Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear proliferation

For Nuclear Sanity

This article was first published by the Transnational Institute

President Barack Obama’s April 5 speech in Prague calling for a world free of the scourge of nuclear weapons is a major foreign and security policy initiative that deserves applause. If he pursues its logic through to the end with the same since rity and passion with which he outlined his commitment “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”, he could be the first United States President to go beyond nuclear arms control and to put nuclear weapons elimination on the global agenda. That would mark a turning point for strategic thinking the world over and open up new avenues through which to seek security.
This remains a big “if”. Obama has not yet worked out the doctrinal, strategic and practical consequences of his fundamental premise that a secure world without nuclear weapons is both possible and desirable. His speech only outlines some necessary steps but without specifying their sequence or time frame, numbers (of weapons to be de-alerted or destroyed), the roles of different actors, the function of legally binding treaties, and so on.
But Obama has stated some premises upfront and emphasised their moral-political rationale in a way no major global leader has done in recent years. Thus, he said, “the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War”; these are “the ultimate tools of destruction”, which can erase the world “in a single flash of light”. The global non-proliferation regime is in crisis and “the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up”; soon, “we could reach the point where the centre cannot hold”.
“We are not destined,” said Obama, “to live in a world where more nations and more people possess [nuclear weapons]. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.” Logically, fighting fatalism means putting “an end to Cold War thinking” and reducing “the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy”.
This sets Obama miles apart not just from George W. Bush but also from Bill Clinton. Obama is effectively reversing a long tradition beginning with the Ronald Reagan presidency towards either a hardening of the U.S. nuclear posture, or the development of new weapons such as “Star Wars”-style ballistic missile defence (BMD), itself premised on even more dangerous doctrines than that of nuclear deterrence, which is fatally flawed.
Thus, the U.S. has failed, even two decades after the Cold War ended, to move beyond relatively paltry reductions in its nuclear arsenal through the Moscow Treaty of 2002. Under Bush, it refused to take 2,200 weapons off “launch on warning” alert. The U.S. military establishment wants to develop a Reliable Replaceable Warhead for existing ones, find new uses (for example, bunker-busting) for old weapon designs, and has yielded to pressures from the nuclear weapons laboratories to modernise and refine existing armaments and do experimental work on fusion weapons at the expensive National Ignition Facility.
Bush was not only obsessed with perpetuating America’s nuclear superiority. He gave it a particularly deadly edge through BMD deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, thus exacerbating tensions with Russia and destabilising strategic balances worldwide. Bush also blurred vital distinctions between conventional and nuclear weapons, unsigned the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia.
Bush’s BMD programme will militarise and nuclearise outer space, in which the U.S. seeks “full-spectrum” dominance. His paranoid response to the September 11 attacks resulted in the worst-ever fiasco in the history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at its important review conference in 2005, liquidating all the significant gains made at the 2000 review.

Obama promises to change course, radically. He has spoken more boldly and honestly in favour of a nuclear weapons-free world than any other U.S. President in decades. He has gone further than any other in acknowledging that the U.S. bears a “moral responsibility” for nuclear disarmament because it is the only power to have used the horror weapon. This speaks of exemplary moral clarity, as does his statement that the U.S. must take the lead on disarmament. However, that cannot be said about four other propositions in Obama’s speech. First, he betrays an unpardonably naive faith in nuclear deterrence: “Make no mistake. As long as [nuclear] weapons exist, the U.S. will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.…” He also believes in extended deterrence – deploying nuclear weapons in non-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries.
This column has dissected the fallacy of nuclear deterrence far too often to warrant further comment other than that it is a fallible, fragile and unreliable basis on which to premise security (via a balance of terror). It involves unrealistic assumptions about capabilities and doctrines, symmetrical perceptions by adversaries of “unacceptable damage” means, and the complete absence of miscalculations and accidents – 100 per cent of the time.
Second, Obama continues to repose faith in BMD – he congratulated the Czech for their “courage” in hosting it – although he qualifies his support by saying BMD must be “cost-effective and proven”. This ignores BMD’s primitive, as-yet-premature status in intercepting missiles, and worse, the danger of escalating military rivalry to uncertain and risky levels where an adversary could feel tempted to neutralise a putative BMD advantage by amassing more missiles or launching wildcat strikes.
Third, Obama, like Bush and Clinton, makes a specious distinction between responsible/acceptable/good nuclear powers (the Big Five-plus-Israel-plus-India-plus-non-Taliban-Pakistan) and irresponsible/dangerous ones (Iran, North Korea). This permits double standards and detracts from the universal urgency of abolishing all nuclear weapons. Obama’s endorsement of Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative – unilateral interception at sea of suspect nuclear-related materials – follows from this.
Finally, Obama believes that disarmament may not be achieved in “my lifetime”. Such pessimism is unwarranted. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s thoughtful plan for global nuclear disarmament, presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, set a 15-year timeline for complete nuclear elimination. This is realistic – if the U.S. and the international community musters the will for an early disarmament initiative.
If Obama effects deep cuts in U.S. nuclear weapons through the promised Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia this year, and launches a drive for banning nuclear testing and ending fissile production worldwide, the momentum can be accelerated, especially if U.S. policy shifts to no-first-use. After all, even the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse – George P. Schulz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn – believe that nuclear weapons abolition can be achieved in the foreseeable future.
Obama’s speech provides an opportunity to all those who believe in complete nuclear weapons elimination, a cause kept alive by the peace movement, a coalition of states, and several expert commissions. India too professes a commitment to this goal and must seize this opportunity.

