Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: nuclear aboliton

  • It’s Time For a Plan to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

    It’s Time For a Plan to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

    In early January 2007, a surprising commentary appeared in the Wall Street Journal pleading for US leadership to move toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The surprise emanated from the identity of the writers: four prominent former high-level US foreign and defense policy officials, a bipartisan group with impeccable hawkish credentials – George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn.

    In their welcome if belated statement of concern about nuclear dangers, they harkened back to the 1986 summit at Reykjavik, where Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev came close to an agreement to rid the world of nuclear weapons. “Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons,” they wrote, “and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations.”

    The four men who signed this commentary might have harkened back even further. In the 1960s, John F. Kennedy likened nuclear weapons to a nuclear sword of Damocles, “hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident, or miscalculation, or by madness.” Kennedy concluded, as have the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who experienced the devastatingly destructive nuclear attacks at the end of World War II, that nuclear weapons “must be abolished before they abolish us.”

    It should be of deep concern to all Americans that more than a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, the danger of the spread and use of nuclear weapons has not substantially diminished and has quite possibly increased. Moreover, it has become increasingly apparent that nuclear weapons may give far more leverage to relatively weak actors, such as terrorist groups, than they do to even the most powerful nations.

    In one of his last speeches at the conclusion of his ten-year tenure as Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan pointedly directed his remarks to the extreme dangers humanity faces due to the failure to eliminate nuclear weapons. He argued, “The one area where there is a total lack of any common strategy is the one that may well present the greatest danger of all: the area of nuclear weapons,” and he cited many reasons necessitating a concerted effort to both prevent proliferation and achieve nuclear disarmament.

    The lynchpin of Annan’s proposal, however, was the specific need for the nuclear weapons states to take action on their nuclear disarmament commitments. “I call on all the States with nuclear weapons,” he said, “to develop concrete plans -– with specific timetables -– for implementing their disarmament commitments. And I urge them to make a joint declaration of intent to achieve the progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons, under strict and effective international control.”

    There can be no doubt that a plan to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons is critically needed and should animate a national, indeed a global, dialogue. Nuclear weapons endanger our nation and the world. These weapons are capable of destroying cities and countries, including our own, and could put an end to civilization. They are tools of our own making that place a dark cloud over the human future. The continued reliance upon these weapons by the United States and other nuclear weapons states is a provocation to other countries to do the same and could lead to a breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

    Terrorists cannot be deterred by nuclear weapons because they cannot be located, and if terrorists gain possession of nuclear weapons they cannot be prevented from using them by threat of retaliation. The security of even a military superpower such as the United States could be dramatically undercut by a single terrorist group with just one nuclear weapon. Such is the leverage of nuclear weapons: they favor the weak over the strong.

    A consensus is finally building behind the conviction that the abolition of nuclear weapons is necessary and that US leadership is urgently needed to achieve this goal. Now we need increased momentum to achieve an action plan so that over the next decade nuclear weapons can be eliminated globally in a process that is transparent, verifiable and irreversible. To succeed in reaching this goal will require a new way of thinking that involves increased reliance on international cooperation and diplomacy to achieve security, and adherence by all nations, even the most powerful, to a strengthened body of international law.

    We are facing a challenge that will determine our common future. As Kofi Annan pleaded to the young people at Princeton who he was addressing in his speech, “Help us to seize control of the rogue aircraft on which humanity has embarked, and bring it to a safe landing before it is too late.”

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.
  • Building Global Peace in the Nuclear Age

    Building Global Peace in the Nuclear Age

    In an age in which the weapons we have created are capable of destroying the human species, what could be more important than building global peace? The Nuclear Age has made peace an imperative. If we fail to achieve and maintain global peace, the future of humanity will remain at risk. This was the view of the preeminent scientists, led by Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, who issued the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955. They stated, “Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?” They continued, “People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war.”

    With the end of the Cold War, nuclear dangers did not evaporate. Rather, new dangers of nuclear proliferation, terrorism and war emerged, in a climate of public ignorance, apathy and denial. Awakening the public to these dangers and building global peace are the greatest challenges of our time, challenges made necessary by the power and threat of nuclear arsenals.

    Peace is a two-sided coin: it requires ending war as a human institution and controlling and eliminating its most dangerous weapons, but it also requires building justice and ending structural violence. One of the most profound questions of our time is: How can an individual lead a decent life in a society that promotes war and structural violence?

    The answer is that the only way to do this is to be a warrior for peace in all its dimensions. This means to actively oppose society’s thrust toward war and injustice, and to actively support efforts to resolve disputes nonviolently and to promote equity and justice in one’s society and throughout the world. Martin Luther King, Jr. said, “The arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice.” We know, though, that it doesn’t bend of its own accord. It bends because people care and take a stand for peace and justice.

    If we are committed to building global peace in the Nuclear Age, we must say an absolute No to war, and we must demonstrate by our words and actions our commitment to peace. We must have confidence that our acts, though the acts of a single person, can and will make a difference. We must understand that we are not alone, although we may be isolated by a corporate media and a sea of indifference. It is our challenge to awaken ourselves, to educate others and to consistently set an example for others by our daily lives. To be fully human is to put our shoulders to the arc of history so that it will bend more swiftly toward the justice and peace that we seek.

    Humanity is now joined, for better or worse, in a common future, and each of us has a role to play in determining that future. Issues of peace and war are far too important to be left only to political leaders. Most political leaders don’t know how to lead for peace. They are caught up in the war system and fear they will lose support if they oppose it. They need to be educated to be peace leaders. Strangely, most political leaders take their lead from the voters, so let’s lead them toward a world at peace.

    If you are an educator, educate for peace. If you are an artist, communicate for peace. If you are a professional, step outside the boundaries of your profession and act like the ordinary human miracle that you really are. If you are an ordinary human miracle, live with the dignity and purpose befitting the miracle of life and stand for peace.

    This will not be easy. There will be times when you will be very discouraged, but you must never give up. You will find that hope and action are intertwined. Hope gives rise to action, as action gives rise to hope. The best and most reliable way to build global peace in the Nuclear Age is to take a step in that direction, no matter how small, and the path will open to you to take a next step and a next. In following this path, your life will be entwined with the lives of people everywhere.

     

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.

  • Emerging from the Nuclear Shadow

    “At any given moment in history, precious few voices are heard crying out for justice. But, now more than ever, those voices must rise above the din of violence and hatred.”

    These are the memorable words of Dr. Joseph Rotblat, who for many years led the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, a global organization working for peace and for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Rotblat passed away last year in August, the month that marked the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. He was 96. In the final phase of his life, he consistently voiced his strong sense of foreboding about the chronic lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament and the growing threat of nuclear proliferation.

    The startling development of military technology has entirely insulated acts of war from human realities and feelings. In an instant, irreplaceable lives are lost and beloved homelands reduced to ruin. The anguished cries of victims and their families are silenced or ignored. Within this vast system of violence — at the peak of which are poised nuclear weapons — humans are no longer seen as embodiments of life. They are reduced to the status of mere things.

    In the face of these severe challenges, there is a spreading sense of powerlessness and despair within the international community, a readiness to dismiss the possibility of nuclear abolition as a mere pipe dream.

    Peace is a competition between despair and hope, between disempowerment and committed persistence. To the degree that powerlessness takes root in people’s consciousness, there is a greater tendency to resort to force. Powerlessness breeds violence.

    But it was human beings that gave birth to these instruments of hellish destruction. It cannot be beyond the power of human wisdom to eliminate them.

    The Pugwash Conferences that were Rotblat’s base of action were first held in 1957, a year that saw a rapid acceleration in the nuclear arms race that came to engulf the entire planet. On Sept. 8 of the same year, my mentor, Josei Toda, issued a call for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The day was blessed with the kind of beautiful clear sky that follows a typhoon, as Toda made his declaration at a gathering of some 50,000 young people in Yokohama:

    “Today a global movement calling for a ban on the testing of atomic or nuclear weapons has arisen. It is my wish to go further; I want to expose and remove the claws that lie hidden in the depths of such weapons. . . . Even if a certain country should conquer the world using nuclear weapons, the people who used those weapons should be condemned as demons and devils.”

    Toda chose to denounce nuclear weapons in such harsh, even strident, terms because he was determined to expose their essential nature as an absolute evil — one that denies and undermines humankind’s collective right to live.

    Toda’s impassioned call issued from a philosophical understanding of life’s inner workings: He was warning against the demonic egotism that seeks to bend others to our will. He saw this writ large in the desire of states to possess these weapons of ultimate destruction.

    The idea that nuclear weapons function to deter war and are therefore a “necessary evil” is a core impediment to their elimination; it must be challenged and dismantled.

    Because Toda saw nuclear weapons as an absolute evil, he was able to transcend ideology and national interest; he was never confused by the arguments of power politics. Today, half a century later, the language of nuclear deterrence and “limited” nuclear war is again in currency. I am convinced that Toda’s soul-felt cry, rooted in the deepest dimensions of life, now shines with an even brighter universal brilliance.

    If we are to eliminate nuclear weapons, a fundamental transformation of the human spirit is essential. Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than 60 years ago, the survivors have transformed despair into a sense of mission as they have continued to call out for nuclear abolition. As people living today, it is our shared responsibility — our duty and our right — to act as heirs to this lofty work of inner transformation, to expand and elevate it into a struggle to eliminate war itself.

    In 1982, as Cold War tensions mounted, the Soka Gakkai International (SGI) organized the exhibition “Nuclear Arms: Threat to Our World” at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. It toured 16 countries, including the Soviet Union and China and other nuclear weapons states. It was viewed by some 1.2 million visitors in total. SGI members also actively participated in the global Abolition 2000 campaign. The purpose of these and other efforts has been to arouse the hearts of people seeking peace.

    To further deepen this type of grassroots solidarity, I would like to call for the creation of a U.N. Decade of Action by the World’s People for Nuclear Abolition and for the early convening of a World Summit for Nuclear Abolition. Such steps would both reflect and support an emerging international consensus for disarmament.

    Needless to say, it is young people who bear the challenges and possibilities of the future. It would therefore be valuable to hold a gathering of youth representatives from around the world prior to the annual U.N. General Assembly, giving world leaders an opportunity to hear the views of the next generation.

    Affording young people such venues and opportunities to engage as world citizens is critical to building the long-term foundations for peace.

    Crying out in opposition to war and nuclear weapons is neither emotionalism nor self-pity. It is the highest expression of human reason based on an unflinching perception of the dignity of life.

    Faced with the horrifying facts of nuclear proliferation, we must call forth the power of hope from within the depths of each individual’s life. This is the power that can transform even the most intractable reality.

    To emerge from the shadow of nuclear weapons we need a revolution in the consciousness of countless individuals — a revolution that gives rise to the heartfelt confidence that “There is something I can do.” Then, finally, we will see a coming together of the world’s people, and hear their common voice, their cry for an end to this terrible madness of destruction.

    Daisaku Ikeda is president of Soka Gakkai International, and founder of Soka University and the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. This column runs on the second Thursday of every month.
  • The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons

    The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons

    There are many serious problems confronting humanity, but none looms larger than the continuing dangers of nuclear weapons. We have entered the seventh decade since nuclear weapons were created and used on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During this period, the world has witnessed an insane nuclear arms race, in which the human species was threatened with annihilation. Despite the end of the Cold War more than 15 years ago, the threat has not gone away. The future of civilization, even the human species, hangs in the balance, and yet very little attention is paid to ending this threat. We are challenged, individually and collectively, to end this ultimate danger to humanity.

