Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: NPT

  • Nuclear Weapon Abolition and Multilateral Negotiations

    Nuclear Weapon Abolition and Multilateral Negotiations

    In the six decades since the beginning of the Nuclear Age, despite the critical need, there have not been multilateral negotiations for nuclear weapons abolition. The closest to achieving such negotiations was the inclusion of Article VI in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls for “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament….”

    On the basis of NPT Article VI, a 1996 World Court Advisory Opinion unanimously stated, “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties to the treaty agreed to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament, including “[a]n unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

    These are clear directives and commitments to pursue multilateral negotiations for nuclear disarmament, but none have taken place. For ten years the Conference on Disarmament, the international community’s single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues, has been blocked by rules of consensus from making any progress.

    Even partial measures aimed at arms control have been blocked or diverted by nuclear weapons states. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), although opened for signatures in 1996, has not entered into force because all nuclear capable states must ratify the treaty for this to happen. As yet, the treaty has not been ratified by the US, China and Israel, and three nuclear weapons states – India, Pakistan and North Korea – have not yet even signed the treaty.

    A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) has long been discussed as an important next step on the path to nuclear disarmament, and was included as one of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. In May 2006, the United States tabled a draft FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament, but one that contained no provisions for verification, making it largely meaningless. Nonetheless, it could provide a starting point for negotiations.

    In addition to their failure to negotiate nuclear disarmament in good faith, as called for by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and by the International Court of Justice, the nuclear weapons states have failed to take nearly all of the other steps called for in the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. The US scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to pursue missile defenses, and has failed to proceed with negotiating with Russia a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III). In the bilateral Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) negotiated by the US and Russia, there are no provisions for transparency, verification or irreversibility as called for in the 13 Practical Steps.

    The failure of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations was noted in the 2006 report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Weapons of Terror. The report stated, “The erosion of confidence in the effectiveness of the NPT to prevent horizontal proliferation has been matched by a loss of confidence in the treaty as a result of the failure of the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their disarmament obligations under the treaty and also to honour their additional commitments to disarmament made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.”

    The result of the failure of the NPT nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) to pursue multilateral negotiations for nuclear weapons abolition has led to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential for even further proliferation. India, Pakistan and Israel, all of which never signed the NPT, have developed nuclear arsenals; and North Korea, which withdrew from the NPT in 2003, has announced its entry into the nuclear weapons club. Some 35 to 40 other countries are nuclear weapons capable and could decide in the future to develop nuclear arsenals.

    Israel does not publicly acknowledge its nuclear arsenal, but it is evident to all parties that they are a nuclear weapons state, and other Middle Eastern countries question why they should accept a second tier nuclear status. Proposals for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone have been consistently rebuffed or ignored by Israel and the US.

    In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and announced their nuclear weapons capacity to the world. These tests were greeted with elation in both countries, as if they were a badge of honor rather than dishonor. Both countries made clear over a long period of time that they were not prepared to be second class global citizens in a world of nuclear apartheid. Although, the nuclear tests were at first condemned, this condemnation has turned to acceptance. The US now seeks to change its own non-proliferation laws as well as the rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in order to provide nuclear technology and materials to India.

    Most recently, North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test, raising considerable alarm around the world. The North Korean test carries with it the potential for a dangerous nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia involving North Korea, Japan, South Korea and China. This would create a far more dangerous region and world.

    North Korea’s nuclear test should be setting off loud warning sirens. Instead of looking at their own obligations, however, the nuclear weapons states are only pointing a finger at North Korea, in effect looking only at the symptom and not the root of the problem. The root of the problem is the ongoing possession and reliance on these weapons of mass annihilation by the nuclear weapons states. The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission stated what should be obvious to all: “So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic.”

    Five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – recently established a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) in their region. They became the world’s sixth nuclear weapons-free zone, following Antarctica; Latin America and the Caribbean; the South Pacific; Africa; and Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, the United States has expressed its opposition to this new treaty and is reportedly pressuring the United Nations and other international bodies to withhold their support of the treaty.

    The question that I would pose is this: What is the world to do when the governments of nuclear weapons states act immorally, illegally and dangerously in failing to fulfill their obligations for good faith negotiations to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons? This question is, of course, not easy to answer. We may seem largely powerless in the face of bad faith by the nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States. It may be difficult to see the way forward, but once we have seen the problem we have no choice but to keep trying.

    I don’t have an answer to this question. I believe it is one we must find together. I have faith that the answer will be found as we move forward, step by step. My fear is that the urgency of the situation does not seem to be recognized widely, and the many efforts that have been made to influence the nuclear weapons states seem to fall on deaf ears.

    I want to encourage us all to appreciate each other on this journey. Each of us who embrace this issue, embraces humanity. I want to express my deep appreciation to the Hibakusha of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and to the cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima for their persistent efforts. And to the Mayors for Peace for their wonderful 2020 Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons, as well as to my colleagues throughout the world in Abolition 2000 and the Middle Powers Initiative.

    On the barren landscape of nuclear arrogance and absurdity we must have faith that humans of goodwill will triumph over catastrophically dangerous technologies in the hands of national leaders with proven capacities to act in ways that are foolish, shortsighted and incompetent. That is a leap of faith that we have all taken. We know that we cannot trust the future of the human species to political or military leaders. We must be the leaders we have been waiting for, and we must prevail in awakening humanity to the cause of a nuclear weapons-free future. Despite the odds, we have no choice but to continue and to prevail. Given the clear record of human fallibilities, there is no place for nuclear weapons in our world, and no alternative to our efforts.

     

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.

  • Statement on North Korea

    The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) deplores the nuclear test by North Korea and urges all parties to exercise restraint and place their faith in diplomacy rather than ratcheting up bellicosity. MPI is dedicated to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through diplomacy and the rule of law. We deplore the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the failure of the nuclear weapons states to demonstrate adequate leadership in fulfilling their legal duty to work for and obtain the universal elimination of nuclear weapons.

    MPI agrees with Secretary General Kofi Annan that North Korea’s action “aggravates regional tensions . and jeopardizes security both in the region and beyond.” We support Mr. Annan’s view that “serious negotiations be renewed urgently in the framework of the six-party talks.” We are encouraged that UN Secretary-General-elect Ban Ki-moon has indicated his willingness to visit the region to assist in the development of a diplomatic solution to this crisis.

    It is also useful to recall the European Union’s strategy against WMD proliferation, adopted in 2003, which states, “The more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon [WMD] programs: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programs can lead to an arms race.”

    We welcome the unanimity of the Security Council in adopting Resolution 1718 in response to the North Korean test. The challenge to and responsibility of the Security Council – and all nations – now is to ensure the diplomatic aspects of the resolution – in particular, the call for the resumption of the Six Parties talks – are favored over the punitive aspects.

    Further steps towards increased militarization and nuclearization on the Korean Peninsula cannot result in anything but a disaster. Only diplomacy anchored to the bedrock principles of international law can offer an effective solution. We applaud Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s statement last week that, “The government of Japan has no position at all to consider going nuclear. There is no need to arm ourselves with nuclear weapons, either.” In a similar vein, South Korea’s emphasis on negotiations over confrontation is extremely satisfying. China – which stands to lose much in terms of economic development and military security in the event any of its neighbors “go nuclear” – has a special role in solidifying the diplomatic track.

    We encourage the Government of North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks, along with the governments of China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. We note that the North Korean government has reaffirmed its support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and for the September 19, 2005, “statement of principles” on negotiations over the crisis. We call on the parties to refrain from any further provocative actions that could derail the renewal of these talks, including further nuclear tests or any threats to use force against any of the parties. The six parties should also explore the possibility for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in North East Asia.

    MPI believes the Government of the United States must take a leadership role in advancing diplomatic solutions and finally engage North Korea in one-to-one talks leading to a full integration of North Korea into the world community as a non-nuclear weapon state with appropriate security assurances that give it confidence that such weapons have no value. Such a course – long overdue – would help diffuse tensions and create the necessary political space. The United States must remain conscious of its singular capacity to strengthen or weaken the international order based on the rule of law. Whether one supports or rejects the political system of North Korea, it remains a sovereign state and thus has a right to peace and security. However, its pursuit of nuclear weapons degrades its standing among nations and must be changed. Only by offering integration into the international community will peaceful change be possible and only by ending North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons will its integration be possible.

