Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear disarmament

The Dawning Age of Nuclear Zero

This article was originally published on Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

It is never clear to us why and how certain critical events reach a tipping point — that is how they fundamentally depart from the status quo. In the case of six decades of nuclear armament, that may be particularly true. But an argument can be made that we are at or near such a tipping point, a tipping point away from expanding nuclear arsenals and toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Two events in the United States bolster this argument. One was a proposal put forward by four moderate-to-conservative leaders — former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Schultz, former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Defense Secretary William Perry — a year ago urging not just a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons, but their elimination as a class. This was seen by many at the time, particularly those familiar with the support these figures had given to new strategic weapons systems in the past, as a shift of historic importance.
More recently, an international organization of public and private figures — once again including a number of Americans and others who had never been identified with disarmament causes in the past — called Global Zero announced its intention to press nuclear-armed nations to reduce, and then eliminate, their arsenals.
The political landscape clearly is shifting in meaningful ways.
The reasons for this shift are many and, in the case of particular individuals, probably unknowable. These may include matters of personal legacy, how one’s public career and values are viewed by history. They may include pragmatic considerations, that the longer existing nuclear powers maintain large stockpiles of warheads and delivery systems (missiles), the more likely it will be that less stable or even unstable nations, such as Iran and North Korea, develop their own capabilities. They may include military considerations: only doomsday scenarios include the use of nuclear weapons as a viable option. They may include the new reality of the changing nature of conflict and the transformation of war, that nation-state wars are declining sharply in probability and unconventional conflict involving stateless nations against whom nuclear weapons represent no deterrent are increasing.
The reasons for the tipping point in opinion may ultimately get down to that most basic of human motives: the desire to leave a safer world for one’s children and future generations now overrides the often casual discussion of the political power once thought to be derived from weapons of ultimate mass destruction.
Now faced with frightening economic consequences of unregulated market collapse and the prospects of a very long international economic recovery, a new Obama administration in Washington could well be looking at initiatives that bring increased security at little or no cost, or indeed that produce cost savings. Nuclear zero, elimination of nuclear arsenals, must be at the top of this list. It may be argued that the president must fix the economy first before anything else gains attention. This false argument assumes intelligent people can do only one thing, even one complex thing, at a time or that some talented economic people cannot carry out their project while other talented diplomatic people carry out quite another.
Reasons and motives are incidental to opportunity. And now the opportunity exists, an opportunity not known for more than 60 years, to rid the world of its greatest menace. Eliminating all nuclear weapons will not be easy. It will require skilled and patient multinational diplomacy. It will require breakthroughs in verification. It will require a tolerable sacrifice of national sovereignty. It will most of all require an enormous amount of international purpose and good will. But it can be done. The principal requirement is political will and visionary political leadership. And it must be done. If not now, when?

Gary Hart is a former US Senator from Colorado.

January 22, 2009
Making Peace a Priority

The election of Barack Obama has brought a new spirit of hope to the United States and the world. We now have the opportunity to chart a new course for US foreign policy and provide leadership to restore peace under international law, promote justice and reestablish America’s credibility in the world. Our time demands such leadership from the United States, which could be demonstrated by taking the following ten steps:

1. Commit to US leadership to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Enter into negotiations with the Russians and then the other seven nuclear weapons states to create a new treaty for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. End the war in Iraq, withdraw American troops, close US military bases in Iraq and provide reparations to the people of Iraq for the damage we have caused there.

3. Pursue and bring to justice the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, using police and intelligence to address counterterrorism, and cease the US war against the Taliban.

4. Close Guantanamo, bring the prisoners to trial in US courts or release them, and provide assurances that the US will never again be a party to torture.

5. Increase the US role in brokering peace in areas of conflict, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

6. Reduce the military budget by 25 to 50 percent, eliminating wasteful and unneeded military expenditures, and reducing our foreign military bases and our global naval presence; and apply the savings to meeting human needs and revitalizing our economy.

7. Cease US plans to put weapon systems in outer space, and join Russia and China in a treaty prohibiting the weaponization of outer space.

8. Pledge US respect for the United Nations Charter and international law, including fulfilling the noble goals of the Charter of ending “the scourge of war” and formulating plans for “the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.”

9. Re-sign the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court and give full US support to holding individuals accountable under international law for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

10. Establish a Department of Peace with a cabinet level Secretary of Peace, so that peace has a permanent place at the table in the councils of government.

We have the opportunity to change our country and the world. Now is the time to seize the moment.

David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and is a councilor on the World Future Council.

December 23, 2008
Our Nuclear Future

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently delivered a speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in which he addressed the future of nuclear weapons. He noted that some past US presidents that he had worked for during the Cold War – Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush – all expressed publicly their desire to eliminate nuclear weapons. But these presidents, he points out, along with other leading policymakers expressing a similar desire, “have come up against the reality that as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves: to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security – making it unnecessary for them to develop their own.”

This is the succinct argument he offers for maintaining an arsenal of nuclear weapons. It is based on two pillars: deterrence and assurance. I might note that two pillars provide a highly unstable platform. If we are to succeed in eliminating nuclear weapons globally, Gates’ argument needs to be carefully examined. I will begin with the argument he makes for deterrence. There are currently nine countries with nuclear weapons, but Gates refers to only three of these, plus a non-nuclear weapon state, as being candidates for deterrence. These are Russia, China, North Korea and Iran (which has no nuclear weapons).

North Korea has very few nuclear weapons and thus it would take relatively few nuclear weapons to deter them. More important, North Korea has been willing to negotiate the elimination of its nuclear program in exchange for development assistance and security guarantees. So, in the case of North Korea, it seems reasonable to assume that they could be deterred with a very small arsenal of nuclear weapons, and there is a high probability that with the proper incentives and security guarantees they would eliminate their nuclear arsenal. If one accepts that the theory of deterrence is valid, the deterrent force would not need to exceed 10 nuclear weapons.

