbyist,” the article went on. “It’s nice for John to be able to go to the White House and they know his name.’”

    Chicago-based Exelon’s website boasts of its operating “the largest nuclear fleet in the nation and the third largest in the world.” It owns 17 nuclear power plants which “represent approximately 20 percent of the U.S. nuclear industry’s power capacity.”

    The climate change or global warming issue is another factor in Obama’s change on nuclear power. An Associated Press article of January 31 on Obama’s having “singled out nuclear power in his State of the Union address and his spending plan for the next budget,” began: “President Barack Obama is endorsing nuclear energy like never before, trying to win over Republicans and moderate Democrats on climate and energy legislation.”

    MSNBC’s Mike Stuckey on February 9 reported about “Obama’s new support for nuclear power, which some feel may be a down payment for Republican backing on a climate change bill.”

    After the “safe, clean nuclear power” claim, Michael Mariotte, executive director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service, declared: “Politically, Obama likely was simply parroting the effort being led by Senators John Kerry, Joe Lieberman and Lindsay Graham to gain support for a climate bill by adding massive subsidies for nuclear power, offshore oil and ‘clean’ coal. But recycling George W. Bush energy talking points is no way to solve the climate crisis or develop a sustainable energy policy…Indeed, Obama knows better. Candidate Obama understood that nuclear power is neither safe nor clean.”

    Climate change has been used by those promoting a “revival” of nuclear power—there hasn’t been a new nuclear plant ordered and built in the U.S. in 37 years—as a new argument. In fact, nuclear power makes a substantial contribution to global warming considering the overall “nuclear cycle”—uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and the disposition of radioactive waste, and so on.

    Climate change is also one argument for pushing atomic energy of  another major influence on Obama on nuclear power, Steven Chu, his Department of Energy secretary. Chu typifies the religious-like zeal for nuclear power emanating for decades from scientists in the U.S. government’s string of national nuclear laboratories. Chu was director of one of these, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, before becoming head of DOE.

    First established during World War II’s Manhattan Project to build atomic weapons, the laboratories after the war began promoting civilian nuclear technology—and have been pushing it unceasingly ever since. It has been a way to perpetuate the vested interest created during World War II.  The number of nuclear weapons that could be built was limited because atomic bombs don’t lend themselves to commercial distribution, but in pushing food irradiation, nuclear-powered airplanes and rockets, atomic devices for excavation and, of course, nuclear power, the budgets and staffs of the national nuclear laboratories could be maintained, indeed increase.

    That was the analysis of David Lilienthal, first chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, which preceded the Department of Energy. Lilienthal in his 1963 book Change, Hope, and the Bomb wrote: “The classic picture of the scientist as a creative individual, a man obsessed, working alone through the night, a man in a laboratory pushing an idea—this has changed. Now scientists are ranked in platoons. They are organization men. In many cases the independent and humble search for new truths about nature has been confused with the bureaucratic impulse to justify expenditure and see that next year’s budget is bigger than last’s.”

    Lilienthal wrote about the “elaborate and even luxurious [national nuclear] laboratories that have grown up at Oak Ridge, Argonne, Brookhaven” and the push to use nuclear devices for “blowing out harbors, making explosions underground to produce steam, and so on” which show “how far scientists and administrators will go to try to establish a nonmilitary use” for nuclear technology.

    Chu, like so many of the national nuclear laboratory scientists and administrators, minimizes the dangers of radioactivity. If they didn’t, if they acknowledged how life-threatening the radiation produced by nuclear technology is, their favorite technology would crumble.

    A major theme of Chu, too, is a return to the notion promoted by the national nuclear laboratories in the 1950s and 60s of “recycling” and “reusing” nuclear waste. This way, they have hoped, it might not be seen as waste at all. The concept was to use radioactive Cesium-137 (the main poison discharged in the Chernobyl disaster) to irradiate food, to use depleted uranium to harden bullets and shells, and so on. In recent weeks, with Obama carrying out his pledge not  to allow Yucca Mountain to become a nuclear waste dump, Chu set up a “blue-ribbon” panel on radioactive  waste—stacked with nuclear power advocates including Exelon’s John Rowe—that is expected to stress the “recycling” theory.  

    “We are aggressively pursuing nuclear energy,” declared Chu in January as he announced DOE’s budget plan—which included an increase in the 2011 federal budget in monies for nuclear loan guarantees to build new nuclear plants cited by Obama Tuesday. “We are, as we have repeatedly said, working hard to restart the American nuclear power industry.”

    The $8.3 billion in loan guarantees Obama announced Tuesday is to come from $18.5 billion in guarantees proposed by the George W. Bush administration and authorized by Congress in 2005. “My budget proposes tripling the loan guarantees we provide to help finance safe, clean nuclear facilities,” said Obama Tuesday, referring to the DOE plan which would add $36 billion and bring the loan guarantee fund to $54.5. And this despite candidate Obama warning about “enormous subsidies from the U.S. government” to the nuclear industry.

