Tag: nuclear terrorism

  • Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy

    Nuclear Terrorism and US Nuclear Policy

    As bad as September 11th may have been, it could have been far worse. Had terrorists attacked with nuclear weapons, the death toll could have risen into the millions. It is likely that even one crude nuclear weapon would have left Manhattan utterly destroyed, and with it the financial and communications centers of the country. Were terrorists to obtain one or more nuclear weapons and use them on New York, Washington or other cities, the United States could cease to exist as a functioning country. The stakes are very high, and yet the US is creating new nuclear policies that increase the likelihood that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons.

    A bipartisan commission, headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, concluded that the United States should be spending some $3 billion per year over the next ten years to help Russia control its nuclear weapons and weapon-grade nuclear materials. Rather than spend less than one percent of the current defense budget on dramatically curtailing the potential spread of nuclear weapons and materials to terrorists or unfriendly regimes, the Bush administration is trying to save money in this area. It is spending only one-third of the proposed amount to help Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons and materials and find alternative work for nuclear physicists a woefully inadequate amount if we are truly attempting to quell nuclear proliferation.

    The administration’s frugality with regard to protecting potential “loose nukes” in Russia should be compared with its generosity for defense spending in general and for missile defenses in particular. The president has recently asked for another $48 billion for defense for fiscal 2003, following an increase of $33.5 billion this year. This year’s budget for ballistic missile defense is $8.3 billion. Since the likelihood of a terrorist using a missile to launch a nuclear attack against the United States or any other country is virtually zero, it would appear that the administration’s budget priorities are way out of line in terms of providing real security and protecting the US and other countries from the threat of nuclear terrorism.

    The administration’s approach to nuclear disarmament with the Russians is to place warheads taken off active deployment onto the shelf so that they can later be reactivated should our current president or a future president decide to do so. While the Russians have made it clear that they would prefer to destroy the weapons and make nuclear disarmament irreversible, they will certainly follow the US lead in also shelving their deactivated warheads. This will, of course, create even greater security concerns in Russia and make it more likely that these weapons will find their way into terrorist hands.

    So what is to be done? The United States must change its nuclear policies and make good on its promise to the other 186 parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the world. This goal can only be achieved with US leadership, and it is a goal that is absolutely in the interests of the people of the United States. When the parties to the NPT meet again this April, the US is sure to come under heavy criticism for its notice of withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, its failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, its new strategy to make nuclear disarmament reversible, and its recent announcement that it is rescinding its security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states.

    In the end, the country that faces the greatest threat from nuclear terrorism is the United States, and it is a threat that cannot be counteracted by missile defenses or threats of retaliation. Terrorists, who cannot be easily located and who may be suicidal anyway, will simply not be deterred by nuclear threat.

    If the Bush administration truly wants to reduce the possibility of nuclear terrorism against US cities and abroad, it must reverse its current policy of systematically dismantling the arms control agreements established over the past four decades. It must instead become a leader in the global effort to urgently and dramatically reduce the level of nuclear weapons throughout the world and bring the remaining small arsenals of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials under effective international controls.
    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Top Five List of Events Related to Nuclear Terrorism in 2001

    On 11 September, terrorists hijacked four US jetliners, crashing two into the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City, one into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and one in Pennsylvania. In the aftermath of 11 September, the question of nuclear terrorism became a serious international concern. The following are the top five nuclear terrorism related events of 2001.

    1. In exercises designed to test security, US Army and Navy Teams successfully penetrate nuclear facilities and obtain nuclear materials. The US takes legislative measures to increase security at and around nuclear facilities.

    2. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf orders an emergency redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal to at least six secret new locations.

    3. The UK Ministry of Defense publishes details about the transport of nuclear weapons and plutonium throughout the country on the Ministry of Defense website, raising controversy over offering potential terrorists a guide to the rail lines, roads and airports used for nuclear materials.

    4. As a precaution against suicide attacks, France increases the number of surface-to-air missiles near La Hague, Europe’s largest nuclear waste reprocessing plant.

    5. Weapons experts testify to attendees of the International Atomic Energy Agency conference in Vienna, Austria that terrorists could use a nuclear device.

     

    1. US Nuclear Facilities Fail Security Drills

    A report released in October by a non-governmental watchdog organization, Project on Government Oversight (POGO), found that the ten US nuclear weapons research and production facilities are vulnerable to a terrorist attack and failed about half of recent security drills. In exercises designed to test security, US Army and Navy teams successfully penetrated nuclear facilities and obtained nuclear materials. US government security regulations require that nuclear facilities defend themselves against the theft of nuclear materials by terrorists or through sabotage. According to Dannielle Brian, POGO Director, the repeated security breaches are serious cause for concern because Department of Energy employees were warned before each security exercise but still failed to stop the would-be terrorists in more than half the drills.

