Tag: nuclear abolition

  • Countless Voices of Hope

    It is with profound appreciation and gratitude that I return to this city of peace, this sacred city of Hiroshima. This city was made sacred not by the tragedy which befell it, but by the rebirth of hope which emerged from that tragedy. From the ashes of Hiroshima, flowers of hope have blossomed, bringing forth a renewed spirit of possibility, of peace, to a world in which hope has been too often crushed for too many.

    The massive destruction that was visited upon this city on August 6, 1945 gave birth to the Nuclear Age, an age in which our species would move from the too often practiced power of genocide to the potential of omnicide, the destruction of all humanity and perhaps all life. The devastating power of nuclear weapons, as manifested first at Hiroshima and then at Nagasaki, has made peace not only desirable but imperative.

    Through the memories of the survivors, the hibakusha, we may learn of the horror they experienced so that we may act to prevent that horror from ever recurring anywhere again. The scenes etched in their memories can pierce us to the marrow of our bones. Sumie Mizukawa, a young girl at the time of the bombing, remembered the sight of a blinded young mother. She wrote:

    Her eyes blinded

    her dead infant in her arms

    with tears streaming

    from those sightless eyes

    that would never see again.

    I saw this in my childhood

    as my mother led me by the hand.

    That image will never leave

    my memories of that dreadful time.

    Kosaku Okabe described a scene of misery with “countless bodies of men, women, and children” floating in the river. “It was then,” he wrote, “that I first began to understand the brutality of war.” He continued, “Burned into my memory is the sight of a young mother, probably in her twenties, a baby on her back and a three- or four-year-old child clasped tightly in her arms. Caught against a girder on a bridge her body bobbed idly in the gentle current.”

    How could these images not be seared into memory? And how vitally important it is that such images be shared with others throughout the world so that this pain will not again be inflicted on young mothers and their children in other cities at other times. As Akihiro Takahashi, a former director of the Hiroshima Peace Culture Center, wrote, “‘Hiroshima’ is not merely a historic fact in the past. It is an alarm bell for the future of humankind.”

    I have had the great privilege of knowing Miyoko Matsubara, who was a twelve year old child when the bomb fell on Hiroshima. Miyoko struggled to learn English so that she could tell the story of what she witnessed and experienced — including her own injury, pain and disfigurement — to young people throughout the world. She was only a child, but she has carried the pain throughout her life. She also carries hope, and her courage gives hope to others.

    Miyoko’s message is the message of Hiroshima: “Never again! We shall not repeat the evil.” This message is a clarion call to sanity. It is a cry to the human species to remember our humanity. If we fail to do so, the consequences will be severe. We run the risk of destroying ourselves and much of life. Our capacity for destruction tests our wisdom. The most important issue of our time, although not widely viewed as such, is that of assuring that the evil is not repeated.

    I would like you to know that the message of your city awakened me. I first visited Hiroshima when I was 21 years old. At the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, I learned of the human cost of nuclear destruction, of the tragedy and suffering caused by that single bomb. The spirit of Hiroshima entered my soul. I had no choice but to find a way to work for peace and an end to the threat of future nuclear holocausts.

    A second experience solidified my commitment to peace. Returning from Japan in 1964, I found that I had been called into the army. Not realizing the full range of my options, I joined a reserve unit rather than serve on active duty. However, four years later this reserve unit was called to active duty, and I received orders to go to Vietnam as an infantry officer. At that time I believed, and continue to believe today, that this was a war both immoral and illegal. I knew that if I went to Vietnam I would be forced to kill and order others to do so. I, therefore, as a conscientious objector, refused the order to go to Vietnam, and ended up fighting the army in federal court.

    It was a great awakening for me to realize that my power as an individual was greater than that of the United States Army. The army had the power to give me an order, but I had the power to say No to their order. I might have gone to jail for doing so, but that was my choice. I had a choice, as we all do, to do what I believed was right. To exercise that choice is tremendously empowering. It is the power of conscience, which is a defining human characteristic, one that separates us from all other forms of life.

    Above all else, I consider myself to be a citizen of Earth. I believe that the bonds of our common humanity uniting us are far stronger than the artificial boundaries that divide us. I am also a citizen of the United States, having been born in Los Angeles three years before the Nuclear Age began. Speaking as a single individual, but I’m sure representing millions of others throughout the world, I deeply regret the crime against humanity that occurred here. As an American, I apologize to you, although I know from Miyoko and other hibakusha that your forgiveness came long ago.

    I apologize because my government has not yet done so. I apologize because my government has not yet heard the message of Hiroshima, nor learned its foremost lesson — “Never again!” I apologize because my government still bases its national security on the threat to use nuclear weapons. I apologize because your pain and your suffering should not be borne by you alone.

    What happened here affects us all. If we can find it in ourselves to share in your tragedy — a tragedy that for most people on Earth today is only of historical memory — we may be capable of sharing in your hope. And, if we can do that, we may be capable of bringing forth a new world in which the ever present threat of nuclear holocaust is ended for all time.

    Just over 40 years ago, Josei Toda, your second president, called for the abolition of all nuclear weapons, and called upon the youth of Soka Gakkai to help lead the way. Five months ago I was in Tokyo and Yokohama for the commemoration of that fortieth anniversary. In the short time since that fortieth anniversary, the youth of Soka Gakkai, beginning here in Hiroshima, have gathered over 13 million signatures for the abolition of nuclear weapons. I am in awe of your effort and your accomplishment. I know that President Ikeda is as well. I can only imagine how proud Josei Toda would have been to know of your effort. Your effort inspires and motivates. It is a source of hope.

    In your effort to gather signatures you have become educators and activists. You have brought this critical issue of nuclear weapons abolition to the attention of over 13 million people, and have obtained their affirmation of the need to end this nuclear weapons era which threatens the future of humanity and, indeed, all life.

    The petition on which you gathered signatures was prepared by Abolition 2000, which is a global network of over 1000 citizens organizations in some 75 countries working for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Abolition 2000 draws its strength from the grassroots, from the people. In this respect, it is similar to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. When the landmines campaign succeeded in having a treaty banning anti-personnel landmines signed in Ottawa, Jody Williams, the coordinator of the campaign, said, “Together we are a superpower. It’s a new definition of superpower. It’s not one of us; it’s all of us.” In Abolition 2000, as in the landmines campaign, we are not alone, and together we can become the most powerful grassroots movement in the history of humankind.

    The Abolition 2000 International Petition asks for three actions. First, end the nuclear threat by such reasonable steps as withdrawing all nuclear weapons from foreign soil and international waters, separating warheads from delivery vehicles, and committing to unconditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Second, sign an international treaty — a Nuclear Weapons Convention — by the year 2000, agreeing to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a fixed period of time. Third, reallocate resources from military purposes to assuring a sustainable global future.

    Each signature you have gathered represents a voice of hope. Together they represent a chorus of hope that can move the world. We don’t know with certainty what forces you have set in motion by your effort, but we do know that you have touched many lives and that they in turn will touch more lives. If other concerned citizens throughout the world will follow your lead, we can achieve our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

    You have concluded your petition campaign, but please don’t consider your task finished until the last nuclear weapon is removed from the world. This will not happen overnight. It will take sustained effort and commitment. It will require the often under-appreciated virtue of perseverance. All that is truly worth achieving requires perseverance — loving relationships, healthy communities, and a decent world.

    I will take the message of your achievement to the leaders of the United Nations, to the delegates preparing for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, to non-governmental organizations working for nuclear weapons abolition throughout the world, and to the leaders of my own country and other nuclear weapons states.

    I urge you to take the message of these 13 million voices to your own government, which has not been true to the people of Japan in its nuclear policies. Your government has not only been content to rely upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but — by its accumulation of reprocessed plutonium — has become a virtual nuclear weapons power capable of assembling hundreds of nuclear weapons in days or weeks. If we are to have a world free of nuclear weapons, we must convince our respective governments to change their policies. You must help to convince your government and I must help to convince mine that reliance upon nuclear weapons for defense is an act of folly that endangers our future and undermines our decency as well as our security.

    Sometimes we cannot see the full fruits of our efforts during our lifetimes. This has been true of many great peace leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. It is also true of Josei Toda whose vision forms the foundation for your effort. It is true for all of us — if our vision is great enough. I believe, however, that a world free of nuclear weapons can and will be achieved within our lifetimes.

    I urge you to dream of what can be, and to always hold fast to your dreams. I beseech you never to lose the dream of a world free from the threat of nuclear holocaust. I implore you to listen to your conscience, and to act courageously upon it. I encourage you to walk the path of peace, which is also the path of justice. I call upon you to follow President Ikeda’s sage advice, “Continue to advance, step-by-step! Never, ever, give up hope.”

    If we follow our dreams, if we listen to our consciences, if we act courageously, if we walk the path of peace, if we never give up hope, we will rise to our full stature as human beings. We will live lives that are rich and full. We will make a difference and, by our examples, we will influence others to live such lives. I promise you that I will do my utmost to join you in living such a life and will encourage others to join us as well.

    I would like to conclude by sharing with you a poem of hope written by Sadako Kurihara just after the bombing of Hiroshima.

    WE SHALL BRING FORTH NEW LIFE

    It was night in the basement of a broken building.

    Victims of the atomic bombing

    Crowding into the candleless darkness,

    Filling the room to overflowing —

    The smell of fresh blood, the stench of death,

    The stuffiness of human sweat, the writhing moans —

    When, out of the darkness, came a wondrous voice

    “Oh! The baby’s coming!” it said.

    In the basement turned to living hell

    A young woman had gone into labor!

    The others forgot their own pain in their concern;

    What could they do for her, having not even a match

    To bring light to the darkness?

    Then came another voice: “I am a midwife.

    I can help her with the baby.”

    It was a woman who had been moaning in pain only moments before.

    And so a new life was born

    In the darkness of that living hell.

    And so, the midwife died before the dawn,

    Still soaked in the blood of her own wounds.

    We shall give forth new life!

    We shall bring forth new life!

    Even to our death.

    To find such hope in the darkness of that awful night is a triumph of the human spirit. In remembering Hiroshima, let us dedicate ourselves to bringing forth new life. Let us dedicate ourselves to building a world in which even the threat of nuclear devastation is not a possibility. Let us dedicate ourselves to bringing forth a new world in which no child ever again must suffer the pain of war or hunger or abandonment. Let us dedicate ourselves to building a world in which there is liberty, justice and dignity for all who share this extraordinary planet that gave birth to life. Let us walk the path of peace, and be active participants in the pursuit of peace!

     

  • 20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War

    Ever since the two adversaries in the Cold War, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., realized that their nuclear arsenals were sufficient to do disastrous damage to both countries at short notice, the leaders and military commanders have thought about the possibility of a nuclear war starting without their intention or as a result of a false alarm. Increasingly elaborate accessories have been incorporated in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to minimize the risk of unauthorized or accidenta launch or detonation. A most innovative action was the establishment of the “hot line” between Washington and Moscow in 1963 to reduce the risk of misunderstanding between the supreme commanders.