Iran currently has no nuclear weapons. It has the capacity to enrich uranium, which could lead to a program to create nuclear weapons. Since an Iranian nuclear capacity would be destabilizing and dangerous, this potential could also require a small nuclear deterrent force on the order of 10 nuclear weapons. The current situation with Iran’s uranium enrichment program raises the question of double standards. While the US has turned a blind eye to the fissile material programs of, for example, India and Israel, it has sought to shut down Iran’s uranium enrichment. There is a need for applying a universal standard to programs generating weapons usable fissile materials. All such programs in all states are potentially dangerous and require strict and effective international control.

The other two nuclear weapons states that Gates refers to are Russia and China. He notes that both countries are pursuing “strategic modernization programs,” but neglects to mention that they have been pushed in this direction by US missile defense programs, which both Russia and China view as giving the US a potential first-strike capability against them. From their perspective, they are strengthening their deterrent capacity in response to a US threat. Both Russia and China have been very vocal in expressing their concerns about the US missile defense program, but the US has waved aside their concerns.

Gates is careful to point out that “we do not consider Russia or China as adversaries.” Given the opportunity this provides, the US should seek agreement with both countries to move the size of all nuclear arsenals to much lower levels and to take other steps that will reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used by accident or design. Russia has in the past expressed a desire to move to lower levels of nuclear weapons than were agreed to in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), but thus far the US has put a floor at 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic weapons with the ability to keep more weapons in reserve. The US should seek immediate negotiations with Russia to move the number far lower, say to 1,000 each (in total) by the end of 2010, and to add verification provisions to the SORT agreement.

China’s arsenal of nuclear weapons is below 500 at present, and they and India are the only countries to publicly proclaim a No First Use policy, meaning that they will not use nuclear weapons first under any circumstance. Further, China does not keep its nuclear arsenal on high alert status, as do the US and Russia. China currently has only about 20 long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to US territory. The US should seek an agreement with Russia and China in which all three states commit to a policy of No First Use of nuclear weapons. The US and Russia should further agree to remove their nuclear arsenals from high alert status.

The second pillar of Gates’ argument is assurance to allies and partners that they can feel secure under the US “nuclear umbrella” and do not need to develop their own nuclear arsenals. But if the US led the way in seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons, this would not be an issue. Ronald Reagan argued in relation to the US and Russia, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?” The same, it would seem, would hold true for the world. A world without nuclear weapons would be safer for all countries, including our allies and partners. Many of these allies, including Japan, have been active in building consensus in the United Nations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Secretary Gates goes on in his speech to throw in a few more arguments for maintaining the US nuclear arsenal. “Our nuclear arsenal,” he says, “helps deter enemies from using chemical and biological weapons.” Assuming this is correct and that nuclear weapons could be needed for this purpose, the number of weapons would not exceed the 10 or so needed to deter North Korea or Iran. Gates finds our nuclear arsenal to be “vital” for one further reason: “We simply cannot predict the future.” But this argument cuts both ways. If the US continues to rely upon its nuclear arsenal, other countries are likely to pursue nuclear arsenals as well, making it more likely that these weapons will fall into the hands of terrorist organizations and creating an even more dangerous future.

Secretary Gates acknowledges the errors in security that have occurred with the US nuclear arsenal and argues that these problems are being addressed by new strengthened command structures. He leaves to our imaginations, though, what security problems may be going unattended in the nuclear arsenals of other countries. Gates worries about the “credibility” of our nuclear arsenal, based upon the “safety, security and reliability of our weapons.” He makes an interesting but common inversion in placing greater concern on the safety and security of the weapons than that of the people they are intended to protect. In fact, nuclear weapons cannot provide security to their possessors; they can only be used to threaten or massively destroy an opponent. It also seems unlikely that a potential adversary of the US would believe it could attack the US with impunity because it estimated that the US arsenal was something less than 100 percent reliable.

In the end, Gates believes the US must rely upon a “credible deterrent,” as opposed to providing leadership to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. “To be blunt,” he says, “there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.” He seeks a modernization program that would include the revitalization of the US nuclear weapons infrastructure and the development of a new nuclear warhead, the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which the Congress has turned down on several occasions. To follow the Gates plan would be to send a message to the rest of the world that the US, although the world’s most powerful state, finds nuclear weapons useful and will rely upon them for the foreseeable future. Rather than contributing to US security, this is a formula for promoting nuclear proliferation, which in the end will be harmful to US and global security.

Gates summarizes his position in this way: “Try as we might, and hope as we will, the power of nuclear weapons and their strategic impact is a genie that cannot be put back in the bottle – at least for a very long time. While we have a long-term goal of abolishing nuclear weapons once and for all, given the world in which we live, we have to be realistic about that proposition.” It seems clear that Gates’ position is a self-fulfilling prophecy. In our current world, only the US, due to its enormous military might, can provide the necessary leadership to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. If US policymakers believe it cannot be done, that the “genie cannot be put back in the bottle,” it will not happen. On the other hand, if US policymakers adopted a different approach, one in which the US sought to end its reliance on nuclear weapons and pressed the other nuclear states to come along, the prospect of a world with zero nuclear weapons would become realistic.

This does not mean unilateral US nuclear disarmament. It means a negotiated agreement for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons. It would not be easy, but the alternative is to continue with the status quo and drift toward nuclear catastrophe. Nuclear weapons do not and cannot protect their possessors. Retaliation is not protection. All countries, including the US, would be more secure in a world without nuclear weapons. We can move cautiously, but we must move determinedly toward that goal. Only the US can lead the way.

David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and a councilor on the World Future Council.

November 7, 2008
For a Nuclear Weapon Free World

This article was originally published in Italian by Corriere della Serra

Dear Editor, an article published in the Wall Street Journal entitled “A
world without nuclear weapons”, signed by George Schultz and Henry
Kissinger, former Secretaries of State under Republican Presidents
Reagan and Nixon, and by Bill Perry and Sam Nunn, the former Defence
Secretary under President Clinton and the Democratic chairman of the
Senate Defence Committee, in January 2007 opened up an extremely
important debate for the future of humanity. In that article, the four
American statesmen proposed the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
Their argument, taken up again in a second article in January 2008, is
that, unless the nuclear-weapon States – and there are now 8 of them –
and especially the two main ones, United States and Russia, take the
lead in launching a process aimed at their total elimination, it will
become increasingly difficult to prevent other countries from acquiring
them, with the risk that sooner or later these weapons may be used, and
that would have catastrophic consequences for the world.

