Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: NPT

  • Analysis of NPT PrepComm III

    Summary

    The third and final preparatory meeting for the 2000 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) concluded at 10:30 p.m. May 21st with an agreement to disagree. In the arcane world of nuclear diplomacy, this was considered a step forward, since the 1998 Second PrepComm had concluded in disarray without an agreement that the parties disagreed. The 1999 action was but a thin cover over the deadlock persisting between the Western Nuclear Weapons States and the leading non-Nuclear Weapons States and, given the worsening international climate, signals a struggle of immense proportions to maintain the viability of the NPT after 2000.

    China excoriated the United States for “wantonly bombing Yugoslavia for more than 40 days,” bullying other countries, and pursuing an inflammatory missile defence system. The U.S. stated that its commitment to the NPT’s Article VI “is broad and deep,” but refused to allow a subsidiary body, which would examine the details of nuclear disarmament, to be established at the 2000 Review. The New Agenda Coalition tabled a working paper with 44 co-sponsors, criticizing the NWS for re-rationalizing their continued possession of nuclear weapons, and calling for “a clear and unequivocal commitment to the speedy pursuit of the total elimination” of nuclear weapons, which “will require a multilateral agreement.” The Non-Aligned Movement went further, with its repeated call for the commencement of negotiations on a phased program of nuclear disarmament within “a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear-Weapons Convention… .” Canada, building on its new nuclear weapons policy statement, presented a draft of new Principles and Objectives for the 2000 Review, which called for acceleration of the START process, the engagement of the three other NWS “in the near future,” and additional new measures such as de-alerting. A lengthy list of States’ proposals was blended into a 61-paragraph Chairman’s Paper which, while not going as far as the NAM desires, went well beyond what the Western NWS would accept. The Chairman, Ambassador Camilo Reyes of Colombia, included: a call for negotiations on the elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons; de-alerting, de-targeting and de-activating all nuclear weapons and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles; an expression of “deep concern that Israel continues to be the only State in the [Middle East] which has not yet acceded to the [NPT] and refuses to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA; a legally-binding negative security assurances regime; an ad-hoc committee at the Conference on Disarmament “with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament.” Several hours of debate on the Chairman’s Paper revealed once more the continuing wide split between the Western NWS and the gathering forces of the NNWS who are increasing their demands that the “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally,” promised in 1995, be lived up to. Almost to the end of the PrepComm, it appeared that absolute deadlock would prevail, as occurred in 1998. But deft steering by the Chairman and a general feeling on all sides that a second total collapse of the PrepComm process could prove fatal for the 2000 Review led to an agreement to send to the 2000 Review the Chairman’s Paper along with all the papers submitted by States with the notation: “The Preparatory Committee was unable to reach agreement on any substantive recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference.”

    This strategem allows the PrepComm material, containing many ideas for strengthening the NPT, to go forward. But Western NWS opposition to the ideas themselves persists.

    1. During the three years of annual PrepComms leading up to the 2000 Review, the nuclear weapons situation has worsened. START II is blocked. The Conference on Disarmament is virtually paralyzed. Overt nuclear proliferation has spread to India and Pakistan. The Nuclear Weapons States continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals. NATO has reaffirmed that nuclear weapons are “essential.” The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is nowhere near entering into force. A fourth U.N. Special Session on Disarmament has been blocked by India, which says that as long as the U.S. opposes nuclear disarmament as a chief item on the agenda, India doesn’t want the Session at all.

    2. The 1999 PrepComm opened under the cloud of the Kosovo war, which, among its other serious consequences for the international community, has severely strained relations between the U.S. and Russia and the U.S. and China. NATO’s decisions to take in nine more nations (on top of the three new members), operate aggressively out-of-area, and bypass the U.N. Security Council in prosecuting the Kosovo war have angered Russia and China in the extreme. An additional $300 billion will be pumped into the U.S. defence budget by 2003 which already is 18 times larger than the combined spending of the seven so-called “rogue” States identified by the Pentagon. The U.S. Congress has enshrined in ional security policy the intention to field a national ballistic missile defence system; the Pentagon has budgeted $10.5 billion over the next six years to create a workable system. Not only is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty now under threat, the whole non-proliferation regime is under siege. A new nuclear arms race is certain, unless Washington, Moscow and Beijing can quickly put collaborative efforts back on track.