    Warnings

    Nuclear weapons unleash the power inside the atom. The creation of these weapons demonstrated significant scientific achievement, but left humankind faced with the challenge of what to do with them. Albert Einstein, whose theoretical understanding of the relationship of energy and mass paved the way for nuclear weapons, was deeply troubled by their creation. “The unleashed power of the atom,” he prophesied, “has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

    By 1955, ten years after the first use of nuclear weapons, both the US and USSR had developed thermonuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful than the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and they had begun testing these weapons on the lands of indigenous peoples. Einstein continued his dire warnings. Along with philosopher Bertrand Russell, an appeal to humanity was issued called the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, signed also by nine other prominent scientists. They wrote: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

    Other warnings from highly credible sources throughout the Nuclear Age sought to put the world on notice of the peril nuclear weapons posed to humanity. The most recent warning came from the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the Blix Commission after its chairman, former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix. Referring to weapons of mass destruction, the 2006 report stated: “So long as any state has such weapons – especially nuclear arms – others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic.”

    With the serious dangers that nuclear weapons pose to the human future, it is curious that so many warnings, over so long a period of time, have gone unheeded. There are still some 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Some 97 percent of these are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. Seven other countries also have nuclear weapons: the UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. There are also countries such as Japan that are virtual nuclear powers, possessing the technology and nuclear materials to develop nuclear arsenals in days or weeks.

    What will it take to awaken humanity, and change its course? Many people think that this will not happen until there is another catastrophic use of nuclear weapons, but this would be an immense tragedy and a great failure of imagination. If we can imagine that another nuclear catastrophe is possible, shouldn’t we act now to prevent it?

    Nuclear weapons are often justified as providing security for their possessors. But it is clear that nuclear weapons themselves cannot provide protection in the sense of physical security. At best, they can provide psychological security if one believes that they provide a deterrent against attack. The United States is currently spending tens of billions of dollars to develop a missile defense system. The only reasonable interpretation of this expenditure is that US defense planners understand that deterrence is not foolproof and that it can fail. Of course, missile defenses are far from foolproof as well and can also easily fail. In fact, most scientists not being paid by the missile defense program believe that missile defenses will fail.

    The Shortcomings of Deterrence

    Deterrence has many shortcomings. For it to be effective, the threat must be accurately communicated and it must be believed. In addition, the opponent must care about the threat enough to alter its behavior. Deterrence won’t work when the threat is unbelievable, or when the opponent is suicidal or not locatable.

    If nuclear weapons cannot provide protection for a population, what other advantages do they offer? One possible answer to this question is prestige. Since the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council all developed nuclear weapons, it may seem to other states that nuclear weapons would contribute to their prestige in the world. This thought was given credence by the large-scale celebrations in the streets of India and Pakistan when these two countries tested nuclear devices in 1998.

    Whatever prestige nuclear weapons may confer comes with a heavy price. Nuclear weapons are costly and possessing them will almost certainly make a country the target of nuclear weapons.

    It seems reasonable to conclude that nuclear weapons serve the interests of the weak more than they do the powerful. In the hands of a relatively weak nation, nuclear weapons can serve as an equalizer. One has only to look at the difference in the way the US has treated the three countries that Mr. Bush incorrectly labelled as being part of an axis of evil: Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The US invaded Iraq on the false charge of having a nuclear weapons program, is threatening Iran for enriching uranium, but has done little but bluster about North Korea, which is thought to have a small arsenal of nuclear weapons and recently tested long-range missiles, adding to the anxiety of many of its potential enemies.

    From the perspective of a powerful state, the worst nightmare would be for nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of non-state terrorist organizations, whose members were both suicidal and not locatable. This could create the ideal conditions for these weapons to be used against a major nuclear power or another state. The US, for example, would be relatively helpless against a nuclear-armed al Qaeda. The US would not be able to deter al Qaeda. Its only hope would be to prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon or the materials to create one.

    Why Abolish Nuclear Weapons?

    Nuclear weapons undermine security. Under current circumstances, with so many nuclear weapons in the world and such an abundance of fissile materials for constructing nuclear weapons, the likelihood is that nuclear weapons will eventually end up in the hands of non-state terrorist organizations. This would be a disastrous scenario for the world’s most powerful counties, opening the door to possible nuclear 9/11s.

    In addition, nuclear weapons are anti-democratic. They concentrate power in the hands of single individuals. The president of the United States, for example, could send the world spiraling into nuclear holocaust with just one order to unleash the US nuclear arsenal. The undemocratic nature of nuclear weapons should be of great concern to those who value democracy and the participation of citizens in decisions that affect their lives.

    Nuclear weapons should also be viewed in terms of their consequences. They are long-range weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction. They destroy equally civilians and combatants, infants and the infirm, men and women. Viewed from this perspective, these weapons must be viewed as among the most cowardly ever created. By their possession, with the implicit threat of use that possession implies, nuclear weapons also destroy the souls of those who rely upon them.

    They are a coward’s weapon and their possession, threat and use is dishonorable. This was the conclusion of virtually all of the top military leaders of World War II, most of whom were morally devastated that the US used these weapons against Japan. Truman’s Chief of Staff William Leahy, for example, wrote about the use of atomic weapons on Japan: “I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”

    Humanity still has a choice, in fact, it is the same choice posed in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. We can choose to eliminate nuclear weapons or risk the elimination of the human species. A continuation of the status quo, of reliance by some states on nuclear arsenals, is likely to result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to others states and to terrorist organizations. The alternative is the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    What Would It Take?

    What would it take to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons? On the one hand, the answer to this question is “very little.” On the other hand, because of the resistance, complacency and myopia of the leaders of the nuclear weapons states, the answer may be a “great amount.”

    To move forward with the elimination of nuclear weapons would require compliance with existing international law. The International Court of Justice concluded in 1996: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” In the decade since the Court announced its opinion, there has been little evidence of “good faith” negotiations by the nuclear weapons states moving toward any reasonable conclusion.

    The negotiations that the Court describes as an obligation of the nuclear weapons states would need to move toward the end a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a treaty setting forth a program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons with appropriate measures of verification. With the political will to pursue these required negotiations, a treaty would not be a difficult task to achieve. What is lacking is the requisite political will on the part of the nuclear weapons states.

    A Special Responsibility, A Tragic Failure

    The United States, as the world’s most powerful country and the only country to use nuclear weapons in warfare, has a special responsibility to lead in fulfilling its obligations under international law. In fact, without US leadership, it is unlikely that progress will be possible toward nuclear disarmament. But rather than lead in this direction, the United States under the Bush administration has been the major obstacle to nuclear disarmament. It has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue dreams of “star wars,” has opposed a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and in general has acted as an obstacle to progress on all matters of nuclear disarmament.

    The US has also pursued a double standard with regard to nuclear weapons. It has been silent on Israeli nuclear weapons, and now seeks to change its own non-proliferation laws to enable it to provide nuclear technology and materials to India, a country that has not joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has developed a nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the US has developed contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against seven countries, five of which are non-nuclear weapons states, despite giving assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against such states.

    What is tragic is that the American people don’t seem to grasp the seriousness of their government’s failure. They are lacking in education that would lead to an understanding of the situation. Their attention has been diverted to Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and they fail to see what is closest to home: the failure of their own government to lead in a constructive and lawful manner to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. “And thus,” in Einstein’s words, “we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

    To bring about real change in nuclear policy, people must begin with a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and then they must speak out as if their lives and the lives of their children depended on their actions. It is unlikely that governments will give up powerful weapons on their own accord. They must be pushed by their citizenry – citizens unwilling to continue to run the risk of nuclear holocaust.

    A New Story

    We need a new story for considering nuclear dangers, a story that begins with the long struggle of humans over some three million years to arrive at our present state of society. That state is far from perfect, but few would suggest that it should be sacrificed on the altar of weapons of mass annihilation capable of reducing civilization to rubble.

    The first humans lived short and brutal lives. They were both predators and preyed upon. They survived by their nimbleness, more of body than mind, doing well if they lived into their twenties. Enough early humans were able to protect and nurture their infants in their hazardous environments that some of the children of each generation could survive to an age when they could themselves reproduce and repeat the cycle.

    Without these amazingly capable early ancestors, and those that followed who met the distinct challenges of their times and environments for many hundreds of thousands of generations, we would not be here. Each of our ancestors needed to survive the perils of birth, infancy, childhood and at least early maturity in order for each of us to have made it into the world.

    On the basis of the pure physical capacity to survive, we owe a debt to our ancestors, but with this debt comes something more. We each have a responsibility for helping to assure the chain of human survival that passes the world on intact to the next generation. In addition to this, we share an obligation to preserve the accumulated wisdom and beauty created by those who have walked the earth before us – the ideas of the great storytellers and philosophers, the great music, literature and art, the artifacts of humankind’s collective genius in its varied forms.

    All of the manifestations of human genius and triumph are placed in jeopardy by nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. Why do we tolerate this threat? Why are we docile in the face of policies that could end not only humanity, but life itself?

    Those of us alive today are the gatekeepers to the future, but the assumption of power by the state has left us vulnerable to the continuing threat of nuclear annihilation. The only way to be free of this threat is to be free of nuclear weapons. This is the greatest challenge of our time. It will require education so that people can learn to think about nuclear weapons and war in a new way. We will need organizational modes of collective action to bring pressure to bear on governments to achieve nuclear disarmament. Ordinary people must lead from below.

    The Role of Citizens

    Organizations working for nuclear disarmament – such as the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Abolition 2000, the Middle Powers Initiative and the Mayors for Peace – can help give shape to efforts to put pressure on governments. But the change that is needed cannot be the sole responsibility of interest groups. Without the intervention of large numbers of people, we will go on with business as usual, a course that seems likely to lead to nuclear proliferation and further catastrophic uses of nuclear weapons. This is not a distant problem, nor one that can be shunted aside and left to governments.

    We who have entered the 21st century are not exempt from responsibility for assuring a human future. Japanese Buddhist leader Josei Toda called for young people to take the lead in pursuing nuclear disarmament. His proposal has great merit given the fact that it is their future and the future of their children that is imperiled by these weapons.

    Change occurs one person at a time. Each of us must take responsibility for creating a world free of nuclear threat. Noted anthropologist Margaret Mead offered this hopeful advice: “Never doubt that a small group of people can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”

    In the end, the necessary changes cannot be left to governments alone. It is up to each of us. What can we do? I have five suggestions. First, become better informed. You can do this by visiting the website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at www.wagingpeace.org. Second, speak out, wherever you are. Talk to your family, friends, and other people around you. Third, join an organization working to abolish nuclear weapons, and help it to become successful. Fourth, use your unique talents. Each of us has special talents that can help make a difference. Use them. Fifth, be persistent. This is a tough job requiring strength and persistence.

    In working for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons, you can be a force for saving the world. Being a nuclear weapons abolitionist will require all the courage and commitment of those who worked in the 19th century for the abolition of slavery. Abolishing slavery was the challenge of that time; abolishing nuclear weapons is the even more consequential challenge of our time

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.