The importance of their article lies in the fact that, for the first
time, the issue of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was being
addressed, in the United States, by politicians who represent the
mainstream of American stategic policy, from both parties, stressing the
fact that this is an objective to be pursued in the interests of both
the nation and the world. Several very important statements followed
their Op-ed. The two US presidential candidates have substantially
agreed with this aim, as have the majority of those who, in the past,
held positions of major responsibility in the USA in this field. In
Russia, there was a positive reaction by Gorbachev and a more cautious,
but not negative, reaction by the Government. In Britain, Gordon Brown
spoke out favourably; the Defence Minister proposed hosting experts from
United States, Russia, England, France and China in the English nuclear
labs, in order to establish the methodologies of verification for the
elimination of nuclear weapons; recently, the Times carried an article
by another bipartisan quartet, including three former Foreign Ministers
and a former Secretary General of Nato, expressing agreement. In
France, the Defence White Paper indicates that the objective to be
pursued is the elimination of nuclear weapons. In Australia, the
Government has established a new international Commission of Experts,
whose task is to chart the road towards the elimination of all nuclear
weapons. There have been innumerable positive reactions among
non-governmental groups.

We think it is important that Italy, too, should give indications that
go in that same direction. Our joint signatures, like those on the
Op-eds in other countries, are evidence of the fact that in both main
political camps, and in the scientific community, there is a shared
common opinion on the importance of this issue and this aim. We wish to
suggest the main steps along this road. The first is the entry into
force of the Treaty banning all forms of nuclear testing, including
underground tests, thus enshrining into a treaty the current moratorium.
The second is to set in motion the stalled negotiations, within the
Disarmament Conference in Geneva, on the FMCT, which prohibits the
production of highly enriched uranium and of plutonium with the isotope
composition necessary for the production of nuclear weapons. Here, too,
there is a de facto moratorium, but without any formal agreement and
without verification measures. The entry into force of these two
Treaties would be appreciated by non-nuclear-weapon States and would
prepare a more favourable ground for the periodical Conference of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty planned for 2010, strengthening the world’s
non-proliferation regime, including the monitoring of the actual
observance of the commitments – in both letter and spirit – envisaged by
the NPT.

We are fully aware that the road that will lead us to the elimination of
nuclear weapons is long. It will call for certain political conditions.
The first is an actual improvement in the relations between the nuclear
superpowers, United States and Russia, who still maintain – despite
recent reductions – over nine tenths of all nuclear weapons in the
world. This would help the other nuclear weapon States recognized by the
NPT – Britain, France and China – to do their part. It is also
necessary to reduce the tensions in those parts of the world where the
risk of nuclear weapons actually being used is highest, perhaps even by
terrorist groups. We refer here to South-east Asia (India and Pakistan)
and to the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab problem in the Middle East. In both
these contexts, moves by the nuclear weapons States indicating that they
are progressing towards a nuclear weapons free world would undoubtedly
have a positive effect. Italy and Europe can and must do what they can
to promote the path towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It
is clear that this final result will be achieved only with the
commitment of the major protagonists, United States and Russia, and of
the other nuclear weapon States. But the spread of a new way of thinking
– of a new “shared wisdom” – is a fundamental step along this path, and
Italy too must contribute. It is necessary that on these fundamental
issues for the very survival of humanity, despite our legitimate –
indeed necessary – political differences, we join together in
recognizing a superior, common interest.

July 24, 2008
Start Worrying and Learn to Ditch the Bomb

This article was originally published by The Times

During the Cold War nuclear weapons had the perverse effect of making
the
world a relatively stable place. That is no longer the case. Instead,
the
world is at the brink of a new and dangerous phase – one that combines
widespread proliferation with extremism and geopolitical tension.

Some of the terrorist organisations of today would have little
hesitation in
using weapons of mass destruction to further their own nihilistic
agendas.
Al-Qaeda and groups linked to it may be trying to obtain nuclear
material to
cause carnage on an unimaginable scale. Rogue or unstable states may
assist,
either willingly or unwillingly; the more nuclear material in
circulation,
the greater the risk that it falls into the wrong hands. And while
governments, no matter how distasteful, are usually capable of being
deterred, groups such as al-Qaeda, are not. Cold War calculations have
been
replaced by asymmetrical warfare and suicide missions.

There is a powerful case for a dramatic reduction in the stockpile of
nuclear
weapons. A new historic initiative is needed but it will only succeed by

working collectively and through multilateral institutions. Over the
past
year an influential project has developed in the United States, led by
Henry
Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn, all leading
policymakers. They have published two articles in The Wall Street
Journal
describing a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and articulating
some
of the steps that, cumulatively taken, could help to achieve that end.
Senator John McCain has endorsed that analysis recently. Barack Obama is

likely to be as sympathetic.

A comparable debate is now needed in this country and across Europe.
Britain
and France, both nuclear powers, are well placed to join in renewed
multilateral efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in
existence.
The American initiative does not call for unilateral disarmament;
neither do
we. Instead, progress can be made only by working alongside other
nations
towards a shared goal, using commonly agreed procedures and strategies.

The world’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons are overwhelmingly controlled
by two
nations: the United States and Russia. While Washington is in possession
of
about 5,000 deployed warheads, Russia is reported to have well over
6,000,
making its stockpile the largest in the world. It is difficult to
understand
why either the American or Russian governments feel that they need such
enormous numbers of nuclear weapons.

Hard-headed Americans, such as Dr Kissinger and Mr Shultz, have argued
that
dramatic reductions in the number of nuclear weapons in these arsenals
could
be made without risking America’s security. It is indisputable that if
serious progress is to be made it must begin with these two countries.