    The actions by North Korea clearly demonstrate the folly of rejecting arms control treaties in the belief that treaties undermine national sovereignty. The record demonstrates consistent improved national and international security through arms control treaty law. Specifically these actions demonstrate the need for the full entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and of its monitoring agency. This throws into sharp relief the lack of wisdom exhibited by powerful counties such as the United States, India and China in failing to ratify the CTBT. A CTBT, coupled with a fully-respected nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, would establish a vital international norm against testing and any further dangerous developments of nuclear weapons. In fact, a vital CTBT would lower the currency of nuclear weapons, establish measures to ensure compliance with a ban on nuclear testing and lead us all to a much safer world.

    Founded in 1998, MPI (www.middlepowers.org) is dedicated to the worldwide reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, in a series of well-defined stages, working primarily with “middle power” governments. MPI is a program of the Global Security Institute (www.gsinstitute.org).
  • The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons

    The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons

    There are many serious problems confronting humanity, but none looms larger than the continuing dangers of nuclear weapons. We have entered the seventh decade since nuclear weapons were created and used on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During this period, the world has witnessed an insane nuclear arms race, in which the human species was threatened with annihilation. Despite the end of the Cold War more than 15 years ago, the threat has not gone away. The future of civilization, even the human species, hangs in the balance, and yet very little attention is paid to ending this threat. We are challenged, individually and collectively, to end this ultimate danger to humanity.

    Warnings

    Nuclear weapons unleash the power inside the atom. The creation of these weapons demonstrated significant scientific achievement, but left humankind faced with the challenge of what to do with them. Albert Einstein, whose theoretical understanding of the relationship of energy and mass paved the way for nuclear weapons, was deeply troubled by their creation. “The unleashed power of the atom,” he prophesied, “has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

    By 1955, ten years after the first use of nuclear weapons, both the US and USSR had developed thermonuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful than the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and they had begun testing these weapons on the lands of indigenous peoples. Einstein continued his dire warnings. Along with philosopher Bertrand Russell, an appeal to humanity was issued called the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, signed also by nine other prominent scientists. They wrote: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

    Other warnings from highly credible sources throughout the Nuclear Age sought to put the world on notice of the peril nuclear weapons posed to humanity. The most recent warning came from the Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, also known as the Blix Commission after its chairman, former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix. Referring to weapons of mass destruction, the 2006 report stated: “So long as any state has such weapons – especially nuclear arms – others will want them. So long as any such weapons remain in any state’s arsenal, there is a high risk that they will one day be used, by design or accident. Any such use would be catastrophic.”

    With the serious dangers that nuclear weapons pose to the human future, it is curious that so many warnings, over so long a period of time, have gone unheeded. There are still some 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Some 97 percent of these are in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. Seven other countries also have nuclear weapons: the UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. There are also countries such as Japan that are virtual nuclear powers, possessing the technology and nuclear materials to develop nuclear arsenals in days or weeks.

    What will it take to awaken humanity, and change its course? Many people think that this will not happen until there is another catastrophic use of nuclear weapons, but this would be an immense tragedy and a great failure of imagination. If we can imagine that another nuclear catastrophe is possible, shouldn’t we act now to prevent it?

    Nuclear weapons are often justified as providing security for their possessors. But it is clear that nuclear weapons themselves cannot provide protection in the sense of physical security. At best, they can provide psychological security if one believes that they provide a deterrent against attack. The United States is currently spending tens of billions of dollars to develop a missile defense system. The only reasonable interpretation of this expenditure is that US defense planners understand that deterrence is not foolproof and that it can fail. Of course, missile defenses are far from foolproof as well and can also easily fail. In fact, most scientists not being paid by the missile defense program believe that missile defenses will fail.

    The Shortcomings of Deterrence

    Deterrence has many shortcomings. For it to be effective, the threat must be accurately communicated and it must be believed. In addition, the opponent must care about the threat enough to alter its behavior. Deterrence won’t work when the threat is unbelievable, or when the opponent is suicidal or not locatable.

    If nuclear weapons cannot provide protection for a population, what other advantages do they offer? One possible answer to this question is prestige. Since the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council all developed nuclear weapons, it may seem to other states that nuclear weapons would contribute to their prestige in the world. This thought was given credence by the large-scale celebrations in the streets of India and Pakistan when these two countries tested nuclear devices in 1998.

    Whatever prestige nuclear weapons may confer comes with a heavy price. Nuclear weapons are costly and possessing them will almost certainly make a country the target of nuclear weapons.

    It seems reasonable to conclude that nuclear weapons serve the interests of the weak more than they do the powerful. In the hands of a relatively weak nation, nuclear weapons can serve as an equalizer. One has only to look at the difference in the way the US has treated the three countries that Mr. Bush incorrectly labelled as being part of an axis of evil: Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The US invaded Iraq on the false charge of having a nuclear weapons program, is threatening Iran for enriching uranium, but has done little but bluster about North Korea, which is thought to have a small arsenal of nuclear weapons and recently tested long-range missiles, adding to the anxiety of many of its potential enemies.

    From the perspective of a powerful state, the worst nightmare would be for nuclear weapons to fall into the hands of non-state terrorist organizations, whose members were both suicidal and not locatable. This could create the ideal conditions for these weapons to be used against a major nuclear power or another state. The US, for example, would be relatively helpless against a nuclear-armed al Qaeda. The US would not be able to deter al Qaeda. Its only hope would be to prevent it from obtaining a nuclear weapon or the materials to create one.

    Why Abolish Nuclear Weapons?

    Nuclear weapons undermine security. Under current circumstances, with so many nuclear weapons in the world and such an abundance of fissile materials for constructing nuclear weapons, the likelihood is that nuclear weapons will eventually end up in the hands of non-state terrorist organizations. This would be a disastrous scenario for the world’s most powerful counties, opening the door to possible nuclear 9/11s.

    In addition, nuclear weapons are anti-democratic. They concentrate power in the hands of single individuals. The president of the United States, for example, could send the world spiraling into nuclear holocaust with just one order to unleash the US nuclear arsenal. The undemocratic nature of nuclear weapons should be of great concern to those who value democracy and the participation of citizens in decisions that affect their lives.

    Nuclear weapons should also be viewed in terms of their consequences. They are long-range weapons of indiscriminate mass destruction. They destroy equally civilians and combatants, infants and the infirm, men and women. Viewed from this perspective, these weapons must be viewed as among the most cowardly ever created. By their possession, with the implicit threat of use that possession implies, nuclear weapons also destroy the souls of those who rely upon them.

    They are a coward’s weapon and their possession, threat and use is dishonorable. This was the conclusion of virtually all of the top military leaders of World War II, most of whom were morally devastated that the US used these weapons against Japan. Truman’s Chief of Staff William Leahy, for example, wrote about the use of atomic weapons on Japan: “I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”

    Humanity still has a choice, in fact, it is the same choice posed in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. We can choose to eliminate nuclear weapons or risk the elimination of the human species. A continuation of the status quo, of reliance by some states on nuclear arsenals, is likely to result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to others states and to terrorist organizations. The alternative is the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    What Would It Take?

    What would it take to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons? On the one hand, the answer to this question is “very little.” On the other hand, because of the resistance, complacency and myopia of the leaders of the nuclear weapons states, the answer may be a “great amount.”

    To move forward with the elimination of nuclear weapons would require compliance with existing international law. The International Court of Justice concluded in 1996: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” In the decade since the Court announced its opinion, there has been little evidence of “good faith” negotiations by the nuclear weapons states moving toward any reasonable conclusion.

    The negotiations that the Court describes as an obligation of the nuclear weapons states would need to move toward the end a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a treaty setting forth a program for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons with appropriate measures of verification. With the political will to pursue these required negotiations, a treaty would not be a difficult task to achieve. What is lacking is the requisite political will on the part of the nuclear weapons states.

    A Special Responsibility, A Tragic Failure

    The United States, as the world’s most powerful country and the only country to use nuclear weapons in warfare, has a special responsibility to lead in fulfilling its obligations under international law. In fact, without US leadership, it is unlikely that progress will be possible toward nuclear disarmament. But rather than lead in this direction, the United States under the Bush administration has been the major obstacle to nuclear disarmament. It has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to pursue dreams of “star wars,” has opposed a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, and in general has acted as an obstacle to progress on all matters of nuclear disarmament.

    The US has also pursued a double standard with regard to nuclear weapons. It has been silent on Israeli nuclear weapons, and now seeks to change its own non-proliferation laws to enable it to provide nuclear technology and materials to India, a country that has not joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has developed a nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the US has developed contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against seven countries, five of which are non-nuclear weapons states, despite giving assurances that it would not use nuclear weapons against such states.

    What is tragic is that the American people don’t seem to grasp the seriousness of their government’s failure. They are lacking in education that would lead to an understanding of the situation. Their attention has been diverted to Iraq, Iran and North Korea, and they fail to see what is closest to home: the failure of their own government to lead in a constructive and lawful manner to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. “And thus,” in Einstein’s words, “we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.”

