Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: NPT

  • Seven Steps to Raise World Security

    Four months from now, in New York, the world will have a rare opportunity to make significant improvements in international security. The question is whether we will be smart enough to use it.

    In recent years, three phenomena have radically altered the security landscape. They are the emergence of a nuclear black market, the determined efforts by more countries to acquire technology to produce the fissile material useable in nuclear weapons and the clear desire of terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

    We have been trying to solve these new problems with existing tools. But for every step forward, we have exposed vulnerabilities in the system. The system itself – the regime that implements the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) – needs reinforcement. Some of the necessary remedies can be taken in May, but only if governments are ready to act.

    The opportunity in New York will come in the form of a conference. If that sounds like yet more bureaucracy – addressing nightmarish nuclear security scenarios with more meetings – I sympathise. But this is no ordinary conference. Every five years, the NPT Review Conference brings world leaders together to focus on combating the threat of nuclear weapons. All but four countries will participate as treaty members. Given the global nature of the threats, these four – India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea – should also be encouraged to contribute their insights and concerns.

    With seven straightforward steps, and without amending the treaty, this conference could reach a milestone in strengthening world security. The first step: put a five-year hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. There is no compelling reason to build more of these facilities; the nuclear industry has more than enough capacity to fuel its power plants and research centres. To make this holding period acceptable for everyone, commit the countries that already have the facilities to guarantee an economic supply of nuclear fuel for bona fide uses. Then use the hiatus to develop better long-term options for managing the technologies (for example, in regional centres under multinational control). To advance these ideas, I have engaged a group of international nuclear experts, and their proposals will be put forward at the conference.

    Second, speed up existing efforts, led by the US global threat reduction initiative and others, to modify the research reactors worldwide operating with highly enriched uranium – particularly those with metal fuel that could be readily employed as bomb material. Convert these reactors to use low-enriched uranium, and accelerate research on how to make highly enriched uranium unnecessary for all peaceful nuclear applications.

    Third, raise the bar for inspection standards by establishing the “additional protocol” as the norm for verifying compliance with the NPT. Without the expanded authority of this protocol, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s rights of inspection are limited. It has proven its value recently in Iran and Libya and should be brought into force for all countries.

    Fourth, call on the United Nations Security Council to act swiftly and decisively in the case of any country that withdraws from the NPT, in terms of the threat the withdrawal poses to international peace and security.

    Fifth, urge states to act on the Security Council’s recent resolution 1540, to pursue and prosecute any illicit trading in nuclear material and technology.

    Sixth, call on the five nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accelerate implementation of their “unequivocal commitment” to nuclear disarmament, building on efforts such as the 2002 Moscow treaty between Russia and the US. Negotiating a treaty to ban irreversibly the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons programmes would be a welcome start.

    Last, acknowledge the volatility of longstanding tensions that give rise to proliferation, in regions such as the Middle East and the Korean peninsula, and take action to resolve existing security problems and, where needed, provide security assurances. In the Middle East, urge all parties to pursue a dialogue on regional security as part of the peace process. One goal of this dialogue would be to make the Middle East a nuclear-weapons-free zone.

    None of these steps will work in isolation. Each requires a concession from someone. But with leadership from all sides, this package of proposals will create gains for everyone. This opportunity will come again – in 2010. But given current trends, we cannot afford to wait another five years. As a UN panel put it recently: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” The stakes are too high to risk inaction.

    The writer is the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He writes here in a personal capacity.

    Originally published by the Financial Times.

  • Erosion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

    I recently participated in a meeting on the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, sponsored by the Middle Powers Initiative at The Carter Center in Atlanta. The Middle Powers Initiative is a coalition of eight international civil society organizations, two of which have received the Nobel Peace Prize. I represented the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at the meeting, one of the founding organizations. In addition to civil society representatives such as myself, the meeting hosted diplomats from many countries. Among the participants were Marian Hobbs, New Zealand’s Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control; Senator Douglas Roche of Canada, chair of the Middle Powers Initiative; Nobuyasu Abe, United Nations Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs; Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, Brazilian Ambassador and President-Designate of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference; former US Ambassador Robert Grey Jr.; and Ambassador Rajab M. Sukayri of the Jordanian Foreign Ministry.

    The participants in the consultation were mindful of the recent United Nations Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The Report, issued in December 2004, indicated that “the nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at risk because of lack of compliance with existing commitments, withdrawal or threats of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to escape those commitments, a changing international security environment and the diffusion of technology.” The Report found, “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.”

    The Report further found that “if a simple nuclear device were detonated in a major city, the number of deaths would range from tens of thousands to more than one million. The shock to international commerce, employment and travel would amount to at least one trillion dollars. Such an attack could have further, far-reaching implications for international security, democratic governance and civil rights.” It was against this background of concern that the Atlanta meeting took place. Ambassador Duarte, who will preside over the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, said, “What we have to contend with at the 2005 Review Conference is a persistent and serious situation of erosion of confidence in the mechanisms of the NPT and on the ability of the instrument to survive the tests it has been put through.”

    Among the major issues that were discussed were the need for the Non-Proliferation Treaty to become universal by bringing in the three nuclear weapons states that are not parties to the treaty (Israel, India and Pakistan) and bringing back North Korea; for the nuclear weapons states parties to the treaty to fulfill their obligations for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament; for more effective safeguarding of nuclear materials and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and for some effective method of sanctions for violating the Treaty’s provisions.

    Former President Jimmy Carter, who spoke at the meeting, pointed out, “Prospects for this year’s discussions are not encouraging. I have heard that the [Preparatory Committee] for the forthcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty talks have so far failed even to achieve an agenda because of the deep divisions between the nuclear powers who seek to stop proliferation without meeting their own disarmament commitments, and the Non-Aligned Movement, whose demands include firm disarmament commitments and considerations of the Israeli arsenal.”

    President Carter also pointed to the contradictions in US nuclear policy. “The United States claims to be upholding Article VI,” he said, referring to the disarmament provision of the Treaty, “but yet asserts a security strategy of testing and developing new weapons [such as] Star Wars and the earth penetrating ‘bunker buster,’ and has threatened first use, even against non-nuclear states, in case of ‘surprising military developments’ and ‘unexpected contingencies.’”

    President Carter referred to another of the contradictions in the approach to nuclear non-proliferation in addressing the issue of Iran and the Middle East: “While the international community is justified in exerting strong pressure on Iran to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there is no public effort or comment in the United States or Europe calling for Israel to comply with the Non-Proliferation Treaty or submit to any other restraints. At the same time, we fail to acknowledge what a powerful incentive this is to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and other states to join the nuclear community.”

    There was a general sense at the meeting that the non-proliferation regime, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty that is its centerpiece, is eroding, and that some measure of success at the May 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference is critical to the future of this regime. Right now the United States is choosing not to recognize the progress made at previous NPT Review Conferences on nuclear disarmament obligations. The Bush administration doesn’t want to be bound by promises made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, promises that committed the nuclear weapons states to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to make nuclear disarmament transparent and irreversible, and to an “unequivocal undertaking” to achieve complete nuclear disarmament.

