Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: NPT

  • Toward The 2005 Non-Proliferatioin Treaty Review Conference

    Toward The 2005 Non-Proliferatioin Treaty Review Conference

    The State of the World

    As we move toward the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, the world is experiencing increased extremism and instability. The extremism has manifested in the form of significant attacks by clandestine international terrorist organizations, such as those on 9/11, and acts of retaliation by powerful states that may or may not be directly related to the initial assaults. Neither the terrorists nor the state leaders involved have demonstrated reasonable regard for established rules of international law.

    In the background of this clash between extremist organizations and governments lurks the ever present danger of the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The possibility of course exists that groups like al Qaeda could somehow acquire nuclear weapons from a sympathetic state or from criminal elements. Should such a group attain nuclear weapons it is unlikely they could be deterred from using them, particularly since they have no fixed location that could be threatened with retaliation in accord with the theory of deterrence.

    At the same time, the United States has put in place policies that appear to lower the barriers to the use of nuclear weapons. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review calls for contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against seven countries, including at least four that are non-nuclear weapons states. It is also declared US policy to use nuclear weapons against chemical or biological weapon stores or in retaliation for the use of these weapons.

    With its doctrine of preventive war, the US administration is undermining the system of international law set in place after the Second World War “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.” It has chosen a path of unilateralism and “coalitions of the willing” over multilateral approaches in accord with international law. The US government is further undermining international law by its failure to support many existing treaties and by its active opposition to the creation of an International Criminal Court (ICC) to hold leaders accountable for the most egregious crimes under international law.

    The Role of the NPT

    The NPT was established primarily to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to states other than the first five nuclear weapon states. The treaty was the brainchild of the US, UK and Russia, who believed that the world would be a safer place if they, along with France and China, controlled the world’s store of nuclear weapons. It was largely a self-serving proposition, not one that offered much inducement for other countries to sign off on nuclear weapons. The NPT bargain contained two elements that presumably benefited the countries that agreed to give up their right to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. First, the treaty promised them assistance in developing the “peaceful” uses of nuclear energy, going so far as to describe nuclear power as an “inalienable right.” Second, the treaty had provisions that the nuclear weapons states would engage in “good faith” negotiations for nuclear disarmament and called for a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date.

    The NPT was put forward in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The non-nuclear weapons states are undoubtedly wondering when the “good faith” negotiations by the nuclear weapons states will begin and why the United States in particular still seems intent on developing new nuclear weapons, such as mini-nukes and “bunker busters.”

    At the 2000 NPT Review Conference the parties to the treaty adopted by consensus a Final Document that contained 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These steps included the ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the preservation and strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and called for the nuclear weapons states to take unilateral as well as multilateral steps to achieve nuclear disarmament. It also called for greater transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals and for making irreversibility a principle of nuclear weapons reductions. On virtually every one of these commitments, the US, under the Bush administration, has shown bad faith. It is demonstrating that US commitments are not likely to be honored and that the most powerful country in the world finds nuclear weapons useful and is attempting to make them more usable.

    Iraq, Iran and North Korea

    In his 2001 State of the Union Address, President Bush described Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an Axis of Evil. In 2002 he began mobilizing US troops in the Middle East and threatening Iraq. In March 2003 he initiated a preventive war against Iraq, which his administration justified on the grounds that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction that posed an imminent threat to the US. In the aftermath of the initial combat phase in Iraq, despite extensive searching, no weapons of mass destruction have been located in Iraq.

    Observing the US threats and attacks against Iraq might well have led Iran and North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons programs aimed at deterring US aggression. At this point, North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT, as is its legal right, and Iran is cooperating with inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

    Six nation talks (US, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia) have been going on to try to resolve the impasse over North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and its declared intention to develop a nuclear arsenal. The CIA estimates that North Korea may currently have one or two nuclear weapons and the materials to make another six or so weapons in the short-term. North Korea is asking for the US to provide it with a non-aggression pact as the price for giving up its nuclear ambitions. It is a small price. The US has vacillated on whether to do this, but recently has indicated its willingness to give informal assurances. It remains unclear whether such assurances will be sufficient to bring North Korea back into the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

    Current Problems with the NPT

    In addition to North Korea’s withdrawal from the treaty, there are other problems. First, its promotion of nuclear energy and nuclear research create the ever-present possibility of countries using the nuclear materials to develop clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Second, it lacks universality and the countries that have refused to join (India, Pakistan and Israel) have all developed nuclear arsenals and have thus, in a sense, been “rewarded” for not joining. Third, there are many unfulfilled commitments, particularly the nuclear disarmament commitments by the nuclear weapons states, which give the appearance that these countries are just making empty promises that they have no intention of keeping.

    There has been virtually no progress on any of the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It is difficult for the non-nuclear weapon states to view this in any way other than as a sign of bad faith on the part of the nuclear weapons states.

    The Role of NGOs

    Given the state of the world and the current problems with the NPT, it seems appropriate for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the disarmament area to question the value of the treaty. What good is a treaty in which the most powerful states do not fulfill their obligations or keep their promises? There is no doubt that the behavior of the nuclear weapon states, and particularly the US, have undermined the value of the NPT and raised serious questions about it in the minds of many observers.

    The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) states have made a diligent effort to get the NPT back on track with their resolutions in the United Nations, but they have been stonewalled by the US and most of its allies. The Middle Powers Initiative, a coalition of eight international non-governmental organizations, has attempted to support and promote the positions of the NAC throughout the world. Through these efforts, they achieved a slight crack in the stone wall when Canada, a NATO member, voted in support of the NAC resolution in the First Committee of the United Nations in November 2003.

    NGOs will likely continue to support and promote the efforts to make the parties to the NPT live up to their obligations, but at the same time are undoubtedly disheartened by the ongoing failure of the nuclear weapon states to meet their obligations or even show minimal good faith. In the years since the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 and despite the end of the Cold War, there has been no substantial progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

    NGOs must choose the points of greatest importance and leverage, and stress these in their activities.

    First, it is long past time for the nuclear weapon states to provide legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear weapon states.

    Second, there should be no regression on the moratorium on nuclear testing.