    The $8.3 billion in loan guarantees is to go toward the Southern Company of Atlanta constructing two nuclear power reactors in Burke, Georgia. These are to be AP1000 nuclear power plants designed by the Westinghouse nuclear division (now owned by Toshiba) although in October the designs were rejected by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as likely being unable to withstand events like tornadoes and earthquakes.

    Obama’s change of stance on nuclear power has led to an earthquake of its own politically. MoveOn, the nonprofit advocacy group that has raised millions of dollars for Democratic candidates including Obama, gauged sentiment of his State of the Union speech by having10,000 MoveOn members record their views. Every few seconds they pressed a button signaling their reactions—ranging from “great” to “awful.” When Obama got his line on energy, the overwhelming judgment was awful. “The most definitive drop in enthusiasm is when President Obama talked about nuclear power and offshore drilling,” said Ilyse Hogue, MoveOn’s director of political advocacy. “They’re looking for clean energy sources that prioritize wind and solar.”

    “Safe, clean nuclear power—it’s an oxymoron,” said Jim Riccio, nuclear policy analyst for Greenpeace USA. “The president knows better. Just because radiation is invisible doesn’t mean it’s clean.”

    “From a health perspective, the proposal of the Obama administration to increase federal loan guarantees for new nuclear reactors poses a serious risk to Americans,” said Joseph Mangano, executive director of the Radiation and Public Health Project. “Adding new reactors will raise the chance for a catastrophic meltdown. It will also increase the amount of radioactive chemicals routinely emitted from reactors into the environment—and human bodies. New reactors will raise rates of cancer—which are already unacceptably high—especially to infants and children. Public policies affecting America’s energy future should reduce, rather than raise, hazards to our citizens.”

    As to government loan guarantees, “The last thing Americans want is another government bailout for a failing industry, but that’s exactly what they’re getting from the Obama administration,” said Ben Schreiber, the climate and energy tax analyst of Friends of the Earth.

    “It would be not only good policy but good politics for Obama to abandon the nuclear loan guarantee program,” said Mariotte of NIRS.

    After Obama’s Tuesday declaration on loan guarantees, Paul Gunter, director of the Reactor Oversight Project of the organization Beyond Nuclear, said: “Unfortunately, the president’s decision is fuel for opposition to costly and dangerous nuclear power. It signals a widening of a divide as the administration steps back from its promise for a change in energy policy and those of us who are committed to a change.”

    “We are deeply disturbed by President Obama’s decision,” said Peter Wilk, executive director of Physicians for Social Responsibility. “Not only does this put taxpayers on the hook for billions, it prioritizes a dirty, dangerous, and expensive technology over public health.  From the beginning to the end of the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear reactors remain a serious threat to public health and safety.  From uranium mining waste to operating reactors leaking radioactivity to the lack of radioactive waste solutions, nuclear power continues to pose serious public health threats.”

    Nuclear opponents have been disappointed in a lack of access to the Obama White House of those with a critical view on nuclear power—who could counteract the pro-nuclear arguments that Obama has been fed. Will President Obama open himself to hearing from those who question nuclear power?

    Obama has credibility trouble already. New York Times columnist Bob Herbert wrote on January 26:

        “Who is Barack Obama? Americans are still looking for the answer…Mr. Obama may be personally very appealing, but he has positioned himself all over the political map…Mr. Obama is in danger of being perceived as someone whose rhetoric, however skillful, cannot always be trusted. He is creating a credibility gap for himself, and if it widens much more he won’t be able to close it.”

  • Radioactive Reservation: The Uphill Battle to Keep Nuclear Waste Off Native American Land

    Nuclear waste is not just an issue for those who live near a nuclear reactor or waste site. It is an issue that in time – due to deadly, toxic waste that will remain harmful for thousands of years – will have adverse affects on the entire world. However, the reality within the United States is that one group has been disproportionately affected by waste policies since the inception of the US nuclear program – the Native American population. In the quest to dispose of nuclear waste, the government and private companies have disregarded and broken treaties, blurred the definition of Native American sovereignty, and directly engaged in a form of economic racism akin to bribery.

    Many people consider treaties between Native American tribes and the United States government to be a topic reserved for history books, yet few realize how hard many Native American tribes are still battling over treaty rights being denied to them. The nuclear waste storage issue has become the most recent excuse for the government to breach treaties made with Native American tribes and perhaps the most well known example is the proposed waste storage site at Yucca Mountain. The planned nuclear waste dump site lies on sacred land to which the Shoshone people have rights based on the Treaty of Ruby Valley. The Western Shoshone Tribe has sued the government, but with little success in halting the plans for the permanent storage of 77,000 metric tons of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. The government has attempted to offer the Shoshone monetary compensation for the use of their land as a radioactive dump. However, the Shoshone people have refused the bribe and they continue to reiterate that they would rather have their land nuclear free than money in their pockets and their land desecrated beyond repair.