    The US position is throwing the prospects for the 2005 Review Conference into disarray. There was a general sense at the meeting that unless the nuclear weapons states, including the United States, stand by their previous commitments, the prospects for assuring future efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation are dim. This is where we stand three months prior to the beginning of the 2005 Review Conference.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and a member of the International Steering Committee of the Middle Powers Initiative.

  • On the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    FIRST, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY PERSONAL GRATITUDE FOR THIS MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE TO PROTECT, OR REVIVE, THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, WHICH IS DEEPLY WOUNDED AND WHOSE VERY LIFE IS THREATENED.

    FIVE YEARS AGO I MADE A SIMILAR SPEECH AT A SIMILAR MEETING IN THIS SAME PLACE, IN ADVANCE OF THE 2000 ROUND OF NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY DISCUSSIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS. LATER, WITH YOUR HELP, I PREPARED AN EDITORIAL IN THE WASHINGTON POST OUTLINING THE PROBLEMS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

    I READ THEM BOTH LAST NIGHT, AND IT IS DISTURBINGLY OBVIOUS THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO IMPROVEMENT OVER THE SITUATION AS IT WAS DESCRIBED IN OUR PREVIOUS MEETING. IN FACT, PROLIFERATION AND THE BEHAVIOR OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WITH REGARD TO DISARMAMENT HAVE WORSENED OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

    I AM WILLING TO PREPARE ANOTHER EDITORIAL IF YOU THINK IT HELPFUL, AND WILL SAVE MY NOTES FOR POSSIBLE REPETITION IN 2010. HOPEFULLY, THERE WON’T BE A GLOBAL CATASTROPHE BEFORE THEN.

    A RECENT UNITED NATIONS REPORT STARKLY WARNED: “WE ARE APPROACHING A POINT AT WHICH THE EROSION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME COULD BECOME IRREVERSIBLE AND RESULT IN A CASCADE OF PROLIFERATION.”

    PROSPECTS FOR THIS YEAR’S DISCUSSIONS ARE NOT ENCOURAGING. I HAVE HEARD THAT THE PREPCOMM FOR THE FORTHCOMING NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TALKS HAVE SO FAR FAILED EVEN TO ACHIEVE AN AGENDA BECAUSE OF THE DEEP DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR POWERS WHO SEEK TO STOP PROLIFERATION WITHOUT MEETING THEIR OWN DISARMAMENT COMMITMENTS, AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, WHOSE DEMANDS INCLUDE FIRM DISARMAMENT COMMITMENTS AND CONSIDERATION OF THE ISRAELI ARSENAL.

    THE MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE APPROACH REMAINS AN EFFORT TO BUILD A BRIDGE BETWEEN THE NEW AGENDA COALITION COUNTRIES ( BRAZIL, EGYPT, IRELAND, MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND, SOUTH AFRICA AND SWEDEN) AND THE EIGHT NATO STATES THAT VOTED LAST YEAR FOR A NEW AGENDA RESOLUTION CALLING FOR IMPLEMENTING COMMITMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. TRAGICALLY, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES ALL VOTED AGAINST THIS RESOLUTION.

    OUR COMMON GOAL IS SIMPLY STATED: “TO EXERT LEVERAGE ON THE NUCLEAR POWERS TO TAKE MINIMUM STEPS TO SAVE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN 2005.” PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS ARE NOT GOOD, BECAUSE OF THE DIRE STATE OF LONG-STANDING TEDIOUSLY NEGOTIATED INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND THE PRESENT INDIFFERENCE AMONG NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO THEIR DECLINE OR DEMISE.

    ALL OF US AMERICAN PRESIDENTS, FROM EISENHOWER TO GEORGE BUSH, SR., WERE AVIDLY SEEKING TO RESTRICT AND REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS – SOME MORE THAN OTHERS. THIS WAS ONE OF MY HIGHEST PRIORITIES. SO FAR AS I KNOW, THERE ARE NO SINCERE EFFORTS UNDERWAY BY ANY OF THE NUCLEAR POWERS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE CRUCIAL GOALS.

    THE MOSCOW TREATY WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND RUSSIA IN 2002 DID NOT MANDATE ANY MEANS OF VERIFICATION, AND “ARMS CUTS” NO LONGER REPRESENT CONFIRMED DISMANTLEMENT AND DISPOSAL BUT SIMPLE STORAGE, WITH RAPID REDEPLOYMENT UNDERSTOOD TO BE PERMITTED.

    THE UNITED STATES CLAIMS TO BE UPHOLDING ARTICLE VI, BUT YET ASSERTS A SECURITY STRATEGY OF TESTING AND DEVELOPING NEW WEAPONS RE STAR WARS AND THE EARTH PENETRATING “BUNKER BUSTER,” AND HAS THREATENED FIRST USE, EVEN AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES, IN CASE OF “SURPRISING MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS” AND “UNEXPECTED CONTINGENCIES.”

    SOME CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE OBVIOUS:

    • THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES LEFT UNRESOLVED FROM THE TREATY OF MOSCOW. IT SHOULD DEMAND THE SAME STANDARDS OF TRANSPARENCY, VERIFICATION AND IRREVERSIBILITY OF PAST ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND PLEDGE TO DISMANTLE AND DISPOSE OF ANY DECOMMISSIONED WEAPONS.
    • “NO FIRST USE” HAS NOW SLIPPED OFF THE AGENDA FOR ALL OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. RUSSIA RENOUNCED THIS POLICY IN 1993 AND NATO CONTINUES TO RESERVE THE RIGHT TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A CORNERSTONE OF ITS POLICY. THE COMMITMENTS AGAINST FIRST USE NEED TO BE RE-ADDRESSED AND HOPEFULLY REWRITTEN AS BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN HAVE FOLLOWED THE OLDER NUCLEAR POWERS AND RESERVED THE RIGHT TO STRIKE FIRST FOR THEMSELVES. WHILE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES SHOULD AGREE TO NON-FIRST USE, AS THE SOLE SUPERPOWER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD ON SUCH ISSUES.
    • THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO DE-EMPHASIZE THE ROLE OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO AND POSSIBLY CONSIDER AN END TO THEIR DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE. DESPITE THE EASTWARD EXPANSION OF THE ORGANIZATION, NATO IS KEEPING THE SAME STOCKPILES AND POLICIES AS IT DID WHEN THE IRON CURTAIN DIVIDED THE CONTINENT, AN ODD STANDARD FOR THE WEST’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO BE SETTING.
    • BOTH AMERICA AND RUSSIA REMAIN ON HAIR TRIGGER ALERT STATUS. THIS IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY AND DRASTICALLY INCREASES THE CHANCES OF AN ACCIDENTAL OR UNPROVOKED LAUNCH. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT A GLOBAL HOLOCAUST IS JUST AS POSSIBLE NOW, THROUGH MISTAKES OR MISJUDGMENTS, AS IT WAS DURING THE DEPTHS OF THE COLD WAR.
    • THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO RETURN TO THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, BUT IS UNFORTUNATELY MOVING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION. THE ADMINISTRATION’S 2005 BUDGET REFERS, FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO A LIST OF TEST SCENARIOS. THIS IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT TO SET; CHINA IS HOLDING OFF ON ITS DECISION REGARDING NUCLEAR TESTING FOLLOWING THE US SENATE’S FAILURE TO RATIFY, AND INDIA AND PAKISTAN ARE ALSO WATCHING AND WAITING.
    • THE ISSUE OF A FISSILE MATERIALS TREATY TO PREVENT THE CREATION AND TRANSPORT OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU) AND PLUTONIUM HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ALSO LEAD IN THE CREATION OF SUCH A TREATY WITH FULL VERIFICATION MEASURES.
    • THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFEASIBLE MISSILE DEFENSE SHIELD (STAR WARS) HAS ALREADY WASTED A HUGE AMOUNT OF AMERICAN TAXPAYERS’ MONEY, IN ADDITION TO THE $40 BILLION SPENT ANNUALLY ON THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT AND DESIGN OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS. THIS FAILED EXPERIMENT HAS BROKEN ITS COMMITMENT TO THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY WITHOUT REPLACING IT WITH A WORKING SUBSTITUTE.
    • AT A MUCH LOWER COST, WE COULD ADDRESS PERHAPS THE WORLD’S GREATEST PROLIFERATION THREAT BY FULLY SECURING RUSSIA’S STOCKPILES.

    NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS AN INCREASING SOURCE FOR INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IRAN HAS REPEATEDLY HIDDEN ITS INTENTIONS TO ENRICH URANIUM WHILE CLAIMING THAT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES ONLY. THIS EXPLANATION HAS BEEN GIVEN BEFORE, BY INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND NORTH KOREA, AND HAS LED TO WEAPONS PROGRAMS IN ALL THREE STATES. IRAN NEEDS TO BE CALLED TO ACCOUNT AND HELD TO ITS PROMISES UNDER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

    • THE IRANIAN CASE ALSO REMAINS A PRIMARY EXAMPLE OF THE NEED TO BAN HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FOR ANY PURPOSE. MEANWHILE, ISRAEL’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE CONTINUES TO EXIST UNACCOUNTED FOR AND ITS REACTOR AT DIMONA IS NOT SUBJECT TO INSPECTION BY THE IAEA BECAUSE ISRAEL HAS NOT SIGNED THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

    WHILE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS JUSTIFIED IN EXERTING STRONG PRESSURE ON IRAN TO COMPLY WITH THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THERE IS NO PUBLIC EFFORT OR COMMENT IN THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE CALLING FOR ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OR SUBMIT TO ANY OTHER RESTRAINTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE FAIL TO ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT A POWERFUL INCENTIVE THIS IS TO IRAN, SYRIA, EGYPT, AND OTHER STATES TO JOIN THE NUCLEAR COMMUNITY.

    THERE IS NO MORE IMPORTANT SUBJECT THAN THE ONE YOU ARE ADDRESSING, AND ILLOGICAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM THREATEN WORLD PEACE. THE TRAGIC AND UNNECESSARY IRAQI INVASION WAS BASED ON FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN HAVING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, AND THE THREAT OF WAR IN KOREA IN 1994 WAS NARROWLY AVERTED AFTER KIM IL SUNG ANNOUNCED THE EXPULSION OF INTERNATIONAL INSPECTORS WITH THE PROSPECT OF REPROCESSING NUCLEAR FUEL. SINCE THEN, THE KOREAN SITUATION HAS DETERIORATED BADLY. MORE RECENTLY, HIGH OFFICIALS HAVE MADE PUBLIC INSINUATIONS OF AMERICAN OR ISRAELI MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN IRAN.

    I USED THE WORDS “ILLOGICAL APPROACHES” BECAUSE THE LAUNCHING OR THREAT OF MILITARY INVASIONS BECOMES NECESSARY ONLY BECAUSE THE FIVE HISTORIC NUCLEAR POWERS, PAKISTAN, INDIA, AND ISRAEL REFUSE TO INITIATE OR RESPECT RESTRAINTS ON THEMSELVES WHILE, AS BRAZIL HAS DESCRIBED IT, “RAISING HERESY CHARGES AGAINST THOSE WHO WANT TO JOIN THE SECT.” THIS IS, INDEED, AN IRRATIONAL APPROACH.

    IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY THAT YOUR SUSTAINED, COURAGEOUS, AND SOMETIMES FRUSTRATING EFFORTS ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. WE AT THE CARTER CENTER ARE EAGER TO HELP WITH YOUR WORTHY CAUSE.

    Jimmy Carter is former president of the United States. This speech was presented at a meeting of the Middle Powers Initiative, “Atlanta Consultation II: On the Future of the NPT,” held at The Carter Center, January 26-28, 2005.

  • New Year Message from Nobel Peace Laureate, Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat

    In November 2004 the world’s NOBEL PEACE LAUREATES came together to issue a Statement. It began:

    “Two decades ago, the world was swept with a wave of hope. Inspired by the popular movements for peace, freedom, democracy and solidarity, the nations of the world worked together to end the Cold War. Yet the opportunities opened up by that historic change are slipping away. We are gravely concerned with the resurgent nuclear and conventional arms race, disrespect for international law and the failure of the world’s governments to address adequately the challenges of poverty and environmental degradation.”

    Today in the aftermath of the terrible devastation following the Indian Ocean tsunami we see that yet again, in times of desperate need, the world’s nations can act together.

    I believe that the challenges that face the world today, of security, poverty and environmental crisis, as well as the new threat of terrorism, can only be met successfully through a united world working through the United Nations.

    One of the greatest challenges that will face the world in the next decade is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the United Nations in New York next May we can act together again to work towards the systematic elimination of these terrible weapons of mass destruction by undertaking to implement fully the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and create a nuclear-weapon-free world for future generations.

    In recognition of the importance of this event the Nobel Peace Laureates gave an undertaking:

    “As an immediate specific task, we commit to work for preserving and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We reject double standards and emphasize the legal responsibility of nuclear weapons states to work to eliminate nuclear weapons. We are gravely alarmed by the creation of new, usable nuclear weapons and call for rejection of doctrines that view nuclear weapons as legitimate means of war-fighting and threat pre-emption.”

    It is my belief, and that of the Nobel Peace Laureates, that the nations of the world must work together again and with a strong civil society. This is the way toward a globalization with a human face and a new international order that rejects brute force, respects ethnic, cultural and political diversity and affirms justice, compassion and human solidarity.

  • The Revolt Against the Bush Administration’s Nuclear Double Standard

    In late November, when Congress refused to appropriate money to fund so-called “bunker busters” and “mini-nukes,” this action represented not only a serious blow to the Bush administration’s plan to build new nuclear weapons, but to the administration’s overall nuclear arms control and disarmament policy.

    That policy has been to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by nations the Bush administration considers “evil.” The military invasion of Iraq, like the gathering confrontation with Iran and North Korea, reflects, at least in part, the administration’s obsession with preventing nations potentially hostile to the United States from acquiring a nuclear capability. This focus upon blocking nuclear weapons development in other countries has some legal justification for, in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, non-nuclear nations agreed not to develop nuclear weapons.

