Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear proliferation

  • The Treaty Wreckers

    In just a few months, Bush and Blair have destroyed global restraint on the development of nuclear weapons.

    Saturday is the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. The nuclear powers are commemorating it in their own special way: by seeking to ensure that the experiment is repeated.

    As Robin Cook showed in his column last week, the British government appears to have decided to replace our Trident nuclear weapons, without consulting parliament or informing the public. It could be worse than he thinks. He pointed out that the atomic weapons establishment at Aldermaston has been re-equipped to build a new generation of bombs. But when this news was first leaked in 2002 a spokesman for the plant insisted the equipment was being installed not to replace Trident but to build either mini-nukes or warheads that could be used on cruise missiles.

    If this is true it means the government is replacing Trident and developing a new category of boil-in-the-bag weapons. As if to ensure we got the point, Geoff Hoon, then the defence secretary, announced before the leak that Britain would be prepared to use small nukes in a pre-emptive strike against a non-nuclear state. This put us in the hallowed company of North Korea.

    The Times, helpful as ever, explains why Trident should be replaced. “A decision to leave the club of nuclear powers,” it says, “would diminish Britain’s international standing and influence.” This is true, and it accounts for why almost everyone wants the bomb. Two weeks ago, on concluding their new nuclear treaty, George Bush and the Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh announced that “international institutions must fully reflect changes in the global scenario that have taken place since 1945. The president reiterated his view that international institutions are going to have to adapt to reflect India’s central and growing role.” This translates as follows: “Now that India has the bomb it should join the UN security council.”

    It is because nuclear weapons confer power and status on the states that possess them that the non-proliferation treaty, of which the UK was a founding signatory, determines two things: that the non-nuclear powers should not acquire nuclear weapons, and that the nuclear powers should “pursue negotiations in good faith on … general and complete disarmament”. Blair has unilaterally decided to rip it up.

    But in helping to wreck the treaty we are only keeping up with our friends across the water. In May the US government launched a systematic assault on the agreement. The summit in New York was supposed to strengthen it, but the US, led by John Bolton – the undersecretary for arms control (someone had a good laugh over that one) – refused even to allow the other nations to draw up an agenda for discussion. The talks collapsed, and the treaty may now be all but dead. Needless to say, Bolton has been promoted: to the post of US ambassador to the UN. Yesterday Bush pushed his nomination through by means of a “recess appointment”: an undemocratic power that allows him to override Congress when its members are on holiday.

    Bush wanted to destroy the treaty because it couldn’t be reconciled with his new plans. Last month the Senate approved an initial $4m for research into a “robust nuclear earth penetrator” (RNEP). This is a bomb with a yield about 10 times that of the Hiroshima device, designed to blow up underground bunkers that might contain weapons of mass destruction. (You’ve spotted the contradiction.) Congress rejected funding for it in November, but Bush twisted enough arms this year to get it restarted. You see what a wonderful world he inhabits when you discover that the RNEP idea was conceived in 1991 as a means of dealing with Saddam Hussein’s biological and chemical weapons. Saddam is pacing his cell, but the Bushites, like the Japanese soldiers lost in Malaysia, march on. To pursue his war against the phantom of the phantom of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction, Bush has destroyed the treaty that prevents the use of real ones.

    It gets worse. Last year Congress allocated funding for something called the “reliable replacement warhead”. The government’s story is that the existing warheads might be deteriorating. When they show signs of ageing they can be dismantled and rebuilt to a “safer and more reliable” design. It’s a pretty feeble excuse for building a new generation of nukes, but it worked. The development of the new bombs probably means the US will also breach the comprehensive test ban treaty – so we can kiss goodbye to another means of preventing proliferation.

    But the biggest disaster was Bush’s meeting with Manmohan Singh a fortnight ago. India is one of three states that possess nuclear weapons and refuse to sign the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The treaty says India should be denied access to civil nuclear materials. But on July 18 Bush announced that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states”. He would “work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India” and “seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies”. Four months before the meeting the US lifted its south Asian arms embargo, selling Pakistan a fleet of F-16 aircraft, capable of a carrying a wide range of missiles, and India an anti-missile system. As a business plan, it’s hard to fault.

    Here then is how it works. If you acquire the bomb and threaten to use it you will qualify for American exceptionalism by proxy. Could there be a greater incentive for proliferation?

    The implications have not been lost on other states. ” India is looking after its own national interests,” a spokesman for the Iranian government complained on Wednesday. “We cannot criticise them for this. But what the Americans are doing is a double standard. On the one hand they are depriving an NPT member from having peaceful technology, but at the same time they are cooperating with India, which is not a member of the NPT.” North Korea (and this is the only good news around at the moment) is currently in its second week of talks with the US. While the Bush administration is doing the right thing by engaging with Pyongyang, the lesson is pretty clear. You could sketch it out as a Venn diagram. If you have oil and aren’t developing a bomb (Iraq) you get invaded. If you have oil and are developing a bomb (Iran) you get threatened with invasion, but it probably won’t happen. If you don’t have oil, but have the bomb, the US representative will fly to your country and open negotiations.

    The world of George Bush’s imagination comes into being by government decree. As a result of his tail-chasing paranoia, assisted by Tony Blair’s cowardice and Manmohan Singh’s opportunism, the global restraint on the development of nuclear weapons has, in effect, been destroyed in a few months. The world could now be more vulnerable to the consequences of proliferation than it has been for 35 years. Thanks to Bush and Blair, we might not go out with a whimper after all.

    Originally published by the Guardian.

  • In the Spirit of Einstein: Scientists Advancing Nuclear Weapons Abolition

    In 1955, fifty years ago and ten years after the harsh inception of the Nuclear Age at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein issued an appeal, known as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. It is the last public document signed by Einstein before his death. In addition to Russell and Einstein, the document was signed by nine other prominent scientists. The appeal warned that powerful new nuclear weapons raised the possibility of “universal death” in an all-out war, and called for the renunciation of war itself. “Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?” The appeal concluded: “Remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

     

    Over the ensuing decades of the Cold War and beyond it, many scientists and citizens throughout the world have grown complacent in the face of continuing nuclear dangers. The Cold War may have ended in the early 1990s, but nuclear dangers to humanity have not abated. In some respects, the dangers have increased. Among the scientists who have banded together to educate the public and offer constructive solutions to the nuclear dangers that threaten humanity are those who are or have been associated with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Pugwash) and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES).

     

    Many scientists have been involved in both organizations. Pugwash, which grew directly from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, began in 1957 and has tended to work in more closed circles of scientists in the hopes of being viewed by governments as more trustworthy. Pugwash shared the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize with its founder, Sir Joseph Rotblat. INES, by contrast, which was established at a large scientific meeting in Berlin in 1991, has been far more open to interactions with other civil society organizations and with the general public. One of the principal aims of INES has been to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons. This aim has been carried out by an extraordinarily dedicated group of scientists, engineers and experts in the INES project, the International Network of Scientists and Engineers Against Proliferation (INESAP). In the remainder of this article, I will discuss INESAP’s activities that have sought to move beyond the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other efforts to halt proliferation and to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

     

    INESAP was formed in 1993 by three young German scientists: Wolfgang Liebert, Martin Kalinowski and Juergen Scheffran. From its inception, the network focused on the central issue of the Nuclear Age: achieving total nuclear disarmament. The principal objectives of INESAP are “to promote nuclear disarmament, to tighten existing arms control and non-proliferation regimes, [and] to implement unconventional approaches to curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to controlling the transfer of related technology.”

     

    The founding conference of INESAP took place in Germany in August 1993, and was entitled, “Against Proliferation: Towards General Disarmament.” Some 50 scientists, engineers and other experts from 20 countries participated. In 1994, INESAP established a Study Group on non-proliferation, called “Beyond the NPT,” referring to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The work of the Study Group led to the publication of a document in early 1995, “Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World.” The document was prepared by some 50 authors from 17 countries, including soon-to-be Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat.

     

    Among the conclusions of this study were that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was insufficient to control nuclear proliferation, and that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of this treaty should be followed by multilateral negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The document proposed that the parties to the treaty, along with the few states still outside the treaty, should begin immediate negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a framework treaty for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Executive Summary of “Beyond the NPT” stated, “In its Final Document the NPT Review and Extension Conference should, in its call for decisive steps towards a NWFW [nuclear weapons-free world], include a mandate for the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). The pattern has to be that which has already been set by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – a total ban.”

     

    The 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference was held at United Nations headquarters in New York. It was one of the most important meetings in the then 25-year history of treaty and may turn out to be one of the significant events of the Nuclear Age, with broad implications for the future of civilization. At issue during the conference was whether the treaty should be extended indefinitely or for periods of time. The United States and other nuclear weapons states were strong supporters of indefinite extension, their goal being to prevent nuclear proliferation while maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Many civil society organizations, along with some non-nuclear weapons states, argued against indefinite extension on the basis that it would be like giving a blank check to parties (the nuclear weapons states) who were notorious for overdrawing their accounts and could not be trusted to keep their promises.

     

    The essential bargain of the NPT was that non-nuclear weapons states would not develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons states would cease the nuclear arms race and engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. From the perspective of the non-nuclear weapons states, the treaty was never meant to establish permanent nuclear double standards, making nuclear weapons acceptable for the small minority while prohibiting them to the vast majority.

     

    INESAP was a leader among the civil society organizations at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference pressing the point that preventing proliferation was not sufficient and that it was necessary to move expeditiously toward a nuclear weapons-free world. In cooperation with other leading international organizations, INESAP sponsored a two-day forum on the abolition of nuclear weapons, based upon its study, “Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World.” The INESAP forum provided an opportunity to present a variety of proposals on how to attain a nuclear weapons-free world and for civil society representatives from around the world to debate strategies for moving forward.

     

    The NPT Review and Extension Conference ended with a victory for the nuclear weapons states and a sound defeat for humanity. The treaty was extended indefinitely with no further requirements that the nuclear weapons states fulfill their obligations under the treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament. Having achieved the indefinite extension of the treaty, the nuclear weapons states showed no inclination to proceed with negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, as INESAP had proposed.

     

    The outcome of the NPT Review and Extension Conference created a strong reaction by civil society organizations and an increased determination among them to work for the abolition of nuclear weapons. INESAP and other civil society groups coalesced to form Abolition 2000, a global network for the abolition of nuclear weapons, which has now grown to over 2,000 organizations and municipalities throughout the world.

     

    In 1996, a year after the conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, civil society organizations played a significant role in bringing the issue of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the world’s highest court. The ICJ issued an opinion in which the court unanimously declared: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

     

    By 1997, INESAP, along with two other important international organizations – the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) – put forward a comprehensive text for a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. The text, relying heavily on the technical information provided by INESAP, provided for a system of societal and technical verification that would make it possible for the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligation under international law for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This would not only make the world far safer, but would be the only truly effective way to assure against nuclear proliferation. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention was introduced to the United Nations as a discussion paper by Costa Rica in 1997.

     

    Since then, INESAP has continued its efforts to promote a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In a 1999 Briefing Paper (No. 7/1999), it explored the question, “Has the Time Come for the Nuclear Weapons Convention?” During that same year, INESAP continued its collaboration with IALANA and IPPNW in producing a book: Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In the year 2000, INESAP put out an edited book on Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The book, emphasizing scientific expertise, provides analysis of the deadlock in achieving progress on the elimination of nuclear weapons and on the means of overcoming the obstacles.

     

    The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention has provided a basic tool for the global nuclear abolition movement. It has been used over the years by Abolition 2000 and its constituent organizations as an example of how countries, if they had the political will to do so, could proceed toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Most recently, the model convention has been used by the Mayors for Peace, led by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in their Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons. This campaign calls for negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention to commence in 2005, to be completed by 2010, and for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

     

    In 2000, INESAP organized a workshop entitled “Abolition of Nuclear Weapons” at the Stockholm Congress of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility. Intensive discussions at this meeting gave rise to a new INESAP program, initiated in cooperation with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, to explore the control and elimination of missile technologies for warlike purposes. The project, Moving Beyond Missile Defense, has held four international conferences over the past five years, in Santa Barbara, Shanghai, Berlin and Hiroshima, focusing on regional and global issues of nuclear disarmament and missile control.