    Despite all precautions, the possibility of an inadvertent war due to an unpredicted sequence of events remained as a deadly threat to both countries and to the world. That is the reason I am prepared to spen the rest of my life working for abolition of nuclear weapons.

    One way a war could start is a false alarm via one of the warning systems, followed by an increased level of nuclear forces readiness while the validity of the information was being checked. This action would be detected by the other side, and they would take appropriate action; detection of that response would tend to confirm the original false alarm; and so on to disaster. A similar sequence could result from an accidental nuclear explosion anywhere. The risk of such a sequence developing would be increased if it happened during a period of increased international tension.

    On the American side many “false alarms” and significant accidents have been listed, ranging from trivial to very serious, during the Cold War. Probably many remain unknown to the public and to the research community because of individuals’ desire to avoid blame and maintain the good reputation of their unit or command. No doubt there have been as many mishaps on the Soviet side.

    Working with any new system, false alarms are more likely. The rising moon was misinterpreted as a missile attack during the early days of long-range radar. A fire at a broken gas pipeline was believed to be enemy jamming by laser of a satellite’s infrared sensor when those sensors were first deployed.

    The risks are illustrated by the following selection of mishaps. If the people involved had exercised less caution, or if some unfortunate coincidental event had occurred, escalation to nuclear war can easily be imagined. Details of some of the events differ in different sources: where there have been disagreements, I have chosen to quote those from the carefully researched book “The Limits of Safety” by Scott D. Sagan. Sagan gives references to original sources in all instances.

    1956, November 5: Suez Crisis coincidence
    British and French forces were attacking Egypt at the Suez Canal. The Soviet Government had suggested to U.S. that they combine forces to stop this by a joint military action, and had warned the British and French governments that (non-nuclear) rocket attacks on London and Paris were being considered. That night the U.S. military HQ in Europe received messages that:
    (i) unidentified aircraft were flying over Turkey and the Turkish
    air force was on alert
    (ii) 100 Soviet MIG-15’s were flying over Syria
    (iii) a British Canberra bomber had been shot down over Syria
    (iv) the Russian fleet was moving through the Dardanelles. It is reported that in U.S.A. General Goodpaster himself was concerned that these events might trigger the NATO operations plan for nuclear strikes against U.S.S.R.

    The 4 reports were all shown afterwards to have innocent explanations. They were due, respectively, to:
    (i) a flight of swans
    (ii) a routine air force escort (much smaller than the number reported) for the president of Syria, who was returning from a visit to Moscow
    (iii) the Canberra bomber was forced down by mechanical problems
    (iv) the Russian fleet was engaged in scheduled routine exercises.

    1961, November 24: BMEWS communication failure
    On the night of 24 November, 1961, all communication links went dead between SAC HQ and NORAD, and so cut SAC HQ off from the three Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites (BMEWS) at Thule (Greenland), Clear (Alaska), and Filingdales (England). For General Power at SAC HQ, there were two possible explanations: either enemy action, or the coincidental failure of all the communication systems which had redundant and ostensibly independent routes including commercial telephone circuits. All SAC bases in U.S.A. were therefore alerted and B-52 nuclear bomber crews started their engines, with instructions not to take off without further orders. Radio communication was established with an orbiting B-52 on airborne alert which was near Thule. It contacted the BMEWS station by radio and could report that no attack had taken place.

    The reason for the “coincidental” failure was that the redundant routes for telephone and telegraph between NORAD and SAC HQ all ran through one relay station in Colorado. At that relay station a motor had overheated and caused interruption of all the lines.

    THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS LASTED FOR THE TWO WEEKS 14-28 OCTOBER 1962. MANY DANGEROUS EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN RELATION TO THE CRISIS, SOME OF THEM BECAUSE OF CHANGES MADE TO ENHANCE MILITARY READINESS. ELEVEN HAVE BEEN SELECTED:

    1962, August 23: B-52 Navigation Error
    SAC Chrome Dome airborne alert route included a leg from the northern tip of Ellesmere Island, SW across the Arctic Ocean to Barter Island, Alaska. On 23 August,1962, a B-52 nuclear-armed bomber crew made a navigational error and flew a course 20 deg. too far north. They approached within 300 miles of Soviet airspace near Wrangel island, where there was believed to be an interceptor base with aircraft having an operational radius of 400 miles.

    Because of the risk of repetition of such an error, in this northern area where other checks on navigation are difficult to obtain, it was decided to fly a less provocative route in future. However, the necessary orders had not been given by the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, so throughout that crisis the same northern route was being flown 24 hours a day.

    August-October 62: U2 flights into Soviet airspace
    U2 high altitude reconnaissance flights from Alaska occasionally strayed unintentionally into Soviet airspace. One such episode occurred in August 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 the U2 pilots were ordered not to fly within 100 miles of the Soviet airspace.

    On the night of 26 October, for a reason irrelevant to the crisis, a U2 pilot was ordered to fly a new route, over the north pole, where positional checks on navigation were by sextant only. That night the aurora prevented good sextant readings and the plane strayed over the Chukotski Peninsula. Soviet MIG interceptors took off with orders to shoot down the U2. The pilot contacted his U.S. command post and was ordered to fly due east towards Alaska. He ran out of fuel while still over Siberia. In response to his S.O.S., U.S. F102-A fighters were launched to escort him on his glide towards Alaska, with orders to prevent the MIG¹s from entering U.S. airspace. The U.S. interceptor aircraft were armed with nuclear missiles. These could have been used by any one of the F102-A pilots at his own discretion.

    1962, October 24: Russian satellite explodes
    On 24 October a Russian satellite entered its parking orbit, and shortly afterwards exploded. Sir Bernard Lovell, director of the Jodrell Bank observatory wrote in 1968: “the explosion of a Russian spacecraft in orbit during the Cuban Missile Crisis… led the U.S. to believe that the USSR was launching a massive ICBM attack.” The NORAD Command Post logs of the dates in question remain classified, possibly to conceal the reaction to this event. Its occurrence is recorded, and U.S. space tracking stations were informed on 31 October of debris resulting from breakup of “62 BETA IOTA”.

    1962, October 25: Duluth intruder
    At around midnight on 25 October, a guard at Duluth Sector Direction Center saw a figure climbing the security fence. He shot at it, and activated the “sabotage alarm”. This automatically set off sabotage alarms at all bases in the area. At Volk Field, Wisconsin, the alarm was wrongly wired, and the Klaxon sounded which ordered nuclear-armed F-106A interceptors to take off. The pilots knew there would be no practice alert drills while DEFCON 3 was in force, and they believed World War III had started.

    Immediate communication with Duluth showed there was an error. By this time aircraft were starting down the runway. A car raced from the command center and successfully signalled the aircraft to stop.

    The original intruder was a bear.

    1962, October 26: ICBM Test Launch
    At Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, there was a program of routine ICBM test flights. When DEFCON 3 was ordered all the ICBM’s were fitted with nuclear warheads except one Titan missile that was scheduled for a test launch later that week. That one was launched for its test, without further orders from Washington, at 4 a.m. on 26 October.

    It must be assumed that Russian observers were monitoring U.S. missile activities as closely as U.S. observers were monitoring Russian and Cuban activities. They would have known of the general changeover to nuclear warheads, but not that this was only a test launch.

    1962, October 26: Unannounced Titan missile launch
    During the Cuba Crisis, some radar warning stations that were under construction and near completion were brought into full operation as fast as possible. The planned overlap of coverage was thus not always available.

    A normal test launch of a Titan-II ICBM took place in the afternoon of 26 October, from Florida towards the S. Pacific. It caused temporary concern at Moorestown Radar site until its course could be plotted and showed no predicted impact within the United States. It was not until after this event that the potential for a serious false alarm was realized, and orders were given that radar warning sites must be notified in advance of test launches, and the countdown be relayed to them.

    1962, October 26: Malmstrom Air Force Base
    When DEFCON 2 was declared on 24 October, solid-fuel Minuteman-1 missiles at Malmstrom Air Force Base were being prepared for full deployment. The work was accelerated to ready the missiles for operation, without waiting for the normal handover procedures and safety checks. When one silo and the first missile were ready on 26 October no armed guards were available to cover transport from the normal separate storage, so the launch- enabling equipment and codes were all placed in the silo. It was thus physically possible for a single operator to launch a fully armed missile at a SIOP target.

    During the remaining period of the Crisis the several missiles at Malmstrom were repeatedly put on and off alert as errors and defects were found and corrected. Fortunately no combination of errors caused or threatened an unauthorized launch, but in the extreme tension of the period the danger can well be imagined.

    October 1962: NATO Readiness
    It is recorded in British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan¹s diary for 22 October that in order to avoid provocation of U.S.S.R., he and the NATO Supreme Commander, General Lauris Norstad, agreed not to put NATO on alert. When the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered DEFCON 3 Norstad was authorized to use his discretion in complying. Norstad therefore did not order a NATO alert. However, several NATO subordinate commanders did order alerts to DEFCON 3 or equivalent levels of readiness at bases in West Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Britain. This seems to have been largely due to the action of General Truman Landon, CINC U.S. Air Forces Europe, who had already started alert procedures on 17 October in anticipation of a serious crisis over Cuba.

    October 1962: British Alerts
    When U.S. SAC went to DEFCON 2, on 24 October, Bomber Command was carrying out an unrelated readiness exercise. On 26 October Air Marshall Cross, C-in-C Bomber Command, decided to prolong the exercise because of the Cuba crisis, and later increased the alert status of British Nuclear forces so that they could launch within 15 minutes.

    It seems likely that Soviet intelligence would perceive these moves as part of a coordinated plan in preparation for immediate war. They could not be expected to know that neither the British Minister of Defence nor Prime Minister Macmillan had authorized them.

    It is disturbing to note how little was learned from these errors in Europe. McGeorge Bundy wrote in Danger and Survival (New York: Random House 1988) “the risk [of nuclear war] was small, given the prudence and unchallenged final control of the two leaders.”

    1962, October 28: Moorestown false alarm
    Just before 9 a.m. on 28 October, the Moorestown, N.J., radar operators informed national command post that a nuclear attack appeared to be under way. A test tape simulating a missile launch from Cuba was being run, and simultaneously a satellite came over the horizon. Operators became confused and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ that impact was expected 18 miles west of Tampa at 9.02 a.m. The whole of NORAD was alerted, but before irrevocable action had been taken it was reported that no detonation had taken place at the predicted time, and Moorestown operators reported the reason for the false alarm.