    But the NPT also calls for nuclear nations to rid themselves of the nuclear weapons they possess. Indeed, in the meetings that fashioned the treaty, the non-nuclear weapons states demanded a commitment to nuclear disarmament by the nuclear powers. And they received it — not only in the form of the treaty’s provisions, but in the formal pledges made by the nuclear powers at the periodic treaty review conferences that have been held since the NPT went into effect.

    It is in this area that the Bush administration has revealed itself as the proponent of a double standard. At the same time that it has assailed selected nations for developing nuclear weapons, it has withdrawn the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, effectively destroyed the START II treaty, and refused to support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It has also raised the U.S. nuclear weapons budget to new heights and proposed the building of new U.S. nuclear weapons, including the “bunker busters” and “mini-nukes.” As Senator Kerry pointed out during the recent presidential campaign, this is not the kind of policy that will encourage other nations to abide by their commitments under the NPT.

    The surprising congressional move to block the Bush plan for new nuclear weapons is but one of numerous signs that this double standard cannot be sustained. As a special high-level U.N. panel has just warned: “We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.” Nor is the breakaway from the NPT limited to the non-nuclear nations. Just the other day the Russian government announced its development of a new nuclear missile. Appropriately enough, the U.N. panel condemned the nuclear powers for failing to honor their commitments, and called upon them to restart the nuclear disarmament process.

    Furthermore, of course, terrorists have been actively seeking nuclear weapons, and might well obtain them. Thousands of tactical nuclear weapons — many of them small, portable, and, therefore, ideal for terrorist use — are still maintained by the U.S. and Russian governments. No international agreements have ever been put into place to control or eliminate them. In fact, it remains unclear how many of these tactical nuclear weapons exist or where they are located. In Russia, at least, they are badly guarded and, in the disorderly circumstances of the post-Soviet economy, they seem ripe for sale or theft.

    The revolt against the Bush administration’s double standard could come to a head in May 2005, when an NPT review conference opens at the United Nations, in New York City. Nuclear and non-nuclear nations are sure to exchange sharp barbs about non-compliance with NPT provisions. Furthermore, more than a hundred mayors from the Mayors for Peace Campaign, which has drawn together the top executives from 640 cities around the world, are expected to come to the U.N. to lobby for nuclear disarmament. They will be joined by United for Peace and Justice, the largest peace movement coalition in the United States, and over 2,000 organizations in 96 different countries. Together, they have launched Abolition Now, a campaign calling on heads of state to begin negotiations in 2005 on a treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

    Ultimately, then, the Bush administration might be forced into accepting a single standard for dealing with the threat posed by nuclear weapons — one designed to lead to a nuclear-free world. Certainly, there are plenty of signs that people and nations around the globe believe that what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander.

    Mr. Witnner is Professor of History at the State University of New York, Albany. His latest book is Toward Nuclear Abolition (Stanford University Press).

    This article was originally published by the History News Network.

  • UK’s Failure on Nuclear Obligation: Letter to the Times of London Editor

    Sir, You take Iran to task for stalling on nuclear agreements (leading article, November 24) and you conclude: “Iran wants to be taken seriously by the international community, yet does not take its international obligations seriously. One is not possible without the other.”

    How very true.

    All the five “recognised” nuclear states: USA, Russia, UK, France and China, have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and thus (under Article VI) committed themselves to the abolition of their nuclear arsenals.

    Yet they have done nothing to show that they take their international obligations seriously.

    The UK is formally committed to nuclear disarmament, but it will not implement it as long as other states keep nuclear weapons. In the institution designated to deal with this issue, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, nobody is taking the initiative. The subject has been stalled for years, and is not even put on the agenda.

    With the re-election of George W. Bush, his nuclear policy – which includes the development of new nuclear warheads and their first-use, even pre-emptively if need be – is very likely to be pursued, leading to a new nuclear arms race.

    An initiative to implement the NPT is urgently needed and, for the reason stated above, the UK should feel obliged to take it.

    Yours faithfully, JOSEPH ROTBLAT, (President Emeritus of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs), 8 Asmara Road, West Hampstead, NW2 3ST. pugwash@mac.com November 24

  • An Open Letter to the Regents of the University of California

    An Open Letter to the Regents of the University of California

    The decision that you make on whether or not to bid to continue managing and overseeing the nation’s nuclear weapons laboratories transcends ordinary university business decisions; it is a decision of profound moral consequence. The question that must be confronted is whether or not an institution of higher education should be involved in the creation and maintenance of weapons of mass destruction.

    While nuclear weapons are intended primarily for deterrence, the concept of deterrence itself is based on an implied assumption that the weapons might be used. Are the Regents of the University of California willing to continue to affiliate the University with laboratories that research and develop nuclear weapons, recognizing that the mass destruction of human beings could result? Although it may not be the intent, the potential use of nuclear weapons and larger implications of the university’s involvement cannot be denied.

    Your decision has vast legal, as well as moral dimensions. In a 1996 opinion, the International Court of Justice found that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be illegal if it violated international humanitarian law. This means that any threat or use of nuclear weapons that failed to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants or that caused unnecessary suffering would be illegal under international law. It is difficult to imagine any use of nuclear weapons that would not violate these rules of international humanitarian law.

    Although the actual decision to threaten or use nuclear weapons would be out of the hands of the University of California Regents and the scientists and technicians who contributed to the creation and maintenance of the weapons, the UC Regents and the scientists and technicians in the labs could be considered accomplices to future international crimes. The current work of the nuclear weapons laboratories in researching new and more usable nuclear weapons, such as “bunker busters” and low-yield nuclear weapons, also runs counter to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which calls for ending the nuclear arms race at an early date and for good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

    The University of California justifies its relationship to the nuclear weapons laboratories as “a national service.” But this so-called “service” of designing and improving weapons of mass destruction is unworthy of a great university. In fact, the “service” the University of California has provided is a fig leaf of respectability to the making and maintenance of these genocidal weapons. Should these weapons be used and destroy large civilian populations, the role of the UC would certainly be viewed as a national disgrace rather than a national service.

    If the nuclear weapons laboratories would focus their talented scientists on limiting their nuclear weapons activities to the dismantlement of these weapons and to maintaining the safety and security (rather than reliability) of these weapons while awaiting dismantlement, their efforts could indeed be considered a national service, even an international service. But under the present circumstances in which the US is moving forward with new nuclear weapon designs that make these weapons more usable, the UC should opt out of providing management and oversight to the labs. As UC Regents, you should base your decision on moral considerations, consistent with international law.

    I urge you also to make your decision to withdraw from your past role in management and oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons labs highly public. Doing so will influence the public and political discourse on the responsibility of the US to set an example in fulfilling obligations for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

    The University of California has a responsibility to pass on the accumulated knowledge of civilization to new generations. The continued engagement of UC in creating and maintaining weapons capable of destroying cities, civilization and most life on earth clearly contradicts the mission of the University, as well as its motto, “Let there be light.” There is no light in the creation of weapons of mass destruction, nor in the shroud of nuclear secrecy.

    I call upon you to take the high road and reconceptualize the national service of the University of California in terms of disarming and dismantling these terrible weapons of mass destruction, rather than creating and maintaining them. In 2005, the 60 th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 50 th anniversary of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and the 35 th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I urge you to take a principled stand for the future of humanity. Your decision could help change the course of our nation and the future of civilization.