    Third, there should be far tighter controls of nuclear materials in all states, including the nuclear weapon states.

    In a November 3, 2003 statement to the UN General Assembly, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the IAEA, called for “limiting the processing of weapon-usable material (separated plutonium and high enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programmes – as well as the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment – by agreeing to restrict these operations exclusively to facilities under international control.” In light of the increasing dangers of proliferation, it is amazing that such a proposal was not implemented long ago. It is a minimum acceptable standard for what must take place immediately if proliferation to both other states and terrorists is to be prevented. NGOs should certainly support this proposal.

    NGOs should also press for nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East, Northeast Asia and South Asia. These are dangerous hotspots where the development of nuclear weapons has threatened regional stability and security. To achieve these goals will require concessions by the nuclear weapons states and faster movement toward fulfilling their disarmament obligations under the NPT. A primary activity of NGOs should be to expose the hypocrisy of the nuclear weapon states and try to develop stronger anti-nuclear sentiments among the populations of these countries and translate such sentiments into political power.

    At the moment there are not many hopeful signs, but one that stands out is 2020 Vision: An Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons by the World Conference of Mayors for Peace. This innovative campaign, spearheaded by the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, calls for the 2005 NPT Review Conference to launch “a negotiating process committed to adopting a comprehensive program for progressive and systematic elimination of nuclear weapons by the next NPT Review Conference in 2010,” and then actually eliminating these weapons over the following decade. It is time-bound program that picks up the baton from Abolition 2000.

    I would encourage NGOs to help promote the effort of the World Conference of Mayors for Peace. NGOs must not give up because, in effect, this would be giving up on humanity’s future. That is what is at stake and that is why our work to support the NPT promise of the total elimination of nuclear weapons is so essential.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). This speech was given on November 23, 2003 at the 2nd Nagasaki Global Citizens’ Assembly for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

  • Facing the Failures of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime

    Each year the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime becomes more uncertain. In the past year alone:

    • North Korea has become the first country ever to withdraw from the treaty.

    • There has been virtually no progress and considerable regression on the thirteen practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    • The US has reasserted policies of nuclear weapons use that undermine the negative security assurances promised to non-nuclear weapon states parties (NNWS) to the NPT in 1978 and again at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

    • The doctrine of preemption, pursued by the United States and adopted by other states with nuclear weapons, threatens to accelerate nuclear weapons proliferation in the face of the threat of aggressive use of force.

    Bilateral policies of the nuclear weapon states parties (NWS) to the NPT are increasingly integrating those nuclear weapons states outside of the NPT regime: India, Pakistan and Israel’s legitimate nuclear powers, through the elimination of sanctions and technology exchanges.

    The NPT regime obligations are having less and less success in restraining the irresponsible behavior of nations, especially the treaty’s NWS, and the United States in particular. As NWS move further away from their obligations under the treaty, they are simultaneously weakening incentives for non-nuclear weapon state parties to the treaty to remain within the NPT regime. If such regressions continue, they will inevitably lead to an abandonment of disarmament goals and the gradual lack of interest by non-nuclear weapons states parties to remain within the regime’s boundaries. It is time for members of the NPT regime to issue a clear statement outlining how the treaty is being undermined and by whom.

    The NPT 13 Practical Steps Towards Disarmament Ignored

    When the United States ambassador stated at the 2002 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee that Washington no longer supported many of the conclusions from the 2000 NPT Review Conference he was clearly alluding to the 13 Practical Steps to achieve complete disarmament under Article VI of the treaty. In the past year not only has no progress been made in fulfilling these steps but NWS, the United States in particular, have pursued policies that demonstrate significant regression from fulfillment of their Article VI obligations.

    In the past year there have been no further ratifications of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by nuclear capable states, including NWS parties to the NPT. There has been no progress in moving towards a fissile material treaty. The principles of irreversibility and verification have been undermined by the United States and Russia in the Moscow Treaty, which lays out reversible offensive reductions without providing for any verification methods. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and the START II arms reduction efforts have been entirely abandoned as has progress towards START III. There has been no effort to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, and in fact the United States is conducting studies on new nuclear weapon designs. The only area where some progress in meeting the 13 Practical Steps has been made is that some states submitted reports with regard to their Article VI obligations at the 2002 PrepCom, a process that is still being resisted by many NWS, including the United States.

    At the NPT’s inception, disarmament obligations under Article VI played a key role in convincing NNWS that it was in their best interest to sign the treaty, though it restricted their ability to develop nuclear weapons. As these disarmament obligations continue to be ignored by the NWS, they eliminate a significant incentive for NNWS to keep their side of the bargain.

    Negative Security Assurances Undermined

    The US has reiterated its policy to use “overwhelming force” against chemical or biological attacks. This policy was reiterated in the recent US National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction issued in December 2002, which states, “The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force including through resort to all of our options to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.”

    Such policies undermine the negative security assurances promised by the United States in 1978 and reaffirmed at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. These assurances are supposed to reassure NNWS that they need not worry about becoming the target of a nuclear weapons attack. Though the United States has reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a chemical or biological weapon attack for some years, the continued emphasis on this first strike policy undermines non-proliferation goals. When the United States, despite its overwhelming conventional military superiority, takes up a policy that requires nuclear weapons to carry out a strike against a potential chemical or biological weapons threat, other states are likely to conclude that nuclear weapons are also necessary for their protection.

    In addition, as the United States continues to fund studies for new tactical weapons designs, such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penatrator, it further erodes the confidence building effect of the negative security assurances. These new nuclear weapon designs are not strategic, to be used to deter a nuclear strike upon the United States, but would most likely be used against the chemical or biological facilities or in other tactical battlefield maneuvers in a first strike, most likely against a NNWS. By eroding its own negative security assurances, the United States is diminishing another important incentive for NNWS to remain within the NPT regime.

    Preemption Doctrine Pursued

    The United States government is pursuing a doctrine of preemptive use of force, both in policy and military action, which ultimately threatens to undermine non-proliferation goals. The Bush administration’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states: “U.S. military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against WMD-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through preemptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before these weapons are used.”

