Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear threat

  • Time is running out, and what is at stake is our common future

    Time is running out, and what is at stake is our common future

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty has never been in greater danger, and along with it the people of the world. The cavalier attitudes of the nuclear weapons states toward fulfilling their Article VI promises of nuclear disarmament, have stretched their credibility to the breaking point. A sober evaluation of the progress on the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament, agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, shows virtually no progress and some serious steps backward on the part of the nuclear weapons states, led by the United States.

    In support of the NPT and its Article VI obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament, many leading world figures have joined together in an Appeal to End Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity and All Life, a project initiated by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The Appeal has now been signed by many prominent leaders of our time, including Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the XIVth Dalai Lama, Queen Noor of Jordan, Coretta Scott King and Muhammad Ali. Among its signers are 38 Nobel Laureates, including 14 Nobel Peace Laureates.

    More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia each continue to deploy some 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons, and together keep some 4,500 of these on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments. The United States is withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build missile defenses and extend its military domination of the earth through the weaponization of outer space. Thirteen nuclear capable countries, including the United States and China, have yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    The recent US Nuclear Posture Review reveals that the US is planning to develop nuclear weapons that will be more useable and is developing contingency plans for such use against at least seven countries, including five non-nuclear weapons states. The US has also announced disarmament plans that will place large numbers of deactivated nuclear weapons in storage, thus making the “disarmament” process rapidly reversible.

    In addition to the unprincipled behavior of the nuclear weapons states, making nuclear proliferation as well as accidental and intentional nuclear war more likely, the risks of nuclear terrorism are increasing. These are not issues solely for some countries or regions. They are issues on humanity’s agenda, and that agenda is best taken up within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and by the international community as a whole.

    As the Appeal starkly states, “The only way to assure that nuclear weapons will not be used again is to abolish them.” We urge the delegates to the 2002 NPT PrepCom, and the leaders of the countries they represent, to join together in acting for all life, present and future, in setting forth a practical plan to bring nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control and to begin negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in order to fulfill the Non-Proliferation Treaty promise of eliminating these weapons completely. Grave risks are inherent in failing. We appeal to you, on behalf of humanity and all life, to accept this responsibility and to do the utmost to eliminate these ultimate weapons of annihilation.

    David Krieger, President
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

  • CNDP Denounces USA’s Nuclear Terror

    The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace, India voices its outrage at the unprecedented nuclear threat to the whole world held out the militarists at the helm of the United States of America. The CNDP also expresses its indignation at the servile silence of New Delhi over the subject.

    The “contingency plans” revealed in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)by the Pentagon under the Bush Administration cannot be clearer in their intent. The multi billion populaces of seven countries — with Russia, China, Syria and Libya now added to the “axis of evil” comprising Iraq, Iran and Korea — have been made the potential targets of nuclear lunacy on the part of the world’s strongest ever superpower. If countries close to these targets are taken into account, the NPR (leaked to the media) is an attempt to intimidate a large swathe of humanity.

    The NPR threatens nuclear strikes against targets too tough for non-nuclear weapons, in “retaliation” against attacks by biological and chemical weapons of which the USA has the largest stockpiles, and even in case of “surprising military developments” of an undefined kind. The added threats of nuclear assaults in an Arab-Israel conflict and a Taiwan-China clash make for a truly alarming prospect. The list of targets leaves no doubt that the Bush regime is not going to be bound by treaties the US has signed including the NPT and the CTBT.

    While the madness has been denounced even by many in the West, the Government of India has yet to find its tongue. New Delhi, which has acquiesced in Washington’s space weaponization schemes and its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, is failing thispeace-loving nation even more by its tacit support for the USA’s line of nuclear terror.
    –Achin Vanaik, Praful Bidwai, Admiral L.Ramdas (Retd.), J. Sri Raman, Prabir Purkayastha, Jayaprakash, and Christopher Fonseca

  • Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy

    Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy

    As bad as September 11th may have been, it could have been far worse. Had terrorists attacked with nuclear weapons, the death toll could have risen into the millions. It is likely that even one crude nuclear weapon would have left Manhattan utterly destroyed, and with it the financial and communications centers of the country. Were terrorists to obtain one or more nuclear weapons and use them on New York, Washington or other cities, the United States could cease to exist as a functioning country. The stakes are very high, and yet the US is creating new nuclear policies that increase the likelihood that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons.

    A bipartisan commission, headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, concluded that the United States should be spending some $3 billion per year over the next ten years to help Russia control its nuclear weapons and weapon-grade nuclear materials. Rather than spend less than one percent of the current defense budget on dramatically curtailing the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorists or unfriendly regimes, the Bush administration is trying to save money in this area. It is spending only one-third of the proposed amount to help Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons and materials and find alternative work for nuclear physicists a woefully inadequate amount if we are truly attempting to quell nuclear proliferation.

    The administration’s frugality with regard to protecting potential “loose nukes” in Russia should be compared with its generosity for defense spending in general and for missile defenses in particular. The president has recently asked for another $48 billion for defense for fiscal 2003, following an increase of $33.5 billion this year. This year’s budget for ballistic missile defense is $8.3 billion. Since the likelihood of a terrorist using a missile to launch a nuclear attack against the United States or any other country is virtually zero, it would appear that the administration’s budget priorities are way out of line in terms of providing real security and protecting the US and other countries from the threat of nuclear terrorism.

    The administration’s approach to nuclear disarmament with the Russians is to place warheads taken off active deployment onto the shelf so that they can later be reactivated should our current president or a future president decide to do so. While the Russians have made it clear that they would prefer to destroy the weapons and make nuclear disarmament irreversible, they will certainly follow the US lead in also shelving their deactivated warheads. This will, of course, create even greater security concerns in Russia and make it more likely that these weapons will find their way into terrorist hands.

    So what is to be done? The United States must change its nuclear policies and make good on its promise to the other 186 parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. This goal can only be achieved with US leadership, and it is a goal that is absolutely in the interests of the people of the United States. When the parties to the NPT meet again this April, the US is sure to come under heavy criticism for its notice of withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its new strategy to make nuclear disarmament reversible, and its recent announcement that it is rescinding its security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states.

    In the end, the country that faces the greatest threat from nuclear terrorism is the United States, and it is a threat that cannot be counteracted by missile defenses or threats of retaliation. Terrorists, who cannot be easily located and who may be suicidal anyway, will simply not be deterred by nuclear threat.

    If the Bush administration truly wants to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism against US cities and abroad, it must reverse its current policy of systematically dismantling the arms control agreements established over the past four decades. It must instead become a leader in the global effort to urgently and dramatically reduce the level of nuclear weapons throughout the world and bring the remaining small arsenals of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials under effective international controls.
    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Nuclear Safety and Theft: Skeletons in Pakistan’s Cupboard

    Forebodings about the lack of safety and theft of weapons of mass destruction in the world’s newest nuclear state, Pakistan, have been incrementally rising since the September 11th terrorist attacks on America, generating nightmarish scenarios of mushroom clouds enveloping volatile and heavily populated South Asia and of satanic non-state actors gaining access to implements of annihilation for killing and crippling thousands of humans with devastating efficiency. The actions, assurances and explanations General Pervez Musharraf’s government has tendered to assuage the world’s anxieties in this regard have fallen short of certifiable guarantees. Not a day passes without new reports and analyses warning that the worst imagined apocalyptic fears of nuclear terrorism could materialize and that Albert Einstein’s “fourth world war fought with sticks and stones” may not be a far-fetched oracle after all.

    Safety of Pakistan’s nuclear explosives, fissile material and installations haunts many analysts and practitioners due to the widespread domestic unpopularity and unrest created by the military regime’s decision to support the war against terrorism in Afghanistan. The most common alarm among many US officials pertains to the possibility that the secrecy of location and storage of Pakistan’s so-called “strategic assets” could be compromised if there was an internal coup by Taliban sympathizers, ‘rogue elements’ of the military and the intelligence services, in a country whose history is replete with army overthrows of existing set-ups. This is a valid concern because of the emotional attachment religious fundamentalists of Pakistan entertain towards possession and deployment of the only ‘Islamic Bomb’ on earth. In response, Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi asserted on September 23rd that Pakistan had placed “multi-layered custodial controls with very clear command structure” on its nuclear program and that panic whistles were being “overblown”. A good month and a half later, however, came revelations in the Washington Post that Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal, missiles and aircraft to at least six secret new locations to prevent them from falling into irresponsible hands.

    In early October, Pakistan’s chief spy General Mahmoud Ahmed was sacked owing to alleged links with Mohammed Atta, mastermind of the September 11th attacks, and the very same pro-Taliban elements that were aiming to capture the nuclear arsenal. Once again, the act was officially described as a “routine reshuffle” that had nothing to do with the impending campaign in Afghanistan or with nuclear safety. Since there is complete porosity and camaraderie of service between the army and ISI in Pakistan unlike other countries where intelligence and military are often at loggerheads, and since the ISI chief knows the ins and outs of nuclear installations, one is left to wonder how much of the nuclear factor weighed in axing Ahmed and how many more Ahmeds are presently occupying ISI desks with knowledge of nuclear secrets.

    Theft or clandestine transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons to terrorist outfits came one step nearer to reality when Osama bin Laden recently admitted to journalist Hamid Mir that Al Qaeda had acquired the capability as a ‘deterrent’ and when the IAEA conceded subsequently in the New York Times that with more than 400 cases of recorded fissile material smuggling in the last decade, renegade groups could assemble a ‘dirty bomb.’ Islamabad reflexively denied any leakage of nuclear raw material from its reservoir and the world began turning pages of the familiar script of ‘loose nukes’ in the former Soviet Union making their way into the sinister embrace of jihad. But mysteriously enough on October 23rd, Pakistani authorities arrested three top nuclear scientists with open Al Qaeda sympathies for ‘enquiry’ and kept releasing and re-arresting them until November 22nd when they were totally exonerated from all charges.

    There was a catch in this hush-hush enquiry too. Islamabad admitted that two of them had visited Afghanistan regularly and “met Bin Laden at least twice during visits to Kandahar in connection with the construction of a flour mill.” What professional scientists of atomic fission and ace terrorist of the world were doing in a flour mill is anyone’s guess, but the Musharraf government is now issuing predictable ‘clarifications’ that the physicists’ visits did not lead to any transfer of dual-use technology or material. Why did it take so agonizingly long and so many sessions of interrogation for this clean chit? It is a matter worth pondering over and asking Pervez Musharraf.