     

    Einstein warned, “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” The scientists, engineers and other experts associated with INESAP have worked to bring about such a change in thinking. They have exemplified a commitment to social responsibility by raising their voices to warn of continuing dangers and by using their scientific and technical expertise to propose solutions to the gravest danger confronting humanity. They carry on in the tradition of truth and courage exemplified by Albert Einstein.

     

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and the Deputy Chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (www.inesglobal.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • Sisyphus with Bombs: A Modern Myth

    Sisyphus with Bombs: A Modern Myth

    Each day from dawn to dusk Sisyphus strained under his load of heavy bombs as he struggled up the mountain. It was slavish, back-breaking work. He sweated and groaned as he inched his way toward the top of the mountain.

    Always, before he reached the top, the bombs were taken from him and loaded onto bomber aircraft. Sisyphus would stand and wipe his brow as he watched the planes take off into the darkening sky on their way to destroy yet more peasant villages somewhere far away.

    Sisyphus believed that he was condemned by fate to carry the bombs up the mountain each day of his life. Since he never reached the top, each sunrise he began anew his arduous and debilitating task.

    Strangely, Sisyphus was happy in his work, as were those who loaded the bombs onto the planes and those who dropped the bombs on peasant villages. As Sisyphus often repeated, “It is a job and it fills my days.”

    Sisyphus with bombs contributes his labors to the war system, as so many of us do. Let us work to disarm Sisyphus and give him back his rock. Our reward will be saving peasant villages and their inhabitants from destruction and the world from annihilation. By our efforts, we may even save ourselves. It is the Sisyphean task of our time.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

  • Nuclear Hero’s ‘Crime’ Was Making Us Safer

    Mordechai Vanunu is the preeminent hero of the nuclear era. He consciously risked all he had in life to warn his own country and the world of the true extent of the nuclear danger facing us. And he paid the full price, a burden in many ways worse than death, for his heroic act — for doing exactly what he should have done and what others should be doing.

    Vanunu’s “crime” was committed in 1986, when he gave the London Sunday Times a series of photos he had taken within the Israeli nuclear weapons facility at Dimona, where he had worked as a technician.

    For that act — revealing that his country’s program and stockpile were much larger than the CIA or others had estimated — Vanunu was kidnapped from the Rome airport by agents of the Israeli Mossad and secretly transported back for a closed trial in which he was sentenced to 18 years in prison.

    He spent the first 11 1/2 years in solitary confinement in a 6-by-9-foot cell, an unprecedented term of solitary under conditions that Amnesty International called “cruel, inhuman and degrading.”

    Now, after serving his full term, he is due to be released today. But his “unfreedom” is to be continued by restrictions on his movements and his contacts: He cannot leave Israel, he will be confined to a single town, he cannot communicate with foreigners face to face or by phone, fax or e-mail (purely punitive conditions because any classified information that he may have possessed is by now nearly two decades old).

    The irony of all this is that no country in the world has a stronger stake than Israel in preventing nuclear proliferation, above all in the Middle East. Yet Israel’s secret nuclear policies — to this day it does not acknowledge that it possesses such weapons — are shortsighted and self-destructive. They promote rather than block proliferation by encouraging the country’s neighbors to develop their own, comparable weapons.

    This will not change without public mobilization and democratic pressure, which in turn demand public awareness and discussion. It was precisely this that Vanunu sought to stimulate.

    Not in Israel or in any other case — not that of the U.S., Russia, England, France, China, India or Pakistan — has the decision to become a nuclear weapons state ever been made democratically or even with the knowledge of the full Cabinet. It is likely that in an open discussion not one of these states could convince its own people or the rest of the world that it had a legitimate reason for possessing as many warheads as the several hundred that Israel allegedly has (far beyond any plausible requirement for deterrence).

    More Vanunus are urgently needed. That is true not only in Israel but in every nuclear weapons state, declared and undeclared. Can anyone fail to recognize the value to world security of a heroic Pakistani, Indian, Iraqi, Iranian or North Korean Vanunu making comparable revelations?

    And the world’s need for such secret-telling is not limited to citizens of what nuclear weapons states presumptuously call rogue nations. Every nuclear weapons state has secret policies, aims, programs and plans that contradict its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the 1995 Declaration of Principles agreed to at the NPT Renewal Conference. Every official with knowledge of these violations could and should consider doing what Vanunu did.

    That is what I should have done in the early ’60s based on what I knew about the secret nuclear planning and practices of the United States when I consulted at the Defense Department, on loan from the Rand Corp., on problems of nuclear command and control. I drafted the Secretary of Defense Guidance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the general nuclear war plans, and the extreme dangers of our practices and plan were apparent to me.

    I now feel derelict for wrongfully keeping secret the documents in my safe revealing this catastrophically reckless posture. But I did not then have Vanunu’s example to guide me.

    When I finally did have an example in front of me — that of young Americans who were choosing to go to prison rather than participate in what I too knew was a hopeless, immoral war — I was inspired in 1971 to turn over a top- secret history of presidential lies about the war in Vietnam to 19 newspapers. I regret only that I didn’t do it earlier, before the bombs started falling.

    Vanunu should long since have been released from solitary and from prison, not because he has “suffered enough” but because what he did was the correct and courageous thing to do in the face of the foreseeable efforts to silence and punish him.

    The outrageous and illegal restrictions proposed to be inflicted on him when he finally steps out of prison after 18 years should be widely protested and rejected, not only because they violate his fundamental human rights but because the world needs to hear this man’s voice.

    The cult and culture of secrecy in every nuclear weapons state have endangered humanity and continues to threaten its survival. Vanunu’s challenge to that wrongful and dangerous secrecy must be joined worldwide.

    Daniel Ellsburg is a member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Advisory Council.

  • Congressional Bills Passed Support Bush Agenda For New Nuclear Weapons

    November 2003 witnessed the passing of the Defense Authorization Bill (HR1588) and Energy and Water Appropriations Bill (HR 2754) for Fiscal Year 2004. These bills provide authorization and funding for the nuclear weapons activities of both the US Department of Energy and the US Department of Defense.

    The 2004 bills include proposals to research a new generation of “usable” nuclear weapons, construct a plutonium pit facility and shorten readiness for nuclear testing, revealing the administration’s intent to rely on its nuclear forces for many decades to come – a stark contrast to US demands that other nations should forgo their nuclear arms.

    Defense Authorization Bill
    This bill authorizes annual US defense programs, including the nuclear weapons budget which is allocated in the Energy and Water Appropriations Bill.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization Bill includes provisions that would authorize funding for:

    • Research on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) or nuclear “bunker buster”;
    • Research on Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts for the development of low-yield nuclear weapons or “mini-nukes”;
    • Design, building and environmental review of a new nuclear bomb plant known as the Modern Pit Facility (MPF);
    • Reduction of Enhanced Test Readiness from between 24-36 months to 18 months.

    Most significantly, Congress voted to repeal of the Spratt-Furse amendment. Adopted as part of the 1994 Defense Authorization bill, the Spratt-Furse legislation prohibits the research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons (five kilotons or less). A final vote took place in November 2003 at the Conference Committee on Defense Authorization, where the Spratt-Furse ban was repealed by a House of Representatives vote of 362-40 and a Senate vote of 95-3. The bill, allocating $401billion, was signed by President Bush on 24 November 2003.

    Energy and Water Appropriations Bill
    The Energy and Water Appropriations Bill details the Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear budget, covering funds for the development and production of US nuclear weapons. In July 2003, the House accepted Senator Dianne Feinstein’s (D-CA) amendments, which included the following modifications to the administration’s request:

    • Cut spending on the RNEP from $15 million to $5 million;
    • Eliminate $6 million on Advanced Nuclear Weapons Concepts for the design of “mini-nukes”;
    • Eliminate $25 million allocated for “Enhanced Test Readiness” which proposes to shorten nuclear test readiness from 24-36 to 18 months;
    • Cut spending on planning and environmental review for the MPF from $23 million to $11 million.

    Most of these proposals, however, were restored in the Senate in September 2003. The bill was reconciled at the House-Senate Conference Committee the following November, where funds totaling $27 billion were approved for water and energy programs. The House voted 387-36 to approve the final version of the bill, and the Senate later approved the bill by a unanimous voice vote. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill was signed by the President on 1 December 2003

    What the Bills Approved

    Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)/ Nuclear “Bunker Busters”
    The Bush administration claims that current US nuclear weapons are unsuitable for use against growing numbers of deeply buried bunkers or stockpiles of chemical and/or biological weapons in enemy states and calls for developing the nuclear “bunker buster.” Designed to withstand high-speed collision with the ground, the “bunker buster” is a nuclear bomb capable of boring through 20-30 feet of rock or concrete before exploding. Research and design activities are currently taking place at Livermore (California) and Los Alamos (New Mexico) nuclear weapons laboratories, both of which are managed by the University of California.

    Unlike the “mini-nuke,” the “bunker buster” is a high yield weapon of between 100 to 300 kilotons (the Hiroshima bomb which killed 140,000 people was 15 kilotons). The detonation of such a weapon would create massive collateral damage; the targeting of underground stockpiles of chemical and/or biological weapons could spread dangerous contaminants and between 10,000-50,000 people would be exposed to a fatal dose radiation within 24 hours if used in urban areas.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization bill approved the continuation of current research on the nuclear “bunker buster.” Under its guidelines, scientists at nuclear weapons labs are able to draft detailed plans of nuclear “bunker busters,” but must seek approval from Congress prior to the commencement of engineering work on its production – a term often referred to as “bending metal.” The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill approved $7.5 million in funds for the research and development (if further authorized by Congress) of the “bunker buster,” half of the $15 million that the Bush administration had requested.

    Low-yield nuclear weapons/“Mini-nukes”
    The concept of “mini-nukes” involves the development of small-scale nuclear warheads which are under five kilotons. With an explosive impact that is small and easier to control, the Pentagon argues that such weapons would be more accurate to target, thereby minimizing collateral damage and inducing only small amounts of radioactive fallout. Research of such weapons is also taking place at Livermore and Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratories.

    Since the Spratt-Furse amendment in 1994, research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons or “mini-nukes” has been prohibited. The introduction of “mini-nukes” would blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weaponry, increasing the likelihood of their use in conflict.

    The passing of the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill was significant in revoking the Spratt-Furse amendment, reversing a decade of self-imposed restrictions. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill granted the full $6 million requested by the Bush administration for Advance Concept studies of “mini nukes.” $4 million of this amount will, however, be contingent on the administration’s submittal of a Nuclear Weapons Stockpile report to Congress, detailing reductions made to the US nuclear stockpile. As with the ‘bunker busters,” scientists are able to perform research on the development of “mini nukes,” but must receive Congressional approval prior to plans for production.

    Modern Pit Facility
    A plutonium pit is a steel encased ball that forms the explosive core of nuclear weapons. It serves as a trigger for the fission of atoms within a nuclear warhead, ensuring its explosion upon impact.

    The US had observed a 14-year moratorium since the 1989 closure of the Rocky Flats plutonium pit facility in Colorado. However, on 22 April 2003, Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory announced on that it had produced the first (small-scale) US plutonium pit, effectively re-establishing the nation’s capability to manufacture new plutonium cores for nuclear weapons. The DOE estimates that certification of Los Alamos produced pits will be complete by 2007, thus authorizing the laboratories to produce 10 pits annually for testing purposes.

    In addition, the DOE has also launched plans to build a Modern Pit Facility (MPF), a new nuclear bomb plant that would boost production in excess of 500 plutonium pits a year. Based on this, each year’s production would equal the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, that of China’s. The construction of the MPF could produce the next generation of nuclear weapons with the introduction of “mini-nukes” and “bunker busters” and could also facilitate the contingency held open by the Bush administration to bring old nuclear weapons out of storage and back on active duty.

    The MPF will cost between $2 to $4 billion to construct, with estimated annual operational costs of $300 million. The facility is due to be constructed by 2020 and an environmental investigation is being prepared to determine how and where the pits should be manufactured. The DOE plans to name a location for the plant by April 2004 and is considering the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina; the Pantex Plant facility in Texas; the Nevada Test Site; and sites at Los Alamos and Carlsbad in New Mexico.

