Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear disarmament

  • What On Earth are Nuclear Weapons For?

    Eric Schlosser’s hair-raising new book about actual and potential accidents with nuclear weapons, “Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety,” sharpens the dialogue, such as it is, between the anti-nuclear peace movement and nuclear strategists who maintain that these weapons still enhance the security of nations.

    We can imagine a hypothetical moment somewhere in time. No one can say when exactly, but for my money it is definitely far in the past. Before that moment—perhaps it was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, or perhaps one of the terrifying incidents Schlosser describes, when computer glitches caused the Soviets or the Americans to misperceive that nuclear missiles had been launched—realists could argue that the deterrent effect of the balance of terror was preventing world war. After that moment, the more nuclear weapons, the more risk and insecurity for the planet as a whole and therefore for all nations whether they have the weapons or not.

    One of the important points that Schlosser makes, one which former Secretary of Defense William Perry has also emphasized, is that our present moment is not less dangerous because the Cold War has passed and treaties have reduced the overall numbers of warheads, but much more dangerous—because military service in the nuclear weapons sector is considered a career dead-end, and the very lack of post-cold-war tension increases potential carelessness. At least General Curtis Lemay, whom John Kennedy had to restrain from launching World War III by attacking Cuba in 1962, pushed the Strategic Air Command to adhere to strict protocols for the safer handling of the weapons. Still, even that additional rigor was insufficient to prevent some of the near-disasters that Schlosser chronicles in such vivid detail.

    The ultimate absurdity of the whole system of security-by-nukes is the potential of nuclear winter, which posits that it would only take the detonation of a small percentage of the total warheads on the planet to loft enough soot into the atmosphere to shut down world agriculture for a decade—in effect a death-sentence for all peoples and nations. Wherever the hypothetical line is before which nuclear weapons enhanced international security, the possibility of nuclear winter demonstrates irrefutably that we are on the other side of that line.

    If some superior intelligence equipped with an interstellar version of the Diagnostical and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders looked closely at the accepted order of things on our planet, they would have serious misgivings about our mental health. As such a visit from aliens seems unlikely to happen, we come to the question of authority here on earth. Ever since Oppenheimer and other scientists gave us nuclear weapons, other deep thinkers like Herman Kahn in his book “Thinking about the Unthinkable” and Henry Kissinger have tried to make rational the permanently irrational subject of mass death. In retirement, Kissinger has thrown up his hands and works now for total abolition. He does this because he knows from experience that nuclear weapons put us in the realm of Rumsfeld’s unknown knowns—no matter what experts may assert, we do know that no one knows how a nuclear war might begin. We have a somewhat clearer idea of how it would end, and “victory” is not one of the words that we associate with such an end.

    No one defined more exactly the reasons why we have been so slow to acknowledge our own madness than Dag Hammarskjold:

    “It is one of the surprising experiences of one in the position of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to find in talks with leaders of many nations, both political leaders and leaders in spiritual life, that the view expressed, the hopes nourished, and the trust reflected, in the direction of reconciliation, go far beyond what is usually heard in public. What is it that makes it so difficult to bring this basic attitude more effectively to bear upon the determination of policies? The reasons are well known to us all. It might not be understood by the constituency, or it might be abused by competing groups, or it might be misinterpreted as a sign of weakness by the other part. And so the game goes on—toward an unforeseeable conclusion.”

    On Thursday, September 26, 2013, the UN hosted the first ever High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament. Russia and the United States boycotted the meeting.

    The urgent and primary task is educational, and that is where you and I can do our small but necessary part, with letters to our newspapers and our legislators. The task is to seed into worldwide discourse the complete dysfunctionality of “realist” nuclear rhetoric—an act of love on behalf of our beautiful and deeply threatened planet. If we succeed in changing the paradigm, a moment in time will come, again a hypothetical, indefinable moment, when the majority of the world’s people and leaders, Obama and Putin and Netanyahu and Hasan Rouhani, the new head of Iran, the thinkers and the generals of the nine nuclear powers, the corporations who make money off these weapons, all will come to realize the futility of the course we are on. And together we will begin to change. God help us, may no fatal accident or misinterpretation happen before that moment arrives.

  • US Plans Nuclear Missile Test On Day of UN Disarmament Meeting

    Santa Barbara, CA – Just hours after the conclusion of the International Day of Peace on September 21st, the United States conducted a test of an unarmed Minuteman III Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The missile was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California to the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands.

    The Air Force has also announced it plans to test another Minuteman III missile in the early morning hours of September 26th.  Later that same day, the United Nations General Assembly will be holding its first-ever High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament.

    “These tests are acts of arrogance, actually hubris of the highest order,” said David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He continued, “Instead of participating at the Presidential level in the UN High-Level Meeting, the US is sending its missiles flying. What kind of example of leadership is this from President Obama, a Nobel Peace Laureate who has eloquently stated that America has a ‘commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.’?”

    Krieger further commented, “The UN High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament offers an exceptional opportunity for US leadership. But will we grasp that opportunity? President Obama should call off the missile test scheduled for September 26th.  He should personally attend the UN High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament where he can play a constructive role in moving the world toward zero nuclear weapons.”

    #                             #                             #

    For further comment, contact David Krieger at dkrieger@napf.org or Sandy Jones at sjones@napf.org or (805) 965-3443.

    The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation — The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s mission is to educate and advocate for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons and to empower peace leaders.  Founded in 1982, the Foundation is comprised of individuals and organizations worldwide who realize the imperative for peace in the Nuclear Age. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit organization with consultative status to the United Nations.  For more information, visit www.wagingpeace.org.