  • Mohamed ElBaradei – Nobel Lecture

    Your Majesties, Your Royal Highness, Honourable Members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency and I are humbled, proud, delighted and above all strengthened in our resolve by this most worthy of honours.

    My sister-in-law works for a group that supports orphanages in Cairo. She and her colleagues take care of children left behind by circumstances beyond their control. They feed these children, clothe them and teach them to read.

    At the International Atomic Energy Agency, my colleagues and I work to keep nuclear materials out of the reach of extremist groups. We inspect nuclear facilities all over the world, to be sure that peaceful nuclear activities are not being used as a cloak for weapons programmes.

    My sister-in-law and I are working towards the same goal, through different paths: the security of the human family.

    But why has this security so far eluded us?

    I believe it is because our security strategies have not yet caught up with the risks we are facing. The globalization that has swept away the barriers to the movement of goods, ideas and people has also swept with it barriers that confined and localized security threats.

    A recent United Nations High-Level Panel identified five categories of threats that we face:

    1. Poverty, Infectious Disease, and Environmental Degradation;
    2. Armed Conflict – both within and among states;
    3. Organized Crime;
    4. Terrorism; and
    5. Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    These are all ‘threats without borders’ – where traditional notions of national security have become obsolete. We cannot respond to these threats by building more walls, developing bigger weapons, or dispatching more troops. Quite to the contrary. By their very nature, these security threats require primarily multinational cooperation.

    But what is more important is that these are not separate or distinct threats. When we scratch the surface, we find them closely connected and interrelated.

    We are 1,000 people here today in this august hall. Imagine for a moment that we represent the world’s population. These 200 people on my left would be the wealthy of the world, who consume 80 per cent of the available resources. And these 400 people on my right would be living on an income of less than $2 per day.

    This underprivileged group of people on my right is no less intelligent or less worthy than their fellow human beings on the other side of the aisle. They were simply born into this fate.

    In the real world, this imbalance in living conditions inevitably leads to inequality of opportunity, and in many cases loss of hope. And what is worse, all too often the plight of the poor is compounded by and results in human rights abuses, a lack of good governance, and a deep sense of injustice. This combination naturally creates a most fertile breeding ground for civil wars, organized crime, and extremism in its different forms.

    In regions where conflicts have been left to fester for decades, countries continue to look for ways to offset their insecurities or project their ‘power’. In some cases, they may be tempted to seek their own weapons of mass destruction, like others who have preceded them.

    * * * * * * *

    Ladies and Gentlemen.

    Fifteen years ago, when the Cold War ended, many of us hoped for a new world order to emerge. A world order rooted in human solidarity – a world order that would be equitable, inclusive and effective.

    But today we are nowhere near that goal. We may have torn down the walls between East and West, but we have yet to build the bridges between North and South – the rich and the poor.

    Consider our development aid record. Last year, the nations of the world spent over $1 trillion on armaments. But we contributed less than 10 per cent of that amount – a mere $80 billion – as official development assistance to the developing parts of the world, where 850 million people suffer from hunger.

    My friend James Morris heads the World Food Programme, whose task it is to feed the hungry. He recently told me, “If I could have just 1 per cent of the money spent on global armaments, no one in this world would go to bed hungry.”

    It should not be a surprise then that poverty continues to breed conflict. Of the 13 million deaths due to armed conflict in the last ten years, 9 million occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, where the poorest of the poor live.

    Consider also our approach to the sanctity and value of human life. In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, we all grieved deeply, and expressed outrage at this heinous crime – and rightly so. But many people today are unaware that, as the result of civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 3.8 million people have lost their lives since 1998.

    Are we to conclude that our priorities are skewed, and our approaches uneven?

    * * * * * * *

    Ladies and Gentlemen. With this ‘big picture’ in mind, we can better understand the changing landscape in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

    There are three main features to this changing landscape: the emergence of an extensive black market in nuclear material and equipment; the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear technology; and the stagnation in nuclear disarmament.

    Today, with globalization bringing us ever closer together, if we choose to ignore the insecurities of some, they will soon become the insecurities of all.

    Equally, with the spread of advanced science and technology, as long as some of us choose to rely on nuclear weapons, we continue to risk that these same weapons will become increasingly attractive to others.

    I have no doubt that, if we hope to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience, and no role in our security.

    To that end, we must ensure – absolutely – that no more countries acquire these deadly weapons.

    We must see to it that nuclear-weapon states take concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament.

    And we must put in place a security system that does not rely on nuclear deterrence.

    * * * * * * *

    Are these goals realistic and within reach? I do believe they are. But then three steps are urgently required.

    First, keep nuclear and radiological material out of the hands of extremist groups. In 2001, the IAEA together with the international community launched a worldwide campaign to enhance the security of such material. Protecting nuclear facilities. Securing powerful radioactive sources. Training law enforcement officials. Monitoring border crossings. In four years, we have completed perhaps 50 per cent of the work. But this is not fast enough, because we are in a race against time.

    Second, tighten control over the operations for producing the nuclear material that could be used in weapons. Under the current system, any country has the right to master these operations for civilian uses. But in doing so, it also masters the most difficult steps in making a nuclear bomb.

    To overcome this, I am hoping that we can make these operations multinational – so that no one country can have exclusive control over any such operation. My plan is to begin by setting up a reserve fuel bank, under IAEA control, so that every country will be assured that it will get the fuel needed for its bona fide peaceful nuclear activities. This assurance of supply will remove the incentive – and the justification – for each country to develop its own fuel cycle. We should then be able to agree on a moratorium on new national facilities, and to begin work on multinational arrangements for enrichment, fuel production, waste disposal and reprocessing.

    We must also strengthen the verification system. IAEA inspections are the heart and soul of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. To be effective, it is essential that we are provided with the necessary authority, information, advanced technology, and resources. And our inspections must be backed by the UN Security Council, to be called on in cases of non-compliance.

    Third, accelerate disarmament efforts. We still have eight or nine countries who possess nuclear weapons. We still have

    27,000 warheads in existence. I believe this is 27,000 too many.

    A good start would be if the nuclear-weapon states reduced the strategic role given to these weapons. More than 15 years after the end of the Cold War, it is incomprehensible to many that the major nuclear-weapon states operate with their arsenals on hair-trigger alert – such that, in the case of a possible launch of a nuclear attack, their leaders could have only 30 minutes to decide whether to retaliate, risking the devastation of entire nations in a matter of minutes.

    These are three concrete steps that, I believe, can readily be taken. Protect the material and strengthen verification. Control the fuel cycle. Accelerate disarmament efforts.

    But that is not enough. The hard part is: how do we create an environment in which nuclear weapons – like slavery or genocide – are regarded as a taboo and a historical anomaly?

    * * * * * * *

    Ladies and Gentlemen.

    Whether one believes in evolution, intelligent design, or Divine Creation, one thing is certain. Since the beginning of history, human beings have been at war with each other, under the pretext of religion, ideology, ethnicity and other reasons. And no civilization has ever willingly given up its most powerful weapons. We seem to agree today that we can share modern technology, but we still refuse to acknowledge that our values – at their very core – are shared values.

    I am an Egyptian Muslim, educated in Cairo and New York, and now living in Vienna. My wife and I have spent half our lives in the North, half in the South. And we have experienced first hand the unique nature of the human family and the common values we all share.

    Shakespeare speaks of every single member of that family in The Merchant of Venice, when he asks: “If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?”

    And lest we forget:

    There is no religion that was founded on intolerance – and no religion that does not value the sanctity of human life.

    Judaism asks that we value the beauty and joy of human existence.

    Christianity says we should treat our neighbours as we would be treated.

    Islam declares that killing one person unjustly is the same as killing all of humanity.

    Hinduism recognizes the entire universe as one family.

    Buddhism calls on us to cherish the oneness of all creation.

    Some would say that it is too idealistic to believe in a society based on tolerance and the sanctity of human life, where borders, nationalities and ideologies are of marginal importance. To those I say, this is not idealism, but rather realism, because history has taught us that war rarely resolves our differences. Force does not heal old wounds; it opens new ones.

    * * * * * * *

    Ladies and Gentlemen.

    I have talked about our efforts to combat the misuse of nuclear energy. Let me now tell you how this very same energy is used for the benefit of humankind.

    At the IAEA, we work daily on every continent to put nuclear and radiation techniques in the service of humankind. In Vietnam, farmers plant rice with greater nutritional value that was developed with IAEA assistance. Throughout Latin America, nuclear technology is being used to map underground aquifers, so that water supplies can be managed sustainably. In Ghana, a new radiotherapy machine is offering cancer treatment to thousands of patients. In the South Pacific, Japanese scientists are using nuclear techniques to study climate change. In India, eight new nuclear plants are under construction, to provide clean electricity for a growing nation – a case in point of the rising expectation for a surge in the use of nuclear energy worldwide.

    These projects, and a thousand others, exemplify the IAEA ideal: Atoms for Peace.

    But the expanding use of nuclear energy and technology also makes it crucial that nuclear safety and security are maintained at the highest level.

    Since the Chernobyl accident, we have worked all over the globe to raise nuclear safety performance. And since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, we have worked with even greater intensity on nuclear security. On both fronts, we have built an international network of legal norms and performance standards. But our most tangible impact has been on the ground. Hundreds of missions, in every part of the world, with international experts making sure nuclear activities are safe and secure.

    I am very proud of the 2,300 hard working men and women that make up the IAEA staff – the colleagues with whom I share this honour. Some of them are here with me today. We come from over 90 countries. We bring many different perspectives to our work. Our diversity is our strength.

    We are limited in our authority. We have a very modest budget. And we have no armies.

    But armed with the strength of our convictions, we will continue to speak truth to power. And we will continue to carry out our mandate with independence and objectivity.

    The Nobel Peace Prize is a powerful message for us – to endure in our efforts to work for security and development. A durable peace is not a single achievement, but an environment, a process and a commitment.

    * * * * * * *

    Ladies and Gentlemen.

    The picture I have painted today may have seemed somewhat grim. Let me conclude by telling you why I have hope.

    I have hope because the positive aspects of globalization are enabling nations and peoples to become politically, economically and socially interdependent, making war an increasingly unacceptable option.

    Among the 25 members of the European Union, the degree of economic and socio-political dependencies has made the prospect of the use of force to resolve differences almost absurd. The same is emerging with regard to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, with some 55 member countries from Europe, Central Asia and North America. Could these models be expanded to a world model, through the same creative multilateral engagement and active international cooperation, where the strong are just and the weak secure?

    I have hope because civil society is becoming better informed and more engaged. They are pressing their governments for change – to create democratic societies based on diversity, tolerance and equality. They are proposing creative solutions. They are raising awareness, donating funds, working to transform civic spirit from the local to the global. Working to bring the human family closer together.

    We now have the opportunity, more than at any time before, to give an affirmative answer to one of the oldest questions of all time: “Am I my brother’s keeper?”

    What is required is a new mindset and a change of heart, to be able to see the person across the ocean as our neighbour.

    Finally, I have hope because of what I see in my children, and some of their generation.

    I took my first trip abroad at the age of 19. My children were even more fortunate than I. They had their first exposure to foreign culture as infants, and they were raised in a multicultural environment. And I can say absolutely that my son and daughter are oblivious to colour and race and nationality. They see no difference between their friends Noriko, Mafupo, Justin, Saulo and Hussam; to them, they are only fellow human beings and good friends.