    The issue of nuclear waste has played a key role in obscuring the definition of Native American sovereignty. Although sovereignty is a simple concept, contradictory government policies have skewed its definition and made it a sticky subject for even the politically astute to comprehend. By turning their nose up at treaties and claiming Native American land as their property for nuclear testing and radioactive waste dumping, the government has blown gaping holes into Native American sovereignty rights. Sadly, the government’s view on sovereignty is that “.an Indian Tribe is sovereign to the extent that the Untied States permits it to be sovereign.” (United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 1973). No Native American nation can be a truly autonomous entity if the United States government can choose when they wish to give them sovereignty.

    In the late 1980s, the United States government seemed to make a complete 180 degree turn when it began to support the idea of Native American sovereignty, but the goal was still the same: to place nuclear waste storage sites on Native American lands. The Department of Energy appealed to native tribes to host temporary nuclear storage sites on their land, mostly based on the fact that restrictions placed on such sites are not as strict on reservations because of their sovereign status. In the words of the Grace Thorpe, an activist against the dumping of nuclear waste on native reservations and a member of the Sac and Fox tribe, “The real irony is that after years of trying to destroy it, the United States is promoting Indian national sovereignty — just so they can dump their waste on Native land.”

    The broken treaties and the confusion injected into the issue of Native American sovereignty are disturbing to be sure. However, the most disturbing aspect of United States nuclear waste policy is the blatant economic racism this policy exhibits. As a whole, Native Americans are the most poverty stricken ethnic group in the United States. On average, 23 percent of Native American families live in poverty, which is almost double that of the national poverty rate of families at 12 percent. Nuclear utility companies and the United States government take advantage of the overwhelming level of poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites.

    No matter how pretty a picture the government paints about their “benevolent” efforts to improve the economic development of the reservations, this policy is virtually a bribe to try to coerce Native tribes into taking nuclear waste out of the hands of the government. An example of this occurred in 1989; Waste Tech Incorporated approached a small Navajo community with an offer to provide 175 jobs, a hospital, and a minimum of $100,000. In exchange, the community would allow Waste Tech to put a toxic waste incinerator and a dump to bury the dangerous toxic ash on their land. At the time, the tribe had a 72 percent unemployment rate. The tribe was targeted by this company because of their poor economic condition. The government itself has almost exactly copied this tactic and solicited Native American tribes with a reservation to host a waste site.

    Yucca Mountain is just one more example to add to the list of the United States government’s existing nuclear waste policies that are transparently racist, violate long-standing Native American treaty rights and disregard Native American sovereignty or use it for their own ends. Millions of dollars are being spent to bribe a minority portion of the population to take stewardship of the majority’s nuclear waste. Is this the best method the United States government can devise to deal with the issue of nuclear waste? Or is it just the simplest option available to the government with the least public visibility? With the billions of dollars spent each year on nuclear weapons and power plants, wouldn’t a more feasible option be to, first and foremost, stop producing new nuclear waste and redirect some of this money to solving the ever growing problem of nuclear waste? Since its formation, the United States government has subjugated and subdued Native Americans, and it is time to reverse this trend, beginning with the government’s policies on nuclear waste.

    Bayley Lopez is a Lena Chang Intern at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and currently a sophomore at Stanford University. This Article expresses her point of view as a person of Native American descent; it does not express the opinion of all native Peoples.

  • Disposal of High-Level Nuclear Waste

    More than a half century after the beginning of the Nuclear Age, there is no satisfactory answer to the serious dilemma of how to dispose of the large quantities of radioactive wastes created by military and civilian uses of nuclear energy. This paper examines technological options for waste disposal, and concludes by favoring Multibarrier Monitored Retrievable Storage (MMRS). The authors point out, however, that this form of storage (it is not really disposal) will require “continuous monitoring… essentially forever.” Thus, the best of the options will require something akin to a “nuclear priesthood” to pass along their skills at monitoring these wastes for thousands of generations – a sobering thought.

    Our century’s indulgence in nuclear technology has created radioactive wastes that are a problem not only in the present but will affect thousands of generations in the future. The problems are so long-term that they are beyond our capacity to plan for adequately. At a minimum, we should cease – with all due speed – to generate more nuclear wastes.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s directors issued a policy statement on nuclear power in May 1996 calling for “a world adequately supplied by renewable, environmentally benign energy sources, and the worldwide elimination of nuclear power.” A copy of the full statement is available from the Foundation.

    – David Krieger

    Introduction

    Disposal of highly radioactive nuclear waste is a critical problem for our time and will remain so well into the future. There are two main waste sources: Nuclear power reactors and bomb-related nuclear material from the production facilities and from the decommissioned U.S. and (former) U.S.S.R. nuclear weapons.