  • UN Meeting Offers Chance for Disarmament Progress

    Douglas RocheAn unprecedented high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament will be held at the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 26.

    For the first time in the 68-year history of the UN, heads of government or at least foreign ministers will devote their attention to “the complete elimination of nuclear weapons” as “essential to remove the danger of nuclear war.”

    Though the UN resolution setting up the meeting was adopted nearly unanimously, the United States, United Kingdom and France abstained (Russia and China voted yes). Given this lack of enthusiasm by the three Western nuclear powers, what is this special meeting likely to achieve?

    With world attention riveted on Syria, nuclear disarmament does not rate high in polls of public concerns. But as Syria showed with the actual use of chemical weapons, public outrage will skyrocket if an aggressor ever launches a nuclear device of some sort. Every informed observer knows that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is the complete elimination of all 17,000 of such weapons still remaining.

    While the international spotlight has been on Iran’s nuclear program and North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons, the heart of the nuclear weapons problem remains the intransigence of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the same five original members of the nuclear weapons club, who each possess a veto and who could not agree on Syria.

    Even though calls for nuclear disarmament escalated through the years, the nuclear weapons states have consistently dodged any real efforts for nuclear disarmament. This year alone, they boycotted a Norway government conference attended by 127 states on the “catastrophic humanitarian consequences” of the use of nuclear weapons, and ignored three special inter-government meetings in Geneva called to do preparatory work for negotiating the end of nuclear weapons.

    The US and Russia have engaged in bilateral rounds of reductions, but the trumpeting of lower numbers has masked their continued modernization of warheads, delivery systems and infrastructure. The 2013 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute states that the nuclear weapons powers, which continue to deploy new nuclear weapons and delivery systems, “appear determined to retain their nuclear arsenals indefinitely.”

    A double standard has deeply conflicted NATO, which continues to claim that the possession of nuclear weapons provides the “supreme guarantee” of the security of its 26 member states. At one and the same time, the NATO states reaffirm their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty goal of nuclear disarmament and their NATO dependence on nuclear weapons.

    The policies are incoherent. The US, UK and France drive NATO and have made it the world’s biggest nuclear-armed alliance. The continued deployment of US tactical nuclear bombs on the soil of Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey, though resisted by growing numbers of people in those countries, is a standing provocation to Russia, which is consequently disinclined to lower its own huge numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. Russia is unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons while it is virtually surrounded by an expanding NATO.

    US-Russia bilateral negotiations for deeper cuts are stalled over such issues as the US’s proposed missile defence system in Europe, the militarization of space, and the US intention to militarily dominate air, land, sea, space and cyberwarfare. Nuclear disarmament is inevitably caught up in geopolitical tensions. US President Barack Obama, who in 2009 convened the first Security Council meeting devoted to the issue, has tried to move nuclear disarmament forward, but received little support from his allies.

    Maybe the nuclear powers won’t do much at the extraordinary meeting on Sept. 26, but this is definitely an opportunity for non-nuclear weapons states to make their views heard. They should demand that the long-awaited Middle East conference on removing all weapons of mass destruction from the region take place. Had this preventive diplomacy action been taken in a timely manner, the Syrian crisis might never have erupted.

    In 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon suggested that the international community start work on a nuclear weapons convention or a framework of instruments to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. This work would amount to a global legal ban on all nuclear weapons.

    This brings us to Canada’s role at the Sept. 26 meeting. In 2010, both the Senate and the House of Commons unanimously adopted a motion calling on the government of Canada to support Ban Ki-moon’s proposals and to launch “a major worldwide Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of preventing nuclear proliferation and increasing the rate of nuclear disarmament.”

    This Parliamentary action was spurred by a campaign by members of the Order of Canada, now numbering 700, who signed an appeal for the government to act on building a global ban on nuclear weapons. Many parliamentarians and Order of Canada members have united in calling on Canada to host a meeting in Ottawa of like-minded states to push this work forward. The Middle Powers Initiative, a civil society organization working with middle power states on this issue, convened such a meeting in Berlin earlier this year.

    Canada has an opportunity on Sept. 26 to make an important contribution to the verified elimination of nuclear weapons, before the world experiences another crisis over weapons of mass destruction. It should be remembered that Foreign Minister John Baird was, at the time, the government house leader who pushed through Parliament the unanimous motion calling for action.

    This article was originally published by Embassy.

  • Eliminating Nuclear Weapons is Just as Important as Eliminating Chemical Weapons

    Lawrence WittnerThe apparent employment of chemical weapons in Syria should remind us that, while weapons of mass destruction exist, there is a serious danger that they will be used.

    That danger is highlighted by an article in the September/October 2013 issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Written by two leading nuclear weapons specialists, Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris of the Federation of American Scientists, the article provides important information about nuclear weapons that should alarm everyone concerned about the future of the planet.

    At present, the article reports, more than 17,000 nuclear warheads remain in the possession of nine nations (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea). Over 90 percent of that inventory consists of U.S. and Russian warheads. These weapons, of course, are incredibly destructive, and almost all of them can massacre populations far more effectively than did the atomic bomb that obliterated the city of Hiroshima. Indeed, a single one of these weapons can slaughter hundreds of thousands of people.

    Although U.S., Russian, British, and French stockpiles of nuclear weapons have been declining since the end of the Cold War, those of the five other nuclear nations have been growing. Consequently, as Kristensen and Norris observe, with the possible exception of North Korea, all of these countries “have sufficient numbers of warheads and delivery systems to inflict enormous destruction over significant ranges with catastrophic humanitarian and climatic consequences in their regions and beyond.”