    Pakistan’s unconvincing record and demeanor on the twin aspects of nuclear safety and theft, coupled with the never-to-be discounted probability of the downfall of Musharraf, have prompted the Bush administration to maintain an “active review” of its nuclear program. The country’s leading daily, Dawn, quoted on October 6th an official in Washington saying, “We’re studying it. We’ve not made any particular proposal. We haven’t seen any need to make any proposal at this time.” In light of latest developments like Mullah Omar’s threat of unleashing a “big plan to destroy America”, Bin Laden’s chilling interview and the uncovering of covert lives of top Pakistani nuclear scientists, it may not be too early for the ‘proposal’ to be made by Washington.

    Ideally, it should be a swift pre-emptive seizure of Pakistan’s tenuously guarded “strategic assets” and minimally, it should comprise a thoroughly international and impartial investigation of all the hanky-panky happenings listed above as well as verification of the reliability of that country’s C-3 (command, control and communication) triad. The future of humanity hangs by slender threads of cast-iron nuclear safety and policing. When nations owning arsenals eschew responsibility for maintenance, accidents and fall-outs, it becomes the moral and legal right of the international community to un-proliferate them.
    *Sriram Chaulia studied History at St. Stephen’s College, Delhi, and took a Second BA in Modern History at University College, Oxford. He researched the BJP’s foreign policy at the London School of Economics and is currently analyzing the impact of conflict on Afghan refugees at the Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse, NY.

  • The History of Defense Systems and Remarks on the National Missile Defense

    “Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power. We have guided missiles and misguided men.”

    Martin Luther King, Jr.

    1. Introduction

    This is a timeless article, for there has never been a time in history when some tribe or nation has not been contemplating actions and policies that lead to war or peace. During the history struggle arose frequently between families, clans, small and large population groups, first about chasing ground for animals, then possession of arable land, and finally about mineral resources. Local fights spread with time to larger areas. Was it first fists and teeth the main weapons, soon humans learned to prepare special tools for fighting each other. In parallel they developed means of body protection by armor, and to surround their living quarters with fortifications. Each advance in offensive weapons was countered by defensive structures, mostly in this time sequence. First all developments stretched over longer periods, but intervals are getting smaller and smaller with progress in technologies and science. It is the aim of this talk to describe briefly the major defense systems, culminating in the proposed Star War idea, developed by President Reagan, who claimed that it would make all other weapons obsolete. This claim had already been made for other weapons at earlier times in history. Will the National Missile Defense idea do what is advertised, or will it lead only to new arms race? Are we willing to learn from historical precedents?

    There is another underlying pattern to defense policy. Soldiers and statesmen are forever laying the pavements of good intentions that lead to the hell of military conflict. The process is endless and will not be interrupted before there is societal understanding of the patterns that lead to destruction and a modification of the behavior on the basis of that understanding. One such pattern is the predilection of tribes and nations to choose their statesmen from the ranks of a military hero [1]. The transition from soldier to statesman may occur at any phase of the career. We all know of the political path taken by General Eisenhower, Captain Truman, Lieutenant Kennedy, Corporal Hitler, and Shepherd David as they make the transition from military hero to national leader. We see the same pattern with General Powell, becoming Secretary of State, and perhaps in four years time President of the strongest nation in the world. It looks that the training, temperament and skills of the soldier are diametrically opposed to the training, temperament and skills of the statesman.

    2. Lifetime and efficiency of defense systems

    Built-up of defense systems is as old as any offense activity. There is no defense system that could withstand forever attack, and no defense system is even at the start perfect. To quote Hellmuth von Moltke: Offence is the straight way to the goal, whereas the defense is the long way around. A few of such systems will be briefly discussed:

    2.1 The Great Wall

    The Chinese Great Wall can be considered as the longest living defense system. It stretched over a length of 6’300 km from the Yalu River (Gulf of Chihli) to Jiayuguan (Central Asia). It has been built and rebuilt during almost 2’000 years, beginning with the interconnection of walls which surrounded small kingdoms. The major construction periods start with the 4th century BC, were accelerated by the first Chinese Emperor Qin 220-206 BC, using almost a million compulsory labor including some 300’000 soldiers. Maintenance work in the 7th century caused a death toll of half a million workers within ten days. A major upgrade was made during 1368-1644 in the Ming Dynasty (5’660 km). The fortification consisted of a 9-meter high wall and about twenty-five thousand alarms towers 13-meters high. Signals could be transmitted over a distance of 2’000 km in 24 hours. During the Qin reign 180 million cubic meters rammed earth provided for the core of the wall (10 meter thick, 5 meter high). The aim of the Wall was to protect against Huns. However, this fortification never performed properly as defense line. In 1208 Dschingis-Khan broke through the Wall and China was liberated again only in 1368. In 1644 the Wall was opened by the treason of a general near Shanghaiguan, where it had the formidable height of 16 meter and a width of 8 meters. The Wall degraded and its remains are since not more than a tourist attraction.

    2.2 The Roman Limes

    In comparison the Roman Limes was a much less ambitious defense building. The best known part was in the western part of Germany spanning between the Rhine and Danube Rivers. Building had been started in 9 AD, and it was reinforced between 117-161 AD. It had a length of 480 km, and consisted of a 3-meter high palisades and watch towers. It fulfilled its intended function only until 260 AD, when Alemanni broke through. Romans built similar Limes in Great Britain, Anatolia, and Syria in 2nd century AD, again with relatively short lifetimes.

    2.3 Castles and city walls

    Castles and city walls were the preferred fortifications for small city-states. Their efficient lifetime was at the best a couple of hundred years, before they were destroyed with the help of gunpowder, canons, and fireballs. Metallic armor of mercenaries turned out to reduce mobility, could not protect the horses of the horsemen, and got soon out of fashion.

    2.4 Defense lines in the 20th century

    The lifetime of fortifications built in the first half of the 20th century decreased rapidly.

    2.4.1 The French Maginot Line connected some modern fortresses, which hold out during World War I. Built in the 1930s, it presented a tremendous advance over previous fortifications and had all imaginable comfort for the defenders to offer. It was built along the French-German border, but not extended to the French-Belgium border, assuming Germans would respect in any conflict the neutrality of Belgium and The Netherlands. Germany did not behave as expected in World War II and its troops marched in 1940 through the northern flank into France, attacking the fortifications from the rear side.

    2.4.2 The counter part of the Maginot Line was the German West-Wall, a much less elaborated defense structure. It was not needed at the very beginning of World War II, but demonstrated some efficiency towards its end in 1945.

    2.4.3 Following the occupation of France in 1940 Germany built up the Atlantic-Wall. Its major fortifications were built near the smallest part of the English Channel, where it was expected that allied troops would try to land. This turned out to be a miscalculation by the German headquarters combined with an underestimation of air troopers that could land behind the Atlantic Wall.

    2.4.4 Antiaircraft canons, developed between the two World Wars, became increasingly worthless due to countermeasures in form of chaff (aluminized paper) used in WW II, that distorted radar images and simulated planes where there were none. High-flying planes flying could only be reached with insufficient accuracy.

    2.4.5 Reagan’s Star War program did not get beyond a preliminary design study, since scientists showed that laser canons could neither produce nor send the desired energy density towards incoming missiles to destroy them.

    The above examples show that time intervals are getting shorter between building of new defense systems and for their efficient use. This very preliminary study of some major defense systems and their “effective” lifetime has been made in order to find out if there is a pattern that might help to predict the performance of future developments. Any such development starts slowly, rises to maturity, and then declines in its efficiency. Rise and decline time may vary considerably from case to case, may have a steep rise and a slow decline, or vice versa, or may be Gaussian. A reasonable scientific description could be done by fitting the data by a Gaussian-like curve and define the efficiency by the full-width at halve maximum. This was not (yet) done for the present study. Instead best estimates for the start-up and complete demise were given. Figure 1 shows a plot (for convenience on a double logarithmic scale) of the so defined useful lifetime of defense installations/methods over two-and-a-half thousand years. In this plot is indicated for each system by whom or by which technical development the system became obsolete. A straight line can represent the data. No effort has yet been made to evaluate error bars, to define the slope, and to represent this line by an equation.

    Since this eyeball-fitted line represents so well the events during a very long period of human history, temptation is great to extrapolate it into the future. Doing so leads to the conclusion that defense mechanisms will become obsolete almost immediately after putting them into place. Taking an extreme view, it could mean that the National Missile Defense would not even see the light of the day before being made obsolete by countermeasures.

    Only time will show the validity of our extrapolation.

    2.5 Shift of warfare from ground to air

    A change in theory and practice of warfare becomes obvious during the later part of the 20th century. Was the practice in earlier epochs mainly composed of political, economic and military elements, it is now increasingly influenced by technological, scientific and psychological elements. In previous centuries the theory of warfare had been subdivided into a strategic part, considering wide spaces, long periods of time, large amount of forces as a prelude to battlefield, and the tactic part, which was just the opposite to the former. A distinction between strategic and tactic blurred since World War I (WW I) and especially during World War II (WW II). Surprisingly to the author, this distinction between strategic and tactic is still kept for nuclear weapons, and finds expression in the START and INF treaties.

    Whereas warfare during WW I was mainly on ground and at sea, and airplanes played only a secondary role for recognition purposes, a dramatic shift occurred during WW II. Weapon systems reached further and beyond front lines.

    Defense systems crumbled, anti aircraft canons became militarily impotent during massive air raids. German V1 and V2 rockets reached almost unimpeded their targets on the British Island. The only defense against these rockets in the forties was to bombard their launch pads. The recent Kosovo War demonstrated even more vividly that defense against planes, now flying at considerably higher altitudes, by anti-aircraft canons is a hopeless enterprise.

    The second half of the 20th century witnessed a dramatic improvement of the rudimentary German WW II rocket technology, promoted on the other side of the Atlantic and now common knowledge in most industrialized countries. These missiles can transport nuclear warheads, and of less military value, chemical and biological weapons [2]. A majority of people condemns these weapons, called Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and demands their elimination. However, some countries believe they need WMDs for deterrence, but deny their possession for others. The escalation of the arms race during the Cold War led to plan for comprehensive antimissile defense systems for both super powers. Fortunately, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), concluded in 1972, limited drastically, and still does, such an out-of-control development.

    3. Missile defense activities since the 1980s

    President Reagan’s speech on March 23, 1983 was the starting point for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The military-industrial complex eagerly picked up the idea. Even the industry in several NATO countries was encouraged to get involved, however not in their desired way in front-element technologies.