    This paper deals with disposal of (a) reactor spent fuel rods and (b) waste sludge from the bomb-grade plutonium separation process. Disposal of bomb-grade plutonium from decommissioned weapons and from existing stockpiles present somewhat different problems which are not treated here.*

    Nuclear waste disposal poses a number of different yet interconnected problems, all of which must eventually be resolved in an integrated fashion: technical, economic, health-related, environmental, political. The present paper addresses primarily technical issues, and does not attempt an analysis of the overall problem.

    Management of radioactive waste is a complex, multifaceted procedure. Spent commercial fuel rods present the most demanding challenge of all waste problems because of the high level of radioactivity. The fuel rods, relatively harmless before entering the reactor, emerge having become dangerously radioactive. They require storage for at least ten years under circulated water in a pool inside the reactor containment structure.

    By statute, the government, through the Department of Energy’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, has promised to provide disposal capacity for the waste generated by the nation’s nuclear power plants. Some of the waste which has accumulated over 45 years of Cold War nuclear bomb production also falls into the high-level category.

    The term “high-level” nuclear waste has had its meaning changed in the U.S. over the years. At the present time the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has defined “high-level” very narrowly as mostly, but not entirely, spent fuel elements and reprocessed military wastes, such as sludges. They further define “spent fuel,” concentrates of strontium-90 and cesium-137, and transuranics as something not necessarily included in their definition of “high-level” waste.

    Because this NRC definition is contrary (if not actually contradictory) to standards of the rest of the world and makes no sense to the authors, “high-level” nuclear waste is defined here as all radioactive waste material coming from nuclear reactor fuel rods whether confined or not:

    a) Spent nuclear fuel rods, clad or declad, from commercial electricity generating reactors; average radioactivity being more than 2.5 million curies per cubic meter.
    b) Semi-liquid sludge from nuclear bomb fabrication waste processing residue – average radioactivity being about 3500 curies per cubic meter.

    All this waste contains five shorter lived and longer lived radionuclides of main concern. The shorter lived are strontium-90 whose half life, t1/2, is 28.5 years, and cesium-137 whose half life, t1/2, is 30 years. See Ref. 1 for the half-life values used in this study. The radioactivity of these shorter lived nuclides is approximately 95% of the total radioactivity of the nuclides of concern. Total hazardous life for these shorter lived nuclides is considered to be between 600 years and 1000 years depending upon one’s point of view.

    The longer lived isotopes are plutonium-239 whose t1/2 is 24,110 years, plutonium-240 whose t1/2 is 6,540 years, and curium-245 whose t1/2 is 8,500 years. Plutonium-238 whose t1/2is 88 years will have essentially disappeared after several thousand years, so in storage terms of the longer lived elements this isotope is not of concern as long as it will have been successfully contained for the next several thousand years. As for the life of these longer lived materials, the NRC considers 10,000 years as the storage time required; however, some people consider a lifetime as long as 100,000 years to 500,000 years as more appropriate.

     Table I
    Radioactivity for 100 Tons of Spent Fuel *
    Curies Remaining
     

     Isotope
     

      t1/2 yrs
     

      10 yrs
     

      500 yrs
     

      1000 yrs
     

     10,000 yrs
     

     100,000 yrs
     

     200,000 yrs
     

    Sr-90
         28 2,000,000         15    trace  

     –
     

      –
     

      –
     

    Cs-137
         30 3,000,000        40    trace  

     –
     

      –
     

      –
     

    Pu-239
    24,110     22,000   27,000  29,000  56,000    8,000      240
     

    Pu-240
      6,540      49,000 175,000 170,000  69,000         7      trace
     

    Cm-245
    85,000     56,000   52,000  52,000  25,000        0.5      trace
     * A typical 1000 megawatt reactor contains about 100 tons of enriched uranium, one-third of which is renewed each year.

    Table I (above) extracted from Ref. 2 should be helpful. It must be noted that as some radioactive isotopes disintegrate, they create other radioactive isotopes in the process. Thus Pu-239 and Pu-240 increase at first and do not begin decreasing until many years later.

    Table I illustrates, as does Figure 1 (below), rather spectacularly the fallacy of the NRC rationale for a 10,000 year waste storage lifetime, when the radioactivity for the plutonium isotopes are greater after that long period than at the outset. However, it must be noted that this Pu-239 is relatively confined and in general will not be disturbed, so the basic health hazards from such radioactive materials as radon and radium from uranium ores appear to be far more serious.

    The general nuclear waste disposal approach is that the repositories should not be more dangerous than natural ores of uranium and thorium. In fact, they might be much less hazardous; after all, the natural ores have no barriers such as containers, and radium is leached from many of the ores so that traces get into the food chain. Spent fuel rods have to be stored between 13,000 and 14,000 years before their level of radioactivity decreases to that of natural uranium ore.