    Furthermore, many of these deadly weapons stand ready for almost instant use. As the authors state, “roughly 1,800 U.S. and Russian warheads are on high alert atop long-range ballistic missiles that are ready to launch 5 to 15 minutes after receiving an order.”

    But surely these terrible weapons are being phased out, aren’t they? After all, the major nuclear powers, plus most nations, have formally committed themselves to building a nuclear weapons-free world. And it is certainly true that the number of nuclear weapons on the world scene has dropped very significantly from the roughly 70,000 that existed in 1986.

    Even so, there are numerous signs that the nuclear disarmament momentum is slowing. Not only have nuclear disarmament negotiations between the United States (with 7,700 nuclear warheads) and Russia (with 8,500 nuclear warheads) apparently run aground, but none of the nuclear powers seems to take the rhetoric about a nuclear weapons-free world seriously. Kristensen and Norris note: “All the nations with nuclear weapons continue to modernize or upgrade their nuclear arsenals, and nuclear weapons remain integral to their conception of national security.”

    For example, the United States is modifying its existing nuclear warheads while planning production of warheads with new designs. Russia is phasing out its Soviet-era missiles and submarines and deploying newer missiles, as well as additional warheads on its missiles. France is deploying new nuclear missiles on its fighter-bombers and submarines. China is upgrading its missile force, while India and Pakistan are locked in a race to deploy new types of nuclear weapons. Although Israel is the most secretive of the nuclear powers, rumors are afloat that it is equipping some of its submarines with nuclear-capable cruise missiles. North Korea reportedly lacks operational nuclear weapons, but its hungry citizens can take heart that it is working to remedy this deficiency.

    In addition, of course, it is quite possible, in the future, that other nations will develop nuclear weapons, terrorists will obtain such weapons from national stockpiles, or existing nuclear weapons will be exploded or launched accidentally.

    In these very dangerous circumstances, surely the safest course of action would be to have the international community agree on a treaty requiring the destruction of all existing stocks of nuclear weapons and a ban on their future production. Nuclear disarmament discussions along these and other lines have recently been concluded by a UN Open Ended Working Group, and will be continued in late September by a UN High Level Meeting and later this fall by the UN General Assembly First Committee.

    But, to judge from past government behavior, it does not seem likely that disarmament discussions among government officials will get very far without substantial public pressure upon them to cope with the nuclear weapons menace. And it is a menace — one at least as dangerous to the future of world civilization as the existence of chemical weapons. So pressing world leaders for action on nuclear disarmament seems thoroughly appropriate.

    The alternative is to throw up our hands and wait, while power-hungry governments continue to toy with their nuclear weaponry and, ultimately, produce a catastrophe of immense proportions.

    This article was originally published by History News Network.

  • Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

    United States Draft

    UNSC Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament

    The Security Council,

    PP1. Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all,

    PP2. Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfill their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

    PP3. Recalling also that the above Statement (S/23500) underlined the need for all Member States to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems in that context threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability,

    PP4. Bearing in mind the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation, and supporting them to continue to play their due roles,

    PP5. Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and calling upon all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament,

    PP6. Reaffirming its firm commitment to the NPT and its conviction that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be maintained and strengthened to ensure its effective implementation,

    PP7. Calling for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security,

    PP8. Welcoming the decisions of those non-nuclear-weapon States that have dismantled their nuclear weapons programs or renounced the possession of nuclear weapons,

    PP9. Welcoming the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament efforts undertaken and accomplished by nuclear-weapon States, and underlining the need to pursue further efforts in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT,

    PP10. Welcoming in this connection the decision of the Russian Federation and the United States of America to conduct negotiations to conclude a new comprehensive legally binding agreement to replace the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which expires in December 2009,

    PP11. Welcoming and supporting the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and contributes toward realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament,

    PP12. Recalling the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and reaffirming that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime,

    PP13. Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009),

    PP14. Reaffirming its resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008),

    PP15. Reaffirming all other relevant non-proliferation resolutions adopted by the Security Council,

    PP16. Gravely concerned about the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the provision of nuclear material or technical assistance for the purposes of terrorism,

    PP17. Mindful in this context of the risk that irresponsible or unlawful provision of nuclear material or technical assistance could enable terrorism,

    PP18. Expressing its support for the 2010 Global Summit on Nuclear Security,

    PP19. Affirming its support for the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,

    PP20. Recognizing the progress made by the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the G-8 Global Partnership,

    PP21. Reaffirming UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) and the necessity for all States to implement fully the measures contained therein, and calling upon all UN Member States and international and regional organizations to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution, including in the course of the comprehensive review as called for in resolution 1810 (2008),

    1. Emphasizes that a situation of noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations shall be brought to the attention of the Security Council, which will determine if that situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and emphasizes the Security Council’s primary responsibility in addressing such threats;

    2. Calls upon States Parties to the NPT to comply fully with all their obligations under
    the Treaty, and in this regard notes that enjoyment of the benefits of the NPT by a State Party can be assured only by its compliance with the obligations thereunder;

    3. Calls upon all States that are not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to join the Treaty so as to achieve its universality at an early date, and in any case to adhere to its terms;

    4 Calls upon the Parties to the NPT, pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty, to undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and calls on all other States to join in this endeavor;

    5. Calls upon all States to refrain from conducting a nuclear test explosion and to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby bringing the treaty into force;

    6. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible, and welcomesthe Conference on Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of its Program of Work in 2009;

    7. Deplores in particular the current major challenges to the nonproliferation regime that the Security Council has determined to be threats to international peace and security, and demands that the parties concerned comply fully with their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions,