    During the incident overlapping radars that should have confirmed or disagreed were not in operation. The radar post had not received routine information of satellite passage because the facility carrying out that task had been given other work for the duration of the Crisis.

    1962, October 28: False warning due to satellite sighting
    At 5.26 p.m. on 28 October, the Laredo radar warning site had just become operational. Operators misidentified a satellite in orbit as two possible missiles over Georgia, and reported by voice line to NORAD HQ. NORAD was unable to identify that the warning came from the new station at Laredo and believed it to be from Moorestown, and therefore more reliable. Moorestown failed to intervene and contradict the false warning. By the time C-in-C NORAD had been informed, no impact had been reported and the warning was “given low credence”.

    END OF CUBA CRISIS EVENTS

    1962 November 2: The Penkovsky False Warning
    In the Fall of 1962 Col. Oleg Penkovsky was working in Russia as a double agent for the (U.S.) CIA. He had been given a code by which to warn the CIA if he was convinced that a Soviet attack on the United States was imminent. He was to call twice, one minute apart, and only blow into the receiver. Further information was then to be left at a “dead drop” in Moscow.

    The prearranged code message was received by the CIA on 2 November, 1962.

    It was not known at CIA that Penkovsky had been arrested on 22 October. Penkovsky knew he was going to be executed. It is not known whether he had told KGB the meaning of the code signal or only how it could be given, nor is it known exactly why or with what authorization KGB staff used it. When another CIA agent checked the dead drop he was arrested.

    1965, November: Power failure and faulty bomb alarms
    Special bomb alarms were installed near military facilities and near cities in U.S.A. so that the locations of nuclear bursts would be transmitted before the expected communication failure. The alarm circuits were set up to display a red signal at command posts the instant that the flash of a nuclear detonation reached the sensor and before the blast could put it out of action. Normally the display would show a green signal, and yellow if the sensor was not operating or was out of communication for any other reason.

    During the commercial power failure in NE United States in November 1965, displays from all the bomb alarms for the area should have shown yellow. In fact two of them from different cities showed red because of circuit errors. The effect was consistent with the power failure being due to nuclear weapon explosions, and the Command Center of the Office of Emergency Planning went on full alert. Apparently the military did not.

    1968, January 21: B-52 crash near Thule
    Communication between NORAD HQ and the BMEWS station at Thule had 3
    elements:
    1. Direct radio communication.
    2. A “bomb alarm” as described above.
    3. Radio communication relayed by a B-52 bomber on airborne alert.

    On 21 January, 1968, fire broke out in the B-52 bomber on airborne alert near Thule. The pilot prepared for an emergency landing at the base. However the situation deteriorated rapidly, and the crew had to bale out. There had been no time to communicate with SAC HQ, and the pilotless plane flew over the Thule base before crashing on the ice 7 miles offshore. Its fuel and the high explosive component of its nuclear weapons exploded, but there was no nuclear detonation.

    At that time, the “one point safe” condition of the nuclear weapons could not be guaranteed, and it is believed that a nuclear explosion could have resulted from accidental detonation of the high explosive trigger. Had there been a nuclear detonation even at 7 miles distant, and certainly if much nearer the base, all three communication methods would have given an indication consistent with a successful nuclear attack on both the base and the B-52 bomber. The bomb alarm would have shown red, and the two other communication paths would have gone dead. It would hardly have been anticipated that the combination could have been caused by accident, particularly as the map of the routes for B-52 airborne alert flights approved by the president showed no flight near to Thule. The route had apparently been changed without informing the White House.

    October 73: False alarm during Middle East crisis
    On 24 October, 1973, when the UN-sponsored ceasefire intended to end the Arab-Israeli war was in force, further fighting started between Egyptian and Israeli troops in the Sinai desert. U.S. intelligence reports and other sources suggested that U.S.S.R. was planning to intervene to protect the Egyptians. President Nixon was in the throes of the Watergate episode and not available for a conference, so Kissinger and other U.S. officials ordered DEFCON 3. The consequent movements of aircraft and troops were of course observed by Soviet intelligence. The purpose of the alert was not to prepare for war, but to warn U.S.S.R. not to intervene in Sinai. However, if the following accident had not been promptly corrected then the Soviet command might have made a more dangerous interpretation.

    On 25 October, while DEFCON 3 was in force, mechanics were repairing one of the Klaxons at Kinchloe Air Force Base, Michigan, and accidentally activated the whole base alarm system. B-52 crews rushed to their aircraft and started the engines. The duty officer recognized that the alarm was false, and recalled the crews before any took off.

    1979 November 9: Computer Exercise Tape
    At 8.50 a.m. on 9 November, 1979, duty officers at 4 command centres (NORAD HQ, SAC Command Post, the Pentagon National Military Command Center, and the Alternate National Military Command Center) all saw on their displays a pattern showing a large number of Soviet missiles in a full-scale attack on U.S.A. During the next 6 minutes emergency preparations for retaliation were made. A number of Air Force planes were launched, including the president’s National Emergency Airborne Command Post, though without the president! The president had not been informed, perhaps because he could not be found.

    No attempt was made to use the hot line either to ascertain the Soviet intentions or to tell the Russians the reason for the U.S. actions. This seems to me to have been culpable negligence. The whole purpose of the “Hot Line” was to prevent exactly the type of disaster that was threatening at that moment.

    With commendable speed, NORAD was able to contact PAVE PAWS early warning radar and learn that no missiles had been reported. Also, the sensors on satellites were functioning that day and had detected no missiles. In only 6 minutes the threat assessment conference was terminated.

    The reason for the false alarm was an exercise tape running on the computer system. U.S. Senator Charles Percy happened to be in NORAD HQ at the time and is reported to have said there was absolute panic. A question was asked in Congress. The General Accounting Office conducted an investigation, and an off-site testing facility was constructed so that test tapes did not in future have to be run on a system that could possibly be in military operation.

    June 80: Faulty Computer Chip
    The warning displays at the Command Centers mentioned in the last episode included windows that normally showed

    0000 ICBMs detected 0000 SLBMs detected

    At 2.25 a.m. on 3 June, 1979, these displays started showing various numbers of missiles detected, represented by 2’s in place of one or more 0’s. Preparations for retaliation were instituted, including nuclear bomber crews starting their engines, launch of Pacific Command’s Airborne Command Post, and readying of Minuteman missiles for launch. It was not difficult to assess that this was a false alarm because the patterns of numbers displayed were not rational.

    While the cause of that false alarm was still being investigated 3 days later, the same thing happened and again preparations were made for retaliation.

    The cause was a single faulty chip that was failing in random fashion. The basic design of the system was faulty, allowing this single failure to cause a deceptive display at several command posts.

    This selection represents only a fraction of the false alarms that have been reported on the American side. Many probably remain unreported, or are hidden in records that remain classified. There are likely to have been as many on the Soviet side which are even more difficult to access.

    The extreme boredom and isolation of missile launch crews on duty must contribute to occasional bizarre behaviour. An example is reported by Lloyd J.Dumas in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol.36, #9, p.15 (1980) quoting Air Force Magazine of 17 Nov.71. As a practical joke, a silo crew recorded a launch message and played it when their relief came on duty. The new crew heard with consternation what appeared to be a valid launch message. They would not of course have been able to effect an actual launch under normal conditions, without proper confirmation from outside the silo.

    COMMENT AND NOTE ON PROBABILITY

    The probability of actual progression to nuclear war on any one of the occasions listed may have been small, due to planned “failsafe” features in the warning and launch systems, and to responsible action by those in the chain of command when the failsafe features had failed. However, the accumulation of small probabilities of disaster from a long sequence of risks adds up to serious danger.

    There is no way of telling what the actual level of risk was in these mishaps but if the chance of disaster in every one of the 20 incidents had been only 1 in 100, it is a mathematical fact that the chance of surviving all 20 would have been 82%, i.e. about the same as the chance of surviving a single pull of the trigger at Russian roulette played \ with a 6-shooter. With a similar series of mishaps on the Soviet side: another pull of the trigger. If the risk in some of the events had been as high as 1 in 10, then the chance of surviving just seven such events would have been less than 50:50.

    The following incident is added to illustrate that even now, when the Cold War has been over for 8 years, errors can still cause concern. Some have said this incident brought the world very close to an accidental nuclear war. That is debatable, but there are still 30,000 nuclear weapons deployed, so grave danger would exist if two nuclear weapons states should get into a hostile adversarial status again.

    January 95: Norwegian Meteorological Missile
    On 25 January, 1995, the Russian early warning radars detected an unexpected missile launch near Spitzbergen. The estimated flight time to Moscow was 5 minutes. The Russian President, the Defence Minister and the Chief of Staff were informed. The early warning and the control and command systems switched to combat mode. Within 5 minutes, the radars determined that the missile’s impact point would be outside the Russian borders.

    The missile was carrying instruments for scientific measurements. On 16 January Norway had notified 35 countries including Russia that the launch was planned. Information had apparently reached the Russian Defense Ministry, but failed to reach the on-duty personnel of the early warning system.

    Principal Sources

    Sagan, Scott D.: The Limits of Safety (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
    University Press, 1993).
    Peace Research Reviews, vol.IX, 4, 5 (1984); vol.X, 3,4(1986) (Dundas,
    ON.: Peace Research Institute, Dundas).
    Calder, Nigel: Nuclear Nightmares (London: British Broadcasting
    Corporation, 1979).
    Britten, Stewart: The Invisible Event (London: Menard Press, 1983)

    Acronyms

    BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site
    CIA Central Intelligence Agency
    CINC Commander in Chief
    DEFCON Defense Readiness Condition
    (DEFCON 5 is the peacetime state;
    DEFCON 1 is maximum war readiness)
    HQ Headquarters
    ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (land based)
    KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopaznosti
    (Soviet Secret Police and Intelligence)
    NORAD North American Air Defense Command
    PAVE PAWS Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning System
    SAC Strategic Air Command
    SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan
    SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

  • We Owe an Allegiance to Humanity

    This interview was held with Joseph Rotblat, the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate, when he visited Santa Barbara to receive the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s 1997 Lifetime Achievement Award for Distinguished Peace Leadership. Professor Rotblat was interviewed on October 29, 1997 by Foundation President David Krieger.

    Krieger: Having worked for more than 50 years for the elimination of nuclear weapons, how would you assess the progress that’s been made toward achieving a nuclear weapons free world?