India’s lukewarm response
Regrettably, Indian policymakers have extended a lukewarm, if not cold, welcome to Obama’s speech. So fearful are they of pressure on India to sign the CTBT that they are clutching at straws. One such is Obama’s statement that “my administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the CTBT”. This is different from what he wrote in a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh before he was sworn in: “I will work with the U.S. Senate to secure ratification of [CTBT] at the earliest practical day, and then launch a major diplomatic initiative to ensure its entry into force.” (The letter was suppressed by South Block.)
Indian policymakers are also reportedly relieved that Obama has not reiterated his letter’s reference to India’s “real responsibilities – [including] steps to restrain nuclear weapons programmes and pursuing effective disarmament when others do so”. They are also pleased that Obama has appointed Ellen Tauscher, a Democrat Congresswoman, as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security rather than Robert Einhorn, described by India’s nuclear hawks as “an ayatollah of non-proliferation”.
Such timidity is unbecoming of a nation that claims to be proud of its pro-disarmament record and has pledged to fight for a nuclear weapons-free world. India opposed the CTBT in 1995-96 not for its intrinsic flaws or demerits but because it wanted to test nuclear weapons. Having done so in 1998, India should sign and ratify the treaty. Even Arundhati Ghose, who famously declared that India will not sign it “not now, not ever”, now says that she sees no problem with its signature. This may show a deplorable level of cynicism, but it is nevertheless a ground for correcting course and returning to the disarmament agenda.
Logically, this includes several steps such as the CTBT, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, regional nuclear risk-reduction and restraint measures (including forswearing missile test-flights and keeping delivery vehicles apart from warheads) and, of course, deep cuts in nuclear weapons by all the nuclear weapons states, beginning with the U.S. and Russia.
India must boldly seize the initiative by updating the Rajiv Gandhi plan, opposing BMD and proactively arguing for rapid strides towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Here lies the litmus test of India’s commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world and of its creative and principled diplomacy.

Praful Bidwai is a journalist and author living in India.

May 2, 2009
First Iran, Now Arabs Going Nuclear: An Interview with Richard Falk

This interview was originally published on Al-Jazeera

There is renewed effort to engage Iran on its nuclear programme. Washington has expressed willingness to hold direct talks with Tehran, which marks a dramatic shift between the policy of Barack Obama, the US president, and his predecessor George Bush.

The emphasis on dialogue comes as North Korea signals that it is restarting a nuclear plant that produces arms-grade plutonium, and Arab nations are importing nuclear technology and assistance at an unprecedented pace.
Al Jazeera spoke to Richard Falk, the chair of the board at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, about Iran’s nuclear programme, its effect on regional Arab ambitions for nuclear power, and whether the Middle East will enter a nuclear arms race.

The following are excerpts from the interview:
Al Jazeera: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, recently announced the opening of a nuclear fuel plant, and stressed Iran’s ability and right to enrich uranium. However, he also welcomed constructive dialogue with the US and other powers. What motives are behind his statements? f

Falk: I think it is difficult to assess the motives behind this kind of Iranian public initiative. It may be connected with domestic politics – the eflection campaign there – where Ahmadinejad is trying to present himself as a leader who has restored Iran’s stature and that this stature is associated symbolically with a robust nuclear programme.

It may also be a signal that though Iran seems receptive to resuming some kind of negotiations about their nuclear programme … this shouldn’t be made too easily.

It could be that this is part of a bargaining strategy by indicating that they already have enrichment capabilities and if they were to curtail them they would have to be given quite a bit in exchange.

Are Arab states pursuing nuclear programmes due to growing energy demands or does the perceived threat from Iran’s apparent capability to develop nuclear weapons play a role?

Often in these kinds of decisions the true motives are disguised and the public explanations are presented in the most acceptable, least provocative form.

I think that is the case here. Most of the rationale for these expanded nuclear energy programmes are almost always related to domestic factors, increasing electricity demand and the expense of importing energy.

It is hard not to believe, given the geopolitical climate in the region – not only Iran, but the Iraq war and other factors like Israel’s nuclear capabilities – that the geo-strategic factors have not entered into the motives of all these countries going in that direction.
Of course, they are also imitating one another. There is a sense that if you don’t move in this direction you are acknowledging you are subordinate or marginalised in the region.

There is also a prestige element at work. It is extremely hard to read the hierarchy of motives. In the background it is probably the way in which India and Pakistan evolved their nuclear programmes.

They developed over time and as a result, India began to be taken seriously as a world power when it crossed the nuclear threshhold.

Will the Middle East witness a race for nuclear technologies?

The background of all of this is the abandonment by the Arab countries of their earlier mission of seeking a nuclear-free region that are directed at weapons and combining it with regional security.
Perhaps it is an interpretation that Israel is never going to go along with the idea of a nuclear-free Middle East.

And now that Iran is at least a latent nuclear weapons state, it doesn’t make any sense to proceed in that direction anymore, rather to the extent that strategic considerations are at work.