    8. Encourages efforts to advance development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a framework that reduces proliferation risk and adheres to the highest international standards for safeguards, security, and safety;

    9. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in Article IV the right of the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I , II and III of the Treaty;

    10. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national controls for the export of sensitive goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;

    11. Encourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree upon measures to this end as soon as possible;

    12. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards are essential to prevent nuclear proliferation and to facilitate cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in that regard:

    a. Calls upon all non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT that have yet to bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement or a modified small quantities protocol to do so immediately,

    b. Calls upon all States to adopt and implement an Additional Protocol, which together with comprehensive safeguards agreements constitute essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,

    c. Stresses the importance for all Member States to ensure that the IAEA continue to have all the necessary resources and authority to verify the declared use of nuclear materials and facilities and the absence of undeclared activities, and for the IAEA to report to the Council accordingly as appropriate;

    13. Encourages States to provide the IAEA with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter;

    14. Undertakes to address without delay any State’s notice of withdrawal from the NPT, including the events described in the statement provided by the State pursuant to Article X of the Treaty, while recognizing ongoing discussions in the course of the NPT review on identifying modalities under which NPT States Parties could collectively respond to notification of withdrawal, and affirmsthat a State remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal;

    15. Encourages States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement or withdraw from the NPT, the supplier state would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, noncompliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

    16. Encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has in place an Additional Protocol in making nuclear export decisions;

    17. Urges States to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate its IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards shall continue with respect to any nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;

    18. Calls for universal adherence to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

    19. Welcomes the March 2009 recommendations of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to make more effective use of existing funding mechanisms, including the consideration of the establishment of a voluntary fund, and affirms its commitment to promote full implementation of UNSCR 1540 by Member States by ensuring effective and sustainable support for the activities of the 1540 Committee;

    20. Reaffirms the need for full implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) by Member States and, with an aim of preventing access to, or assistance and financing for, weapons of mass destruction, related materials and their means of delivery by non-State actors, as defined in the resolution, and calls upon Member States to cooperate actively with the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and the IAEA, including rendering assistance, at their request, for their implementation of UNSCR 1540 provisions, and in this context welcomes the forthcoming comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSCR 1540 with a view to increasing its effectiveness, and calls upon all States to participate actively in this review;

    21. Calls upon Member States to share best practices with a view to improved safety standards and nuclear security practices and raise standards of nuclear security to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, with the aim of securing all vulnerable nuclear material from such risks within four years;

    22. Calls upon all States to manage responsibly and minimize to the greatest extent that is technically and economically feasible the use of highly enriched uranium for civilian purposes, including by working to convert research reactors and radioisotope production processes to the use of low enriched uranium fuels and targets;

    23. Calls upon all States to improve their national technical capabilities to detect, deter, and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, and to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity building in this regard;

    24. Urges all States to take all appropriate national measures in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, to prevent proliferation financing, shipments, or illicit trafficking, to strengthen export controls, to secure sensitive materials, and to control access to intangible transfers of technology;

    25. Declares its resolve to monitor closely any situations involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery or related material, including to or by non-State actors as they are defined in resolution 1540 (2004), and, as appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security;

    26. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

    US President Barack Obama will chair a special meeting of the UN Security Council on September 24 to discuss nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

  • Nukes Are Nuts

    When asked by a reporter why nuclear weapons are useless, Colin Powell, former US secretary of state and four-star general said: “Because they’re such horrible weapons. And so no sane leader would ever want to cross that line to using nuclear weapons. And, if you are not going to cross that line, then these things are basically useless.” In other words, one could say, nukes are nuts.

    There are innumerable global security issues that need to be addressed, some of which are poverty, terrorism, the climate crisis, pollution of the oceans, loss of biodiversity and forest depletion. Not one of these issues can be addressed with nuclear weapons. In fact, nuclear weapons draw much-needed resources away from solving these global problems. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons are justified by their possessors for nuclear deterrence, but nuclear deterrence is only a hypothesis about human behavior. While “no sane leader would ever want to cross that line,” even the best of political and military leaders can be less than rational at times, particularly when they are under stress. Nuclear deterrence is only as sound as the craziest political or military leader with a finger on the nuclear button. Does the name Kim Jong-un raise any concerns? Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons are weapons of vast overkill. They are equal-opportunity destroyers of men, women and children. The radioactive effects of these weapons cannot be contained in time or space. They affect not only the living, but generations yet to be born. Their radioactive material will affect countless future generations. Even a small regional nuclear war could result in a global nuclear famine, killing a billion people. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons can destroy everything we hold dear and love most. They can destroy every special thing, every sacred thing that has ever been created. Nuclear weapons are anti-human weapons: they threaten us all, even their possessors, and place all of humanity at risk of annihilation. But they also place all of complex life at risk of destruction. The possession of these weapons makes us irresponsible stewards of our environment and of all the creatures dependent upon our stewardship. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons are extremely costly, with anticipated global expenditures for the next decade at over $1 trillion. The US plans to modernize its B61 bombs, which it deploys in five European countries, at a cost that is more than two times that of building them out of solid gold. Nuclear weapons take away resources from the education of the world’s children, medical treatment from the world’s sick and infirm and food from the world’s hungry. Nukes are nuts.

    Nuclear weapons divide us when we need to unite to find cooperative, diplomatic and nonviolent solutions to the great global issues of the 21st century. Only nine countries have nuclear weapons and, of these, only two countries, the US and Russia, possess more than 90 percent of the more than 17,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Nukes are not useful, nor are they status symbols. Nukes are nuts.