    Rotblat: I believe that we have made significant progress. Perhaps hopes were a bit too optimistic that, with end of the Cold War, very quickly we could get rid of all nuclear weapons because their purpose, if there was any purpose, certainly ceased to exist. We hoped that particularly the United States would then take drastic steps to get rid of the weapons. Steps have been taken; a certain amount of the dismantlement of weapons has taken place with a number of treaties, stopping testing, etc. But I am disappointed that the progress is not greater, particularly that the nuclear powers still stick to the same way of thinking they did during the Cold War – that nuclear weapons are needed for security. As long as this thinking exists, there is not much hope that there will be an agreement by the nuclear powers to get rid of the weapons. I believe, however, that we’re gradually winning the logical argument against the retention of nuclear weapons. What is needed at the present is a push from the mass media and from mass movements to support the suggestions made in a number of recent studies. I believe that if this is done and specific ideas put forward which could easily be implemented, it will start the process of elimination of nuclear weapons which could be achieved in about two decades.

    Krieger: What do you think is needed to achieve the sort of mass movement for abolition that you are calling for?

    Rotblat: I think two things – a positive and a negative. The negative one is to point out that the problem with nuclear weapons has not been solved – that the progress which started the world toward disarmament has come to a halt. There is now a real danger that the nuclear arms race will start again and more nations will acquire nuclear weapons. People must realize that the nuclear issue must be put on the agenda because of the real threat that we will go back to the dangers that existed during the Cold War. People should be aware there is a danger.

    And then, following out of this, we must put forth specific proposals which will start the whole disarmament process over again. In my opinion, among several proposals like de-alerting of nuclear weapons, separating warheads from the missiles, all of which will make the world safer, we also need something which will enable us to go ahead to the actual elimination of nuclear weapons. One such step is a No First Use Treaty, providing that the nuclear weapons states will agree among themselves that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack and nothing else. Once they’ve agreed to this, if they agree to such a treaty, then I see the way directly open to the final step to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Krieger: What will have to happen for the nuclear weapons states to take such a significant step?

    Rotblat: They will have to be pushed towards it. And I said there are two things. One is to present the logical argument which is really unassailable. There’s no need for nuclear weapons today. It’s been shown that the world can live in better safety without nuclear weapons than with nuclear weapons. So the first thing is to convince the nuclear weapons states from the professional’s point of view, and then they’ll have to feel the pressure from the people because, after all, they are subject to election. They can’t ignore the voice of the people. If we can build up a real mass movement – people demonstrating, writing petitions, writing to member of Parliament, etc. – if we can just build up to a real crescendo, then I think the nuclear weapons states will have to accept it.

    Krieger: What you are calling for is a campaign to educate the people on the one hand and to educate the leaders on the other hand. Is that correct?

    Rotblat: You cannot start a mass movement without telling people what they are trying to achieve. Therefore, when I speak about starting a mass movement, of course, it has to start by educating the people. Give them the facts. They should not just believe they are living in a world where nuclear weapons don’t matter. The truth now is that many people think that the danger is over completely, and this is the reason why the nuclear issue is no longer on the agenda. The first thing is to inform the people that the process is not complete, and in fact it may reverse. Give them facts. Groups like yours, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, have a big task in this mass movement campaign for the abolition of nuclear weapons, part of the Abolition 2000 program.

    Krieger: Do you believe that we will achieve a nuclear weapons free world in a reasonable period of time?

    Rotblat: I don’t know what is reasonable. I would like to see it in my lifetime, at least the beginning. What is important is for the nuclear weapons states to get away from the mode of thinking that nuclear weapons are needed for security. This I believe could be achieved very quickly. It could be done before the end of the century. It could be done next year. I believe that if this were achieved, if leaders really accepted a No First Use Treaty, which would mean a breakthrough in their thinking, from then on it would be largely a technical matter how to ensure that a convention banning nuclear weapons will not be violated. I believe this can be done. The main thing is to start the process. If the process is started, which I hope will happen soon, then it would take another two decades until a nuclear weapons free world is completely achieved.

    Krieger: This way of thinking that you’re talking about, do you believe this is what Einstein meant when he made his famous statement that “the splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking”?

    Rotblat: What he meant was a new way to approach the problem of security – away from national security to global security. This is a new way of thinking. Many people have adopted it, but not yet the decision-makers. We still need a new way of thinking. It is still the most important issue at the present time.

    Krieger: You mentioned Abolition 2000 – the campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to be agreed to before the year 2000. Can you share some of your thoughts on this Abolition 2000 campaign?

    Rotblat: It is a much needed mass movement campaign. It will be, I believe, the deciding factor in whether the nuclear decision makers will accept abolition or not. But I feel that we need something more than has been done up to now. Additional aspects need to be added to the present movement, that is, to explain to people that they have to do something about the danger and then point to a number of events and pull out specifically one event that we can get very quickly. In my opinion this would be a No First Use Treaty. I think that with this there is a good chance that we shall be successful.

    Krieger: You’re almost 89 years old and you’ve worked hard over the course of your life to eliminate nuclear weapons and to engender more responsibility by scientists as well as citizens in general. What gives you hope for the future?

    Rotblat: My hope is based on logic. Namely, there is no alternative. If we don’t do this, then we are doomed. The whole existence of humankind is endangered. We are an endangered species now and we have to take steps to prevent the extinguishing of the human species. We owe an allegiance to humanity. Since there is no other way, then we must proceed in this way. Therefore, if we must do it, then there is hope that it will be done.

    Krieger: I know that you have a great concern for young people and for life. If you could give one message to the young people of today, what would it be?

    Rotblat: My message would be: “You have a duty. You enjoy many fine aspects of life, better perhaps than your parents had. We have bequeathed to you many of the things which we ourselves have inherited and have tried to improve on, to ensure that you have a happy life. I think it is your duty to ensure that this goes on to your children and your grandchildren so that human life on this planet will continue to be enriched all the time.”

    Krieger: Thank you.

  • From Arms Control to Abolition: Global Action for a Nuclear Weapons Free World

    During the Cold War, nuclear arsenals were rationalized on the basis of deterrence, and the nuclear weapons states developed military strategies of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Since it was recognized that attacks and counter-attacks with nuclear arsenals would be without precedent in their destructiveness, even to the point of destroying human civilization and most life on Earth, the acronym MAD seemed particularly appropriate. During the Cold War period, leaders tried to bring some modicum of sanity to an otherwise insane situation by engaging in arms control discussions and occasionally reaching agreements regarding the control of nuclear arsenals.

    The two most important arms control agreements during the Cold War were reached in the 1960s. The first was the Partial Test Ban (PTB) Treaty, which was signed and entered into force in 1963. This treaty prohibited nuclear testing in the oceans, atmosphere, and outer space. The PTB was achieved under considerable pressure from citizens throughout the world who objected to the dangerous health effects associated with atmospheric nuclear testing. Among the leaders in the protest against atmospheric nuclear testing were Linus Pauling, the great scientist, and his wife Ava Helen Pauling, who organized a petition signed by 9,235 scientists, which Pauling delivered to U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold on January 15, 1958. The document was entitled, “Petition to the United Nations Urging that an International Agreement to Stop the Testing of Nuclear Bombs Be Made Now.”

    The PTB did not put an end to nuclear testing, and thus to the development of new and more efficient nuclear weapons. Rather, it resulted in moving nuclear testing underground. In this sense, the treaty was more an environmental treaty than an arms control treaty. The only thing that the treaty disarmed was public outrage at the health risks related to atmospheric nuclear testing. The treaty contained the promise of “seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,” which was widely recognized as a critical step in ending the nuclear arms race. Unfortunately, the goal of ending nuclear testing remained essentially dormant for the next 33 years until a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally adopted by the United Nations and opened for signatures in 1996.

    The second important arms control agreement during the Cold War was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. This treaty sought to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials to states not in possession of nuclear arsenals as of January 1, 1967. The treaty recognized two classes of states: nuclear weapons states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China), and non-nuclear weapons states (all other states). The nuclear weapons states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials to the non-nuclear weapons states, and the non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to receive or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materials.

    When the NPT was negotiated, the non-nuclear weapons states recognized the unequal nature of the treaty, and argued for two concessions from the nuclear weapons states. First, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was described in the treaty as an “inalienable right,” and nuclear weapons states promised to help the non-nuclear weapons states in developing nuclear power plants. Second, the non-nuclear weapons states objected to the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” created by the treaty, and negotiated Article VI of the treaty which called for good faith negotiations to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Article VI of the NPT, despite its carefully crafted language, is one of the most important, if not the most important, of all commitments made by nuclear weapons states in arms control agreements.

    In exchange for not attempting to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapons states had a reasonable expectation under Article VI that the nuclear weapons states would proceed with good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament, to rid the world of the terrible threat of nuclear holocaust. Until the end of the Cold War, however, the nuclear weapons states had made scant progress toward nuclear disarmament, and were widely viewed by states from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as being in violation of their Article VI commitment. In fact, at the end of the Cold War, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the nuclear weapons states were considerably larger than they were when the NPT was signed in 1968.

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the rationale for retaining nuclear arsenals has evaporated. Deterrence was always a questionable theory, but without the threatened attack of an enemy, it clearly makes no sense at all. Nuclear weapons can be more clearly recognized in the aftermath of the Cold War as “instruments of genocide” that serve no reasonable purpose. Since the end of the Cold War, increasing pressure has mounted for the nuclear weapons states to fulfill the promise under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    START I, START II, and START III

    Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in the early 1990s resulted in two treaties agreeing to the reduction of the numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the United States and former Soviet Union. START I, which was signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Bush in 1991, called for reductions to approximately 6,500 deployed strategic weapons on each side. START II, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in 1993, called for further reductions of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 3,000 to 3,500 on each side by January 1, 2003. START II was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996, but has yet to be ratified by the Russian Duma, many members of which have expressed deep concerns over the U.S.-led efforts to expand NATO eastward. In September 1997, the U.S. and Russia agreed to extend the date for achieving START II reductions for five years to the end of 1997.

    However, even if START II is successfully completed, there will still be as many deployed strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the two major nuclear weapons states as there were when the NPT was signed in 1968. This has led many of the non-aligned states to question the sincerity and good faith of the nuclear weapons states in fulfilling their Article VI promises.

    Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have had preliminary discussions regarding START III, and have suggested that this agreement could reduce nuclear arsenals to 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side by the year 2007. This advance, however, is uncertain due to the Russian opposition to the proposed expansion of NATO. Even more significant is that the proposed START III agreement is simply more incrementalism. It lacks a vision of a world without nuclear weapons, and simply reduces the overkill ratio to a somewhat lower level. It is consistent with maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” indefinitely. It misses the tremendous opportunity that currently exists to move from arms control to abolition.

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference

    A NPT Review and Extension Conference was called for by the terms of the treaty 25 years after the treaty entered into force. The purpose of this conference, which was held in 1995, was to determine whether the treaty should be extended indefinitely or for a period or periods of time. The nuclear weapons states, which saw the treaty as advantageous to themselves, argued for an indefinite extension of the treaty. Many non-aligned states, though, questioned the good faith of the nuclear weapons states, and suggested that the treaty should be extended for periods of time and re-extended contingent upon sufficient progress toward fulfillment of the Article VI promise of nuclear disarmament.