    This US preemption doctrine, which was drafted largely in response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 and which was used in justifying the recent invasion of Iraq, is likely to have serious negative effects on the NPT regime.

    First, it is setting a dangerous precedent for other nuclear powers to justify using aggressive preventive force to settle international disputes. Some countries have already begun echoing the new US doctrine as a possible approach to solving long-standing regional conflicts. Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha stated recently, “There were three reasons which drove the Anglo-US forces to attack Iraq possession of weapons of mass destruction, export of terrorism and an absence of democracy all of which exist in Pakistan.” On April 11, 2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes said he endorsed Sinha’s recent comments that India had “a much better case to go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the United States has in Iraq.” Such a doctrine of preemption pursued by India towards Pakistan is extremely dangerous, particularly given Pakistan’s conventional weakness. In the face of an Indian policy of preemption, Pakistan is likely to approach its own nuclear arsenal with an even higher alert status, bringing these two countries a step closer to intentional or accidental nuclear war, as well as accelerate the regional arms race.

    Second, the US policy of preemption is heightening the level of threat felt by potential nuclear weapons states by adding to the perceived need to possess nuclear weapons in order to ward off an aggressive offensive attack. Instead of warning or discouraging nuclear threshold states such as Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear arsenals, the lesson that these countries are most likely to learn from the Iraq example is that they must accelerate their nuclear weapons programs in order avoid to the fate of the Ba’th regime.

    Israel, India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenals Accepted

    In addition to the many regressions from fulfilling obligations under the NPT, NWS policies toward countries with nuclear arsenals outside of the NPT regime are also having a damaging effect on the treaty. Through their evolving bilateral policies, NWS parties to the NPT are increasingly integrating Israel, India and Pakistan into the international community as legitimate nuclear powers outside of the NPT regime, undermining incentives for NNWS to remain within the treaty.

    There has long been a double standard in calling for the adherence to UN resolutions relevant to the elimination of nuclear weapons within the Middle East that puts little pressure on Israel to eliminate its arsenal. While NWS have put increased pressure on countries such as Iraq and Iran not to develop nuclear weapons, Israel has never faced significant consequences for having a nuclear arsenal of some 200 weapons outside of the NPT regime. In fact, by continuing to aid Israel in developing its missile defense technology, the United States is helping Israel create a protective shield from which it may, at some point, be able to launch a nuclear weapon, without perceiving itself to be vulnerable to a reciprocal missile strike. Not only is Israel developing this potentially destabilizing anti-missile technology, but it is also considering selling this technology, if it is given US approval, to India, another nuclear power that is not a member of the NPT regime.

    The United States lifted sanctions against the sale of dual-use technologies to Pakistan in 2001 in order to gain Pakistan’s cooperation in the post-September 11 war on terror. Such sanctions against India, which were partially lifted when India also became part of the US-led “coalition against terrorism” in 2001, were repealed in their entirety in February 2003. The United States Congress is also examining ways to expand the co-operative non-proliferation efforts from states of the former Soviet Union to include countries such as India, aiding them in advancing their nuclear security technology and protocol.

    Reports from a summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in December 2002 also indicated that negotiations are moving forward for India to lease at least one Russian-made Akula-11 class nuclear-powered submarine, capable of carrying a payload of nuclear cruise missiles. Though the head of India’s navy, Admiral Madhvendra Singh, refused to confirm or deny assertions concerning the possible lease, if such a lease is undertaken it would significantly alter the balance of nuclear capability between India and Pakistan. Prior to the summit, Russia announced its intention to allow India to become an associated member of the United Nuclear Research Institute, one of the top nuclear research institutes in Russia. India was previously denied access to the facilities of this prestigious institute, where nearly half of all Russian nuclear advances have occurred, because it is not a member of the NPT. But India’s NPT status is a factor that appears to be of decreasing concern to the Russian government when considering weapons, science and technology exchanges.

    The increasing transfer of dual-use and missile defense technology to Israel, Pakistan and India continues despite the fact that these countries are not restrained by the NPT regulations from sharing this technology with NNWS, even in the case of Pakistan, a country that likely aided North Korea in developing its uranium-based nuclear weapons program. Such policies clearly undermine the goals of the NPT, sending NNWS a clear message: remaining outside of the NPT regime has many benefits and few costs.

    A Time To Speak

    The NPT was to be the cornerstone for disarmament, arms control and the peaceful prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, a role that the treaty is clearly failing to fulfill. It is no longer fruitful to wait and hope that the political will appears to make the NPT a workable and effective regime. It is time, instead, to realize how and why the regime is not working and what countries bear responsibility for the treaty’s ineffectiveness. The NNWS members of the NPT should unite in motioning for a type of censure, a statement that clearly lays out the reasons for the NPT’s failures holding specific countries responsible for their part in the regime’s degradation. Such a motion would not pass the NPT PrepCom’s procedure of consensus, but it would send a strong message that the majority of NPT members are not complacent in the face of continuing disregard for treaty obligations by the NWS.

    In particular, the United States’ persistent role in undermining the goals of the NPT should be clearly outlined by the other parties to the treaty. If the United States is not going to take its obligations under the NPT seriously, which it shows no intention of doing in either the near or distant future, and if the United States continues to pursue policies that directly undermine the treaty regime, then this behavior must be recognized and forthrightly condemned by the other members of NPT regime. Such a statement is not likely to be effective in changing US policy it could possibly affect the sentiment of the American public. Given that the NPT regime is hardly benefiting from US symbolic membership, there is little to lose by members of the NPT formally voicing a strong opposition to the United States’ many transgressions.

    As the United States government is becoming more and more frank in its disregard for multilateral diplomatic solutions to security issues, so must the international community be frank in its rejection of the aggressive and dangerous policies of the United States that threaten to draw the world into an unending arms race and a state of perpetual war.
    * David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and can be contacted at dkrieger@napf.org. He is the co-author of Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age (Middle way Press, 2002) and editor of Hope in a Dark Time, Reflections on Humanity’s Future (Capri Press, 2003).

    Devon Chaffee is the Research and Advocacy Coordinator of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and can be contacted at advocacy@napf.org.