    With over 10,000 intact warheads, the US has manufactured enough pits for this stockpile, with another 5,000-12,000 pits in reserve. The renewed production of plutonium pits contravenes US commitments to de-emphasize its reliance on nuclear weapons and adds to speculations regarding Bush’s nuclear weapons ambitions. Plans to launch the MPF and the development of the Los Alamos pit facility coincides with the administration’s plans to increase the US nuclear arsenal and develop a new generation of nuclear weapons.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization bill approved plans for the MPF while the 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill allocated only $11 million for the project, $12 million short of the $23 billion that the White House had originally requested.

    Enhanced Test Readiness
    Despite the current 11-year US test moratorium, the Bush administration has called for the recommencement of nuclear testing in order to prevent the “degradation” of the US nuclear arsenal.

    The last nuclear explosion at the main US nuclear testing ground, the Nevada Test Site, occurred on 23 September 1992. A US test moratorium was subsequently established in 1994, and between 24-36 months was required to prepare the site for the resumption of full-scale testing. For Fiscal Year 2004, the Bush administration has requested the shortening of this time to 18 months.

    While Bush insists that he will not end the moratorium, simultaneous plans for increased funding towards nuclear testing and enhanced readiness of the Nevada Test Site form part of a well-coordinated effort to resume production of nuclear weapons, including new and untested weapons.

    The 2004 Defense Authorization bill allocated $34 million in funds to improve the Nevada Test Site. The 2004 Energy and Water Appropriations bill approved $25 million in spending toward Enhanced Test Readiness, but restricted the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to improve its current test readiness capability to 24 months rather than the administration’s proposal of 18 months.

    Analysis: What do the Bills mean?

    In the 2002 US Nuclear Posture Review, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that the US nuclear infrastructure had “atrophied,” and emphasized the importance of revitalizing it “to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate unneeded weapons and mitigate the risks of technological surprise.” Furthermore, the Pentagon report, “Future Strategic Strike Force” asserts its aims “to transform the nation’s forces to meet the demands placed on them by a changing world order.” The report advocates a new role for nuclear weapons in US strategy, making them “relevant to the threat environment” in the “war on terror.”

    The Bush administration’s view is that US must obtain the technology and skills needed to counter threats of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. In April 2003, Linton Brooks, administrator at the NNSA and the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security told a Congressional hearing, “We are seeking to free ourselves from intellectual prohibitions against exploring a full range of technical options.”

    Despite restrictions of certain funds, the approval of the Defense Authorization and Energy and Water Appropriation bills for 2004 shows strong support for most requests sought by the Bush administration. To critics this indicates moving a step closer to realizing the administration’s aggressive nuclear doctrine. The authorization of the bills further confirms to the world that nuclear weapons constitute a central component of the US defense strategy, prompting other countries to redouble their own efforts to acquire nuclear arms and begin nuclear testing.

    The Bush administration’s “vertical proliferation” plans contravene US commitments to de-emphasize reliance on nuclear weapons as well as disregard pledges made under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in taking steps towards disarmament. While the Bush administration demands that North Korea, Iran and other countries renounce their nuclear ambitions and submit to inspections in accordance with the NPT, the US does not engage in a process of transparent and irreversible reduction and elimination of its own arsenal.

    As Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, recently stated, “Double standards are being used here. The US government insists that other countries do not possess nuclear weapons.” He adds, “On the other hand they are perfecting their own arsenal. I do not think that corresponds with the treaty they signed.”

    By assigning a new, more “usable” role for nuclear weapons, the US is increasing the probability of nuclear weapons use, either by a nation or terrorist group. This would make it more likely, not less, that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would be used against the US. Unless effective measures are enforced to curb the current administration, the US will be guilty of leading the world down the slippery slope of an emerging global nuclear arms race.

    Opportunities are still available to prevent Bush’s aggressive nuclear plans from materializing. The future deployment of the administration’s new nuclear strategy will depend upon the outcome of the next presidential election, as well as congressional debates over the next few years. These, in turn, will depend upon US and international citizens engaging in a debate on future nuclear policies, and calling on Congress and presidential candidates to take a principled stance against the dangerous Bush nuclear policies.

    *Justine Wang is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Back to the Framework

    There is an eerie case of deja vu in Korea. Nearly nine years ago, President Kim Il Sung expelled international inspectors and threatened to process plutonium from spent fuel at an old graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. The Clinton administration had rejected negotiations with North Korea, was contemplating a military strike to destroy the nuclear facility and was seeking U.N. Security Council economic sanctions. The North Koreans announced that such sanctions would be considered an act of war. It was clear the United States and South Korean militaries could prevail, but there would be massive casualties from the formidable ground forces of North Korea.

    As now, the isolated and economically troubled nation was focused on resolving basic differences with the United States. Deeply suspicious and perhaps paranoid, the North Koreans were demanding assurances against a nuclear attack and opportunities for normal bilateral relations.

    At the invitation of Kim Il Sung, and with the approval of the White House, I went to Pyongyang and negotiated directly with the man known as the “Great Leader.” He agreed to freeze the nuclear situation at Yongbyon and permit international inspectors to monitor the agreement. In return, the United States was to pledge that nuclear weapons would not be used against North Korea and that two modern light-water reactors would be built to replace the Yongbyon facility. In the meantime, a monthly supply of fuel oil would help provide electrical power. The subsequent death of Kim Il Sung, who was replaced by his son, Kim Jong Il, interfered with the more rapid timetable that we envisioned, but these nuclear proposals were accepted officially in the Agreed Framework, also involving South Korea and Japan.

    Kim Il Sung wanted to discuss long-term issues, with the goal of achieving normal relations between the Koreas and with America. He agreed to an immediate summit meeting with South Korea’s president to discuss cross-border visitation among Korean families and the implementation of general principles adopted in 1992 regarding reunification. His suggestions for future talks with the United States included cooperation in recovering the remains of U.S. soldiers, a step-by-step reduction of Korean armed forces to 100,000 men on each side, with U.S. troops to be reduced in the same proportion, withdrawal of long-range artillery and other aggressive military forces from near the demilitarized zone, and mutual inspections to ensure the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

    Although the promised light-water reactors were not built, substantial progress was made between North Korea and the United States, illustrated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s successful discussions in Pyongyang.

    The Bush administration brought a change in relationship with both Koreas.

    Rejection of the “sunshine policy,” which had earned the Nobel Peace Prize for South Korean President Kim Dae Jung; announcements that North Korea, like Iraq and Iran, was part of an “axis of evil”; public statements that the new “Great Leader” was loathed as a “pygmy” who deliberately starved his own people, that America was prepared to fight two wars at the same time, and that our missile defense system was a shield against North Korea — all this helped cause many in that country to assume that they were next on America’s hit list after Iraq.

    With evidence that Pyongyang was acquiring enriched uranium, in direct violation of the Agreed Framework, President Bush announced that there would be no discussions with North Korea until after its complete rejection of a nuclear explosives program, and the monthly shipments of fuel oil were terminated.

    Now, once again, international inspectors have been expelled, and the North Koreans have announced they will no longer be bound by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or an agreement to forgo testing of ballistic missiles. This is a serious threat to regional and world peace. North Korea has offered inspectors from the United States access to its nuclear sites to confirm that they are not developing weapons, but only complete international monitoring can determine whether they have decided to develop a nuclear arsenal or are using threats as a ploy to promote bilateral agreements with the United States.

    It is clear that the world community cannot permit the North Koreans to develop a nuclear arsenal. They must be convinced that they will be more secure without nuclear weapons, and that normal diplomatic and economic relations with the United States are possible.

    The announced nuclear policies of North Korea and the American rejection of direct talks are both contrary to regional and global interests. Unfortunately, both sides must save face, even as the situation deteriorates dangerously.

    To resolve this impasse, some forum — perhaps convened by Russia or China — must be found within which these troubling differences can be resolved. The principles of the Agreed Framework of 1994 can be reconfirmed, combined with North Korea’s full and verifiable compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a firm U.S. declaration of nonaggression against North Korea, so long as all agreements are honored.

    Then perhaps the more far-reaching proposals discussed with Kim Il Sung can be implemented and a permanent peace can come to the reconciled Koreas.
    *Former president Carter is chairman of the Carter Center in Atlanta.

  • Depleted Uranium Weapons – A Threat to Human Health?

    The use of Depleted Uranium (DU) Weapons in the Gulf War, and more recently in the Balkan Wars, has drawn a lot of attention.

    This short review will explain what is DU, for what purpose DU weapons have been manufactured, and how many of them were used, first in the Gulf War and then later on in the Balkan Wars in Herzegovina and Kosovo.

    Widespread leukemia and other ailments have been claimed in the media. They were mostly attributed to the radioactivity of DU and partially to the chemical effects of the heavy metal. A critical analysis of these claims needs a brief review of basic physics and relevant radiation regulations as well as legal limits on toxic chemicals. How is DU ammunition dispersed on impact, and how can minute particles find their way into the human body. Possible health risks will be put in perspective and compared with other risks in war and in daily life. The question is raised, if DU weapons can be called still conventional or if they fit better the definition of radiological and chemical weapons. DU weapons and their “efficiency” have to be seen also in the context of treaties on so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which are signed and even ratified, but do not yet have an implementation procedure or the political will to enact.

    1. What is Depleted Uranium (DU)?

    1.1 Activity of Uranium Ore Before and After Extraction

    Uranium is a chemical element that is more abundant than silver, gold, mercury and cadmium and is contained by 2 to 4 millionths in the Earth’s crust. It can be found on surface and in ore mines in many countries, among them Zaire, South Africa, and Canada and also in the Czech Republic. One ton of ore contains on the average about 3 kg of uranium.

    Uranium comes essentially in three isotopic forms. Isotopes are any of two or more forms of an element having the same atomic number (i.e. the same chemical property) but different atomic weights due to a different number of neutrons in the nucleus. Natural uranium contains 99.274% of 238U, 0.720% of 235U, and 0.0055% of 234U, they all have 92 protons in the nucleus, but 146, 143 and 142 neutrons, respectively. The half-life of 238U, 235U, and 234U is 4.49·109, 7.10·108, and 2.48·105 years, respectively, ranging from billion to million years. The longer the half-life the less radioactive decay products appear in a given time interval and could effect human health. When uranium is dug out of the Earth its radioactive decay products come along. However, in the chemical process of uranium extraction of the three isotopes from the ore, all radioactive daughter products in the radioactive decay series’ 238U and 235U are eliminated, with the exception of the radiogenic isotope 234U.

    In short, radiation background in mines and in extraction facilities is different and so are the health risks. There is an extensive evidence of excess lung cancers in underground uranium miners caused by the decay products of the radioactive gas radon (222Rn). But uranium mill workers have not shown increased mortality or excess lung cancers despite their increased exposure to uranium dust and radon decay products. There is no obvious explanation for this difference.

    1.2 Enriched and Depleted Uranium

    The extraction of energy from uranium for peaceful or military purposes asks for well-defined ratios of the two isotopes. In order to sustain the chain reaction of nuclear fission, uranium has to be enriched by the fissible isotope 235U to a reactor grade of 3.2 – 3.6% or weapon grade (90%+) uranium. This process not only produces the enriched product, but also a waste stream depleted in 235U, typically to less than 0.3%, which is often called the tail. The 235U content in the depleted uranium in the U.S. are lowered to 28% of its content in natural uranium.

    Depleted uranium is a byproduct of uranium enrichment process, with a relatively small contribution from reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel. In addition to the 3 natural isotopes 238U, 235U, and 234U, depleted uranium from this latter source also contains a minute quantity (0.003%) of a man-made isotope 236U. The specific activity of DU is 15,902 Bq/gram (for definitions of radioactive units see annex). Traces of 236U were found in Kosovo after the war and gave rise to – unjustifiable – concern in various press reports.

    Based on the measured isotopic composition of depleted uranium, the total activity (a-particles = helium nuclei, b-particles = electrons, g-rays) can be calculated as 22% less and the a-activity as 43% less compared to natural uranium.

    The gaseous diffusion process for enrichment of the fissible isotope 235U is used in the United States. This process requires uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), primarily because the compound can be used in the gas form for processing, in the liquid form for filling containers, and in the solid form for storage. At atmospheric pressure, UF6 is solid at temperatures below 57°C and a gas above this temperature.