    At the conference the nuclear weapons states and their allies (primarily the NATO states) exerted considerable pressure on the non-aligned states and finally prevailed in having the treaty extended indefinitely. However, at the insistence of the non-aligned states, certain non-binding agreements were attached to the indefinite extension which called for, among other steps, the following:

    “(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

    “(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

    “(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

    Abolition 2000 Global Network

    At the NPT Review and Extension Conference, an Abolition Caucus — composed of representatives of citizen action groups from throughout the world — was organized to share information and to join in lobbying the delegates. From this caucus an 11-point plan, calling for nuclear weapons abolition was drafted and agreed to. This document was called the Abolition 2000 Statement. The Statement called for a treaty by the year 2000 for the prohibition and elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework.

    The Abolition 2000 Statement became the basis for the establishment of the Abolition 2000 Global Network, which has now grown to over 700 citizen actions groups from six continents. It is a dynamic citizen network committed to the goal of achieving a nuclear weapons free world.

    The World Court Project

    The World Court Project (WCP) was initiated by three major international citizen action groups: the International Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and the International Peace Bureau (IPB). The purpose of the project was to obtain an opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Through intensive lobbying of delegates to the World Health Organization and the United Nations General Assembly, the WCP was successful in having both of those bodies request an opinion from the Court.

    The question posed by the World Health Organization (WHO) focused on use of nuclear weapons: “In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?” The question posed by the General Assembly also included the threat of use: “Would the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance be permitted under international law?”

    The Court received considerable written and oral argument from states. On July 8, 1996, the Court issued its opinion on the question posed by the U.N. General Assembly. At the same time, the Court declined to issue an opinion on the question posed by WHO, stating that their question failed to meet the criteria of arising within the scope of WHO’s activities. In response the General Assembly, the Court issued a 37 page opinion, and each of the 14 judges on the Court issued a separate statement with the opinion. The Court found that any threat or use of nuclear weapons must conform with the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. This means that nuclear weapons cannot be threatened or used in such a manner as to fail to discriminate between civilians and combatants, and that they must not cause unnecessary suffering to combatants. Based primarily upon this finding, the Court then found that any threat or use of nuclear weapons would be generally illegal.

    The Court was unable to determine, however, whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be legal or illegal “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.” The Court’s opinion went a long way toward shutting the door on the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but it left open this narrow possibility in the case of the very survival of a state. Some of the judges pointed to the irony of leaving open the possibility of using nuclear weapons in conditions in which the survival of a state was at stake, since such use could result in escalation endangering the survival of all life.

    Given what the Court found to be an ambiguity in international law involving an “extreme circumstance of self-defence,” it reviewed Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and concluded: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” The Court’s ruling on the Article VI commitment clarifies that nuclear disarmament must be complete, that it must be disarmament “in all its aspects,” and that it is not tied to conventional disarmament or other security issues.

    The nuclear weapons states have argued that the Court’s opinion is advisory only, and they have not acted on it. While the opinion is, in fact, advisory in nature, it is still the pronouncement of the highest Court in the world on an issue of utmost importance. The significance of the opinion has not been lost on the states in the non-aligned movement that have been pressing for complete nuclear disarmament. Nor has the significance of the opinion been lost on citizen action groups around the world, such as the Abolition 2000 Global Network, that have been pressing the case for the abolition of nuclear arsenals.

    The Canberra Commission Report

    In response to French nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific, the Australian government established a prestigious commission of eminent individuals to examine the case for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Participants in the Commission included General Lee Butler, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command; Robert McNamara, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense; Michel Rocard, a former French Prime Minister; Field Marshall Micheal Carver, a former British Chief of Defence Staff; Jacques Cousteau, the late ocean explorer and advocate for future generations; and Joseph Rotblat, founder and president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs and the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate.

    The Report of the Canberra Commission stated: “Nuclear weapons pose an intolerable threat to humanity and its habitat, yet tens of thousands remain in arsenals built up at a time of deep antagonism. That time has passed, yet assertions of their utility continue…. A nuclear weapon free world can be secured and maintained through political commitment, and anchored in an enduring and binding legal framework.”

    The Report called for some immediate steps to reduce the nuclear threat:

    • Taking nuclear forces off alert;
    • Removal of warheads from delivery vehicles;
    • Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
    • Ending nuclear testing;
    • Initiating negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals; and
    • Agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states.

    These steps would take us a long way toward reducing the immediate risks of nuclear warfare, but as yet the nuclear weapons states have resisted their implementation. The only exception is the signing of the CTBT and, even in this case, at least one of the nuclear weapons states, the United States, is continuing to conduct “sub-critical” nuclear tests which undermine the spirit of the treaty.

    The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was finally opened for signatures in September 1996, but it has yet to enter into force and the procedures for entry into force make it unlikely that this will occur. Entry into force requires the ratification of all 44 nuclear capable states, and India has made it clear that it will not sign or ratify the treaty so long as there is no firm commitment by the declared nuclear weapons states to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. India’s position is that it is unwilling to give up the option of conducting nuclear tests in a world in which the declared nuclear weapons states, which have already tested extensively, refuse to make a firm commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and thus continue to rely upon them for their security. While India has been widely criticized for this position, one must admit that this position is not without logic.

    The CTBT has been marred by the insistence of the U.S. that “sub-critical” tests fall within the framework of the treaty. The U.S. has already begun a series of such tests, and it is likely that other nuclear weapons states will follow its lead. The U.S. is also planning a Stockpile Stewardship Program, on which it plans to spend some $45 billion over the next ten years. This program includes the development of new and expensive structures for laboratory testing of nuclear weapons. Again, it is likely that other nuclear weapons states will follow the U.S. lead by continuing to test by other means that circumvent the spirit if not the letter of the CTBT.

    The Statement by International Generals and Admirals*

    In December 1996 some 60 retired generals and admirals from around the world issued statements calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. U.S. Generals Lee Butler and Andrew Goodpaster issued a statement at the National Press Club in Washington, DC. Their statement called for “pursuit of a policy of cooperative, phased reductions with serious commitments to seek the elimination of all nuclear weapons.”

    As a separate statement, 58 of these retired generals and admirals argued “the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.” The generals and admirals called for the following three steps:

    “First, present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back;

    “Second, remaining nuclear weapons should be gradually and transparently taken off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states; and

    “Third, long-term international nuclear policy must be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons.”

    A Nuclear Weapons Convention

    In December 1996 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (51/45M) expressing appreciation to the International Court of Justice for responding to its request. It underlined the Court’s unanimous conclusion that an obligation exists “to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.” The resolution called for “commencement of multilateral negotiations in 1997 leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.”

    In order to demonstrate that drafting a nuclear weapons convention was a technically feasible possibility, two citizens action groups — the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) — prepared a draft model Nuclear Weapons Convention. This draft was made public in April 1997 at the PrepCom for the NPT Review Conference.

    From Arms Control to Abolition

    Arms control has been a method of maintaining strategic balance between the key nuclear weapons states, while at the same time maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” In other words, arms control has been in part a dangerous game to maintain special privilege played at the precipice of nuclear holocaust. It has been a game of high stakes, both financially and militarily. In the end, it caused the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the jury is still out on what its ultimate effects will be on the United States, the one nation that has used nuclear weapons in warfare.

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, it is now a particularly propitious time to move forward with the abolition of nuclear weapons. To do so will require a change in mindset of decision-makers in the nuclear weapons states, many of whom seem determined to hold on to their nuclear arsenals. The International Court of Justice has spoken on the obligation to achieve complete nuclear disarmament. The Canberra Commission has offered positive proposals for eliminating the immediate threat. The international generals and admirals have argued the case for the security benefits of eliminating nuclear arsenals.

    Citizen action groups around the world have joined together in the call for achieving a treaty by the year 2000 calling for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons within a timebound framework. They have called for achieving this treaty by the year 2000 so that the people of the world can enter the 21st century with a treaty in place leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a timebound framework.

    Unfortunately, the leaders of the nuclear weapons states do not seem to have heard or understood the arguments for eliminating their nuclear arsenals. They are expending their efforts on arms control proposals, like the CTBT, which they try to evade in practice. These leaders do not seem to have grasped that this is not a game, and that “superiority” cannot be realized by arsenals of genocidal weapons. They are still thinking in old ways that are no longer appropriate in the Nuclear Age. Their thinking could pull us into the vortex of nuclear conflagration, by accident or design.

    Einstein argued that “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” The new way of thinking that Einstein called for must take into account the tremendous destructive power of the “instruments of genocide” in the arsenals of the nuclear weapons states. If we oppose genocide, we must also oppose basing our security on nuclear weapons.

    When enough people speak out and demand that government leaders change their ways of thinking, then these leaders will change. Until enough people demand such change, government officials will likely continue to tread old paths of the mind. We need a united effort of people everywhere to demand that the goal of a nuclear weapons free world be realized, and that we enter the 21st century with a treaty in place that will lead to elimination of nuclear weapons within a timebound framework.

    Bibliography

    Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 1996, United Nations General Assembly, A/51/218, 15 October 1996

    Model Nuclear Weapons Convention 1997, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York

    Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 1996 National Capital Printers, Canberra, Australia [http://www.dfat.gov.au/dfat/cc/cchome.html]

    Evan, William and Ved Nanda (eds.) 1995 Nuclear Proliferation and the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, University Press of America, Inc., Lanham, Maryland

    Pauling, Linus 1983 No More War!, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York

    Roche, Douglas, Unacceptable Risk: Nuclear Weapons in a Volatile World 1995 Project Ploughshares and Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Ontario

    Rotblat, Joseph, et.al. (eds.) A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World Desirable? Feasible? 1993 Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado

    Ruggiero, Greg and Stuart Sahulka (eds.) 1996 Critical Mass, Voices for a Nuclear-Free Future, Open Media, Westfield, New Jersey

    INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ADVISORY OPINION

    ON THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    July 8, 1996 Paragraph 105. For these reasons, THE COURT,

    (1) By thirteen votes to one, Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion;

    In Favour. President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Koroma, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;

    Against: Judge Oda.

    (2) Replies in the following manner to the question put by the General Assembly:

    A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;

    B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such;

    In Favour: President Bedjaoui; Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereshchetin, Ferrari Bravo, Higgins;

    Against: Judges Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma.

    C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 is unlawful;

    D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;

    E. By seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote, It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law,

    However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake;

    IN FAVOUR: President Bedjaoui; Judges Ranjeva, Herczegh, Shi, Fleischhauer, Vereschetin, Ferrari Bravo;

    AGAINST: Vice-President Schwebel; Judges Oda, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma, Higgins.

    F. Unanimously, There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

    Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six, in two copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the other transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

    (Signed) Mohammed Bedjaoui, President.