    David Krieger is a founder and the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). For more information on campaign to end the University of California ‘s involvement with the nuclear weapons laboratories, visit www.ucnuclearfree.org.

  • In Search of Security: Finding An Alternative To Nuclear Deterrence

    According to the President just elected, nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism represent the single most important threat to US and global security.

    I wrote that sentence three weeks ago, well before the election results were known, and yet I knew it would be true – because it was one of the key issues on which Senator Kerry and President Bush – and, for that matter, most other world leaders – agreed.

    That said, fundamental differences of opinion remain on how to deal with this ever growing menace to our survival. Should we opt for diplomacy or for preemption? What are the relative merits of collective versus unilateral action? Is it more effective to pursue a policy of containment or one based on inclusiveness?

    These are not new questions, by any measure. But they have taken on renewed urgency as nations struggle, both regionally and globally, to cope with an extended array of conflicts, highly sophisticated forms of terrorism, and a growing threat of weapons of mass destruction.

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the global anchor for humanity’s efforts to curb nuclear proliferation and move towards nuclear disarmament. There is no doubt that the implementation of the NPT continues to provide important security benefits – by providing assurance that, in the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear energy is not being misused for weapon purposes. The NPT is also the only binding agreement in which all five of the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to move forward towards nuclear disarmament.

    Still, for all of us who have been intimately associated with the implementation of the Treaty for over three decades, it is clear that recent events have placed the NPT and the regime supporting it under unprecedented stress, exposing some of its inherent limitations and pointing to areas that need to be adjusted. Today I would like to discuss some of the lessons that can be taken from recent experience, and a number of possible ways for moving forward.

    The Iraq Experience: What Can We Learn?

    Of all the recent actions to address nuclear proliferation and other security concerns, the most dramatic have taken place in Iraq. Naturally, it remains too early to judge the final outcome of the Iraq War, but I believe there are some insights to be gained already from the events that led up to the war and those that have transpired since.

    The first point to be made is that the inspections were working. The nuclear inspection process – while requiring time and patience – can be effective even when the country under inspection is providing less than active cooperation. When international inspectors are provided adequate authority, aided by all available information, backed by a credible compliance mechanism, and supported by international consensus, the verification system works. The report recently issued by the Iraq Survey Group confirmed the conclusions the IAEA was providing to the United Nations Security Council before the war – when we said we had found no evidence to suggest that Iraq had reconstituted any element of its former nuclear weapon programme.

    But inspections are only of value when the results are accepted in good faith and taken into account in future action. Unfortunately, the Iraq inspection process was not given the time required, nor were its findings given due recognition. It is true that the record and mode of behaviour of Saddam Hussein´s regime did not inspire much confidence; but it is also true that we had not seen any clear and present danger involving weapons of mass destruction, after months of intrusive inspection.

    The second point to be made is that we need to exercise maximum restraint before resorting to military force. In 1841, the US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, characterized preemptive military action as being justified only when the prospect of an attack made clear that “the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Naturally, times have changed, but the exhortation for restraint expressed in those words remains valid. The Iraq experience should tell us that unless extreme conditions exist to justify preemptive action against a suspected weapons of mass destruction programme, diplomacy in all its forms, including maximum pressure, coupled with credible verification, should be the primary avenue of choice. In my view, loosely defining what justifies pre-emptive action by individual nations could become an invitation for all countries to use force in a garden variety of situations, and render a severe setback to the UN Charter effort to limit the use of force to cases of self-defence of the type Webster described, and to enforcement actions authorized by the Security Council. And in this context, I should recall Henry Kissinger´s remark: “It is not in the American national interest to establish preemption as a universal principle available to every nation.”

    The third point to be made is that no one gains when we are divided on crucial issues such as the use of force. Like the international community as a whole, the Security Council was deeply divided in its views in the run-up to the Iraq War – and, after years of collective decisions on Iraq, the Council’s role and authority was set aside by the decision of the Coalition to take military action. But one lesson has been made very clear by the Iraq experience: when the international community and the Security Council are divided on matters of war and peace, everyone loses. The Coalition lost in credibility in some people’s eyes by proceeding to use force without the endorsement of the Security Council. The United Nations lost in credibility as the body driving the action against Iraq on behalf of international legitimacy, and as a result has come to be perceived in some quarters – particularly by many in Iraq – as an adjunct of the Coalition force, and not as an independent and impartial institution. And perhaps it is the Iraqi people who have lost the most; after years of suffering under a brutal dictatorship, and after enduring the hardships brought on through an extended period of sanctions, they have had still more misery brought on by the ravages of war and the unforeseen and extended period of insurgency and civil disorder.

    Other Lessons From Recent Verification Experience

    Of course, the Iraq experience is the most glaring recent case relevant to nuclear proliferation and security, but unfortunately not the only one. The IAEA´s efforts to verify undeclared nuclear programmes in Iran, Libya and the Democratic People´s Republic of Korea have also provided considerable insights and a number of lessons.

    The first lesson is that, for nuclear verification to be successful, IAEA inspectors must have adequate authority. The “any time, any place” authority granted by the Security Council in the case of Iraq was extraordinary, and it is not likely that countries would voluntarily grant the IAEA such blanket rights of inspection. Moreover, the IAEA´s authority under the NPT is limited to verifying that nuclear material has not been diverted for non-peaceful uses – and we have no clear-cut mandate to search for weaponization activities, per se, unless we have reason to believe that nuclear material has actually been diverted to those activities.

    Nonetheless, within the NPT framework, adequate authority can be achieved in those countries that accept the so-called “additional protocol” as a supplement to their NPT safeguards agreement. The additional protocol provides the Agency with significant additional authority with regard to both information and physical access. As illustrated by the IAEA’s experience in Iraq before the first Gulf War, without the authority provided by the protocol, our ability to verify nuclear activities is mostly limited to the nuclear material already declared – with little authority to verify the absence of undeclared, or clandestine, nuclear material or activities. By contrast, our recent efforts in Iran and elsewhere have made clear how much can be uncovered when the protocol is applied.

    The second lesson is that international efforts to limit the spread of technology through the use of export controls have left much to be desired. The most disturbing insight to emerge from our work in Iran and Libya has been the revelation of an extensive illicit market for the supply of nuclear items. The relative ease with which a multinational illicit network could be set up and operated demonstrates the inadequacy of the present export control system. The fact that so many companies and individuals could be involved (more than two dozen, by last count) – and that, in most cases, this could occur apparently without the knowledge of their own governments – points to the shortcomings of national systems for oversight of sensitive equipment and technology. It also points to the limitations of existing international cooperation on export controls, which relies on informal arrangements, does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity, and does not include sufficient sharing of export information with the IAEA.

    But more importantly, it is time to change our assumptions regarding the inaccessibility of nuclear technology. In a modern society characterized by electronic information exchange, interlinked financial systems, and global trade, the control of access to nuclear weapons technology has grown increasingly difficult. The technical barriers to mastering the essential steps of uranium enrichment – and to designing weapons – have eroded over time. Much of the hardware in question is “dual use”, and the sheer diversity of technology has made it much more difficult to control or even track procurement and sales.