    Nine of the ten weapons facilities are within 100 miles of cities with more than 75,000 people. Eight of the ten weapons facilities contain a total of 33.5 metric tons of plutonium. It only takes a few pounds of plutonium to create a nuclear bomb. Regarding security at the nuclear weapons facilities, Brian stated that no one thought it really mattered until 11 September. A spokesperson from the National Nuclear Security Administration declined to comment on the report. The full report can be accessed online at POGO’s website http://www.pogo.org/.

    In related news, Representative Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts) introduced legislation on 14 November requiring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to have supplies of potassium iodide within 200 miles of each of the 103 operating nuclear power plants in the US. If passed, the bill would also require the government commission to stock potassium iodide at individual homes and public facilities within 50 miles of a nuclear power plant. Potassium iodide has been shown to protect the body’s thyroid gland from diseases related to radiation exposure and must be taken within several hours after exposure to be effective.

    In addition, Markey is urging US lawmakers to pass measures that would increase security at nuclear power plants in the wake of the 11 September events. Markey stated, “In this new era of terrorism, in which the threat of an intentional release of radioactivity can no longer be ignored, we should waste no more time.”

    On 15 November, US Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-New York) and Harry Reid (D-Nevada) announced that they will introduce legislation to federalize security guards at the 103 nuclear power plants across the US. Currently, nuclear power plant operators hire private guards. The guards carry weapons, but they do not have police power. Since the events of 11 September, local police, and state police and, in some states, National Guard troops have augmented security at the nation’s nuclear power plants.

    While conservatives in the Senate will likely object to federalizing guards, according to Senator Clinton, “We can no longer leave the security at our nation’s nuclear power plants to chance.” Senator Reid noted that Congress just agreed to federalize passenger and baggage screeners at airports. He stated, “It’s time we focus the same energy to improve safety at nuclear power plants.”

    2. Pakistan Restructures Nuclear Arsenal and Military to Avoid Nuclear Terrorism

    On 10 November, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of the country’s nuclear arsenal to at least six secret new locations. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was moved for fear of theft or strikes against the country’s nuclear facilities and also to remove its nuclear arsenal from bases that might be used by the US.

    Musharraf also reorganized military oversight of the nuclear forces in the weeks after joining the US in its campaign against terrorism in Afghanistan. On 7 October, Musharraf created the new Strategic Planning Division, headed by a three-star general to oversee operations as part of a top military and intelligence restructuring designed to marginalize officers considered too sympathetic to the Taliban and other extremist factions. General Khalid Kidwai is now the director of operational security for the country’s nuclear sites and weapons and he answers directly to Musharraf.

    Reports from the US Central Intelligence Agency and other sources have stated that Pakistan stores its nuclear warheads and missiles separately but it is unknown whether in the emergency conditions of the months following the 11 September events whether the equipment was repositioned for easier assembly. Intelligence sources believe that Pakistan has between 30-40 warheads and it has test-fired intermediate range ballistic missiles. US officials fear that if Musharraf is assassinated or ousted in a military coup, extremists could gain control of the Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal or share knowledge about them with hostile organizations or regimes.

    3. UK Ministry of Defense Releases Details of Nuclear Transports Despite Threat Posed by Nuclear Terrorism

    The UK Ministry of Defense published details about the transport of nuclear weapons and plutonium throughout the country on the Ministry of Defense website in November intended to assist police, fire brigades and city councils in drafting emergency plans in case of an accident. The Ministry of Defense has received criticism for the report entitled “Defence Nuclear Materials Transport Contingency Arrangements,” because opponents argue that the report could offer potential terrorists a guide to the rail lines, roads and airports used for nuclear materials. It also raised controversy in light of Home Secretary David Blunkett’s attempts to prevent nuclear terrorism. The report challenges one of Secretary Blunkett’s proposed measures that makes it an offense punishable by seven years in jail to disclose any information that “might prejudice the security of any nuclear site or of any nuclear material.”

    The report details security for nuclear convoys. It also lists UK military nuclear reactor factories and test sites and for the first time where “special nuclear materials” such as weapons-grade uranium and plutonium would travel. In addition, the publication reveals that a warhead is unstable if heated. According to the report, “If weapon is jetting (flames under pressure) explosion may be imminent, debris may be scattered within 600 m[eter] radius.”