  • North Korea’s Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty Official

    On January 10th 2003 North Korea announced its intent to become the first country ever to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Though North Korean officials argued that its withdrawal was official immediately, according to Article X of the treaty the withdrawal was not official until today, three months after the notification was issued. This unfortunate event highlights the severe implications of the Bush administration’s refusal to engage North Korea diplomatically. It also draws attention to concerns about the uncertain future of the NPT regime.

    Under the NPT North Korea and other countries not possessing nuclear weapons at the time agreed not to develop or obtain nuclear weapons and the nuclear powers agreed to disarm and not to spread nuclear weapons to other states. Now that North Korea is officially not a party to the NPT, there are few legal obstacles preventing it from developing nuclear weapons and selling such weapons, technology and materials to other countries.

    North Korea had announced its intent to withdraw from the NPT regime once before in 1993. At that time the United States engaged in bilateral negotiations leading the DPRK to retract its withdrawal days before it officially went into effect.

    When North Korea again announced its withdrawal in January its statement of intent clearly called for further negotiation initiatives with the United States. These requests did not, however, result in the skillful diplomatic maneuvering that was employed during the 1993 crisis. Instead, the Bush administration has refused all requests for bilateral talks, urging a multilateral approach that has, thus far, proved entirely unfruitful.

    North Korea now joins India, Pakistan, Israel, as the only countries not currently within the NPT regime. Few of these countries have faced serious consequences for such remaining outside of the regime.

    Although some sanctions were originally imposed on India and Pakistan after they conducted nuclear tests in 1998, these sanctions have been largely abandoned. The nuclear status of India and Pakistan is increasingly accepted by the world’s major powers. They have been allowed to enter into certain international nuclear research institutions, from which they were previously excluded, and the U.S. is investigating ways to aid these countries in securing their nuclear arsenals.

    It currently appears unlikely that the U.N. Security Council will take any punitive action in response to North Korea’s NPT withdrawal. This seeming complacency of the international community in regards to nuclear proliferation begs the question: what is preventing other nuclear aspiring nations, such as Iran, from following North Korea’s lead and withdrawing from the NTP regime?

    As the United States continues to wage a pre-emptive attack on Iraq, in part due to Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction programs, increasing alarm is voiced by other nations accused of such proliferation. It is likely that nations such as Iran will accelerate their nuclear weapons programs due to fears of such U.S. aggression. This is particularly so as the Bush administration continues to increase its emphasis on its own nuclear weapons technology, ignoring its disarmament obligations under Article XI of the NPT. Though these issues will likely be discussed at the upcoming preparatory meeting for the NPT Review Conference this May, the Bush administration is increasingly distancing itself from arenas pushing to find diplomatic solutions to the threat of weapons of mass of destruction.
    * Devon Chaffee is the research and advocacy coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

  • North Korea Incites More US Nuclear Hypocrisy

    David KriegerOn January 10th, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). US Secretary of State Colin Powell responded by stating, “North Korea has thumbed its nose at the international community. This kind of disrespect for such an agreement cannot go undealt with.” Dick Cheney opined that North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT “could undermine decades of non-proliferation efforts.”

    Yet, those who have read and understand the NPT appreciate that the treaty intertwines the issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The one is dependent on the other. Since the US and the other declared nuclear weapons states have failed in their obligations to achieve nuclear disarmament, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War, they should expect, sooner or later, that one result will be a breakdown of the NPT regime.

    The NPT was created in 1968 by the US, UK and Russia as a means of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapons states agreed not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons and, in return, the nuclear weapons states agreed to engage in good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

    In the years since 1970 when the treaty entered into force, 187 countries have signed and ratified the treaty. All of these countries are non-nuclear except for the five declared nuclear weapons states (US, UK, France, Russia and China). The only four states that are not parties to the treaty are India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba, and Cuba has indicated its intention to join the treaty.

    India, Pakistan and Israel have all developed nuclear arsenals outside the framework of the treaty. India made clear for many years that it was willing to forego its nuclear option if the five declared nuclear weapons states would take seriously their obligations for nuclear disarmament. After years of waiting in vain for the implementation of serious nuclear disarmament efforts by the nuclear weapons states, India went nuclear in 1998 and Pakistan followed suit.

    In 1995 when the NPT was extended indefinitely, the declared nuclear weapons states promised “[t]he determined pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons….”

    In 2000, when the parties to the NPT held their sixth review conference, the nuclear weapons states again promised “[a]n unequivocal undertaking…to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament….” In addition to violating this obligation, the US has also withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty after promising in 2000 that it would preserve and strengthen this treaty “as a cornerstone of strategic stability.”

    The US also agreed to apply the “principle of irreversibility” to nuclear disarmament, meaning that deactivated warheads would be destroyed. Instead of following this principle, however, the US pushed the Russians to agree to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty that is based upon the opposite principle, that of reversibility. The US announced that at its discretion the strategic nuclear weapons taken off active deployment pursuant to the agreement would be kept in storage for potential future redeployment.

    After the US promised “the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” in 2000, the Bush administration has refused to re-send this treaty to the Senate for ratification (the Senate failed to ratify in 1999). The Bush administration has also sought to reduce the time needed to resume nuclear testing.

    Bush spokesperson Ari Fleischer commented on North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, “There is a light at the end of the tunnel, and that begins with North Korea’s immediately dismantling its nuclear weapons programs and coming into compliance with its obligations around the world.” The light at the end of the tunnel could also begin with the United States coming into compliance with its obligations around the world, starting with its obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

    To defuse the current crisis with North Korea, the US should pursue a policy of engagement. It should accept North Korea’s offer to enter into negotiations for a non-aggression pact. The US should also offer to provide North Korea with additional development assistance to help them in building their economy and eliminating starvation.

    Assurances of peace and non-aggression on the Korean Peninsula would make all of North Korea’s neighbors more comfortable. Such assurances would also be an acceptable trade-off for North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program and to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency back into the country to verify the termination and dismantlement of any nuclear weapons program. These assurances would allow North Korea to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1994 Agreed Framework.