    Globalization, through travel, media and communication, can also help us – as it has with my children and many of their peers – to see each other simply as human beings.

    * * * * * * *

    Your Majesties, Your Royal Highness, Ladies and Gentlemen.

    Imagine what would happen if the nations of the world spent as much on development as on building the machines of war. Imagine a world where every human being would live in freedom and dignity. Imagine a world in which we would shed the same tears when a child dies in Darfur or Vancouver. Imagine a world where we would settle our differences through diplomacy and dialogue and not through bombs or bullets. Imagine if the only nuclear weapons remaining were the relics in our museums. Imagine the legacy we could leave to our children.

    Imagine that such a world is within our grasp.

  • The Role of US Nuclear Weapons New Doctrine Falls Short of Bush Pledge

    A nuclear draft doctrine written by the Pentagon calls for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), pre-emptively if necessary.

    The doctrine, the first formal update since the Bush administration took office, is entitled “Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations”[1] and has been strongly influenced by the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other directives published by the Bush administration since 2001. A final version is expected later this fall.

    The draft doctrine and editing comments were freely available on the Internet until recently, providing a rare glimpse into the secret world of nuclear planning in the post-Cold War era.

    Foremost among the doctrine’s new features are the incorporation of pre-emption into U.S. nuclear doctrine and the integration of conventional weapons and missile defenses into strategic planning. The Bush administration claims that it is significantly reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

    Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the updated doctrine falls far short of fulfilling the administration’s claim. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, the new doctrine reaffirms an aggressive nuclear posture of modernized nuclear weapons maintained on high alert. Conventional forces and missile defenses merely complement—instead of replace—nuclear weapons.

    The new doctrine continues the thinking of the previous version from 1995 in its reaffirmation of nuclear deterrence. It differs in three other key elements: the threshold for nuclear use, nuclear targeting and international law, and the role of conventional and defensive forces.

    What’s New?

    The importance of the new doctrine is less about what it directs the military to do, and more about what it shows U.S. nuclear policy has become. It has changed considerably from the 1995 version. A new chapter has been added on theater nuclear operations, a discussion of the role of conventional and defensive forces, and an expanded discussion on nuclear operations.

    The addition of a chapter on theater nuclear operations reflects the post-Cold War preoccupation of U.S. nuclear planners on finding ways of deterring regional aggressors (i.e., rogue states) armed with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It also reflects a decade-old rivalry between the regional combatant commanders and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) over who “owns” regional nuclear-strike planning.

    Yet, the new doctrine’s approach grants regional nuclear-strike planning an increasingly expeditionary aura that threatens to make nuclear weapons just another tool in the toolbox. The result is nuclear pre-emption, which the new doctrine enshrines into official U.S. joint nuclear doctrine for the first time, where the objective no longer is deterrence through threatened retaliation but battlefield destruction of targets.

    Another highly visible change is the incorporation of a discussion of the role of conventional weapons and defensive forces into the sections describing the purpose, planning, and employment of nuclear forces. What is most striking is the extent to which conventional and defensive capabilities are woven into the fabric of nuclear planning.

    Reaffirmation of Deterrence

    In the foreword to the 2001 NPR report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the review “puts in motion a major change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our deterrent strategy.” In Rumsfeld’s testimony to Congress and numerous statements made by other officials, the Bush administration portrayed the NPR as reducing the role of nuclear weapons, lowering the readiness requirement for the nuclear forces, and increasing the role of non-nuclear and missile defense capabilities.

    Yet, the “major change” in the role of nuclear weapons is difficult to find in the new doctrine. Instead, the new nuclear doctrine presents an emphatic defense for nuclear deterrence with sustaining and modernizing nuclear forces maintained on high alert. “To maintain their deterrent effect,” the doctrine states, “U.S. nuclear forces must maintain a strong and visible state of readiness…permitting a swift response to any no-notice nuclear attack against the United States, its forces, or allies.”

    For the authors of the new doctrine, the logic behind such an aggressive posture is simple: military strength automatically strengthens deterrence. Therefore, stronger nuclear capabilities also benefit national security. Indeed, defending the nation against its enemies is best achieved, the new nuclear doctrine declares, through “a defense posture that makes possible war outcomes so uncertain and dangerous, as calculated by potential adversaries, as to remove all incentives for initiating attack under any circumstances.”

    This nuclear dogma is by no means new to deterrence theory, but the new nuclear doctrine fails to explain, even illustrate, why deterrence necessarily requires such an aggressive nuclear posture and cannot be achieved at lower levels without maintaining nuclear forces on high alert. A deterrence posture can also be excessive, with capabilities far beyond what is reasonably needed. Threatening nuclear capabilities may in theory deter potential enemies but may just as well provoke other countries and undercut other vital aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The end result may be decreased security for all.

    Nor does the new nuclear doctrine spell out why the Pentagon ultimately settled on the force that it did. It says that the basis of its decision is a vague and unspecific invention called “capability-based planning” that the Pentagon says “focuses on the means and how adversaries may fight; not a fixed set of enemies or threats.” This hardly seems to be a new development, as U.S. military planning has always focused on how adversaries might fight. Even capability-based planning must identify a set of enemies and threats that is, for all intents and purposes, fixed. Still, the new doctrine repeats the NPR’s decision that a force level of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic warheads is “the lowest possible number” that the United States can maintain while maintaining a credible deterrent. Just how the 1,700-2,200 warhead level was decided remains a mystery.

    The mystery is even greater because the Pentagon claims that the force-sizing is “not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia.” Yet, in 1996 when STRATCOM examined force structure options in preparation for the 1997 Helsinki agreement—when Russia was an immediate contingency—the bottom-line force level was also 2,000 warheads.[2] Keith Payne, who co-chaired the Deterrence Concepts Advisory Group that drafted the NPR and subsequently served as deputy assistant secretary of defense from 2002 to 2003, recently explained:

    In general, the NPR’s recommended force structure and number of deployed nuclear warheads was calculated to support not only the immediate requirements for deterrence, but also to contribute to the additional goals of assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential opponents from choosing the route of arms competition or military challenge, and providing a hedge against the possible emergence of more severe, future military threats or severe technical problems in the arsenal.[3]

    The only item on that list that is new, and only partially so, is “dissuading potential opponents from choosing the route of arms competition or military challenge.” Deterring enemies, assuring allies, and hedging are all elements of U.S. nuclear planning that are as old as the post-Cold War era; the first two are even as old as the nuclear age itself.

    Even so, under the headline “New Thinking for a New Era,” the new nuclear doctrine describes capability-based planning as “a major break from Cold War thinking” that “allows the United States to take the lead in reducing nuclear stockpiles rather than rely on protracted arms control negotiations.” That claim overlooks the first Bush administration’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992, both of which took the lead without protracted negotiations well before the current Bush administration presented its “new thinking.” The claim also overlooks that not one of the strategic nuclear reductions announced by the 2001 NPR was conceived by the Bush administration. All, without exception, implemented decisions made in the 1990s.

    Lowering the Bar for Nuclear Use

    So what does the Pentagon mean when it refers to capability-based planning? One indication comes from the claim made in the new nuclear doctrine and by government officials during the past couple of years that a major break has occurred in nuclear planning. A break does seem to have occurred but is not about reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Granted, the number of weapons have been reduced, but the major break is about transforming nuclear plans and capabilities to enable destruction of targets anywhere in the world more efficiently. In that transformation lays a subtle belief that nuclear deterrence will fail sooner or later, and before it does, U.S. nuclear forces and war plans need to be ready and capable of striking, even pre-emptively.

    The signs of this development are evident throughout the new nuclear doctrine in its description of the need for responsive nuclear forces that can “rapidly respond” to threats anywhere. It even defines a new category of nuclear planning, Crisis Action Planning, as “the time-sensitive development of joint operations plans and orders in response to an imminent crisis.” It is different from highly structured Deliberate Planning and flexible Adaptive Planning:

    Crisis action planning follows prescribed crisis action procedures to formulate and implement an effective response within the time frame permitted by the crisis. It is distinct from adaptive planning in that emerging targets are likely to have no preexisting plans that could be adapted. Success in engaging these types of targets depends heavily upon the speed with which they are identified, targeted, and attacked.

    The basis for this drive for speed and responsiveness is the perception of the threat that faces the United States and its allies in the 21st century. It has become almost a mantra in national security discussions and analysis to portray today’s multipolar security environment as more unpredictable and dangerous than even the Soviet threat during the Cold War. The new nuclear doctrine enshrines that hype into nuclear doctrine.

    Although today’s threats from “rogue” states and terrorists are serious indeed, it is healthy to keep in mind, especially when discussing nuclear weapons policy, that they are on a completely different scale than the global nuclear standoff that characterized the Cold War. Then, the human race and life on the planet was held at nuclear gunpoint for four decades, only 30 minutes away from global annihilation. Today’s nuclear strategy often operates on a far different scale: incorporating the far more limited threat from hostile states and even terrorists.

    Yet, the new doctrine ignores this distinction and instead lowers the crisis intensity level needed to potentially trigger use of U.S. nuclear weapons by replacing “war” with “conflict.” The change may seem trivial, but its implication is important and deliberate. The change was proposed by STRATCOM, which explained that “[r]eplacing the word ‘war’ with ‘conflict involving the use of’ emphasizes the nature of most conflicts resulting in use of a nuclear weapon. Nuclear war implies the mutual exchange of nuclear weapons between warring parties—not fully representative of the facts.”

    During the Cold War, a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would have involved both countries launching nuclear weapons at each other. Yet, in the post-Cold War era a conflict may involve only one or a few nuclear weapons being used and not necessarily by both warring countries in an exchange. The new doctrine predicts that terrorists and “rogue” states armed with weapons of mass destruction “will likely test U.S. security commitments to its allies and friends.”

    To be sure, some parts of this approach are not new: the 1995 doctrine also considered a role for nuclear weapons against terrorists despite serious questions about the credibility of such a role. Put together, however, the rhetoric in the new doctrine indicates that military planners anticipate that U.S. nuclear weapons might be used in much less intense crises than envisioned previously.

    For example, the new nuclear doctrine states that an adversary might detonate a nuclear weapon high in the atmosphere to damage U.S. military electronic equipment with a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse. Whatever the adversary use might be, the new nuclear doctrine makes it clear that the United States will not necessarily wait for the attack but pre-empt with nuclear weapons if necessary. It identifies four conditions where pre-emptive use might occur:

    • An adversary intending to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations.

    • Imminent attack from an adversary’s biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy.

    • Attacks on adversary installations including weapons of mass destruction; deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons; or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against the United States or its friends and allies.

    • Demonstration of U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary WMD use.

    The previous doctrine from 1995 did not describe specific scenarios where the United States might use nuclear weapons pre-emptively, but the new doctrine enshrines the Bush administration’s pre-emption policy into official U.S. nuclear doctrine. It acknowledges that “the belligerent that initiates nuclear warfare may find itself the target of world condemnation” but adds that “no customary or conventional international law prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict.” In other words, the Pentagon seems to conclude the United States is legally free to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively if it chooses.

    The End of “Nonstrategic”

    The pre-emptive nuclear options are included in the chapter on theater nuclear operations, which traditionally have been associated with nonstrategic nuclear weapons (those with shorter range). The 1995 doctrine described the theater (local or regional) mission with nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a means of controlling escalation by linking conventional forces to the full nuclear retaliatory capability of the United States. By contrast, strategic weapons historically have included weapons of intercontinental range.