    Stewart Kemp, Secretary of the Nuclear Free Local Authorities stated, “If the government judges that there is an increased terrorist threat then the right thing to do is to stop the transports altogether.”

    The full report can be obtained online at http://www.mod.uk/index.php3?page=2474.

    4. France Deploys Missiles to Defend Nuclear Waste Reprocessing Plant

    As a precaution against suicide attacks, France increased the number of surface-to-air missiles near La Hague, Europe’s largest nuclear waste reprocessing plant in November. In October, the French Defense Ministry announced that radar systems capable of detecting low-flying planes and surface-to-air missiles had been positioned at La Hague as well as at Il Longue, a military base for nuclear submarines off the Brittany coast in northwest France.

    A top regional official stated that the deployment of surface-to-air missiles was placed a mile from the plant and the measure was purely precautionary in light of the events of 11 September in the US.

    5. IAEA Calls for Global Nuclear Security Standards to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

    Weapons experts told attendees of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference in Vienna, Austria on 2 November that terrorists could use a nuclear device. Speakers at the conference suggested that western countries, in particular the US, should accelerate efforts to protect nuclear materials that could, if they haven’t already, fall into the hands of terrorists. Morten Bremer Maerli, a researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affaris, stated, “The only strategy is to protect the material where it is, but this kind of implementation strategy doesn’t exist.”

    Maerli and other experts testified to a shocking lack of security and control to prevent the theft or purchase of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities in many countries, especially Russia. Since 1993, the IAEA has reported 175 cases of nuclear materials trafficking, including 18 cases involving small amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. In these cases, law enforcement agencies seized the materials, but records at the facilities from which the materials were stolen, most of them Russian, did not show anything missing. According to Matthew Bunn, Assistant Director of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, up to 60 percent of nuclear material remains inadequately secured in Russia.

    Mohamed ElBaradei, IAEA Director General, stated “The controls on nuclear material and radioactive sources are uneven. Security is as good as its weakest link and loose nuclear material in any country is a potential threat to the entire world.” According to ElBaradei, in the wake of the 11 September events, the IAEA has expanded its concerns about nuclear materials getting into clandestine weapons programs, not only in states that sponsor terrorism, but also into the hands of extremist groups.

    ElBaradei called for international unity to create universal minimum security standards for nuclear plants and materials. Currently, standards are largely left to individual countries. The IAEA also requested $30 million to $50 million to step up safety work in securing nuclear materials globally.

  • Time to Shut Down the Nation’s Nuclear Plants

    In the aftermath of the horrific September 11 attack on the World Trade Center there has been considerable discussion in the US media about the threat of a future chemical or biological attack. Meanwhile, the much greater threat posed by a successful terrorist attack on a US nuclear reactor has passed almost without notice. Currently there are about 110 operational nuclear reactors in the United States. And virtually every one of these electrical generating facilities is vulnerable to terrorism. Indeed, from the standpoint of the terrorist it would be hard to imagine a more ideal target than a nuclear reactor. These plants are uniquely vulnerable by virtue of their design. A successful assault on even one nuclear reactor could produce a catastrophe that would make the recent tragedy in New York seem puny by comparison.

    Such terrorism would be much easier to mount than the attack on the World Trade Center. No need to hijack a commercial jet liner. A small plane would suffice, and could be legally rented at any of a hundred airports in the US. The plane could be flown to a remote air strip located, say, on a rented farm, there loaded with explosives or even gasoline, before being pointed in kamikaze fashion at a nuclear plant.

    Such an attack, planned by someone with the necessary expertise, and staged by a handful of determined men, would be extremely difficult to stop. Current operational safeguards at US nuclear plants are designed to protect against truck bombs. But apparently no thought has been given to the sort of aerial assault that toppled the World Trade Center.

    The objective of such terrorism would be to disable the nuclear plant’s safety (cooling) systems, triggering a worst-case scenario: a nuclear melt-down.

    A partial melt-down of uranium fuel did occur at Three Mile Island in 1979, and, again, at Chernobyl in 1986. However, serious as these accidents were, especially Chernobyl, the long-term consequences of a full-scale melt-down would be immeasurably worse, worse even than the detonation of a nuclear weapon. Why? Because the core of a nuclear reactor contains many times as much uranium fuel as the largest nuclear bomb. Hence the potential for the release of far more radiation.

    Try and imagine, if you can, the hellish scenario that would result from such an attack. A full scale melt-down is a runaway nuclear reaction in the core of a nuclear reactor. It leads to a “China Syndrome,” where the “hot” uranium fuel literally melts its way through the floor of the reactor’s containment vessel, then sinks into the earth until it reaches ground water; whereupon a gigantic plume of intensely radioactive material rises like death into the air and begins to spread with the winds over a vast area.