    (Signed) Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar.

    President Bedjaoui, Judges Herczegh, Shi Vereshchetin and Ferrari Bravo append declarations to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

    Judges Guillaume, Ranjeva and Fleischhauer append separate opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

    Vice-President Schwebel, Judges Oda, Shahabuddeen, Weeramantry, Koroma and Higgins append dissenting opinions to the Advisory Opinion of the Court.

  • Ending the Nuclear Weapons Era

    The Nuclear Age

    The Nuclear Age began on a quiet stretch of desert in Alamogordo, New Mexico on July 16, 1945. Robert Oppenheimer, a principal scientist in the effort to create the atomic bomb, is reported to have recalled this line from the Bhagavad Gita, “I am become death, the shatterer of worlds.” Just three weeks after the first test, a second atomic bomb was exploded, this time over the city of Hiroshima. On August 6, 1945, Hiroshima became death. Three days later, on August 9, 1945, Nagasaki became death. Oppenheimer and his fellow scientists were, indeed, shatterers of worlds.

    The Nuclear Age was conceived in fear and born with destructive impulse. The atom bomb was developed to protect its creators; it was used to destroy their enemies. It remains to be seen whether it will also destroy its creators. For the first time in history, humankind had created a tool powerful enough to destroy itself. Thus, we should be sobered by our own invention, and warned by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But as a species we seem to be neither sufficiently sobered nor warned.

    In the name of national security, a mad race to develop nuclear arsenals took place between the United States and the former Soviet Union. It drained the treasuries of these countries, and cast a dark shadow on the souls of their inhabitants. With scientific genius, these so-called superpowers (and ethical weaklings) improved the power and efficiency of their nuclear devices. Their leaders believed that national security justified threatening to kill hundreds of millions of innocent people that were called “the enemy.”

    On each side, the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction was pursued with intensity of purpose. This is the atmosphere into which most of the world’s people now living have been born and raised. This is the Nuclear Age.

    Einstein warned that “the unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” How are we to respond? How are we to change our thinking? How are we to avoid the catastrophes that lurk not only in the shadows of the Nuclear Age, but in our Congresses, our Parliaments, our Diets, our Dumas, our very hearts?

    The Nuclear Age was born from the destruction of World War II. The atomic bombs were the final exclamation points on a world crazed with killing. From this same frenzy and turmoil of war came other creations more hopeful. From the ashes of World War II came the United Nations, an organization dedicated to preventing the “scourge of war,” which twice in the lifetimes of the U.N.’s creators had brought “untold sorrow to mankind.” The United Nations was viewed as a place where representatives of nations could gather to resolve the world’s problems with civility rather than bombs. On occasion, it has succeeded in dramatic and more subtle ways, but on many other occasions it has failed to prevent wars from erupting.

    It is a great irony of history that in the three-day period between the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, representatives of the U.S., U.K., USSR and France met in London to sign the treaty establishing the International Military Tribunal to hold Nazi leaders accountable for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. At this Tribunal held in Nuremberg and at other international tribunals, the principle of individual accountability was upheld against the leaders of the defeated Axis powers. The concept of individual accountability under international law was given broad support by the United Nations General Assembly, but it has taken root in the succeeding half century far more slowly than its dangerous sibling, the bomb.

    In the Nuclear Age, there has been a fearful acceleration of the struggle between the forces of violence and the forces of reason, between brutality and civility, that have been woven through human history. But the tools have changed as have the stakes of the outcome. In the Nuclear Age, the most awesome tools of violence, nuclear weapons, threaten the continuation of our species. The forces of reason include a place of global dialogue, the United Nations, and the concept that all individuals, even national leaders, must be held accountable for acts constituting crimes under international law. The struggle continues. The outcome remains uncertain.

    The Past Decade

    The world has changed dramatically since the mid-1980s. As 1985 began, the nuclear arms race was at its zenith. The U.S. under President Reagan was pressing ahead with development of Star Wars, a space-based missile defense system. It appeared that the U.S. and USSR were on the verge of entering an even more dangerous chapter of the nuclear arms race in which costly new defensive systems would stimulate the deployment of even more lethal offensive systems. The nuclear weapons states seemed fully committed to pursuing their nuclear weapons programs no matter what the cost.

    In the midst of those dark days, a bright light of sanity appeared. Some, like Helen Caldicott, have described it as a miracle. Mikhail Gorbachev, the new leader of the Communist Party of the USSR, declared a moratorium on all nuclear tests on August 6, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. He invited the U.S. to join in the moratorium, but the U.S. continued to test.

    The year 1985 ended with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. Accepting the award for IPPNW, its

    co-founder, Dr. Bernard Lown, stated, “Combatting the nuclear threat has been our exclusive preoccupation, since we are dedicated to the proposition that to insure the conditions of life, we must prevent the conditions of death. Ultimately, we believe people must come to terms with the fact that the struggle is not between different national destinies, between opposing ideologies, but rather between catastrophe and survival. All nations share a linked destiny; nuclear weapons are the shared enemy.”

    Early in 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev called for the abolition of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. His dramatic proposal was not met with particular interest by the other nuclear weapons states.

    In the Spring of 1986 an accident occurred at Reactor 4 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, which spewed some 50 million curies of radiation into the environment. The Chernobyl accident demonstrated an often overlooked facet of the Nuclear Age: it is not only our warlike technologies that threaten humanity; our so-called peaceful technologies can also cause devastation to life and property.

    In the Fall of 1986 Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev held a summit meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. The two presidents seriously discussed the possibility of abolishing nuclear weapons, but the talks ultimately failed due to Reagan’s refusal to abandon his plans to develop a space-based missile defense system. The utterly impractical plan to provide a shield against missile attack prevented agreement on creating a nuclear weapons free world. The nuclear arms race between the U.S. and USSR continued, but with less intensity. Gorbachev had challenged the West to end the dangerous nuclear arms race, and there was growing pressure in the West to respond.

    In 1987 the U.S. and USSR entered into an agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, providing a direct communications link that would be used to exchange information on ballistic missile tests and other matters. Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987, eliminating all land-based missiles held by the two countries with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles. For the first time in the Nuclear Age an entire class of nuclear weapons was eliminated. This Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988.

    By Fall 1990 the last Pershing II missiles were removed from Germany. By mid-1991 the new American President George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), providing for the elimination of almost 50 percent of the strategic nuclear warheads carried by ballistic missiles. In 1991 both Bush and Gorbachev were making promises of further unilateral reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Bush announced the cancellation of controversial nuclear weapons programs, and the withdrawal of all remaining army and navy tactical nuclear weapons worldwide. Gorbachev announced the elimination or reduction of a range of tactical nuclear weapons on land, sea and air, and promised to exceed the START I requirements by reducing the number of Soviet strategic warheads to 5,000 within seven years. He also initiated a new moratorium on nuclear testing.

    While nuclear arms negotiations were proceeding, a sea change in international politics was occurring. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. The Soviet Union was disintegrating, and would cease to exist by Christmas 1991 when Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as president of the USSR, ending nearly 75 years of communist rule. The nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union ended up in the control of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. It would be necessary to reach agreements with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus with regard to control of the nuclear warheads left on their territories. All subsequently agreed to transfer their nuclear arsenals to Russia and join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.

    In 1992 George Bush and Boris Yeltsin reached an agreement on a second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), this one calling for a reduction by each side to 3,000-3,500 strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2003. Bush stated, “The nuclear nightmare recedes more and more.” Yeltsin, addressing a joint session of the U.S. Congress said that nuclear weapons and the Cold War “turned out to be obsolete and unnecessary to mankind, and it is now simply a matter of calculating the best way and the best time schedule for destroying them and getting rid of them.”

    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference

    Despite these achievements, ridding the world of nuclear weapons has proven to be more difficult than President Yeltsin suggested. Three major events that occurred in 1995 demonstrate the problems involved. The first of these major events was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference, which was held in April and May at the United Nations in New York. This Conference was called for in the 1970 Treaty to decide whether the Treaty should be extended indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods. Four of the five declared nuclear weapons states (U.S., U.K., France, and Russia), argued for indefinite extension of the Treaty. With indefinite extension, other states would remain obligated indefinitely not to develop nuclear arsenals, while the nuclear weapons states would continue their special status of possessing nuclear weapons. The U.S. lobbied particularly hard for this, beginning its lobbying efforts nearly two years in advance of the Conference. The fifth declared nuclear weapons state, China, adopted a more neutral posture that was more conciliatory to non-nuclear weapons states. China indicated its willingness to eliminate its nuclear arsenal, contingent upon all other nuclear weapons states doing so.

    In advance of the Conference, a number of citizen action groups, including the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, lobbied for extension of the Treaty for a series of fixed periods that would be tied to a commitment by the nuclear weapons states to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. We argued that the nuclear weapons states had promised in the NPT to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The Treaty had entered into force in 1970, but during the following 25-year period the nuclear weapons states had increased rather than decreased the size of their nuclear arsenals, as well as substantially improving them qualitatively. Therefore, an indefinite extension of the Treaty would be the equivalent to giving a blank check to states that had not fulfilled their past promises.1

    A group of non-aligned countries held out against an indefinite extension of the Treaty, but in the end the nuclear weapons states prevailed and the Treaty was extended indefinitely. However, the price for achieving this was the adoption of a set of Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Among these were:

    “(a) The completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than 1996. Pending the entry into force of a Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should exercise utmost restraint;

    “(b) The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein;

    “(c) The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”2

    These commitments were non-binding, but they set clear standards by which the behavior of the nuclear weapons states could be measured. Yet, within days of making these commitments, the Chinese conducted a nuclear weapons test, and just over a month later French President Jacques Chirac announced that the French would conduct a series of eight nuclear weapons tests in the South Pacific.

    French Testing

    French testing was the second of the major events in 1995 related to the struggle to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Despite protests from throughout the world and in France, where over 60 percent of the population opposed the tests, the French conducted six nuclear weapons tests on the atolls of Moruroa and Fangataufa. The most important lesson to be drawn from the French testing is that one leader of a nuclear weapons state can set his will against the people of the world, including his own people. On this occasion, Jacques Chirac unilaterally led the French government in a series of nuclear tests. In the future, a leader of a nuclear weapons state may decide, against the will of the people, to use nuclear weapons as a means of attack. This is a reality of the Nuclear Age. The decision to use nuclear weapons is not subject to a democratic process. The weapons themselves are an obscene concentration of power that undermine democracy.

    French testing also showed the extent of opposition to nuclear weapons throughout the world. Protests came not only from citizens groups, but from many governments. As a direct result of their anger over French testing, the Australian government established the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. In announcing the formation of the Commission, the then Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, said, “Some years ago a commission of this type would have been a theoretical exercise. But the end of the Cold War means that we can seriously envisage a concrete program to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons.”3

    For the first time a country in the Western alliance was taking steps at the government level to promote the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Canberra Commission, composed of 17 eminent government leaders, scientists, disarmament experts, and military strategists from throughout the world, held its first of four meetings in January 1996. The Commission’s members included British Field Marshal Michael Carver, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard.