    Concerned, eminent scientists made feasibility studies, culminating in the “Report to The American Physical Society of the study group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons” [3]. Soviet scientists made a similar study [4]. Both groups came to the conclusion that most of the systems would not work as advertised or even not at all. The latter is the case for space-based laser canon [5]. The software aspects cause another tremendous hurdle [6]. A discussion of the results of these two documents is beyond the scope of the present paper. The reader is referred to the original literature, which remains a valid document up to date.

    Considerable amount of money was wasted during the years following Reagan’s proposal. Deception of the public about supposed successes played a role in promoting SDI [7, 8]. However, the topic did for several years no longer make any headlines. Public awareness was reawakened only during the first Gulf War. Unfounded success stories and tests were then sold to the public, which does mostly not understand the basic science and technology behind such claims. During CNN broadcasts, the military commanders claimed a widely exaggerated success rate of the Patriot missile in shooting down Scud missiles coming from Iraq. The General Accounting Office found that only nine percent of the Patriot-Scud engagements are supported by the strongest evidence that an engagement resulted in a warhead kill. The Patriot’s supposedly near-flawless performance may be one of the greatest myths in weapons history. As Winston Churchill once said “In war truth is such a precious good that it has to be surrounded by a strong body guard of lies”.

    The Patriot was originally designed to shoot down aircraft. In the 1980s, it was given an upgrade and a modified warhead to give it a limited capability to defend against short-range ballistic missiles. The Scuds were flying over 3,600 km per hour faster than the Patriot had been designed to deal with. The Patriot must detonate when it is within a few meters of the Scud to have a high probability of destroying the warhead [9-11].

    During the Clinton presidency SDI was revived, now only under another name, as National Missile Defense (NMD). An excellent description of all aspects of NMD, written for general public, can be found in [12]. NMDs task is advertised as a defense against a small number of missiles coming from rogue states. NMD consists actually out of two components: the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). A shift of SDI from Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) to Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW) occurred [13, 14].

    NMD does no longer rely on space-based laser canons, in so far becoming more realistic. It is supposed to destroy warheads in mid-course, but this policy may still change to the easier boost-phase interception [15].

    NMD is planned to protect against both, so-called theatre missiles and strategic (intercontinental) missiles. Such a development is seen by the departing and the incoming administration of the U.S. as a positive step in the right direction, but by a majority of other countries as counterproductive and giving rise to an unlimited arms race [16-20].

    3.1 Countermeasures

    First tests of BMD are very far from successful [21-23]. Will the BMD system be effective? The answer will depend among many other questions to be solved on the effect of countermeasures on the kill probability. It appears to be highly impossible to protect entire countries against missile attacks, as it is claimed by the United States.

    The kill probability is one of the key technical parameters for evaluating the effectiveness of a missile defense system. The higher the kill probability is, the more effective the defense system will be. Inevitably, a missile defense system will be challenged by countermeasures, which may decrease the kill probability. There are three different kinds of them against THAAD system: infrared stealth, radar interference and decoys. A brief qualitative discussion of these measures follows.

    3.1.1 Infrared stealth

    The endgame phase of an intercept begins when the infrared (IR) sensor built in interceptor’s kill vehicle (KV) acquires the target. The distance between the KV and the target at the beginning of the endgame is the so-called acquisition range. During the whole endgame phase, the KV maneuvers according to target’s trajectory information provided by the IR sensor to put itself on a path that leads to a direct hit with the target. For realizing a hit, enough endgame time, which is to say large enough acquisition range, is needed for the KV to correct its current velocity and position errors.

    Against IR sensors, there may exist several kinds of countermeasures; among which to shorten the acquisition range to an unacceptable level is a common one, known as IR stealth. For a given IR sensor and background noise, the acquisition range depends mainly on temperature, material and sizes of the target. The most effective way of realizing IR stealth is to chill the target to very low temperature since IR radiation decreases quickly with temperature. Dry ice or liquid nitrogen will do the job, being filled into the space between shroud and thermally insulated layers.

    3.1.2 Radar interference

    The X band ground based radar (GBR) is one of the most important components of the THAAD system. The GBR detects, acquires and tracks targets before interceptors could launch. When a certain tracking accuracy is achieved, interceptors are committed to their targets and launched, then the GBR continues to track the targets and issues updated target information through BMC4I system to the interceptors and KVs to guide their boost phase flights and midcourse flights respectively. When a KVs midcourse flight finishes and its endgame flight begins, the KV is delivered to the hand over point where the IR sensor of the KV is expected to acquire the target. The so-called hand over point is actually an error basket in space. To achieve a successful intercept, the basket has to satisfy two conditions: (1) at the hand-over point, the KV is at the position where it can acquire the target, (2) the KV’s position and velocity vector at the moment insures that the resulting zero effort miss distance (ZMD) error is within the KV’s maneuvering capability. On the one hand, the above two conditions depend mainly on the GBR’s capability to accurately predict the trajectory of the target. On the other hand, the KV’s capability of removing ZMD error is limited by the amount of fuel it carries and the total time of flight (TOF) during the endgame that is available for the KV to maneuver.

    In addition to GBR information obtained from satellites may be used for tracking. Their jamming could then be also being an effective countermeasure.

    3.1.3 Decoys

    Decoys or false targets are a most commonly used countermeasure. They are required to simulate some physical characteristics of the real reentry vehicle (RV), like size, shape, and temperature, speed etc., according to their task. The discrimination distance plays an important role. KP drops as discrimination distance decreases.

    Typical velocities of strategic targets are 7 km/s, and for theater targets 5 km/s. Calculations show that the KV with a speed of about 5 km/s will have nearly the same kill probability against strategic missiles as against theater missiles. It strongly suggest that a defense system with same performances would be nearly as capable in intercepting strategic missiles as in dealing with theater missiles if its performances and reliability are proved in testing against theater missile targets. The KV should explode when it is at about 4 meters away from the target. This requires timing within a fraction of a millisecond.

    3.2 Kill what and when?

    There is no doubt that weapons attain more destructive power over time, as was the case with the switch from TNT to nuclear explosives. There is no longer a strong relation between power and number of weapons as in a classical war. The population agglomeration gets denser, and therefore the vulnerability of the civil population increased and effects them physically and morally.

    BMD is advertised as an efficient means to protect the United States and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It assumes that the main threat is coming from missiles, which could transport nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. The author has argued that delivery of biological and chemical agents this way is extremely inefficient and highly improbable [2]. The main danger is originating from nuclear warheads. They are getting so compact that countries of concern or terrorists can choose many other ways for transportation.

    Whatever the load the warhead contains, an intercept with a kill vehicle can cause two effects, which are rarely discussed in detail: Firstly, it can destroy either the propulsion part of the weapon (if any is still connected with the warhead), or the warhead itself, or both. Secondly, it could leave the warhead intact, but gives an additional momentum to it, causing a deviation of its trajectory.

    Can warhead destruction always considered to be an advantage or can it have detrimental effects?

    The destruction of the warhead will leave debris behind, which will essentially follow the original trajectory. The parts will hit ground somewhere. Since an intercept will happen at high altitude, chemical or biological material will be distributed over wide space. The agent will probably not have severe effects on humans, since its density at ground level will not reach the necessary, critical value to cause adverse health effects. An exception might be with plutonium, where strong negative long-term effects at ground level might be expected.

    In case the warhead remains intact and its trajectory is changed in an unpredictable way, effects during landing at another than the originally targeted place may be advantageous or not for the attacked country.

    4. Who should make decisions?

    Clemenceau once said: Modern war is too serious a business to entrust it to soldiers. This statement could be modified and enlarged: “Preparation for peace through building of defense systems is too serious a business to be handled by military heroes, since it may lead to modern war.”

    The 20th century has seen already one hero as statesman, Adolf Hitler, who considered himself as the greatest strategist of all times (Grösster Feldherr aller Zeiten). The world experienced the consequences of his ‘leadership’. The 21st century needs diplomats and not heroes, heads of state who are able to address questions of the international economy, market interventions, unanticipated crisis, all by peaceful methods.

    Fortunately, no decision on NMD had been made during the Clinton administration [24, 25]. However, the probability for a rush into failure at the beginning of the Bush administration looms on the horizon. A starting point of the new government could have been to limit the influence of military people in the decision making process. However, the choice of a military hero, General Colin Powell, to head the State Department, points in the wrong direction. General Powell is three things Mr. Bush is not: a war hero, worldly wise and beloved by Afro-Americans. That gives him a great deal of leverage. It means that Mr. Bush can never allow him to resign in protest over anything. The Bush team will be serious about what the Clinton team was not serious about, which is about intervening militarily [26]. This is the way generals are trained for.

    There should be an open discussion within the largest existing military pact, the NATO, on its necessity after the end of the Cold War and of its eventual dissolution. Building new defense systems should not jeopardize disarmament treaties. In particular the cornerstone, the ABM Treaty, should be maintained.

    For some four decades, deterrence was at the center of U.S. defense policy. There were three important features to it. First, it sounded robust without being reckless. Second it was hard to think of a better way to make sense of a nuclear inventory. Third, it seemed to work. A re-evaluation started with Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, which was based on the idea that it was better ‘to protect than avenge’. The problem with NMD is that it is likely to aggravate other problems, in particular the already tense relations with Russia and China. Worse, it could provide an illusion of security that, if ever tested, might come tragically apart. It may be wise to use deterrent threats only sparingly, but it can hardly make sense never use them at all [28.29].

    Many prominent scientists should reevaluate, if deemed necessary, their assessment of SDI and extend it to NMD. Scientists in the big weapon laboratories should be given tasks that are addressing more urgent problems of society, such as changes in means of energy production, protection of the environment, to name a few challenging tasks. Scientific evaluation, like the one that had been done by a group of prominent experts in the case of SDI, should get more weight than the judgement of military heroes.

    Should the American government pay more attention to the will of the people? Answers during a recent poll in the U.S. [18] on the question “Which of the following do you think is the most important issue facing the country today: Education, Medicare, health care, fight crimes/drugs, economic growth, crack down on illegal guns, cut taxes, strong military, national missile defense?” show that NMD has an extremely low priority of 1 percent, and a strong military a marginal 4 percent. This overwhelming disinterest is a clear sign that the drive for NMD is to search elsewhere. A good candidate may be the military-industrial complex.

    5. Conclusion

    There are an infinite number of better and necessary actions to be taken by any responsible government than to build the equivalent of a “National Missile Defense”, that has a high chance not to work at all. Not long ago a well-known physicist had to testify on the feasibility and efficiency of such a system during a hearing at an U.S. Senate’s Committee. He had been asked if NMD would work. It is reported that he thought for a short while, then came up with a resounding “YES”, and after a pause he added, “provided the adversary collaborates.” Even such an answer seems to me still too optimistic.