    Let us assume such an attack near a large US city — a fair assumption given that many nuclear plants are located near metropolitan areas. With the prevailing winds, a melt-down at a plant in Pennsylvania, say, or in Virginia, would contaminate a large portion of the eastern seaboard with lethal radiation, killing untold numbers of people, and necessitating the evacuation of tens of millions of others. Large areas would be rendered uninhabitable for centuries. Entire cities, including New York and even the nation’s capital, might have to be permanently vacated. The human cost in lives, not to mention the vast disruptions to American society, would be on a scale that is impossible to comprehend.

    Yet the danger is all too real. Although the inherent vulnerability of nuclear reactors to terrorism has been understood for many years, the threat has not been taken seriously — until now — for reasons of hubris and greed.

    From the day of their election President Bush and Vice President Cheney have touted a new generation of “clean” and “safe” nuclear power reactors that, we are told, will solve the nation’s latest energy crisis. The two most powerful men in the land have, in short, been doing everything in their power to magnify the problem, and have played straight into the hands of Osama bin Ladin.

    No doubt, Bush and Cheney’s support for nuclear has been driven by politics. They have sought to reward those in industry who supported their candidacy. Make no mistake, the only reason nuclear power has survived is because of federal subsidies. Corporate welfare has been its life-blood. In a truly free marketplace nuclear energy would long ago have gone the way of the dinosaurs.

    In the wake of the disaster in New York the nation must finally come to terms with the true risks of nuclear energy. We must face the reality that there is no way to adequately safeguard these plants. When terrorists are willing to die they are very difficult to stop. The only solution is prevention: phase out nuclear power as soon as possible in an orderly transition to wind and solar energy; which are immune to terrorism, in addition to being cost-effective and environmentally friendly.

    *Mark Gaffney is the author of a pioneering study of the Israeli nuclear weapons program. Mark is currently preparing a briefing paper “Will the Next Mid-East War Go Nuclear?” for the Washington-based Middle East Policy Council. He can be reached at: PO Box 100 Chiloquin, OR 97624 541-783-2309

  • U.S. Needs a Contigency Plan For Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal

    There is growing concern, and evidence for concern, that the instability in Afghanistan could quickly spread to neighboring Pakistan and undermine the security of that country’s nuclear arsenal. Of all of the negative consequences this turn of events might bring, none would be more dangerous and catastrophic than nuclear weapons falling into the hands of the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

    Until Sept. 11, the Pakistani regime and the Taliban were very close, and there have been reports out of Pakistan that military officers assisted the Taliban in preparing for U.S. airstrikes—counter to direct orders from Pakistan’s leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Top military officers, including the head of Pakistan’s intelligence services, recently have been sacked, reportedly for their pro-Taliban views.

    Violence in the streets, while not widespread beyond the border area with Afghanistan, speaks to the tensions inside Pakistan. A Newsweek poll this week found that 83% of Pakistanis polled sympathized with the Taliban in the current conflict. It is possible, therefore, that Pakistani forces assigned to protect Pakistan’s nuclear forces could be compromised.

    This is surely the nightmare scenario, and immediate steps should be taken to prevent such a turn of events from coming to pass.

    Pakistan possesses enough nuclear material for close to 40 nuclear weapons, if not more. The U.S., however, knows very little about how this material is stored, what security measures are applied to its protection, how personnel with access to nuclear weapons and materials are screened and where the material is located.

    Pakistan has a responsibility to ensure that its assets are adequately protected and to convince other countries that this responsibility is taken seriously. Other countries and organizations have a responsibility to help Pakistan keep these materials secure, without in any way assisting that country in modernizing or deploying its nuclear capability.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, a U.N.-affiliated organization, has decades of experience in developing and verifying security measures associated with nuclear weapons-usable materials. The agency routinely assists countries in ensuring that their peaceful nuclear programs are adequately protected. Despite its lack of membership in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan could receive advice and assistance from the IAEA.

    In addition, the U.S. and other IAEA members have extensive experience—publicly available—on how to protect nuclear materials and on how to ensure that weapons-usable uranium or plutonium cannot be diverted without being detected. States could make equipment available to Pakistan that did not directly assist in its development or control of nuclear weapons, such as alarm systems and polygraph equipment for personnel screening. In addition, corporations and nongovernmental organizations with significant expertise in nuclear matters could provide Pakistan with assistance on security.