    The separation has always been somewhat blurred, but the new nuclear doctrine does away with a separate theater role for nonstrategic nuclear forces. Instead, it assigns all nuclear weapons, whether strategic or nonstrategic, support roles in theater nuclear operations. The theater mission will be further detailed in “Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Nuclear Planning” (Joint Pub 3-12.1), a secret subdoctrine scheduled for publication by the Pentagon sometime after the release of the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.

    Military officials have argued for years that there are no nonstrategic nuclear weapons; all nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era should be seen as strategic because all nuclear use is strategic in nature. Yet, the language in the new doctrine and the elimination of a specific regional role for nonstrategic nuclear weapons hint of a deeper shift: strategic nuclear weapons have increasing regional (theater) roles as nonstrategic nuclear weapons are reduced and guidance and doctrine demand new missions against the capabilities of rogue states and nonstate actors.

    The increasing incorporation of strategic weapons from the global-intensity level into smaller regional conflicts means that the operational distinction between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons is being blurred. In a regional deterrence scenario against an adversary armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, all nuclear weapons can be battlefield weapons or strategic weapons, depending on the circumstances. The U.S. pre-emption or retaliation could utilize a B61 nuclear bomb deployed in Turkey or a strategic warhead launched from a Trident submarine patroling near Japan.

    This doctrinal shift has already progressed to the point that STRATCOM has drawn up and implemented a new global strike plan for the use of nuclear and conventional forces in regional scenarios. The new strike plan, called Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) 8022, was first put into effect in late 2003, less than a year after the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive 17, its strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction. CONPLAN 8022 makes operational the Bush administration’s pre-emption policy and the new nuclear doctrine codifies it.

    The Role of Conventional Weapons

    Another new element of the nuclear doctrine is the role of advanced conventional weapons in strategic planning. This was one of the central pillars of the 2001 NPR, and the new doctrine states that “targets that may have required a nuclear weapon to achieve the needed effects in previous planning may be targeted with conventional weapons.” The doctrine describes how “integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide U.S. leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies.”

    Yet, in the same breath the document cautions that “some contingencies will remain where the most appropriate response may include the use of U.S. nuclear weapons.” The objective is still assured destruction of facilities, and it seems clear that the conventional capabilities need to evolve considerably before conventional weapons will be capable of significantly replacing nuclear weapons in the war plans. Indeed, in an acknowledgement that “there are few programs to convert the NPR vision to reality,” the Pentagon in April established a task force aimed in part at better integrating the new triad of nuclear, conventional, and defensive capabilities. Four and a half years after the Bush administration announced its “major change” to strategic targeting, the incorporation of conventional weapons still appears marginal at best.

    Part of the impediment appears to be the challenge of incorporating sufficient accuracy into the two ballistic missile legs of the nuclear triad. The explosive power of conventional weapons also is inherently inferior to the yield of even the smallest nuclear warheads in the stockpile. “It’s more than just precision,” STRATCOM Commander General James Cartwright told Inside the Pentagon in April 2005. “I can’t generate enough [conventional explosive] energy for some of these targets to destroy them. So I’m not leading you down a path that I can get rid of nuclear weapons.”

    Also, there is the issue of command and control for conventional strategic forces. The line of command for nuclear strikes has evolved over many decades, but how will it work when a non-nuclear weapon is used in a strategic strike against an adversary’s nuclear weapons facility? The Air Force, which maintains nuclear ICBMs and bombers, pointed out during the editing of the new nuclear doctrine that, although the president and secretary of defense are required to approve all nuclear targeting, they do not necessarily approve conventional targeting.[4] Presumably, the Bush administration will want to close that hole to ensure 100 percent control of strategic strikes and ensure that other nuclear powers do not misinterpret the intention.

    Finally, but equally important, merging nuclear and conventional warheads on ballistic missiles or on strategic platforms has serious implications for crisis stability. A nuclear-weapon state being attacked by a conventionally armed ballistic missile early in a conflict may conclude that it is under nuclear attack and launch its own nuclear weapons. Merging nuclear and conventional capabilities seems to be a recipe for disaster.

    Missile Defenses

    The second pillar of the 2001 NPR was the role of active defenses in strategic planning, and the new doctrine incorporates the new mission. The previous doctrine from 1995 also described the contribution of missile defense, but this issue is expanded in the new doctrine. Instead of describing how missile defenses can be used to protect people from missile strikes, however, the new doctrine appears to focus on how missile defenses can enhance the survivability of nuclear forces and increase offensive capabilities.

    Focusing on protecting nuclear forces rather than people might not seem so cynical if not for the Bush administration’s emphasis on protecting people in its justification for withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and securing congressional funding for the multibillion-dollar missile defense program. In December 2001, when preparing to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, President George W. Bush stated:

    I have concluded the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks…. Defending the American people is my highest priority as commander in chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.[5]

    In stark contrast with the president’s priority, the new doctrine describes missile defense as a tool to protect military forces. The doctrine only mentions defense of the population three times and always in a secondary role, after protection of military forces.

    Moreover, the doctrine states that one objective of protecting military forces is to enhance U.S. offensive nuclear strike capabilities. STRATCOM planning seeks to integrate U.S. and allied offensive and defensive forces, the doctrine explains, “in order to exploit the full range of characteristics offered by U.S. strategic nuclear forces to support national and regional deterrence objectives.”

    In an operational scenario, limited or insufficient missile defense capabilities could force U.S. decision-makers into a corner where they would have to choose between saving Los Angeles or Vandenberg Air Force Base.

    Nuclear Targeting and International Law

    The new nuclear doctrine’s deepening of the commitment to regional targeting beyond nuclear facilities, and lowering the bar for when nuclear weapons could be used—even pre-emptively—raise important questions about nuclear targeting and international law. During the editing process of the new nuclear doctrine, a debate was triggered among the different commands over which term to use for different types of targeting. Of particular concern was the legal status of countervalue targeting, a targeting methodology that was included in the 1995 nuclear doctrine:

    Countervalue targeting strategy directs the destruction or neutralization of selected enemy military and military-related activities, such as industries, resources, and/or institutions that contribute to the enemy’s ability to wage war. In general, weapons required to implement this strategy need not be as numerous or accurate as those required to implement a counterforce targeting strategy, because countervalue targets generally tend to be softer and unprotected in relation to counterforce targets.[6]

    During the editing of the new doctrine, STRATCOM declared that it had decided that “countervalue targeting violates” the Law of Armed Conflict. The command therefore suggested changing “countervalue” to “critical infrastructure targeting.” In explaining its decision, STRATCOM stated:

    Many operational law attorneys do not believe “countervalue” targeting is a lawful justification for employment of force, much less nuclear force. Countervalue philosophy makes no distinction between purely civilian activities and military related activities and could be used to justify deliberate attacks on civilians and non-military portions of a nation’s economy. It therefore cannot meet the “military necessity” prong of the Law of Armed Conflict. Countervalue targeting also undermines one of the values that underlies Law of Armed Conflict—the reduction of civilian suffering and to foster the ability to maintain the peace after the conflict ends. For example, under the countervalue target philosophy, the attack on the World Trade Center Towers on 9/11 could be justified.[7]

    Other military commands did not agree with the name change. The argument from European Command was that countervalue should not be changed to critical infrastructure because countervalue has an institutionalized and broadly understood meaning in the academic literature on nuclear warfare and in international security studies in general. “If in doubt on this point,” European Command argued, “insert the word ‘countervalue’ in any electronic search engine and note how many ‘hits’ appear that are directly relevant to nuclear policy.”[8]

    In the end, the commands could not agree and the term “critical infrastructure targeting” was withdrawn to end the discussion. Yet, the term “countervalue” also disappeared and is no longer included in the new nuclear doctrine. The issue was dropped, although targeting appears to continue, and simply changing the terminology obviously does not change the illegal targeting itself.

    To be fair, the new nuclear doctrine emphasizes U.S. abhorrence of unrestricted warfare and U.S. adherence to laws of war. Yet, if the intention of mentioning international law is that it matters, then the doctrine notably ignores that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its 1996 ruling on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons could not reach agreement (it was a split vote) that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is lawful, even in an extreme circumstance of self-defense where the very survival of a state is at stake. The ICJ did agree unanimously that international law does not authorize even the threat of use of nuclear weapons.[9] These important nuances are ignored by the new doctrine.

    Conclusion

    Although there has been extensive public debate on whether to build new or modified nuclear weapons, there has been essentially no debate about the doctrine that guides the use of nuclear weapons and influences future requirements. This is ironic given the considerable interest in the Bush administration’s policy on pre-emption. As a result, the rewriting of the nuclear doctrine has occurred with essentially no public debate.

    Still, the doctrine and editing documents reveal a significant contradiction between the Bush administration’s public rhetoric about reducing the role of nuclear weapons and the guidance issued to the nuclear planners. Although the overall number of warheads is being reduced, the new doctrine guiding planning for the remaining arsenal reaffirms an aggressive posture with nuclear forces on high alert, ready to be used in an increasing number of limited-strike scenarios against adversaries anywhere, even pre-emptively. The new doctrine appears to be precipitated by anticipation among military planners that deterrence will fail and U.S. nuclear weapons will be used in a conflict sooner or later.

    For the nuclear planners, it seems so simple: deterrence must be credible, and the way to make it more credible is to increase the capabilities and number of strike options against any conceivable scenario. Ironically, a decade and a half after we should have escaped this nuclear deterrence logic of the Cold War, the planners cling to these old business practices. Instead of drastically reducing the role of nuclear weapons, as the Bush administration told the public it would do, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism seem to have spooked the administration into continuing and deepening a commitment to some of the most troubling aspects of the nuclear war-fighting mentality that symbolized the Cold War.

    US Nuclear Weapons Guidance, War Plans

    The updated Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations reflects how combatant commanders have translated the administration’s attempts to reshape U.S. nuclear policy into operational guidance for military forces. It comes nearly five years after the completion of the Bush administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in December 2001 and represents the first revision of basic nuclear doctrine in a decade. The list below describes some of the major milestones that led to the new doctrine and their significance. [1]

    2001

    May: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publishes the Strategic Defense Review. This document, among other things, sets “requirements for the number and types of weapons in the stockpile.”

    December 31: Rumsfeld forwards the NPR report to Congress.

    2002

    June: The White House issues National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 14, “Nuclear Weapons Planning Guidance.”

    September 14: The White House issues NSPD 17, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The document states that “[t]he United States will make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force—including potentially nuclear weapons—to the use of [weapons of mass destruction] against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”

    September 17: The White House issues the “National Security Strategy of the United States.” The document provides the first official public articulation of a strategy of pre-emptive action against hostile states and terrorist groups developing weapons of mass destruction.

    October 1: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a new nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 2002, which translates White House guidance into specific military plans.

    December 10: The White House releases “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” the unclassified version of NSPD 17. The wording in NSPD 17 of using “potentially nuclear weapons” is replaced with “all of our options.”

    December 16: The White House issues NSPD 23, “National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense,” which orders withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and construction of a national ballistic missile defense system.