    Workers in metal processing plants, including those who make DU penetrators, do not exhibit increased mortality or excess cancers.

    2. Application of DU

    Depleted Uranium is a low cost material that is readily available, since it was produced during the separation of weapon grade uranium. The Department of Energy in the U.S., as of June 1998, is in possession of almost 3/4 of a million metric tons (725·103 tons) stockpile of depleted uranium hexafluoride. This corresponds to a total activity of 527,000 Ci and a-activity 193,000 Ci. The a-activity per mass amounts to 0.389 mCi/kg.

    Depleted uranium’s high density (19.05 g/cm3, 1.7 times more than 11.35 g/cm3 for lead) and its high atomic number Z = 92 also provide useful solution for g-radiation shielding. It has been used at various occasions at particle accelerators, e.g. at CERN in the UA2 detector.

    Control surfaces on wide body aircraft require heavy counterweights. Tungsten (with density 19.3 g/cm3) or DU is ideal materials for this application where volume constraints prohibit the use of less dense metals. An airplane such as Boeing 747 needs 1,500 kg of counterweight. However, DU for this purpose gets out of fashion due to a few accidents and problems with surface embrittlement.

    2.1 DU Ammunition

    The US Army considered high-density materials such as tungsten and DU as metal in kinetic energy penetrators and tank armor already in the early 1970’s. DU was ultimately selected due to its availability and pyrophoricity. While 50% of tungsten has to be imported, mainly from China (US$ 150/kg in 1980), DU is provided for free to arms manufacturers. Tungsten also has much higher melting point than uranium and lacks pyrophoricity. DU penetrators contain no explosives; they act only by impact and immediate ignition of the dust (500°C). Conventional ammunition does not penetrate DU armor, however DU projectiles are capable of piercing it.

    2.2 Proliferation of DU Weapons

    The United States is no longer the only country with DU munitions. 17 countries including Britain, France, Russia, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Pakistan, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, and other countries have acquired depleted uranium weapons. Probably NATO countries will follow soon. These weapons were extensively tested on at least 14 sites in the U.S. and also in Britain.

    As of early 1994 already more than 1.6 million tank penetrators and 55 million small caliber penetrators had been manufactured in the U.S. and another 200 million rounds (some part made out of tungsten) had been ordered by 1998. The approximate cost per shell of a 120-mm tank round is US$ 3,300, implying that handling of DU and manufacturing of ammunition takes the lion’s share, whereas the material itself comes almost for free.

    3. Combat and Accidents

    The US military used depleted uranium ammunition on the battlefield for the first time during the Gulf War in 1991. The amount of DU munitions released in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq during the Operation Desert Storm totals to 860,550 rounds and corresponds to 294,500 kg DU, for a total activity of 312 Ci and a-activity of 115 Ci. In addition, 9,720 DU aircraft rounds and 660 DU tank rounds (6,430 kg of DU) burned as a result of a monstrous fire in the ammunition storage area and motor pool at the US Army base in Kuwait.

    Data on the use of DU ammunition are still less well known for the war in Bosnia in 1994-1995 and in Kosovo in 1999. They are estimated to 11,000 and 31,000 rounds, corresponding to a total of 10,000 kg of DU.

    4. Effects of Depleted Uranium

    4.1 Effects of DU Penetrator Impact

    When a depleted uranium penetrator impacts armor, 18 – 70% of the penetrator rod will burn and oxidize into dust. The DU oxide aerosol formed during the impact has 50 – 96% of respirable size particles (with diameter less than 10 mm, conditions very similar to “desirable” particle size for efficiency in chemical or biological warfare), and 17 – 48% of those particles are soluble in water. Particles generated from impact of a hard target are virtually all respirable. While the heavier non-respirable particles settle down rapidly, the respirable DU aerosol remains airborne for hours.

    The solubility of the uranium particles determines the rate at which the uranium moves from the site of internalization (lungs for inhalation, gastrointestinal tract for ingestion, or the injury site for wound contamination) into the blood stream. About 70% of the soluble uranium in the blood stream are excreted in urine within 24 hours without being deposited in any organ and the remainder primarily depositing in the kidneys and bones. The kidney is the organ most sensitive to depleted uranium toxicity. When DU particles of respirable size are inhaled, roughly 25% of the particles become trapped in the lungs, where the insoluble particles can remain for years. Approximately 25% of the inhaled DU is exhaled (particle diameters between 1 and 5 mm) and the remaining 50% is subsequently swallowed.

    4.2 Radiological effects

    4.2.1 The Regulations

    The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommends and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the US (NRC) mandates an occupational annual dose equivalent for the whole body no more than 5 rem/year and no more than 10 rem in 5 years. No short-term health effects are detectable at this dose equivalent.

    The non-occupational annual dose equivalent limit for the general public is selected as 100 mrem/year, which is comparable to the average background of 363 mrem/year.

    There are well-defined legal limits for inhalation and digestion of DU.

    4.2.2 Calculated and measured doses

    The impact of one 120-mm tank round with the 5.35 kg DU penetrator on an armored target, with 18 – 70% of the penetrator rod oxidizing into aerosol, is taken as an example. The initial contaminated area from the impact of one DU tank round inaccessible to general public (50 m radius circle) is about 0.8 hectares. If contamination spreads with weather elements up to 38 hectares become inaccessible to general public, with 0.9 nCi/m2 the allowed surface contamination for general public.

    The air contamination after the impact and before the DU dust settles can be estimated to maximum of soluble uranium 16 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers and 3,500 times higher than the allowed air concentration for general public. The maximum air concentration of insoluble uranium is 800 times higher than the NRC limit for radiation workers and 180,000 times higher than the allowed air concentration for general public.

    The residual contamination in Iraq 8 years after the end of the Golf War in the oil fields north of Kuwait was measured. It showed radiation levels 35 times above the background over parts of the battlefield and 50 times above the background over the rusting tanks hit by DU ammunition.

    The accumulated dose equivalent becomes significant when spent but unexploded DU penetrators are worn by army personnel as war souvenirs in direct contact with the skin (1,800 rem/year) or when used by children as toys. The skin dose equivalent limit of 50 mrem/year for radiation workers would be reached in about 10 days.

    4.3 Chemical Toxicity

    4.3.1 Uranium Effects on Kidney

    The RAND review on radiological and toxic effects of uranium puts the overall maximum permissible concentration, i.e. concentration of metal in the kidney associated with no significant increase in the frequency of kidney malfunction, at 3 mg/kg of kidney for uranium and calls it a de facto standard.

    Soluble uranium, which is absorbed in the blood circulation within the body, is eliminated rapidly through the kidney in urine. About 67% are excreted within the first day without being deposited in any organ. Approximately 11% is initially deposited in the kidney and excreted with a 15-day half-life. Most of the remaining 22% is initially deposited in the bone (up to 20%), which is the principle storage site in the body, and the rest is distributed to other organs and tissues.

    The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) established occupational limits for inhalation of heavy metals. The values for tungsten, lead, uranium in soluble form are 1, 0.05, and 0.05 mg/m3, for insoluble form 5, 0.10, and 0.25 mg/m3, respectively. Current Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards set the values at 44 mg/l for groundwater and 20 mg/l for drinking water.

    4.4.2 Gulf War Illness

    An estimate for exposure of a veteran from the Gulf War is difficult to make and studies on the illness came not yet to a final conclusion. More than 10,000 veterans (out of a total of 695,000) reported mysterious illnesses, like muscle and joint pain, chronic fatigue, depressed immune systems, neurological disorders, memory loss, chemical sensitivities, rashes. They may have exceeded the OSHA limit for inhalation of DU by a factor of 3 and the ATSDR minimal risk level intake for general public by 17 times.

    Many factors may have contributed to the ailments, such as·

    • Multiple vaccinations against anthrax and botulinum toxoid
    • Medical treatment with pyridostigmine bromide to counter effects of potential chemical exposure
    • Petroleum from oil fire
    • Pesticide and insect repellants
    • Tropical parasites such as leishmaniasis
    • Depleted uranium dust and shrapnel from DU ammunition and armor.

    It is not clear to which extend DU contributed to the reported illnesses.

    However, there is ample evidence to show that contact with DU ammunition had consequences, especially for children, among them an increase of childhood leukemia in southern Iraqi provinces by a factor of 3 between 1989 – 93, while in the Central Provinces the incidence remained normal. Local concentrations of DU may have been exceedingly high producing this high incidence of leukemia.

    It appears premature to attribute reported illnesses of military personnel to effects of DU ammunition in Kosovo. In Kosovo, similar to Iraq, many parameters may have played a role in producing symptoms, that could be also attributed to the release of chemicals after bombing of factories.

    A study of possible health effects has been made [2], assuming that 100 tons of DU were distributed uniformly over a one-kilometer-wide strip along 100 kilometers on the “Highway of Death” between Kuwait City and Basra, a city in southern Iraq [2]. Under this assumption average dose for someone who lived in the area for a year would be about one millirem – or about 10 percent of the dose from uranium and its decay products already naturally occurring in the soil. The authors came to the conclusion that an individual’s estimated added risk of dying from cancer from such a dose would be about one in 20,000. The doses for heavy metal effects are probably also far below the exposure limits set by OSHA. However, since no exposure and urine tests had been done for two years after the war, it is now too late to draw any conclusions.

    5. Comparison of DU with other risks

    DU is a dangerous material when used as ammunition in war fighting. Obviously, the driver of an armored tank or vehicle, that is hit by a DU penetrator, has a high chance to die from the blast and/or the heat immediately, and he is no longer subject to the consequences of inhaling or digesting DU.

    The spread of DU weighs on the environment and the population, civil or military, in the vicinity of the impact as a long-term consequence. For DU, and likewise for chemical, biological or radiological weapons, the local concentration and time constants of the dispersed material play the important role.

    The legal limit for exposure to chemicals and radioactivity is set such, that values just beyond are not detrimental to human health or the environment. Only an excess value by order(s) of magnitude should give rise to serious concern.

    The consequences of the use of DU ammunition pale in comparison with the other direct and indirect effects of war. As an example may serve the estimated 30,000 unexploded fragmentation bomblets lying on Kosovo’s ground, adding substantial danger to the not yet cleared land mines.

    In order to put the danger from radioactive exposure into perspective the following example may be instructive.

    The risks associated with radioactivity and irradiation in general are, usually, measured in Sieverts. For most people, even scientists, this unit has no real meaning. Therefore, following a suggestion [3], a comparison is made with the risk with similar consequence of producing cancer. Cigarette smoking is such a case. The data are based on the following dose-effect relations: 0.04 lethal cancers per Sievert, 1 lethal cancer per eighty thousand cigarette packs.

    Comparison between effects of some irradiation exposures and cigarette smoking
    Annual dose in millisieverts Equivalent number of annual cigarette packs
    Natural total irradiation
    3
    9
    Radon
    2
    6
    Cosmic Rays
    0.3
    0.9
    Medical X-rays
    0.4
    1.2

     

    Comparison of allowed doses of irradiation to effects of cigarette smoking
    Maximum allowed dose in millisieverts/year Equivalent in cigarette packs/year
    Professionals 20 60
    Public 1 3

     

    6. Conclusions

    Depleted uranium produced as a by-product of uranium enrichment is classified as radioactive and toxic waste and it is subjected to numerous regulations for handling and disposal. Yet the US regulatory limits for general public exposure are exceeded – at least locally and temporarily – up to five orders of magnitude for airborne radioactive emissions and up to 3 orders of magnitude for residual radioactive contamination when DU ammunition has been used in battlefield. The use of DU ammunition, perhaps the most effective new weapon, was not publicly revealed until a year after the Gulf War. These weapons have an indiscriminate character and can have adverse health effects not only on combatants but also on the population at large. Precautions could have been taken to limit possible health effects for the combatants and the civil population, and immediate medical tests could have removed a lot of ambiguities of the effects of DU ammunition.

    Cancer can be the expected long-term consequence of both the radiological and toxic effects of depleted uranium exposure, albeit with an extremely low probability.

    In 1996 the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed a resolution in which they “urged all States to be guided in their national policies by the need to curb production and spread of weapons of mass destruction or with indiscriminate effect, in particular nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, fuel-air bombs, napalm, cluster bombs, biological weaponry, and weaponry containing depleted uranium”.