    Pakistan has resisted any outside attempts to help secure its nuclear materials. There is the risk that receiving assistance for its nuclear program from outside powers might further destabilize the current situation. Yet Pakistan has already made its strategic decision to throw in with the West against terrorism. Taking this additional step, while difficult, may be part of the price it pays to reestablish itself as a responsible global partner.

    If Pakistan does not agree to these types of programs, the U.S. should begin to work immediately on contingency plans should the Islamabad regime lose control over its nuclear arsenal. These plans should include the ability to rapidly deploy forces to Pakistan to find and regain control of any lost nuclear materials and, only as a last option in a crisis, remove them from Pakistan to a secure location.

    These steps might seem extreme. Yet when faced with the real possibility of losing control of nuclear weapons to the types of organizations capable of the destruction seen Sept. 11, they could be considered realistic and even prudent. The consequences of not being prepared to act are too great for us to imagine, even with our new ability to imagine the horrible.

    *Jon B. Wolfsthal is an associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s nonproliferation program and a former nonproliferation policy advisor to the U.S. Department of Energy.

  • Preventing a Terrorist Mushroom Cloud

    The images of the hijacked planes crashing into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania are nightmare images of unspeakable horror that will forever be a part of our reality.

    Imagine, however, another nightmare — that of a mushroom cloud rising over an American city. This is a threat we can no longer ignore. Terrorists have demonstrated their willingness to attack US cities and the possibility of them doing so with nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. After September 11th, citizens and leaders alike should be better able to understand the seriousness of the nuclear threat.

    The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were powerful warnings. They signaled that determined terrorists are prepared to sacrifice their lives to harm us, that future attacks could involve weapons of mass destruction, and that nuclear dangers are increasing because of terrorist activity.

    Our leaders have failed to grasp that our present nuclear weapons policies contribute to the possibility of nuclear terrorism against our country. We are simply not doing enough to prevent nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists.

    A US blue ribbon commission, headed by former Senate majority leader Howard Baker, has called for spending $3 billion a year over the next ten years to maintain control of the nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and nuclear scientists in the former Soviet Union. Yet, the Bush administration has proposed funding cuts for this program from $1.2 billion to $800 million next year.

    The Bush Administration’s primary response to the nuclear threat has been to push for a national missile shield costing billions of dollars, the technology of which is unproven, and which would at best be years away from implementation. A missile shield would likely do irreparable harm to our relations with other countries, countries that we need to join us in the fight against international terrorism.

    The mad nuclear arms race during the Cold War, and the paltry steps taken to reverse it since the end of the Cold War, have left tens of thousands of nuclear weapons potentially available to terrorists. Today there is no accurate inventory of the world’s nuclear arsenals or weapons-grade fissile materials suitable for making nuclear weapons. Estimates have it, however, that there are currently more than 30,000 nuclear weapons in the world. We simply don’t know whether these weapons are adequately controlled, or whether some could already have fallen into the hands of terrorists.

    Osama bin Laden claims to possess nuclear weapons. His claim is feasible. Former Russian Security Advisor Aleksandr Lebed has stated that some 80 to 100 suitcase-size nuclear weapons in the one kiloton range are missing from the Russian arsenal. This claim was reiterated by Alexey Yablokov, an advisor to former Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

    The Russian government has denied the claims of missing Russian nuclear weapons, but former US Deputy Energy Secretary Charles Curtis has expressed doubt about these assurances. According to Curtis, “We believe we have a full accounting of all of Russia’s strategic weapons, but when it comes to tactical weapons – the suitcase variety – we do not know, and I’m not sure they do, either.”

    More than ten years after the end of the Cold War we and the Russians still have more than 10,000 nuclear weapons each with a total of some 4,500 of them on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments. Russia has been urging the US to move faster on START 3 negotiations to reduce the size of the nuclear arsenals in both countries, but US leaders had been largely indifferent to their entreaties.

    In November 2001, President Bush announced that the US was prepared to reduce its arsenal of long-range nuclear weapons to between 2,200 and 1,700 over the next ten years. President Putin indicated that Russia would make commensurate cuts. These steps are in the right direction, but they still indicate reliance on Cold War strategies of deterrence. They also do not address tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons, which are the most likely weapons to be used and to fall into the hands of terrorists.

    Large nuclear arsenals, measured in the thousands, on hair-trigger alert are Cold War relics. They do not provide deterrence against terrorist attacks. Nor could a missile shield have prevented the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center or the Pentagon, or protect against future nuclear terrorism.