    2003:

    January 10: Bush signs Change 2 to the Unified Command Plan, which, in addition to maintaining nuclear strike plans, assigns four additional missions to U.S. Strategic Command: missile defense planning, global strike planning, information operations, and global C4ISR (Command, Control, Computers, Communication, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).

    March: Rumsfeld issues to Congress “Nuclear Posture Review: Implementation Plan, Department of Defense Implementation of the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Report.” The document formally implements the decisions of the 2001 NPR.

    2004

    March 13: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues the “National Military Strategy of the United States,” including the classified Annex B (Nuclear). The document translates the National Security Strategy into specific guidance for military planners.

    April 19: Rumsfeld issues the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy. The document states in part that “ U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world.”

    May: The White House issues NSPD 34, “Fiscal Year 2004-2012 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan,” which “directs a force structure through 2012” and cuts the total stockpile “almost in half.”

    May: The White House issues NSPD 35, “Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization,” which authorizes the military to continue deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

    December 31: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues a new nuclear supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for fiscal year 2005, codifying new global strike and theater nuclear operations guidance and implementing the 2004 Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy.

    2005

    January: In a letter to U.S. Strategic Command, Rumsfeld tasks the command with spearheading the Defense Department’s efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

    January 10: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issues Global Strike Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1, for conducting global strike operations during the “seize the initiative” phase of a conflict (“seconds to days”). Targets include WMD production, storage, and delivery capabilities, critical command and control facilities, anti-access capabilities (radars, surface-to-air missile sites, theater ballistic missile sites), and adversary leadership.

    Fall 2005: The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to publish Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations.

    ENDNOTES

    1. A chronology of nuclear weapons guidance issued by the Bush administration is available at http://www.nukestrat.com.

    Hans M. Kristensen is co-author of the World Nuclear Forces appendix to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Yearbook and a consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council.

    ENDNOTES

    1. The draft doctrine might be slightly different from the final doctrine, although at this late stage any changes are expected to be cosmetic. Copies of the new doctrine, previous versions, and editing comments are available at http://www.nukestrat.com.

    2. See U.S. Strategic Command, “Post-START II Arms Control,” 1996 (partially declassified).

    3. Keith B. Payne, “The Nuclear Posture Review: Setting the Record Straight,” Washington Quarterly 28, no. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 147.

    4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), “JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” December 16, 2004, p. 59.

    5. The White House, “Remarks by the President on Missile Defense,” December 13, 2001.

    6. CJCS, “JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” December 15, 1995, p. II-5.

    7. CJCS, “JP 3-12, Joint Staff Input to JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Second Draft),” April 28, 2003, pp. 34-35.

    8. CJCS, “JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations,” December 16, 2004, pp. 67-69.

    9. International Court of Justice, “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” July 8, 1996, items A and E (advisory opinion).

  • Sir Joseph Rotblat: A Legacy of Peace

    Joseph Rotblat was one of the great men of the 20th century. He was a man of science and peace. Born in Warsaw, Poland in 1908, he was one of those rare individuals who, like Rosa Parks or Nelson Mandela, comes to an intersection with history and courageously forges a new path. In Joseph’s case, the intersection with history arrived in 1944 while he was working on the Manhattan Project, the US project to develop an atomic bomb.

    Joseph had worked as a scientist toward the creation of an atomic weapon, first in the UK at the University of Liverpool and then at Los Alamos, New Mexico. When he learned in late 1944 that Germany would not succeed in developing an atomic bomb, he believed there was no longer reason to continue work on creating a US bomb. For him, there was only one reason to create an atomic weapon, and that was to deter the German use of such a weapon during World War II. If the Germans would not have an atomic weapon, then there was no reason for the Allies to have one. Joseph was the only scientist to leave the Manhattan Project on moral grounds.

    He was the last living signer of the 1955 Russell-Einstein Manifesto, one of the great documents of the 20th century, and he often quoted its final passage: “We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open for a new paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

    He was convinced that countries needed to abolish nuclear weapons and he devoted his life to achieving this goal, as well as the goal of ending war as a human institution. Just prior to his 90th birthday, he said that he still had two great goals in life. “My short-term goal,” he said, “is the abolition of nuclear weapons, and my long-term goal is the abolition of war.”

    Joseph was for many years the General Secretary of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and later served as president of the Pugwash Conferences. In his work with Pugwash, he was instrumental in bringing together scientists from East and West, so that they could find common ground for ending the Cold War with its mad nuclear arms race. In 1995, Joseph and the Pugwash Conferences were joint recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize.

    He began his Nobel acceptance speech by saying, “At this momentous event in my life…I want to speak as a scientist, but also as a human being. From my earliest days I had a passion for science. But science, the exercise of the supreme power of the human intellect, was always linked in my mind with benefit to people. I saw science as being in harmony with humanity. I did not imagine that the second half of my life would be spent on efforts to avert a mortal danger to humanity created by science.”

    In his speech, he reasoned that a nuclear weapon-free world would be safer than a world with nuclear weapons, but the danger of “ultimate catastrophe” would still exist. He concluded that war must be abolished: “The quest for a war-free world has a basic purpose: survival. But if in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear, by kindness rather than compulsion; if in the process we learn to combine the essential with the enjoyable, the expedient with the benevolent, the practical with the beautiful, this will be an extra incentive to embark on this great task.”

    When Joseph came to Santa Barbara in 1997 to receive the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Lifetime Achievement Award for Distinguished Peace Leadership, I asked him, “What gives you hope for the future?” He responded, “My hope is based on logic. Namely, there is no alternative. If we don’t do this [eliminate nuclear weapons and engender more responsibility by scientists as well as citizens in general], then we are doomed. The whole existence of humankind is endangered. We are an endangered species now and we have to take steps to prevent the extinguishing of the human species. We owe an allegiance to humanity. Since there is no other way, then we must proceed in this way. Therefore, if we must do it, then there is hope that it will be done.”

    Earlier this year, Joseph made an appeal to the delegates to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, held in May at the United Nations in New York. “Morality,” he wrote, “is at the core of the nuclear issue: are we going to base our world on a culture of peace or on a culture of war? Nuclear weapons are fundamentally immoral: their action is indiscriminate, affecting civilians as well as military, innocents and aggressors alike, killing people alive now and generations as yet unborn. And the consequence of their use could bring the human race to an end.” He ended his appeal with his oft-repeated plea, “Remember your humanity.”

    I visited Joseph at his home in London just a few months ago. He had been slowed down by a stroke and was disturbed that he wasn’t able to be as active as he’d been accustomed. But his spirit was strong, and he was still smiling and looking forward. He was as committed as ever to his dual goals of achieving a world without nuclear weapons and without war – goals to which he had devoted the full measure of his energy, intellect and wisdom.

    Joseph has left behind a strong legacy of peace. It is our job now to pick up the baton that he carried so well and passionately for so long, and continue his legacy.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org) and the Deputy Chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (www.inesglobal.org).

  • A Letter to UC President Robert Dynes

    A Letter to UC President Robert Dynes

    The following is the text of David Krieger’s letter to the University of California’s President Robert Dynes opposing the UC’s management of the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, which research and develop nuclear weapons.

     

    Dear President Dynes,

    I am writing on Human Rights Day to urge you to oppose further collaboration between the University of California and the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Laboratories. It is highly inappropriate for a great university like the University of California to involve itself in the research and development of weapons of mass destruction. By providing oversight and management to the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories, the University of California places itself in the position of researching and developing weapons capable of causing massive suffering and slaughter, such as occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

    The International Court of Justice has stated, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” Rather than contributing toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, the University of California is providing support for continued U.S. reliance on and development of nuclear weapons. Policies of the current administration include research on more usable nuclear weapons, such as mini-nukes and “bunker-busters,” research being carried out at the UC-managed labs.

    A great university should provide not only knowledge but a moral compass to the students it educates and to the larger society. The University of California cannot fulfill this function so long as it remains an accomplice in the U.S. effort to base its security on the ongoing threat of mass annihilation. The University of California should be a leader in working to end the nuclear weapons era; not a leader in contributing to new nuclear arms races that extend the nuclear weapons era.

    I encourage you to take a strong and principled stand against a continued relationship between the University of California and the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories, a stand that will contribute to nuclear sanity and the security of all Americans.

    Sincerely,

    David Krieger
    President

    *David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is the editor of Hope in a Dark Time (Capra Press, 2003).

  • The Frog’s Malaise: Nuclear Weapons and Human Survival

    If a frog is dropped into a pot of scalding water, it will sense the danger and immediately jump out. However, if a frog is dropped into a pot of tepid water and the water temperature is gradually raised, the frog will succumb rather than trying to escape.

    We humans are like the frog in this story. At the onset of the Nuclear Age we were dropped into a pot of tepid water and here we sit as the temperature of the water rises. ******

    “We cannot bear the thought that human life can disappear from this planet, least of all, by the action of man. And yet the impossible, the unimaginable, has now become possible. The future existence of the human species can no longer be guaranteed. The human species is now an endangered species.” -Sir Joseph Rotblat

    “Nuclear weapons are the enemy of humanity. Indeed, they’re not weapons at all. They’re some species of biological time bombs whose effects transcend time and space, poisoning the earth and its inhabitants for generations to come.” -General George Lee Butler

    The Rio Conference

    When the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development convened in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, nuclear weapons – arguably the most serious threat to the human future – were not on the agenda. It seems surrealistic that the leaders of the world’s nations gathered in Rio de Janeiro could devote nearly two weeks to the subjects of the environment and sustainable development without addressing, or at least acknowledging, the dangers of nuclear weapons.

    The Declaration issued from the Rio Conference contains 27 principles. None of them mention nuclear dangers, although one mentions warfare and one mentions peace. Principle 24 states: “Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.” Surely if warfare is destructive of the environment, nuclear warfare – if warfare would be an adequate way to conceptualize the extent of the devastation and annihilation caused by the use of nuclear weapons – would immeasurably aggravate the damage.

    Nuclear warfare has the potential to destroy cities, countries, even humanity itself. Given the magnitude of the potential dangers of nuclear weapons, it is surprising that these dangers did not rise to the level of inclusion in the Rio Conference.

    Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration states: “Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.” While true, this principle also does not sound an alarm regarding the magnitude of danger inherent in the nuclear weapons policies of the states that possess these weapons.

    One other principle of the Rio Declaration deserves mention. Principle 1 states: “Human beings are at the center of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.” Surely, this would include freedom from nuclear annihilation. Perhaps a corollary to this principle should be the oft-repeated statement of those who survived the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “Nuclear weapons and human beings cannot co-exist.”

    There are many possible explanations for why the Rio Conference did not take up the issue of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the delegates to the Rio Conference in 1992 had their hands full with other problems related to environment and sustainable development, of which there were many. Perhaps dealing with issues of nuclear dangers seemed too confrontational to the nuclear weapons states. Perhaps the organizers of the Rio Conference believed that nuclear weapons issues would be better dealt with in disarmament forums.

    Whatever their reasons for leaving nuclear weapons and their dangers to humanity off the Rio agenda, the Conference failed to deal with what is arguably the most acute present danger to human survival, sustainable development and environmental security. When the Conference was held in 1992 the Nuclear Age, which was initiated by the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in World War II, was 47 years old. The temperature in the pot in which the frog is treading water had grown very warm indeed.

