Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear war

  • PSR Peacemaker Award to Bob Dodge

    David Krieger delivered this speech at an event sponsored by Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles on September 9, 2012.


    David KriegerIt’s great to be in a room filled with health care professionals who take seriously the challenge of healing their patients, their country and their planet. 


    Before I present the Peacemaker Award to Bob Dodge on behalf of Physicians for Social Responsibility, I’ve been asked to make a few remarks about the continuing dangers of nuclear weapons.


    The most important thing I can tell you is this: Nuclear weapons haven’t gone away.  They still threaten the very foundations of civilization.  There are still over 19,000 of them in the world.  The only acceptable number is zero.


    Even a small nuclear war between regional powers would have global consequences.  Scientists have modeled a nuclear war between India and Pakistan in which each country used 50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons on the other side’s cities.  Using less than half of one percent of the nuclear weapons on the planet would lead to putting enough soot into the stratosphere to reduce warming sunlight, lower the surface temperatures on the planet to the lowest in 1,000 years, shorten growing seasons, cause crop failures, and bring on a global famine that would kill hundreds of millions of people, perhaps a billion people, throughout the world.


    This would be a nuclear war totally beyond our control.


    It is only one of the risks we run every day that we rely upon nuclear weapons to protect us.  Incidentally, these weapons cannot and do not protect us.  Deterrence is not defense and it is not protection.  All that can be done with nuclear weapons is to threaten retaliation.  And if there were a nuclear war between the US and Russia, we’re talking about an extinction event for most or all complex life on the planet.


    Fifty years ago, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis and, in that crisis, we came far too close to nuclear war.


    Today, we are tempting fate by moving NATO membership to the Russian borders and placing US/NATO missile defenses near the Russian borders.  When Russia tells us this undermines their deterrent capability and worries them, we tell them, in essence, “Don’t worry, be happy.”  This is needless provocation. 


    What is needed is to work together with Russia as partners to help solve the world’s great problems: climate change, environmental degradation, poverty, terrorism, human rights abuses and, of course, the abolition of nuclear weapons and deep reductions in military budgets. 


    No matter how powerful a country is, no one country can solve these problems alone.  We need to come together as a world to solve these problems.


    I could go on talking about nuclear problems with Iran, North Korea and terrorist organizations.  But I won’t.  I just want to leave you with the thought that nuclear weapons still have the potential to do what Physicians for Social Responsibility recognized early on – to cause “The Last Epidemic.”



    Now, I want to talk about Bob Dodge.  What a fantastic human being you’ve chosen for your Peacemaker Award.  He is a Peacemaker with every fiber of his being.


    Growing up, his father helped him to recognize that war simply does not work.  The birth of his son, David, crystallized in him a passion to work for peace.  He considers this work both a responsibility and an opportunity.


    As far back as high school, he stood up against the Vietnam War and he has never stopped standing up and speaking out against war. 


    Many outstanding leaders in the anti-nuclear movement inspired him and instilled in him a sense of urgency to work for a world without nuclear weapons.


    He practices family medicine in Ventura.  The people of Ventura know him not only as a great family doctor.  They know him, as you do, as a Peacemaker.


    Every year, he informs his community how much taxpayers in Ventura are paying for nuclear weapons while basic needs for many go unmet. 


    Bob has been a leader in the Ventura chapter of PSR since 1985.  He is a leader in Beyond War.  He is a founder and leader of Citizens for Peaceful Resolutions.


    He is a man of firm character and boundless enthusiasm.  He is also tenacious.  He doesn’t give up.  He demonstrates in his life the values I most admire – compassion, commitment and courage. 


    I think Bob Dodge must be an amazing physician.  I know from my experiences working with him over many years for a world without nuclear weapons that he is an extraordinary Peacemaker.


    It’s a great pleasure to join you in honoring him tonight.

  • References on High Alert and Nuclear Famine Dangers

    Bruce Blair, “Keeping Presidents in the Nuclear Dark,” Bruce Blair’s Nuclear Column (Episode #2:  The SIOP Option that Wasn’t), Feb. 16, 2004. Retrieved from http://www.cdi.org/blair/launch-on-warning.cfm

    Bruce G. Blair,”A Rebuttal of the U.S. Statement on the Alert Status of U.S. Nuclear Forces,” October 13, 2007. Retrieved from http://lcnp.org/disarmament/opstatus-blair.htm

    Bruce G. Blair, Harold Feiveson and Frank N. von Hippel, “Who’s Got the Button? Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert,” Scientific American, November 1997. Retrieved from http://www.cdi.org/aboutcdi/SciAmerBB

    False Warnings of Soviet Missile Attacks during 1979-80 Led to Alert Actions for U.S. Strategic Forces; National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 371 Posted – March 1, 2012. Retrieved from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb371/index.htm

    Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Co-Chairs. Retrieved from http://icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/part-ii-2.html

    Nathan Hodge and Sharon Weinberger, “The Ever-Ready Nuclear Missileer,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 14-21 DOI: 10.2968/064003005. Retrieved from http://www.thebulletin.org/files/064003005.pdf

    ICAN Nuclear Weapons Convention: http://icanw.org/nuclear-weapons-convention

    M.Mills, O. Toon, R. Turco, D. Kinnison and R. Garcia, “Massive Global Ozone Loss Predicted Following Regional Nuclear Conflict,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA), Apr 8, 2008, Vol 105(14), pp. 5307-12. Retrieved from http://www.pnas.org/content/105/14/5307.abstract

    A. Robock, L. Oman and G. Stenchikov, “Nuclear Winter Revisited with a Modern Climate Model and Current Nuclear Arsenals: Still Catastrophic Consequences,” Journal of Geophysical Research – Atmospheres, Vol. 112, No. D13, 2007. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf

    A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B. Toon, C. Bardeen and R. Turco, “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, 2007, p. 2003-2012. Retrieved from http://www.atmos-chem-phys.org/7/2003/2007/acp-7-2003-2007.pdf

    O.B.Toon, R. Turco, A. Robock, C. Bardeen, L. Oman, and G. Stenchikov, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, 2007, pp. 1973-2003. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

    O.B. Toon and A. Robock, “2010:  Local Nuclear War, Global Suffering,”  Scientific American, 302, 74-81. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf

    O. Toon, A. Robock and R. Turco, “The Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War,” Physics Today, vol. 61, No. 12, 2008. Retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf

    S. Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, December 2009. Retrieved from http://icnnd.org/Documents/Starr_Nuclear_Winter_Oct_09.pdf

    S. Starr, “Launch-Ready Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to All Nations and Peoples,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, August 2011. Retrieved from https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011_06_24_starr.pdf

    http://www.nucleardarkness.org

  • Open Letter on NATO Missile Defense Plans and Increased Risk of Nuclear War

    To President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev:


    Recent U.S. decisions to deploy an integrated missile defense system in Western, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, coupled with the continued expansion of NATO and its military activities, have created increasingly sharp divisions and distrust between the Russian Federation and the United States.[i] This process now threatens to destroy the New START agreement and reverse previous progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Further deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations could result in a return to the perilous nuclear postures of the Cold War.