    From the outset, the Bush administration’s foreign policy course has been based on unilateral US actions and indifference bordering on hostility to international law. Since September 11th, the administration seems to have recognized that we cannot combat terrorism unilaterally. A multilateral effort to combat terrorism will require the US to change its policies and embrace multilateral approaches to many global problems, including the control and elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

    The global elimination of nuclear weapons can no longer be a back-burner, peace activist issue. It is a top-priority security issue for all Americans, and it will require US leadership to achieve.

    *David Krieger, an attorney and political scientist, is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • US Nuclear Weapons Policy After September 11th

    US Nuclear Weapons Policy After September 11th

    Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush gathered together his top security advisors to consider the implications of terrorism for US nuclear policy. A few facts were clear. There were well-organized and suicidal terrorists who were committed to inflicting large-scale damage on the US. These terrorists had attempted to obtain nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. They probably had not succeeded yet in obtaining nuclear weapons, but would certainly keep trying to do so. It was highly unlikely that terrorists would be able to deliver nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction by means of missiles, but they could potentially smuggle one or more nuclear weapons into the United States and use them to attack US cities. The death and destruction would be enormous, dwarfing the damage caused on September 11th.

    These facts alarmed the Bush security advisors. They went to work immediately developing plans to protect the American people against the possible nuclear terrorism that threatened American cities. The first prong of their defense against nuclear terrorism was to call for dramatically increased funding to secure the nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. Encouraged by the success that had been achieved up to this point with the Nunn-Lugar funding, they realized that this was an area in which they could work closely with Russia in assuring that these weapons were kept secure and out of the hands of criminals and terrorists. The Russians were eager to get this help and to join with the Americans in this effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.

    The second prong of the US plan was to work with the Russians in achieving significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of each country in order that there would be less nuclear weapons available to potentially fall into the hands of terrorists. Since the end of the Cold War the US and Russia have been reducing their nuclear arsenals, and now it was time to make even greater progress toward the promise of the two countries “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.” This meant reaching an agreement as a next step to slash the size of their arsenals to a few hundred nuclear warheads and to make these reductions irreversible. The international community applauded the boldness of this step, celebrating this major achievement in nuclear disarmament and this important step toward realizing the promise of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    The third prong of the US plan was to give its full support to bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force, giving momentum to assuring an end to nuclear testing for all time. This step was viewed by the Bush security advisors as having indirect consequences for nuclear terrorism by assuring that other countries would forego the capability to improve the sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. It would be seen as a sign of US leadership for a world free of nuclear weapons, and this would have a positive effect on preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    The fourth prong of the US plan was to reevaluate the administration’s commitment to developing and deploying missile defenses. Prior to September 11th, President Bush and his security team had been strong advocates of developing and deploying ballistic missile defenses. President Bush had even been threatening to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to move forward with missile defense deployment. Following September 11th, it was clear that it made little sense to devote another $100 billion or more to missile defenses when terrorists were capable of attacking US cities by far simpler means. There were more urgent needs for these resources to be used in improving US intelligence and keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. Therefore, the decision was made to put the development of missile defenses on the back burner and instead devote major resources to safeguarding nuclear materials throughout the world. These actions were extremely helpful in improving our relations with both Russia and China, which were both relieved at not having to respond to our missile defenses by increasing their nuclear arsenals.

    The fifth prong of the US plan was to work intensively with countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel to convince them that nuclear weapons were not in their security interests and that they would have a heavy price to pay if they did not join us in moving rapidly toward a nuclear-weapons-free world. The Bush advisors knew that this would be difficult, but they were certain that the US example of curtailing its own nuclear arsenal and foregoing missile defenses, along with support to these countries for economic development, would convince them to follow our lead.

    The world’s leaders and citizens have not heard about these US actions to combat nuclear terrorism because they never happened. The description above is an imaginative account of what might have happened — what should have happened. The most remarkable reality about the US response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 is how little these attacks actually affected US nuclear policy. Although US nuclear forces will certainly not deter terrorists, US nuclear policy remains highly dependent on nuclear weapons and the policy of nuclear deterrence.

    To set the record straight, the Bush administration has supported cuts in the Nunn-Lugar funding for securing Russian nuclear weapons and materials. It has called for reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons over a ten-year period, although not within the scope of a binding treaty and, in fact, has indicated it plans to put the deactivated warheads on the shelf for potential future use. It has come out against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and boycotted a UN conference to bring the treaty into force more rapidly. President Bush has announced that the US will unilaterally withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and move forward rapidly to deploy ballistic missile defenses, a move that has drawn critical response from both Russia and China. Finally, the Bush administration, rather than putting pressure on India and Pakistan to disarm, has ended the sanctions imposed on them for testing nuclear weapons in May 1998. The administration has never put pressure on Israel to eliminate its nuclear arsenal, although this is a major factor in motivating Arab countries to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

    While there is much the Bush administration might have done to make nuclear terrorism less likely, the path they have chosen increases the risks of nuclear terrorism. It also undermines our relationship with countries we need in the fight against terrorism in general and nuclear terrorism in particular. Finally, the US nuclear policy after September 11th is a slap in the face to the 187 parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and increases the possibilities of nuclear proliferation and a breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and regime.