    The Commission released its report on August 14, 1996. It found “that immediate and determined efforts need to be made to rid the world of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to it.” The Report continued, “The proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used defies credibility. The only complete defense is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.” The Committee called for an unequivocal commitment by the nuclear weapons states to a nuclear weapons free world and the following immediate steps:

    • Take nuclear forces off alert
    • Remove warheads from delivery vehicles
    • End deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons
    • End nuclear testing
    • Initiate negotiations to further reduce United States and Russian nuclear arsenals

    Achieve agreement amongst the nuclear weapons states of reciprocal no first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states. 4

    World Court Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

    The third event in 1995 related to ridding the world of nuclear weapons was the oral arguments at the International Court of Justice in The Hague on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. At these hearings, which were initiated at the request of the World Health Organization and the United Nations General Assembly, the nuclear weapons states argued that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was a political rather than a legal question and, therefore, the Court should not issue an advisory opinion. The nuclear weapons states went further, and argued that if the Court did decide to issue an advisory opinion it should find that the weapons themselves were not inherently illegal. The majority of states presenting positions to the Court argued that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international law.

    The Court issued its advisory opinion on July 8, 1996.5 It found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons was generally illegal under international law and that the nuclear weapons states were obligated to complete negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The Court was unable to reach a conclusion on whether or not the threat of use of nuclear weapons for self-defense would be legal in the extreme circumstance when the survival of the state was at stake.

    The decision of the Court will have far-reaching effects for the future of nuclear weapons and for the future of humanity. The opinion that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal under international law gives strong support to the advocates of a nuclear weapons free world and puts the governments of the nuclear weapons states under increased pressure to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

    In December 1995, Joseph Rotblat, a former Manhattan Project scientist, and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs shared the Nobel Peace Prize. In his Nobel Lecture, Professor Rotblat stated, “As for the assertion that nuclear weapons prevent wars, how many more wars are needed to refute this argument? Tens of millions have died in the many wars that have taken place since 1945. In a number of them nuclear states were directly involved. In two they were actually defeated. Having nuclear weapons was of no use to them. To sum up, there is no evidence that a world without nuclear weapons would be a more dangerous world. On the contrary, it would be a safer world.”6

    Also in December 1995 the nations of Southeast Asia created a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone throughout Southeast Asia.

    The year 1995 ended with the United Nations General Assembly passing a resolution calling for the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. The resolution called upon the nuclear weapons states “to undertake step-by-step reduction of the nuclear threat and a phased programme of progressive and balanced deep reductions of nuclear weapons, and to carry out effective nuclear disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of these weapons within a time-bound framework.”7 The resolution was opposed by the same nuclear weapons states and their allies that had fought so hard at the NPT Review and Extension Conference for an indefinite extension of that Treaty.

    In April 1996 the Treaty of Pelindaba was signed creating an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. With the signing of this treaty nearly the entire Southern hemisphere had designated itself as nuclear weapons free.

    The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva drafted a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CD, however, was unable to reach consensus on the Treaty due to India’s demand that the nuclear weapons states make a commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a time-bound framework.

    Australia took the draft CTBT to the U.N. General Assembly, and in special session on September 10, 1996, the General Assembly adopted the Treaty by a vote of 158 to 3 with 5 abstentions and 19 members absent. The Treaty was opened for signatures on September 24, 1996. All five declared nuclear weapons states have signed the Treaty. However, to enter into force the Treaty requires the signatures and ratifications of all 44 nuclear capable countries, including India. India has made it clear that it will neither sign nor ratify the Treaty until the nuclear weapons states have made the commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

    The Twenty-First Century

    As we approach the twenty-first century, the struggle continues between those who would rely upon nuclear weapons to provide for their national security and those who would abolish these weapons of indiscriminate mass murder. More than anything else, the issue seems to be one of privilege within the international system. The nuclear weapons states are comfortable with their privileges in the current two-tier system of nuclear “haves” and “have nots.” The “haves” appear willing to cut back their arsenals, to eliminate underground nuclear tests (but not laboratory testing), and to make promises about “the ultimate goal” of eliminating nuclear weapons. They appear unwilling, however, to make a commitment to eliminating their nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework.

    In essence, the nuclear weapons states are resisting giving up what they perceive to be their privileged status within the structure of the international system. Of course, there is a huge blindspot in their strategy of attempting to maintain their special status. In the last analysis, other states will do as the nuclear weapons states do, not as they say. If, as the behavior of the nuclear weapons states demonstrates, nuclear weapons are deployed to provide security in a dangerous world, then other states will eventually turn to this form of security. The result will be an even more dangerous world.

    Finding a Way Out

    But there is a way out. More than half the world sees it, and has called for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Eventually the nuclear weapons states also will be forced to see it. A nuclear weapons free world is in the interests of all people on Earth, and all those who will follow. This includes the interests of the nuclear weapons states. In fact, their reliance on nuclear weapons is the main threat to their own security.

    Nuclear weapons are a test for humanity. If we can control and eliminate these and other weapons of mass destruction that threaten our common future, it is possible for humanity to join in common purpose to solve other pressing problems confronting us, such as eliminating poverty, protecting human rights, and safeguarding the environment from pollution and over-exploitation.

    In the Nuclear Age, humanity must grow to meet the new responsibilities that it has created for itself. The new way of thinking that Einstein called for is perhaps not so new. It may be as old as the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you; do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto you. It may be as simple as attempting to view the world from an imagined vantage point of a perceived opponent or of future generations. It may be as simple as Joseph Rotblat said in concluding his Nobel Laureate Address, “Remember your duty to humanity.”

    But most likely it will not be this simple. Ending the nuclear weapons era will require dedication, sustained effort, and mass education. It will require the commitment of millions of individuals who believe that humanity is worth saving, that the future is worth preserving. It will require an optimism that refuses to give way to despair. It will require hope. It will require friendship. It will require sacrifice.

    Between 1985 and the present there has been substantial progress in reducing the world’s nuclear arsenals. It is not too much to hope that we could enter the new millennium with a treaty in place committing the world to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. It is our challenge to make this vision a reality.

    Other Nuclear Age Issues

    I have focused attention primarily on nuclear weapons and the need for their abolition. But this is far from the whole story of the Nuclear Age. Nuclear weapons are only the most prominent, dramatic, and dangerous development of the Nuclear Age. There are many other issues that require the attention of society. Without going into detail, I wish to mention some of these.

    1. The environmental impacts of nuclear technology. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were produced with only minimal concern for the environment. Today leaking storage tanks and inadequate methods of waste storage are major problems that need to be remedied. It will require hundreds of billions of dollars to clean up behind the weapons producers.

    Many nuclear submarines carrying nuclear weapons have suffered accidents and gone down at sea. Others have been purposefully dumped at sea after their useful life has ended. As the nuclear materials in the sunken reactors and weapons breach their containments, the ocean environment will be threatened.

    Even today there is no adequate answer to the question of how to dispose of long-lived radioactive wastes. The best that scientists can suggest at this time is monitored, multi-barrier retrievable storage. This is not a permanent solution. It simply puts off a long-term solution to a later date; it recognizes that we don’t know enough to attempt a permanent solution that will affect thousands of generations in the future. There are hundreds of nuclear power plants scattered throughout the world. Each of these plants produces high level radioactive wastes in the process of boiling water to generate electricity. The costs of attempting to shield these wastes from the environment for thousands of years have not been adequately assessed. Proceeding with the development of nuclear power plants without having an adequate answer to the problem of nuclear waste storage reflects an arrogance almost as great as using the power of the atom to create weapons that place humanity’s future in jeopardy.

    2. The role of science in society. The Manhattan Project to develop a nuclear bomb was the first great project of corporate science put at the disposal of the nation-state. Corporate science and nationalism have proven to be a dangerous combination. They have given us both nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants.

    Scientists have been rewarded for their efforts by receiving a special status in modern societies, a status reserved for medicine men, healers, and spiritual leaders in more primitive societies. Alvin Weinberg, a prominent nuclear scientist, has spoken of the need for a “nuclear priesthood” to be the guardians of nuclear materials in the future, and to pass on their knowledge from generation to generation. This is a heady proposition, that society should become beholden to those with special knowledge to protect thousands of future generations from the potential harm of radioactive materials and to keep these materials from the hands of terrorists.

    Scientists as a group and as individuals have rarely exercised responsibility for their discoveries. Rather than providing cautious advice, they have often been overly optimistic about society’s ability to manage and control the products of their knowledge. Of course, scientists, like other humans, cannot foresee the ways in which their discoveries might be used. They can, however, draw a line at working on improving or testing weapons of mass destruction or at developing industries that have dangerous waste products that cannot be contained with certainty.

    3. Secrecy and democracy. The Nuclear Age brought forth elaborate measures to maintain secrecy with regard to the development and improvement of nuclear weapons. Such measures were believed to be necessary to prevent the spread of knowledge about making nuclear weapons, but they did not succeed. Today the knowledge of how to make a nuclear weapon is widespread. Even undergraduate college students have demonstrated a grasp of this knowledge, which they have been able to discover from scientific literature available to the public. It is widely acknowledged that terrorists would be able to develop nuclear weapons perhaps crude weapons, but nonetheless nuclear weapons if they were able to get their hands on bomb-grade nuclear materials.

    Secrecy in the Nuclear Age has expanded beyond technological considerations to encompass policy decisions and information that governments find embarrassing. The revelations, for example, that the U.S. government conducted secret experiments with radioactive materials on hospital patients and prisoners without their consent has come to light decades after the experiments took place.

    The real danger of secrecy is that it undermines democracy. Citizens in democracies cannot make intelligent choices about their societies if they are lacking the requisite information. Just as we have accepted that informed consent is necessary in a medical context regarding our bodies, we must apply the same principle to decisions of the body politic.8 If citizens are not informed of government decisions because they are taking place behind a wall of secrecy, then citizens have lost control of their political process and, therefore, of their future.

    In the Nuclear Age the only way that individuals in governments can be held accountable for their acts is by transparency: open decisions openly arrived at. Citizens should demand that if government actions cannot be done in full public view, they shouldn’t be done.

    4. International cooperation. The power of our technologies, most dramatically represented by nuclear technology, has globalized many of the problems we face. These problems include the transportation and storage of nuclear wastes, the safety of nuclear power plants, the diversion of nuclear materials from the nuclear fuel cycle for weapons, the prevention of nuclear terrorism, and the inspection and verification of disarmament agreements.