    6. References:

    [1] Hero as Statesman, Political Leadership in Military Defense Edited by John P. Craven Readings for Leaders, Harland Cleveland, Volume I Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University Press of America, 1988

    [2] The Concept of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Chemical and Biological Weapons, Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment, Gert G. Harigel Seventh ISODARCO-Beijing Seminar on Arms Control, Xi’an, October 8-13, 2000,

    [3] Report to The American Physical Society of the study group on Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons N. Bloembergen, C.K.N. Patel, P. Avizonis, R.G. Clem, A. Hertzberg, T.H. Johnson, T. Marshall, R.B. Miller, W.E. Morrow, E.E. Salpeter, A.M. Sessler, J.D. Sullivan, J.C. Wyant, A. Yariv, R.N. Zare, A.J. Glass, L.C. Hebel Reviews of Modern Physics, Vol.59, No.3, Part II, July 1987, S0- S201

    [4] Space-Strike Arms and International Security, Report of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Piece, Against the Nuclear Threat, Moscow October 1985

    [5] Physics and Technical Aspects of Laser and Particle Beam Weapons for Strategic Defense, R.L. Garwin, 1986, submitted to Physikalische Blätter

    [6] Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems, David Lorge Parnass, American Scientist, Volume 73, 432-440, September-October 1985

    [7] Aspin Confirms Deception Plan Existed to Promote SDI Program Dunbar Lockwood Arms Control Today, October 1993, pg. 18

    [8] Strategic ‘Deception’ Initiative John Pike Arms Control Today, November 1993, pp. 3-8

    [9] The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor John Conyers, Jr. Arms Control Today, November 1992, pp. 3-10

    [10] The Patriot Debate: Part 2, Letter to the Editor Frank Horten Arms Control Today, January/February 1993, pp. 26/27 Author’s Response, Arms Control Today, January/February 1993, pp. 27, 29

    [11] The Patriot Debate: Part 3, Letter to the Editor Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis Arms Control Today, March 1993, pg. 24

    [12] Defense Mechanisms Kosta Tsipis The Sciences, November/December 2000, pp. 18-23

    [13] Theater Missile Defense Programs: Status and Prospects John Pike Arms Control Today, September 1994, pp. 11-14

    [14] The Clinton Plan for Theater Missile Defenses: Costs and Alternatives David Mosher and Raymond Hall Arms Control Today, September 1994, pp. 15-20

    [15] Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative Richard L. Garwin Arms Control Today, September 2000, pp. 8-11

    [16] Missile Defense: The View From the Other Side of the Atlantic Camille Grand Arms Control Today, September 2000, pp. 12-18

    [17] A Pause in Unilateralism? Jack Mendelsohn Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 21-23

    [18] No Pressure From the People Mark S. Mellman, Adam Burns, Sam Munger Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 19, 20, 23

    [19] Security: The Bottom Line Jack F. Matlock, Jr. Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 17, 18, 24

    [20] Facing the China Factor Banning Garrett Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 14-16

    [21] Ballistic Missile Defense: Is the U.S. ‘Rushing to Failure’? John Pike Arms Control Today, April 1998, pp. 9-13

    [22] Mixed Results in U.S. TMD Tests Wade Boese Arms Control Today, September 2000, pg. 29

    [23] Officials Testify on National Missile Defense, Assess Program Wade Boese Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 25, 29

    [24] National Missile Defense, the ABM Treaty And the Future of START II Arms Control Association press conference, Arms Control Today, November/December 1998, pp. 3-10

    [25] Where Do We Go From Here? Harold Brown Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 12-13

    [26] Powell, a Serious Man to Be Tested Before Long Thomas L. Friedman International Herald Tribune, December 20, 2000

    [27] Does Deterrence Have a Future? Lawrence Freedman Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 3-8

    [28] Finding the Right Path Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Arms Control Today, October 2000, pp. 11, 24

    Years “Efficient lifetime” of defense systems

    2000 – ————– Chinese Great Wall – Huns

    1000 –

    500 –

    —- Upgraded Great Wall – Traitor 200 – — Roman Limes — Complete metal armor – Horses unprotected Alemanni — Castles in Europe – Gun powder

    100 –

    50 –

    20 – Antiaircraft canons – Planes too high

    10 – — Maginot Line – Attack from behind

    5 – – German West Wall – limited efficiency (‘Siegfried Line’) – Atlantic Wall – Disembarkation in Normandy

    2 – – SDI – Scientists

    1 –

    0.5 – – Safeguard ABM – Maintenance cost

    0.2 – NMD ? Decoys Jamming Cooling of radars of missiles

    0.1 500 500 1000 1500 1800 1900 1950 1980 1990 1995 1998 2000 BC AC Year

    Forum on “The Missile Threat and Plans for Ballistic Missiles Defense: Technology, Strategic Stability and Impact on Global Security”

    Istituto Diplomatico “Mario Toscano” and Parliament, Library Room “Il Refettorio” Rome, Italy, 18-19 January 2001

  • A Terrorist Threat – The Movement of Black Market Nuclear Materials into the United States

    “What is the problem? The breakup of the Soviet Union left nuclear materials scattered throughout the newly independent states and increased the potential for the theft of the those materials, and for organized criminals to enter the nuclear smuggling business. As horrible as the tragedies in Oklahoma City and the World Trade Center were, imagine the destruction that could have resulted had there been a small-scale nuclear device exploded there.”

    — President William Jefferson Clinton

    Overview

    The problem is recognizing that the nuclear threat from terrorists acquiring weapons grade fissile material is greater than all the other threats combined and that it has to be treated independently for the specific set of threats it poses.

    Biological and chemical threats are scalable in their level of threat because they create damage in proportion to the amount of material distributed over a given geographical area. The effects, while deadly, are relatively short term and perishable with proper treatment. Also, they are dependant on effective distribution systems and environmental conditions. They can be used in small amounts in small areas quite easily but use in large areas requires techniques that lend themselves to detection and prevention. If an event occurs, rapid response can mitigate their effects substantially in a relatively short time.

    In comparison, the nuclear threat is that it will cause the greatest damage over a large area from a single point with a small amount of material. A nuclear blast is its own distribution system and its effects are persistent over larger areas for longer periods. Rapid response to an event will offer little in the mitigation of the effects other than defining the areas of destruction and contamination. It will create its own environment for distribution as it expands into the prevailing environment.

    Level of Threat

    Dealing with nuclear terrorism requires an understanding of what the potential threats are, at what level they exist and what their consequences will be. The most formidable characteristics of terrorism are variability and unpredictability. Target selection, time of use, degree of destruction and psychological impact are all open questions.

    Where any nuclear threat is perceived, maximum effort has to be expended to verify its potential and prevent the occurrence of an event. There are no options to this action. However, reaction at this level will require a mobilization of resources in a given area in a very short period of time. Therefore, the overall consequences of a nuclear threat by terrorists have to be evaluated within its probability of occurrence. Multiple threats of nuclear events would quickly paralyze the response systems and produce wide scale vulnerabilities, increasing the probability of a successful terrorist event at some location .

    Specific scenarios of prevention and reaction need to be developed by posing postulates for as many methods of acquisition, assembly and deployment as can be imagined. Unfortunately, it appears that no focused effort in this regard has coalesced. The most discernible appreciation for the nuclear threat seems to be to prepare for an after-the-fact reaction to it.

    Background

    Proliferation in the production of fissile materials in many countries has increased the probability that such materials will fall into the hands of terrorist groups who have the capability for assembling crude nuclear weapons.

    During the Cold War, nuclear materials were highly controlled by the nations that developed them. With the end of the Cold War, the controls have slipped to an unacceptable level; security for nuclear inventories has been dangerously degraded. In fact, there are unknown amounts of fissile material for which there has been no accountability. Locations for these materials are scattered and, for the most part, unknown. Additionally, inventory control at many of the existing storage warehouses for nuclear materials is lacking and security measures are generally unsophisticated and inadequate.

    The major threat these unaccounted for materials present is that they will fall into the hands of terrorist groups whose purpose is to bring about, for their own cause, destruction, distraction from national purpose and general social upheaval. Secondary threats will be the creation of unbridled fear, distrust, economic instability and the sense of a loss of personal security should the possession become known.

    Preventive Measures

    The imperative for detecting and controlling these materials is recognizing that for them to be useful for terrorist purposes the materials must be moved from their points of origin or storage to points of utilization. If a concentrated effort is directed toward identifying potential transfer methodologies and routes of distribution then it might be possible to interdict the materials before they can be transformed into weapons status.

    In the area of import/export accountability there is much work to be done. There are no international standards that can be effectively applied for maintaining control during the transportation of nuclear materials and, even if there were, It would take a prodigious effort to oversee the extremely complex interconnected network of international transportation and commerce. The proliferation of the drug traffic throughout the world presents strong evidence of this fact. Gaps in import/export controls almost insure that distribution of fissile materials will occur undetected.

    Once the material is in the distribution system the unknown factors increase – Where did it go? To whom? And for what purpose? Even when lost it bequeaths a set of hazardous conditions that are unacceptable in normal commerce.

    Yet, movement is a key to interdiction. To be useful, the materials must be sent to a central location for additional processing and assembly. At some point sufficient material must be present to construct a nuclear device. Movement of large quantities of fissile material to a construction site is unlikely because it presents a greater possibility for interdiction than do small quantities. Also, large scale movements present additional hazards to the handling facilities because of the possibilities of radioactive leakage and accidental detection.

    Movement of small quantities of the material, on the other hand, afford a greater probability that the movement will be undetected by conventional means and will be delivered successfully to a destination of choice. Smaller shipments are more likely to remain undetected during transport.

    Established commercial conveyance systems probably will be used where small quantities of fissile material can be shipped using various packaging techniques and routes to a single destination. Because of the increased detection probabilities, quantities of fissile material will not be shipped in a given container to a single destination.

    Some possibilities for moving this type of material are:

    (1) – Superimpose the shipment of small, well-shielded packages on established drug and contraband routes.

    (2) – Ship materials conventionally in well-shielded, small containers through a surreptitious network of widely dispersed handlers.

    (3) – Man carry many small quantities across the mostly porous borders of the United States.

    (4) – Use diversified distribution techniques (routes and conveyances) by requiring multiple way-points and altering the characteristics of external shipping containers at each point.

    (5) – Mix materials and legitimate products for routine deliveries.

    The formidable nature of the tasks required to detect and identify well packaged fissile materials in small quantities renders the likelihood of detection highly questionable.