    If nothing else, the double standard for DU in radiation protection and handling of low radioactive waste in the civilian sector on one hand and by the military on the battlefield on the other is morally and legally untenable.

    The manufacturing and use of DU weapons is a new man-made problem that should be addressed by the international community on an appropriate level. However, it pales compared to major, other unsolved problems in arms control. There is not yet an implementation program for the biological weapons convention (BWC, ratified in 1972!)! The elimination of enormous stockpiles of chemical weapons may take decades, but there is at least a working implementation body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The number of nuclear warheads does not shrink, only some of their delivery vehicles are being discarded, slowly approaching the limit set in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) is in danger to be discarded, the Test-Ban Treaty (TBT) is not yet ratified by all Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs), and major possessors of land mines have not signed up to the Ottawa Treaty.

     

    7. Some Selected References

    [1] Review of Radioactivity, Military Use, and Health Effects of Depleted Uranium Compiled by Vladimir S. Zajik, July 1999 http://members.tripod.com/vzajic/

    [2] After the dust settles Steve Fetter & Frank von Hippel The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, pp. 42-45

    [3] Global warming or nuclear waste – which do we want? H. Nifenecker and E. Huffer europhysics news March/April 2001, pp. 52- 55

    Some radiation units:

    1 Curie = 1 [Ci] = 37·109 decays/second or = 37·109 Becquerel = 37·109 [Bq] 1 milliCurie-of-intensity-hour = 1 Sievert = 1 [Sv] 1 Sievert corresponds approximately to 8.38 Roentgen

    1 rem = roentgen equivalent man
    The dose equivalents for the uranium isotopes 238U, 235U, and 234U and their decay products uniformly distributed in the whole body are 1.28, 1.30, 1.32 [(mrem/year)/(pCi/kg)].

  • Nuclearism and Its Spread to Asia

    Introduction

    At its core, nuclearism is the belief that nuclear weapons and nuclear power are essential forms of progress that in the right hands will protect the peace and further the human condition. Nuclearism is a dangerous ideology — as dangerous as the technologies it has unabashedly and unreservedly promoted. In this belief system, “the right hands” have generally been synonymous with one’s own country, and “to further the human condition” has generally been synonymous with benefit to oneself, one’s country or one’s corporation. The key elements of nuclearism are:

    1. The belief that nuclear weapons keep the peace, and are a necessary evil. 2. The belief that nuclear power is a safe, reliable and inexpensive source of energy, and that the nuclear power industry is an absolute good. 3. The belief that, despite the expansion of the nuclear power industry, the diversion of nuclear materials from the nuclear fuel cycle to military uses can be prevented.

    The ideology and the technologies it has supported have created extraordinary dangers for all life on Earth. While the dangers posed by nuclear weapons are potentially more immediate and cataclysmic in scope, the insidious dangers posed by nuclear power reactors and their radioactive waste products are now already harming humankind, other forms of life, and the environment and this threat will continue for thousands of generations. Believers in nuclearism, to the extent that they acknowledge these dangers, argue that nuclear technology brings benefits that more than compensate for its inherent dangers.

    The dangers of nuclear technology may be summarized as follows:

    1. Nuclear deterrence is only a theory. It may fail causing many times more casualties and suffering than were experienced at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 2. Nuclear weapons may be used by accident or miscalculation as well as by intention. The nuclear destruction of one city by one bomb could result in millions of deaths and casualties. A large-scale nuclear exchange could result in the annihilation of humankind and most other forms of life on Earth. 3. Nuclear weapons or the materials for making them may find their way into the hands of terrorists or irrational leaders of countries. 4. Nuclear power reactors are subject to catastrophic failures such as occurred at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and nearly occurred at Three Mile Island in the United States. Such failures could occur as a result of accident, human error, terrorist activity, or destruction by an enemy in time of war. 5. The spent fuel storage pools located at nuclear power reactors are particularly vulnerable to the release of radioactive materials as a result of terrorist or military attack. 6. Accidents occurring during the transportation of nuclear materials by highway, railway, ship, or air could result in hazardous releases of radioactive materials. 7. No long-term means of storage of radioactive waste materials currently exists to protect the environment and human health against the dangers of radiation release.

    Despite these dangers, the proponents of nuclearism have succeeded in many countries in obtaining large amounts of public funding to support the development, testing, deployment, and maintenance of nuclear weapons and/or the development and subsidization of the nuclear power industry. The costs of nuclear technology have included:

    1. Over $8 trillion spent on nuclear weapons and delivery systems by the nuclear weapons states over the past half century. 2. The diversion of generations of scientists and technologists to work on weapons of mass destruction rather than on projects of positive value to humankind. 3. The widespread contamination of the environment by radioactive pollutants created in the process of building and testing nuclear warheads over a fifty year period. Cleanup costs are estimated at hundreds of billions of dollars, and it is understood that some areas of contamination will never be adequately restored to safe use. (In the United States, such areas are referred to as “national sacrifice zones.”) 4. Nuclear power reactors, once thought to be relatively inexpensive to build, now cost some $5 billion per 1000 megawatt reactor. This cost has priced nuclear reactors out of competitiveness in the United States despite enormous government (that is, taxpayer) subsidies. 5. Radioactive wastes generated by the military and nuclear power industry will need to be stored to prevent environmental pollution and subsequent health problems for tens of thousands of years. The bulk of this burden will fall to future generations.

    In this paper, I will review the development of nuclearism in the West, its roots in military technology, its linkage to commercialism, attempts to place a boundary between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and the spread of nuclear weapons to Asian countries. I will then review the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its reference to nuclear energy as an “inalienable right,” return to the nuclearist view that nuclear weapons are a necessary evil and nuclear power an absolute good, and discuss the need for new thinking about nuclear technologies, as called for by Albert Einstein. I will then review nuclearism in Asia, global nuclearism, and finally the pressing need and important opportunity that now exists to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.

    Nuclearism Is a Western Ideology

    Nuclearism is an ideology that originated in the West. The primary proponents of nuclearism have been the United States, Britain, France, and the former Soviet Union (now replaced by Russia). The “East-West” struggle of the Cold War described the division of Europe with Western Europe and the United States on one side of the divide, and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on the other side. Both sides were proponents of nuclearism. Both sides believed that their nuclear deterrent forces prevented nuclear war and thereby kept the peace. Despite a lack of objective evidence that there was a causal connection between nuclear arsenals and the absence of a nuclear war, each side credited its expanding nuclear arsenal with keeping the peace. To underline this, the United States during the Reagan presidency named some of its powerful nuclear armed missiles “peacekeepers.”

    Both nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are products of the West. Nuclear weapons, nuclear power, and the ideology of nuclearism developed in the West and have spread throughout the world.

    Nuclearism Originated As a Military Technology

    Nuclear weapons were developed by the United States with the aid of European refugee scientists during World War II. The initial impetus for the U.S. effort was the fear that the Germans might develop similar weapons, and that these weapons would be necessary to deter the Germans from using theirs. However, by the time that the first U.S. nuclear weapons were developed, the Germans had already surrendered without having succeeded in developing a nuclear weapon.

    The first U.S. nuclear weapon test took place on July 16, 1945 at Alamogordo, New Mexico. The war in the Pacific was still going on at that time, although the United States was aware that the Japanese were seeking to negotiate terms of surrender.(1) Just three weeks after the initial successful test of the weapon, it was used at Hiroshima, Japan on August 6, 1945, and three days later at Nagasaki, Japan. At Hiroshima some 90,000 persons, mostly civilians, were killed immediately, and a total of some 140,000 persons died as a result of the bombing by the end of 1945. At Nagasaki some 40,000 persons, again mostly civilians, were killed immediately, and a total of some 70,000 persons died as a result of the bombing by the end of 1945. The suffering of the survivors, the hibakusha, continues to the present. The people of Japan were the first victims of this powerful new technology.

    The decision to use the newly developed weapon against the Japanese was made by U.S. President Harry Truman. When Truman received confirmation of the “success” of the use of the nuclear weapon dropped at Hiroshima, he is reported to have said, “This is the greatest day in history.”(2) One can imagine that the response to the devastation and mass killing of civilians was viewed somewhat differently in Japan.

    In the United States certain myths developed around the use of nuclear weapons.(3) The weapons were credited with ending the war and saving American lives. They were, therefore, generally perceived in a positive light. In Japan, these weapons were seen from the perspective of the victims, and the Japanese developed what has been described as a “nuclear allergy.” At the Hiroshima Memorial Peace Park it says, “Never again! We shall not repeat this evil.”

    With these tragic events the United States brought the world into a new era, the Nuclear Age. Its hallmark was a determined effort that involved the subordination of science and technology to military purpose. The effort resulted in harnessing the power of the nucleus of the atom, and releasing a destructive force far greater than had previously been possible by manmade means. The Nuclear Age was born of a scientific enterprise with a military purpose — the creation of nuclear weapons — that was organized, funded and controlled by government. In this new age the destruction of cities by a single weapon became not only a possibility, but a reality. The destruction of humankind became imaginable and possible.

    Nuclearism and Commercialism

    While nuclearism may have begun as a military-based ideology, it soon also developed a commercial aspect related to the use of nuclear reactors to generate electric power. Thus, nuclearism became an ideology with two intertwined aspects, one aligned with military ends and one aligned with peaceful ends. U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower took the lead in promoting the peaceful applications of nuclear energy for generating electricity with his “Atoms for Peace” speech at the United Nations in 1953.(4)

    The promise of “Atoms for Peace” was virtually free and unlimited electric energy to power the world and provide the benefits of electric energy to the poor of the Earth. From this technology of death would come, Eisenhower prophesied, electricity so inexpensive that it would not need to be metered. It was the promise of something too good to be true, and in fact it was not true. It was the promise of creating virtually free electrical power for everyone everywhere. Nuclearism, like a modern alchemy, promised to convert the evil of a city-destroying weapons technology to a tool for powering the future.

    The promise of nuclear power would prove to be largely hyperbole based upon wishful thinking or outright fraud. The hope and dream of “Atoms for Peace” became, however, a central tenet of the ideology of nuclearism. By adopting this tenet of nuclearism, developed states were able to shift to taxpayers the financial responsibility for research and development of the so-called peaceful atom. Huge taxpayer subsidies authorized in the United States, Western European nations, and later Japan made possible the development and implementation of the nuclear power industry.

    The nuclear power industry continues to operate in the United States only due to Congressional legislation, the Price-Anderson Act, which transfers the majority of liability for a major accident from the corporations operating nuclear power plants to the taxpayers. Even so, there has been no nuclear power plant built in the United States since the early 1970s. In the early 1970s, the U.S. nuclear industry was forecasting 1000 nuclear power plants for the country by the year 2000. Today, however, there are only 110 such plants, and there are no plans to build more.

    Costs have been the major roadblock to the continued expansion of nuclear power in the United States. Initially it was estimated that the capital costs for building a 1000 megawatt nuclear power plant would be a few hundred million dollars. By the early 1970s the costs had risen to approximately $5 billion per reactor.

    In true Cold War competitive style, the former Soviet Union raced ahead with its version of the “peaceful atom” by building nuclear power plants that would prove to be among the most dangerous in the world. This was dramatically demonstrated by the major accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. This accident had serious consequences in Ukraine, Belarus, many parts of Europe, and even the United States.(5)

    Nuclearism Draws an Artificial Boundary Between Military and So-Called Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

    Advocates of nuclearism have generally tried to walk a narrow line between the military and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On the one hand, they have sought to contain the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. On the other hand, they have tried to promote the spread of nuclear energy to other states for research and commercial purposes. Since the knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons is readily available and the nuclear materials needed for this purpose may be derived from the nuclear power industry, advocates of nuclearism needed to establish at least a facade of control over the nuclear power industry. They accomplished this goal through the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), charged with promoting nuclear energy internationally while providing safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. It is, of course, a clear conflict of interest to give promotional functions to a regulatory agency.

    The Spread of Nuclear Weapons

    The United States would have preferred to have maintained its early monopoly over nuclear technology. It was recognized from the outset, however, that this would not be possible. The U.S. scientific establishment badly miscalculated the length of time it would take the Soviet Union to develop nuclear weapons. Truman was advised that the development of nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union could take some twenty years, and in fact it occurred in just four years.