     

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism

    The greatest nuclear danger that I am concerned with is not the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other states, though that is a grave danger. Of even greater concern is the invidious belief of policy makers in a small number of states that they have a right to maintain nuclear weapons indefinitely, and that in their hands nuclear weapons do not constitute a threat either to their own citizens or to the remainder of humanity. This is a foolish belief that discounts the principle that if something can go wrong it will go wrong. It is also a belief that is likely to encourage proliferation to other states and possibly to terrorist groups as well.

    There is no reason to be assured that nuclear weapons in the hands of the current nuclear weapons states will not result in tragedy surpassing all imagination. One can only wonder what it is that makes most citizens of nuclear weapons states so complacent under these circumstances. Clearly, for the most part, otherwise normal people have learned to live with the terror of nuclear weapons and, in doing so, have become accustomed to condoning terrorism at a national level.

    It is this situation that compounds the danger because without the vigorous protests of citizens in the nuclear weapons states, there is no impetus to change the status quo. And if the status quo with regard to reliance on nuclear weapons does not change, there will surely be proliferation and it will be only a question of time until nuclear weapons are again used in warfare.

    Due to the intransigence of the nuclear weapons states, there has been virtually no progress toward nuclear disarmament in the past five years. The START II Treaty, which was agreed to by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 1993, called for reductions in deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,500 on each side by January 1, 2003. Since then, Presidents .Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed to move this date back five years to December 31, 2007.

    The total number of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia at the completion of START II, if it is completed, will be around 10,000 on each side.

    For decades India has made it clear that it supports complete nuclear disarmament, but that it is not willing to live in a world of “nuclear apartheid.” Indian leaders have stated that if all states will renounce nuclear weapons and agree to go to zero, India will happily join them. On the other hand, Indian leaders have said that if the nuclear weapons states insist on maintaining nuclear arsenals, India will do so as well.

    As we know, India gave the world a wake-up call in May when it tested nuclear weapons, followed a few weeks later by Pakistan’s tests. In light of the testing by India and Pakistan, I would like to offer five propositions.

    My first proposition is that the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan does not constitute nuclear proliferation. Both states have long had nuclear weapons. India first tested a nuclear device, which it said was for peaceful purposes, in 1974. The world largely ignored the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan by referring to them, along with Israel which also has a nuclear arsenal, as “threshold states.” This was simply a euphemism to perpetuate the denial that nuclear proliferation had already occurred.

    It is interesting to note the reactions to the recent nuclear testing in South Asia. President Clinton responded to the Indian tests by stating, “To think that you have to manifest your greatness by behavior that recalls the very worst events of the 20th century on the edge of the 21st century, when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind, is just wrong. And they clearly don’t need it to maintain their security.”

    There are several points worth noting in President Clinton’s response. Haven’t the United States and the other nuclear weapons states sought to manifest their greatness in just this way? Isn’t this the basis for UK’s or France’s claim to great power status, whatever that is, at this point in time? Where is the evidence that “everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age behind”? Certainly it is almost impossible to find that evidence in President Clinton’s own record. And if India does not need nuclear weapons to maintain its security, wouldn’t that argument be even stronger for the United States and other countries infinitely more militarily powerful than India?

    Referring to this reaction by President Clinton, Henry Kissinger, who many would argue should rank among the greatest war criminals of the latter part of the 20th century, stated, “But he [Clinton] destroys the U.S. case by using hyperbole that cannot be translated into operational policy: by claiming a special insight into the nature of greatness in the 21st century; by the dubious proposition that all other nations are trying to leave the nuclear world behind (what about Iran, Iraq and North Korea?), and by the completely unsupported proposition that countries with threatening nuclear neighbors do not need nuclear weapons to assure their security.”

    Mr. Kissinger has perhaps always felt that only he has “special insight into the nature of greatness.” Unfortunately for humanity, the United States has allowed him an operational platform on which to act upon his insights in Chile, Iran, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and elsewhere. Clearly all other states are not trying to leave the nuclear world behind, but why does he pick out only Iran, Iraq, and North Korea? What about the nuclear weapons states themselves? And their NATO allies that join in a common nuclear strategy? What about Japan accumulating tons of reprocessed plutonium suitable for making nuclear weapons? What about Israel?