    To bring about real change in nuclear policy, people must begin with a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and then they must speak out as if their lives and the lives of their children depended on their actions. It is unlikely that governments will give up powerful weapons on their own accord. They must be pushed by their citizenry – citizens unwilling to continue to run the risk of nuclear holocaust.

    A New Story

    We need a new story for considering nuclear dangers, a story that begins with the long struggle of humans over some three million years to arrive at our present state of society. That state is far from perfect, but few would suggest that it should be sacrificed on the altar of weapons of mass annihilation capable of reducing civilization to rubble.

    The first humans lived short and brutal lives. They were both predators and preyed upon. They survived by their nimbleness, more of body than mind, doing well if they lived into their twenties. Enough early humans were able to protect and nurture their infants in their hazardous environments that some of the children of each generation could survive to an age when they could themselves reproduce and repeat the cycle.

    Without these amazingly capable early ancestors, and those that followed who met the distinct challenges of their times and environments for many hundreds of thousands of generations, we would not be here. Each of our ancestors needed to survive the perils of birth, infancy, childhood and at least early maturity in order for each of us to have made it into the world.

    On the basis of the pure physical capacity to survive, we owe a debt to our ancestors, but with this debt comes something more. We each have a responsibility for helping to assure the chain of human survival that passes the world on intact to the next generation. In addition to this, we share an obligation to preserve the accumulated wisdom and beauty created by those who have walked the earth before us – the ideas of the great storytellers and philosophers, the great music, literature and art, the artifacts of humankind’s collective genius in its varied forms.

    All of the manifestations of human genius and triumph are placed in jeopardy by nuclear weapons and the threat of their use. Why do we tolerate this threat? Why are we docile in the face of policies that could end not only humanity, but life itself?

    Those of us alive today are the gatekeepers to the future, but the assumption of power by the state has left us vulnerable to the continuing threat of nuclear annihilation. The only way to be free of this threat is to be free of nuclear weapons. This is the greatest challenge of our time. It will require education so that people can learn to think about nuclear weapons and war in a new way. We will need organizational modes of collective action to bring pressure to bear on governments to achieve nuclear disarmament. Ordinary people must lead from below.

    The Role of Citizens

    Organizations working for nuclear disarmament – such as the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Abolition 2000, the Middle Powers Initiative and the Mayors for Peace – can help give shape to efforts to put pressure on governments. But the change that is needed cannot be the sole responsibility of interest groups. Without the intervention of large numbers of people, we will go on with business as usual, a course that seems likely to lead to nuclear proliferation and further catastrophic uses of nuclear weapons. This is not a distant problem, nor one that can be shunted aside and left to governments.

    We who have entered the 21st century are not exempt from responsibility for assuring a human future. Japanese Buddhist leader Josei Toda called for young people to take the lead in pursuing nuclear disarmament. His proposal has great merit given the fact that it is their future and the future of their children that is imperiled by these weapons.

    Change occurs one person at a time. Each of us must take responsibility for creating a world free of nuclear threat. Noted anthropologist Margaret Mead offered this hopeful advice: “Never doubt that a small group of people can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”

    In the end, the necessary changes cannot be left to governments alone. It is up to each of us. What can we do? I have five suggestions. First, become better informed. You can do this by visiting the website of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation at www.wagingpeace.org. Second, speak out, wherever you are. Talk to your family, friends, and other people around you. Third, join an organization working to abolish nuclear weapons, and help it to become successful. Fourth, use your unique talents. Each of us has special talents that can help make a difference. Use them. Fifth, be persistent. This is a tough job requiring strength and persistence.

    In working for peace and a world free of nuclear weapons, you can be a force for saving the world. Being a nuclear weapons abolitionist will require all the courage and commitment of those who worked in the 19th century for the abolition of slavery. Abolishing slavery was the challenge of that time; abolishing nuclear weapons is the even more consequential challenge of our time

    David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.
  • Prospects for Preventing Nuclear Proliferation

    Prospects for Preventing Nuclear Proliferation

    Also published in Volume 8, Number 1-2, Winter/Spring 2006 of “Global Dialogue”

    In 1945, the United States became the world’s sole nuclear power, and almost immediately used its new weapons on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Following the creation of the first nuclear weapon by the United States, all further development of these weapons has constituted some form of nuclear proliferation, either horizontal proliferation to other countries or vertical proliferation within a country already possessing nuclear weapons.

    Many scientists who worked on the Manhattan Engineering Project – the US nuclear weapons development program – warned the government that use of nuclear weapons against Japan launch a dangerous nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union. They were right. It took the Soviet Union just four years to succeed in its pursuit of nuclear weapons, conducting its first nuclear test in 1949.

    During the four year period from1945 to 1949, the US continued to develop and test its nuclear arsenal, engaging in a kind of unilateral nuclear arms race. Once the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons in 1949, a bilateral nuclear arms race began, concluding only with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.

    In the decade and a half following the Soviet Union’s development of nuclear arms, the UK, France and then China also developed nuclear weapons. By 1967, the five declared nuclear weapons states formed an exclusive club. They were the only states with nuclear weapons, and they were all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. As such, these nations had considerable prestige in the world. They all justified their nuclear arsenals on the basis of deterrence – the threat to retaliate to a first-strike nuclear attack – and all but China, which had pledged “No First Use” of nuclear weapons, held open the possibility of responding to a conventional attack with nuclear force.

    Among the five nuclear powers, there was a great deal of posturing by means of atmospheric nuclear tests and missile launches, first by the US alone, then by the USSR, and finally by the other nuclear weapons states. They all played the game of comparing explosive force and missile sizes, demonstrating their power through these highly visible means. Australian physician and nuclear activist Helen Caldicott characterized this posturing as “missile envy.”

    At the height of the nuclear arms race, there were more than 60,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Today there are still some 30,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and more than 95 percent of these are in the arsenals of the US and Russia. The trend is in the right direction, but the pace of reductions has been agonizingly slow.

    The unwillingness of the nuclear weapons states to give up their reliance on nuclear arsenals or their options for vertical proliferation, and to move with greater rapidity toward a nuclear weapons-free world, remains a significant incentive to horizontal proliferation. This is extremely dangerous, and particularly so in a world in which extremist groups seek nuclear weapons capabilities to threaten massive destruction of powerful states.

    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

    In the mid-1960s, following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the US, UK and USSR forged ahead with a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They feared a far more dangerous world in the event of proliferation to many states. In negotiations with non-nuclear weapons states, they agreed to a trade-off in which the non-nuclear weapons states would not develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapons states would in turn make three commitments: first, end the nuclear arms race at an early date; second, engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament; and third, assist the non-nuclear weapons states in developing nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.

    Despite making this agreement, the nuclear weapons states subsequently demonstrated little effort to stop the nuclear arms race or to engage in good faith negotiations for total nuclear disarmament. Instead, they focused their efforts on partial measures of arms control, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START). Through these negotiations, the nuclear arms race continued largely unabated and there were no good faith efforts to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

    On the third part of the bargain, assisting with the development of “peaceful” nuclear technology, the nuclear weapons states were more helpful, particularly when profits could be made by selling nuclear reactors. The problem with this part of the bargain was that nuclear reactors used enriched uranium and produced plutonium that could be used in weapons programs. In other words, nuclear energy programs, particularly those involving enriching uranium and plutonium separation, have actually aided in nuclear weapons proliferation.

    Over the years, many countries, and finally nearly all countries, became parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A few, however, stayed outside the treaty so as not to be bound by it. Israel was one of these, and is widely understood, although has not admitted, to have developed an arsenal of some 200 or more nuclear weapons. Mordechai Vanunu, a technician at the Dimona reactor in Israel, released information on Israel’s clandestine nuclear program to British newspapers, and subsequently was kidnapped, secretly tried and served 18 years in prison, mostly in solitary confinement. Even after his release from prison, Vanunu is not allowed to leave Israel or speak with foreign journalists. Israel still refuses to confirm the existence of its nuclear arsenal.

    India and Pakistan also never became parties to the treaty. India was always clear that it was willing to forego the nuclear option, but not live in a world of nuclear apartheid. In other words, India was prepared to be a non-nuclear weapons state in a world where no state had nuclear weapons, but would not do so in a world where some states reserved nuclear weapons status for themselves but denied such status to others. India first tested a nuclear weapon in 1974, and then tested more extensively and openly in May 1998. Immediately following India’s 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests, sending a message back to India that it too could play the nuclear game. India and Pakistan, two rival states that have warred many times over the disputed territory of Kashmir, are now engaged in a nuclear standoff.