    One of the most serious engineering problems is that of allowing for release of the prodigious heat emanating from stored nuclear power waste. Most of the heat comes from the strontium-90 and cesium-137 at the start, but the longer-lived actinides produce more in later years. As noted in Table II (below), the heat liberated by spent nuclear reactor fuel decreases significantly as it ages.

    From a practical engineering standpoint there is little difference between a 500 year lifetime and a 500,000 year lifetime. The 500 years is so long a time that no storage prototype system can ever be tested, thus the basic engineering considerations remain unchanged regardless of the waste lifetime. It is on this fact that any long-term storage conclusions are predicated. As is discussed below, any storage technique that utilizes permanent or nonretrievable ground burial is fundamentally a violation of basic engineering principles. This was pointed out to the nuclear industry over 25 years ago, but their response at that time was that they had “faith” that some satisfactory new technique would be developed, by the government of course and at taxpayers’ expense, before it would be necessary to initiate long-term storage. Obviously, that has not happened and we are now faced with a nuclear waste disposal problem that has no fully satisfactory solution and probably never will have.

    Multibarrier Monitored Retrievable Storage (MMRS)

    This, unfortunately, is the final technique of choice for this particular waste disposal problem. It is unfortunate because there must be a continuous monitoring of the waste essentially forever. There are two fortunate aspects deserving mention: (1) the total volume of the waste involved is small by world standards, i.e., one football field for each type of waste each ten or twelve stories high, and (2) the number of people theoretically required to perform the monitoring task is also quite small, perhaps one hundred people or less worldwide. A ball park estimate of costs in present day dollars indicates that about $100 million is required over a 10,000 year time period for each 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant.

    For the nuclear power plant waste, which consists of spent fuel rods, the most desirable inner barrier is the original cladding used for the nuclear fuel in the basic power plant configuration. This excellent cladding barrier is usually zirconium but sometimes stainless steel is used. The lifetime of this cladding has never been tested, so there is no telling exactly how long it can be depended upon. Safety engineering, however, dictates that because this barrier has already proved to be very reliable, it should be left in place and not removed. Further barriers have to be determined as a result of experimental development based upon both thermal characteristics and mechanical properties. Possibilities include glass, copper, ceramic, additional zirconium, stainless steel, nickel, or titanium. All this is for the power plant spent fuel rods only. Bomb waste having been processed requires another barrier or cladding before application of the “standard” multibarriers.

    Because the bomb waste is initially in a semi-liquid sludge form, it has to be solidified at the outset. The quantities involved are approximately 105 million gallons for the U.S. as of 1994, so the total quantity worldwide would be about 200 million gallons. A ball park estimate of the solidified quantity results in roughly the same volume as the power plant waste with the identical radioactive nuclides. The major difference between this solidified nuclear bomb waste and the spent fuel rods will be that the former will probably be contained in vitrified or glassified cylinders as compared with the latter being in long slender cylindrical fuel rods with metallic cladding. Actually, if we fabricated the bomb waste’s vitrified cylinders in long slender rods the same size as the spent fuel rods, the remainder of the waste disposal process could be identical for both waste components.

    Of special note here is that the final configuration must be a solid container or cask whose outer surface is monitored. Engineering jargon usually refers to this approach as placing the canister in a “bath tub.” Sensitive radioactive sensors in the “bath tub” must monitor this outer container surface continuously in an automated fashion. Such automation must incorporate Built-In-Self-Test, making use of many space exploration techniques.

    While the waste canisters or containers are stored in shallow, underground but easily accessible facilities, all testing and monitoring should be performed by automated equipment. Such techniques preclude human errors caused by boredom, undetected equipment malfunctions, and misinterpretation of displayed information. Human intervention is necessary only for overall supervision and periodic testing of the automated equipment because of multiple error causation possibilities beyond the original design. We have to remember that there is nothing that is 100% safe; nuclear bombs for example only possessed six or seven safety interlocks. Periodically, the nuclear waste monitoring equipment must be replaced and the waste canisters themselves will require retrieval and automatic repackaging every hundred years or more. It is noted that there are essentially two sets of automatic equipment, (1) the canister “bath tub” monitors and (2) the retrieval/repackaging mechanism. The latter might well be simply remote controlled equipment or a combination of semi-automatic components.

    A summary of our viewpoint is that the best disposal method known to date consists of sealing the zirconium or stainless steel-clad spent fuel rods, without reprocessing, in copper or steel canisters and storing these in a geologic but easily accessible repository. This is the once-through fuel cycle. The spent fuel rods should be allowed to stand at least ten years under water so that most of the radioactive materials decay, and the rate of heat generation has fallen by about 86%. The repositories must have multiple barriers. The canisters must be arranged so that sufficient cooling air can circulate around them after disposal. The waste density must not exceed that required for adequate heat flow.