    Although the “Phased Adaptive Approach” missile defense system is being installed under the auspices of NATO, it is perceived by Russia to be “a U.S. system on European soil.”[ii] This system is regarded with apprehension by Russia, particularly since later phases include plans to deploy very advanced-stage Standard Missile-3 land-based interceptors, which have the potential to effectively target Russian strategic nuclear missiles. Russia consequently regards the proposed and ongoing deployments as no more than “an interim step toward building a full-scale missile defense system to provide guaranteed protection of U.S. territory against any missile attack.”[iii]
     
    The official U.S. political rationale for these deployments is that they are necessary to defend against yet-to-be-developed Iranian long-range ballistic missiles. Yet American scientists have stated that forward-based European radar systems give the U.S. the ability to track Russian ICBMs very early after a launch and to guide interceptors against them.[iv] Russian leaders have expressed specific concerns that the U.S./NATO missile defense system could be used for such a purpose and continue to question at whom the system is directed.
     
    Fundamental mutual distrust stems from the fact that both the U.S. and Russia still maintain strategic war plans that include large nuclear strike options, with hundreds of preplanned targets that clearly include cities in each other’s nation.[v] Both nations keep a total of at least 1,700 strategic nuclear weapons mounted on launch-ready ballistic missiles, which can carry out these strike options with only a few minutes’ warning.
     
    Thus, many in Russia believe the final stages of deployment of the U.S./NATO missile defense system are designed to have the capability of greatly reducing or eliminating Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Continued technological advances in hypersonic missiles,[vi] which would greatly enhance interceptor missile capabilities, combined with the possibility that nuclear warheads could be installed in missile interceptors, will only serve to exacerbate Russian fears about U.S./NATO European missile defense.[vii]


    Mutual suspicion has prevented true cooperation in joint missile defense, just as it has with the still defunct U.S.-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center, which was supposed to share information about U.S. and Russian missile launches.[viii] The failure to include Russia in a joint missile defense also reflects the fact that NATO has not made Russia a full partner in the alliance, despite the end of the Cold War.
     
    It is only natural that Russia should consider NATO a potential threat, particularly since NATO has greatly expanded eastward, has actively recruited and included former members of the Warsaw Pact and has engaged in extensive military campaigns in Europe, Africa and South Asia.  The combination of NATO expansion with the deployment of a massive missile defense system that surrounds Russia has triggered a strong political reaction in Russia.  From a Russian perspective, a U.S./NATO missile defense system in Europe undermines their perceived nuclear deterrent, decreases U.S. vulnerability and increases Russian vulnerability to a U.S. nuclear first-strike attack.
     
    In November, President Medvedev made his most forceful political statement against the U.S. and NATO to date.[ix]  Included in the speech was a specific warning that Russia would withdraw from the New START agreement should the U.S./NATO missile defense system continue to move forward.  This is not new information—the Russian Federation issued an unambiguous statement in April 2010 when New START was signed, making clear that both quantitative and qualitative limitations on the U.S. missile defense program were so essential that Russia would be prepared to withdraw from the treaty if these limitations were not honored.[x]
     
    A Russian withdrawal from New START would likely precipitate a fully-renewed nuclear arms race and thus completely reverse movement toward a world without nuclear weapons. Many of the signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would also regard the collapse of the New START process as an explicit violation of the NPT; this could lead to the collapse of the NPT and extensive nuclear proliferation.
     
    In his November speech, President Medvedev also issued a number of explicit instructions to his military forces that essentially amounted to military threats against the U.S. and NATO.  He stated, “I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defense system data and guidance systems, if need be ….  [I]f the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe.”[xi]
     
    Although many political analysts in the West have discounted this warning as merely a way to put pressure on the U.S. and NATO to change course, this statement by President Medvedev must be taken seriously. Russia will certainly carry out the directives of its President.
     
    The leaders of the U.S., NATO and Russia must seriously consider the possibility that the current course of political events is pushing them towards an eventual military confrontation and conflict.  Further expansion of NATO, its “nuclear umbrella” and missile defense system to the very borders of Russia increase the odds that any conventional military confrontation would quickly escalate into nuclear war.


    If Russia decided “to take out any part of the missile defense system in Europe,” as threatened by President Medvedev, would not such an action be likely to lead to nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia?  According to recent peer-reviewed studies, the detonation of the launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals could leave the Earth virtually uninhabitable for more than a decade.[xii]  Such a war would lead to global famine and starvation of most of the human race.[xiii]


    We suggest the following steps, both as a way out of the immediate crisis and to advance the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free-world. These are not the only steps that could be helpful, but we are hopeful that leaders on both sides might be willing to act upon them:



    1. There should be a freeze on U.S./NATO deployment of missile defenses in Europe pending an open, joint U.S.-Russian quantitative assessment of the threats that missile defense is supposed to counter, and of the threats posed by U.S. and Russian tactical and strategic nuclear forces.[xiv] The threats posed by missile defense and its effectiveness should be studied and integrated into the previously-mentioned assessment. It is essential that this analysis include a thorough scientific evaluation of the long-term effects of nuclear conflict upon the global environment, climate and human agriculture.[xv]
    2. It is essential, not only for the creation of a peaceful and secure Europe but for the continuation of civilization and the human species itself, that launch-ready nuclear arsenals be immediately stood-down, that nuclear war be avoided, and that nuclear arsenals be eliminated. This is a priority that must trump all other priorities, including what are seen as the most pressing security priorities of major world powers.

    We reiterate strongly that differences of opinion over missile defense must not be allowed to de-rail progress to zero nuclear weapons, or worse, to put that progress into reverse and instead reinstate Cold War security postures, as would be precipitated by the collapse of New START.


    In pursuing a solution, it is vital that both sides feel their concerns are being respected and that their security interests have been properly taken into account. An outcome that advantages one side only, or that is perceived as doing so, is no solution at all.


    The elimination of nuclear weapons must take place not in some far-off utopian future, but at an early date, as demanded by the vast majority of the world’s governments in resolution after resolution at the United Nations.  It is quite clear that the ordinary citizens of every nation no longer wish to live under the shadow of imminent nuclear destruction and see no reason why massive nuclear arsenals should continue to exist when they clearly represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race.