    The most complex of the above projections is No. 4. Presuming an originating point in Asia, a small package could be shipped with little notice through Cambodia to the island of Palau into Micronesia or the Phillipines, then through the small Kiribati Islands to the Cook Islands, then to Hawaii and then to the mainland USA through Mexico, Canada or directly through an open area of the US borders. There are literally hundreds of such routes that could be set up and utilized. The detection and surveillance of these multiple transfer shipping points would require the participation of hundreds of specialists examining all arriving and departing packages – a near impossible task, thereby essentially insuring a successful delivery for most attempts.

    The virtual impossibility of providing surveillance at the many points of exit in the Far East and the many potential points for entry into the United States makes this an imposing task but nevertheless it has to be undertaken. It is almost a given that, once in the United States, the free and open access to our highway network and relatively unsecured transportation system, make it a simple task to transport dangerous materials throughout the United States without any great fear of interdiction.

    Where nuclear materials are concerned, individuals involved with national security need to become focused on more effective prevention strategies than ever before. This new era of terrorism demands a dramatic shift in thinking with regard to the possibility of a small-scale, but dramatic and destructive, nuclear catastrophe. No longer are they faced with decisions about extensive arrays of military weapons with comprehensive destructive capabilities, but rather, they are faced with the likelihood of attacks by small covert bands of individuals with crude nuclear weapons which can still deliver substantial destructive power.

    New methodologies incorporating sophisticated sensing devices are needed for the tasks of detecting, containing, and eliminating small-scale movements of nuclear material in order to prevent such terrorist events. The face of war is changing from that of a well-equipped soldier in uniform to that of the nondescript member of a dedicated cult whose very nature is to deceive and remaine hidden from view until their targets are most vulnerable and the political climate is confused.

    Conclusion:

    There are no easy solutions or quick fixes.

    “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, as we drift toward unparalleled catastrophes.”

    – Albert Einstein

    A number of experts predicted that some catastrophic event similar to the Oklahoma City bombing disaster would be needed to energize the international community to work in concert to eliminate this problem. It has happened in New York and Washington. The unfortunate fact is that the US government, as well as other governments, and the American people found themselves in situations for which they were not prepared. This has to change.

    The danger is so great, and the threat so immediate, that US policymakers and the public need to recognize that the diversion of fissile materials is as critical and urgent a national security priority as controlling the theft of a complete nuclear weapon. This will require top-level commitment to public education and sufficient resource allocation if, eventually, we are to prevail in this new security challenge.

    One can only hope that a nuclear tragedy will not be necessary for galvanizing world action, and that we will achieve progress toward an international consensus that it is in no one’s interest to allow these materials to be expropriated for terrorist purposes. The need is to concentrate an effort within existing political structures to build a collective regional security, capped by the United Nations, that would promote collaboration among nuclear weapons states to establish methods and records of control over the inventories of fissile materials.

    In examining current efforts on how to stop the illegal distribution of these materials, it is hard to see how any current strategy, no matter how clever the concept or broad the implementation, could do more than raise the level of awareness of the problem. The responsibility is so fragmented among sovereign states and among competing agencies within these sovereignties that viable methods of control are either paralyzed or, for practical purposes, nonexistent. Because of this, problems in managing the inventories of these materials are too diverse and complex to solve in the short term. Consequently, without international cooperation, the United States cannot expect to control the misappropriation of fissile material that is inherent in nuclear proliferation and inappropriate nuclear disarmament methodologies.

    The reality is that a number of states are actively seeking the technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. Their main requirement is getting the materials to do so. Unfortunately, because of some very lax attitudes toward the security of weapons grade nuclear materials during the current disarmament process, the materials already exist in the Black Market. Indifference to this fact seems to be continuing and will contribute to the likelihood that, within the next two-to-three years, there will be a political crisis involving a terrorist group and nuclear materials.

    Slow progress has been made in establishing global and regional non proliferation measures. Commensurately, little effort has been expended for controlling the illegal movement of fissile materials. There appears to be a blindness to the fact that, in this imperfect world, while no system can be developed that will stop all the determined terrorists; a high level of effort must be expended for understanding the dimensions of the problem and correcting deficiencies. In some measure, all civilized nations should be prepared to respond as effectively as possible when terrorist threats of any kind occur but, especially, where nuclear materials are concerned.

    During the Cold War, high technology warheads sat atop powerful delivery systems. Targeting was a known factor. The world was at risk of a hair-trigger response but the realization of a mutually assured destruction kept these systems under “reasonable” control. Today, the potential weapon size is speculative and the delivery system in all probability will have feet. The targets are completely unpredictable – they can be anything, anywhere, at any time. No negotiating. No advanced warning. No clues of impending danger. Nothing is rational in the equation.

    Ultimately, there can be no foolproof system short of eliminating all inventories of the materials. However, it is an immediate and critical imperative that all nations work in collaboration to eliminate the spread of fissile materials. Control will require the continuous and simultaneous exercise of multiple measures including international intelligence gathering, international cooperation for conflict resolution, import/export accountability, and selective, proportional coercive measures including the use of force. Eventually, a comprehensive set of measures will have to be developed for the international community that will allow it to exercise the political will to stop and ultimately eliminate the threat of a catastrophe involving terrorist and nuclear materials.

    George Washington said, “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance.” Again, it is time to listen to one of our founding fathers.

    *Gene R. Kelly is a human factors engineer who has consulted for government and industry on issues of nuclear security for the past 22 years.

  • US Nuclear Weapons Policy After September 11th

    US Nuclear Weapons Policy After September 11th

    Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush gathered together his top security advisors to consider the implications of terrorism for US nuclear policy. A few facts were clear. There were well-organized and suicidal terrorists who were committed to inflicting large-scale damage on the US. These terrorists had attempted to obtain nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They probably had not succeeded yet in obtaining nuclear weapons, but would certainly keep trying to do so. It was highly unlikely that terrorists would be able to deliver nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction by means of missiles, but they could potentially smuggle one or more nuclear weapons into the United States and use them to attack US cities. The death and destruction would be enormous, dwarfing the damage caused on September 11th.

    These facts alarmed the Bush security advisors. They went to work immediately developing plans to protect the American people against the possible nuclear terrorism that threatened American cities. The first prong of their defense against nuclear terrorism was to call for dramatically increased funding to secure the nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. Encouraged by the success that had been achieved up to this point with the Nunn-Lugar funding, they realized that this was an area in which they could work closely with Russia in assuring that these weapons were kept secure and out of the hands of criminals and terrorists. The Russians were eager to get this help and to join with the Americans in this effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.

    The second prong of the US plan was to work with the Russians in achieving significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of each country in order that there would be less nuclear weapons available to potentially fall into the hands of terrorists. Since the end of the Cold War the US and Russia have been reducing their nuclear arsenals, and now it was time to make even greater progress toward the promise of the two countries “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” This meant reaching an agreement as a next step to slash the size of their arsenals to a few hundred nuclear warheads and to make these reductions irreversible. The international community applauded the boldness of this step, celebrating this major achievement in nuclear disarmament and this important step toward realizing the promise of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    The third prong of the US plan was to give its full support to bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force, giving momentum to assuring an end to nuclear testing for all time. This step was viewed by the Bush security advisors as having indirect consequences for nuclear terrorism by assuring that other countries would forego the capability to improve the sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. It would be seen as a sign of US leadership for a world free of nuclear weapons, and this would have a positive effect on preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    The fourth prong of the US plan was to reevaluate the administration’s commitment to developing and deploying missile defenses. Prior to September 11th, President Bush and his security team had been strong advocates of developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses. President Bush had even been threatening to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to move forward with missile defense deployment. Following September 11th, it was clear that it made little sense to devote another $100 billion or more to missile defenses when terrorists were capable of attacking US cities by far simpler means. There were more urgent needs for these resources to be used in improving US intelligence and keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. Therefore, the decision was made to put the development of missile defenses on the back burner and instead devote major resources to safeguarding nuclear materials throughout the world. These actions were extremely helpful in improving our relations with both Russia and China, which were both relieved at not having to respond to our missile defenses by increasing their nuclear arsenals.

    The fifth prong of the US plan was to work intensively with countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel to convince them that nuclear weapons were not in their security interests and that they would have a heavy price to pay if they did not join us in moving rapidly toward a nuclear-weapons-free world. The Bush advisors knew that this would be difficult, but they were certain that the US example of curtailing its own nuclear arsenal and foregoing missile defenses, along with support to these countries for economic development, would convince them to follow our lead.

    The world’s leaders and citizens have not heard about these US actions to combat nuclear terrorism because they never happened. The description above is an imaginative account of what might have happened — what should have happened. The most remarkable reality about the US response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is how little these attacks actually affected US nuclear policy. Although US nuclear forces will certainly not deter terrorists, US nuclear policy remains highly dependent on nuclear weapons and the policy of nuclear deterrence.

    To set the record straight, the Bush administration has supported cuts in the Nunn-Lugar funding for securing Russian nuclear weapons and materials. It has called for reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons over a ten-year period, although not within the scope of a binding treaty and, in fact, has indicated it plans to put the deactivated warheads on the shelf for potential future use. It has come out against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and boycotted a UN conference to bring the treaty into force more rapidly. President Bush has announced that the US will unilaterally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and move forward rapidly to deploy ballistic missile defenses, a move that has drawn critical response from both Russia and China. Finally, the Bush administration, rather than putting pressure on India and Pakistan to disarm, has ended the sanctions imposed on them for testing nuclear weapons in May 1998. The administration has never put pressure on Israel to eliminate its nuclear arsenal, although this is a major factor in motivating Arab countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

    While there is much the Bush administration might have done to make nuclear terrorism less likely, the path they have chosen increases the risks of nuclear terrorism. It also undermines our relationship with countries we need in the fight against terrorism in general and nuclear terrorism in particular. Finally, the US nuclear policy after September 11th is a slap in the face to the 187 parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and increases the possibilities of nuclear proliferation and a breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and regime.

     

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Commentary on the Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity

    The Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity was initiated by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in early 2000. By April 2000 it had some 50 prominent signers. It was run as a half-page advertisement in the New York Times on the opening day of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference on April 24, 2000. Since then more prominent leaders from throughout the world have signed the Appeal. Signers include 35 Nobel Laureates including 14 Nobel Peace Laureates, former heads of state, diplomats, military leaders, scientists and entertainers, each a leader in his or her own field. What follows is the appeal set forth in italics with comments by signers of the Appeal.

    We cannot hide from the threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity and all life. These are not ordinary weapons, but instruments of mass annihilation that could destroy civilization and end all life on Earth.