    The last state thought to have developed a small nuclear arsenal is North Korea, a country that withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003. No one is certain that North Korea actually has a nuclear arsenal, but it claims to have developed nuclear weapons and it has the technological capability and the weapons-grade nuclear materials from its nuclear reactors to have done so.

    The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

    By the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Review and Extension Conference was held in 1995, 25 years after the treaty had entered into force. Some states parties to the treaty and many civil society organizations argued that the treaty should not be extended indefinitely because that would be akin to giving a blank check to the nuclear weapons states who had been so lax in fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the treaty. These states and groups argued that instead of an indefinite extension, the treaty should be extended for 5 or 10 year periods with automatic extensions if the nuclear weapons states had achieved concrete progress on nuclear disarmament.

    Under heavy lobbying and arm twisting by the United States, the treaty was extended indefinitely. To reach this outcome, certain additional promises were made. Among these were the following points listed in the Final Document of the conference:

    First, completion of negotiations for a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty no later than 1996;

    Second, The immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a treaty banning production of fissile materials; and

    Third, the “determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons….”

    The document also made reference to UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), which provided security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states, and called for further steps that would be “internationally legally binding.”

    While the international community did manage to complete and open for signature a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996, the treaty required the ratifications of all nuclear capable states. As of this time, there are still about one-quarter of the 44 states in this category that have not ratified. The United States was the first to sign the treaty, but the US Senate rejected ratification in 1999, and the Bush administration has been hostile to the treaty and has not resubmitted it to the Senate.

    The Bush administration’s opposition to the CTBT is best understood in relation to its interest in developing a new generation of nuclear weapons, such as “bunker busters” and low yield nuclear weapons. This is reinforced by the administration’s efforts to reduce the time needed to resume nuclear testing from 36 months to 18 months, suggesting that it is holding open the possibility of breaking the current moratorium on underground nuclear testing.

    There have not been negotiations in the UN Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Nor have there been any efforts to provide legally binding assurances against the use of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear weapons states. Given this lack of progress, it is hard to argue that there has been a “determined pursuit…of systematic and progressive efforts” by the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament. In fact, the Bush administration’s secret Nuclear Posture Review, released to Congress at the end of 2001, states that US nuclear policy includes a possible nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack against the US or its allies.

    2000 NPT Review Conference: 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament

    At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties agreed by consensus to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. This was viewed as an important step forward on the path to achieving nuclear disarmament. These steps included the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament issues, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, applying the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, and an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals….”

    Unfortunately, the nuclear weapons states have not taken these steps seriously. In the world community, the United States has been the country least responsive to these steps, putting up obstacles to nearly all of them. The US opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opposed a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, opposed a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament, abandoned the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and made nuclear disarmament completely reversible in the one agreement they did reach with Russia.

    The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT), entered into by the US and Russia, calls for reducing deployed strategic nuclear weapons from about 6,000 on each side to about 2,000 on each side by the year 2012, but makes no provision for destroying these weapons or otherwise making the reductions irreversible. After 2012, the treaty ends with no further prohibitions on the size of nuclear arsenals. In some respects this treaty may even promote proliferation by allowing both sides to keep many nuclear warheads in reserve, and therefore potentially more vulnerable to theft by extremist groups.

    2005 NPT Review Conference

    The most recent NPT Review Conference in 2005 ended without progress and without a Final Document demonstrating even a modicum of agreement. The US opposed any mention of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament in the agenda of the conference, giving the impression that they wanted to rewrite history, blotting out any memory of the progress made in the year 2000.

    The 2005 NPT Review Conference was almost surrealistic. In the basement of the United Nations where the conference was taking place, there was a broad corridor leading to some of the conference rooms. At one end of this corridor were a group of survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki earnestly pleading for progress on nuclear disarmament so that their fate would not befall others in the future. At the other end of the corridor was a representative of the United States handing out slick brochures claiming that the US was leading the world in nuclear disarmament. Conveniently removed from the timeline in one of these brochures was any mention of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty being opened for signatures in 1996 or of the agreement on the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament in the year 2000. George Orwell’s presence seemed alive and well in the US promotional literature.

    Nuclear Double Standards

    The original intent of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was to stop proliferation and put an end to nuclear double standards by achieving nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapons states have, however, largely made it clear that they are committed to double standards rather than to fulfilling their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    In an attempt to quell proliferation, while maintaining nuclear double standards, George W. Bush has promoted a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which he first announced in Krakow on May 31, 2003. The PSI was described in a White House press release as “a broad international partnership of countries which, using their own laws and resources, will coordinate their actions to halt shipments of dangerous technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern – at sea, in the air, and on the land.” The original members of the PSI were all European states except Australia and Japan, and included the three Western nuclear weapons states – the US, UK and France. A PSI “Statement of Interdiction Principles” was adopted on September 4, 2003. The first and key principle is: “Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”

    On April 28, 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which called upon states to “refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.” The resolution also called upon states to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, as well as border and export and transit controls.

    Resolution 1540 was in effect a Security Council effort to further the Proliferation Security Initiative, seeking to enforce controls against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Proliferation Security Initiative, its Statement of Interdiction Principles and Security Council Resolution 1540 all seek to prevent proliferation by means of international cooperation and, if necessary, the use of force. They also seek implicitly to maintain the nuclear double standard, since they make no reference to the current arsenals of nuclear weapons or the need for their dismantlement.

    A key question for the international community and for any thinking person concerns whether proliferation can be prevented in a world composed of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Those who promote the double standard initiatives, seem to believe that they can hold back nuclear proliferation while continuing to rely themselves on nuclear weapons for security. Their argument, however, leaves no room for inevitable errors and misjudgments.

    Zero Tolerance

    So long as nuclear weapons and materials exist in the world, there is the possibility that they may proliferate to other states or non-state actors. In the hands of non-state extremist groups, the prospects of deterrence by means of retaliatory threat are zero. Deterrence is a psychological theory, which requires rationality and also fear of retaliation. It cannot work against a terrorist organization that cannot be located. Nor can it work against groups or individuals who are prepared to die for their cause. Therefore, the tolerance level for nuclear weapons falling into the hands of extremist groups is also zero.

    The more nuclear weapons in the world, the greater the possibility that some will be obtained by extremist groups. The fewer nuclear weapons in the world, the less weapons-grade nuclear materials and the greater the international controls, the less likely these weapons will fall into the hands of extremists groups.

    Zero tolerance requires zero nuclear weapons and full international controls. It requires implementation of the Article VI nuclear disarmament obligations in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Viewed in this light, the PSI and Security Council Resolution 1540 may be viewed as band-aids, possibly comforting but unlikely to solve the problem.

    We have already seen that the criminal ring headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, was quite active in spreading nuclear technology and materials for proliferation. It appears that his ring was stopped in time, but it is not fully certain how much damage was done by Khan’s efforts or what their results will be in the future.

    Iraq, Iran and North Korea

    In his 2002 State of the Union speech, George W. Bush named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an “Axis of Evil.” These states, along with some others, had already shown up in the US Nuclear Posture Review as states for which the US was making contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons. In 2002, Bush and other US administration officials began talking about Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Subsequently, in March 2003, the US invaded Iraq, initiating a war of aggression against that country and using the justification in part of nuclear proliferation.

    Following the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction were found. Surely, the war against Iraq has put other states on notice that nuclear weapons may be useful to them to prevent a US attack. This suggests that, while nuclear weapons may not be particularly useful to a powerful state, they would have deterrent value to a weaker state to prevent the attack of a more powerful state. This may be the lesson drawn by both Iran and North Korea.

    Iran is relying on the Article IV provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (nuclear energy as an “inalienable right”) in maintaining its right to enrich uranium for nuclear reactors. This points to the inherent contradiction in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which seeks both to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote nuclear energy.

    In the case of North Korea, it has withdrawn from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, undertaken reprocessing of its spent fuel to extract plutonium, and claims to have developed a small arsenal of nuclear weapons. Six party talks have taken place for several years between the US, North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. The North Korean negotiators have been clear that they are seeking security assurances and development aid from the US in exchange for giving up their nuclear programs and returning to the NPT. After several years of negotiating, little progress has been made, although it would seem that the conditions set forth by the North Koreans are reasonable.