    Signed:


    Organizations


    Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (France)
    Artistes pour la Paix (Canada)
    Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition (Australia)
    Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Canadian Pugwash Group (Canada)
    Daisy Alliance (USA)
    Footprints for Peace (Australia)
    Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space (USA)
    International Association of Peace Messenger Cities
    International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
    International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War – Kenya (Kenya)
    Just Peace Queensland (Australia)
    Los Alamos Study Group (USA)
    Medact (UK)
    Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia)
    No2nuclearweapons (Canada)
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA)
    Pax Christi Metro New York (USA)
    Pax Christi Montreal (Canada)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament NSW (Australia)
    People for Nuclear Disarmament WA (Australia)
    Physicians for Global Survival (Canada)
    Physicians for Social Responsibility (USA)
    Project Ploughshares (Canada)
    Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire (France)
    Science for Peace (Canada)
    Scientists for Global Responsibility (UK)
    Swedish Peace Council (Sweden)
    Transnational Foundation (Sweden)
    Tri-Valley CAREs (USA)
    US Peace Council (USA)
    Veterans Against Nuclear Arms (Canada)
    West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – U.S. Section (USA)
    Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom – Vancouver (Canada)


    Individuals (Organizational affiliation for identification purposes only)


    Lynn Adamson (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Janis Alton (Co-Chair, Canadian Voice of Women for Peace, Canada)
    Marcus Atkinson (International Coordinator, Footprints for Peace, Australia)
    Rosalie Bertell (Regent, International Physicians for Humanitarian Medicine, Switzerland)
    Amanda Bresnan (Member, Australian Capital Territory Legislative Assembly, Australia)
    Adele Buckley (Executive Committee, Canadian Pugwash Group, Canada)
    Yousaf Butt (Federation of American Scientists, USA)
    Helen Caldicott (Co-Founder, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Australia)
    Lisa Clark (Beati i Costruttori di Pace, Italy)
    Gill Cox (West Midlands Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Phyllis Creighton (Veterans Against Nuclear Arms, Canada)
    Wilfred Dcosta (Indian Social Action Forum, India)
    Roberto Della Seta (Member, Senate of the Republic, Italy)
    Dale Dewar (Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival, Canada)
    Kate Dewes (Disarmament & Security Centre, New Zealand)
    Jayantha Dhanapala (Former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, 1998-2003, Sri Lanka)
    Gabriele Dietrich (National Alliance of People’s Movements, India)
    Dennis Doherty (Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition, Australia)
    Gordon Edwards (President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, Canada)
    George Farebrother (Secretary, World Court Project, UK)
    Gregor Gable (Shundahai Network, USA)
    Bruce K. Gagnon (Coordinator, Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, USA)
    Joseph Gerson (American Friends Service Committee, USA)
    Bob Gould (President, Physicians for Social Responsibility – San Francisco, USA)
    Jonathan Granoff (President, Global Security Institute, USA)
    Ulla Grant (Hall Green Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Commander Robert Green (Royal Navy, ret., New Zealand)
    Jenny Grounds (President, Medical Association for Prevention of War, Australia)
    Mark Gubrud (University of North Carolina, USA)
    Luis Gutierrez-Esparza (Latin American Circle of International Studies, Mexico)
    Regina Hagen (Darmstädter Friedensforum, Germany)
    John Hallam (People for Nuclear Disarmament, Australia)
    David Hartsough (PEACEWORKERS, USA)
    John Hinchcliff (President, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Herbert J. Hoffman (Vice President, Maine Veterans for Peace Chapter 001, USA)
    Inge Höger (Member of Parliament, Germany)
    Kate Hudson (General Secretary, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Cesar Jaramillo (Program Officer, Project Ploughshares, Canada)
    Pierre Jasmin (President, Artistes pour la Paix, Canada)
    Birgitta Jónsdóttir (Member of Icelandic Parliament and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Iceland)
    Martin Kalinowski (Chairman, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research, Germany)
    Sergei Kolesnikov (Member of Russian Parliament and President of the Russian affiliate of IPPNW, Russia)
    David Krieger (President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Harry Kroto (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Steve Leeper (Chairman, Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, Japan)
    Mairead Maguire (Nobel Peace Laureate, Peace People, N. Ireland)
    Ak Malten (Pro Peaceful Energy Use, Netherlands)
    Willem Malten (Director, Los Alamos Study Group, USA)
    Alfred Marder (International Association of Peace Messenger Cities, USA)
    Bronwyn Marks (Hiroshima Day Committee, Australia)
    Jean-Marie Matagne (President, Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire, France)
    Ibrahim Matola (Member of Parliament, Malawi)
    Lisle Merriman (Palestine-Israel Network, USA)
    Natalia Mironova (President, Movement for Nuclear Safety, Russia)
    Sophie Morel (Board member, Réseau Sortir du Nucleaire, France)
    Peter Murphy (Coordinator, SEARCH Foundation, Australia)
    Abdul Nayyar (President, Pakistan Peace Coalition, Pakistan)
    David Norris (Senator, Ireland)
    Rosemarie Pace (Director, Pax Christi Metro New York, USA)
    Sergei Plekhanov (Professor, York University, Canada)
    Pavel Podvig (Russian Nuclear Forces Project, Russia)
    John Polanyi (Nobel Laureate in Chemistry, USA)
    Ernie Regehr (Research Fellow, University of Waterloo, Canada)
    Barney Richards (New Zealand Peace Council, New Zealand)
    Bob Rigg (Former Chair, New Zealand National Consultative Committee on Peace and Disarmament, New Zealand)
    Bruce A. Roth (Daisy Alliance, USA)
    Joan Russow (Global Compliance Research Project, Canada)
    Kathy Wanpovi Sanchez (Tewa Women United, USA)
    Mamadou Falilou Sarr (African Center for Global Peace and Development, Senegal)
    Wolfgang Schlupp-Hauck (Chairman, Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen, Germany)
    Jürgen Schneider (Professor, Universität Göttingen, Germany)
    Sukla Sen (Committee for Communal Amity, India)
    Steven Starr (Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility and Associate, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Kathleen Sullivan (Program Director, Hibakusha Stories, USA)
    P K Sundaram (DiaNuke.org, India)
    Terumi Tanaka (Secretary General, Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations, Japan)
    Desmond Tutu (Nobel Peace Laureate, Archbishop Emeritus of Cape Town, South Africa)
    Hiro Umebayashi (Special Advisor, Peace Depot, Japan)
    Jo Vallentine (Chairperson, Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia, Australia)
    Dirk Van der Maelen (Member of Parliament, Belgium)
    Achin Vanaik (University of Delhi, India)
    Alyn Ware (International Representative, Peace Foundation, New Zealand)
    Elizabeth Waterston (International Councilor, Medact, UK)
    Rick Wayman (Director of Programs, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, USA)
    Dave Webb (Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK)
    Tim Wright (Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Australia)
    Col. Valery Yarynich (Soviet Missile Forces – ret., Russia)
    Uta Zapf (Member of the Bundestag, Germany)


    Endnotes:


    [i] To date, Spain, Romania, the Netherlands, Poland and the Czech Republic have agreed to participate in this deployment. Patriot missiles have been deployed in Poland on the border of the Russian enclave in Kaliningrad and X-band radar is also likely to be deployed in Turkey. Medium- and intermediate-range interceptor missiles are scheduled to be deployed on U.S. warships in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.
    [ii] Tom Collina, “NATO Set to Back Expanded Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today, retrieved from http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_11/NATOMissileDefense.
    [iii] Rusian Pukhov, “Medvedev’s Missile Threats are only his Plan B,” The Moscow Times, December 1, 2011, retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/medvedevs-missile-threats-are-his-plan-b/448992.html.
    [iv] Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol, “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defense” (2011), FAS Special Report No. 1, Federation of American Scientists, September 2011, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf.
    [v] U.S. strategic targets include Russian military forces, war supporting and WMD infrastructure, and both military and national leadership. Hans Kristensen, “Obama and the Nuclear War Plan,” Federation of American Scientists Brief, February 2010, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/WarPlanIssueBrief2010.pdf.
    [vi] The U.S. has successfully tested non-ballistic missiles which have traveled at speeds up to mach-20 (16,700 mph or 27,000 km per hour). See http://www.examiner.com/military-technology-in-washington-dc/the-usaf-x51-a-and-the-u-s-army-ahw-both-test-november-2011.
    [vii] “Hypersonic missile: who is the target?” Voice of Russia, November 28, 2011, retrieved from http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/11/28/61168605.html.
    [viii] JDEC was agreed on and ratified by both the U.S. and Russia, with the purpose of preventing accidental nuclear war between them as a result of a false warning of attack. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/jdec/text/000604-warn-wh3.htm. However, neither side appeared willing to share the “raw” or unfiltered data from their early warning systems because of concerns it would reveal too much to the other side about its warning system capabilities. Thus, the facility was never opened; an empty building in Moscow where the center was supposed to be stands as a testament to the continued failure to cooperate.
    [ix] Text of Medvedev’s November 23, 2011 speech translated from the Russian version, retrieved from http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3115:
       First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning station in Kaliningrad on combat alert.
       Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences.
       Third, the new strategic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advance missile penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads.
       Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems, if need be.
       These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost.
       Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation System will employ modern, offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the missile defence system in Europe.
       One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region.
       Other measures to counter the European missile defence system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.
       Furthermore, if the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favor, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures.
    Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for the withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty.
       But let me stress this point, we are not closing the door on continued dialogue with the USA and NATO on missile defence, and on practical cooperation in this area. We are ready for that.  However, this can only be achieved by establishing a clear, legal basis for cooperation that would guarantee our legitimate interests and concerns are taken into account.  We are open to dialogue and hope for a reasonable and constructive approach from our Western partners.
    [x] Missile defense is explicitly discussed in the preamble and in Article 5 of New START. The preamble recognizes the “relationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms” and stipulates that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” Thus, the ongoing deployment of U.S./NATO missile defense systems is, in the eyes of Russia, at least a violation of the spirit of New START.
    [xi] Ibid.
    [xii] Steven Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict,” The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, December 2009, retrieved from http://www.icnnd.org/Documents/Starr_Nuclear_Winter_Oct_09.pdf.
    [xiii] Steven Starr, “U.S .and Russian Launch-Ready Nuclear Weapons: A Threat to All Peoples and Nations,” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, October 2011, retrieved from /wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011_06_24_starr.pdf.
    [xiv] Specific proposals for such assessments have already been published. See B. Blair, V. Esin, M. McKinzie, V. Yarynich, P. Zolotarev, “One Hundred Nuclear Wars: Stable Deterrence between the United States and Russia at Reduced Nuclear Force Levels Off Alert in the Presence of Limited Missile Defenses,” Science & Global Security, 2011, Vol. 19, Issue 3, pp. 167-194, and H. Kristensen, R. Norris, and I. Oelrich, “From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council, Occasional Paper, April 2009, p. 15, retrieved from http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/OccasionalPaper7.pdf.
    [xv] O. B. Toon and A. Robock, “Local nuclear war, global suffering,” Scientific American, 302, 74-81 (2010), retrieved from http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSciAmJan2010.pdf.

  • A Nuclear-Free Middle East: Necessary, Desirable and Impossible

    This article was originally published by Al Jazeera.


    Richard FalkFinally, there is some discussion in the West that supports the idea of a nuclear-free zone for the Middle East. Such thinking is still treated as politically marginal, and hardly audible above the deafening beat of the war drums. To the extent proposed, it also tends to be defensively and pragmatically phrased to reinforce the prevailing anti-Iran consensus.


    For instance, in a recent New York Times article by Shibley Telhami and Steven Kull a full disclosure title gives the plot away: “Preventing a Nuclear Iran”. The authors offer us a prudential argument against attacking Iran to avoid a damaging Iranian retaliation and in view of the inability of an attack to do more than delay Iran’s nuclear programme by a few years. Beyond this, an attack seems likely to create irresistible pressures in Iran to do everything possible to obtain a nuclear option with a renewed sense of urgency, as well as to disrupt Western interests wherever possible.


    This Telhami/Kull position is reinforced by evidence that Israeli society is not as war-prone as claimed, and would be receptive to a more cautious and less belligerent approach. They refer readers to a recent Israeli poll finding that only 43 per cent of Israelis favour a military strike, while 64 per cent support establishing a nuclear-free zone (NFZ) in the region that included Israel.


    In effect, then, establishing a NFZ that includes Israel would seem politically feasible, although not a course of action that seems within the range of options being considered by the current Israeli political leadership.


    The failure of the United States to raise the possibility of a solution to the conflict other than either an Iranian surrender with respect to its enrichment rights or an impending military attack is also discouraging. The silence of Washington with respect to a peaceful regional solution to the conflict with Iran confirms what is widely believed around the world – that the US Government will not deviate from the official Israeli line on security issues in the Middle East.


    The fact that the Israeli public may be more peace-oriented than its elected leaders seems to make no difference to strategic thinking in the US, and what is more, the realisation that the exercise of the military option would have a likely huge negative impact on national and global interest is also put to one side.


    Prince Turki‘s proposals


    Another variant of NFZ thinking is more oriented to the realities of the Middle East. It has most clearly formulated by the influential Saudi Prince, Turki Al-Faisal, former Saudi ambassador to the United States and once the head of his country’s intelligence service. He argues that NFZ is preferable to the military option for many reasons, and he believes, in contrast to President Obama, that it should be removed from the bag of tricks at the disposal of diplomats.


    Prince Turki believes that sanctions have not, and will not alter Iran’s behaviour. His proposal is more elaborate than simply advocating a NFZ. He would be in favour of coercive steps against Iran if there is ever convincing evidence that it actually possesses nuclear weapons, but he also argues for the imposition of sanction on Israel if it fails to disclose openly the full extent of its nuclear weapons arsenal.  


    Prince Turki’s approach has several additional features: extending the scope of the undertaking to all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), that is, including biological and chemical weapons; a nuclear security umbrella for the region maintained by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; a resolution of outstanding conflicts in the region in accordance with the Mecca Arab proposals of 2002 that calls for Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories and the Golan Heights occupied in 1967, as well as the political and commercial normalisation of relations between Israel and the Arab world.