The US and Russia should ensure that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
of
1991 continues to provide the basis for co-operation in reducing the
number
of nuclear weapons. The treaty’s provisions need to be extended.
Agreement
should be reached on the issue of missile defence. The US proposal to
make
Poland and the Czech Republic part of their missile defence shield has
upset
the Kremlin. It has been a divisive issue, but it need not be. Any
missile
threat to Europe or the United States would also be a threat to Russia.
Furthermore, Russia and the West share a strong common interest in
preventing proliferation.

Elsewhere, there are numerous stockpiles that lie unaccounted for. In
the
former Soviet Union alone, some claim that there is enough uranium and
plutonium to make a further 40,000 weapons. There have been reports of
nuclear smuggling in the Caucasus and some parts of Eastern Europe.
Security
Council Resolution 1540, which obliges nations to improve the security
of
stockpiles, allows for the formation of teams of specialists to be
deployed
in those countries that do not possess the necessary infrastructure or
experience in dealing with stockpiles. These specialists should be
deployed
to assist both in the monitoring and accounting for of nuclear material
and
in the setting up of domestic controls to prevent security breaches.
Transparency in these matters is vital and Britain can, and should, play
a
role in providing experts who can fulfil this important role.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, for 40 years the foundation of counter-
proliferation efforts, in in need of an overhaul. The provisions on
monitoring compliance need to be strengthened. The monitoring provisions
of
the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which
require
a state to provide access to any location where nuclear material may be
present, should be accepted by all the nations that have signed up to
the
NPT. These requirements, if implemented, would have the effect of
strengthening the ability of the IAEA to provide assurances about both
declared nuclear material and undeclared activities. At a time when a
number
of countries, including Iran and Syria, may be developing a nuclear
weapons
programme under the guise of civilian purposes, the ability to be clear
about all aspects of any programme is crucial.

Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into effect would, similarly,

represent strong progress in the battle to reduce the nuclear threat.
The
treaty would ban the testing of nuclear weapons, ensuring that the
development of new generations of weapons ceases. However, it will only
come
into force once the remaining nine states who have not yet ratified it
do
so. Britain, working through Nato and the EU, must continue to encourage

those remaining states that have not yet agreed to the Treaty – India,
Pakistan, Egypt, China, Indonesia, North Korea, Israel, Iran and the
United
States – to ratify it.

A modern non-proliferation regime will require mechanisms to provide
those
nations wishing to develop a civilian nuclear capability with the
assistance
and co-operation of those states that possess advanced expertise and
that
are able to provide nuclear fuel, spent-fuel management assistance,
enriched
uranium and technical assistance. But, in return, proper verification
procedures must be in place and access for the IAEA must not be impeded.

Achieving real progress in reducing the nuclear weapons threat will
impose
obligations on all nuclear powers not just the US and Russia. The UK has

reduced its nuclear weapons capability significantly over the past 20
years.
It disposed of its freefall and tactical nuclear weapons and has
achieved a
big reduction of the number of warheads used by the Trident system to
the
minimum believed to be compatible with the retention of a nuclear
deterrent.
If we are able to enter into a period of significant multilateral
disarmament Britain, along with France and other existing nuclear
powers,
will need to consider what further contribution it might be able to make
to
help to achieve the common objective.

Substantial progress towards a dramatic reduction in the world’s nuclear

weapons is possible. The ultimate aspiration should be to have a world
free
of nuclear weapons. It will take time, but with political will and
improvements in monitoring, the goal is achievable. We must act before
it is
too late, and we can begin by supporting the campaign in America for a
non-nuclear weapons world.

June 30, 2008
A Powerful Peace

Article originally appeared in YES! Magazine.

If the nuclear powers wish to be safe from nuclear weapons, they must surrender their own.

With each year that passes, nuclear weapons provide their possessors with less safety while provoking more danger. Possession of nuclear arms provokes proliferation. Both nourish the global nuclear infrastructure, which in turn enlarges the possibility of acquisition by terrorist groups.

The step that is needed to break this cycle can be as little doubted as the source of the problem. The double standard of nuclear haves and have-nots must be replaced by a single standard, which can only be the goal of a world free of all nuclear weapons.

What is it that prevents sensible steps toward nuclear abolition from being taken? The answer cannot be in doubt, either. It is the resolve of the world’s nuclear powers to hold on to their nuclear arsenals. Countries that already have nuclear arms cite proliferation as their reason for keeping them, and those lacking nuclear arms seek them in large measure because they feel menaced by those with them.

A double-standard regime is a study in futility—a divided house that cannot stand. Its advocates preach what they have no intention of practicing. It is up to the nuclear powers to take the first step.

Their nuclear arsenals would be the largest pile of bargaining chips ever brought to any negotiating table. More powerful as instruments of peace than they ever can be for war, they would likely be more than adequate for winning agreements from the non-nuclear powers that would choke off proliferation forever.

The art of the negotiation would be to pay for strict, inspectable, enforceable nonproliferation and nuclear-materials-control agreements in the coin of existing nuclear bombs. What would be the price to the nuclear powers, for example, of a surrender by the nuclear-weapons-free states of their rights to the troublesome nuclear fuel cycle, which stands at the heart of the proliferation dilemma? Perhaps reductions by Russia and the United States from two thousand to a few hundred weapons each plus ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?

Further reductions, now involving the other nuclear powers, might pay for establishment and practice of inspections of ever-greater severity, and still further reductions might buy agreements on enforcement of the final ban on nuclear arms. When nuclear weapons holdings reached zero, former nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, abolitionists all, would exercise a unanimous will to manage, control, roll back, and extirpate all nuclear weapon technology.

A world from which nuclear weapons had been banned would, of course, not be without its dangers, including nuclear ones. But we must ask how they would compare with those now approaching.

Let us suppose that the nuclear powers had agreed to move step by step toward eliminating their own arsenals. The iron chains of fear that link all the nuclear arsenals in the world would then be replaced by bonds of reassurance. Knowing that Russia and the United States were disarming, China could agree to disarm. Knowing that China was disarming, India could agree to disarm. Knowing that India was ready to disarm, Pakistan could agree to disarm as well. Any country that decided otherwise would find itself up against the sort of united global will so conspicuous by its absence today.