It seems that the leading Arab countries think that they need to have their own long-term security. It should be a contingency option for them.

Arab leaders have implied that Israel does not want to see Arab countries acquire nuclear technology and has thwarted their efforts to advance their programmes.

As you suggested, the evidence over the years is that Israel becomes very nervous when any of the Arab countries move in directions that could challenge its regional military superiority.

Though that is sort of a remote prospect, the manner in which Israel views its relationship with its neighbours is such that it has consistently opposed arms sales of any kind or of enhancement of their potential capabilities.

Maybe Israel would prefer to see the Arab countries energy-dependent rather than energy-independent. I think it is consistent with the kind of regional hegemonic ambition that Israel both defensively and offensively assert.

Thirty years ago you called for a total renunciation of nuclear power in exchange for other pollution-free energy sources. Obama has also pledged to create a nuclear-free world. But is it too late?

I think it is already too late. A number of elements make it too late.

The first of which is this sense that alternative energy is indispensable for dealing with the limitations on oil supply and in the face of increasing demand for oil and gas, combined with considerations for climate change and combined with the fact that there is a sufficient commitment on the part of a sufficient number of important states that it is just implausible to think that this kind of total de-nuclearisation can occur.

The only thing that might give it a renewed possibility is another Chernobyl-type accident. Or several Chernobyls which would highlight the other aspect of developing nuclear energy – what you do with the waste and a variety of related things.

Jordan wants to maintain their right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But the UAE has unilaterally given up theirs to prove their peaceful intentions to advance their programme. Should Arab countries be allowed to enrich uranium?

The US geopolitical discipline in relation to nuclear energy and weapons has faced a two-tier view of international legitimacy. Some countries are allowed to have the weapons and other countries are not.

Of the ones that are, most say that the others are not allowed to come close to the threshhold. At the same time, from the perspective of the international law regime embodied by the NPT, it was supposed to be consistent with having the complete benefits of peaceful uses, including the option to develop the nuclear fuel cycle.

You have a much stricter regime geopolitically than you do legally. The UAE is trying to conform to the geopolitical discipline or reality by assuring the world its nuclear energy programme is accepting international inspection and forgoing the option to reprocess nuclear fuel or have the enrichment capability.

I suppose the UAE is trying to make itself look like the optimal actor of how to ensure the energy security transition beyond the petroleum age. They also have the resources to pull off the kind of programme there.

Is it fair for ‘nuclear weapons states’ to tell others they cannot produce weapons without stripping down their own nuclear arsenals?

The fascinating fact is that they have been able to successfully for 45 years convince most of the actors in the world that they are better off going along with nonproliferation charades, rather than repudiating them.

It is based on this whole pervasive double standard that is embedded in the whole idea of nuclear nonproliferation and what I call the mind game that has been successfully played by the nuclear weapons states that makes us believe that the danger comes more from those who don’t have the weapons, rather than those who have the weapons.

Nuclear weapons states have not fulfilled the Article Six pledge of nuclear disarmament. It was unanimously affirmed in the advisory opinion of the world court of the legality of nuclear weapons.

It was divided on the issues of use, but unanimous on obligation to seek in good faith and I think they have not acted in good faith and fulfilled the real bargain. Therefore non-nuclear states, from a legal point of view, would be quite entitled to say they are no longer bound either.

Is it in the interest of these states, particularly Israel and the US, to work toward military de-nuclearisation?

I would think it is in Israel’s long term interest. It is particularly pertinent to the region because there are several dimensions of unresolved conflict, one important adversary posses a rather formidable nuclear weapons capability, others, particularly Iran have clearly latent potential.

So if one is thinking from the perspective of conflict avoidance or war prevention, it could seem that one is at a point where it would make a lot of sense to exert that kind of political pressure.
Israel talks a lot about attacking Iran, but that is filled with uncertainty and probably would generate a very strong backlash in the region and possibly even in the US and Europe. They stand to gain a lot by a reliable process of regional regulation, security, system of mutual non-aggression.
In that sense it exposes the unwillingness of the US to press Israel in the way it would press other countries, which is illustrative of another aspect of these double standard in nuclear weapons and nuclear energy.

Richard Falk is Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

April 14, 2009
The US-India Deal: When Geopolitics Meets Principle

When geopolitics comes up against principle in the US Congress, it is generally principle that is forced to give way. In the case of the US-India nuclear deal, originally proposed by President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2005, the deal would involve transferring nuclear technology and material from the US to India. Geopolitically, it would strengthen the relationship between the two countries, but it would do so at the expense of the principle of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

India is not a party to the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It never joined because its leaders believed that the Non-Proliferation Treaty promoted nuclear apartheid with its two classes of states: nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” By not signing the treaty, India, like Pakistan and Israel, held open the possibility of developing nuclear weapons. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear device, what it called a “peaceful nuclear device.” In 1998, India conducted multiple tests of nuclear weapons, and was followed almost immediately by a series of Pakistani nuclear tests.

The United States, unlike India, is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Like all other parties to the treaty, it promised in Article I of the treaty “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.” India is a “non-nuclear-weapon State” by the treaty’s definition. By providing nuclear materials and technology to India, the US will be assisting India to develop a larger nuclear arsenal than it already has developed. Thus, the US will be in violation of its treaty obligations.