    Every man, woman and child on the planet can understand that nukes are nuts. So, if we understand that, what are we going to do about it? My answer is to wage all-out peace with a sense of urgency until the last nuclear weapon is eliminated from the planet. We would be nuts to settle for anything less.

    This article was originally published on Truthout.

  • Buenos Aires Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament

    The Senior Officials of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), having met on August 20, 2013 in the city of Buenos Aires, Republic of Argentina, aware of the historical commitment of the Community towards nuclear disarmament, issued the following Declaration:

    1. Highlighted the relevance and full validity of the Special Communiqué on the Complete Elimination of Nuclear Weapons adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the CELAC, on December 3, 2011 in Caracas, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  In this context, they reiterated their grave concern at the threat that the ongoing existence of nuclear weapons and their potential use or threat of use poses for mankind.

    2. Highlighted also the full validity of the Declaration of the 33 Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), adopted in September 2011, reaffirming, inter alia, the urgent need to advance towards the primary goal of nuclear disarmament and achieve complete and general elimination of nuclear weapons, and in this regard, agreed to join the efforts of the International Community in making progress towards the negotiation of a universal and legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons.

    3. Reaffirmed that the region grants the highest priority to the achievement of a complete and verifiable nuclear disarmament and reiterated that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination.

    4. Reiterated that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, and of the Charter of the United Nations.

    5. Highlighted the importance of active participation by CELAC Member States in drafting concrete proposals to achieve universal nuclear disarmament, in accordance with a multilaterally agreed clear, irreversible, and verifiable timeframe.

    6. Identified as a legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States, which includes all CELAC Member States, the unequivocal and legally binding assurance by nuclear weapon States against the use or threat to use such weapons.  CELAC Member States called for a start to the negotiation and adoption, as soon as possible, of a universal and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

    7. Called on all States, in particular Nuclear Weapon States, to eliminate the role of nuclear weapons in their doctrines, military strategies and security policies or as a prospective approach for the management of conflicts in order to achieve the total elimination of this armament regardless of its type or geographical location.

    8. Stressed that the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones strengthens international peace and security as well as the non-proliferation regime, and is an important contribution to nuclear disarmament.

    9. Expressed Latin America and the Caribbean’s pride in being the first densely populated area in the world to be declared a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Reaffirmed that the establishment of a NWFZ in the Latin American and Caribbean region has contributed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as to regional and global peace and security.

    10. Emphasized that the Tlatelolco Treaty and the OPANAL have constituted a political, legal and institutional reference in the establishment of other Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) in different regions of the world. Today OPANAL’s experience, together with that of the other four existing NWFZs and Mongolia as a single State unilaterally declared free of nuclear weapons, constitutes an important heritage of the international community to inspire the establishment of new NWFZs and advance towards the goal of a nuclear weapons free world.

    11. Urged nuclear powers to withdraw all interpretative declarations to the Protocols I and II of the Tlatelolco Treaty that constitute actual reservations prohibited by this Treaty, thus contributing to eliminate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons against the countries of the region. Expressed their commitment to continue working with those States Parties to the Protocols in order to convince them to withdraw or modify such declarations.

    12. Regretted the failure to implement the agreement on the convening in 2012 of an International Conference for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Reiterated that the convening of this Conference is an important and integral part of the final outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Expressed that the outcomes of this Conference will be an important contribution to achieve the nuclear disarmament goal and reiterated their firm conviction that the establishment of said Zone would represent a significant step towards the peace process in the Middle East region. Urged the convening of this Conference as soon as possible.

    13. Urged Nuclear-Weapon States to fulfill their commitments under Article VI of the NPT, and to advance towards the complete elimination of those weapons.  Urged them to fully and immediately implement the thirteen (13) practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, as well as the Plan of Action adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

    14. Reaffirmed the inalienable right of States to develop research, production and peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the NPT.  Reiterated the commitment of all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

    15. Expressed their total rejection to the enhancement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, which is inconsistent with the obligation of complete nuclear disarmament.

    16. Called on all States to refrain from nuclear weapon test explosions, other nuclear explosions or any other relevant non-explosive experiments, including subcritical experiments, for nuclear weapons development purposes. Such actions are contrary to the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), its spirit, if not the letter, undermining its desired impact as a nuclear disarmament measure.

    17. Reiterated the demand for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and urged those States in Annex II whose ratification are essential for the entry into force of the CTBT to accelerate the process of signing and/or ratifying this instrument, as a matter of priority and an indication of their political will and commitment to international peace and security.

    18. Reaffirmed the importance of initiating negotiations for an international legally binding instrument banning nuclear weapons and commitment towards this primary goal.

    19. Recalled that the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament (SSOD-I) established the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. Urged the CD to demonstrate the necessary political will in order to ensure the commencement without delay of substantive work through the adoption and implementation of a balanced and comprehensive program of work that advances the agenda of nuclear disarmament.

    20. Recognized the work of the Open-ended Working Group established by Resolution A/RES/67/56 of the United Nations General Assembly, with the mandate to put forward proposals to foster multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, as well as the proposals and contributions made in this Group by the CELAC Member Countries.

    21. Reiterated the firm commitment of the CELAC to work on convening an International High-Level Conference as soon as possible to identify ways and methods to eliminate nuclear weapons, aimed at agreeing on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specific timeframe.  This program would ban the development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and stipulate their destruction.

    22. Emphasized the intention of CELAC Member States to actively participate in the High-Level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament to be held in New York on September 26, 2013, as well as in the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held in New York in 2014.

    23. Expressed their greatest concern at the humanitarian impact of vast proportions and global effects of any accidental or intentional nuclear detonation. Called upon the International Community to reiterate its concern on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons whenever the debate on this type of weapons takes place. Welcomed the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in March 2013, and, in this regard, called all States to participate in the Second International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons to be held in Mexico, on February 13-14, 2014.