    The only reasonable conclusion is that the control of technology is not, in itself, a sufficient barrier against further proliferation. For an increasing number of countries with a highly developed industrial infrastructure – and in some cases access to high enriched uranium or plutonium – the international community must rely primarily on a continuing perception of security as the basis for the adherence of these countries to their non-proliferation commitments. And security perceptions can rapidly change.

    In fact, a country might choose to hedge its options by developing a civilian nuclear fuel cycle – legally permissible under the NPT – not only because of its civilian use but also because of the “latent nuclear deterrent” value that such a programme could have, both intrinsically and in terms of the signal it sends to neighboring and other countries. The unspoken security posture could be summarized as follows: “We have no nuclear weapons programme today, because we do not see the need for one. But we should be prepared to launch one, should our security perception change. And for this, we should have the required capacity to produce the fissile material, as well as the other technologies that would enable us to produce a weapon in a matter of months.” Obviously, the narrow margin of security this situation affords is worrisome.

    The third lesson, as amply illustrated by the North Korean situation, is that the international community cannot afford not to act in a timely manner in cases of non-compliance, and before available options are narrowed. Beginning in the mid-1980s, North Korea took seven years to fulfill its obligations under the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency. In 1992, shortly after this agreement was concluded and the IAEA began inspections, we sounded the alarm that North Korea had not reported its total production of plutonium. From that time forward, despite the Agreed Framework concluded with the United States, North Korea has been in continuous non-compliance with its NPT obligations, and has not allowed the IAEA to fully verify its nuclear programme. At the end of 2002, North Korea capped that non-compliance by ordering IAEA inspectors out of the country, dismantling the monitoring cameras, breaking IAEA seals and, a few weeks later, declaring its withdrawal from the NPT.

    Naturally, all of these actions were promptly reported by the Agency to the Security Council – but with little to no response. This lack of timely action may have complicated finding a solution, and may have conveyed the message that breaking the non-proliferation norms with impunity is a doable proposition – or worse, that acquiring a nuclear deterrent will bring with it a special treatment.

    Lesson four: insecurity breeds proliferation. It is instructive that nearly all nuclear proliferation concerns arise in regions of longstanding tension. In other words, nuclear proliferation is a symptom , and these symptoms will continue to persist and worsen as long as we leave unaddressed the underlying causes of insecurity and instability – such as chronic disputes which continue to fester, the persistent lack of good governance and basic freedoms, a growing divide between rich and poor, and newly perceived schisms based on ethnic or religious differences.

    It is in this context that I have begun to stress not only the value but also the limitations of the IAEA´s role. While the Agency can use verification effectively to bring to closure questions of compliance with legal and technical requirements, the long term value of these efforts can only be realized to the extent that they are reinforced by all other components of the non-proliferation regime, and followed by the necessary political dialogue among concerned States to address underlying issues of insecurity, and to build confidence and trust. I should note that verification, supported by diplomacy, has been an important part of the success so far in Iran and Libya, and in that sense I can only hope that the continuation of the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear programme will yield results that will include, inter alia, full IAEA verification.

    Exploiting the Window of Opportunity

    Clearly, the world has changed. The key features of the international security landscape have been altered significantly over the past two decades. Whatever value the concept of nuclear deterrence may have served during the Cold War, as the volatile currency on which the standoff between two superpowers was balanced, they have now become the ultimate “elephant in the parlor”. For the five countries recognized as nuclear-weapon States under the NPT, their nuclear arsenals are increasingly becoming either a focal point for resentment or cynicism among the nuclear “have-nots”, or, worse, a model for emulation for States that wish to pursue clandestine WMD programmes, hoping that this will bring them security and status.

    It is the height of irony that, in today´s security environment, the only actors who presumably would find the world’s most powerful weapons useful – and would deploy them without hesitation – would be an extremist group. A nuclear deterrent is absolutely ineffective against such groups; they have no cities that can be bombed in response, nor are they focused on self-preservation. But even as we take urgent measures to protect against nuclear terrorism, we remain sluggish and unconvinced about the need to rapidly rid ourselves of nuclear weapons.

    Why? The answer, in my view, is that the international community has not been successful to date in creating a viable alternative to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as the basis for international security. Nuclear weapons will not go away until a reliable collective security framework exists to fill the vacuum. The aftermath of the Cold War should have served as the logical lead-in to such an effort. The resulting changes to the international security landscape have been obvious; it is only that we have not acted to adapt to these changes.

    If there is any silver lining to this dark cloud, it is that the window of opportunity is still open. The efforts to counteract Iraq´s phantom weapons of mass destruction, to unveil a clandestine nuclear weapon programmes in Libya, to understand the extent and nature of Iran´s undeclared nuclear programme, to bring North Korea back to the NPT regime and dismantle any nuclear programme they may have, and to prevent nuclear terrorism have all brought worldwide attention to bear on issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. That energy is ours to harness. If we are ever to build a global security culture based on human solidarity and shared human values – a collective security framework that will serve the interests of all countries equally, and make reliance on nuclear weapons obsolete – the time is now.

    The Responsibility For Action

    The question remains, how? Whose responsibility is it to create this collective security framework? Is this an initiative for policy makers? The UN Security Council? The scientific community?

    The answer, of course, is that it will take all of us. Progress must be made on all fronts – political, scientific and societal. We must all take the responsibility for action.

    Sidney Drell comes to this problem as a physicist, and I come to it as a lawyer and diplomat, but we have arrived at the same basic conclusion: that reliance on nuclear weapons is a recipe for self-destruction. I find it encouraging that people from all sectors of society have been coming forward with proposals on how to address the challenges of nuclear proliferation and nuclear arms control.

    In my view, this could be the beginning of a much needed discussion on security – and we should do all we can to stimulate this dialogue, move it forward, and keep it in public focus. I would like to spend my remaining minutes outlining what I see as the types of actions that must be taken.

    Creating the Framework: the Political and Policy Front

    Let me first turn to the political and policy front. In this area, leadership must be focused on restoring and strengthening the credibility of multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts and threats to international security – conflicts and threats ranging from preserving the environment to ensuring respect for human rights, working for sustainable development, and controlling weapons of mass destruction – which, in our globalized world, can only be resolved through a collective and multilateral approach, in which competing interests and powers can be contained and harmonized. The system of collective security hoped for in the United Nations Charter has never been made fully functional and effective. This must be our starting point.

    For some years now, efforts to achieve Security Council reform have been mostly focused on the question of whether additional countries should be given a permanent seat. In my view, such a change would be helpful in making the Council more representative of today’s global realities, and in removing the current correlation – in that the same five countries recognized under the NPT as nuclear weapon States hold the five permanent seats on the Security Council.

    But more importantly, for the Security Council to take the leadership role for which it was designed, its reform must be focused on more than issues of membership. The Council must be able and ready to engage swiftly and decisively in both preventive diplomacy and enforcement measures, with the tools and methods in place necessary to cope with existing and emerging threats to international peace and security. This should include mechanisms for preventive diplomacy to settle emerging disputes within and among nations. The genocide in Rwanda and the appalling situation in Darfur, where 10 000 people are dying every month, are two prime examples of the lack of early and decisive intervention by the Security Council.