    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He is the co-author of Choose Hope, Your Role in Waging Peace in the Nuclear Age.

  • Sort of a Treaty, But Not Really

    Sort of a Treaty, But Not Really

    Published in International Law and Editorial

    Nuclear weapons were the greatest threat to humanity’s future before 9/11, and remain the greatest threat after 9/11. They are the only weapons capable of destroying major cities and even ending human life on Earth. Given the dangers that these instruments of genocide pose to humanity, it is baffling why we’re not doing more to end this threat.

    I attribute the lack of action primarily to the myopic leadership in the United States, where the short-sightedness of U.S. political leadership on this issue is bipartisan. During its eight-year tenure, the Clinton administration made little progress to make good on the formal U.S. commitment in the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to undertake good-faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the nuclear-weapons states clarified their treaty commitments by pledging to pursue the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Promises also were made for “[t]he early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons.”

    Instead of fulfilling these promises, however, the newly installed Bush dministration announced its opposition to the ABM Treaty, and later withdrew from it. It then foisted a fraudulent Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) on the Russians, a treaty so problematic that it accomplishes little more than mislead the public into thinking that some progress is being made toward nuclear disarmament.

    SORT will lead only to the reduction of the number of actively deployed strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 by year 2012, with no timetable other than the endpoint and no procedures for verification. And the U.S. has announced that it will not be destroying most of the weapons taken off active deployment: It plans merely to place them on a shelf for retrieval in case they are deemed to be needed again in the future. The treaty has no effect on tactical (shorter-range) nuclear weapons.

    When this fraudulent treaty, which the U.S. Senate still must ratify, is combined with the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review presented to Congress earlier this year, the clear indication is that the U.S. is committed to keeping its nuclear arsenal, and to lowering the political and military thresholds of its possible use.

    The portions of the secret Nuclear Posture Review that were leaked to the press indicate that the U.S. is developing new, more usable nuclear weapons, as well as plans for their use against at least seven countries (Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, Libya, Russia and China). This is hardly the stance of a country seeking to provide leadership toward fulfilling its NPT obligations to eliminate its nuclear weapons.

    Terrorism is the threat to injure or kill innocent people for political ends. The terrorist acts that targeted the United States on September 11 last year were despicable, and condemnable as crimes against humanity. But isn’t planning to use nuclear weapons, which would kill not 3,000 people but hundreds of thousands (in a small-scale use) to millions of people (in a larger scale use), terrorism too?

    It is past time for the United States and the other nuclear-weapons states to recognize their own terrorist threats against humanity. These states have existing obligations under international law to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, including under the NPT and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the nternational Court of Justice, which ruled that the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international law under nearly all conceivable circumstances.

    Fulfilling their international law obligations with respect to nuclear disarmament is also in the self-interest of these states. By eliminating nuclear weapons and strengthening non-proliferation regimes, these states would diminish the risk that such weapons would fall into the hands of terrorist groups, like those that targeted the United States last September.
    *David Krieger is president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. Published in International Law and Editorial, September 15, 2002.

  • Groups Urge Countries to Oppose Bush’s Nuclear Plans

    Originally Published on OneWorld US

    As country representatives enter the second week of discussions on a treaty aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear arms around the world, peace groups are urging them to oppose a possible United States policy shift that could mean a new role for nuclear weapons as part of the “war against terrorism.”

    International delegates, who are currently meeting in New York to prepare the ground for a 2005 review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are under pressure from lobby groups to take a stand against controversial U.S. nuclear defense proposals which have been publicized in recent months.

    David Krieger, president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, which has a representative at the NPT meeting, says the U.S. is in danger of violating international law if it goes ahead with proposals to make nuclear weapons a legitimate part of the country’s portfolio of defense options.

    “That the U.S. is making contingency plans and preparations to use nuclear weapons is revealed in its secret Nuclear Posture Review,” said Krieger, referring to a confidential policy report, partially declassified in January, which outlined the case for the weapons in the post-September 11 security climate.

    “Just as planning and preparation for aggressive war was held to be a crime at Nuremberg, U.S. planning and preparation to use nuclear weapons constitutes…a crime under international law,” said Krieger, noting a 1996 International Court of Justice ruling that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be illegal.

    Leaks to the media last month revealed that the Posture Review named seven states–Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea (news – web sites), Russia, and China–against which nuclear weapons could be used. Of those states, only Russia and China are known to possess nuclear weapons.

    Since the second bomb was dropped by the U.S. on Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used. However, the Review raises the prospect of the development of smaller and more functional nuclear weapons that could be more easily deployed, according to media reports.

    Jan Øberg, director of the Sweden-based Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, believes that the new U.S. posture signals a change in how nuclear weapons will be perceived in the future.

    “Morally and politically nuclear weapons are not something you just throw around, but now there is the prospect they could be used against a government we don’t like, and in particular, a list of countries that don’t have the capacity to invade or who don’t have nuclear weapons at all,” Øberg explained.

    The posture is consistent with the lack of enthusiasm demonstrated by the administration of George W. Bush for multilateral efforts to controls arms, said John Isaacs, head of Council for a Livable World, pointing to the U.S. government’s reluctance to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

    “We hope the rest of world does not do the same thing because the more the U.S. goes against world opinion, the more likely it will weaken treaties, leading other countries to withdraw and to begin to develop nuclear capabilities,” said Isaacs.

    The preparatory committee session, which began Monday, is scheduled to end April 19. The NPT itself, which includes 187 member states, has led international initiatives on non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and other nuclear treaties, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, since 1970.

  • The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade – New Agenda Position Paper

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Preparatory Committee, New York
    April 2002

    I Background

    In 1995, the States parties extended the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely and undertook to make every effort to achieve its universality. The Review Process of the Treaty was strengthened and Principles and Objectives to address the implementation of the Treaty were adopted. The Resolution on the Middle East was adopted as an integral part of the 1995 package.

    In 1996, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice concluded unanimously that: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control”.

    The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference represents a positive step on the road to nuclear disarmament. In particular, nuclear-weapon States made the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and agreed on practical steps to be taken by them that would lead to nuclear disarmament. To this end, additional steps were necessary to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty.