During the Cold War, the principal objection in the United States to a nuclear-weapon-free world was that you could not get there. That objection melted away with the Soviet Union, and today the principal objection is that even if you could get there, you would not want to be there. The arguments usually begin with the observation that nuclear weapons can never be disinvented, and that a world free of nuclear weapons is therefore at worst a mirage, at best a highly dangerous place to be. It is supposedly a mirage because, even if the hardware is removed, the know-how remains. It is said to be highly dangerous because the miscreant re-armer, now in possession of a nuclear monopoly, would be able to dictate terms to a helpless, terrorized world or, alternately, precipitate a helter-skelter, many-sided nuclear arms race.

This conclusion seems reasonable until you notice that history has taught an opposite lesson. Repeatedly, even the greatest nuclear powers have actually lost wars against tiny, backward nonnuclear adversaries without being able to extract the slightest utility from their colossal arsenals. Think of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, or the U.S. in Vietnam, or Britian in Suez.

If, in the 60 years of the nuclear age, no great power has won a war by making nuclear threats against even tiny, weak adversaries, then how could a nuclear monopoly by a small country enable it to coerce and bully the whole world? The danger cannot be wholly discounted, but it is surely greatly exaggerated.

If the nuclear powers wish to be safe from nuclear weapons, they must surrender their own. They should collectively offer the world’s non-nuclear powers a deal of stunning simplicity, inarguable fairness, and patent common sense: we will get out of the nuclear weapon business if you stay out of it. Then we will all work together to assure that everyone abides by the commitment.

The united will of the human species to save itself from destruction would be a force to be reckoned with.

Jonathan Schell wrote this article as part of A Just Foreign Policy, the Summer 2008 issue of YES! Magazine. Jonathan is the Harold Willens Peace Fellow at the Nation Institute and a senior visiting lecturer at Yale. He has written many books. This article is adapted from his latest, The Seventh Decade: The New Shape of Nuclear Danger.

June 6, 2008
No Nuclear Weapons: An Interview with George Shultz

Article originally appeared in YES! Magazine.

George Shultz was there when nuclear disarmament slipped through our fingers. Today, he says, action is even more urgent. Sarah van Gelder interviews George Shultz, former Secretary of State.

Twenty years ago, U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev came within a hair’s breadth of agreeing to phase out their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The encounter took place at Reykjavik, Iceland, and one of the people who was there was Secretary of State George Shultz. When the proposal came up, he is reported to have said, “Let’s do it!”

Today, from his office at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, he’s back on the case. In collaboration with former Senator Sam Nunn, William Perry, who was secretary of defense under Bill Clinton, and Henry Kissinger, this veteran of the Cold War is taking on what may be the biggest threat to human security.

YES! executive editor Sarah van Gelder spoke to Secretary Shultz in March 2008, shortly after he returned from Oslo, where he led the third in a series of conferences on eliminating nuclear weapons—this one involving representatives of all the countries of the world that have nuclear weapons.

Sarah: Can the United States be secure without its nuclear stockpile?
Shultz: You’re going to be more secure if there are no nuclear weapons in the world, because if you achieve this goal, you won’t be risking having nuclear weapons blow up in one of our cities.

At the conferences abroad I’ve been attending, it was certainly borne in on me that the notion of a two-tiered world—where some countries can have nuclear weapons and others can’t—is getting less and less acceptable.

The Nonproliferation Treaty in Article 6 says that those who don’t have nuclear weapons will have access to nuclear power technology and they won’t try to get nuclear weapons, and those who do have nuclear weapons will phase down their importance eventually to zero. People are looking for governments to live up to that treaty.

Sarah: Is it possible to verify that nuclear weapons have been eliminated?
Shultz: That’s one of the main subjects to be worked on. The British government has volunteered to take on verification—to try to think through how you work it out.

We have the START Treaty between the United States and Russia that includes the best verification procedures of anything that’s been developed. It expires in December of 2009, so we’re suggesting that the treaty be extended so as not to lose those verification provisions.

Sarah: How would it affect our relative power in the world if nuclear weapons were eliminated?
Shultz: At a meeting in Washington, DC, about a year ago, Henry Kissinger said, “The thing that I lost sleep over, and that I agonized about more than anything else when I was in office, was what would I say if the president ever asked my advice on whether to use a nuclear weapon, knowing that a hundred thousand or maybe more would be killed, and if there were a nuclear exchange, it would be in the billions.”

Now that we know so much about these weapons and their power, they’re almost weapons that we wouldn’t use. So I think we’re better off without them.

Of course the United States has such awesome conventional power, I think probably that on the relative balance we would be well off.

Sarah: Do you think there can be nuclear energy without proliferation?
Shultz: If you get the nuclear fuel cycle under control, yes. But I listen to people talk about nuclear power plants, and they hardly ever mention the issue. I don’t think people are alert to this problem.

In terms of the nuclear fuel cycle, there is just as strong a feeling that you don’t want to have another two-tiered system, in which some countries are allowed to enrich uranium and others aren’t. I think there’s going to have to be an international regime on that.

Sarah: Why is the reaction today so different from the reaction to President Reagan’s proposal at Reykjavik to eliminate nuclear weapons?
Shultz: After Reykjavik, you may remember, the reaction was very negative. Margaret Thatcher came over, practically summoned me to the British ambassador’s residence, and she read me out: How could I possibly take part in such a discussion?

I think it has dawned on people that we’ve gone to sleep on this subject. The proliferation problems are growing, and the amount of nuclear fissile material around is large, and some of it isn’t well safeguarded. We have a terrorist phenomenon, and the non-proliferation treaty is fraying at the edges. So maybe we should do something a little different.