    Prince Turki warns that if some such arrangement is not soon put in place, and Iran proceeds with its nuclear programme, other countries in the region, including Turkey, will almost certainly be drawn into an expensive and destabilising nuclear arms race.


    In effect, as with Telhami/Kull, Prince Turki’s approach is designed to make sure that worst case scenarios do not happen. It is more contextually framed to encompass several larger challenges in the Middle East, rather than confining its rationale to addressing the Israel/Iran confrontation.  


    The Turki proposals have some problematic aspects, including the idea that governments in the region could be expected to rely on the five permanent members of the Security Council to co-operate effectively if faced with a challenge to the NFZ. From another perspective, the proposal might be questioned as a historically insensitive effort to delegate authority over future security issues in the region to former colonial powers.


    NFZ or WMDFZ without Israel


    There is another perplexing feature of Prince Turki’s vision of a peaceful future for the Middle East. He urges the adoption of such a collective commitment to the elimination of WMD in the region with or without Israeli support at a conference of parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty scheduled for later this year in Finland, which seems to play into the hands of Western hawks.


    Israel is not even a party to the NPT, has so far not indicated its willingness to attend the conference, and if participating, would likely play an obstructive role. What is the point of a NFZ or WMDFZ without Israel? As long ago as the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the Arab countries put forward a proposal to establish in the Middle East a WMD-free zone, but it has never been subsequently invoked.


    Israel, which is not a member of the NPT, has consistently taken the position over the years that only after peace prevails throughout the region, will it consider lending support to a legal regime, prohibiting the possession of nuclear weapons.


    The NFZ or WMDFZ initiatives need to be seen in the setting established by the NPT regime. An initial observation involves Israel’s failure to become a party to the NPT coupled with its covert nuclear programme that resulted in the acquisition of the weaponry more than 20 years ago with the complicity of the West as documented in Seymour Hersh’s 1991 The Samson Option.


    This Israeli pattern of behaviour needs to be contrasted with that of Iran, a party to the NPT that has reported to and accepted, although with some friction in recent years, international inspections on its territory by the Western oriented International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran has consistently denied any ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, but has insisted on its rights under Article IV of the treaty to exercise “… its inalienable right… to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination…”


    Iran has been under constant threat of an attack by Israel. It has also been the target for several years of Israel’s extremely dirty low intensity war, as well as being the subject of a US Congressionally funded destabilisation programme of the US that is reinforced by a diplomacy that constantly reaffirms the relevance of a military option, and operates in a political climate that excludes consideration of Israel’s nuclear arsenal.


    What is surprising under these circumstances is that Iran has not freed itself from NPT obligation as it is entitled to do. All parties to the NPT have a treaty right to withdraw set forth in Article X requiring only that a withdrawing state give notice to other treaty parties and provide an explanation of its reasons for withdrawing.


    Geopolitical priorities


    Comparing these Israeli and Iran patterns of behaviour with respect to nuclear weapons, it would seem far more reasonable to conclude that it is Israel, not Iran, that should be subjected to sanctions, and put under pressure to participate in denuclearising negotiations. After all, Israel acquired the weaponry secretly and defiantly, has not been even willing to accept the near universally applicable discipline of the NPT, and has engaged periodically in aggressive wars against its neighbours that have resulted in several long-term occupations.


    It can be argued that Israel was entitled to enhance its security by remaining outside the NPT, and thus is acting within its sovereign rights. This is a coherent legalistic position, but we should also appreciate that the NPT is more a geopolitical than a legal regime, and that Iran, for instance, would be immediately subject to a punitive response if it tried to withdraw from the treaty. In other words, geopolitical priorities override legal rights in the NPT setting.


    The history of the NPT has reflected its geopolitical nature. This is best illustrated by the utter refusal of the nuclear weapons states, above all the US, to fulfill its core obligation under Article VI “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”


    The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on The Legality of Nuclear Weapons unanimously affirmed in its findings the legal imperative embodied in Article VI: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control.”


    This finding that has been completely ignored by the nuclear weapons states (who had made full use of their diplomatic leverage in a failed effort to convince members of the UN General Assembly not to seek guidance from the ICJ with respect to the legal status of nuclear weapons and the obligations of the NPT). The refusal to uphold these obligations of Article VI would certainly appear to be a material breach of the treaty that under international law authorises any party to regard the treaty as void.


    Again, the international discourse on nuclear weapons is so distorted that it is a rarity to encounter criticism of its discriminatory application, its double standards as between nuclear and non-nuclear states, and its geopolitical style of selective enforcement. In this regard, it should be appreciated that the threat of military attack directed at Iran resembles reliance on the so-called Bush Doctrine of preventive war that had been used to justify aggression against Iraq in 2003, and represents a blatant geopolitical override of international law.


    Need to avoid war


    In summary, it is of utmost importance to avoid a war in the Middle East arising from the unresolved dispute about Iran’s nuclear programme. One way to do this is to seek a NFZ or a WMDFZ for the entire region that must include the participation of Israel. What has given this approach a renewed credibility for the West at this time is that such a measure seems to be the only way to prevent a lose/lose war option from materialising in an atmosphere where mainstream pundits are increasingly predicting an attack on Iran during 2012. 


    A NFZ plan has some prudential appeal to change minds in Tehran and Tel Aviv before it is too late, and could also encourage Washington to take a less destructive and self-destructive course of action. Whether this prudential appeal is sufficiently strong to overcome the iron cage of militarism that constrains policy choices in Israel and the US remains doubtful.


    Thinking outside the militarist box remains a forbidden activity, partly reflecting the domestic lock on the political and moral imagination of these countries by their respective military industrial media think-tank complexes.


    I would conclude this commentary with three pessimistic assessments that casts a dark shadow over the regional future:



    (1) an NFZ or WMDFZ for the Middle East is necessary and desirable, but it almost certainly will not be placed on the political agenda of American-led diplomacy relating to the conflict;


    (2) moves toward nuclear disarmament negotiations that have been legally mandated and would be beneficial for the world, and for the nuclear weapons states and their peoples, will not be made in the current atmosphere that blocks all serious initiatives to abolish nuclear weapons;


    (3) the drift toward a devastating attack on Iran will only be stopped by an urgent mobilisation of anti-war forces in civil society, which seems unlikely given other preoccupations. 


    To overcome such pessimism requires a broader vision of peace and justice that is even broader than the contextual approach taken by Prince Turki. It would centre on demilitarisation of the region through disarmament, as well as a firm regional commitment to avoid entangling alliances with external actors, meaning no military deployments or bases in the region. With drones engaging in lethal missions in the Middle East and an array of American military bases, this seems like a utopian fantasy, and maybe it is.


    But maybe also we have reached a paradoxical stage in the region, and possibly the world, where only the utopian imagination can offer us a realistic vision of a hopeful human future.

  • Statement on the Situation with NATO Countries’ Missile Defense System in Europe

    This speech transcript was originally published on the website of the Kremlin.


    Citizens of Russia,


    I address you today in connection with the situation concerning the NATO countries’ missile defence system in Europe.