    3. China went up front at the PrepComm in castigating the U.S. Stung by the three NATO missiles that struck China’s embassy in Belgrade, Ambassador Sha Zukang led off his opening speech with a condemnation of NATO’s bombing campaign. “The Chinese Government and people express their utmost indignation and severe condemnation of the barbarian act and lodge the strongest protest. U.S-led NATO should bear all responsibilities arising therefrom.” Sha then accused the U.S., through trying to build absolute security on the insecurity of others, of undermining international peace and security and impairing efforts towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. He singled out the proposed U.S. missile defence system as an unacceptable U.S. effort to achieve strategic superiority in the 21st century. “It will disrupt global and regional strategic balances and stability, and possibly trigger off a new round of arms races.” He foresaw the collapse of existing international regimes on disarmament if the U.S. continues its present bullying methods, forcing other countries to resort to every possible means to protect themselves. “If that happens, the bombardment by the U.S. led NATO is the only thing to blame and it is U.S. and NATO which will provoke the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Calling for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, he promoted proposals already put forward, including the time-bound nuclear disarmament program advanced by the NAM, the work of the New Agenda Coalition, and the Canberra Commission Report.

    4. The U.S. speech, given by Norman A. Wulf, reiterated U.S. strong commitment to the NPT and “continuing to meet its obligations under all aspects of the Treaty.” He criticized the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan as “a grave disservice to our collective efforts because it occurred in the context of an historic achievement of a CTBT and a continuing deep reduction in the number of nuclear weapons worldwide.” He called for a “balanced” review process. “We must approach our work with a healthy dose of realism and avoid the assumption that the NPT process can achieve what has not been achievable elsewhere.”

    5. The U.S. tabled two lengthy Fact Sheets detailing steps the U.S. has taken in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The information package showed that the U.S. has brought its deployed strategic nuclear weapons down from 12,000 in 1989 to about 8,000 today, and that 80 percent of the tactical warhead stockpile has been eliminated. “The U.S., through the vigorous pursuit and conclusion of strategic and theater nuclear arms control and reduction agreements with the former Soviet Union, and by canceling new procurement and development programs, has helped to end the Superpower nuclear arms race. This Article VI obligation has been achieved.” Mr. Wulf attempted to marginalize the New Agenda Coalition by stating: “There has been a lot of focus this past year on trying to identify a new agenda for the disarmament process. I would suggest that we have an existing agenda that remains to be completed.”

    6. The NGO community immediately issued a rebuttal to U.S. claims that it is advancing nuclear disarmament. The U.S. Fact Sheets had not mentioned Presidential Decision Directive 60, in which the U.S. will continue to rely on nuclear arms as a cornerstone of its national security for the “indefinite future.” In addition, recent planning documents of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate nuclear retaliation against the use of chemical and biological arms, an action that would violate negative security assurances.

    The NGO statement said the 8,000 figure was misleading because it counted only operational weapons. By counting those in reserve, the total exceeds 10,000 warheads. The Stockpile Stewardship Program, encompassing sub-critical testing at weapons laboratories at Los Alamos and Livermore, violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the CTBT; and the U.S. plans to invest $45 billion over the next decade for nuclear weapons research, development, testing, and production. Stocks of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium are maintained at excessive levels. “While the U.S. may have completely eliminated more than a dozen different types of nuclear warheads, during the same period it has initiated programs to develop several new warheads, or modifications of existing warheads.” These include: the B-61/11, a new earth-penetrating warhead, a new warhead to be deployed on the Trident I and II missile, a refurbishment for the W87, currently used on MX missiles, and improvements for the B83.