    The very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly called for the creation of an Atomic Energy Commission that would develop a plan for the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments.(6) But early efforts and proposals to achieve international control of nuclear weapons failed, and by July 1946 the United States, then the only nuclear weapons state in the world, began an atmospheric testing program in the Pacific. Radioactivity from the testing spread throughout the world, but brought the greatest harm to the people of the Pacific.

    Until 1949, when the former Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon, the U.S. remained the sole nuclear weapons state in the world. From 1949 forward, until the end of the Cold War, the United States and former Soviet Union vied with each other for “nuclear supremacy,” a concept that some would define as beyond the bounds of reason. These two states would subsequently be joined by the United Kingdom, France, and China as declared nuclear weapons states. China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, and became the first Asian nation to possess nuclear weapons. A decade later, in 1974, India tested its first nuclear weapon, which it claimed was only for peaceful purposes. Subsequently, Pakistan is thought to have developed a nuclear weapons capability. Israel is the third of the threshold or undeclared nuclear weapons states.

    China is thought to have developed its nuclear weapons capability in response to being threatened by nuclear weapons by the United States during the Korean War in 1954 and again during the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in 1958.(7) India is thought to have developed its nuclear weapons capability in response to China doing so, and Pakistan is thought to have developed its capability in response to India doing so. Thus, there have been security concerns that have led to the spread of nuclear weapons into Asia. China did not want to find itself, as had Japan, the victim of nuclear weapons delivered by the United States or later by the Soviet Union. India feared the possibility of attack by China; Pakistan feared the possibility of attack by India. This is the faulty logic of deterrence, which has grave built-in dangers.

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty: An “Inalienable Right” to Nuclear Energy?

    It was the general understanding by the U.S., former USSR, and the UK that the spread of nuclear weapons created a more dangerous world. These states considered it acceptable and reasonable that they would maintain their nuclear arsenals, but believed it to be too dangerous for other countries to follow their lead in developing and maintaining such arsenals. This led these leading nuclear weapons states to initiate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was opened for signatures in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.(8) This treaty created two categories of states, those that had nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 1967, and all other states. In the category of nuclear weapons states were the United States, former Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France and China. France and China, however, did not become parties to the NPT until the early 1990s.

    In the NPT, non-nuclear weapons states pledged not to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear weapons states pledged not to transfer nuclear weapons or otherwise help non-nuclear weapons states to develop nuclear arsenals. On its face, this would appear to be an uneven and perhaps even unreasonable bargain. The nuclear weapons states, however, did sweeten the offer by agreeing in Article VI to have good faith negotiations on a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, on nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The nuclear weapons states also agreed that they would help other countries develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; the treaty even refers in Article IV to peaceful nuclear energy as an “inalienable right.” Thus, in attempting to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, the treaty actually promotes the use of nuclear technology for generating energy. The dual purpose nature of nuclear technology has opened a back door to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a number of countries have sought to walk through it.

    India and Pakistan were both able to develop their nuclear weapons through nuclear reactor programs that were purportedly being used for peaceful purposes. Iraq also came close to developing nuclear weapons in this way. What is needed to accomplish this, in addition to nuclear reactors for energy or research purposes, are facilities for enriching uranium or separating plutonium from spent fuel. Two countries in Asia with this capability are North Korea and Japan. North Korea is thought to possess enough plutonium for constructing one or two nuclear weapons. Japan has some 13,000 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium, enough to potentially manufacture more than a thousand nuclear weapons.(9) South Korea and Taiwan have tried to acquire the necessary plutonium reprocessing technologies to develop nuclear weapons, but they have been kept from doing so by the United States.

    Nuclearists View Nuclear Weapons as a Necessary Evil and Nuclear Power an Absolute Good

    In the ideology of nuclearism, nuclear weapons are accepted as a necessary evil to maintain the peace. This evil, however, can only be tolerated in certain countries that can be trusted to control the weapons. Nuclear weapons were seen by the West as a threat in the hands of the former Soviet Union, but at least it was understood that they would take necessary steps to control their weapons. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union is viewed by many as a serious danger to world security due to the potential spread of nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials to unstable national leaders or terrorists. Apparently, though, it has not been considered a serious enough danger by the United States and its allies to make the control of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union a matter of highest priority with appropriate funding. Some funding has been provided, but the amounts are insufficient to the nature of the danger.

    In the view of nuclearists, world peace can be maintained by nuclear arms, which would be used only as a last resort. This intention, of course, could dramatically fail if weapons from the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union or any other state fell into the hands of unstable national leaders or terrorists.

    It is also the view of nuclearists that nuclear power is an absolute good. They envision world markets being expanded by building highly capital intensive nuclear power plants throughout the developing world. It is a vision that encompasses the entire world, bringing the promise of nuclear power to rich and poor countries alike. It is unfortunately a vision that primarily benefits its promoters while bringing serious dangers to all who accept the technology.

    The public relations arm of the nuclear power industry, including the International Atomic Energy Agency, has painted the promise of safe, reliable, and inexpensive energy in glowing terms (pun intended), while skimming over the high capital costs, the need for huge subsidies, the danger of accidents, the added risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the unsolved problems of nuclear waste storage. These are the considerations borne from experience that have dampened enthusiasm for nuclear energy in the United States, Sweden, and other technologically advanced countries. The nuclear power industry has painted a picture of the benefits of nuclear energy that has attracted substantial interest from developing countries, many in Asia — countries that are eager to light their cities with this high-tech solution that they believe will be cheap and environmentally benign. Beneath the surface of the glittering promises, there is some sense that dangers are lurking, but these are easily overlooked in the hope of a quick fix for economies badly in need of inexpensive energy sources.

    Need for New Thinking

    Einstein, who had at first encouraged Franklin Roosevelt to establish a U.S. government project to develop nuclear weapons, was utterly distraught by what had occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He warned, “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” Einstein’s reflection remains the central challenge of the Nuclear Age.

    What will it take to change our modes of thinking with regard to nuclearism? One source of encouragement is that nuclearism does not seem to be an ideology with widespread support among the people of the world. It appears to be largely concentrated among those who stand to profit from it, and their supporters in government.

    The nature of nuclearism has been revealed in starker terms in the aftermath of the Cold War. Despite the breakup of the former Soviet Union and the end of communism as a state ideology in Russia, the West has continued to rely upon nuclear arsenals and to pursue policies of maintaining these arsenals, although at lower levels than in the Cold War period. But these arsenals do not assure global security, and many experts have argued that the breakup of the former Soviet Union has created serious dangers of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of unstable national leaders or terrorists.

    In the West, nuclearism and militarism have forged a strong link. Most Western European countries have become partners of the United States, Britain, and France in relying upon nuclear weapons for security. Russia has also been reliant upon its nuclear arsenal, and recently has announced that it has adopted a first-use doctrine, similar to that of NATO countries, if it is threatened by attack.(10) Eastern European countries, that formerly fell under the Soviet nuclear umbrella, are now seeking to join NATO and place themselves under the NATO nuclear umbrella. NATO recently voted to admit Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic.

    This proposed expansion of NATO has placed Russia on the defensive, and could have the result of stopping all progress in the reduction of nuclear armaments. The nationalistic Russian Duma may not ratify START II if NATO is expanded eastward closer to Russia’s borders. George Kennan, an elder statesman of United States foreign policy and former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, has referred to the expansion of NATO as “the most fateful error in U.S. policy in the entire post Cold War era.”(11)

    The linkage of nuclearism and militarism has had huge financial implications. The United States alone has spent some $4 trillion on its nuclear arsenal and its delivery and command and control systems since the early 1940s. The former Soviet Union is thought to have spent nearly a like amount, which ultimately was a key factor in its economic collapse and disintegration.

    Nuclearism in Asia Today

    There is some hope, albeit slim, that from the geographic East, from Asia, there will be leadership for an end to nuclearism. The Japanese people, as the most prominent victims of nuclearism, have always opposed nuclear weapons. Their government, however, has been content to rely upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and has also accumulated many tons of weapons-grade plutonium that could be fashioned into a sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal. The Japanese government has also built up a substantial nuclear power industry to reduce Japan’s reliance on imported oil. The Chinese have always had a better position on nuclear disarmament than their Western counterparts. The Indians and the Pakistanis argued for a universal commitment to complete nuclear disarmament in connection with the drafting of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but they were rebuffed by the West.

    Can Asian nations resist the temptations to nuclearism? Are they already too Westernized? Or, is there some aspect of Asian culture that is capable of rejecting nuclearism and leading the world back from the insane policies that were pursued during the Cold War and that continue to be relied upon today? These questions are worth exploring throughout Asia. If they can awaken new possibilities to dull the gleaming but false promises of nuclearism, they may help reverse recent historical trends that have the world on a collision course with disaster. A review of nuclearism in major Asian nations follows.

    China

    The major nuclear weapons state in Asia is China, which is thought to have some 400 nuclear weapons, of which some 250 are thought to be strategic weapons.(12) The remaining 150 weapons are thought to be tactical weapons for battlefield use. Since China’s nuclear weapons program has been conducted in great secrecy, it is possible that the size of their arsenal is considerably larger. It remains a relatively small arsenal, however, by comparison with those of the United States and Russia, which are each thought to currently contain some 10,000 nuclear weapons.(13)

    China has always said that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is the only one of the declared nuclear weapons states to make this pledge. China has also repeatedly called for nuclear disarmament, and said that it would go to zero nuclear weapons if the other nuclear weapons states would do so as well. There is no reason to doubt that China is serious about these pledges as they would appear to be strongly in their interests given the size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals.

    China also appears intent upon expanding its nuclear energy program. Today it has three nuclear power plants, and has expressed intentions of expanding to 100 nuclear power plants by the middle of the next century.(14)

    Japan

    Japan relies upon the U.S. nuclear “umbrella” for its defense. The close relationship that has existed between the U.S. and Japan in the post World War II period has allowed the U.S. to adopt a very lenient posture toward the Japanese accumulation of weapons-grade plutonium. While Japan does not have nuclear weapons, it has the materials, technological capability, and facilities to produce them rapidly in large numbers. This capacity has been referred to as “virtual deterrence.”(15)

    The Japanese government has consistently expressed its three non-nuclear principles — that it will not manufacture, nor possess, nor allow the bringing in of nuclear weapons. In actual fact, however, the position of the government with regard to future Japanese possession of nuclear weapons seems to be more ambiguous than the position of the Japanese people, which is solidly opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state.

    In Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the state renounces the right to make war:

    “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

    “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”(16)

    Despite this Constitutional provision, however, Japan now has the third largest military expenditures in the world, behind only the U.S. and Russia. Japan is now spending some $50 billion per year on its military.(17) It has a very highly trained and well equipped military force, which it calls its “Self-Defense Forces.”

    Japan also has the largest concentration of nuclear power reactors in Asia with 53 units. These reactors supply some 28 percent of Japan’s energy. Japanese officials are seeking to increase this amount to 42 percent by 2010 in an effort to reduce the country’s dependence on imported oil and gas.(18) The Japanese have been developing fast-breeder reactors, which produce more nuclear fuel than they consume. This has provided the rationale for the country to accumulate large amounts of plutonium that could also be used for weapons. The Japanese have developed reprocessing facilities that give them the capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. They also have agreements with France for the French to reprocess their spent fuel and provide them with reprocessed plutonium.

    A series of accidents at nuclear power plants over the past few years, including one at the Monju fast-breeder reactor, have undermined confidence in nuclear power among the people of Japan. This confidence was also undermined by the Kobe earthquake, and the knowledge that Monju and other reactors were built on earthquake faults. The Japanese government has tried to allay fears about nuclear power with a cartoon character, “our little friend Pluto,” who tells children that plutonium is safe enough to drink.(19)

    There is a growing anti-nuclear movement in Japan directed against nuclear power plants. In August 1996 Japanese voters in Maki, about 200 miles from Tokyo, participated in the first referendum in Japan on building a nuclear power plant. The Maki voters overwhelmingly rejected the plant with 61 percent voting against it.(20)

    The Japanese people have always strongly opposed nuclear weapons. In the international community the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have remained powerful and eloquent spokespersons for the victims of the bombings in those cities.