    A major point to be made is that a very responsible and conscientious group of people is required to take care of our long-term nuclear garbage. This group must have substantial credentials for at least several centuries of resource concern and responsible treatment of their environment. Few groups in the world will qualify and it is worth considerable remuneration from the society at large to this select management group to perform the waste monitoring required. The compensation referred to, while quite large for the equipment and personnel involved in terms of the select group, will be minuscule compared with the monetary interest the U.S. presently pays on its debt or the amount societies throughout the world have been willing to spend on weapons of mass destruction.

      Table 2: Thermal Power Per Metric Tonne* of Spent Fuel

     

    Age (years)
     

     Rate of Heat Liberated(watts)
     

     Percent of Heat from Strontium and Cessium
     

    1
     

     12,300
     

     67
     

    5
     

      2,260
     

    69
     

    10
     

      1,300
     

    72
     

     20
     

      950
     

     68
     

     50
     

      572
     

     56
     

    100
     

      312
     

     31
     

     200
     

     183
     

     5

     * 2 metric tonne = 1000 kilograms = 1 long ton = 2200 lbs.

    Nonretrievable Geologic Storage

    The major effort toward long-term high-level nuclear waste disposal has been in the area of depositing in the ground all the dangerous material in some sort of containers. This approach seeks to find a permanent disposal technique so the waste can be left for posterity without any possibility of future generations being at risk. While the motivation and results sought after are commendable, the reality of what is being attempted has not really been fully recognized.

    Of prime importance here is the basic engineering principle alluded to above that any truly new system has to be tested for at least one life cycle in order for there to be reasonable confidence that there have been no design or fabrication errors. Given a new disposal system that has a life cycle of at least 300 years, the required engineering prototype test is not possible. After twenty-five years, the faith of responsible nuclear power parties that government would figure out an acceptable solution eventually is as remote a possibility today as it was in the first place. Needless to say, that confidence in a permanent solution has now been thoroughly shaken, as basic engineering considerations dictated at the outset.

    The geologic materials investigated throughout the world have included salt, granite, volcanic tuff, and basalt. Each particular site chosen, after much consideration of geologic and scientific aspects, has proven to have some flaw that makes such contemplated irretrievable burial unacceptable. In some instances fractures in the structure have occurred or been discovered whereby the nuclear waste could eventually get outside the confinement volume. Other problems include the buildup and then outflow of water. Earthquake susceptibility is always of concern and automatically precludes use of some sites.

    In the end it does not look as though we can possibly have sufficient confidence in any one geologic site that would allow permanent disposal. One possibility, of course, is to treat the waste similarly to the way we instituted nuclear power in the first place, i.e., proceed with what seems satisfactory at the time and leave any serious long-term problems to be solved only after they have actually arisen. In other words, there is always the irresponsible option of letting our distant descendants be plagued with our 20th century errors.

    Burying of Casks Inside Underground Bomb Test Cavities

    Given the already contaminated underground cavities made by bomb-testing in Nevada, a logical option would appear to be the use of these voids for permanent waste disposal. An important factor to be considered is the high level of radioactivity already present within those cavities. While leaks into the air occurred in some tests, in most cases all of the radioactivity from the explosions was confined. After all, this was the bomb-testing option of choice to prevent contamination of the atmosphere. A typical test was the Chesire experiment, conducted on February 14, 1976. It was a hydrogen bomb with a yield between 200 and 500 kilotons. It was detonated at a depth of 3830 feet, which was 1760 feet below the water table.

    There is already considerable experience in drilling into bomb cavities. The purpose was to sample the radioactive materials for analysis, in order to estimate the yield and efficiency (which is the percentage of U-235 and/or Pu-239 which underwent fission). If the deeper cavities are chosen (to insure that they are well below the water table), it would be easiest to drill a shaft in the same place as the original one. By now, the fission products which are most dangerous, such as iodine-131, have all decayed. The only gaseous fission product left is krypton-85, with half-life 10.7 years. It is not nearly as dangerous as radon, and in any case only a small amount would diffuse out. Casks of waste would be lowered into the cavity using a cable suspended from a derrick, with the operator inside a shielded housing, if necessary. At the end, the cavity is filled with earth, and the shaft closed.

    Although this burial technique looks promising and derserving of further study, it is by no means clear that this technique for disposing of hazardous waste is satisfactory. It could develop that creating new cavities for the express purpose of using them as repositories could become attractive. In that case, the site would be carefully chosen with the water table in mind, and the cavity blasted very deep. Hydrogen bombs might be best since most of the energy comes from deuterium fusion, thus minimizing the amount of radioactivity created.