    II Fundamental Principles

    The participation of the international community as a whole is central to the maintenance and enhancement of international peace and stability. International security is a collective concern requiring collective engagement. Internationally negotiated treaties in the field of disarmament have made a fundamental contribution to international peace and security.

    Unilateral and bilateral nuclear disarmament measures complement the treaty based multilateral approach towards nuclear disarmament. It is essential that fundamental principles, such as transparency, verification and irreversibility, be applied to all disarmament measures.

    We reaffirm that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and with the broader goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

    Irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions, and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. A fundamental pre-requisite for promoting nuclear non-proliferation is continuous irreversible progress in nuclear arms reductions.

    Each article of the Treaty is binding on the respective State parties at all times and in all circumstances. It is imperative that all States parties be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance of their obligations under the Treaty.

    Further progress on disarmament must be a major determinant in achieving and sustaining international stability. The 2000 NPT undertakings on disarmament have been given and the implementation of them remains the imperative.

    A nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

    III Developments since the 2000 NPT Review Conference

    To date, there have been few advances in the implementation of the thirteen steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We remain concerned that in the post Cold War security environment, security policies and defence doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons. The commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and defence doctrines has yet to materialise. This lack of progress is inconsistent with the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to achieve the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. In addition, we are deeply concerned about emerging approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons as part of new security strategies.

    The Conference on Disarmament has continued to fail to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The expectations of progress that resulted from the 2000 NPT Review Conference have to date not been met.

    Although implementation of the CTBT’s international monitoring system has proceeded, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. There are no indications that nuclear-weapon States have increased transparency measures. Measures have been taken by one nuclear-weapon State to unilaterally reduce the operational status of its nuclear weapons systems. To date, there is no evidence of any agreed concrete measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapon systems.

    There is no sign of efforts involving all of the five nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, there are worrying signs of the development of new generations of nuclear weapons. While welcoming the statements of intent regarding substantial cuts by the United States and the Russian Federation to deployed nuclear arsenals, we remain deeply concerned at the continuing possibility that nuclear weapons could be used. Despite the intentions of, and past achievements in bilateral and unilateral reductions, the total number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still amounts to thousands.

    There is concern that the notification of withdrawal by one of the State parties to the treaty on the limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM), the additional element of uncertainty it brings and its impact on strategic stability as an important factor contributing to and facilitating nuclear disarmament, will have negative consequences on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It could also have grave consequences for the future of global security and create an apparent rationale for action based solely on unilateral concerns. Any action, including development of missile defence systems, which could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, is of concern to the international community. We are concerned about the risk of a new arms race on earth and in outer space.

    The achievements and promise the bilateral START process held, including the possibility it offered for development as a plurilateral mechanism including all the nuclear-weapon States, for the practical dismantling and destruction of nuclear armaments, undertaken in the pursuit of the elimination of nuclear weapons, is in jeopardy.

    In the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the heads of State and Government resolved to strive for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, and to keep all options open for achieving this aim, including the possibility of convening an international conference to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

    We are concerned by the continued retention of the nuclear-weapons option by those three States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as their failure to renounce that option.

    There has been progress in the further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions, and, in particular, the movement towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas from such weapons. In this context, the ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba by all the States of the region, and all concerned States is of great importance. They should all work together in order to facilitate adherence to the protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties by all relevant States that have not yet done so. States parties to those treaties should be encouraged to promote their common objectives with a view to enhance cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zones and to working together with the proponents of other such zones. On the other hand, no progress has been achieved in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.

    IV The Way Ahead

    We remain determined to pursue, with continued vigour, the full and effective implementation of the substantial agreements reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. That outcome provides the requisite blueprint to achieve nuclear disarmament.

    Multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances must be given by the nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties. The Preparatory Committee should make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on the modalities for immediate negotiations on this issue. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States should fully respect their existing commitments in this regard.

    The nuclear-weapon States must increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures.

    Further efforts by nuclear-weapon States to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally are required. Formalisation by nuclear-weapon States of their unilateral declarations in a legally binding agreement including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility is essential. Nuclear-weapon States should bear in mind that reductions of deployments are a positive signal but no replacement for the actual elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Nuclear-weapon States should implement the NPT commitments to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying the nuclear warheads in the context of strategic nuclear reductions and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment. While deployment reduction, and reduction of operational status, give a positive signal, it cannot be a substitute for irreversible cuts and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be a priority. Nuclear weapon States must live up to their commitments. Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out in a transparent and irreversible manner and to include reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the overall arms reductions negotiations. In this context, urgent action should be taken to achieve:

    • further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
    • further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;
    • concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and to formalising existing informal bilateral arrangements regarding non-strategic nuclear reductions, such as the Bush-Gorbachev declarations of 1991, into legally binding agreements.

    Nuclear-weapon States must undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

    We underline the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT without delay and without conditions. This gains additional urgency since the process of the installation of an international system to monitor nuclear weapons tests under the CTBT is more advanced than the real prospects of entry into force of the treaty. This is a situation not consistent with the idea of elaborating a universal and comprehensive test ban treaty.

    In the interim, it is necessary to uphold and maintain the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of the CTBT. The strict observance of the CTBT’s purposes, objectives and provisions is imperative.

    The Conference on Disarmament should establish without delay an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.

    The Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

    The Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. The Conference should complete the examination and updating of the mandate contained in its decision of 13 February 1992, and to establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible.

    The international community must redouble its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT and to be vigilant against any steps that would undermine its determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Those three States [India, Pakistan and Israel] which are not yet parties to the NPT, must accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States, promptly and without condition, and bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with the additional model protocol, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation, and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

    The Trilateral Initiative between the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States must be implemented, and consideration should be given to the possible inclusion of other nuclear-weapon States.

    Arrangements should be made by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification.

    International treaties in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation must be observed, and all obligations flowing from those treaties must be duly fulfilled.

    All States should refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

    V The Strengthened Review Process

    The Preparatory Committee should deal with the procedural issues necessary to take its work forward but also with matters of substance as was decided in the 1995 and 2000 outcomes, and to ensure that the issues of substance deliberated upon are recorded in the factual summary of the Preparatory Committee.