    North Korea

    North Korea, like Japan, has reprocessing facilities to create weapons-grade plutonium. It also has indigenous uranium supplies. It is thought that North Korea may have developed 12 to 15 kilograms of separated weapons-grade plutonium, enough for one or two nuclear weapons. Concern over this possibility led to an agreement in December 1995 in which North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for two 1000 megawatt light water nuclear reactors, to be financed by Japan and South Korea, and various other incentives.

    A top level defector from North Korea was recently quoted as saying that “North Korea could turn the capitalist South into a sea of flames and scorch Japan in a nuclear attack.”(21)

    South Korea

    South Korea has an active nuclear power program with ten reactors generating over 9000 megawatts of electricity. Forty percent of its electricity is provided from these plants. There are plans for an additional 15 reactors in the future.(22) South Korea has tried since the 1970s to acquire uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing facilities which would give it the capability to develop nuclear weapons, but it has been forestalled in these efforts by the United States.

    For many years the U.S. is thought to have maintained tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, but it is now believed that these weapons have been withdrawn. Of course, the continued U.S. military presence in South Korea creates the possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in a potential conflict with North Korea.

    Taiwan

    Taiwan, like South Korea, has an active nuclear power program, and has tried to acquire facilities for uranium enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing, but has not been successful in doing so. Also like South Korea, it has the technological competence to develop nuclear weapons if it obtained the materials to do so. Given its uneasy relationship with China, Taiwan would probably like to have a nuclear deterrent force against China’s nuclear weapons arsenal.

    Taiwan meets one-third of its energy needs by means of nuclear power. It has six nuclear power plants supplying some 5,000 megawatts of electricity.(23)

    India and Pakistan

    The Indian subcontinent presents one of the greatest dangers of nuclear war. Although both India and Pakistan deny it, they are both thought to have nuclear arsenals. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, and is thought to have a few dozen nuclear weapons. Pakistan has never tested a nuclear weapon, but is thought to possess a similar number or somewhat less than India. Both countries consider the other an enemy, and they have clashed many times over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

    India has ten nuclear power reactors generating less than 2000 megawatts of electricity, while Pakistan has only one nuclear power reactor generating 125 megawatts of electricity. In 1991 the two countries signed an agreement not to preemptively strike each other’s nuclear facilities.(24)

    Global Nuclearism

    Nuclearism in Asia is clearly embedded in global nuclearism. It cannot be separated out and treated for its symptoms without also treating the systemic disease of global nuclearism. It is certain that China will not give up its nuclear arsenal while the U.S. and Russia retain their arsenals. Nor will Japan give up its nuclear option while China retains its nuclear weapons. The same is true of India, and it is equally certain that Pakistan will not give up its nuclear weapons capability while India maintains its capability. It is fair to say that Asian nuclearism has been a reaction to the West. The United States demonstrated what may be viewed as the “usefulness” of nuclear weapons in warfare and its willingness to use these weapons. But it is a far different scenario to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear armed opponent that is already virtually defeated, as the U.S. did in Japan, than it is to use nuclear weapons against an opponent in possession of nuclear weapons or one that could quickly develop a nuclear weapons arsenal.

    It is becoming abundantly clear that nuclear weapons can serve only one reasonable purpose, and that is to deter another state from using nuclear weapons. Once one state has used nuclear weapons against a nuclear armed opponent or the ally of a nuclear armed opponent, retaliation is likely, and this would make any first use untenable. If the only purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence, then it is clear that as long as any state has nuclear weapons other states will want to maintain theirs or acquire such weapons as a means of deterrence. Therefore, there are only two choices: proliferation and eventual use of nuclear weapons, or the elimination of all nuclear weapons. General Lee Butler, the former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, has found that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.(25) How are we to proceed in this direction?

    Achieving a World Free of Nuclear Weapons

    In 1994 the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, for an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons was permitted under international law under any circumstances. Oral hearings on this question were held at the end of 1995. The three declared Western nuclear weapons states (U.S. UK, and France) and Russia all argued before the Court that the Court should decline to answer the question but, if it did choose to answer, it should find that under certain circumstances the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal. Some NATO allies of these nuclear weapons states supported their position. China chose not to participate in the hearings.

    Many non-aligned states argued before the Court that the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be considered illegal under all circumstances. They argued that international humanitarian law did not permit any use of nuclear weapons because such law prohibited the use of excessively injurious weapons (and surely nuclear weapons fit this category) and that nuclear weapons cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. Nuclear weapons, in fact, have been targeted at civilian populations in policies known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

    After receiving written and oral testimony from states, the Court deliberated extensively, and released its opinion on July 8, 1996.(26) The Court found unanimously that the rules of international humanitarian law apply to any threat or use of nuclear weapons. They also found in a split vote, decided by the President of the Court, that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be illegal under the international law of armed conflict. The Court indicated that it was unable to determine one way or the other whether or not the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be allowed in an extreme case of self-defense in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. With regard to this point, the President of the Court, M. Bedjaoui stated in his separate declaration, “I cannot sufficiently emphasize the fact that the Court’s inability to go beyond this statement of the situation can in no manner be interpreted to mean that it is leaving the door ajar to recognition of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”(27) He also referred to nuclear weapons as the “ultimate evil.”(28)

    The Court also interpreted Article VI of the NPT to the effect that the nuclear weapons states are under an obligation to complete good faith negotiations on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. The Court stated: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”(29)

    Responding to the Court’s opinion, the United Nations General Assembly expressed its appreciation to the Court and called for the good faith negotiations to begin in 1997 for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to prohibit and eliminate all nuclear weapons.(30) (See Appendix A.)

    Thus far, the nuclear weapons states have ignored the Court and the United Nations General Assembly. But the pressure is building around the world to force the nuclear weapons states to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. In December 1996, 58 generals and admirals from 17 nations released a statement calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons. They stated: “We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continued existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.”(31) The generals went on to urge that “long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”(32) (See Appendix B.)

    At the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, representatives of citizen action groups from around the world gathered in New York to lobby the delegates for nuclear abolition. An Abolition Caucus was formed and drafted an important statement known as the Abolition 2000 Statement. (See Appendix C.) This statement calls for the nuclear weapons states to enter into a treaty by the year 2000 to eliminate nuclear weapons in a timebound framework. Based upon this statement an Abolition 2000 Global Network was formed that now has participation by over 700 citizen action groups around the world. It is a growing citizens movement advocating the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.(33)

    A Sunflower Story

    In June 1996 Ukraine, which had inherited nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, transferred the last of its nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement. The defense ministers of Ukraine and Russia met with the Secretary of Defense of the United States at a former Ukrainian missile base which once housed 80 SS-19 missiles aimed at the United States. They celebrated the occasion by scattering sunflower seeds and planting sunflowers. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry said: “Sunflowers instead of missiles in the soil would insure peace for future generations.”(34)

    The sunflower has become the symbol of a world free of nuclear weapons. It is a simple symbol that powerfully suggests the difference between a flower that is bright and beautiful and whose seeds provide nutrition on the one hand, and a missile that is armed with nuclear warheads that can incinerate the inhabitants of entire cities on the other hand. There should be no doubt that the sunflower is the right choice. It represents life rather than death, and the sun’s abundant radiant energy that can be used to benefit rather than destroy humanity.

    Conclusion

    Momentum is building throughout the world for the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to counter the logic of death and destruction, the logic of the Cold War that ended many years ago, with a logic of hope for the future of humanity. If we are to give hope meaning in our time, we must seize the opportunity afforded by the end of the Cold War and move surely and rapidly to denuclearize our planet. Asia has an important role to play in this movement, which must be primarily a movement of people that will become so powerful that no government can stand in its way. Opposition to nuclearism provides an opportunity for humanity to unite around a common theme of assuring a future for our children and grandchildren. The time to act is now. There is far too much to do that is positive rather than to continue to spend our human, our scientific, and our financial resources on weapons of mass annihilation and nuclear power reactors that create radioactive poisons that will endanger the Earth for thousands of generations. Hiroshima and Nagasaki should have been enough of a lesson for the world to learn. There is no need to wait until more cities are added to this unfortunate list. East and West, North and South face the common problem of nuclear terror. We can end that terror once and for all if enough of us will stand up, speak out, and demand an end to nuclearism. It is time to reject both nuclear weapons and the dangerous technology of nuclear energy with which weapons production is so intimately intertwined.

    * Paper prepared for conference, “Human Security and Global Governance,” sponsored by the Toda Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 5-8, 1997. The author would like to thank Lori Beckwith for her research assistance.

    ** David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He can be contacted at Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; Fax: 805 568 0466; Web Site: https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com.

    ENDNOTES

    1. See, for example, President Truman’s personal journal, July 18, 1945. “Stalin had told P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in….”

    2. Wyden, Peter, Day One, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 289. Also quoted as “It is the greatest thing in history” in Udall, Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994, p. 23.

    3. For a good review of these myths, see: Udall, Stuart L., The Myths of August, New York: Pantheon Books, 1994.

    4. Speech given by Dwight Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly, December 8, 1953.

    5. Yaroshinskaya, Alla, Chernobyl, The Forbidden Truth, Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1995. See also “Chernobyl spawns crisis in Belarus,” by Angela Charlton, The Honolulu Advertiser, March 26, 1996.

    6. United Nations General Assembly Resolution I (1), January 24, 1946.

    7. Mack, Andrew, Proliferation in Northeast Asia, Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Occasional Paper No. 28, July 1996, p. 6.

    8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 729 UNTS 161.

    9. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 2.

    10. “Russia Adopts ‘First Strike’ Nuclear Tactic,” Santa Barbara News Press, May 26, 1997.

    11. Kennan, George, “A Fateful Error, Expanding NATO Would Be a Rebuff to Russian Democracy,” New York Times, February 5, 1997.

    12. “British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1996, p. 64.

    13. Arkin, William M. and Robert S. Norris, “Nuclear Notebook,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1997 and May/June 1997.

    14. Farley, Maggie, “Asia and the Atom: Willing and Wary.” Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1996.

    15. Mack, Andrew, Op. Cit., p. 17.

    16. Asai, Motofumi, “Japan at the Crossroads: ‘Redefinition’ of the U.S.-Japan Security System,” Pacific Research, May 1996, p. 11.

    17. Mann, Jim, “Clinton Second Term Resembles Ike Redux,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 1997.

    18. Watanabe, Teresa, “In Historic Vote, Japanese Town Rejects Nuclear Plant,” Los Angeles Times, August 6, 1996.

    19. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.

    20. Watanabe, Teresa, Loc. Cit.

    21. “Defector Suggests N. Korea Has Atom Arms, Paper Says,” Los Angeles Times, April 23, 1997.

    22. Farley, Maggie, Loc. Cit.

    23. Pollack, Andrew, “Reactor Accident in Japan Imperils Energy Program.” New York Times, February 24, 1996.

    24. Kapur, Ashok, “Western Biases,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1995.

    25. General Lee Butler speaking at the National Press Club, Washington D.C., December 4, 1996.

    26. “Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,” United National General Assembly A/51/218, October 15, 1996.

    27. Ibid., 40.

    28. Ibid., 42.

    29. Ibid., 37.

    30. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 M, December 10, 1996.

    31. “Statement on Nuclear Weapons By International Generals and Admirals,” December 5, 1996.

    32. Ibid.

    33. For more information on Abolition 2000, contact the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, CA 93108-2794; (805)965-3443; e-mail: wagingpeace@napf.org. Information is also available on Worldwide Web at www.napf.org.

    34. “Sunflower Seeds Sown at Ukrainian Missile Site,” New York Times International, June 5, 1996.

     

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    Appendix A

    United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45M on Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons December 10, 1996

     

    Recalling its resolution 49/75 K of 15 December 1994, in which it requested the International Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is permitted in any circumstances under international law,

    Mindful of the solemn obligations of States parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, particularly to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

    Recalling its resolution 50/70 P of 12 December 1995, in which it called upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework,

    Recalling also the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the objective of determined pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons,

    Recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty that they will never be produced again, Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally binding prohibition of the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and their destruction under effective international control,

    Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and welcoming every effort towards this end, Reaffirming the central role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum,

    Noting the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by the General Assembly in its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996,

    Regretting the absence of multilaterally negotiated and legally binding security assurances from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states,

    Convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for all life on Earth.