    The Security Council should also have, at the ready, “smart” sanctions that can target a government without adding misery to its helpless citizens, as we have seen in Iraq. The Council should have adequate forces to intervene in the foreseeable range of situations – from maintaining law and order, to monitoring borders, to combating aggression. And yes – in my view, the Security Council should be able to authorize collective pre-emptive military action when the imminence and gravity of the threat merit such action.

    Increasing the effectiveness and relevance of the Security Council is an essential step towards a functional system for collective security. Such a system is the only alternative to the reliance that some nations, including nuclear weapon States and their allies, now place on nuclear deterrence – in a “good guys versus bad guys” approach that inevitably leaves some nations seeking to achieve parity. A functional system for collective security is the only alternative to the current hodge-podge of approaches to addressing security issues – ranging from inaction or late action on the part of the international community, to unilateral and “self-help” solutions on the part of individual States or groups of States.

    With a viable system of collective security in place, policy makers and political leaders may find it easier to make progress on the nuclear arms control front, such as bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and negotiating an internationally verifiable Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty.

    In my view, every effort should be made, starting at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and continuing in other venues, to agree on benchmarks for non-proliferation and disarmament. These benchmarks should include: urging all States to bring the additional protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements into force; tightening and formalizing the controls over the export of nuclear materials and technology; working towards multilateral control over the sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle – enrichment, reprocessing, and the management and disposal of spent fuel; and ensuring that States cannot withdraw from the NPT without clear consequences, including prompt review and appropriate action by the Security Council. The international community should also work rapidly to reduce the stockpiles of high enriched uranium and plutonium around the globe, and to strengthen the protection of existing nuclear material and facilities.

    An essential benchmark will be that a concrete roadmap for verified, irreversible nuclear disarmament, complete with a timetable, and involving not only the NPT nuclear weapon States but also India, Pakistan and Israel, is at last put in place.

    Just over a month ago, the foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden spoke out jointly, saying: “Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin, and both must be energetically pursued.” Thirty years after the enactment of the NPT, with the Cold War ended and over 30 000 nuclear weapons still available for use, it should be understandable that many non-nuclear-weapon States are no longer willing to accept as credible the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to their NPT disarmament obligations.

    In my view, we have come to a fork in the road: either there must be a demonstrated commitment to move toward nuclear disarmament, or we should resign ourselves to the fact that other countries will pursue a more dangerous parity through proliferation. The difficulty of achieving our ultimate objective – the elimination of all nuclear weapons – should by no means be underestimated. But at the same time, it should not be used as a pretext for failing to start the process of drastic reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, and simultaneously to explore the development of collective response mechanisms that will be needed against any future clandestine nuclear proliferation efforts.

    The Scientific Front: Roles for Researchers and Inventors

    I would also like to emphasize the role of scientists in advancing non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, and the responsibility for action that lies with the scientific community. Science brought us the atom bomb. And if we are to rid ourselves of nuclear weapons, we will need an equally intensive effort on the part of scientific researchers – to develop innovative tools for nuclear verification and mechanisms for reducing the proliferation potential of nuclear material and technology.

    In the area of nuclear verification, for example, advances in environmental sampling and analysis techniques are enabling IAEA inspectors to determine, with far greater precision, the nature and origin of individual particles of uranium – and thereby to help us detect undeclared activities. Satellite imagery technology and advanced information analysis techniques have also broadened the range of inspection capabilities. And in the long run, science may be able to develop additional innovative ways and means to neutralize the impact of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

    The Responsibility of Concerned Citizens

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons – “The Gravest Danger” , in the words of Sidney Drell and James Goodby – is a legacy we all share, and ultimately, every concerned citizen also shares the responsibility for action. In countries ranging from the most powerful to some of the least developed, the voice of the citizen is increasingly a force in the political debate. It is vital that we engage individuals from all sectors of society in a public dialogue on international security – to remind them of the continued danger of nuclear war, to explain to them possible alternatives, and to offer avenues for involvement. We must continue to develop and refine proposals for action, to bring them to the attention of governments and opinion leaders, and to promote public discourse on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament that will become too forceful to be ignored.

    And here I am pleased to recognize the important role played by CISAC as a force in the field of international security and cooperation. Your efforts to develop proposals that aim to move us away from a reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence has never been more urgent or more relevant.

    Conclusion

    For centuries, perhaps for millennia, security strategies have been based on boundaries: city walls, border patrols, and the use of racial and religious groupings or other categories to separate friend from foe. Those strategies no longer work. The global community has become interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas and goods. Many aspects of modern life – global warming, Internet communication, the global marketplace, and yes, the war on terrorism – point to the fact that the human race has walked through a door that cannot be re-entered.

    Yet with all the strides we have made to connect on many levels, we continue to think disconnectedly on others. We think globally in terms of trade, but we continue to think locally in terms of security. We cherish our connectivity on the Web, but turn away from solidarity in matters of extreme poverty. James Morris, Executive Director of the World Food Programme, recently pointed out, “There are about 800 million hungry people in the world today, about half of them children” – yet the governments of the world spent $900 billion on armaments last year. Could it be that our priorities are skewed?

    This is a mindset we must change. In this century, in this generation, we must develop a new approach to security capable of transcending borders – an inclusive approach that is centred on the value of every human life. The sooner we can make that transition, the sooner we will achieve our goal of a planet with peace and justice as its hallmark.

    by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei

  • A New Bridge to Nuclear Disarmament

    A bridge on the long road to nuclear disarmament was built when eight NATO States supported a New Agenda Coalition resolution at the United Nations calling for more speed in implementing commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    The bridge gained extra strength when Japan and South Korea joined with the NATO 8 – Belgium, Canada, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway and Turkey.

    These States, along with the New Agenda countries – Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden – now form an impressive and perhaps formidable center in the nuclear weapons debate and can play a determining role in the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

    The bridge they have formed links the nuclear weapons States, which are entrenching nuclear weapons in their military doctrines, and the Non-Aligned Movement, which wants immediate negotiations on a time-bound program for nuclear disarmament.

    It is hard to know what to call this new collection of important States in the center. It is certainly not an entity. To be called a working partnership, it will at least have to pursue a common goal. And it is by no means certain that the tensions within the center can be contained. Nonetheless, the strategy adopted by the New Agenda Coalition to make its annual resolution at the U.N. First Committee more attractive particularly to the NATO and like-minded States – and thus shore up the moderate middle in the nuclear weapons debate – is working.

    Although the bridge needs strengthening, it is firm enough for the centrist States to exert leverage on the nuclear weapons States to take minimum steps to save the NPT in 2005.

    These steps are spelled out in the New Agenda resolution. It starts out by expressing “grave concern” at the danger to humanity posed by the possible use of nuclear weapons, and reminds nuclear weapons States of their 2000 “unequivocal undertaking” to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It then calls on “all States” to fully comply with their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation commitments and “not to act in any way that may be detrimental to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation or that may lead to a new nuclear arms race.”

    The resolution identifies priorities for action: universal adherence to the NPT and the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-development of new types of nuclear weapons; negotiation of an effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty; establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament; and compliance with principles of irreversibility and transparency and verification capability.