Sarah: You just returned from a conference in Norway on the abolition of nuclear weapons. What happened there?
Shultz: Sam Nunn and I went. Henry Kissinger and Bill Perry were not able to go. Twenty nine countries were represented—all the countries with nuclear weapons, including Israel. The people there had their doubts, but they were intrigued; they can see there is a danger—a tipping point problem.

We’re getting to the point where proliferation could get out of control. If a terrorist group gets a nuclear weapon or the fissile material from which they can make one, they aren’t getting it for deterrence. They are getting it to use it.

The Doctrine of Deterrence justified nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The deterrent impact of Mutual Assured Destruction kept an uneasy peace, although if you were involved, you knew that there were more close calls than you were comfortable with.

At the end of the Cold War, more countries were acquiring nuclear weapons, and others were aspiring to have them.

The Gulf states all want nuclear power plants, and if you enrich your own uranium—as the Iranians aspire to do—you can enrich it for a weapon. When the fuel is spent, it can be reprocessed into plutonium. If nuclear power spreads—as the people who are worried about global warming are pushing for—then the problem of the nuclear fuel cycle emerges. All of these things together give you that uneasy feeling.

Sarah: Have you had a response from the leading presidential contenders?
Shultz: I haven’t seen anything from Senator McCain. Senator Obama has made a statement supporting what we’re doing. Senator Clinton has been a little less forthcoming than Senator Obama, but has indicated interest.

I hope that I, or Henry, or someone can get a chance to talk to Senator McCain before long.

Sarah: Is there active opposition to your initiative to eliminate nuclear weapons?
Shultz: There are people who think that the idea is not a good idea and that it will never happen. Mostly, however, they say that they are in favor of the steps that we’ve identified. So we say, OK, let’s get going on the steps that we can do today that will make the world safer.

Sarah: What response have you had from the Russians to this proposal?
Shultz: No formal response. But, at our meeting in London, two former Russian foreign ministers were there, one of whom, I understand, is close to the current regime. When he finished speaking, I said, “Igor, will you let me translate what you said? It is that as far as Russia is concerned, the door is open.” He said, “That’s a fair translation. We’re ready to think about it.”

That’s as good as you can get.

Sarah: What is the first thing you would like the next president to do to move this process forward?
Shultz: I’m not trying to prescribe for the next president. We’re trying to get the building blocks ready. We’ve talked to people from some other countries, and they’re interested enough so that if the United States, working with Russia, were to take this initiative and get other people to join, it might be pretty exciting. And it might once again put us in the role of doing something that people feel good about.

There is quite a list of people—large numbers of former secretaries of state, defense, and national security advisors—who have publicly stated their support. So we’d be in a position to say to a new president, “If you decide to go this way, here are a bunch of people from both sides of the aisle who are willing to stand up behind you and applaud.”

Sarah van Gelder interviewed George Shultz as part of A Just Foreign Policy, the Summer 2008 issue of YES! Magazine. Sarah is Executive Editor of YES! Magazine.

June 6, 2008
US Leadership for Global Nuclear Disarmament
“The road from the world of today, with thousands of nuclear weapons in national arsenals to a world free of this threat, will not be an easy one to take, but it is clear that US leadership is essential to the journey and there is growing worldwide support for that civilized call to zero.” Thomas Graham Jr. and Max Kampelman

There will be no substantial progress on nuclear disarmament without the active participation and leadership of the United States. I recognize that many countries and individuals throughout the world are rightly skeptical of US leadership after nearly four decades of noncompliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, and particularly after the past seven years of US nuclear policy under the Bush administration.

But on the issue of nuclear disarmament, there is no choice. If the US does not lead on nuclear disarmament, no substantial progress will be possible, mainly because without US leadership, Russia will not move and this will block the UK, France and China from taking significant steps.

The US has thus far been the limiting factor in progress on nuclear disarmament. It has promoted nuclear double standards and it has provided leadership in the wrong direction, toward long-term reliance on nuclear arms. In 15 votes on nuclear disarmament issues in the 2007 United Nations General Assembly, the US cast a negative vote on every one of the resolutions.

The US has engaged in a preventive war against Iraq, based on the now undisputed lie that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program. The US has threatened Iran because it pursues uranium enrichment. At the same time, the US has supported the transfer of nuclear technology to nuclear-armed India, shielded Israel’s possession of nuclear arms, and sought to replace every thermonuclear warhead in its own arsenal with more “reliable” weapons.

The issues I mention are just the tip of the iceberg, but they demonstrate how nuclear weapons deeply undermine democracy. A small group in power, even a single leader, such as Mr. Bush, can thwart both US and global opinion on nuclear disarmament and, in a worst case, plunge the world into a devastating nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or design.

Kissinger, Shultz, Perry, Nunn and other US foreign policy elites have awakened to the dangers that continued reliance on nuclear weapons pose to the United States. They understand that such reliance makes nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism more likely, threatening the cities of the US, its European Allies and others. They understand that deterrence no longer works (if it ever really did) and cannot be relied upon, particularly in the case of extremists in possession of nuclear weapons.

A new US president will be chosen in November. There will be change. The new president will need to hear from the American people and from people throughout the world. At the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, we are partnering with other groups throughout the world to present the new president with one million signatures on an Appeal calling for US leadership for a nuclear weapons-free world. The Appeal calls specifically for the new president to take the following steps:
- De-alert. Remove all nuclear weapons from high-alert status, separating warheads from delivery vehicles;
- No First Use. Make legally binding commitments to No First Use of nuclear weapons and establish nuclear policies consistent with this commitment;
- No New Nuclear Weapons. Initiate a moratorium on the research and development of new nuclear weapons, such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead;
- Ban Nuclear Testing Forever. Ratify and bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- Control Nuclear Material. Create a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty with provisions to bring all weapons-grade nuclear material and the technologies to create such material under strict and effective international control;
- Nuclear Weapons Convention. Commence good faith negotiations, as required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased, verifiable and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons;
- Resources for Peace. Reallocate resources from the tens of billions currently spent on nuclear arms to alleviating poverty, preventing and curing disease, eliminating hunger and expanding educational opportunities throughout the world.
For all of these points, and others that could be added, political will is more critical than technological skill. The possibility of US leadership on nuclear abolition will be greatly enhanced if the US government is pressured from abroad. The US government needs to hear from its friends. It needs to be pressured by its friends. If NATO continues to buckle under and go along with US opposition to nuclear disarmament due to US pressure, and that of the UK and France, it only enables their nuclear addiction.