    Incentives to Proliferate

    There are many countries that could develop nuclear arsenals, but have chosen not to do so. Among these are Canada, Sweden and Japan. Decisions by Canada and Sweden were taken early in the Nuclear Age. Japan is a good example of a virtual nuclear power. It has the technological capability to make nuclear weapons and tons of reprocessed plutonium for doing so, but has thus far foregone the option as it currently falls under the US nuclear umbrella. If Japan did decide to become a nuclear weapons state, it could become a major one in a matter of months. North Korea’s advances in its nuclear arsenal and missile technology may play a key role in determining whether Japan decides to join the nuclear club in future years.

    Some states have developed or obtained nuclear weapons and given them up. South Africa actually developed a small nuclear weapons arsenal and then destroyed it just before the end of apartheid. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union split apart, but agreed to transfer all of their nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement. Brazil and Argentina had nuclear programs and were on the path to creating nuclear weapons, but gave up these programs.

    Among the major incentives to proliferation are threats of nuclear attack, threats of conventional attack by a more powerful state, and national prestige. These incentives suggest that nuclear weapons serve the purposes of the weak more than they do the strong. They suggest that strong states would better serve their national security and their citizens by leading the way toward nuclear disarmament rather than clinging to nuclear arsenals. By their very act of reliance on their own nuclear arsenals, the nuclear weapons states provide incentives for other states to join them in the nuclear club. A two-tier system of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” is ultimately unstable and untenable.

    A Return to the Basics

    Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty calls for “good faith” negotiations by the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament. The International Court of Justice in 1996 ruled: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation called for the following eight commitments as the minimum necessary to revive nuclear disarmament in the non-proliferation regime.

    • Commitment to total nuclear disarmament and to good faith negotiations. This is the basic commitment of Article VI of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    • Commitment to a timeframe for achieving nuclear disarmament. This is a necessary commitment to indicate to the international community that the nuclear weapons states are indeed acting in good faith.
    • Commitment to No First Use. Without this commitment there will always be pressure for some non-nuclear weapons states to consider developing nuclear arsenals to provide deterrence against larger nuclear weapons states.
    • Commitment to irreversibility and verifiability. This is one of the key steps of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. It would close the door to reversing the progress made in disarmament efforts, and would be a strong confidence building measure.
    • Commitment to standing down nuclear forces. This would dramatically reduce the possibility of using nuclear weapons inadvertently, currently a serious danger to humanity.
    • Commitment to no new nuclear weapons. This would be another sign of good faith on the part of the nuclear weapons states, indicating that they are not basing their policies on the double standard of asking others not to develop new nuclear weapons while doing so themselves.
    • Commitment to a verifiable ban on fissile materials. This is one of the 13 Practical Steps and would rein in the amount of fissile material being created that could be used for nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons states should commit to placing their stores of weapons-grade fissionable materials under strict international control and to the elimination of this material.
    • Commitment to accounting, transparency and reporting. These are essential for building confidence and providing a baseline for verification of the disarmament process.In addition to these eight commitments for achieving nuclear disarmament, the Foundation called for five additional commitments for closing the loophole created by the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s promotion of the so-called “peaceful” uses of atomic energy. These are:
    • Commitment to a global ban on spent fuel reprocessing and reduced reliance on nuclear energy. Reprocessing of spent fuel may be good for nuclear industry, but it creates far more weapons-grade material that could be used for military purposes.
    • Commitment to bring uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities under strict international control. It is primarily enriched uranium and separated plutonium that can be converted to weapons use. These controls must be placed on all states, not only the non-nuclear weapons states.
    • Commitment to regulate and store spent nuclear fuel under strict international control. There need to be high standards of control for the regulation and storage of spent fuel in order to keep it from being reprocessed for weapons use.
    • Commitment to make the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol mandatory for all states. The IAEA Additional Protocol places states under a higher set of standards for safeguarding nuclear materials. Currently the Additional Protocol only applies to non-nuclear weapons states, and this should be universalized to apply to nuclear weapons states as well.
    • Commitment to highly restrict the trade of all nuclear materials and technology. The trade in nuclear materials and technology creates possibilities for proliferation through theft or enhancement of a country’s nuclear programs.These final five commitments can help to create a far stronger barrier between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the military uses. They are critically important steps in keeping nuclear materials from being diverted to weapons programs. These commitments complement the eight commitments above to revive nuclear disarmament. Both sets of commitments are mutually reinforcing.

      Evaluating the Prospects for Preventing Proliferation

      If it is true that these commitments are needed to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, then it may be unlikely that proliferation will be prevented. Most of the nuclear weapons states seem comfortable continuing with the double standards that have characterized their behavior, and seem unwilling to make the necessary commitments. The nuclear weapons states appear comfortable asking for commitments from others, but not in making commitments themselves. Over time, this promises to be a recipe for international failure in preventing nuclear proliferation.

      It is noteworthy that the nuclear weapons states at the bottom of the nuclear pyramid – namely, China, India and Pakistan – have all indicated a willingness to go to zero nuclear weapons if the other nuclear weapons states would do so. Additionally, Russia has offered to reduce its nuclear arsenal below the levels agreed to in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, but the US has not accepted these lower levels.

      In the end, preventing proliferation will depend upon changes in the policies of the most powerful nuclear weapons state, the United States. The US sets the tone for the world. If the United States does not show leadership in this area, proliferation will certainly continue. At the present, the US non-proliferation effort is based entirely on double standards. It continues to rely upon its nuclear arsenal, while seeking to develop and implement mechanisms to prevent others countries from doing as it does. The US even seeks to develop new nuclear weapons, a form of vertical proliferation.

      Given the US aversion to serious nuclear disarmament measures and its failure to provide leadership to the other nuclear weapons states to fulfill their disarmament obligations, nuclear proliferation appears inevitable. This is not only due to the narrow policy positions of the Bush administration. It was also true, in a less extreme form, during the Clinton administration. The great irony of this is that the country most likely to be the target of a terrorist nuclear attack is the United States.

      This leads to the conclusion that the United States is acting against its own best interests in not ending nuclear double standards and making phased and negotiated nuclear disarmament a priority of its nuclear non-proliferation program. Perhaps at some point US leaders will awaken to the likelihood that their nuclear posturing is making it more likely that their cities and citizens will become the victims of their own nuclear policies.

      Hopefully, this awakening will not be the result of a nuclear attack, and that it will be possible to prevent such an attack against the US or any other country. This may be possible if we employ imagination, reason and leadership, and seek the necessary international cooperation.

      1. Caldicott, Helen. Missile Envy. New York, Bantam, 1984.

      2. 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I, (NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part I), p. 10.

      3. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), Part I.

      4. “Statement on Proliferation Security Initiative,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 4, 2003.

      5. Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles, adopted in Paris, September 4, 2003.

      6. S/RES/1540 (2004).

      7. Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, United Nations General Assembly, A/51/218, 15 October 1996.

      8. Krieger, David and Carah Ong, “Back to Basics: Reviving Nuclear Disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Regime.” Santa Barbara, CA: Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 2005, pp. 13-15.

      9. Krieger and Ong, Op.Cit., pp. 16-17.

      David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global effort for a world free of nuclear weapons.

  • The Way Ahead for a Safer World

    Towards the end of July 1945, Japan was on the verge of surrendering to the Allies. Despite military advice to the contrary, United States President Harry. S. Truman authorised the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and on Nagasaki on August 9. The President was fully aware of the deadly consequences of deploying this weapon, from the results of the Nevada test conducted just a month earlier. Analysts believe this decision was primarily taken to convey a message to the rest of the world community and especially to the Soviet Union: the emergence of the US as the sole leader of the post-war world. Predictably, other nations followed suit to produce the atomic bomb: the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and lastly, China in 1964. Ten years later, India demonstrated its technical capability and conducted its first “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” in 1974. Twenty-four years later, in May 1998, India and Pakistan conducted further tests and declared themselves nuclear weapon capable states.

    It was in protest against nuclear testing by France that the valiant ship “Rainbow Warrior” belonging to Greenpeace was lost. She was sunk by French agents on July 10, 1985, whilst moored at Auckland harbour, in New Zealand. She was due to sail the next day for Mururoa Atoll, the venue of the French tests. Needless to say, this triggered a worldwide outcry and David Lange, then Prime Minister of New Zealand, described it as “a sordid act of international state-backed terrorism.” Not only have Greenpeace and other anti-nuclear activists in civil society protested against nuclear testing, but India too has been at the forefront, calling for global nuclear disarmament. Despite almost 35 years of the Non Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) existence, the Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs) have failed to carry out nuclear disarmament as per Article VI. All that the world community has been able to achieve during this period is to give the NPT a fresh lease of life into perpetuity. Meanwhile, efforts to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force have also failed. The US rejected the CTBT in the Senate, and that virtually sealed its fate. The two five yearly NPT review meetings held at the United Nations in 2000 and recently in May this year, have both resulted in virtual disaster. Nothing tangible has been possible in persuading the NWSs to move towards nuclear disarmament.