    The resolution was adopted by a vote of 135 States in favour, 5 against and 25 abstentions. This was a considerable gain over the 121-6-38 vote for the New Agenda’s much more extensive resolution last year.

    China voted for the resolution and Russia abstained. The three Western nuclear weapons States, the U.S., the U.K. and France, all voted no, along with Israel and Latvia. Not able to object to what was in the resolution, the Western NWS said their “no” was based on what was not in it, namely recognition that the Moscow Treaty “commits the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals by several thousand warheads over the next decade.” Nonetheless, the Western NWS looked forward to “ongoing dialogue” at the NPT 2005 Conference.

    The U.S. took an aggressive stance against the resolution, both in meetings at the U.N. and in demarches in capitals. Some NATO States were obviously intimidated, but the presumed NATO solidarity was cracked when seven NATO States joined with Canada, which for two years had stood alone in NATO in supporting the New Agenda resolution. The fact that such important NATO players as Germany, Norway, The Netherlands and Belgium have also now taken a pro-active stance indicates that they wanted to send a message to the U.S. to take more significant steps to fulfilling commitments already made to the NPT.

    Japan, which annually offers its own resolution, “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” suddenly decided to support the New Agenda resolution, in order, as the government explained, to engender a “favourable atmosphere for nuclear disarmament.” This was a statesmanlike step, especially since the New Agenda countries failed to reciprocate when they abstained on Japan’s resolution. To parse the minute differences between the New Agenda’s and Japan’s resolutions is to engage in the technical games that experts play that result in diplomatic paralysis and public apathy.

    The situation the NPT finds itself in is so serious and the threat of nuclear terrorism so real that governments need to put aside their quarrels and power plays and take meaningful steps to ensure that the NPT will not be lost to the world through erosion.

    The centrist States have shown that they can cooperate in at least a basic manner to vote together on a program of meaningful action. They will now have to find ways of effectively negotiating with the NWS at the 2005 conference. They can do this provided they retain a confidence that the bridge they have built can hold and trust one another in the forthcoming NPT deliberations.

    Here the role of civil society should be noted. Like the States within the NPT, civil society is itself composed of groups with different viewpoints about how to achieve elimination. Some groups, understandably impatient, want fast action. But the resistance of the Western NWS, particularly the U.S., is so strong that demands for immediate comprehensive negotiations run up against a brick wall.

    Intermediate gains, such as the steps outlined in the New Agenda resolution, would go a long way in moving the international community down the path to nuclear disarmament. The New Agenda strategy of building up the center for moderate, realistic achievements deserves the full-fledged support of civil society.

    Senator emeritus Douglas Roche, O.C. of Canada is Chairman of the Middle Powers Initiative and author of “The Human Right to Peace.”

  • Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Examining the Policies of Bush and Kerry

    Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Examining the Policies of Bush and Kerry

    President Bush and Senator Kerry agree that nuclear proliferation is the top national security threat facing the United States . Given this agreement, it is worth examining the solutions each candidate is offering to solve the problem.

    The issue of Russian “loose nukes” has been at the forefront of the non-proliferation agenda since the end of the Cold War. A January 2001 Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia concluded: “The most urgent, unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction of weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.” This bipartisan report called for the US to develop and implement a ten-year $30 billion plan to bring Russian nuclear weapons and materials under control. The Bush administration has been spending at a rate of less than half this amount and has made little progress. Senator Kerry calls for completing the task in a four-year period.

    In Northeast Asia, North Korea has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and claims to have nuclear weapons. Under the Bush administration, the US has been engaged in periodic six-party talks on security issues with North Korea , South Korea , Japan , China and Russia . These talks have made little progress. By initiating its war against Iraq on the basis of purported weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration has provided incentive to countries such as North Korea to develop nuclear deterrent forces against US attack. Adding to this, Bush has labeled North Korea as part of his “axis of evil” and referred to its leader as a “pygmy.” Senator Kerry has indicated that he would intensify the process of stopping North Korean nuclear proliferation by engaging in bilateral talks, as well as six-party talks, with the leaders of North Korea on the full range of issues of concern.

    In the Middle East, the Bush administration has enraged Arab populations by initiating its war against Iraq on false pretenses. Further, President Bush branded both Iraq and Iran as part of his “axis of evil.” The administration has put pressure on Iran to cease its uranium enrichment, which Iran claims is for peaceful purposes, but thus far with little effect. The US is widely viewed in the region as hypocritical for failing to apply equal pressure on Israel to dismantle its nuclear arsenal. Senator Kerry has set forth a plan to create a consortium to supply Iran with the fuel it needs for peaceful purposes with the agreement that Iran would return the spent fuel to the consortium, thus eliminating the threat that this material would be converted to use for weapons.

    In South Asia, both India and Pakistan have developed nuclear weapons capabilities. Following the nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, the US placed sanctions on them. However, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has largely removed the sanctions and has developed close ties with Pakistan . President Bush claims to have “busted” the network of A. Q. Khan that was supplying nuclear materials and technology around the world. In fact, Khan was pardoned by Pakistani President Musharraf and has never been questioned by US intelligence agents. Senator Kerry has promised to work multinationally to toughen export controls and strengthen law enforcement and intelligence sharing to prevent such non-proliferation breaches in the future. Further, he has called for working through the United Nations to make trade in nuclear and other technologies of mass destruction an international crime.

    The United States has itself been engaged in a program to create new and more usable nuclear weapons, weapons for specific purposes such as “bunker busting,” and smaller nuclear weapons that are about one-third the size of the Hiroshima bomb. The Bush administration has supported this program, while Senator Kerry has said that he would end it because seeking to create new nuclear weapons sets the wrong example when we are trying to convince other nations not to develop nuclear arsenals.

    Both candidates recognize the dangers of nuclear proliferation and of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The Bush administration has set up the Proliferation Security Initiative that allows for boarding ships at sea to inspect for nuclear materials. Senator Kerry has pointed out that this initiative allows for inspecting on short notice only 15 percent of the 50,000 large cargo ships at sea and has less than 20 full participants. He plans a comprehensive approach that would not rely only on “coalitions of the willing,” but would create a broad international framework for preventing nuclear proliferation. Senator Kerry would also appoint a Presidential Coordinator to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism and make the issue a cabinet-level priority.

    In evaluating the candidates in regard to their willingness and ability to deal with the threats of nuclear proliferation, we should consider also the commitments made in 2000 by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the US , to achieving 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These steps include ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the creation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, making nuclear disarmament irreversible, and an unequivocal undertaking to achieve the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. These steps are important not only because they are international obligations, but because the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation regime in general rests upon the nuclear weapons states as well as the non-nuclear weapons states fulfilling their obligations.

    In nearly all respects President Bush has failed to meet these obligations. He has opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, opposed verification of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, made nuclear disarmament entirely reversible under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and, rather than demonstrating leadership toward the elimination of nuclear arsenals, has sought to create new nuclear weapons.

    It is difficult to imagine any US president achieving so dismal a record on so critical an issue. It is time for presidential leadership that will restore US credibility in the world and not betray the national security interests of the American people.

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and co-author of Nuclear Weapons and the World Court.