    According to Oscar Arias, a Nobel Peace Laureate and former President of Costa Rica, “The existence of nuclear weapons presents a clear and present danger to life on Earth.”

    Jean-Michel Cousteau, the founder and president of the Ocean Futures Society, states, “The canary is dead…and we are going on with business as usual. How can we better move the public out of lethargy so we can protect the fragile peace?” This is our challenge with regard to the nuclear threats that confront humanity.

    Former U.S. Senator Alan Cranston argues, “There is a simple reason for focusing on the nuclear issue. Many, many issues are of supreme importance in one way or another, but if we blow ourselves up with nuclear weapons, no other issue is really going to matter. Quite possibly there would be no other human beings left to be concerned about anything else.”

    Father Theodore Hesburgh, the President Emeritus of Notre Dame University and one of the great educators of our time, writes, “The threat of nuclear war in our time has been the greatest threat that humanity has ever faced on Earth.”

    Former Australian Ambassador Richard Butler states, “Disarmament requires politicians and governments who know the truth – nuclear weapons threaten all and must be eliminated.”

    Nuclear weapons are morally and legally unjustifiable. They destroy indiscriminately – soldiers and civilians; men, women and children; the aged and the newly born; the healthy and the infirm.

    Can there be any doubt that nuclear weapons, capable of destroying the entire human species and most other forms of life, are the most serious moral issue of our time.

    The XIVth Dalai Lama has called for both internal and external disarmament. With regard to external disarmament, he states, “We must first work on the total abolishment of nuclear weapons.”

    Gerry Spence, the famed trial attorney and author, writes, “All my life I’ve worked for justice. What kind of justice could possibly exist in a nuclear bomb?”

    Another attorney, Jonathan Granoff, the vice president and UN representative of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, writes, “We are the first generation which must choose whether life will continue. This living sphere may be the only such place in the entire universe where this gift of life, this gift to love, exists. We surely do not have the right to place it at risk through our collective ingenuity and in the service of something we have created.”

    Harrison Ford, one of the great actors of our time, argues, “The United States must assume world leadership to end once and for all the threat of nuclear war. It is our moral responsibility.”

    Nobel Peace Laureate Mairead Corrigan Maguire writes, “The hope lies in the truth being spoken that we cannot use these weapons to kill our own brothers and sisters, and in the process destroying our homeland, Mother Earth.”

    Ambassador Richard Butler states the matter simply, “There are plenty of experts who can argue and discuss the problem of proliferation, but it is beyond doubt that this in itself will not do the job. Doctrines of deterrence obfuscate the central reality that the day these weapons are used will be a catastrophe.”

    The obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects,” as unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice, is at the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    The highest court in the world, known as the World Court, wrote in a 1996 opinion that it was their unanimous opinion that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

     

    Ten years have now passed since the end of the Cold War, and yet nuclear weapons continue to cloud humanity’s future. The only way to assure that nuclear weapons will not be used again is to abolish them.

    Retired US Admiral Eugene Carroll, the Deputy Director of the Center for Defense Information, argues, “American leaders have declared that nuclear weapons will remain the cornerstone of US national security indefinitely. In truth, as the world’s only remaining superpower, nuclear weapons are the sole military source of our national insecurity. We, and the whole world, would be much safer if nuclear weapons were abolished and Planet Earth was a nuclear free zone.”

    Retired US Admiral Noel Gayler, a former Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command, asks, “Does nuclear disarmament imperil our security?” He answers his question, “No. It enhances it.”

    The former Chief of the Indian Naval Staff, Admiral L. Ramdas, states, “We have to give expression to the need of the hour, which very simply put is to run down nuclear weapons to zero and recycle these huge budgets in the areas where it is most needed – human security.”

    Queen Noor of Jordan argues persuasively, “The sheer folly of trying to defend a nation by destroying all life on the planet must be apparent to anyone capable of rational thought. Nuclear capability must be reduced to zero, globally, permanently. There is no other option.”

    Ted Turner, the founder of CNN, states, “We should get rid of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons will not protect us. Only a more equitable world will protect us.”

    Nobel Peace Laureate Betty Williams, states, “We must put an end to this insanity and ‘End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity.’”

    We, therefore, call upon the leaders of the nations of the world and, in particular, the leaders of the nuclear weapons states to act now for the benefit of all humanity by taking the following steps:

    • Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and reaffirm commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
    • De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.
    • Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.
    • Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.
    • Reallocate resources from the tens of billions of dollars currently being spent for maintaining nuclear arsenals to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

    Former US President Jimmy Carter has argued, “All nuclear states must renew efforts to achieve worldwide reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, it requires no further negotiations for leaders of nuclear nations to honor existing nuclear security agreements, including the test ban and anti-ballistic missile treaties, and to remove nuclear weapons from their present hair-trigger alert status.”

    Nobel Peace Laureate Oscar Arias argues that “the tens of billions of dollars that are dedicated to their [nuclear weapons] development and maintenance should be used instead to alleviate human need and suffering.”

    Muhammad Ali, the great boxing champion and humanitarian, states, “We must not only control the weapons that can kill us, we must bridge the great disparities of wealth and opportunity among peoples of the world, the vast majority of whom live in poverty without hope, opportunity or choices in life. These conditions are a breeding ground for division that can cause a desperate people to resort to nuclear weapons as a last resort.” Ali concludes, “Our only hope lies in the power of our love, generosity, tolerance and understanding and our commitment to making the world a better place for all of Allah’s children.”

    Father Theodore Hesburgh of Notre Dame University, argues, “This is a time to reinvigorate our efforts towards reductions while we still have the opportunity of doing so. Nothing should distract us from this ultimate goal, which is all in the right direction for the peace and security of humankind.”

    How Can We Move Forward?

    Our best hope in moving forward lies with the power of the people. We cannot count on our leaders to act in good faith and in a timely way on this issue without pressure from the people.

    Australian Ambassador Richard Butler argues, “The key requirement for ending the nuclear threat to human existence is for ordinary people to bring the issue back to the domestic political agenda. Voters must make clear to those seeking public office that they will not get their vote unless they promise to pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament.”

    Arun Gandhi, the founder of the M.K. Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence, concludes, “The people of the world must wake up to the negativity that has governed our lives for centuries giving rise to hate, discrimination, oppression, exploitation and leading to the creation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction.”

    Harrison Ford puts the matter clearly, “We have been led to believe that we have come a long way toward world nuclear disarmament. But that is not the case. Our government is not doing all that it could. We must urge our leaders to fulfill the obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

    The mayor of Nagasaki, Iccho Itoh, states, “I believe that the abolition of nuclear weapons can be accomplished by consolidating the efforts of world citizens and NGOs and mobilizing the conscience of humanity. Let us focus all our efforts on realizing a 21st century free from nuclear weapons and building a world in which our children can live in peace.”

    Maj Britt Theorin, a member of the European Parliament and former Swedish Ambassador for Disarmament, proclaims, “The unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear weapon states at the Non-Proliferation Conference to eliminate their nuclear arsenals is a victory. Together with scientists and NGOs, we now have five years to present a timetable for how and when all nuclear weapons will be eliminated.”

    This is our challenge. The people must awaken and act in their own self-interest and the interests of all humanity to end the nuclear weapons threat to our common future.

  • Canada and the Nuclear Challenge

    The report of the Canadian House of Commons’ Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, entitled “Canada and the Nuclear Challenge,” was released today.

    The committee’s 15 recommendations are reproduced in full below.

    LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

    RECOMMENDATION 1
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada adopt the following fundamental principle to guide its nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy, within an overarching framework encompassing all aspects – political, military, and commercial – of Canada’s international relations:

    * That Canada work consistently to reduce the political legitimacy and value of nuclear weapons in order to contribute to the goal of their progressive reduction and eventual elimination.

    RECOMMENDATION 2
    In order to implement this fundamental principle, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada issue a policy statement which explains the links between Canada’s nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policy and all other aspects of its international relations. In addition, it must also establish a process to achieve a basis for ongoing consensus by keeping the Canadian public and parliamentarians informed of developments in this area, in particular by means of:

    * Annual preparatory meetings – held, for example, under the auspices of the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development – of the type held with non-governmental organizations and representatives of civil society before the annual meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission;
    * An annual public appearance before this Committee by the Ambassador to the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs;
    * Strengthened coordination between the departments of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and National Defence, in the first instance by the inclusion of a representative from National Defence on Canadian delegations to multilateral nuclear non-proliferation fora.

    RECOMMENDATION 3
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada intensify its efforts, in cooperation with States such as its NATO allies and the members of the New Agenda Coalition, to advance the process of nuclear disarmament. To this end, it must encourage public input and inform the public on the exorbitant humanitarian, environmental and economic costs of nuclear weapons as well as their impact on international peace and security. In addition, the Government must encourage the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their unequivocal commitment to enter into and conclude negotiations leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Drawing on the lessons of the Ottawa Process, it should also examine innovative means to advance the process of nuclear disarmament.

    RECOMMENDATION 4
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada explore additional means of both providing more information to Canadians on civilian uses of nuclear technology, and receiving more public input into government policy in this area. As one means of achieving this, the Committee also recommends that the Parliament of Canada conduct a separate and in-depth study on the domestic use, and foreign export of, Canada’s civilian nuclear technology.

    RECOMMENDATION 5
    In the interest of increased nuclear safety and stability, and as a means to advance toward the broader goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada endorse the concept of de-alerting all nuclear forces, subject to reciprocity and verification – including the arsenals of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the three nuclear-weapons-capable States – and encourage their governments to pursue this option.

    RECOMMENDATION 6
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada take all possible action to encourage the United States and Russia to continue the START process. In particular, Canada should encourage Russia to ratify START II, should provide concrete support towards achieving this objective, and should encourage like-minded states to work with Russia to ensure increased political and economic stability in that country. Beyond this, Canada should urge both parties to pursue progressive and reciprocal reforms to their respective nuclear postures.

    RECOMMENDATION 7
    Given its potential contribution to nuclear safety and stability, and the need to act promptly to address the possible implications of the millennium bug, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada explore further with the United States and Russia the feasibility of establishing a NORAD “hotline” to supplement and strengthen Russia’s missile early warning system. Canada should also strongly support the idea of broadening such a mechanism to include other nuclear-weapons-capable States.

    RECOMMENDATION 8
    The Committee recommends that the Government reject the idea of burning MOX fuel in Canada because this option is totally unfeasible, but that it continue to work with other governments to address the problem of surplus fissile material.