    So much for the positive aspects. Negative aspects include the idea that just because deep underground cavities are already contaminated with long lived radioactive nuclides from nuclear bomb explosions, we are not justified increasing the potential future health hazards by orders of magnitude. As with other geologic burials, there are possibilities of earthquakes, ground fractures, and unanticipated failures in the deep drilled shafts that would cause water leakage. However, of all the possible permanent disposal sites, these deep holes of hazardous remnants from past bomb development follies appear to be the most attractive, even though a time period of at least 10,000 years is too long to confidently conclude that there are no significant failure-modes.

    Because permanent geologic disposal in nuclear bomb cavities violates fundamental engineering principles, it can be considered to be irresponsible for present generations to pursue that option. Perhaps considerations of our lack of knowledge today of what the worldwide land usage was many thousands of years ago will provide an understanding of our cautious conclusions here. We simply cannot be reasonably certain how the use of land throughout the world will evolve over the forthcoming thousands of years. Thus conscientious adherence to responsible behavior requires our not utilizing this bomb cavity technique at present. Further study might possibly result in something useful a hundred or more years hence.

    Burial Between Tectonic Plates

    The interior of the Earth contains the elements potassium, uranium, and thorium, all slightly radioactive. This radioactive decay liberates heat, which keeps the Earth’s core hot. The consequence of a hot, liquid core is movement of floating tectonic plates, and formation of mountain ranges and continents. Were this not the case, mountains and all land would erode down, and our planet would be covered with water. Without this radioactivity, we would not exist.

    Geologists discovered many years ago that the continents are in constant motion relative to each other. Far below the ground tectonic plates are sliding very slowly over each other. The continents rest on these plates, so the oceans are changing size and shape while the surface continents are moving relative to one another. At the edge of a plate whose motion is toward the ocean, there will be a subduction layer between that tectonic plate and the one below. Any material between the plates at that point will be pulled in between and remain there for at least several million years.

    Concern over the years has been to consider just how one could perform the placement of high-level nuclear waste into a tectonic plate subduction layer. One major problem is digging down to that depth. But even more stringent than that is the problem of construction of shaft walls that will withstand the weight of all the earth above. The same problem is encountered when constructing a research module to descend to the ocean floor. While the ocean depth is a maximum of about 6 miles, the tectonic plate depth is as much as 50 miles. Finally, there are the construction strength problem differences between an enclosed submerged module in the ocean and the side wall problems in a shaft through which nuclear waste canisters are to be lowered.

    There has not been, nor is there even a contemplated possibility of constructing a shaft that would be strong enough for this nuclear waste disposal option. Thus, another apparently attractive approach seems to be beyond our reach.

    Transmutation

    Soon after commercial generation of electricity via reactors started and their high-level waste began to accumulate, ways to simplify and manage the problem were sought. Among these was reprocessing to separate the waste into several fractions, and then, using neutrons, to transmute via fission the transuranium elements (neptunium, plutonium, americium, etc.) into nuclides which have relatively short half-lives so that they lose their radioactive sting in a repository during an abbreviated storage time. The transuranium elements would require sequestering in a repository for many thousands of years.

    If the nuclear waste is bombarded with neutrons, electrons, or other atomic particles so that it is changed from a long-lived to a short-lived radioactive material, the process has been termed “transmutation.” About thirty years ago, people inquiring about the long-term nuclear waste disposal for commercial reactors were told that the military had the identical problem for its nuclear bomb waste. Because the military waste was already twenty years old, the word to one of the authors was that the military had not only decided that transmutation was the best solution to this problem but had already worked out all pertinent details. Many years and many nuclear reactors later, of course, we found out that the military had not developed any viable transmutation waste disposal system at all.

    In fact, the basic problems with transmutation have been perennial. Each nuance has resulted in the same general result. Any process based on transmutation would require reprocessing to separate the waste into several fractions, and then, using neutrons, to transmute via fission the transuranium elements (neptunium, plutonium, americium, etc.) into nuclides which have relatively short half-lives. Considerable research has been carried out recently on these nuclear incineration techniques. Tests are being conducted at Hanford, Los Alamos, and Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island. Success of the proposed procedure depends on reprocessing spent fuel by either the PUREX process or a technique similar to the TRUMP-S process. The actinides would then be reintroduced into the reactor or bombarded with neutrons generated using an accelerator. Thus neutron sources might be either nuclear reactors, perhaps of the breeder type, or linear accelerators to produce high-energy protons, which collide with lead, bismuth, or tungsten targets. This produces abundant neutrons, which must be moderated using heavy water. The neutrons then cause fission of the actinides, and liberation of huge amounts of energy, as in a nuclear reactor.

    Disposal of wastes by transmutation is intimately related to fast breeder reactors. While American reactors of this type were phased out by Congress in 1983, a new type, the Integral Fast Reactor, is now being studied. These breeder reactors use liquid sodium as coolant and have no moderator. They are being promoted as a way to cope with nuclear waste. The problem, of course, is that “we’ve heard that story before.”