    The Preparatory Committee should substantively focus on nuclear disarmament so as to ensure that there is a proper accounting in their reports by States of their progress in achieving nuclear disarmament. Accountability will be assessed in the consideration of these reports that the States parties agreed to submit. The Preparatory Committee should consider regular reports to be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision.

    The strengthened review process envisioned in the 2000 NPT Final Document concerning the implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 & 2 as well as the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995 should be fully implemented.

    These reports should be submitted to each session of the Preparatory Committee. The reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the thirteen steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps (inter alia, the number and specifications of warheads and delivery systems in service and number and specifications of reductions, dealerting measures, existing holdings of fissile materials as well as reduction and control of such materials, achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability). These reports should address current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas.

  • Time is running out, and what is at stake is our common future

    Time is running out, and what is at stake is our common future

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty has never been in greater danger, and along with it the people of the world. The cavalier attitudes of the nuclear weapons states toward fulfilling their Article VI promises of nuclear disarmament, have stretched their credibility to the breaking point. A sober evaluation of the progress on the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament, agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, shows virtually no progress and some serious steps backward on the part of the nuclear weapons states, led by the United States.

    In support of the NPT and its Article VI obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament, many leading world figures have joined together in an Appeal to End Nuclear Weapons Threat to Humanity and All Life, a project initiated by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The Appeal has now been signed by many prominent leaders of our time, including Jimmy Carter, Mikhail Gorbachev, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the XIVth Dalai Lama, Queen Noor of Jordan, Coretta Scott King and Muhammad Ali. Among its signers are 38 Nobel Laureates, including 14 Nobel Peace Laureates.

    More than ten years after the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia each continue to deploy some 7,000 strategic nuclear weapons, and together keep some 4,500 of these on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments. The United States is withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to build missile defenses and extend its military domination of the earth through the weaponization of outer space. Thirteen nuclear capable countries, including the United States and China, have yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

    The recent US Nuclear Posture Review reveals that the US is planning to develop nuclear weapons that will be more useable and is developing contingency plans for such use against at least seven countries, including five non-nuclear weapons states. The US has also announced disarmament plans that will place large numbers of deactivated nuclear weapons in storage, thus making the “disarmament” process rapidly reversible.

    In addition to the unprincipled behavior of the nuclear weapons states, making nuclear proliferation as well as accidental and intentional nuclear war more likely, the risks of nuclear terrorism are increasing. These are not issues solely for some countries or regions. They are issues on humanity’s agenda, and that agenda is best taken up within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and by the international community as a whole.

    As the Appeal starkly states, “The only way to assure that nuclear weapons will not be used again is to abolish them.” We urge the delegates to the 2002 NPT PrepCom, and the leaders of the countries they represent, to join together in acting for all life, present and future, in setting forth a practical plan to bring nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control and to begin negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in order to fulfill the Non-Proliferation Treaty promise of eliminating these weapons completely. Grave risks are inherent in failing. We appeal to you, on behalf of humanity and all life, to accept this responsibility and to do the utmost to eliminate these ultimate weapons of annihilation.

    David Krieger, President
    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

  • Taking Stock of the Non-Proliferation Regime

    From 8-19 April 2002, States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) met at the United Nations in New York for the first Preparatory Committee (Prep Com) meeting to the 2005 review conference of the treaty. This was the first meeting of the States parties to the NPT since the 2000 Review Conference at which the Thirteen Practical Steps to Implement Article VI Obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were adopted. While the NPT is the most universal arms control regime, there are serious problems facing its survival as the cornerstone for nuclear disarmament.

    Reporting

    The issue of reporting sparked heated debate during the meeting. In the final consensus document of the 2000 Review Conference, the States parties agreed to “regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.” However, at the Prep Com, the nuclear weapons states, led by the US, resisted the idea of a standardized procedure that was put forward by Canada and advocated by many other countries.

    While reporting would be a means to ensure that States are more transparent and accountable for their actions, the US argued that reporting should be left to the determination of individual States parties. Ambassador Javits of the United States delegation stated, “Engaging in technical or legal interpretation of the [13] steps [agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference in the Final Document] individually or collectively would not, in our judgement, be a useful exercise. The question that should be before us on Article VI is not whether any given measure has or has not been fulfilled, but rather: is a nuclear weapon state moving toward the overall goal? For the United States, the answer is an emphatic yes.”

    While the reduction of large nuclear stockpiles that were built up during the Cold War is certainly welcomed, the nuclear weapons States must not simply limit their reporting to these reductions while ignoring specific commitments they made in the context of the NPT. It is a complete hypocrisy for the nuclear weapons States on the one hand to claim that they are fulfilling their obligations to eliminate nuclear weapons by making large reductions in strategic stockpiles, while on the other hand taking no action to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. In fact, the nuclear weapons States continue to rely on nuclear deterrence, modernize nuclear arsenals and develop new nuclear weapons.

    The US Nuclear Posture Review

    Many statements made by delegations expressed concern, whether explicitly or indirectly, with the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that leaked to the media in March 2002. Fears about US plans and the future of the NPT were heightened when the US said during its opening statement that it only “generally” agrees with the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

    Despite commitments to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, the NPR reaffirms the role of nuclear weapons in US national security policy. In the past, nuclear weapons have been viewed as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons. However, the NPR reveals that the US intends to integrate nuclear weapons into a full spectrum of war-fighting capabilities, including missile defenses. The NPR unveils that nuclear weapons are no longer weapons of last resort, but instruments that could be used in fighting wars. States at the NPT Prep Com also raised concerns about the possible resumption by the US of full-scale nuclear testing and plans to develop and deploy new “earth-penetrating” nuclear weapons.

    The NPR contains contingency plans for using nuclear weapons against seven states — Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Russia and China — constituting a disturbing threat in particular to the named states and in general to international peace and security. Contrary to long-standing US assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, five of the named states for which the US has contingency plans are non-nuclear states. As Reverend Joan Brown Campbell noted in a Middle Powers Initiative presentation, when the US reserves to itself the right of first strike, it gives up the moral high ground and the right to tell other nations to give up their weapons of mass destruction.