    RECOMMENDATION 9
    In view of their responsibilities as nuclear-weapon States under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and as Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada encourage the United Kingdom, France and China to: increase transparency about their nuclear stockpiles, fissile material and doctrine; support the call of Canada and other States for the substantive discussion of nuclear disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament; and explore with the United States and Russia means of preparing to enter nuclear disarmament reductions at the earliest possible moment.

    RECOMMENDATION 10
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada continue to support all international efforts to address the underlying regional security issues in South Asia and the Middle East. Working with like-minded States, it should take a more proactive role in stressing the regional and global security benefits of immediately increasing communication and co-operation between States in those regions as a means of building trust. In both regions – but particularly in South Asia given the recent nuclear tests – Canada should also stress: the freezing of nuclear weapon programs; adhering to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and participating in the negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and; joining the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

    RECOMMENDATION 11
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada work to strengthen international efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and missile systems and to ensure adequate funding for verification purposes. In addition to strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through the negotiation of a Verification Protocol and continuing to support the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Government should also examine methods of increasing the effectiveness of the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as cooperation in intelligence and law enforcement to prevent terrorist acquisition of such weapons.

    RECOMMENDATION 12
    The Committee recommends that the Government, having strengthened the international safeguards regime by signing its new Model Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, use all means at its disposal to convince other States to do likewise. Before entering into a future Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with any other State, the Government should, at a minimum, require that State to adopt the new Model Protocol.

    RECOMMENDATION 13
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada meet annually with the other parties to all Nuclear Cooperation Agreements to review the application of such Agreements, and table a report on the results of such meetings in Parliament.

    RECOMMENDATION 14
    The Committee recommends that the Canadian Government intensify its efforts, in cooperation with like-minded States, such as our NATO allies, to advance the global disarmament and security agenda:

    * Canada should reaffirm its support for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the centrepiece of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and should reject any attempt to revise the Treaty to acknowledge India and Pakistan as “nuclear-weapon States” under it. It should also continue to strive to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States honour their commitments to a strengthened review process for the NPT, which will lead to an updated statement of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the 2000 Review Conference. Canada should complete the process of ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as quickly as possible and urge all other States to do likewise. Should India and Pakistan refuse to accept the Treaty unconditionally, Canada should nevertheless encourage the international community to ensure the Treaty’s legal entry into force.
    * Canada should play a strong role at the Conference on Disarmament in thr forthcoming negotiations for a broad Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty which will serve both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives.
    * Canada should support the establishment of a nuclear arms register to cover both weapons and fissile material as proposed by Germany in 1993.
    * Canada should support the call for the conclusion of a nuclear weapons disarmament convention.

    RECOMMENDATION 15
    The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada argue forcefully within NATO that the present re-examination and update as necessary of the Alliance Strategic Concept should include its nuclear component.

     

  • Senator Kerrey calls on U.S. to cut Nuclear Weapons Unilaterally

    Writing in the Washington Post on November 17, 1998, Walter Pincus reports that Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb) will call on President Clinton to immediately make unilateral reductions in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal and to de-alert many nuclear weapons that remain.

    Kerrey is quoted as stating that the $25 billion spend maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal could be better spend on more important military threats like regional war, ethnic conflict, and international terrorism.

    According to the Washington Post report, Kerrey believes that “our maintenance of a nuclear arsenal larger than we need provokes Russia to maintain one larger than she can control. Keeping nuclear arsenals far in excess of what we need is an accident waiting to happen.”

    The speech follows:

     

    “Toward A New Nuclear Policy: Reducing The Threat To American Lives”
    Senator Bob Kerrey (D-NE)
    November 17, 1998

    Prepared Text — Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations

     

    Good afternoon. At the beginning of this talk let me say I am grateful for this opportunity to speak to you today and hope that at the conclusion of my remarks you will feel some gratitude as well. Either for my coming or my departure. It is an honor for me to be introduced by Warren Rudman, with whom I had the great honor of serving. Two other former colleagues, Jim Exon and Sam Nunn, have been instrumental in helping me learn more about, and keeping America safe from, nuclear dangers. They have my thanks as well. Special thanks are also in order for other members of the Council on Foreign Relations, especially my friend Skip Stein, who helped organize this lunch. Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington has been generous with both his time and his creativity on the topic I will address today, as has Bruce Blair of the Brookings Institution and many others.

    The most important business of the Federal government must be to keep the people of the United States of America safe. The President and Congress have the responsibility of assessing the threats to our country and designing an appropriate response to minimize them.

    At the dawn of our Republic the thirty- nine men who drafted our Constitution defined this objective as “providing for the common defense.” They envisioned this purpose as little more than defending our territory against outside invaders. Over time, as our nation has grown, this mission has grown. We have learned from bitter experience that our interests extend beyond our borders. We have learned that diplomacy backed by a credible military force can prevent wars from happening. We have learned that good intelligence can help us build and direct that force so that threats are accurately assessed.

    In these times, devastatingly hovering over mankind are three weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological. They have the dynamics of plunging the world suddenly in an unimaginable war aimed more at civilians than military casualties.

    A commission created by my colleague, Arlen Specter, is engaged in an in-depth study of this threefold threat. It is headed by chairman John Deutch and its report is expected shortly. I hope we have learned the importance and value of a credible military force — but I do not assume it.

    The history of this century should keep us vigilant against the tendency to want to disarm. We disarmed and came home after the Great War, the war to end all wars. We responded to the military actions of Japan and Germany with words which were not enough to prevent 50 million people from dying in the Second World War. Little remembered is this fact: After the second world war we slashed our defense budgets again. We withdrew our forces from Europe and Asia. And though it is an open question as to what might have happened to Eastern Europe had a credible military force faced the Soviet Union or a credible force been close to the Korean peninsula, there can be no doubt it would have had a deterrent impact on the decisions made by Soviet and North Korean leaders. They did not believe we would respond and so they acted.

    Today the United States of America is the most important arbiter of world peace. The measure of our success can be seen around the world. More people are living in free and democratic nations than ever before. The cold war is over. Today, when the word “Russia” is spoken, we think of economic problems and not espionage or proxy wars or nuclear weapons. The global economy — frustrating, confusing and challenging — is making us more interdependent and reducing the ol territorial and military tensions between nation-states. But please observe: It is the threat of conventional force deployment which produced the Dayton Accords and the agreement in Kosovo and, hopefully, Iraq’s compliance with United Nations Resolutions.

    Still, threats remain. Not only do they remain, but the nature of the threat has changed radically from what it was as recently as 10 years ago. Because of that,there is a clear and present need for constant re-examination of policies to ensure we are not using yesterday’s strategy and/or force structure on today’s and tomorrow’s threats. Never before has thinking outside the old box that confined our plans been so important.

    That is my purpose here today: To step outside of the old way of meeting the one threat with the potential of killing every single American: nuclear weapons. I begin by describing that threat. Consider this scenario, which could unfold by sundown today:

    A peaceful scientific rocket is launched off the coast of Norway. To the east, in Russia, radar operators mistake the launch for a nuclear attack by the West. A deadly process — nearly on auto-pilot — is triggered. Within minutes President Yeltsin has been alerted of the attack. For the first time in history, the Russian nuclear briefcase is activated. With thousands of nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert around the world, commanders tell Yeltsin he has just minutes — three minutes, five at most — to decide whether to launch a retaliatory strike against American cities. Like a raft on a raging river, Yeltsin is being carried away by events. Literally minutes before a retaliatory strike is ordered, military commanders realize the rocket is peaceful. They had been given advance warning of the scientific launch. They had simply failed to pass it on to the duty officers who evaluate warning indicators.

    In the chaos, though, it is too late: After a breakdown in discipline or communication within Russia’s underpaid and poorly equipped command structure, one SS-25 missile with a 550-kiloton warhead has been launched at Chicago. The missile rockets north over the top of the world, across the arctic pole, and inside an hour detonates over Chicago within — even on a bad day — a few hundred yards of its intended target.

    The surrounding air is instantaneously heated to 10 million degrees Celsius. The fireball shoots outward at a rate of a few hundred kilometers per second. A mushroom cloud dozens of miles across and high rips up from the explosion. Everything within miles of the detonation site is vaporized. In the immediate blast zone nearly everyone is killed. The radius of destruction reaches out for miles. Even in the farthest reaches of the blast zone, structures are severely damaged, thousands are dead, half are injured and most survivors have suffered second and third-degree burns.

    If that sounds like a fantasy cooked up in a Hollywood studio, consider this: According to public reports, every event I have just described to you, right up until the actual launch of one missile, occurred on January 25, 1995, with the Soviet Union three years in the grave.

    This scenario will probably not happen, but it most assuredly could. It is at least as plausible as any number of other threats that absorb the attention and rhetoric of our policy makers. And as important as it is to mount a good defense against terrorism, narcotics traffickers, or political instability in the Middle East or Balkans, they are pale worries in comparison to the number of Americans who would die if just one of Russia’s nuclear weapons were to be launched at the United States. Chinese weapons get more attention today, but it is Russia’s, not China’s, that are accurate and capable of being launched across an ocean and hitting a hard target.

    The topic of this speech is reducing nuclear dangers. By the end of it, I intend to leave you with three ideas:

    First, the several thousand nuclear warheads on Russian soil are the gravest, most imminent threat to the security of the United States. Second, our old policies of arms control and deterrence no longer work and may be increasing the danger, both by making nuclear threats worse and by diverting money and resources away from the conventional forces that are the key to our safety in the post-Cold War world. Third, we are confronted by both an urgent danger and an urgent opportunity. The danger is obvious; the opportunity is not. The opportunity is a window of time during which we can significantly reduce the danger nuclear weapons pose to American lives. But this window is closing. We must act now, and we must act boldly.

    I call this nuclear threat to your attention with such an urgent tone because I fear that Americans, amidst our well earned joy in the victory of freedom in the Cold War, have been lulled into a false sense of security about it. What America needs from its leaders today is not a lullaby, but a wake-up call. I am not here to tell you to cast off old suspicions, but to replace them with new ones, suspicions in many ways graver than the old ones and less curable by the incentives for rational behavior on which our strategy of deterrence has historically relied. We need a new nuclear policy to confront new nuclear dangers.

    What are these new nuclear dangers?

    I see four scenarios in which nuclear weapons threaten American lives. First is an authorized launch, which is to say a deliberate attack by Russia on the United States. Even in the unlikely event of a throwback totalitarian regime in Russia, there is little reason to fear such an attack. Second is the acquisition of weapons in the Russian arsenal by rogue groups or individuals, whether they be terrorist states or their clients or simply a disgruntled Russian soldier. Third is an accidental launch, like the one I just described, based on technological error or miscalculation. Fourth is another country acquiring nuclear weapons, either through proliferation or their own nuclear program.