    Even though the outlook for nuclear transmutation is most unpromising, a few details are perhaps in order. The accelerator procedure is highly unfavorable from the standpoint of energy consumption. The steel and other parts would be activated by neutrons, and become radioactive. It seems that about as much radioactive waste would be produced as is consumed, as stated above, if not more. Costs would be fantastic. The procedure could not easily be used with fission products. They absorb neutrons poorly; after all, they were in a neutron environment for years, and survived. Only two, iodine-129 and technetium-99, are easily transmuted to nonradioactive nuclides, and these are not particularly important. Technetium-99 (half-life nearly a quarter of a million years) is converted by neutrons into technetium 100 (half-life only 16 seconds) forming ruthenium. If this process is carried out while a stream of ozone is passed through the apparatus, volatile ruthenium tetroxide is constantly removed. Transmutation might be successful in this case, and perhaps that of iodine-129, but in general the technique is not expected to be satisfactory.

    In 1992 a group of nine qualified experts finished an exhaustive assessment of disposing of waste through transmutation via fast breeder reactors, accelerators, and high temperature electrolysis techniques (the Ramspott report, after the first author). These scientists are associated with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, two universities, and a private firm. The study concluded that high-temperature electrolysis procedures for separating actinide metals in reprocessing high-level waste offers no economic incentives or safety advantages. Unfortunately, actinide separation and transmutation cannot be considered a satisfactory substitute for geological disposal.

    Spacecraft Transport to the Sun

    Of all the theoretically possible disposal techniques one can think of, this is one of the most preferable. Materials on the sun are already similar to our waste products, so our depositing high level nuclear materials on the sun would blend right in. Unfortunately, the numbers are such that we cannot do the job, either technologically or economically.

    Given the liquid sludge nuclear bomb waste of about 108 gallons for the U.S. alone, the following ballpark numbers apply:

    ~0.1 = conversion factor for solidification.
    ~0.1 = conversion factor for gallons to cu ft.
    ~100 lbs/cu ft density.
    10,000 lb effective spacecraft waste payload for an Apollo-type vehicle assuming the additional 7000 lb payload will be required for containers and the retro-rockets.
    108 x 0.1 x 0.1 x 100 x 10-4 = 104 spacecraft for only accumulated U.S. military waste.

    Besides the fact that the U.S. does not have the economic resources to fund such a gigantic number of spacecraft, each vehicle would have to have perfect launch systems that would not blow up on the launch pad plus perfect guidance systems that would insure the vehicle not turning around back toward the Earth. Obviously, this is beyond any forseeable capability and must be abandoned as a possible option.

    Conclusions

    A major point emphasized in this study is that it is unethical to force a known potential environmental hazard on future generations when a reasonable alternative exists. This aspect was phrased above in engineering terms, i.e. basic engineering principles; however, it could easily have been phrased in more socially oriented terms. This leads to the only responsible choice being the multibarrier monitored retrievable storage (MMRS) technique which will cost in present dollars between $100 million and $1 billion per 1000 megawatt power plant over a 10,000 to 100,000 year storage period.

    It also needs to be pointed out that there are some important lessons to be learned from Mother Nature:

    1) The natural nuclear reactors at Oklo in Gabon, West Africa, demonstrated that the plutonium and most metallic fission products did not leach out, even over thousands of centuries of leaching. Even the strontium-90 stayed in place until it decayed. The cesium-137 did migrate out, and the iodine fission products evaporated. Despite this favorable result, strictly speaking it applies to the particular geology of that area.

    2) Another natural site teaches us more valuable lessons about the behavior of radioactive materials during long storage. There is a hill called Morro do Ferro in Brazil where there are 30,000 tons of thorium and 100,000 tons of rare earths. Much of the fission products are rare earths. Chemically, thorium resembles plutonium in some ways and the rare earths resemble curium and americium. Again, the evidence is that migration of the most dangerous materials from the surface over eons of weathering has been negligible.

    3) Still another area whose study yields valuable lessons is the Koongarra ore body in Australia. This is a giant deposit of uranium ore in a common type of geological formation through which groundwater has been flowing for millions of years. Movement of uranium and its decay products has been investigated by drilling a series of holes through the ore body and surrounding layers. The results indicate that migration of only a few tens of meters has occurred on the weathered surface, and virtually no movement has taken place underground.

    So with responsible behavior designing and implementing the MMRS long-term nuclear waste system, there is reasonable historical assurance that future disasters will probably be avoided even if some failures should occur in that system.

    References

    1. Edgardo Browne, Richard B. Firestone; and Virginia Shirley, Ed.; Table of Radioactive Isotopes, John Wiley & Sons: New York,1986, Table 1 pp. D-10 to D-26.
    2. Warf, James C., All Things Nuclear, First Edition, Southern California Federation of Scientists, Los Angeles, 1989, p. 85.