    7. Thirteen NGO papers were verbally presented to the PrepComm, covering many aspects of the NPT. Forums and literature were in abundance. At one forum, the new book, “Security and Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention,” whose principal authors are Merav Datan and Alyn Ware, was presented. This thorough examination of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, already a U.N. document, was distributed to delegates. At the forum, Rebecca Johnson, who provided excellent daily reporting (with Nicola Butler) of the PrepComm on behalf of the Acronym Institute, made an interesting observation. A paradigm shift of thinking from the impossibility to the practicality of nuclear weapons abolition is needed. When the paradigm shift occurs, we will be surprised how fast nuclear abolition will take hold. She likened the work of NGOs today to loosening the earth around a big rock at the top of a mountain; after enough digging, the rock will start to roll down the mountain – unstoppable.

    8. The NAM paper called once again for commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on “a phased program of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention… .” The NAM also called for negotiations for a legal instrument assuring non-nuclear States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons (negative security assurances) to be annexed as a protocol to the NPT. In fulfillment of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the NAM stressed the urgency of Israel acceding to the NPT without delay and recommended a subsidiary body at the 2000 Review to examine this question.

    9. Following adoption of its Resolution 53/77Y at the 1998 UNGA, the New Agenda Coalition submitted a paper, which showed growth of support for the NAC. Though Slovenia, a NATO aspirant, had dropped off the original membership of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, the group was augmented by 37 more countries that co-sponsored the paper: Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Malaysia, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

    The NAC paper expressed “profound concern” at the lack of evidence that the NWS are living up to their commitments to Article VI. “On the contrary, the continued possession of nuclear weapons has been re-rationalized. Nuclear doctrines have been reaffirmed. …The indefinite extension of the NPT does not sanction the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons. That must be absolutely clear. …It is imperative to secure a clear and unequivocal commitment to the speedy pursuit of the total elimination of these weapons.”

    The NAC called for the pursuit of the START process, the “seamless integration” into the process by the other NWS, de-alerting, reduction of reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, and a legally-binding Negative Security Assurances.

    10. Canada, building on its new policy statement on nuclear weapons, said that all members of the international community have “a binding obligation” to pursue nuclear disarmament under Article VI, even though for the foreseeable future the primary responsibility for the negotiation of nuclear reductions rests with the U.S. and Russia, with the engagement of the other three NWS “in the near future.” Canada proposed a new set of Principles and Objectives, to be adopted at the 2000 Review, which would press for acceleration of the START process, de-alerting, entry-into-force of the CTBT, a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and discussion of nuclear disarmament issues at the Conference on Disarmament.

    11. It was left to the Chairman to distill the 27 working papers and other documents submitted by delegations into a coherent presentation of ideas to strengthen the NPT. His final version, amounting to 61 paragraphs, was considered a progressive document, since it embodied an ad hoc committee at the Conference on Disarmament with a negotiating mandate to address nuclear disarmament, and a call to Israel to accede to the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards “without further delay and without conditions.” These two subjects – comprehensive negotiations for nuclear disarmament and Israeli compliance with the NPT – are the thorniest issues the 2000 Review will face. Therefore, the NAM, led by South Africa, pressed for subsidiary bodies to be attached to the regular main committees in 2000 for the purpose of giving detailed attention to nuclear disarmament and the Israeli situation. The United States vigorously objected – as it had in 1998 to the same proposal. For a few moments the PrepComm teetered on the point of subsidiary bodies, a surrogate issue representing the basic split between the NWS and the leading NNWS. Then,because neither side wanted the PrepComm to fail outright, compromise language was crafted in which it was noted that some delegations proposed subsidiary bodies be established, and some delegations wanted to defer the decision, and thus the question would be resolved at the 2000 Review. A sigh of relief went around the room. And when the formal decision was taken to send the Chairman’s Paper forward, with the specific notation that it was not an agreed text, delegates applauded.

    12. Egypt immediately struck a realistic note, stating the PrepComm had not been a success and that no substantive recommendations had been sent to the 2000 Review. It hoped for better results on nuclear disarmament and the Middle East problem in 2000.