    Kissinger’s final point about countries with threatening nuclear neighbors needing nuclear weapons to assure their security is a clear recipe for proliferation as well as disaster. Would he advise the countries of the Middle East to develop nuclear arsenals in response to Israel having done so? Perhaps Mr. Kissinger has calculated that the nuclear weapons of the United States and its allies are not threatening. Other states, with other experiences, may view U.S. nuclear weapons and those of its allies somewhat less benignly.

    My second proposition is that proliferation of nuclear weapons is virtually assured given the continuation of present policies by the nuclear weapons states. So long as the nuclear weapons states maintain that nuclear weapons are necessary for their security, we can expect that other countries will desire to have these weapons. Statements condemning proliferation by leaders of nuclear weapons states, like Mr. Clinton’s response to India’s testing, will not be taken seriously so long as the U.S. continues its current policy of maintaining its nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future.

    There is only one way to prevent nuclear proliferation. That is for the nuclear weapons states to make an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to take steps, such as de-alerting their arsenals, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, and so on, to show that they are serious about their commitment. Short of moving rapidly in this direction and bringing all nuclear warheads and nuclear weapons materials under strict international controls, nuclear proliferation is assured.

    My third proposition is that nuclear weapons do not provide security. If you possess nuclear weapons, you will be the target of a threatened nuclear weapons attack. I wonder if the citizens of nuclear weapons states really understand the jeopardy in which they are placed by their governments’ policies. Of course, there is also the risk to the security of the world. By the obscenely large arsenals created and maintained by the U.S. and Russia, the entire world is jeopardized — the future of humanity, the future of most forms of life. It always amazes me that many people calling themselves environmentalists don’t seem to understand that nuclear weapons pose a manmade environmental threat that exceeds all bounds of reason.

    Deterrence is simply a theory. It is not a shield. One cannot prove that a nuclear war has not occurred because of deterrence. There is no clear cause and effect linkage. In fact, it is not possible to prove a negative — that because of one thing, something else does not happen. We may be just plain lucky that a nuclear war has not occurred since two or more countries have been in possession of nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan, countries that have warred three times in the past 40 years, will certainly put additional strain on the theory of deterrence.

    My fourth proposition is that arms control agreements have served largely as a “figleaf” of respectability for maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty actually enshrines the proposition that there are two classes of states — those that possessed nuclear weapons before January 1, 1967 as one class, and everyone else as the other class. The only way around this situation is for the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament as set forth in the treaty. Unfortunately, the nuclear weapons states have not done this despite the strong reinforcement of this treaty provision by the World Court in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the general illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

    The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may also be viewed as a treaty that supports the favored position of the nuclear weapons states. After conducting over 2,000 nuclear tests, the nuclear weapons states agreed to stop testing. However, they have interpreted this prohibition as not applying to so-called “sub-critical” tests that use conventional explosives around a nuclear core but do not result in a sustained nuclear chain reaction. The U.S. has already conducted three sub-critical tests, and Russia has announced that it also has plans to conduct such tests this year.

    My fifth and final proposition is that terrorism has become an accepted and integrated part of the national security policies of the nuclear weapons states. Terrorism is the threat to injure or kill innocent people unless the terrorist’s demands are met. Nuclear weapons threaten to injure or kill innocent people. That is what they are designed to do. That is what they did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is what the nuclear weapons states threaten to do with them as a matter of policy. The nuclear weapons states, no matter how they argue their intentions, have become terrorist states. They have made their citizens either willing or unwilling accomplices in acts of terrorism. In time, if nothing is done to alter the present situation in the world, other states or criminal groups will obtain nuclear weapons and they too will act as terrorists.

    The current situation is fraught with danger. There seems to be a loss of moral bearing in the world. What is most tragic is that an opportunity to abolish nuclear weapons is being squandered in the nuclear weapons states by leaders with a lack of vision and citizens caught in an amoral drift of complacency. In order to change the world before it is too late, these citizens must awaken to their responsibilities as members of the human species and demand change from their governments. Otherwise significant progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is unlikely to occur, and the result will be increased nuclear proliferation and terrorism and, as a certainty, disastrous consequences.

    *David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. You can contact him at Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 1187 Coast Village Road, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794. The quotes by Clinton and Kissinger were in an op-ed by Henry Kissinger, “Hyperbole Is Not a Nonproliferation Policy,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1998.