    Expresses its appreciation to the International Court of Justice for responding to the request made by the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session;

    Takes note of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on 8 July 1996 (A/51/218);

    Underlines the unanimous conclusion of the Court that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”;

    Calls upon all States to fulfill that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination;

    Requests the Secretary-General to provide necessary assistance to support the implementation of the present resolution;

    Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-second session an item entitled “Follow-up to the Advisory Opinion on the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.”

    Sponsors:

    Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Brazil, Burundi, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Lesotho, Libyan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe

     

    Appendix B

    Statement On Nuclear Weapons By International Generals And Admirals December 5, 1996

     

    We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

    Through our variety of responsibilities and experiences with weapons and wars in the armed forces of many nations, we have acquired an intimate and perhaps unique knowledge of the present security and insecurity of our countries and peoples.

    We know that nuclear weapons, though never used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represent a clear and present danger to the very existence of humanity. There was an immense risk of a superpower holocaust during the Cold War. At least once, civilization was on the very brink of catastrophic tragedy. That threat has now receded, but not forever-unless nuclear weapons are eliminated.

    The end of the Cold War created conditions favorable to nuclear disarmament. Termination of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States made it possible to reduce strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and to eliminate intermediate range missiles. It was a significant milestone on the path to nuclear disarmament when Belarus, Kazakhastan and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons.

    Indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996 are also important steps towards a nuclear-free world. We commend the work that has been done to achieve these results.

    Unfortunately, in spite of these positive steps, true nuclear disarmament has not been achieved. Treaties provide that only delivery systems, not nuclear warheads, will be destroyed. This permits the United States and Russia to keep their warheads in reserve storage, thus creating a “reversible nuclear potential.” However, in the post-Cold War security environment, the most commonly postulated nuclear threats are not susceptible to deterrence or are simply not credible. We believe, therefore, that business as usual is not an acceptable way for the world to proceed in nuclear matters.

    It is our deep conviction that the following is urgently needed and must be undertaken now:

    First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

    Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states;

    Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.

    The United States and Russia should-without any reduction in their military security-carry forward the reduction process already launched by START-they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The other three nuclear states and the three threshold states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. There is nothing incompatible between defense by individual countries of their territorial integrity and progress toward nuclear abolition.

    The exact circumstances and conditions that will make it possible to proceed, finally, to abolition cannot now be foreseen or prescribed. One obvious prerequisite would be a worldwide program or surveillance and inspection, including measures to account for and control inventories of nuclear weapons materials. This will ensure that no rogues or terrorists could undertake a surreptitious effort to acquire nuclear capacities without detection at an early stage. An agreed procedure for forcible international intervention and interruption of covert efforts in a certain and timely fashion is essential.

    The creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, confidence-building and transparency measures in the general field of defense, strict implementation of all treaties in the area of disarmament and arms control, and mutual assistance in the process of disarmament are also important in helping to bring about a nuclear- free world. The development of regional systems of collective security, including practical measures for cooperation, partnership, interaction and communication are essential for local stability and security.

    The extent to which the existence of nuclear weapons and fear of their use may have deterred war-in a world that in this year alone has seen 30 military conflicts raging-cannot be determined. It is clear, however, that nations now possessing nuclear weapons will not relinquish them until they are convinced that more reliable and less dangerous means of providing for their security are in place. It is also clear, as a consequence, that the nuclear powers will not now agree to a fixed timetable for the achievement of abolition.

    It is similarly clear that, among the nations not now possessing nuclear weapons, there are some that will not forever forswear their acquisition and deployment unless they, too, are provided means of security. Nor will they forego acquisition it the present nuclear powers seek to retain everlastingly their nuclear monopoly.

    Movement toward abolition must be a responsibility shared primarily by the declared nuclear weapons states- China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, by the de facto nuclear states, India, Israel and Pakistan; and by major non-nuclear powers such as Germany and Japan. All nations should move in concert toward the same goal.

    We have been presented with a challenge of the highest possible historic importance: the creation of a nuclear- weapons-free world. The end of the Cold War makes it possible.

    The dangers of proliferation, terrorism, and new nuclear arms race render it necessary. We must not fail to seize our opportunity. There is no alternative.

    Signed,

    CANADA Johnson, Major General V. (ret.) Commandant, National Defense College DENMARK Kristensen, Lt. General Gunnar (ret.) former Chief of Defense Staff FRANCE Sanguinetti, Admiral Antoine (ret.) former Chief of Staff, French Fleet GHANA Erskine, General Emmanuel (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief and former Chief of Staff, UNTSO (Middle East), Commander UMFI (Lebanon) GREECE Capellos, Lt. General Richard (ret.) former Corps Commander Konstantinides, Major General Kostas (ret.) former Chief of Staff, Army Signals INDIA Rikhye, Major General Indar Jit (ret.) former military advisor to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold and U Thant Surt, Air Marshal N. C. (ret.) JAPAN Sakoijo, Vice Admiral Naotoshi (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security Shikata, Lt. General Toshiyuki (ret.) Sr. Advisor, Research Institute for Peace and Security JORDAN Ajelilat, Major General Sahfiq (ret.) Vice President Military Affairs, Muta University Shiyyab, Major General Mohammed K. (ret.) former Deputy Commander, Royal Jordanian Air Force NETHERLANDS van der Graaf, Henry J. (ret.) Director Centre Arms Control & Verification, Member, United National Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters NORWAY Breivik, Roy, Vice Admiral Roy (ret.) former Representative to NATO, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic PAKISTAN Malik, Major General Ihusun ul Haq (ret.) Commandant Joint Services Committee PORTUGAL Gomes, Marshal Francisco da Costa (ret.) former Commander-in-Chief, Army; former President of Portugal RUSSIA Belous, General Vladimir (ret.) Department Chief, Dzerzhinsky Military Academy Garecy, Army General Makhmut (ret.) former Deputy Chief, USSR Armed Forces General Staff Gromov, General Boris, (ret.) Vice Chair, Duma International Affairs Committee, former Commander of 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan, former Deputy Minister, Foreign Ministry, Russia Koltounov, Major General Victor (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Larinov, Major General Valentin (ret.) Professor, General Staff Academy Lebed, Major Alexander (ret.) former Secretary of the Security Council Lebedev, Major General Youri V. (ret.) former Deputy Chief Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Makarevsky, Major General Vadim (ret.) Deputy Chief, Komibyshev Engineering Academy Medvodov, Lt. General Vladimir (ret.) Chief, Center of Nuclear Threat Reduction Mikhailov, Colonel General Gregory (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Nozhin, Major General Eugeny (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Rokhilin, Lt. General Lev, (ret.) Chair, Duma Defense Committee, former Commander Russian 4th Army Corps Sleport, Lt. General Ivan (ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Simonyan, Major General Rair (ret.) Head of Chair, General Staff Academy Surikov, General Boris T. (ret.) former Chief Specialist, Defense Ministry Teherov, Colonel General Nikolay (ret.) former Chief, Department of General Staff, USSR Armed Forces Vinogadov, Lt. General Michael S. (ret.) former Deputy Chief, Operational Strategic Center, USSR General Staff Zoubkov, Rear Admiral Radiy (ret.) Chief, Navigation, USSR Navy SRI LANKA Karumaratne, Major General Upali A. (ret.) Silva, Major General C.A.M.M. (ret.) USF, U.S.A. TANZANIA Lupogo, Major General H.C. (ret.) former Chief Inspector General, Tanzania Armed Forces UNITED KINGDOM Beach, General Sir Hugh (ret.) Member U.K. Security Commission Carver, Field Marshal Lord Michael (ret.) Commander-in-Chief of East British Army (1967-1969), Chief of General Staff (1971-1973), Chief of Defense Staff (1973-1976) Harbottle, Brigadier Michael (ret.) former Chief of Staff, UN Peacekeeping Force, Cyprus Mackie, Air Commodore Alistair (ret.) former Director, Air Staff Briefing UNITED STATES Becton, Lt. General Julius (USA) (ret.) Burns, Maj. General William F. (USA) (ret.) JCS Representative, INF Negotiations (1981-88), Special Envoy to Russia for Nuclear Dismantlement (1992-93) Carroll, Jr., Rear Admiral Eugene J. (USN) (ret.) Deputy Director, Center for Defense Information Cushman, Lt. General John H. (USA) (ret.) Commander, I Corps (ROK/US) Group (Korea) (1976-78) Galvin, General John R., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987-1992) Gayler, Admiral Noel (USN) (ret.) former Commander, Pacific Horner, General Charles A. (USAF) (ret.) Commander, Coalition Air Forces, Desert Storm (1991) former Commander, U.S. Space Command James, Rear Admiral Robert G. (USNR) (ret.) Odom, General William E. (USA) (ret.) Director, National Security Studies, Hudson Institute Deputy Assistant and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (1981-1985), Director, National Security Agency (1985-1988) O’Meara, General Andrew (USA) (ret.), former Commander, U.S. Army Europe Pursley, Lt. General Robert E. USAF (ret.) Read, Vice Admiral William L. (USN) (ret.) former Commander, U.S. Navy Surface Force, Atlantic Command Rogers, General Bernard W. (USA) (ret.) former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; former NATO Supreme Allied Commander (1979-1987) Seignious, II, Lt. General George M. (USA) (ret.) former Director Army Control and Disarmament Agency Shanahan, Vice Admiral John J. (USN) (ret.) Director, Center for Defense Information Smith, General William Y. (USAF) (ret.) former Deputy Commander, U.S. Command, Europe Wilson, Vice Admiral James B. (USN) (ret.) former Polaris Submarine Captain

    Appendix C

    Abolition 2000 Statement April 25, 1995

    Statement of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Abolition Caucus at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference

    A secure and livable world for our children and grandchildren and all future generations requires that we achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty years of nuclear weapons testing and production.

    Further, the inextricable link between the “peaceful” and warlike uses of nuclear technologies and the threat to future generations inherent in creation and use of long-lived radioactive materials must be recognized. We must move toward reliance on clean, safe, renewable forms of energy production that do not provide the materials for weapons of mass destruction and do not poison the environment for thousands of centuries. The true “inalienable” right is not to nuclear energy, but to life, liberty and security of person in a world free of nuclear weapons.

    We recognize that a nuclear weapons free world must be achieved carefully and in a step by step manner. We are convinced of its technological feasibility. Lack of political will, especially on the part of the nuclear weapons states, is the only true barrier. As chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, so must nuclear weapons be prohibited.

    We call upon all states(particularly the nuclear weapons states, declared and de facto(to take the following steps to achieve nuclear weapons abolition. We further urge the states parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared nuclear weapons states to implement these measures:

    1) Initiate immediately and conclude by the year 2000 negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time- bound framework, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.*

    2) Immediately make an unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

    3) Rapidly complete a truly comprehensive test ban treaty with a zero threshold and with the stated purpose of precluding nuclear weapons development by all states.

    4) Cease to produce and deploy new and additional nuclear weapons systems, and commence to withdraw and disable deployed nuclear weapons systems.

    5) Prohibit the military and commercial production and reprocessing of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.

    6) Subject all weapons-usable radioactive materials and nuclear facilities in all states to international accounting, monitoring, and safeguards, and establish a public international registry of all weapons-usable radioactive materials.

    7) Prohibit nuclear weapons research, design, development, and testing through laboratory experiments including but not limited to non-nuclear hydrodynamic explosions and computer simulations, subject all nuclear weapons laboratories to international monitoring, and close all nuclear test sites.

    8) Create additional nuclear weapons free zones such as those established by the treaties of Tlatelolco and Raratonga.

    9) Recognize and declare the illegality of threat or use of nuclear weapons, publicly and before the World Court.

    10) Establish an international energy agency to promote and support the development of sustainable and environmentally safe energy sources.

    11) Create mechanisms to ensure the participation of citizens and NGOs in planning and monitoring the process of nuclear weapons abolition.

    A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non- proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. Our common security requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.

    * The convention should mandate irreversible disarmament measures, including but not limited to the following: withdraw and disable all deployed nuclear weapons systems; disable and dismantle warheads; place warheads and weapon-usable radioactive materials under international safeguards; destroy ballistic missiles and other delivery systems. The convention could also incorporate the measures listed above which should be implemented independently without delay. When fully implemented, the convention would replace the NPT.