    In a few weeks from now, we shall be remembering the hundreds of thousands lost in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If anything, the world is becoming more and more of a dangerous place to live in. Despite the end of the Cold War, both Russia and the US have nearly 3,000 nukes under hair trigger alert. We have enough nuclear warheads to destroy this beautiful planet many times over. Not content with this, every NWS has been engaged in upgrading its nuclear inventories with the latest technologies. Whilst all this may sound exciting, the problem of managing nukes with safety is yet to be attained. Many questions still remain unanswered. How are we to ensure correct interpretation of intent, especially if deception is in the mind of the adversary? If things are going very badly in the conventional warfare scene, can we be sure that the losing party will still not raise the level to a nuclear exchange? Can these weapons not be deployed either by accident or due to a misinterpretation of detection on any one of the many sensors? What then is the way ahead?

    India needs to take the initiative to address nuclear disarmament very seriously. Perhaps the best time is now. Let India build on the Rajiv Gandhi plan for total nuclear disarmament as presented by him to the U.N. in 1988. India should convene an International Conference by inviting all the Nuclear Weapons States and also those 43 states listed for bringing the CTBT into force. This would provide a great opportunity to all the countries to put on the table their concerns and contributions for making this world a safer place to live in. Now that India is a nuclear weapons capable nation, an initiative of this nature at this stage would be widely welcomed by the world community.

    Whilst the ultimate goal must remain to run down nuclear weapons to zero, even partial success like achieving a consensus on `de-alerting’ will be a great step forward. For as long as these horrible weapons exist, there is always the danger that they could be used either by accident or design. Let the loss of so many innocents and that of the “Rainbow Warrior” not go in vain. The struggle must continue to make this planet a safe place for all of us and successive generations to come.

    Admiral Laxminarayan Ramdas is a former Chief of India’s Naval Staff.

    Originally published in the Hindu.

  • US Nuclear Hypocrisy: Bad For The World

    US Nuclear Hypocrisy: Bad For The World

    Every five years the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty meet in a review conference to further the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of the treaty. This year the conference ended in a spectacular failure with no final document and no agreement on moving forward. For the first ten days of the conference, the US resisted agreement on an agenda that made any reference to past commitments.

    The failure of the treaty conference is overwhelmingly attributable to the nuclear policies of the Bush administration, which has disavowed previous US nuclear disarmament commitments under the treaty. The Bush administration does not seem to grasp the hypocrisy of pressing other nations to forego their nuclear options, while failing to fulfill its own obligations under the disarmament provisions of the treaty.

    The treaty is crumbling under the double standards of American policy, and may not be able to recover from the rigid “do-as-I-say, not-as-I-do” positions of the Bush administration. These policies are viewed by most of the world as high-level nuclear hypocrisy.

    Paul Meyer, the head of Canada’s delegation to the treaty conference, reflected on the conference, “The vast majority of states have to be acknowledged, but we did not get that kind of diplomacy from the US.” Former UK Foreign Minister Robin Cook also singled out the Bush administration in explaining the failure of the conference. “How strange,” he wrote, “that no delegation should have worked harder to frustrate agreement on what needs to be done than the representatives of George Bush.”

    What the US did at the treaty conference was to point the finger at Iran and North Korea, while refusing to discuss or even acknowledge its own failure to meet its obligations under the treaty. Five years ago, at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the parties to the treaty, including the US, agreed to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. Under the Bush administration, nearly all of these obligations have been disavowed.

    Although President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, the Bush administration does not support it and refused to allow ratification of this treaty, which is part of the 13 Practical Steps, to even be discussed at the 2005 review conference. The parties to the treaty are aware that the Bush administration is seeking funding from Congress to continue work on new earth penetrating nuclear weapons (“bunker busters”), while telling other nations not to develop nuclear arms.

    They are also aware that the Bush administration has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to pursue a destabilizing missile defense program, and has not supported a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, although the US had agreed to support these treaties in the 13 Practical Steps.

    The failure of this treaty conference makes nuclear proliferation more likely, including proliferation to terrorist organizations that cannot be deterred from using the weapons. The fault for this failure does not lie with other governments as the Bush administration would have us believe. It does not lie with Egypt for seeking consideration of previous promises to achieve a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Nor does the fault lie with Iran for seeking to enrich uranium for its nuclear energy program, as is done by many other states, including the US, under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would no doubt be preferable to have the enrichment of uranium and the separation of plutonium, both of which can be used for nuclear weapons programs, done under strict international controls, but this requires a change in the treaty that must be applicable to all parties, not just to those singled out by the US.

    Nor can the fault be said to lie with those states that, having given up their option to develop nuclear weapons, sought renewed commitments from the nuclear weapons states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. It is hard to imagine a more reasonable request. Yet the US has refused to relinquish the option of first use of nuclear weapons, even against non-nuclear weapons states.

    The fault for the failure of the treaty conference lies clearly with the Bush administration, which must take full responsibility for undermining the security of every American by its double standards and nuclear hypocrisy.

    The American people must understand the full magnitude of the Bush administration’s failure at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. This may not happen because the administration has been so remarkably successful in spinning the news to suit its unilateralist, militarist and triumphalist worldviews.

    As Americans, we can not afford to wait until we experience an American Hiroshima before we wake up to the very real dangers posed by US nuclear policies. We must demand the reversal of these policies and the resumption of constructive engagement with the rest of the world.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and the Deputy Chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (www.inesglobal.org). He has written extensively on nuclear dangers.

  • Break the Nuclear Deadlock

    UNITED NATIONS, New York
    Regrettably, there are times when multilateral forums tend merely to reflect, rather than mend, deep rifts over how to confront the threats we face. The review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which ended on Friday with no substantive agreement, was one of these.
    For 35 years, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT, has been a cornerstone of our global security. With near universal membership, the treaty has firmly entrenched a norm against nuclear proliferation and helped confound predictions that today there would be 25 or more countries with nuclear weapons.
    But today, the treaty faces a dual crisis of compliance and confidence. Delegates at the month-long conference, which is held once every five years, could not furnish the world with any solutions to the grave nuclear threats we all face. And while arriving at an agreement can be more challenging in a climate of crisis, it is also at such times that it is all the more imperative to do so.
    Let me be clear: Failure of a review conference to come to any agreement will not break the NPT-based regime. The vast majority of countries that are parties to the treaty recognize its enduring benefits. But there are cracks in each of the treaty’s pillars – nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology – and each of these cracks requires urgent repair.
    Since the review conference last met, in 2000, North Korea has announced its withdrawal from the treaty and declared itself in possession of nuclear weapons. Libya has admitted that it worked for years on a clandestine nuclear weapons program. And the International Atomic Energy Agency has found undeclared uranium enrichment activity in Iran. Clearly, the NPT-based regime has not kept pace with the march of technology and globalization. Whereas proliferation among countries was once considered the sole concern of the treaty, revelations that the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan and others were extensively trafficking in nuclear technology and know-how exposed the vulnerability of the nonproliferation regime to non-state actors.
    The treaty’s framers could hardly have imagined that we would have to work tirelessly to prevent terrorists from acquiring and using nuclear weapons and related materials. And while progress toward disarmament has taken place, there are still 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world, many of which remain on hair-trigger alert. At the same time, the intergovernmental bodies designed to address these challenges are paralyzed.
    In Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to agree on a program of work for eight years. The UN Disarmament Commission has become increasingly marginal, producing no real agreement since 2000. And at the NPT review conference, nearlytwo-thirds of the proceedings were consumed by debate about agenda and logistics, instead of substantive discussions on how to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
    In my opening address to the conference, I argued that success would depend on coming to terms with all the nuclear dangers that threaten humanity. I warned that the conference would stall if some delegates focused on some threats instead of addressing them all. Some countries underscored proliferation as a grave danger, while others argued that existing nuclear arsenals imperil us. Some insisted that the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle technology posed an unacceptable proliferation threat, while others countered that access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology must not be compromised.
    In the end, delegations regrettably missed the opportunity to endorse the merits of all of these arguments. As a result, they were unable to advance security against any of the dangers we face. How, then, can we overcome this paralysis? When multilateral forums falter, leaders must lead. This September, more than 170 heads of state and government will convene in New York to adopt a wide-ranging agenda to advance development, security and human rights for all countries and all peoples. I challenge them to break the deadlock on the most pressing challenges in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. If they fail to do so, their peoples will ask how, in today’s world, they could not find common ground in the cause of diminishing the existential threat of nuclear weapons.
    To revitalize the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, action will be required on many fronts. To strengthen verification and increase confidence in the regime, leaders must agree to make the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol the new standard for verifying compliance with nonproliferation commitments.
    Leaders must find ways to reconcile the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the imperative of nonproliferation. The regime will not be sustainable if scores more countries develop the most sensitive phases of the fuel cycle, and are equipped with the technology to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.
    A first step would be to create incentives for countries to voluntarily forgo the development of fuel-cycle facilities. I commend the nuclear agency and its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, for working to advance consensus on this vital question, and I urge leaders to join him in that mission. Leaders must also move beyond rhetoric in addressing the question of disarmament.
    Prompt negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty for all countries is indispensable. All countries also should affirm their commitment to a moratorium on testing, and to early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. And I hope leaders will think seriously about what more can be done to reduce – irreversibly – the number and role of nuclear weapons in the world.
    Bold commitments at the September meeting would breathe new life into all forums dealing with disarmament and nonproliferation. They would reduce all the risks we face – of nuclear accidents, of trafficking, of terrorist use and of use by countries themselves. It is an ambitious agenda, and probably daunting to some. But the consequences of failure are far more daunting. Solutions are within are reach; we must grasp them.
    Kofi A. Annan is Secretary General of the United Nations. Herald Tribune All rights reserved