    Russia’s relations with the USA and NATO in the missile defence area have a long and complicated history. I remember that when US President Barack Obama revised his predecessor’s plans to build a missile defence system in Europe in September 2009, we welcomed this as a positive step.


    This decision paved the way to our being able to conclude the important New START Treaty which was signed not too long ago and which clearly states the intrinsic link between strategic offensive weapons and missile defence. Let me state that again, this was a major achievement.


    Subsequently, however, the USA began carrying out a new missile defence plan that foresaw the creation of a missile defence system in stages. This specifically raises concerns in Russia. It would eventually see the deployment of US missiles and military capability in close proximity to Russia’s borders and in the neighbouring waters. 


    At the NATO-Russia Council summit in Lisbon a year ago, I proposed developing a joint sector-based missile defence system in Europe where every country would be responsible for a particular sector.


    Furthermore, we were ready to discuss additional modifications to the system, taking into account our NATO partners’ views. Our only goal was to preserve the basic principle that Europe does not need new dividing lines, but rather, a common security perimeter with Russia’s equal and legally enshrined participation. 


    It is my conviction that this approach would create unique opportunities for Russia and NATO to build a genuine strategic partnership. We are to replace the friction and confrontation in our relations with the principles of equality, indivisible security, mutual trust, and predictability.


    Regrettably, the USA and other NATO partners have not showed enough willingness to move in this direction. Rather than showing themselves willing to hear and understand our concerns over the European missile defence system at this stage, they simply repeat that these plans are not directed against Russia and that there is no point for us to be concerned. That is the position of the executive authorities, but legislators in some countries openly state, the whole system is against Russia.


    But our requests that they set this out on paper in the form of clear legal obligations are firmly rejected. We do hold a reasonable position. We are willing to discuss the status and content of these obligations, but our colleagues should understand that these obligations must have substance and not be just empty words. They must be worded not as promises and reassurances, but as specific military-technical criteria that will enable Russia to judge to what extent US and NATO action in the missile defence area correspond to their declarations and steps, whether our interests are being impinged on, and to what extent the strategic nuclear balance is still intact. This is the foundation of the present-day security.


    We will not agree to take part in a programme that in a short while, in some 6 to 8 years’ time could weaken our nuclear deterrent capability. The European missile defence programme is already underway and work on it is, regrettably, moving rapidly in Poland, Turkey, Romania, and Spain. We find ourselves facing a fait accompli.


    Of course we will continue the dialogue with the USA and NATO on this issue. I agreed on this with US President Barack Obama when we met recently, and on that occasion again stated our concerns very clearly. There is still time to reach an understanding. Russia has the political will to reach the agreements needed in this area, agreements that would open a new chapter in our relations with the USA and NATO.


    If our partners show an honest and responsible attitude towards taking into account Russia’s legitimate security interests, I am sure we can come to an agreement. But if we are asked to ‘cooperate’ or in fact act against our own interests it will be difficult to establish common ground. In such a case we would be forced to take a different response. We will decide our actions in accordance with the actual developments in events at each stage of the missile defence programme’s implementation.


    In this connection, I have made the following decisions:


    First, I am instructing the Defence Ministry to immediately put the missile attack early warning radar station in Kaliningrad on combat alert.


    Second, protective cover of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons will be reinforced as a priority measure under the programme to develop our air and space defences.  


    Third, the new strategic ballistic missiles commissioned by the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy will be equipped with advanced missile defence penetration systems and new highly-effective warheads.


    Fourth, I have instructed the Armed Forces to draw up measures for disabling missile defence system data and guidance systems if need be. These measures will be adequate, effective, and low-cost.


    Fifth, if the above measures prove insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy modern offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country, ensuring our ability to take out any part of the US missile defence system in Europe. One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad Region.


    Other measures to counter the European missile defence system will be drawn up and implemented as necessary.


    Furthermore,


    If the situation continues to develop not to Russia’s favour, we reserve the right to discontinue further disarmament and arms control measures.


    Besides, given the intrinsic link between strategic offensive and defensive arms, conditions for our withdrawal from the New START Treaty could also arise, and this option is enshrined in the treaty. 


    But let me stress the point that we are not closing the door on continued dialogue with the USA and NATO on missile defence and on practical cooperation in this area. We are ready for that.


    However, this can be achieved only through establishing a clear legal base for cooperation that would guarantee that our legitimate interests and concerns are taken into account. We are open to a dialogue and we hope for a reasonable and constructive approach from our Western partners.

  • Breaking Free from Nuclear Deterrence

    2011_12_16_10th_kelly_lecture.pdf

  • Consequences of a Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence

    Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war, and the consequences of such a failure would be profound.  Peer-reviewed studies predict that less than 1% of the nuclear weapons now deployed in the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon States, if detonated in urban areas, would immediately kill tens of millions of people, and cause long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people.  A full-scale war, fought with the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, would so utterly devastate Earth’s environment that most humans and other complex forms of life would not survive.


    Yet no Nuclear Weapon State has ever evaluated the environmental, ecological or agricultural consequences of the detonation of its nuclear arsenals in conflict. Military and political leaders in these nations thus remain dangerously unaware of the existential danger which their weapons present to the entire human race. Consequently, nuclear weapons remain as the cornerstone of the military arsenals in the Nuclear Weapon States, where nuclear deterrence guides political and military strategy.   


    Those who actively support nuclear deterrence are trained to believe that deterrence cannot fail, so long as their doctrines are observed, and their weapons systems are maintained and continuously modernized. They insist that their nuclear forces will remain forever under their complete control, immune from cyberwarfare, sabotage, terrorism, human or technical error. They deny that the short 12-to-30 minute flight times of nuclear missiles would not leave a President enough time to make rational decisions following a tactical, electronic warning of nuclear attack.


    The U.S. and Russia continue to keep a total of 2000 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status – ready to launch with only a few minutes warning.   Yet both nations are remarkably unable to acknowledge that this high-alert status in any way increases the probability that these weapons will someday be used in conflict.  How can strategic nuclear arsenals truly be “safe” from accidental or unauthorized use, when they can be launched literally at a moment’s notice?  A cocked and loaded weapon is infinitely easier to fire than one which is unloaded and stored in a locked safe.


    The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a nuclear war.  Our best scientists now tell us that such a war would mean the end of human history.  We need to ask our leaders:  Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race?


    However, in order to pose this question, we must first make the fact known that existing nuclear arsenals – through their capacity to utterly devastate the Earth’s environment and ecosystems – threaten continued human existence.  Otherwise, military and political leaders will continue to cling to their nuclear arsenals and will remain both unwilling and unable to discuss the real consequences of failure of deterrence.  We can and must end the silence, and awaken the peoples of all nations to the realization that “nuclear war” means “global nuclear suicide”.