    Nuclear Weapons: Warnings, Promises and Failure to Act

    We are approaching the ten-year anniversary of the Rio Conference, and the water temperature has continued to rise. Not that there have not been warnings. Many of the greatest individuals of the 20th century have spoken out against nuclear weapons. The list is impressive: Albert Camus, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, Jacques Cousteau, Mikhail Gorbachev, the XIVth Dalai Lama, Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Religious leaders, military leaders and political leaders have spoken out. Nobel Laureates have spoken out, but the frog still treads water as the temperature rises.

    Since the Rio Conference, there have been a number of key events related to the elimination of nuclear weapons. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. At that time, the nuclear weapons states promised the completion of negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the early conclusion of negotiations for a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and “determined pursuit…of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons….”

    We have learned, however, that the promises of the nuclear weapons states mean very little. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was completed, but has yet to be ratified by some key states, including the United States and China. Negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty have not yet gotten off the ground. And the “determined pursuit” promise has led only to systematic and progressive efforts to maintain a two-tier structure of nuclear weapon “have” and “have-not” states.

    In 1996, the International Court of Justice considered the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The Court concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally illegal, but could not decide whether or not it would be illegal if the very survival of a state were at stake. The Court did make clear, however, that there could be no legal threat or use if such use would not discriminate between soldiers and civilians or if such use would cause unnecessary suffering. It is difficult to imagine any possible use of nuclear weapons that would not violate these principles of international humanitarian law.

    The Court was unanimous in concluding: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The nuclear weapons states have largely ignored this strong and clear opinion of the highest court in the world.

    In August 1996, the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, composed of a distinguished group of experts from throughout the world convened by the Australian government, issued its report. The Commission stated: “The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used – accidentally or by decision – defies credibility. The only complete defence is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance they will never be produced again.”

    The Canberra Commission viewed the existing situation of a world divided into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” as discriminatory, unstable and therefore unsustainable. They wrote: “Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.”

    The Canberra Commission recommended a series of immediate steps: taking nuclear forces off alert; removal of warheads from delivery vehicles; ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons; ending nuclear testing; initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals; and agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states.

    In December 1996, a group of some 60 retired generals and admirals from throughout the world issued a statement in which they said: “We, military professionals, who have devoted our lives to the national security of our countries and our peoples, are convinced that the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.” Among other urgently needed steps, the generals and admirals agreed that “long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”

    In February 1998, 117 civilian leaders, including 47 past or present presidents and prime ministers, issued a statement calling the threat of nuclear conflict “intolerable,” and invoking a “moral imperative” for the elimination of nuclear weapons. They called, as had the Canberra Commission, for immediate steps to reduce nuclear dangers, including the development of “a plan for eventual implementation, achievement and enforcement of the distant but final goal of elimination.” They also called for consideration of a ban on the production and possession of large, long-range ballistic missiles.

    “The world is not condemned to live forever with threats of nuclear conflict, or the anxious fragile peace imposed by nuclear deterrence,” the civilian leaders stated. “Such threats are intolerable and such a peace unworthy. The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons invokes a moral imperative for their elimination. That is our mandate. Let us begin.”

    In May 1998, India demonstrated the unsustainability of the global nuclear balance by testing nuclear weapons with Pakistan following closely in India’s footsteps. Both countries demonstrated their nuclear capabilities, and held mass public demonstrations lauding the scientists and political leaders who had given them these new powers. South Asia suddenly became a flashpoint of nuclear danger.

    In June 1998, the foreign ministers of eight middle power states (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden) expressed their concern for the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament and called for action by the nuclear weapons states. In a Joint Declaration issued in Dublin on June 9th, the foreign ministers called for a New Agenda to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. They stated: “We can no longer remain complacent at the reluctance of the nuclear-weapon states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to take that fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability and we urge them to take that step now.”

    More recently, at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Review Conference, the parties to the treaty, led by the middle power states calling for a New Agenda, agreed to 13 practical steps to further the goal of nuclear disarmament. Among the new promises made by the nuclear weapons states were “an unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals…” and a promise to preserve and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons….” The nuclear weapons states have thus far shown no progress on the first promise, and the US is thwarting the second promise by threatening to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to deploy a National Missile Defense system.

    Nuclear Strategy

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the preeminent military and economic power in the world. The United States is the leader of NATO and has the potential to lead the world to achieve the promises of eliminating nuclear weapons. The United States, however, has not demonstrated any inclination to lead in this direction. Through eight years of the Clinton administration, the United States made no further agreements toward achieving nuclear disarmament. In fact, under Clinton’s leadership the United States and Russia postponed the date to achieve the disarmament levels set forth in the START II agreement from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. Russian President Putin offered to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals in a START III agreement from START II levels of 3,500 to 1,500 or lower. Clinton failed to respond. He may be remembered as the President who had the greatest opportunity to end the nuclear weapons threat but lacked the vision and/or courage to do so.

    Whereas Clinton may have lacked vision altogether in the area of nuclear disarmament, George Bush has a confused and dangerous vision. Bush sees the primary nuclear threat to the United States arising from so-called “rogue” nations such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea. He seeks to build a missile shield to protect the United States, its friends, allies and troops from a ballistic missile attack by such smaller hostile states. To do so, he would abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the treaty the US promised to preserve and strengthen at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. This has led to expressions of grave concern on the part of Russia, China and a number of US allies. US deployment of a National Missile Defense, as envisaged by Bush, could result in undermining the entire structure of arms control agreements that have been built up over many decades and initiate new arms races.

    While Bush has also made more positive proposals for the unilateral reduction of the size of the US nuclear arsenal to the lowest level consistent with national security and for further de-alerting of the US nuclear arsenal, these proposals would provide a better basis for global stability if they were made in the context of multilateral agreements and were made irreversible. The US has also continued to develop a new nuclear warhead, the B61-11, a warhead claimed to be capable of earth penetration and bunker busting. It has a smaller yield and is presumably a more usable nuclear warhead. The US has also indicated in a 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 60) that it would use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapons attack on the US, its troops or allies.

    The bottom line is that the US and the other nuclear weapons states seem intent upon continuing to rely upon their nuclear weapons for the indefinite future, regardless of their promises made in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the destructive effects on the prospects for global security resulting from their shortsighted policies.

    The frog grows more lethargic as the water temperature rises.

    Sustainability

    Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This has led to the comforting illusion that they will never be used again. But as long as these weapons exist in the arsenals of the world’s nuclear weapons states, there remains the possibility that they will be used – by accident or design. So long as these weapons exist, they will also be a spur and incitement to the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.

    What is the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used again in warfare? This is perhaps an impossible question to answer, but we know that the answer is not zero. We also know that relations between states can alter rapidly. Further, we know that there have been numerous instances in which states have considered using nuclear weapons or in which they have come close to accidental launches. One such incident occurred in 1995 when the Russians mistook a joint US-Norwegian rocket launch for an attack on their country. President Yeltsin, a man noted for excessive drinking, was awakened in the middle of the night to make the decision on whether or not to launch a retaliatory strike against the US. Yeltsin extended the time allotted to him to make the decision, and disaster was averted when it became clear that the missile was not aimed at Russia.

    Nuclear weapons do not protect any country, and it makes no sense to endanger the security of the world in a futile attempt to provide security to a few countries. Therefore, nuclear weapons must be abolished. This goal is in accord with security interests, international law and the moral foundation of all religions.

    Sustainable development presupposes protecting natural resources and the environment. The mining of uranium, the testing of nuclear weapons, and the ongoing problems of storing nuclear wastes present serious challenges to the environment and human health. The greatest challenge to sustainability, however, comes from the very existence of nuclear weapons, which pose a threat to humanity and all living things that surpasses other dangers. This threat must be addressed, and cannot be swept aside by those who otherwise express concern for the planet’s well being.

    When the International Court of Justice rendered its opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the Court pointed out: “The destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.” In this way nuclear weapons are unique.

    How Did the Frog Get Into the Pot?

    The frog did not just jump into the pot. Someone dropped it in, someone with his own motivations. Likewise, the situation in which we now find ourselves with respect to nuclear weapons did not just occur. It was created and maintained by national leaders and others with their own motivations for wanting nuclear weapons and tolerating nuclear dangers.

    The Nuclear Age began with reasonable intentions. Émigré scientists, refugees of Hitler’s policies in Germany, worried about the danger of Hitler developing a nuclear weapon and its implications for the war in Europe. Leo Szilard, a brilliant Hungarian scientist, convinced his friend Albert Einstein to sign a letter to President Roosevelt warning of this danger. The letter encouraged Roosevelt to initiate a project to explore the creation of weapons that would unlock the power of the atom. The project began slowly, but when the United States entered World War II it expanded dramatically. Thousands of scientists and engineers worked on the top-secret Manhattan Project that resulted in the creation of the world’s first atomic weapons.

    Many of the scientists who had worked on creating the atomic bomb, led by Leo Szilard, tried to convince Roosevelt and then Truman that the bomb should not be used against Japan. A petition to President Truman drafted by Szilard and signed by 68 members of the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago, stated: “The development of atomic power will provide the nations with new weapons of destruction. The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of their future development. Thus a nation which sets the precedent of using these newly liberated forces of nature for purposes of destruction may have to bear the responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.”

    The petition to President Truman was dated July 17, 1945, less than three weeks before the first atomic weapon was used at Hiroshima. When President Truman heard of the bomb’s “success” at Hiroshima, he said, “This is the greatest thing in history.” Truman believed that it might take the Soviet Union 20 years to develop an atomic bomb. It took them four years. From that point until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 the world experienced a nuclear arms race that would result in deployment of tens of thousands of ever more powerful nuclear weapons capable of destroying most life on Earth.

    Understanding the Frog’s Malaise

    The first thing that is necessary to understand about our present situation is that there is not just one frog in the pot. We are all in a nuclear cauldron, potentially sharing a common tragic fate. Some have already died – the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the uranium miners, the victims of nuclear experiments, the downwinders of nuclear tests, the soldiers and indigenous peoples deliberately exposed to nuclear tests. There will also be countless future generations that will pay the price — in genetic mutations, deformities, cancers and leukemias — of the radioactive legacy of preparing for nuclear war.

    The second thing necessary to understand is that those who have kept the frog in the pot are able to ignore the dangers to the frog so long as their goals are achieved. Many politicians, military leaders and academics believe that nuclear weapons make them more secure. In many respects, they do not believe that they are in the pot with the rest of us or, if they do, they believe that their personal gain outweighs the risks of disaster. They are true believers and they have constructed deeply held myths, which they have perpetuated to support their recklessness.

    The third thing necessary to understand is that there is no technological fix to the frog’s dilemma. No fancy umbrella over the pot will protect the frog from demise. The nuclear dilemma will not be resolved by a missile shield to protect against so-called “rogue” nations. Not only is it unlikely that a missile shield could ever be effective, but it is a way for certain countries to continue to rely upon nuclear weapons. A US missile shield will also be guaranteed to halt progress on nuclear disarmament with Russia and lead to new nuclear arms races in Asia. It is a costly and dangerous approach, which will decrease rather than increase security from nuclear dangers.

    What Keeps the Frog in the Pot?

    It was more than an oversight that nuclear weapons issues were not on the agenda at the Rio Conference, the world’s most significant conference for environment and sustainable development. Keeping the frog in the pot has been a matter of policy for the nuclear weapons states, and this policy has not been effectively challenged.