  • America’s Broken Nuclear Promises Endanger Us All

    Not a day goes by without a member of team Bush lecturing us on the threat from weapons of mass destruction and assuring us of the absolute primacy they give to halting proliferation. How odd then that the review conference on the non-proliferation treaty will break up this evening, barring an 11th-hour miracle, with no agreed conclusions. And how strange that no delegation should have worked harder to frustrate agreement on what needs to be done than the representatives of George Bush.

    The tragedy is that, for all its faults, the non-proliferation treaty has hitherto been the best barrier put up by the international community against the spread of nuclear weapons. With the support of all but a handful of nations, the treaty provided a robust declaration that the development of nuclear weapons is taboo. That peer-group pressure has since resulted in more countries abandoning nuclear weapons than acquiring them.

    South Africa disowned and dismantled its nuclear weapons after the collapse of the apartheid regime. New states to emerge from the Soviet Union, such as Ukraine, renounced the nuclear systems they inherited on their territory. Argentina and Brazil dropped the nuclear capability they were developing after negotiating a non-nuclear pact between themselves. Even Iraq turned out to have abandoned its nuclear weapons programme, although in that particular case the success of the non-proliferation regime was more of an embarrassment to George Bush.

    Previous review conferences, which come round every five years, have been used as an important opportunity to regenerate support for the treaty. Not this time. The full weight of Washington diplomacy was focused on preventing any reference in the agenda to the commitments the Clinton administration gave to the last review conference. As a result, the first two weeks of negotiation were taken up with arguing over the agenda, leaving barely one week for substantive talks. Robert McNamara, the former US defence secretary and no peacenik, has observed that if the people of the world knew “they would not tolerate what’s going on in the NPT conference”.

    Observance of the non-proliferation treaty rested on a bargain between those states without nuclear weapons, who agreed to renounce any ambition to acquire them, and the nuclear-weapon powers, who undertook in return to proceed in good faith to disarmament. It suits the Bush administration now to present the purpose of the treaty as halting proliferation, but its original intention was the much broader ambition of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The acrimonious exchanges inside the present review conference reflect the frustration of the vast majority of states, who believe they have kept their side of the deal by not developing nuclear weapons but have seen no sign that the privileged elite with nuclear weapons have any intention of giving them up.

    It was to bridge the growing gulf between the two sides that the British delegation, led by Peter Hain, at the last review conference in 2000 helped broker agreement to 13 specific steps that the nuclear-weapon powers could take towards disarming themselves. Labour scores reasonably well against those benchmarks. Britain has taken out of service all non-strategic nuclear weapons and as a result has disarmed 70% of its total nuclear explosive power. It has also halted production of weapons-grade material and placed all fissile material not actually in warheads under international safeguards. This positive progress will be comprehensively reversed if Tony Blair does proceed as threatened to authorise construction of a new weapons system to replace Trident, but until then Britain has a good story to tell.

    Not that it gets heard in the negotiating chambers, where it is obscured by our close identification with the Bush administration and our willingness in the review conference to lobby for understanding of their position. Their position is simply stated: obligations under the non-proliferation treaty are mandatory on other nations and voluntary on the US. Even while the review conference was sitting, the White House asked Congress for funds to research a bunker-busting nuclear bomb, although to develop new nuclear weapons, especially ones designed not to deter but to wage war, is to travel in the opposite direction to the undertakings the US gave to the last review conference.

    The rationale for the bunker-buster is revealing. Its objective is to penetrate and destroy deeply buried arsenals of weapons of mass destruction. Perversely, the current regime in Washington does not perceive its development of nuclear weapons as an obstacle to multilateral agreement on proliferation but as the unilateral means of stopping proliferation. Whatever may be said for this muscular approach to proliferation, there is for sure no prospect of negotiating an agreed text with the rest of the world legitimating it.

    Any progress within the non-proliferation treaty is therefore likely to be on hold until George Bush is replaced by a president willing to return to multilateral diplomacy. This is worrying as there are other pressing problems that should not be left waiting.

    One of the design flaws of the treaty dates from its negotiation in the pre-Chernobyl era of rosy optimism about nuclear energy. As a result it turned on a deal in which the nuclear powers undertook to transfer peaceful nuclear know-how in return for other nations forswearing the military applications of nuclear technology. At the time many of us warned that it was inconsistent to enshrine the spread of nuclear energy in a treaty trying to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

    It therefore is no surprise that we now have a crisis over the advanced nuclear ambitions of Iran. One of the weaknesses in the west’s negotiating position is that there is nothing in the non-proliferation treaty to prohibit Iran from acquiring a declared nuclear energy programme, although it seems implausible that the country has any urgent need for one, as it practically floats on a lake of oil.

    The desirable solution is for an addition to the treaty banning countries without nuclear weapons from developing a closed fuel cycle for nuclear energy, which would stop them acquiring the fissile material for bombs. But this would deepen the present asymmetry between the nuclear powers and everyone else, and is only going to be negotiable if there is some evidence that we are serious about disarmament.

    If the review conference breaks up in failure to agree, I suspect there will be some in Washington celebrating tonight, perhaps not in anything as foreign as French champagne but in the Napa Valley imitation. Within their own narrow terms they will have succeeded. They will have stopped another multilateral agreement and will have escaped criticism for not fulfilling their commitments under the last one. But in the process they will have weakened the non-proliferation regime and made the world a more dangerous place. The next time they lecture us on their worries about weapons of mass destruction, they do not deserve to be taken seriously.

    Originally published by the Guardian

  • In the Spirit of Einstein: Scientists Advancing Nuclear Weapons Abolition

    In 1955, fifty years ago and ten years after the harsh inception of the Nuclear Age at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein issued an appeal, known as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. It is the last public document signed by Einstein before his death. In addition to Russell and Einstein, the document was signed by nine other prominent scientists. The appeal warned that powerful new nuclear weapons raised the possibility of “universal death” in an all-out war, and called for the renunciation of war itself. “Here, then, is the problem which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?” The appeal concluded: “Remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

     

    Over the ensuing decades of the Cold War and beyond it, many scientists and citizens throughout the world have grown complacent in the face of continuing nuclear dangers. The Cold War may have ended in the early 1990s, but nuclear dangers to humanity have not abated. In some respects, the dangers have increased. Among the scientists who have banded together to educate the public and offer constructive solutions to the nuclear dangers that threaten humanity are those who are or have been associated with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Pugwash) and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES).

     

    Many scientists have been involved in both organizations. Pugwash, which grew directly from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, began in 1957 and has tended to work in more closed circles of scientists in the hopes of being viewed by governments as more trustworthy. Pugwash shared the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize with its founder, Sir Joseph Rotblat. INES, by contrast, which was established at a large scientific meeting in Berlin in 1991, has been far more open to interactions with other civil society organizations and with the general public. One of the principal aims of INES has been to achieve the abolition of nuclear weapons. This aim has been carried out by an extraordinarily dedicated group of scientists, engineers and experts in the INES project, the International Network of Scientists and Engineers Against Proliferation (INESAP). In the remainder of this article, I will discuss INESAP’s activities that have sought to move beyond the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other efforts to halt proliferation and to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

     

    INESAP was formed in 1993 by three young German scientists: Wolfgang Liebert, Martin Kalinowski and Juergen Scheffran. From its inception, the network focused on the central issue of the Nuclear Age: achieving total nuclear disarmament. The principal objectives of INESAP are “to promote nuclear disarmament, to tighten existing arms control and non-proliferation regimes, [and] to implement unconventional approaches to curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to controlling the transfer of related technology.”