    A Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence could lead to:



    • A nuclear war between India and Pakistan;
    • 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) weapons detonated in the mega-cities of both India and Pakistan (there are now 130-190 operational nuclear weapons which exist in the combined arsenals of these nations);
    • The deaths of 20 to 50 million people as a result of the prompt effects of these nuclear detonations (blast, fire and radioactive fallout);
    • Massive firestorms covering many hundreds of square miles/kilometers (created by nuclear detonations that produce temperatures hotter than those believed to exist at the center of the sun), that would engulf these cities and produce 6 to 7 million tons of thick, black smoke;
    • About 5 million tons of smoke that would quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where strong winds would carry it around the Earth in 10 days;
    • A stratospheric smoke layer surrounding the Earth, which would remain in place for 10 years;
    • The dense smoke would heat the upper atmosphere, destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer, and block 7-10% of warming sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface;
    • 25% to 40% of the protective ozone layer would be destroyed at the mid-latitudes, and 50-70% would be destroyed at northern and southern high latitudes;
    • Ozone destruction would cause the average UV Index to increase to 16-22 in the U.S, Europe, Eurasia and China, with even higher readings towards the poles (readings of 11 or higher are classified as “extreme” by the U.S. EPA). It would take 7-8 minutes for a fair skinned person to receive a painful sunburn at mid-day;
    • Loss of warming sunlight would quickly produce average surface temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere colder than any experienced in the last 1000 years;
    • Hemispheric drops in temperature would be about twice as large and last ten times longer then those which followed the largest volcanic eruption in the last 500 years,  Mt. Tambora in 1816. The following year, 1817, was called “The Year Without Summer”, which saw famine in Europe from massive crop failures;
    • Growing seasons in the Northern Hemisphere would be significantly shortened.  It would be too cold to grow wheat in most of Canada for at least several years;
    • World grain stocks, which already are at historically low levels, would be completely depleted; grain exporting nations would likely cease exports in order to meet their own food needs;
    • The one billion already hungry people, who currently depend upon grain imports, would likely starve to death in the years following this nuclear war;
    • The total explosive power in these 100 Hiroshima-size weapons is less than 1% of the total explosive power contained in the currently operational and deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.


    A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B. Toon, C. Bardeen, and R. Turco, “Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, 2007, p. 2003-2012.
    B. M. Mills, O. Toon, R. Turco, D. Kinnison, R. Garcia, “Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA), Apr 8,2008, vol. 105(14), pp. 5307-12.
    C. I. Helfand, ”An Assessment of the Extent of Projected Global Famine Resulting From Limited, Regional Nuclear War”, 2007, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Leeds, MA.
    D. Starr, S. (2009) “Deadly Climate Change From Nuclear War: A threat to human existence.”


    A Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence could lead to:



    • The launching of 1000 U.S. and 1000 Russian strategic nuclear weapons which remain on launch-ready, high-alert status, capable of being launched with only a few minutes warning;
    • These 2000 weapons – each 7 to 85 times more powerful than the Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) weapons of India and Pakistan – would detonate in the United States and Russia, and probably throughout the member states of NATO;
    • The detonation of some fraction of the remaining 7700 deployed and operational U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads/weapons would then follow;
    • Hundreds of large cities in the U.S., Europe and Russia would be engulfed in massive firestorms . . . the explosion of each weapon would instantly ignite tens or hundreds of square miles or kilometers of the land and cities beneath it;
    • Many thousands of square miles of urban areas simultaneously burning would produce up to 150 million tons of thick, black smoke;
    • The smoke would rise above cloud level and form an extremely dense stratospheric layer of smoke and soot, which would quickly engulf the Earth;
    • The smoke layer would remain for at least 10 years, and block and absorb sunlight, heating the upper atmosphere and producing Ice Age weather on Earth;
    • The smoke would block up to 70% of the sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface in the Northern Hemisphere, and up to 35% of the sunlight in the Southern Hemisphere, producing a profound “nuclear darkness”;
    • In the absence of warming sunlight, surface temperatures on Earth become as cold or colder than they were 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age;
    • There would be rapid cooling of more than 20°C over large areas of North America and of more than 30°C over much of Eurasia;
    • Average global precipitation would be reduced by 45% due to the prolonged cold;
    • 150 million tons of smoke in the stratosphere would cause minimum daily temperatures in the largest agricultural regions of the Northern Hemisphere to drop below freezing every night for 1 to 3 years;
    • Nightly killing freezes and frosts would occur, no crops could be grown;
    • Growing seasons would be virtually eliminated for at least a decade;
    • Massive destruction of the protective ozone layer would also occur, allowing intense levels of dangerous UV-B light to penetrate the atmosphere and reach the surface of the Earth; as the smoke cleared, the UV-B would grow more intense;
    • Massive amounts of radioactive fallout would be generated and spread both locally and globally. The targeting of nuclear reactors would significantly increase global radioactive fallout of long-lived isotopes such as Cesium-137;
    • Gigantic ground-hugging clouds of toxic smoke would be released from the fires; enormous quantities of industrial chemicals would also enter the environment;
    • It would be impossible for many living things to survive the extreme rapidity and degree of changes in temperature and precipitation, combined with drastic increases in UV light, massive radioactive fallout, and massive releases of toxins and industrial chemicals;
    • Already stressed land and marine ecosystems would collapse;
    • Unable to grow food, most humans would starve to death;
    • A mass extinction event would occur, similar to what happened 65 million years ago, when the dinosaurs were wiped out following a large asteroid impact with Earth (70% of species became extinct, including all animals greater than 25 kilograms in weight);
    • Political and military leaders living in underground shelters equipped with many years worth of food, water, energy, and medical supplies would probably not survive in the hostile post-war environment.

    1. O. Toon , A. Robock, and R. Turco, “The Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War”, Physics  Today, vol. 61, No. 12, 2008, p. 37-42.
    2. A. Robock, L. Oman, G. Stenchikov, “Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences”, Journal of Geophysical Research – Atmospheres, Vol. 112, No. D13, 2007. p. 4 of 14.
    3. S. Starr, “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict”. (2009). ICNND


    See www.nuclearfamine.org or www.nucleardarkness.org for detailed sources of information on the environmental consequences of nuclear war.

  • British Petroleum, Imagination and Nuclear Catastrophe

    Vaya aquí para la versión española.

    Before the catastrophic British Petroleum oil gush in the Gulf of Mexico, there were environmentalists who warned that offshore drilling was fraught with risk – risk of exactly the type of environmental damage that is occurring.  They were mocked by people who chanted slogans such as “Drill, baby, drill.”  Now it is clear that the “Drill, baby, drill” crowd was foolish and greedy.  The economic wellbeing of people in and around the Gulf coast has been badly damaged and, for some, destroyed altogether.  Aquatic and estuary life, in the Gulf and beyond, has fallen victim to an environmental disaster that was foreseeable with a modicum of vision and imagination.