India has agreed to allow its civilian nuclear reactors to be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but not its military reactors. By supplying nuclear material and technology to India, it will allow India to use all of the uranium and plutonium from its military reactors, which are not subject to inspection, to be used for increasing the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal. This will, in turn, promote nuclear arms races with Pakistan and China.

Earlier this month, the US applied pressure to the 45 member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to waive their rules and allow nuclear material and technology transfers to India. Many of the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group were as eager as the United States at the opportunity for their big corporations to cash in on selling nuclear reactors to India.

With the Nuclear Suppliers Group having signed off on the deal, it left only the US Congress to reconsider the matter before giving the green light to the deal. The first step in getting the deal through Congress was gaining the approval of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In this Committee, Senator Russ Feingold introduced an amendment to the bill calling on the administration to reach an agreement with the Nuclear Suppliers Group that there will be no transfers of uranium enrichment or plutonium separation technologies to a country that is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Since India is not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Feingold amendment would have prohibited transfers of these technologies for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials to India. It is an amendment that upholds the principle that transfers of nuclear technology should not assist in the development of nuclear weapons. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in its eagerness to see the US reap perceived geopolitical and financial advantages, threw principle to the wayside and voted 15 to 4 against the amendment. The four principled Senators voting for the amendment were Feingold, along with Barbara Boxer, Robert Casey and Jim Webb.

Following the defeat of the amendment, the Committee, in its embarrassing rush to line up behind a Bush policy that substantially undermines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime, voted 19 to 2 in favor of the deal. The only two Senators on the Committee to stand on principle and vote against the deal were Russ Feingold and Barbara Boxer.

If the House Foreign Affairs Committee follows its colleagues in the Senate, it is almost assured that the Congress of the United States will vote in favor of this ill-conceived deal, and the prospects of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons will have been dealt a near fatal blow. The US will have demonstrated that perceived short-term geopolitical gain, with an unhealthy dose of potential financial profit thrown in, is more than enough to defeat even the most important of security-related principles. The Bush administration will have succeeded in making the Congress complicit in blowing a hole the size of a nuclear explosion through the principle of safeguarding the country and the world against the spread of nuclear weapons.

David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a councilor of the World Future Council.

September 25, 2008
Congress Has the Last Chance to Say No to the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal

India never joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, it developed and tested nuclear weapons. It is a known nuclear proliferator. India is now thought to have an arsenal of some 60 nuclear weapons, and India’s first nuclear test in 1974 led Pakistan to also develop and later test nuclear weapons. India’s 1974 nuclear test also led to the formation of a Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of 45 countries that agreed to ban nuclear technology transfers that would make nuclear proliferation more likely, particularly to countries such as India and Pakistan that were outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Despite the obvious implications for nuclear proliferation, George W. Bush put forward a plan in 2005 to transfer nuclear technology and materials to India. For this plan, which is best characterized as the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal, a special waiver was needed from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, requiring the consent of all members. This deal ran into trouble when Austria, Ireland and New Zealand initially sought to uphold the obligations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and held out for tighter proliferation controls, at a minimum a commitment by India that it would conduct no further nuclear tests. Although India would not make this commitment – only going so far as to say it would engage in a voluntary moratorium on testing – arm-twisting diplomatic pressure from the US caused these last hold-outs against proliferation to capitulate. The only barrier remaining to this Nuclear Proliferation Deal going through is the US Congress.

The Bush administration has given three justifications for pursuing this deal with India. First, it will forge a strategic partnership with the world’s largest democracy. Second, it will help India meet its increasing energy demand in an “environmentally friendly” way. Third, it will open a market for the sale of billions of dollars of nuclear technology to India.

Forging a strategic partnership with India is fine, but why do it on a foundation of nuclear weapons proliferation? Surely, other countries will be looking at this Nuclear Proliferation Deal as a model that will serve their own interests as well. If the US can do it with India, why not China with Pakistan? Or Russia with Iran? Or Pakistan with Syria? The possibilities for nuclear proliferation are endless, and this deal makes them more likely.

It is also fine for the US to help India to meet its growing energy demand in an environmentally friendly way, but it is absolute hypocrisy to classify nuclear energy “environmentally friendly.” No one knows what to do with the long-lived radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants – not the US, not anyone. And these wastes are truly long-lived. In the case of the highly toxic and leukemia causing by-product of nuclear power production, plutonium 239, the wastes will gradually decline in danger over a period of 240,000 years. Not the best gift to bestow on future generations.

There are other reasons as well to be skeptical of nuclear power plants. They are capital intensive, subject to accidents and tempting targets for terrorists. They also require large societal subsidies, such as the underwriting of liability insurance. The uranium used in these plants, if highly enriched, not a technologically difficult feat, provides the basic ingredients for nuclear weapons. The plutonium generated in these plants, if reprocessed, also not difficult technologically, provides another fissionable material for nuclear weapons. Why not support India to produce truly environmentally friendly energy sources, such as wind or solar energy?