     

    The founding conference of INESAP took place in Germany in August 1993, and was entitled, “Against Proliferation: Towards General Disarmament.” Some 50 scientists, engineers and other experts from 20 countries participated. In 1994, INESAP established a Study Group on non-proliferation, called “Beyond the NPT,” referring to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The work of the Study Group led to the publication of a document in early 1995, “Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World.” The document was prepared by some 50 authors from 17 countries, including soon-to-be Nobel Peace Laureate Joseph Rotblat.

     

    Among the conclusions of this study were that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was insufficient to control nuclear proliferation, and that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of this treaty should be followed by multilateral negotiations to achieve a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The document proposed that the parties to the treaty, along with the few states still outside the treaty, should begin immediate negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a framework treaty for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Executive Summary of “Beyond the NPT” stated, “In its Final Document the NPT Review and Extension Conference should, in its call for decisive steps towards a NWFW [nuclear weapons-free world], include a mandate for the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). The pattern has to be that which has already been set by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – a total ban.”

     

    The 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference was held at United Nations headquarters in New York. It was one of the most important meetings in the then 25-year history of treaty and may turn out to be one of the significant events of the Nuclear Age, with broad implications for the future of civilization. At issue during the conference was whether the treaty should be extended indefinitely or for periods of time. The United States and other nuclear weapons states were strong supporters of indefinite extension, their goal being to prevent nuclear proliferation while maintaining the two-tier structure of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots.” Many civil society organizations, along with some non-nuclear weapons states, argued against indefinite extension on the basis that it would be like giving a blank check to parties (the nuclear weapons states) who were notorious for overdrawing their accounts and could not be trusted to keep their promises.

     

    The essential bargain of the NPT was that non-nuclear weapons states would not develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapons states would cease the nuclear arms race and engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament. From the perspective of the non-nuclear weapons states, the treaty was never meant to establish permanent nuclear double standards, making nuclear weapons acceptable for the small minority while prohibiting them to the vast majority.

     

    INESAP was a leader among the civil society organizations at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference pressing the point that preventing proliferation was not sufficient and that it was necessary to move expeditiously toward a nuclear weapons-free world. In cooperation with other leading international organizations, INESAP sponsored a two-day forum on the abolition of nuclear weapons, based upon its study, “Beyond the NPT: A Nuclear Weapon-Free World.” The INESAP forum provided an opportunity to present a variety of proposals on how to attain a nuclear weapons-free world and for civil society representatives from around the world to debate strategies for moving forward.

     

    The NPT Review and Extension Conference ended with a victory for the nuclear weapons states and a sound defeat for humanity. The treaty was extended indefinitely with no further requirements that the nuclear weapons states fulfill their obligations under the treaty to achieve nuclear disarmament. Having achieved the indefinite extension of the treaty, the nuclear weapons states showed no inclination to proceed with negotiations for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons, as INESAP had proposed.

     

    The outcome of the NPT Review and Extension Conference created a strong reaction by civil society organizations and an increased determination among them to work for the abolition of nuclear weapons. INESAP and other civil society groups coalesced to form Abolition 2000, a global network for the abolition of nuclear weapons, which has now grown to over 2,000 organizations and municipalities throughout the world.

     

    In 1996, a year after the conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference, civil society organizations played a significant role in bringing the issue of the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the world’s highest court. The ICJ issued an opinion in which the court unanimously declared: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

     

    By 1997, INESAP, along with two other important international organizations – the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) – put forward a comprehensive text for a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. The text, relying heavily on the technical information provided by INESAP, provided for a system of societal and technical verification that would make it possible for the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligation under international law for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This would not only make the world far safer, but would be the only truly effective way to assure against nuclear proliferation. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention was introduced to the United Nations as a discussion paper by Costa Rica in 1997.

     

    Since then, INESAP has continued its efforts to promote a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In a 1999 Briefing Paper (No. 7/1999), it explored the question, “Has the Time Come for the Nuclear Weapons Convention?” During that same year, INESAP continued its collaboration with IALANA and IPPNW in producing a book: Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. In the year 2000, INESAP put out an edited book on Global Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The book, emphasizing scientific expertise, provides analysis of the deadlock in achieving progress on the elimination of nuclear weapons and on the means of overcoming the obstacles.

     

    The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention has provided a basic tool for the global nuclear abolition movement. It has been used over the years by Abolition 2000 and its constituent organizations as an example of how countries, if they had the political will to do so, could proceed toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Most recently, the model convention has been used by the Mayors for Peace, led by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in their Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons. This campaign calls for negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention to commence in 2005, to be completed by 2010, and for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

     

    In 2000, INESAP organized a workshop entitled “Abolition of Nuclear Weapons” at the Stockholm Congress of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility. Intensive discussions at this meeting gave rise to a new INESAP program, initiated in cooperation with the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, to explore the control and elimination of missile technologies for warlike purposes. The project, Moving Beyond Missile Defense, has held four international conferences over the past five years, in Santa Barbara, Shanghai, Berlin and Hiroshima, focusing on regional and global issues of nuclear disarmament and missile control.

     

    Einstein warned, “The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” The scientists, engineers and other experts associated with INESAP have worked to bring about such a change in thinking. They have exemplified a commitment to social responsibility by raising their voices to warn of continuing dangers and by using their scientific and technical expertise to propose solutions to the gravest danger confronting humanity. They carry on in the tradition of truth and courage exemplified by Albert Einstein.

     

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org), and the Deputy Chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (www.inesglobal.org). He is a leader in the global effort to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • Reviving Nuclear Disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Regime Opening Remarks

    This panel on “Reviving Nuclear Disarmament in the Non-Proliferation Regime” is of tremendous importance to the outcome of this Seventh Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Beyond that, it may prove vital to the present and future security of our planet. I am very pleased to be a part of it.

    Although the public is largely unaware of this, it is no secret to any of you that nuclear disarmament is a central component of the non-proliferation bargain. On the one hand, this treaty provides obligations to halt nuclear proliferation; on the other, it provides obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    This makes perfect sense, of course, for the two obligations are highly interlinked. Without fulfilling disarmament obligations, it will not be possible to prevent proliferation. And should there be further nuclear proliferation, nuclear disarmament will be all the more difficult.

    There has been much emphasis in the news – a subject with which I have some familiarity – about the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, the nuclear disarmament obligations of the nuclear weapons states receive far less attention in news reporting, (at least within the United States). This may well be simply because a degree of isolationism still exists across the breadth of our land. That manifests itself in a down-playing of international news. Too often there is only minimum attention given by our local news media, print and broadcast, to the deeper, more intricate stories about our global community, its problems and hopes.

    I’m afraid that a far too large percentage of our population does not recognize that nuclear disarmament is an essential component of the non-proliferation bargain. It is reason for us to worry. It seems that the United States and the other nuclear weapons states are trying to evade their obligations and responsibilities under this critical treaty.

    These countries have in the first instance behaved as though the “unequivocal undertaking” which they made five years ago at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, was subject to being discarded at will. They commit a similar affront to the non-proliferation treaty community by ignoring other of their promises.

    Such behavior strains the credibility of these countries and puts the outcome of this Review Conference in jeopardy of failure. That outcome, of course, would be a tragedy for the world.

    In this 60th year of the Nuclear Age, we must all be thinking about what can be done to assure a future for human beings on our planet. As the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, have continually warned – “Nuclear weapons and human beings cannot co-exist.”

    As a species, we are neither smart enough nor careful enough to continue to live with nuclear weapons in our midst. So far we have been lucky in that since the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have not been used again in war. But there is no telling how long this luck will last. We certainly cannot count on it to last indefinitely.

    Therefore, we must get back to basics. We must return to the nuclear disarmament part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain. And we must do so with clarity of purpose and determination to succeed. This is what my very distinguished fellow panelists are here to talk about today. The panelists include both representatives of civil society and of government. They all have worked on these issues with extraordinary dedication for a very long time.

    I urge the delegates to this treaty conference to listen to them carefully – and to act with certainty that the future of humanity, including yet unborn generations, is dependent upon your success – right here and right now! You have a very important responsibility and the future is in your hands.

    I trust that you will act with the foresight, courage and resolve that our current situation demands.

    Walter Cronkite is an eminent broadcast journalist and recipient of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s 2004 Distinguished Peace Leadership Award.