    Conclusion

    The NPT stalemate, crucial as it is to the hopes for a viable non-proliferation regime in the 21st century, is itself part of a larger world struggle today. Nuclear weapons, like the Kosovo war, are about the rule of law. How will international law be imposed in the years ahead: by the militarily powerful determining what the law will be, or by a collective world effort reposing the seat of law in the United Nations system? Already, only a decade after the end of the Cold War, the hopes for a cooperative global security system have been dashed on the rocks of power. The trust, engendered during the early post-Cold War years, is now shattered. New arms races are underway.

    It would be the height of folly to sweep under the rug this unpleasant turn of events. It would be equally folly to think that the rest of the world is powerless against the NWS. Gains are being made, however small compared to the immensity of the nuclear weapons problem. Reductions have occurred. Good documentation, even if not agreed, has been prepared for the 2000 Review. The New Agenda Coalition is developing strength. NATO has committed itself to review its nuclear weapons policy. There is an interplay in these NPT-NAC-NATO developments. Singly,they may not amount to much; taken together and built upon by a new fusion of strength by like-minded governments and the advanced wave of civil society, they can create enormous world pressure that the NWS will not be able to ignore.

    The world is staring into an abyss of nuclear weapons proliferation. The danger of the use of nuclear weapons is growing. The recognition of this should galvanize intelligent and committed people – in both governments and civil society – to action.

  • European Parliament Resolution on sub-critical nuclear testing

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on nuclear non-proliferation,

    A. whereas sub-critical nuclear tests were carried out by the United States on 2 July 1997 and on 18 September 1997 at the Nevada Test Site, and whereas the US plans to carry out four more such tests before September 1998,

    B. noting that the US Government has presented the tests as necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of its existing nuclear arsenal, but also noting that critics of the programme claim that the tests also can be used to create new types of warheads as well as to upgrade existing ones,

    C. whereas no international verification exists on whether the tests are in fact sub-critical and therefore in compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),

    D. whereas the tests may not be against the letter of the CTBT, but still violate the spirit of the treaty and place in jeopardy its entry into force by creating a “crisis of confidence”,

    E. whereas sub-critical tests and new weapons development risk reinforcing India and Pakistan in their refusal to sign the CTBT, thus blocking its entry into force, and also reinforcing opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), especially in these two nations,

    F. noting that at least 15 countries, including Norway, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia and Iran, as well as the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 46 members of the US Congress, have publicly expressed their concern about or opposition to these tests,

    G. whereas all EU Member States signed the CTBT after it was opened for signature in September 1996,

    H. whereas states who have signed the CTBT are bound to “refrain from any action that could defeat its object and purpose”, by definition of the Vienna Convention on Treaties,

    1. Reaffirms its support for the CTBT and its request for early ratification of the treaty, and calls on all Member States to act promptly,

    2. Calls on the US Government to halt the series of sub-critical tests and calls on all governments to refrain from carrying out such tests;

    3. Calls on the US Government to issue an official declaration stating that the tests in no way form part of a new weapons design programme, and that new nuclear weapons design does not form part of US policy,

    4. Calls for increased transparency on-site as well as additional confidence-building measures, in order to allay international concern over possible CTBT violations,

    5. Calls on the Council to adopt a joint action under Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, to promote signature and ratification by other states, and to include all necessary assistance to enable other states to comply with the provisions of the treaty, particularly the establishment of an effective global verification regime,

    6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the President and Congress of the United States of America.

  • Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

    The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

    Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

    Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

    In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

    Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

    Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

    Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

    Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

    Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

    Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

    Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

    Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

    Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

    Have agreed as follows:

    Article I

    Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

    Article II

    Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

    Article III

    1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

    2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

    3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty.

    4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements of this Article either individually or together with other States in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification or accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall commence not later than the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation of negotiations.

    Article IV

    1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

    2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

    Article V

    Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

    Article VI

    Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

    Article VII

    Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

    Article VIII

    1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

    2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment.

    3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening of further conferences with the same objective of reviewing the operation of the Treaty.

    Article IX

    1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

    2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

    3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the States, the Governments of which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

    4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

    5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

    6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

    Article X

    1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

    2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.1

    Article XI

    This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

    DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London, Moscow and Washington, the first day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.

    Note:
    On 11 May 1995, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided that the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely (see decision 3).