    Today we must deal with nuclear threats differently. The policy of Mutual Assured Destruction, or deterrence, protected us from the old threat — deliberate attack. But it does not protect us from these new ones. In fact, I will argue, it makes them worse.

    The underlying assumption of deterrence is rational behavior on the other side. None of these potential new nuclear powers — whether they be terrorist groups or rogue states or desperate individuals — can be counted on to respond rationally to the threat of retaliation.

    In addition, leaving nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert is a recipe for miscalculation caused by events controlling leaders rather than leaders controlling events. In the case I mentioned to you earlier, President Yeltsin had a matter of minutes to react. The combination of hair-trigger alert, deadly weapons and the potential for human or technological error is a combustible mixture with lethal consequences.

    The threats either of proliferation or the seizure of nuclear materials by criminals inside Russia are real. Russia’s economy is failing, creating an economic incentive to proliferate. The physical and human infrastructure responsible for safeguarding her nuclear arsenal are in dangerous disrepair.

    You do not need the warnings of a senator responsible for oversight of our highly secret intelligence community to know this threat exists. According to the Los Angeles Times, last month a 19-year-old Russian sailor killed eight crewmen on his nuclear submarine near Murmansk, seized control of the sub and held it for 20 hours. Said one former Russian Navy captain: “It is really scary that one day the use of nuclear arms may depend on the sentiments of someone who is feeling blue, who has gotten out of bed on the wrong side and does not feel like living. The probability of this today is higher than ever before.”

    Mutual Assured Destruction is no deterrent to such problems, and the massive, redundant arsenals this policy has produced may be making them worse. Our maintenance of a nuclear arsenal larger than we need provokes Russia to maintain one larger than she can control. In the wake of these kinds of threats, from proliferation to loose weapons, keeping massive nuclear arsenals far in excess of what we need is an accident waiting to happen. Every weapon we maintain that we do not need to defend ourselves provokes the Russians to maintain another to match it. This is a simple mathematical proposition: If what we most fear is a mistake, rather than a deliberate attack, the probability of that threat grows with every weapon in the arsenal of either side. In this environment, every nuclear weapon in those arsenals is like another round loaded into the chamber in what is a literal and deadly game of Russian roulette.

    Nor can the United States ignore the power of our example in influencing others’ behavior. Our heavy reliance on these weapons … despite the vastly diminished threat they were created to deter … has helped make nuclear arms the Rolex wristwatch of international relations: a costly purchase whose real purpose is not the service it provides, but the prestige it confers. It was status, not just security, that the one billion citizens of India sought in electing a government that had made clear its intention to make their nation a nuclear power. It is nationalism, not just national security, that has hogtied START TWO in the Russian Duma.

    And, finally, the passing of Cold War threats has given rise to new ones, ranging from ethnic or regional conflict to international terrorism. The $25 billion we reportedly spend every year to maintain our nuclear arsenal is diverting resources from those real and imminent threats to fight an old one. If America is to be engaged in the world today, it will be with the threat or use of conventional, not nuclear, force. Maintaining massive nuclear forces while trimming the conventional forces that are the real tool of American leadership is an act of retrenchment at a time when the world desperately needs our engagement.

    By alerting you to these dangers, I do not mean to disparage the extraordinary Russian experiment with democracy. Russia’s progress, economic and political, must be measured in decades, not years. The courageous pro democracy leaders there are navigating a complex obstacle course of domestic politics, international diplomacy and, most important, the friction between new ideas and the old.

    Indeed, I underscore our friendship with Russia to suggest that history presents no better time than right now to reduce nuclear danger. But that opportunity comes with this warning: At the dawn of the millennium, history travels in high gear at high speed. The rapid pace of change within Russia and around the world will not shift into neutral while we debate whether to seize this opportunity. I expect our friendship with Russia to endure. I expect their experiment with democracy to succeed. But the road to that destination will take us around a few curves, into a few potholes and over a few speed bumps. We know what our relationship with Russia is like today. We can predict, but cannot know, what it will be in a year, or two, or five, or 10. We do not know whether the circumstances for reducing nuclear dangers will be as favorable then as they are now, and therefore it is incumbent on us to act boldly and to act swiftly. History will judge us harshly if we ignore this opportunity when it is open to us.

    The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, process has taken us in the right direction. It has marked a steady series of steps back from the brink of nuclear conflagration. But even after START ONE is fully implemented and six thousand warheads are left, the walk back to that brink would be a short trip. More important, I fear the pace of change in Russia could overtake us and the opportunity before us could close before the START process has time to run its lengthy course. This process takes so long because its safeguards were erected under a cloud of fear of a first strike by a Cold War enemy. The result is a cumbersome treaty, more than 250 pages long, that makes the journey back from the brink long, laborious and expensive.

    Today our open friendship with Russia and the technology of intelligence allow us to move more swiftly. We need a new nuclear policy that protects us from new nuclear dangers, and we need a new framework for enacting it that moves at the pace of world change and can seize this opportunity before it is gone.

    To that end I am proposing the following:

    First, the President of the United States should work with Congress to remove legislative restraints on reducing deployed strategic U.S. forces below the START ONE level of 6,000 warheads. This deployed arsenal no longer serves our national security interests, and it is provoking Russia to maintain an arsenal that undermines our national security interests.

    Simultaneous with this request, the president should agree with Republican leadership to build a defined, rigorously tested strategic missile defense. He should make clear to Russia’s leaders we would build it for accidental and rouge nation threats.

    The president should couple this request with a request for such funds as necessary to make certain Russia knows that Nunn-Lugar will be fully funded to go to START THREE levels.

    Second, acting in his capacity as Commander in Chief and in an act of international leadership, the President should immediately order the reduction of American nuclear forces to no more than the proposed START THREE levels. The two thousand to twenty-five-hundred nuclear warheads that would remain are more than enough — many, many times over — to destroy any nation, any where, any time, that threatens us. And the diversity of our triad — nuclear weapons on air, land and sea — protects us against the risk of a first strike destroying our capacity to retaliate. If we can reduce farther without endangering our security, we should.

    Third, because the complete and verifiable dismantling of those weapons will take time, the President should immediately stand down weapons in excess of START THREE levels from their hair-trigger alert. Warheads should be physically separated from delivery vehicles. Our national security will not be endangered by leaders having two days, rather than two minutes, to make life-and-death decisions about nuclear war. While this proposal would apply only to warheads in excess of START THREE levels, we should seriously explore the possibility of the United States and Russia standing down all forces from hair-trigger alert.

    Fourth, this reciprocal reduction to START THREE levels should be only a way station, not an end point. We should continue to supplement the START process with a series of mutual, transparent and reciprocal steps between the United States and Russia to reduce nuclear arsenals and alert levels. We should be willing to go as low as Russia wants to go, as low as we can verify they are going, and as low as we can go without risking our security either from Russia or other nuclear powers.

    To enable this process of mutual, transparent steps, we should greatly expand funding for the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. We should spend whatever is necessary to help Russia dismantle and secure her nuclear arsenal. Nunn-Lugar is one of the great acts of post-Cold War statesmanship, and it defies understanding that we are engaged in a year-to-year battle to fund it. If we can spend $25 billion a year on a nuclear policy that is making people less safe, surely we can spend a fraction of that on an investment that is making us more safe.

    There is precedent for action like I have described. On September 27, 1991, with the Soviet Union still intact and before the Soviet parliament ratified START ONE, President Bush went on national television to announce he was ordering the elimination of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons, deactivating 450 ICBMs, standing down our bomber fleet, and ordering a stop to Pentagon development of a short-range ballistic missile. President Gorbachev reciprocated nine days later. Likewise President Clinton showed courageous leadership by first unilaterally rescinding our nuclear testing, and, second, by providing the leadership that culminated in the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty at the United Nations. I will urge the Republican Senate leadership to bring that treaty up for Senate approval as soon as possible.

    Today it is clear Russia not only wants to follow our lead, but must. Russia’s own defense minister recently said, publicly, that Russia is thinking of its long-term nuclear arsenal in terms of hundreds, not thousands. Our action would give Russia the confidence to do what the unbearable cost of maintaining nuclear arsenals already dictates that she must do.

    The approach I have outlined would have the following benefits.

    First, a bold gesture of friendship and leadership that does not threaten our security would give Russia the confidence to significantly reduce her own nuclear arsenal, strengthen the position of our pro-democracy friends there and send a signal to the world that nuclear weapons are a sign of peril, not prestige, in the post-Cold War era.

    Second, by reducing the number of nuclear weapons around the world, we would reduce the new nuclear dangers of accidental launch, proliferation or acquisition by rogue groups or individuals.

    Third, by de-alerting weapons in excess of what we need to defend ourselves — and perhaps the rest of the world’s arsenals — we would reduce the new nuclear danger of total war being dictated by a time-line that prevents rational deliberation.

    Fourth, our reduction of our own stockpile would free money and resources to confront other, newer, threats, from regional war to ethnic conflict to international terrorism. We would, quite simply, be getting more safety for less money. This last point is crucial. The $25 billion a year it is estimated we spend maintaining our nuclear arsenal adds far less value to the safety of Americans today than $25 billion spent on our Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps and the intelligence gathering that support these and other pillars of our national security infrastructure.

    No President can take such bold action without domestic support. Our ability to forge a new nuclear policy for the post-Cold War era hinges on our ability to thaw the Cold War between those on opposite sides of the ideological divide in our own country. We must realize that we share a common goal: reducing nuclear dangers. I am eager to build partnerships that seize on that common ground while reducing ideological differences. If, for example, some of my Republican colleagues will support me in seeking steep cuts in nuclear arsenals, I am open to working with them on the deployment of a defined, rigorously tested missile defense. Whether it be through this or other means, those with a common goal — reducing nuclear dangers — must find common ground. If we elevate imagination over ideology, we can do it.

    Imagination seems like a good note on which to end this speech. I opened by telling you we need a new nuclear policy to confront new nuclear dangers. I close by telling you that to do it, we need something that isn’t new at all. The same courage, creativity and leadership that won the Cold War are exactly the ingredients we need to keep our people safe in its aftermath. It is clear to me that our nuclear arsenal and the policies which controlled these weapons of mass destruction helped keep our safety and the world’s peace for 40 years. It is equally clear that we need a new policy — one which will seize an opportunity to make the world safer still. Thank you.