The third reason for the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal sounds to me like the real one – that it will open a market to sell billions of dollars of nuclear technology to India. There will be a small number of corporations and their chief executives that will profit big-time from this deal, but they will be doing so at a heavy cost to the people of the world. This Nuclear Proliferation Deal has “double standards” written all over it. Can you imagine the US pushing the same deal with Iran, Iraq or North Korea? Of course not! This deal puts a hole the size of a nuclear explosion through the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Very soon the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal will be back before the US Congress for a final vote. If the Congress approves the deal as it stands, it goes through. If Congress votes it down, it doesn’t go through. This deal, initiated and promoted heavily by the Bush administration, will undermine the security of the American people and people everywhere, if Congress allows it to go through.

The Bush administration was able to pressure the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but the American people should not allow Mr. Bush to proceed with this final cynical act to enrich the few at the expense of national and global security. If you care about the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation, it’s time for action. Let your representative in Washington know that you expect a No vote on the US-India Nuclear Proliferation Deal.

David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org).

September 8, 2008
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Turns Forty

July 1, 2008 marks the 40th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) being opened for signatures. The true purpose of this treaty has always been two-fold: to prevent nuclear proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament; in other words, to create a level playing field in which there are no nuclear weapons. In the preamble to the treaty, the parties declare “their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”

The treaty recognized five states as nuclear weapons states: the United States, Soviet Union (now Russia), United Kingdom, France and China. Three countries never joined the Treaty – Israel, India and Pakistan – and all three have subsequently developed nuclear arsenals. One country, North Korea, withdrew from the treaty and tested a nuclear device in 2006.

Thus, at the 40-year anniversary, the number of nuclear weapons states in the world has not quite doubled. Actually, four other states became nuclear weapons states during this period, but gave up their nuclear arsenals. South Africa developed a small nuclear arsenal and then dismantled it. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union broke apart, but turned them over to Russia for dismantling.

The greatest failure of the NPT at the 40-year mark is in the area of nuclear disarmament. In 1968, when the NPT was opened for signatures, there were 38,974 nuclear weapons in the world. By 1986, the number of nuclear weapons reached its height at 70,481 nuclear weapons. By the time the NPT turned 25 (from its entry into force in 1970), there were 40,344 nuclear weapons in the world, more than when it was opened for signatures. There remain some 26,000 nuclear weapons in the world, with over 95 percent of these in the arsenals of the US and Russia. Yet, there are some hopeful signs.

Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has created an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament with the purpose of forging a global consensus on how to reinvigorate the NPT at its 2010 Review Conference. “We cannot simply stand idly by” Rudd said, “and allow another review conference to achieve no progress – or worse, to begin to disintegrate. The treaty is too important. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is too important.”

In Europe, 69 members of the European Parliament from 19 European Union member states issued a Parliamentary declaration in support of the Nuclear Weapons Convention, a draft treaty for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Angelika Beer, a member of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense, said, “Only a serious commitment to disarmament provides the moral ground for demanding non-proliferation from others.”

In their endorsement of the Nuclear Weapons Convention, the parliamentarians stated, “We take seriously the universal obligation, affirmed by the International Court of Justice, to achieve nuclear disarmament in good faith in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

It is also hopeful that over 2,300 mayors of cities from throughout the world have recognized the particular danger that nuclear weapons pose to cities. They have joined the Mayors for Peace 2020 Campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

Despite the United States voting against every one of the 15 nuclear disarmament measures to come before the 2007 United Nations General Assembly, there is hope on this front as well. Both major party candidates for US president have endorsed the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and have indicated that they would take steps to realize this goal. With serious US presidential leadership for achieving the nuclear disarmament obligation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there will hopefully be far more to celebrate on the 50th anniversary of the treaty.

David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and a councilor of the World Future Council (www.worldfuturecouncil.org).

July 1, 2008
The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Human Survival

In the vastness of the universe there is only one place we know of where life exists. That place, of course, is our planet, our Earth. Our planet has been hospitable to the evolution of life, resulting in the development of complex life forms, including homo sapiens, the “knowing” ones. We are “knowing” because we have the capacity to perceive and reflect upon our surroundings, our vision reaching to the far ends of the universe itself.

We humans are nature’s mirror. We were created by the conditions of the universe, but in a sense it is also true that, by our perceptions and reflections, we create the universe. A well-known philosophical riddle asks whether a tree falling in the forest would make a sound if there were no one there to hear it. In the same way, but on a larger scale, we might ask if the universe itself would exist if there were no creatures like ourselves capable of perceiving and reflecting upon it.

All of this is to say that human beings are special. In the long span of universe time, the appearance of humans is just a few short ticks on the cosmic clock. Yet, in that short span of time we have achieved remarkable intellectual, spiritual and artistic heights. We have also created tools capable of destroying much of life, including ourselves. By our cleverness in creating nuclear weapons, we have placed our own future on the planet in danger.

With the existence of the future of our species in jeopardy, we are faced with a choice. We can confront this existential threat with ignorance, apathy and denial, or we can join together to end this threat of our own making. Choosing the latter route would mean accepting responsibility for our common future and acting to assure it.