    If the frog continues treading water as the temperature rises, it will eventually die. Why does the frog fail to take action to save itself while the water temperature rises? If we can ascribe to the frog some human reasoning skills and other human characteristics, the following may be some of the principal factors that explain its failure to act, and also ours.

    Ignorance. The frog may fail to recognize the dilemma. It may be unable to predict the consequences of being in water in which the temperature is steadily rising.

    Complacency. The frog may feel comfortable in the warming water. It may believe that because nothing bad has happened yet, nothing bad will happen in the future.

    Deference to Authority. The frog may believe that others are in control of the thermostat and that it has no power to change the conditions in which it finds itself.

    Sense of Powerlessness. The frog may fail to realize its own power to affect change, and believe that there is nothing it can do to improve its situation.

    Fear. The frog may have concluded that, although there are dangers in the pot, the dangers outside the pot are even greater. Thus, it fails to take action, even though it could do so.

    Economic Advantage. The frog may believe that there are greater short-term rewards for staying in the pot than jumping out.

    Conformity. The frog may see other frogs treading water in the pot and not want to appear different by sounding an alarm or acting on its own initiative.

    Marginalization. The frog may have witnessed other frogs attempt to raise warnings or jump out, and seen them marginalized and ignored by the other frogs.

    Technological Optimism. The frog may understand that there is a problem that could lead to its demise, but believe that it is not necessary to act because someone will find a technological solution.

    Tyranny of Experts. Even though the frog may believe it is in danger, the experts may provide a comforting assessment that makes the frog doubt its own wisdom.

    Turning Down the Heat

    There are a number of important steps that can be taken to turn down the heat on nuclear dangers. Proposals for moving forward have been set forth in the statement of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, in the statements of the generals and admirals and the civilian leaders, and in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament set forth in the 2000 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    Turning down the heat on nuclear dangers is primarily a question of political will. Without political will progress will continue to be slow to non-existent. With political will to reduce nuclear dangers and achieve a nuclear weapons free world, important steps can be taken that would rapidly improve global security, including the following actions:

    1. De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

    2. Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.

    3. Establish international accounting and control systems for all nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    4. Reaffirm the commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and cease efforts to violate that Treaty by the deployment of national or theater missile defenses, and cease the militarization of space.

    5. Sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, cease laboratory and subcritical nuclear tests designed to modernize and improve nuclear weapons systems, cease construction of Megajoule in France and the National Ignition Facility in the US and end research programs that could lead to the development of pure fusion weapons, and close the remaining nuclear test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya.

    6. Support existing nuclear weapons free zones, and establish new ones in the Middle East, Central Europe, North Asia, Central Asia and South Asia.

    7. Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions for effective verification and enforcement.

    8. Publicly acknowledge the weaknesses and fallibilities of deterrence: that deterrence is only a theory and is clearly ineffective against nations whose leaders may be irrational or suicidal; nor can deterrence assure against accidents, misperceptions, miscalculations, or terrorists.

    9. Publicly acknowledge the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons under international law as stated by the International Court of Justice in its 1996 opinion, and further acknowledge the obligation under international law for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

    10. Publicly acknowledge the immorality of threatening to annihilate millions, even hundreds of millions, of people in the name of national security.

    11. Set forth a plan to complete the transition under international control and monitoring to zero nuclear weapons by 2020, with agreed upon levels of nuclear disarmament to be achieved by the NPT Review Conferences in 2005, 2010 and 2015.

    12. Begin to reallocate the billions of dollars currently being spent annually for maintaining nuclear arsenals ($35 billion in the U.S. alone) to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

    Taking the Frog Out of the Pot

    Those who put the frog into the pot are not likely to be the same ones to take the frog out. We need new leadership and, as Einstein warned, a new way of thinking. There is only one way out of the pot, and that is by cooperation on a global scale. Absent such cooperation and the leadership to attain it, further nuclear proliferation and the use of nuclear weapons by accident or design are inevitable.

    Once the water in the pot has heated up, it is doubtful that the frog can get out of the pot by itself. The frog’s dilemma can only be resolved by getting it out of the pot or turning down the heat. To resolve the nuclear dilemma confronting humanity will require cooperation – cooperation among people, cooperation among countries. Currently the nuclear weapons states, led by the United States, are blocking that cooperation. That is why it is so essential for US citizens to press their government for leadership in achieving agreement for the verified elimination of nuclear weapons in all countries. It is also why the leadership of the middle power countries calling for effective nuclear disarmament is also so important.

    The frog may need help getting out of the pot, but this help is unlikely to be forthcoming unless it asks for help. To end the nuclear threat to humanity requires all of us to raise our voices and demand the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    A Final Word

    Nuclear weapons are not weapons of war. They are devices that kill indiscriminately, and their use cannot be confined to soldiers in combat. Nor is their threat limited in time or place. It affects humanity across the globe and across time. This threat, along with the damage nuclear weapons have already done to the environment, will be our generation’s legacy to the future inhabitants of the planet – if we are able to keep the planet intact.

    Nuclear weapons are the tools of fools and cowards. Those who promote these evil tools should be removed from leadership. They are the ones who have kept the frog in the pot and are manipulating the controls on the heat. They will stay in control until the people of this planet act in concert to change the rules, reach accords for cooperative and sustainable development, and end the nuclear weapons threat to humanity and all life.

    The word croak has two meanings. One is the sound of a frog’s voice. The other is slang for “to die.” By recognizing the frog’s malaise and using our voices, we have the possibility to prevent the widespread death and destruction that will be the predictable result of continuing to base national security on the threat to use nuclear weapons. If we fail to recognize the seriousness of the frog’s malaise and fail to act on our own malaise, the result could be tragedy beyond imagination.

    In 1955 Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein issued a manifesto signed by themselves and some of the greatest scientists of the time. In that manifesto, they stated: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge and wisdom. Shall we instead choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal, as human beings to human beings: remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.” The choice is still before us.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

     

    Appendix A

    Play a Role in Ending the Nuclear Weapons Threat

    If you and others do nothing, humanity will eventually face a nuclear holocaust that in a worst case could end human life on Earth.

    The nuclear weapons threat will not diminish or go away if good people who care about a sustainable human future do nothing. If you would like to play a role in ending the nuclear weapons threat to humanity, I encourage you to take these steps.

    1. Educate yourself. A good place to begin is the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s web site: www.wagingpeace.org. At this web site you will find a wealth of information on nuclear dangers as well as ideas for action. At this site you can sign up as a free online participating member of the Foundation and receive the monthly e-newsletter, The Sunflower.

    2. Educate others. Spread the word. Help your family and friends to realize the danger and lack of sustainability of some nations continuing to rely upon nuclear weapons. You can send information to others from the Foundation’s web site.

    3. Take Action. Sign the Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity, and ask others to sign it. You can do this online at the above web site. Encourage political leaders to support the elimination of nuclear weapons and to oppose abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by the United States.

    Appendix B

    Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity

    [This Appeal, initiated by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, has been signed by some of the world’s great peace leaders, including Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the XIVth Dailai Lama, and Queen Noor of Jordan. The Appeal has been signed by 37 Nobel Laureates, including 14 Nobel Peace Laureates.]

    We cannot hide from the threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity and all life. These are not ordinary weapons, but instruments of mass annihilation that could destroy civilization and end most life on Earth.

    Nuclear weapons are morally and legally unjustifiable. They destroy indiscriminately – soldiers and civilians; men, women and children; the aged and the newly born; the healthy and the infirm.

    The obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament “in all its aspects,” as unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice, is at the heart of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    More than ten years have now passed since the end of the Cold War, and yet nuclear weapons continue to cloud humanity’s future. The only way to assure that nuclear weapons will not be used again is to abolish them.

    We, therefore, call upon the leaders of the nations of the world and, in particular, the leaders of the nuclear weapons states to act now for the benefit of all humanity by taking thefollowing steps:

    De-alert all nuclear weapons and de-couple all nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles.

    Reaffirm commitments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    Commence good faith negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention requiring the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons, with provisions foreffective verification and enforcement.

    Declare policies of No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear weapons states and policies of No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.Reallocate resources from the tens of billions of dollars currently being spent for maintaining nuclear arsenals to improving human health, education and welfare throughout the world.

    Appendix C

    13 Practical Steps for Nuclear DisarmamentThe following text is excerpted from the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review ConferenceFinal Document.

    The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systemic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament”:

    1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

    2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

    3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandatecontained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

    4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

    5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

    6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

    7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

    8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way thatpromotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

    – Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

    – Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

    – The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

    – Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

    – A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that theseweapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

    – The engagement as soon as appropriate for all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

    10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material in peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of the military programmes.

    11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

    12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

    13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provideassurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

  • Taking Ourselves Off the Endangered Species List

    Can you imagine a world without human eyes to view its wonder? Nuclear weapons make such a world possible. Our inaction in the face of nuclear dangers may make such a world probable. Despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to place human beings on the endangered species list. It is up to us to take ourselves off this list. Before we can do so, however, we must first recognize that we are on it.

    Perhaps this recognition is a motivating factor in US plans to develop and deploy a National Missile Defense system. These plans represent a pursuit of invulnerability to nuclear attack for US citizens. The problem is that there can be no invulnerability for one piece of territory or one country ‘s citizens in the Nuclear Age. There are no perfect defenses and, n the case of nuclear weaponry, even small margins of error can spell disaster.

    The problem is complicated by the fact that if one country proceeds with a defensive system, other countries will feel threatened. The reason for this is that one country ‘s invulnerability or even imagined invulnerability will give it potential offensive advantages over other countries. If, for example, the US has a missile defense system it believes will make it invulnerable to attack, then China will worry about being bullied by the US and further develop its offensive missile capabilities. Thus, improved defensive capabilities can lead to offensive arms races. Such is the contorted logic of security in the Nuclear Age.

    Invulnerability is not an option, but US decision makers are proceeding as though it is. This is a dangerous policy that could rekindle nuclear arms races throughout the world. A far better approach would be to provide leadership toward a nuclear weapons free world. Such an approach would increase global stability and reduce the risks of catastrophe resulting from human fallibility. This approach would be in accord with international law and the precepts of morality basic to all religions. It would also bring nuclear weapons and materials under tighter controls and reduce the risks of the weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists or criminals.

    For these reasons, individuals from through- out the world are adding their names and voices to the Foundation ‘s Appeal to End the Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity. Walter Cronkite, one of the most respected men in America and a signer of the Appeal, wrote: “Facing a holocaust that could take thousands or perhaps billions of lives and render much of the earth uninhabitable, how is it possible for humankind to continue to believe that the way to settle its disputes is by killing each other? Nuclear weapons represent the utmost fantasy in the perpetuation of this savage philosophy.”

    If you ‘d like to add your name to this Appeal, you can sign up online. If you are not already a member of the Foundation, we invite you to join us in waging peace by educating yourself, educating others and taking action. We try to make this easy for you by providing up-to-date information and suggestions for action.

    There is strength in numbers. When people come together for peace they are a powerful force. Like a mighty ocean, people power can overcome even the dangers of the Nuclear Age. We may not be invulnerable, but we are not without the power to shape our future. I invite you to play a greater role in spreading the Foundation ‘s message of peace, and helping us to grow to fulfill our mission of creating a peaceful, nuclear weapons-free future for humanity and all life.

    *David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.