    24. Agreed to continue coordinating positions and contributing to the implementation of practical actions as a follow-up to the above mentioned High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly, including the adoption of a resolution on the matter in the First Committee, during the 68th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly.

    25. Agreed to distribute this Declaration as an official document of the High-Level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament and as an official document of the OPANAL General Conference.

    26. Expressed appreciation to the Government and People of the Republic of Argentina for the warm hospitality and the successful organization of the Meeting.

  • Declaración de la CELAC sobre Desarme Nuclear

    Los Altos Funcionarios de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC), reunidos el 20 de agosto en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, República Argentina,  conscientes del  compromiso histórico de la Comunidad con el desarme nuclear,  emitieron la siguiente Declaración:

    1.    Destacaron la relevancia y plena vigencia del Comunicado Especial sobre la Eliminación Total de las Armas Nucleares, adoptado  por los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la CELAC, el 3 de diciembre de 2011, en Caracas, República Bolivariana de Venezuela. En ese contexto, reiteraron su profunda preocupación ante la amenaza contra la humanidad que representa la continua existencia de armas nucleares y su posible uso o amenaza de uso.

    2.    Enfatizaron la plena vigencia de la Declaración de los 33 Estados Miembros del OPANAL, aprobada en septiembre de 2011, en la cual, entre otras cosas, reafirmaron la necesidad urgente de avanzar hacia el objetivo prioritario del desarme nuclear y de lograr la eliminación total y general de las armas nucleares, y en ese sentido, acordaron sumarse a los esfuerzos de la comunidad internacional para avanzar hacia la negociación de un instrumento universal jurídicamente vinculante que prohíba las armas nucleares.

    3.    Reafirmaron que la región confiere la más alta prioridad a alcanzar el desarme nuclear, completo y verificable, y reiteraron que la única garantía contra el empleo o la amenaza del uso de las armas nucleares, es su total eliminación.

    4.    Reiteraron que el uso o amenaza de uso de armas nucleares constituye un crimen contra la humanidad y una violación al derecho internacional,  incluido el derecho internacional humanitario, y la Carta de Naciones Unidas.

    5.    Subrayaron la importancia de la activa participación de los Estados miembros de la CELAC en la elaboración de propuestas concretas para alcanzar el desarme nuclear universal, de acuerdo con un cronograma multilateralmente acordado, transparente, irreversible y verificable.

    6.    Identificaron como  un interés legítimo de los Estados no poseedores de armas nucleares, entre los que se incluyen todos los miembros de la CELAC,  que los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares brinden garantías inequívocas y jurídicamente vinculantes de no usar ni amenazar con el uso de esas armas. Los Estados Miembros de la CELAC instaron a trabajar en la negociación y adopción, en el plazo más breve posible, de un instrumento universal jurídicamente vinculante en materia de garantías negativas de seguridad.

    7.    Llamaron a todos los Estados, particularmente a los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares a eliminar la función de las armas nucleares en sus doctrinas, políticas de seguridad y estrategias militares, o como un enfoque prospectivo para el manejo de conflictos, con el fin de alcanzar la total eliminación de este armamento independientemente de su tipo o ubicación geográfica.

    8.    Destacaron que el establecimiento de Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares fortalecen la paz y la seguridad internacional y regional, así como el régimen de no proliferación, siendo una importante contribución para lograr el desarme nuclear.

    9.    Expresaron el orgullo de América Latina y el Caribe por ser la primera área densamente poblada en el mundo que se declaró como Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares (ZLAN), por medio del Tratado para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco). Reafirmaron que la creación de una ZLAN en la región de América Latina y el Caribe, ha contribuido con el desarme y la no proliferación nuclear, así como con la paz y la seguridad regional y global.

    10.    Destacaron que el Tratado de Tlatelolco y el Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe (OPANAL) han sido un referente político, jurídico e institucional en la creación de otras Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares (ZLANs) en diferentes regiones del mundo. La experiencia del OPANAL constituye hoy, junto a las otras cuatro ZLANs existentes y Mongolia como Estado declarado unilateralmente libre de armas nucleares, un importante patrimonio de la comunidad internacional para inspirar la creación de nuevas ZLANs para avanzar hacia el objetivo de un mundo libre de armas nucleares.

    11.    Instaron a las potencias nucleares a que retiren las declaraciones interpretativas a los Protocolos I y II del Tratado de Tlatelolco, que constituyen verdaderas reservas prohibidas por el Tratado, contribuyendo así a eliminar la posibilidad del uso de armas nucleares contra los países de la región. Expresaron su compromiso de continuar trabajando con los Estados Parte en los Protocolos a fin de lograr el retiro o la adecuación de esas declaraciones.

    12.    Lamentaron el incumplimiento del acuerdo sobre la celebración en 2012 de la Conferencia Internacional para el establecimiento en el Medio Oriente de una Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares y otras Armas de Destrucción Masiva. Reiteraron que la celebración de esta Conferencia es parte importante e integral del resultado final de la Conferencia de Revisión del Tratado de No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares (TNP) de 2010. Expresaron que los acuerdos que resulten de esta Conferencia serán una contribución importante para alcanzar el objetivo del desarme nuclear, y reiteraron su  firme convencimiento de que el establecimiento de dicha Zona significaría un paso trascendental para el proceso de paz en la región del Medio Oriente. Instaron  a que esta Conferencia se efectúe Io más pronto posible.