The diplomats from many nations of the world who negotiated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had a solution to the nuclear weapons threat to humanity. They sought to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other states, and they also sought to eliminate the nuclear weapons already in the arsenals of those states that possessed them. Their efforts resulted in Article VI of the Treaty, in which the nuclear weapons states were required to engage in “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

The NPT was opened for signatures in 1968, and we are still waiting for those “good faith” negotiations for complete nuclear disarmament. In 1995, an NPT Review and Extension Conference was held on the 25th anniversary of the Treaty entering into force. Many civil society organizations argued at this conference that the NPT should not be extended indefinitely, since it would give the equivalent of a blank check to the nuclear weapons states who had so badly failed in fulfilling their Treaty obligations for its first quarter century.

But the United States, along with the UK and France, argued for an indefinite extension. They twisted arms and, in the end, prevailed. And the warnings that they would approach their obligations for “good faith” negotiations with the same disdain or indifference with which they had approached them in the past have proven true.

At the five-year NPT Review Conferences and the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings in between, the United States and its allies have fought against recognition of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty. They distribute slick public relations brochures that gloss over the lack of progress in complying with Article VI. They resist accepting even the responsibility to engage in the good faith negotiations to which they have committed themselves. Their goal seems to be to deflect criticism, while actually doing virtually nothing to promote a world free of nuclear weapons.

At the NPT Review Conferences and PrepComs, civil society organizations come to plead on behalf of humanity. They are given a few hours on the program to make their impassioned pleas, but often find that the official delegates to the conference are unwilling even to come to hear what they have to say. Over the years, the expectations that the delegates to the NPT will achieve any substantial progress have continued to diminish.

I am no longer interested in the charades that are played by the delegates to the NPT representing the governments of the nuclear weapons states. I want to see some meaningful action on their part. We have a right to expect and demand such action.

At stake is the future of our species. It is time for countries to stop playing cynical games that seek to avoid existing NPT obligations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Mutually Assured Destruction is unacceptable, whether it be between the US and Russia or India and Pakistan. Mutually Assured Delusions are also unacceptable. It is time for the UK and France to stop relying upon nuclear weapons because these weapons make them feel like they are still important world powers. Israel needs to end its nuclear weapons program before other Middle East countries follow its example. Other countries, for example those in NATO, need to step out from under the US nuclear umbrella and stop being enablers of the nuclear addiction of a small number of states.

The only way out of our nuclear dilemma is for the countries of the world to demand that the Article VI obligation for “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament be fulfilled. The US will have to provide leadership or it is unlikely that substantial progress will be possible. If the US doesn’t act, it is unlikely that Russia will do so, and without Russian participation, it is unlikely that significant progress will be possible with the UK, France and China.

The NPT, with its membership of nearly all the world’s countries, provides an appropriate forum for the countries of the world to negotiate a new treaty, a Nuclear Weapons Convention, for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. Once negotiations are planned, the non-NPT states (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) should be invited to join. Alternatively, the United States, as the world’s most militarily powerful country, could under new leadership use its convening capacity to initiate negotiations among the nine nuclear weapons states, leading to a Nuclear Weapons Convention with universal participation.

Civil society has already prepared a draft Nuclear Weapons Convention. It has been introduced to the United Nations by the Republic of Costa Rica and Malaysia. The draft treaty is feasible. It is desirable. It could be accomplished relatively quickly. All that is required is the political will of the nuclear weapons states. Without this political will, the human future remains in peril. It is the 21st century equivalent of fiddling while Rome burns, but with far graver potential consequences for our common future.

David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a councilor of the World Future Council.

April 4, 2008
Why I Oppose Nuclear Weapons

I oppose nuclear weapons because they are long-distance killing machines incapable of discriminating between soldiers and civilians, the aged and the newly born, or between men, women and children.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they threaten the destruction of all that is sacred, of all that is human, of all that exists.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they threaten to foreclose the future.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they are cowardly weapons, and in their use there can be no honor.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they are a false god, dividing nations into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” bestowing unwarranted prestige and privilege on those that possess them.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they are a distortion of science and technology, twisting our knowledge of nature to destructive purposes.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they mock international law, displacing it with an allegiance to raw power.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they waste our resources on the development of instruments of annihilation.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they concentrate power and undermine democracy.

I oppose nuclear weapons because they corrupt our humanity.

Shortly after graduating from college, I visited the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Museums. At these museums, I was awakened to the human suffering caused by the use of these weapons. This suffering is not part of the American lore about the use of the bombs. These museums gave me insight into the differences in perspective between those who had been above the bomb and those beneath the bombs.

Those above the bombs, the victors, celebrated the technology of triumph, and went on to engage in a mad nuclear arms race. Those beneath the bombs, the victims, learned the simple lesson: “Never again! We shall not repeat the evil.”

The vision of the future held by those above the bombs and those beneath the bombs may be the decisive struggle of our time. On the side of nuclear weapons is the arrogance of power that is willing to put at risk the future of civilization, if not of life itself. On the side of the survivors, the hibakusha, is the moral clarity of calling evil by its name.

Resolving this struggle is the challenge presented to humanity by nuclear weapons. Each of us must choose. Ignorance, apathy and denial are de facto votes for continuing the nuclear threat. Only by unalterably opposing nuclear weapons and working actively for their elimination can an individual align himself or herself with those who experienced first-hand the absolute devastation of these weapons. This is my choice. I seek without reservation the elimination of all nuclear weapons from our unique planet, the only one we know of in the universe that supports life.