    Albert Einstein reached the conclusion that “Imagination is more important than knowledge.” He said that “knowledge is limited to all we now know and understand, while imagination embraces the entire world, and all there ever will be to know and understand.”  Let us try applying our imaginations to nuclear weapons and nuclear war.  Here are some scenarios:

    Scenario 1: Al Qaeda does what most commentators believed to be impossible.  They obtain nuclear materials for several nuclear weapons and hire scientists to construct crude nuclear weapons.  These weapons are detonated in London, New York and Paris within hours of each other.  Millions would lie dead and injured.  Around the world stock markets would freefall.  Before the terrorist nuclear attacks, the people who warned against such a possibility were mocked.

    Scenario 2: Nuclear deterrence fails dramatically, and India and Pakistan engage in a nuclear war over Kashmir.  The hundred or so nuclear warheads that detonate on Indian and Pakistani cities leave millions dead and lower global temperatures so as to significantly shrink the size of agricultural areas in which food can be grown.  Crop failures leave hundreds of millions more people to starve to death.  Before the war, the people who warned against such a possibility were mocked.  

    Scenario 3: A nuclear war begins with an accidental launch of a nuclear-armed missile by Russia, followed by a retaliatory strike by the US, which brings further retaliation from Russia, leading to still more from the US.  Before the accidental launch, few people believed that such a cataclysmic accident and its retaliatory follow up were possible.  In its aftermath, the scenario seems far too feasible.  People now realize that the failsafe devices to prevent accidental launches could fail, but those who foresaw this danger and warned about it earlier were mocked.

    Scenario 4: North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il launches a nuclear attack that destroys US military bases on the Japanese island of Okinawa.  He threatens to destroy the Japanese city of Kyoto and Seoul, South Korea unless he receives the development assistance he says was promised to him by the United States.  Those who argued throughout the Nuclear Age that continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would result in nuclear proliferation and the weapons falling into the hands of irrational leaders were mocked.  

    There are many scenarios possible for the onset of nuclear war and there remain many justifications for nuclear weapons.  Leaders of nuclear weapon states argue that these weapons are only for nuclear deterrence, that is, to prevent war by threatening nuclear retaliation.  They don’t foresee the potential failure of nuclear deterrence, even though they recognize the cataclysmic consequences of failure.  They believe that nuclear weapons bolster a country’s prestige and give it greater power in the international system.  They proudly display their nuclear weapons and test their missile delivery systems.  Those who argue that nuclear deterrence could fail catastrophically are mocked.

    Political and military leaders have failed to honor the proposition that in every complex system in which humans are involved, system failure is a possibility.  They have dismissed the idea of system failure leading to nuclear annihilation.  Scientists spoke out about this shortsightedness, but they were mocked.  Former high-level policymakers spoke out about the dangers, and they, too, were mocked.  Even some former military leaders spoke out against the dangers of reliance on nuclear weapons, and they were mocked.  The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, who witnessed the horrors of the atomic bombs firsthand, have told their stories in an attempt to awaken people to the danger of nuclear weapons, but their voices are soft and few people in high places have listened to them.  

    Civil society organizations from throughout the world have called out for a commitment to an urgent plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and they also have been mocked.  But, like the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they continue to speak out because it is the right thing to do.  Nuclear weapons can end life on Earth as we know it.  They can destroy civilization.  In a major nuclear war, they could bring the human species and most complex forms of life to extinction.  Even in a smaller nuclear war or accident, they could destroy cities and countries.  

    As the oil from the British Petroleum failure in the Gulf of Mexico continues to destroy the ocean and surrounding environment, it is perhaps too late to ask ourselves whether offshore drilling is worth the risk.  Clearly it is not.  It is still not too late, however, to raise the question of whether continued reliance on nuclear weapons is worth the risk to humanity and to future generations.  

  • Deadly Climate Change from Nuclear War: A Threat to Human Existence

    2010_02_18_starr_climate_change.pdf

  • What Should the President Say in Oslo?

    What Should the President Say in Oslo?

    President Obama will soon be traveling to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize, one of the highest honors that can be bestowed upon an individual or organization. In Alfred Nobel’s will, he stated that the Peace Prize should be awarded to the person who “during the preceding year…shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction or standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses.”

    The president will be receiving the award while America remains engaged in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and continues to make drone incursions in a third country, Pakistan. While he seeks to disengage from the war in Iraq, he has recently announced his decision to expand the war in Afghanistan by sending an additional 30,000 American troops.

    Against this background, what might the president say in Oslo? He will, of course, have his own ideas, but here are some thoughts.

    First, acknowledge that militarism globally is making the world less secure for a majority of the inhabitants of the planet. The nearly $1.5 trillion spent for military purposes is taking food from the hungry, shelter from the homeless, healthcare from the impoverished, and education from hundreds of millions of the world’s children. He should pledge to reduce the military budget of the United States by half by the year 2015, and call upon other countries to do the same.

    Second, recognize the role of inequality in generating conflicts throughout the globe and pledge to use the savings from military budgets in the US to help meet the eight United Nations Millennium Development Goals by the year 2015, starting with dramatically reducing poverty and hunger and promoting education and health care.

    Third, call for major reductions in arms transfers that fuel wars throughout the world and pledge that the US will reduce its arms transfers by half by the year 2015.

    Fourth, reiterate his and America’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons, announcing new and urgent steps to reduce the reliance of the US on nuclear arms, including de-alerting the weapons currently on high-alert status, pledging No First Use of nuclear weapons, and convening the nine nuclear weapons states to begin negotiations on a treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

    Fifth, recognize, as did Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, that the Nuclear Age demands not only the abolition of nuclear weapons, but the abolition of war. For too long, the US and other countries have sought to prevent war by preparing for it. Now, the time has come to prevent war by preparing for peace. Cultures of peace must be built upon foundations of justice and human dignity. This means that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the international law that supports these rights, must be respected and adhered to. It also means that human institutions must uphold these rights, and there must be accountability for leaders who violate international law.

    Finally, introduce the concept of trusteeship of the earth and its resources as a vital element of building cultures of peace. All of us share in the responsibility to pass the earth on intact to the generations that will follow us on the planet. We are trustees for future generations. We cannot allow global warming to change the climate, the ozone layer to be further damaged, our soil to be depleted, or our atmosphere, rivers and oceans to be polluted beyond recovery.

    President Obama might conclude his Nobel Lecture by noting that peace is a sacred right for children everywhere and that all countries, starting with his own, should end the barbaric practice of sacrificing their children at the altar of war. He might observe that if politicians cannot refrain from choosing war, they should themselves go off to fight and leave the young men and women at home to pursue their lives in peace. It would follow that if politicians were to fight their own wars, the institution of war would soon end, and peace would cease to be the intervals between wars. It would be celebrated in all seasons across the globe.

    Of course, these ideas and commitments are unlikely to be in the president’s Nobel Lecture and have been made more so by his recent announcement of his intention to increase the number of US troops in Afghanistan. It is pleasant to dream, though, that this young president might make such a speech and carry out a commitment truly deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a Councilor on the World Future Council.