    13.    Urgieron a los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares a cumplir con sus compromisos asumidos en virtud del Artículo VI del TNP y avanzar hacia la eliminación total de esas armas. Los instaron a la plena e inmediata aplicación de las 13 medidas prácticas hacia el desarme nuclear acordadas en la Conferencia de Examen del TNP del año 2000, así como el Plan de Acción aprobado en la Conferencia de Examen de 2010.

    14.    Reafirmaron el derecho inalienable de los Estados a desarrollar la investigación, la producción y el uso pacífico de la energía nuclear sin discriminación y de conformidad con los Artículos I, II, III y IV del TNP. Reiteraron el compromiso de todas las Partes del Tratado de facilitar la participación en el intercambio más completo posible de equipos, materiales e información científica y tecnológica para el uso pacífico de la energía nuclear.

    15.    Expresaron su total rechazo al perfeccionamiento de las armas nucleares existentes y al desarrollo de nuevos tipos de esas armas, lo que es inconsistente con la obligación de un completo desarme nuclear.

    16.    Llamaron a todos los Estados a que se abstengan de efectuar explosiones de prueba de armas nucleares, otras explosiones nucleares o cualquier otro experimento no explosivo relevante, incluyendo experimentos subcríticos, para fines de desarrollo de armas nucleares. Estas acciones son contrarias al objeto y propósito del Tratado de Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares (CTBT), su espíritu, si no la letra, socavando su impacto deseado como una medida de desarme nuclear.

    17.    Reiteraron la exigencia de que se prohíban completamente los ensayos nucleares de todo tipo e instaron a los Estados del anexo II, cuya ratificación es imprescindible para la entrada en vigor del CTBT, a que aceleren su proceso de firma y/o ratificación de dicho instrumento, como una cuestión prioritaria, y una muestra de su voluntad política y de su compromiso con la paz y la seguridad internacionales.

    18.    Reafirmaron la importancia de que se inicien las negociaciones para un instrumento internacional jurídicamente vinculante que prohíba las armas nucleares y su compromiso en favor de este objetivo prioritario.

    19.    Recordaron que la Primera Sesión Extraordinaria de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas dedicada al Desarme (SSOD-I) estableció la Conferencia de Desarme (CD) como único órgano de negociación multilateral de desarme. Instaron a la CD a demostrar la voluntad política necesaria para asegurar el inicio sin más demora de labores sustantivas a través de la adopción e implementación de un programa de trabajo equilibrado e integral que avance la agenda de desarme nuclear.

    20.    Reconocieron la labor del Grupo de Trabajo de Composición Abierta creado por la Resolución A/RES/67/56 de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, con el mandato de elaborar propuestas para hacer avanzar las negociaciones multilaterales de desarme nuclear, así como las propuestas y contribuciones presentadas en ese Grupo por Estados  miembros de la CELAC

    21.    Reiteraron el firme compromiso de la CELAC de trabajar en la convocatoria de una Conferencia Internacional de Alto Nivel para identificar las vías y métodos de eliminar las armas nucleares en el plazo más corto posible, con el objetivo de acordar un programa por fases para la eliminación completa de las armas nucleares en un período de tiempo específico, que prohíba su desarrollo, producción, adquisición, prueba, almacenamiento, transferencia, uso o amenaza del uso, y estipular su destrucción.

    22.    Enfatizaron la intención de los Estados Miembros de la CELAC de participar de manera activa en la Reunión de Alto Nivel de la Asamblea General de la ONU sobre Desarme Nuclear, que tendrá lugar en Nueva York, el 26 de septiembre de 2013, así como en la Tercera Sesión  del Comité  Preparatorio de la Conferencia de Examen  del Tratado de No Proliferación de Armas Nucleares, a realizarse en Nueva York el año 2014.

    23.    Expresaron su más alta preocupación por las consecuencias humanitarias de enormes proporciones y los efectos globales de cualquier detonación nuclear accidental o intencional. Exhortaron a la comunidad internacional a reiterar su preocupación sobre las consecuencias humanitarias de las armas nucleares, donde sea que se lleve a cabo el debate sobre este tipo de armas. Dieron la bienvenida a los resultados de la Conferencia de Oslo sobre el Impacto Humanitario de las Armas Nucleares, celebrada en marzo de 2013 y, en este sentido, hicieron un llamado a todos los Estados a participar en la segunda Conferencia Internacional sobre el Impacto Humanitario de las Armas Nucleares que se celebrará en México, los días 13 y 14 de febrero de 2014.

    24.    Acordaron continuar coordinando posiciones y contribuir a la implementación de acciones prácticas en  seguimiento a la mencionada Reunión de Alto Nivel de la Asamblea General, incluyendo la adopción de una resolución sobre el tema en la Primera Comisión durante el 68 período ordinario de sesiones de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas.

    25.    Acordaron distribuir la presente Declaración como documento oficial de la Reunión de Alto Nivel de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas sobre Desarme Nuclear y como documento oficial de la Conferencia General del OPANAL.

    26.    Agradecieron al Gobierno y al Pueblo de la República Argentina por la cálida hospitalidad y la exitosa organización de la Reunión.

  • Abolishing Nuclear Arms: It Can Be Done

    This article was originally published on CNN Opinion

     

    When President Obama called for a world free of nuclear weapons in Prague, Czech Republic, this spring, many dismissed this part of his speech as idealistic rhetoric.

    But the abolition of nuclear weapons is not an unrealistic fantasy. It is a practical necessity if the American people are to have a secure future. President Obama should use his Nobel speech this week to reaffirm his commitment to this essential and obtainable goal.