David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org)

August 22, 2007
The Greatest Immediate Threat to Humanity

It is perhaps the least talked about and most worrying irony of our time. The United States has a massive defense budget, but spends relatively little addressing the most immediate danger to humanity.

Global security is vital to family life, the growth of business, the wise husbanding of resources and the environment. And yet, all our hopes and plans for the future exist under the shadow of a catastrophic threat – one that could kill millions of people in a few moments and leave civilization in shambles.

Although there are other significant threats, such as global warming and infectious diseases, it is nuclear weapons that are the greatest immediate danger confronting our species. We must stop ignoring this threat and start providing leadership to eliminate nuclear arsenals around the globe.

Let’s look at some of the facts about nuclear weapons. They are the only weapon capable of destroying civilization and the human species. They kill indiscriminately, making them equal opportunity destroyers. In the hands of terrorists, they could destroy a country as powerful as the United States. A nuclear 9/11 could have resulted in deaths exceeding one million and the collapse of the US and world economies.

There are currently some 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and 12,000 of these are deployed. Of these, 3,500 nuclear weapons are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments.

Nine countries currently possess nuclear weapons: the United States, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. More than 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world are in the arsenals of the US and Russia. The UK, France, China and Israel are estimated to have arsenals numbering a few hundred each. India and Pakistan are thought to have arsenals under 100, and North Korea to have up to 12 nuclear weapons. As many as 35 other countries have the technological capability to become nuclear weapons states, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Iran and Egypt.

Nuclear weapons give a state sudden clout in the international system. India, Pakistan and North Korea all increased their stature in the international system after testing nuclear weapons. Recently, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva emphasized the perceived prestige that nuclear weapons potential gives a country. He said: “Brazil could rank among those few nations in the world with a command of uranium enrichment technology, and I think we will be more highly valued as a nation — as the power we wish to be.”

Nearly all countries in the world are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Only three countries have not signed the treaty: Israel, India and Pakistan. A fourth country, North Korea, withdrew from the NPT in 2003. All of these countries have developed nuclear arsenals.

The NPT obligates the nuclear weapons states that are parties to the treaty to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice has interpreted this to mean that negotiations must be concluded “leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.”

As the world’s only remaining superpower, the United States can lead the way in fulfilling this obligation. It has failed to do so. The US missile defense program has been provocative to other countries, particularly Russia and China, and has resulted in these countries improving their offensive nuclear capabilities. The US has also sought to upgrade and improve its nuclear arsenal, and has proposed replacing every thermonuclear weapon in the US arsenal with the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead. The US has, in effect, said to the world that it intends to rely upon its nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

In addition, the US has failed to provide legally binding security assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. In fact, the US indicated in its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review that it was developing contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against seven countries – two nuclear weapons states (Russia and China) and five non-nuclear weapons states (Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya and North Korea, which at the time was not thought to have nuclear weapons).

US nuclear policy undermines the security of its people. The more the US relies on nuclear weapons, the more other countries will do so. Former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated: “The more that those states that already have [nuclear weapons] increase their arsenals, or insist that such weapons are essential to their national security, the more other states feel that they too must have them for their security.” Reliance on nuclear weapons will assure their proliferation.

The more nuclear weapons in the world, the more likely they will end up in the hands of terrorist extremists incapable of being deterred. The longer nations rely on nuclear weapons for security, the more likely it is that they will be used, by accident or design.

The US needs to work urgently for a treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons under strict international control, just as we have already done with chemical and biological weapons. To do this requires political will, which has not been demonstrated by the current US administration. Continuing with existing US nuclear policies is a recipe for disaster. The Cold War ended more than15 years ago, and new problems now confront humanity. It is time for a drastic change in US nuclear policy – change that will require strong and effective leadership.

David Krieger is the President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org)

July 19, 2007
Time to Wake Up

In this season of the 61st anniversaries of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, it is noteworthy that there are still 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world. These weapons are in the arsenals of nine countries, but over 95 percent of them are in the arsenals of just two countries: the US and Russia. These two countries each actively deploy some 6,000 nuclear weapons and keep about 2,000 on hair-trigger alert.

The political elites in the US seem to think this is fine, and that they can go on with nuclear business-as-usual for the indefinite future. Not a single member of the US Senate has called for pragmatic steps leading to the abolition of nuclear weapons, including negotiations for nuclear disarmament as required by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

US leaders are living within a bubble of hubris that is manifested in many ways, flagrant examples of which are the pursuit of an illegal war in Iraq, and opposition to joining the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto accords on global warming. Underlying their policies is the attitude that US military and economic power gives them the right to violate international law at will and pursue a unilateral path of force when it suits their fancy. We citizens are being held hostage to their major errors in judgment, which in the Nuclear Age could result in the destruction of the country and much of civilization.

Rather than working to reduce the nuclear threat, US nuclear policy is promoting nuclear proliferation. A recent example is the proposed US-India nuclear deal, in which the Congress appears prepared to change its own non-proliferation laws in order to sell nuclear materials and technology to a country that never signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and secretly developed nuclear weapons. US leaders must have their heads deeply buried in the sand if they fail to grasp that this will spur an even more intense nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent and be viewed as hypocritical by the vast majority of the non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In the 2006 Hiroshima Peace Declaration, Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba pointed out that the US Conference of Mayors adopted a resolution in June “demanding that all nuclear weapons states, including the Untied States, immediately cease all targeting of cities with nuclear weapons.” Of course, this would be a good beginning, but nuclear weapons have little use other than to target cities or other nuclear weapons. They are, after all, the ultimate weapon of mass destruction.