    National boundaries are largely permeable. National governments cannot prevent people, pollution, projectiles (missiles), or ideas from crossing their borders. Thus, sovereignty is eroding in the face of technological advances. Information travels the world instantaneously. Electronic communications make events anywhere in the world available instantaneously to people everywhere. The spread of pollutants by accident or design, including radioactive pollutants, has a slower migration, but is equally without respect for national borders.

    In the Nuclear Age there are problems that can only be solved at the global level. Among these are problems of transboundary pollution, transportation of hazardous wastes, proliferation of nuclear weapons, and protection of the common heritage of humankind (the oceans, the atmosphere and outer space). These problems cannot be solved by any one nation or group of nations; they can only be solved by global cooperation. They force us to recognize our common humanity and our common future. Global cooperation, through the United Nations and its affiliated agencies, is the key to providing for our common security. However, there is much that needs to be done to transform the United Nations into an institution that is democratically empowered to meet the challenges that confront it.

    5. The power of the individual. The greatest threat to the future of humanity in the Nuclear Age may not be nuclear weapons or nuclear waste. It may be the lack of compassion, commitment and vision of individuals, including our leaders, in the global community. Apathy is disempowering. We must overcome it by education that opens our eyes to the threats that confront us if we fail to take required actions.

    There is only one place in the universe that we know of where life exists, and it is our Earth. As far as we know, we humans are life’s fullest expression of intelligence to date. Visitors from another planet, were they to exist and were they to visit us, might not think so. We are not doing so well in managing our planetary home. But we can change this. It is within our power as individuals to do so. We can make the world a better place. We can fulfill our responsibility to future generations to pass on the planet, intact, to the next generation. We must begin from where we are, with an awareness of the dangers and challenges of the Nuclear Age. We must not be silent nor passive. We must stand up and act for a safer and saner world, a better tomorrow. By our actions, we must restore a sense of hopefulness about our common future.

    If Gandhi could lead the Indian subcontinent to independence from Britain and Nelson Mandela could spend 27 years in prison and come out to end apartheid in South Africa and become president of that country, each of us can also play a role in changing the world. We may not all be Gandhis or Mandelas, but we can play a role in meeting the challenges of the Nuclear Age. Each of us can make a difference.

    Conclusion – Two Ways Out

    Knowledge gained cannot be unlearned, but we can manage and control our dangerous technologies. The genie of knowledge may not fit back into the bottle. There is no reason, however, that the most dangerous tools created with that knowledge cannot by agreement be dismantled and systems established to prevent these tools from being recreated. It is within our power to end the nuclear weapons era, if not the Nuclear Age. Whether or not we will succeed will depend upon the clarity of our vision and the steadiness of our commitment.

    There are only two ways out of the Nuclear Age. One is by death and destruction, by nuclear conflagration, by Nuclear Winter, by the poisoning of our life support systems. Few would consciously choose this path, but many of our decisions, based on national rather than global priorities, have led us in this direction. There is, however, a second option, and that is to affirm without reservation that the power of life is greater than the power of death. Technology is already breaking down barriers between nations. Education and spiritual grounding in the miracle of Creation must now provide the basis for breaking down the barriers in our minds that separate us. We are one humanity. We share one Earth.

    If we awaken to who we truly are not only Americans, not only Russians, not only Japanese, not only Indians, but above all citizens of Earth then our choices will be clear, and we will do everything within our power to preserve this extraordinary planet and its abundant forms of life. Our first step forward on this path will be our absolute commitment to ridding the world of nuclear weapons, the only weapons capable of destroying the future of human life on this planet. In achieving this goal, we will know what we are truly capable of accomplishing, and we will get on with the serious problems of creating cultures that are committed to liberty, justice, human dignity, and ecological integrity.

    Notes

    1. See Krieger, David and Bas Bruyne, “Preventing Proliferation By Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Supporting a Limited Extension of the NPT,” Global Security Study No. 20, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, September 1994.

    2. “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” 1995 Review and Extension conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF. 1995/L.5, 9 May 1995.

    3. “Commission for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World,” Press Release of Australian Government, November 27, 1995.

    4. Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 14, 1996, p. 4.

    5. “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” International Court of Justice, General List No. 95, July 8, 1996.

    6. The Nobel Lecture given by The Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 1995 Joseph Rotblat, Oslo, December 10, 1995. Copyright The Nobel Foundation, Stockholm 1995.

    7. United Nations General Assembly, A/C.1/50/L.46/Rev.1, 14 November 1995.

    8. See Hull, Diana, “Informed Consent: From the Body to the Body Politic,” in Krieger, David and Frank Kelly (Editors), Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age, Santa Barbara: Capra Press, 1988

    * David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • Chaining the Nuclear Beast

    When I became a private citizen and a businessman two and one-half years ago, it was my intention to close the journal of my military career and never to reopen it…. My decision to step back into public life is prompted by an inner voice I cannot still, a concern I cannot quiet. I am compelled by a growing alarm, born of my former responsibilities, and a deepening dismay as a citizen of this planet, with respect to the course of events governing the role of nuclear weapons after the Cold War.

    Over the last 27 years of my military career, I was embroiled in every aspect of American nuclear policy making and force posturing, from the councils of government to military command centers, from cramped bomber cockpits to the suffocating confines of ballistic missile submarines I have certified hundreds of crews for their nuclear mission and approved thousands of targets for potential nuclear destruction. I have investigated a dismaying array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces. I have read a library of books and intelligence reports on the former Soviet Union and what were believed to be its capabilities and intentions…and seen an army of “experts” proved wrong. As an advisor to the President on the employment of nuclear weapons, I have anguished over the imponderable complexities, the profound moral dilemmas, and the mind-numbing consequences of decisions which would invoke the very survival of our planet.

    Seen from this perspective, it should not be surprising that no one could have been more relieved than was I by the dramatic end to the Cold War. The reshaping of Central Europe, the democratization of Russia, and the rapid acceleration of arms control agreements were miraculous events SQ events that I never imagined would happen in my lifetime. Even more gratifying was the opportunity as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the United States’ military forces, and then as commander of its strategic nuclear forces, to be intimately involved in recasting our defense posture, shrinking our arsenals, and scaling back huge impending Cold War driven expenditures. Most importantly, I could see for the first time the prospect of restoring a world free of the apocalyptic threat of nuclear weapons.

    Over time, that shimmering hope gave way to a judgment which has now become a deeply held conviction: that a world free of the threat of nuclear weapons is necessarily a world devoid of nuclear weapons.

    The concern… which compels me to speak frankly… is that the sense of profound satisfaction with which I departed my military career has been steadily eroded in the ensuing months and years. The astonishing turn of events which brought a wondrous closure to my three and one-half decades of service, and far more importantly to four decades of perilous ideological confrontation, presented historic opportunities to advance the human condition. But now time and human nature are wearing away the sense of wonder and closing the window of opportunity. Options are being lost as urgent questions are marginalized, as outmoded routines perpetuate Cold War habits and thinking; and as a new generation of nuclear actors and aspirants lurch backward into the dark world we so narrowly escaped without a thermonuclear holocaust.

    What, then, does the future hold? How do we proceed? Can a consensus be forged that nuclear weapons have no defensible role, that the political and human consequences of their employment transcends any asserted military utility, that as weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand-fold stronger and more urgent than for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production?

    I believe that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative, and is in fact growing daily. I see it in the reports issuing from highly respected institutions and authors; I feel it in the convictions of my colleagues on the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; it finds eloquent voice in the Nobel prize awarded to Joseph Rotblat and Pugwash; and a strident frustration in the vehement protests against the recent round of nuclear tests conducted by France.

    Notwithstanding the perils of transition in Russia, enmities in the Middle East, or the delicate balance of power in South and East Asia, I believe that a swelling chorus of reason and resentment will eventually turn the tide. As the family of mankind develops a capacity for collective outrage, so soon will it find avenues for collective action. The terror-filled anesthesia which numbed rational thought, made nuclear war thinkable and grossly excessive arsenals possible during the Cold War is gradually wearing off. A renewed appreciation for the obscene power of a single nuclear weapon is taking a new hold on our consciousness, as we confront the nightmarish prospect of nuclear terror at the micro level.

    Where do we begin? What steps can governments take, responsibly, recognizing that policy makers must always balance a host of competing priorities and interests?

    First and foremost is for the declared nuclear states to accept that the Cold War is in fact over, to break free of the attitudes, habits and practices that perpetuate enormous inventories, forces standing alert and targeting plans encompassing thousands of aimpoints.

    Second, for the undeclared states to embrace the harsh lessons of the Cold War: that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous, hugely expensive, militarily inefficient and morally indefensible; that implacable hostility and alienation will almost certainly over time lead to a nuclear crisis; that the strength of deterrence is inversely proportional to the stress of confrontation; and that nuclear war is a raging, insatiable beast whose instincts and appetites we pretend to understand but cannot possibly control.

    Third, with respect to present and prospective arms control agreements given its crucial leadership role, it is imperative for the United States to undertake now a sweeping review, led by the President, of nuclear policies and strategies. The Clinton administration’s 1993 Nuclear Posture Review was an essential but far from sufficient step toward rethinking the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world. While clearing the decks of some pressing force structure questions, the Review purposefully avoided the large policy issues. However, the Review’s justification for maintaining robust nuclear forces as a hedge against the resurgence of a hostile Russia is in my view regrettable from several respects. It sends an overt message of distrust in an era when building a positive security relationship with Russia is arguably the United States most important foreign policy concern. It codifies force levels and postures completely out of keeping with the profound transformation we have witnessed in world affairs. And, it perpetuates attitudes which inhibit a willingness to proceed immediately toward negotiation of greatly reduced levels of strategic arms.

    Finally… I want to record my strong conviction that the risks entailed by nuclear weapons are far too great to leave the prospects of their elimination solely within the province of governments. Highly influential opinion leaders like yourselves can make a powerful difference in swelling the tide of global sentiment that the nuclear era must end. I urge you to read the one page statement from the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons…. Better still, read the Commission Report in full, reflect on its recommendations, communicate with influential colleagues and with the Canberra Commissioners. Take an active role in debating and supporting the practical steps we set forth in our Report, such as taking nuclear weapons off a hair trigger alert and placing the associated warheads in secure storage.

    These are steps which can be taken now, which will reduce needless risks and terminate Cold War practices which serve only as a chilling reminder of a world in which the principal antagonists could find no better solution to their entangled security fears than Mutual Assured Destruction.

    Such a world was and is intolerable. We are not condemned to repeat the lessons of forty years at the nuclear brink. We can do better than condone a world in which nuclear weapons are enshrined as the ultimate arbiter of conflict. The price already paid is too dear, the risks run too great. The nuclear beast must be chained, its soul expunged, its lair laid waste. The task is daunting but we cannot shrink from it.

    The opportunity may not come again.