    It is essential because a world armed with nuclear weapons is simply too dangerous for us to countenance. Since the end of the Cold War we have tended to act as though the threat of nuclear war had gone away. It hasn’t. It is only our awareness of this danger that has faded. In fact, there are some 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world today; 95 percent of them are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia.

    Just this past weekend, the START treaty limiting the number of U.S. and Russian warheads expired. Negotiators in Geneva, Switzerland, have not yet been able to work out the details of a follow-up treaty.

    We must hope they will be able to agree to deep reductions. A recent study by Physicians for Social Responsibility showed that if only 300 of the weapons in the Russian arsenal attacked targets in American cities, 90 million people would die in the first half hour. A comparable U.S. attack on Russia would produce similar devastation.

    Further, these attacks would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which the rest of the population depends for survival. In the ensuing months the vast majority of people who survived the initial attacks in both countries would die of disease, exposure and starvation.

    The destruction of the United States and Russia would be only part of the story. An attack of this magnitude would lift millions of tons of soot and dust into the upper levels of the atmosphere, blocking out sunlight and dropping temperatures across the globe.

    In fact, if the entire Russian and U.S. strategic arsenals were involved in the fighting, average surface temperature worldwide would fall 10 degrees Centigrade to levels not seen on Earth since the depth of the last ice age 18,000 years ago.

    For three years there would not be a single day in the Northern Hemisphere free of frost. Agriculture would stop, ecosystems would collapse and many species, perhaps even our own, would become extinct. This is not just some theoretical scenario; it is a real and present danger.

    On January 25, 1995, we came within minutes of nuclear war when Russian military radar mistook a Norwegian-U.S. scientific rocket for a possible attack on Moscow. President Yeltsin, a man reportedly suffering from alcoholism and other major medical problems, was notified and given five minutes to decide how to respond.

    Then as now, both the United States and Russia maintained a policy of “launch on warning,” authorizing the launch of nuclear missiles when an enemy attack is believed to be under way. We don’t know exactly what happened in the Kremlin that morning, but someone decided not to launch Russian missiles and we did not have a nuclear war.

    January 25, 1995, was five years after the end of the Cold War. There were no unusual crises anywhere in the world that day. It was a relatively good day in a time much less dangerous than our own. And we almost blew up the world. That was 15 years ago and the United States and Russia still maintain more than 2,000 warheads on high alert ready to be launched in 15 minutes and to destroy each other’s cities 30 minutes later.

    Nuclear weapons are the only military threat from which U.S. armed forces cannot protect us. It is urgently in our national security interest to eliminate these instruments of mass annihilation from the arsenals of potential adversaries. If we have to get rid of our own nuclear weapons to achieve this, it is a deal well worth making.

    Make no mistake, the elimination of nuclear weapons is an attainable goal. These bombs are not some force of nature. They are the work of our hand. We built them and we can take them apart.

    Some governments falsely see these weapons as safeguards of their security. It will not be easy to convince them that true safety requires that we abolish them. Nor will it be easy to design the verification regime needed to assure that the weapons are dismantled and that no new weapons are built. Yet national security experts in the United States and around the world say that it can be done and it must be done.

    If politics is the art of the possible, then statesmanship is the art of the necessary. And if ever there was a time that cried out for statesmanship it is now.

    There are many important issues that demand our attention — health care reform, energy policy, creating more jobs — but none is as urgent as eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

    Ira Helfand, MD, is a past president of Physicians for Social Responsibility, the U.S. affiliate of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.

  • Message to First Annual Student Movement for Nuclear Disarmament Conference

    This message was delivered to the First Annual Student Movement for Nuclear Disarmament Conference at Soka University of America on November 17, 2012.


    David KriegerI want to congratulate you for organizing this conference and for bringing together students to form a movement for nuclear disarmament.  It is a much needed effort.  As someone who has worked for nuclear weapons abolition for most of my adult life, I believe firmly that the involvement of students is necessary for achieving the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. 


    You did not create nuclear weapons, but you have inherited them, and they will remain a threat to your future for so long as they exist.  Thus, your awareness, your engagement and your voices are critical to your own future as well as to the future of your children and grandchildren.


    Nuclear weapons are illegal, immoral and costly.  They do not make their possessors safer or more secure; they only assure that their possessors are targets of some other country’s nuclear weapons.


    If the most powerful counties in the world behave as though nuclear weapons are useful to them, as they do, they assure that other countries will seek nuclear weapons for themselves.  Thus, the possession of nuclear weapons encourages the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.   


    The more nuclear weapons proliferate, the greater the chances are that they will end up in the hands of terrorist organizations.  In truth, though, any country that relies upon nuclear deterrence for its security is threatening the use of nuclear weapons against innocent people, and thus behaving as a terrorist nation itself.


    We must recognize nuclear weapons for what they are.  Some, like Archbishop Desmond Tutu, see them as an “obscenity.”  Others, like Josei Toda, view them as an “absolute evil.”  I see them as a human-designed threat to the future of civilization and perhaps to all complex life on earth.  By our technological cleverness, we humans have created the means of our own demise.  We cannot allow this to continue.


    Our great challenge is to abolish nuclear weapons before they abolish us.  It is not an easy goal to achieve, but it is not an impossible one.  It is a necessary goal, and it gives me hope that your conference is taking place and that each of you is involved and joining in the effort to create a world free of nuclear threat. 


    The only number of nuclear weapons that will assure a human future is zero.  No significant goal, such as the abolition of nuclear weapons, can be accomplished without awareness, boldness, creativity and hard work.  I hope that you will never lose sight of the need to achieve a world with zero nuclear weapons and that you will always choose hope as an impetus for building a better world.  Be persistent, persevere and never give up.