We have a saying in the US, “Friends do not let friends drive drunk.” US nuclear policy endangers not only other drivers. It endangers the world. It is time to take away the keys. This can only be done by friends who care enough to act for the good of the drunk and the good of others on the road.

An additional benefit to strong public pressure for nuclear weapons abolition by US allies is that it helps those of us in the US that are seeking to move our own government to take responsible action on this issue. The opening for US leadership created by the Kissinger-Shultz group can be bolstered by strong statements from US friends abroad. The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Appeal to the Next President will also be furthered by such support. And, of course, it will matter greatly who is chosen as the next president. Friends from abroad can help us to choose wisely by emphasizing the decisive importance of US leadership for global nuclear disarmament.

David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and a member of the Executive Committee of the Middle Powers Initiative.
April 2, 2008
Risk and Nuclear Weapons
Those of us working to eliminate the threat that nuclear weapons pose to human survival face three major barriers that a new approach attempts to overcome:
- The public is more worried about the risk of modifying our nuclear posture than maintaining it. Even a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is criticized as too risky by guardians of the nuclear status quo. Larger steps such as the recent efforts by Shultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn to pose even the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons are derided as fantasy.
- Public interest only approaches an appropriate level when the world is on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe and fades at the first partial success. When the Cold War ended, I was horrified that public concern evaporated in the mistaken belief that the nuclear threat had been extinguished. Without an ongoing effort, it was only a matter of time before the pendulum swung back, as it is now doing, and the threat of nuclear war reared its ugly head once more.
- A true solution to the nuclear threat involves such far-reaching changes in human thought and behavior that most people discount their ever occuring. “You can’t change human nature,” is a phrase we all have heard far too often. What naysayers miss is that these changes do not occur in one fell swoop, but rather as a process. What is impossible early on becomes feasible in the new environment produced by the first steps. Abolishing slavery and women’s suffrage, both initially derided as fools’ errands, came to be in just this fashion.
Defusing the Nuclear Threat, as the new approach is called, is based on a simple, but surprising observation: People have a right to know the risk associated with locating a nuclear power plant near their homes and to object if they feel that risk is too high. Similarly, they should have a right to know the risk associated with nuclear deterrence and to object if they feel that risk is too high. But they cannot because that latter risk is largely unknown. The initial goal of the project is summarized in a statement endorsed by seven eminent individuals including two Nobel Laureates, a former president of Stanford University, a former Director of NSA and Deputy Director of the CIA, and which concludes:
“We, the undersigned, therefore urgently petition the international scientific community to undertake in-depth risk analyses of nuclear deterrence and, if the results so indicate, to raise an alarm alerting society to the unacceptable risk it faces as well as initiating a second phase effort to identify potential solutions.” How do these proposed studies overcome the three barriers we face?
- They do not change our military posture one iota and therefore cannot be criticized as “too dangerous.”
- My preliminary analysis indicates that the current risk is literally thousands of times greater than acceptable. If the proposed in-depth studies agree even approximately, it says that society cannot go back to sleep at the first partial success.
- Reducing risk a thousand-fold clearly cannot be done in one instantaneous act. The long-term nature of the solution as a process is almost self-evident: First find ways to halve the threat. Then halve it again, and again, and again. Thus, without ever explicitly calling for the ultimate goal of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the world can discover if that end state is required as it journeys through ever safer levels.
My paper “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” has just appeared in the magazine of the national engineering honor society and provides more details. While it includes some higher mathematics, those sections can be skipped without losing the paper’s main thrust.
Martin Hellman is Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford and previously taught at MIT. His invention of public key cryptography is the basis of secure financial transactions on the Internet and has been honored with numerous awards, most notably election to the National Academy of Engineering, election as a Fellow of the IEEE, and being named a Marconi International Fellow.
March 20, 2008
Who’s Going to Give Them Up First?
In January 2007, an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal called “World Free of Nuclear Weapons” said: “Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage – to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.”

Photo: CND/Elliot Taylor

Now who would have thought that I would be quoting Henry Kissinger, George P. Schultz, William J. Perry and Sam Nunn?

But perhaps you should not be surprised. The nuclear issue is not a partisan political issue. It is reassuring to see some of the most conservative figures in both the UK and the USA supporting complete nuclear disarmament.

Some of you may know that Ronald Reagan was strongly opposed to nuclear weapons. Reagan called for the abolition of “all nuclear weapons,” which he considered “totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilisation.”

We are at an historic moment in history in a number of respects. Many hard choices lay before us, with many serious consequences if we make the wrong decisions.

The strategy of defending the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, as an effective deterrent to others, is now recognised as a flawed argument. If they were once justified, as a means of American-Soviet deterrence, they are no longer. Nuclear weapons were considered essential to maintaining international security during the cold war, but that is no longer the case.

Former shadow Defence Secretary Michael Ancram said: “The threat of using nuclear weapons is not only illogical but incredible… the need for a genuinely independent alternative and flexible non-nuclear deterrence is if anything greater.”

Of course, the idea that the £76billion needed to finance refurbishment of the UK’s Trident submarines will provide us with an independent nuclear deterrent is nonsense. Unlike China, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the United States – and perhaps North Korea – the UK does not have and will not have an independent deterrent. We rely on the US for logistical support, and we import components from them, too.

Independence comes at a price: France is spending four times what we are on their nuclear deterrent strategy. But if the adherents to this argument intend to be taken seriously, they could at least have presented us with a truly independent solution.