The World Court found the threat or use of nuclear weapons to be illegal. Most churches have been vocal about their immorality. These weapons detract from security rather than add to it. A recent international commission report on weapons of mass destruction, Weapons of Terror, concluded: “So long as any state has [weapons of mass destruction] – especially nuclear arms – others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic.”

Why are we not appalled by the myopia and arrogance of our political leadership for disastrous policies such as those that ignore the obligation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty for good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament in all its aspects? We should be asking: How do individuals who support these insane policies rise to such high office? We should also be asking: Why do ordinary Americans not care enough about their survival to change their leadership?

A large part of the answer to the first question is that the system is broken and far too dependent on large cash contributions to buy television ads. Insight into an answer to the second question may be found in the recent Harris Poll (July 21, 2006) that reported that 50 percent of US respondents still believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction when the US invaded that country in March 2003. One opinion analyst, Steven Kull, described such views as “independent of reality.” That is how it is for many Americans and their political leaders in this 61st year of the Nuclear Age. Living with such purposeful ignorance is a recipe for disaster.

David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.

August 9, 2006
Iran, International Law, and Nuclear Disarmament

Iran has been accused of secretly pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Although Iranian leaders claim to be enriching uranium only for peaceful nuclear energy purposes, these claims have been treated with derision by the West. Despite the fact that most experts believe that Iran is still years away from developing a nuclear weapon, there are media reports suggesting that Israel and the US are making plans to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, should Iran not give up its uranium enrichment program. Given this possible military scenario, and the recent vote by the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council, what is Iran likely to do?

First, Iran will continue to assert its right under Article IV the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program. Article IV refers to the “inalienable right” of states to nuclear energy. The parties to the treaty are promised assistance from more technologically advanced countries in pursuing this right. While this may be considered an untenable stipulation in the treaty, it is, nonetheless, the way the law stands. In accord with the treaty, in exchange for pursuing this right, Iran must agree to inspections of its nuclear facilities to assure that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials for making weapons. In fairness, if this aspect of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to be altered, it must be done for all states, not singling out Iran for special punitive treatment. Currently, uranium enrichment plants are operating in China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom and United States. Of these, Germany and Japan are non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thus have a similar relationship to the treaty as does Iran.

Second, Iran will assert that under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States and the other nuclear weapons states have not fulfilled their obligations for “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament. It will point to the 1996 International Court of Justice advisory opinion that states: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” And it will point out the blatant refusal by the nuclear weapons states to carry out their Article VI commitments, including the plans by the United States to develop the Reliable Replacement Warhead, a new type of nuclear warhead to extend the viability of the US nuclear arsenal.

Third, Iran will question the unequal treatment that it is receiving as compared to another Middle Eastern country, Israel, which is thought to possess some 200 nuclear weapons. Iran will note that there is not only a double standard between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots,” but also a double standard between Israel and other countries in the Middle East. It will rightly point out that there have long been calls for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, including at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, which have been largely ignored by Israel and the Western countries.

Article X of the Non-Proliferation Treaty allows for a party to withdraw after giving three months notice if it decides that “the supreme interests of its country” are being jeopardized by the treaty. With threats of an attack against Iran if it does not cease its uranium enrichment, and the example of Israel developing a nuclear arsenal outside the NPT, it would not be unreasonable for Iran’s leaders to conclude that Iranian interests were better served by withdrawing from the treaty. Should they reach this conclusion, they may also point to the precedent of the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 on grounds that US national interests were being jeopardized by that treaty.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most widely adhered to treaty in the area of arms control and disarmament. Only four countries are not parties to this treaty – India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea – and all have developed nuclear arsenals.

To effectively preclude Iran from leaving the treaty and possibly developing a nuclear arsenal, and avoid risking the significant dangers involved in preventive military strikes, larger problems must be solved. First, the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime must be made universal, applicable to all states, bringing in the four states currently outside the treaty. Second, the nuclear weapons states, both within the treaty and those currently outside of it, must begin the good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament required by the treaty. These negotiations must be aimed at a Nuclear Weapons Convention that provides for the phased and internationally verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons from all national arsenals. Third, all enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of plutonium, fissile materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons, must be brought under strict and effective international control.

If this sounds utopian, it is surely no more so than believing that the current set of double standards, those that allow some states to continue to possess nuclear weapons while seeking to prevent others from having them, will be maintainable indefinitely. It is also certainly no more utopian than believing that preventive war, such as that waged illegally against Iraq, is a reasonable answer to every suspicion of nuclear weapons proliferation.

The only safe number of nuclear weapons in the world is zero. The only way to reach this number is for the nuclear weapons states to become serious about the “unequivocal undertaking” to eliminate their nuclear arsenals that they made at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Until they do so, the prospects are high of countries like Iran following North Korea’s example of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and pursuing nuclear weapons programs.

David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the author of many studies of peace in the Nuclear Age, including Nuclear Weapons and the World Court.

February 5, 2006