Such a solution, in any case, is totally unacceptable. Quite aside from the monumental costs involved, Trident renewal will make it far more difficult to get arms reduction around the world. As Mohammed El-Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was quoted as saying, Britain “cannot modernise its Trident submarines while at the same time telling everyone else that nuclear weapons are not needed in the future… We need to treat nuclear weapons the way we treat slavery or genocide. There needs to be a taboo over possessing them.”

Furthermore, the replacement of the Trident nuclear missile programme in the UK is in violation of international law. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty states: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

Kofi Annan has said of the UK’s policy that: “They should not imagine that this will be accepted as compatible with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
Going further, The International Court of Justice, in their “Advisory Opinion on the Illegality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons on July 8, 1996, stated: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was intended to guarantee the end of nuclear weapons, but as the January Wall Street Journal op-ed points out, despite the fact that every president since Nixon has renewed the U.S.’s obligations under the treaty, and that the UK government claims to remain committed to the Treaty, non-nuclear weapon states are – justifiably – growing increasingly suspicious of the intentions of the so-called nuclear powers. In addition, four nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – either never ratified or have withdrawn from the Treaty. This is astonishing and unacceptable.

In 2005 Peacerights, an NGO dedicated to peaceful conflict resolution, commissioned a report by legal experts Rabinder Singh QC and Professor Christine Chinkin, who concluded that a renewal of Trident would infringe on intransgressible requirements of customary international law, since nuclear weapons do not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.

In a second legal opinion, solicited in 2006, Philippe Sands QC and Helen Law found the renewal to be disproportionate, and therefore unlawful, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

But it is not only that our governments are violating international agreements that they themselves signed. They are also acting with arrogance and carelessness when it comes to handling the weapons they have already. Even the supposedly most advanced nations can by alarmingly lax when it comes to the security precautions in place for nuclear weapons.

Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called the unbelievable US Army security failure last August, in which six nuclear warheads were inadvertently removed from their bunkers and flown from North Dakota to Louisiana, “unprecedented”. Owing to “a lack of attention to detail and lack of adherence to well-established Air Force guidelines, technical orders and procedures”, for thirty-six hours, no-one knew where the warheads were, or even that they were missing.

Each of the warheads contained ten times the yield of that dropped on Hiroshima at the end of the Second World War. No breach of nuclear procedures of this magnitude had ever occurred before. Surely it is only a matter of time before an error like this becomes a disaster. Commentators have blamed this failure on the US Army’s reduced nuclear focus in recent years. Why, I would argue, not go the whole way? Why not do away with nuclear weapons altogether?

The tolerance for error when it comes to nuclear weapons is very low – in fact, it is zero. But zero tolerance cannot realistically be achieved, which is another reason why immediate and worldwide disarmament is such an important, and a pressing, priority. Even Arnold Schwarzenegger said, “Mistakes are made in every other human endeavour. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt?”

David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, notes in an article this month that “even Edward Teller, father of the H-Bomb, recognized, ‘Sooner or later a fool will prove greater than the proof, even in a foolproof system.’”

We have come to the point where something has to give. South Africa is to be heartily applauded for its total disarmament, which was officially declared in 1994, following an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In order to affect real change globally, we now need one of the major powers to follow suit.
The question has now become: “Who’s going to give them up first?”

I would like to propose that Britain, as both the oldest parliamentary democracy in the world, and as one of the only countries with no independent nuclear deterrent in place, is the perfect candidate. I believe it is up to us to lead, and let others follow. It is up to us to take advantage of this perfect opportunity to pave the way.

And Britain is uniquely positioned at this precise moment in time to act: the decision to renew Trident can still be repealed. In March 2007, a record 167 MPs from all sides of the House expressed their doubts that the case for Trident had been proven. They were unconvinced of the need for an early decision. Since March, the situation has not changed.

Imagine the circumstances in which we might employ nuclear weapons. Let’s imagine the case of a rogue state that has threatened our major cities with a nuclear strike.

Are we really prepared to engage in mutual obliteration? To kill millions because of the foolhardiness of the few? I wish every defender of nuclear weapons would read a little of John Hersey’s Hiroshima, and ask themselves again whether such devastation and suffering can ever be justified. I do not believe it can.

Last month I read an article in the Guardian reporting that a manifesto by five of the west’s most senior military officials and strategists, from the U.S., Britain, Germany, France and the Netherlands, insists that a “first strike” nuclear option remains an “indispensable instrument”, since there is “simply no realistic prospect of a nuclear-free world”. This is a horrifying development, but we cannot and we must not allow this to dishearten us.

There is every prospect of a nuclear-free world. All that this manifesto shows is that not enough has been done to research the other options. Not enough has been done to examine the causes of increasing proliferation. We have the power to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. We have a responsibility to use that power to bring about global disarmament.

Nuclear weapons are not containable. Where they exist, innocent lives are at risk. There is no such thing as a smart bomb. There will never be a “smart” nuclear weapon. And there will never be a smart supporter of nuclear weapons, either.

Britain’s international obligations, as set out in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, are clear: we are legally committed to scrapping nuclear weapons. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if our leaders were, for once, brave enough to make good on their promises?

When they consider their responses to our pleas, politicians would do well to keep in mind the words of two men.

The first is Dwight D. Eisenhower, who pledged America’s determination “to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”

The second is a man who knows as much about nuclear weapons as anyone, Mikhail Gorbachev. He said that “that the infinite and uncontrollable fury of nuclear weapons should never be held in the hands of any mere mortal ever again, for any reason.”

The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation has launched an appeal that I urge each of you to sign. It calls on the next President of the United States to:
- De-alert all nuclear weapons;
- Commit to No First Use;
- Commit to no new nuclear weapons;
- Ban nuclear testing forever;
- Control nuclear material worldwide;
- Uphold nuclear weapons conventions; and
- Reallocate resources for peace.
I would like to extend the reach of this appeal to Gordon Brown. I urge him to answer each of these points in the affirmative. I urge him to do it now.

You can sign the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s appeal by visiting www.wagingpeace.org/appeal.

Thank you very much.

Speech at the CND Global Summit
City Hall, London
February 16, 2008

Bianca Jagger is Chair of the World Future Council.
February 16, 2008