    Counter-proliferation or Prevention?

    After 11 September, there has been an effort to divert attention from key issues facing humanity to the war on terrorism. However, in the post-11 September environment there remains an opportunity to address the prospect of terrorism from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in a way that deligitimizes their use. There is a legitimate concern about WMD and missile proliferation. However, the only way to ensure that WMD do not reach terrorists is to abolish them and their means of delivery.

    Serious concerns were raised about US plans to deploy missile defenses. Despite agreeing to preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in the 2000 Thirteen Practical Steps document, the US delivered formal notification to the States of the former Soviet Union on 13 December 2001 that it will withdraw from the treaty in June 2002 in order to proceed with the deployment of missile defenses. While the stated purpose of missile defenses is to defend against missile attacks, it is unlikely that they could do so effectively. The deployment of missile defenses will only produce instability and insecurity in critical regions of the world, including in North East Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. Additionally, the inherent link between the deployment of missile defenses and the weaponization of outer space means that withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will allow the US to research and develop space weapons and space-based weaponry using technological overlaps from missile defenses.

    Regional Issues

    In light of the current conflict in the Middle East, many delegations condemned Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons and failure to join the NPT. There was also concern that no action has been taken by the States parties to promote the achievement of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, nor the realization of the goals of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

    There was little talk about India and Pakistan, despite the escalating conflict between the two nuclear rivals in the last several months. Neither India nor Pakistan has joined the NPT. The US called on all four non-NPT parties — Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan — to show restraint in their nuclear programs and to “protect against the proliferation of technology and materials to others seeking nuclear weapons.”

    NGOs and the NPT

    Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are playing an increasing role in the NPT process that is largely reflective of a more globalized world. During the Cold War, States were the primary actors in the world. However, today, groups and individuals are playing greater roles. The challenge for NGOs is to increase their role in the NPT process and at the same time to reach beyond the governmental process to the people. As UN Undersecretary for Disarmament Affairs Jayantha Dhanapala noted in his address during the Middle Powers Initiative presentation on the first day of the Prep Com, there is a need to reactivate civil society on the nuclear issue because of the complacency and apathy that set in after the Cold War.

    At the Prep Com, NGOs were given one meeting of the session to deliver 14 prepared statements on issues related to the NPT. Following the presentations, there was a roundtable for NGOs and delegates to exchange information. Several delegations complimented the NGOs on the level of expertise and professionalism in both the presentations and in the literature that NGOs brought to the Prep Com. NGOs also held a number of panel presentations outside of the Prep Com.

    Conclusion

    The time leading up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference is critical. NGOs bear great responsibility to raise awareness in civil society about the issues facing the survival of the non-proliferation regime and efforts towards eliminating nuclear weapons. NGOs also must transform the discussion of nuclear abolition into a dynamic of action by urging individuals everywhere and non-nuclear weapons States to put pressure on the nuclear weapons States to fulfill their obligations of verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

    Resources

    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Briefing Book on the Status of Nuclear Disarmament
    https://wagingpeace.davidmolinaojeda.com/new/programs/index.htm

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Importance to Disarmament Efforts
    http://www.nuclearfiles.org/prolif/index.html

    Chairman’s Factual Summary of the NPT 2002 Prep Com
    http://www.nuclearfiles.org/articles/2002/020424ongchairman.htm

    NGO Presentations at the NPT Prep Com
    http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/npt/ngostate2002.html

    Reaching Critical Will NGO Shadow Report to the Prep Com http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/npt/shadowreport/ngoshadrepindex.html

    Thirteen Practical Steps to Implement Article VI Obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
    http://www.nuclearfiles.org/docs/2000/0713nptsteps.html

  • End the Nuclear Terror: A Call to Action from the Abolition 2000 Global Council

    The Global Council of the Abolition 2000 Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons condemns the United States Nuclear Posture Review and US plans to develop new nuclear weapons that are more useable, and thus more likely to be used. The Bush Administration has directed the US military to prepare contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, and to build smaller nuclear weapons for use in warfare. We condemn this policy as insane, immoral and illegal.

    These plans break promises that the US made thirty-two years ago in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) when it agreed to negotiate in good faith to eliminate its nuclear weapons. Along with other nuclear-armed countries, the US renewed that promise in 2000, when it agreed to an “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the “total elimination” of its nuclear arsenal, plus twelve other practical steps leading to nuclear disarmament.

    Instead of implementing these 13 practical steps, the US has reawakened the specter of nuclear horror with its plans for developing new nuclear weapons, and giving three unthinkable scenarios for using them: “against targets able to withstand nonnuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; or in the event of surprising military developments.” With these steps, the US shows it will use nuclear weapons against countries that do not have them, a complete reversal of previous agreements. This policy increases nuclear danger in a world already rife with conflicts involving nuclear-armed countries (India and Pakistan in South Asia, and Israel in the Middle East), and fearful of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials.

    We, the members of the Abolition 2000 Global Council, call on all citizens of the Earth to wake up and act! At a time when the people of our planet desperately seek ways to create a safer, more secure world, the US strikes nuclear terror into all of our hearts. Stark gaps between the world’s “haves and the have-nots,” and glaring social injustice, contribute to a rising tide of violence everywhere. Yet the world’s richest and most powerful nation can only offer the threat of the ultimate violence: the use of nuclear weapons.

    The world is in grave danger. Everything and everyone we love is at risk. Now is the moment to get deadly serious about nuclear abolition, while we still have time. We urge all citizens: Make your voices heard – in the halls of government, in the media, to your friends, family and neighbors. We must act now!

    Our strength as a Global Council comes from the over 2000 citizen groups in 90+ countries who form the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons <www.abolition2000.org/>. Since our founding in 1995 at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, our network’s many groups have demonstrated their commitment to a more sustainable world by creating ways to bring about nuclear abolition. One of our most valuable tools has been the law: the treaties our nations have signed and ratified, the International Court of Justice 1996 Advisory Opinion on the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the model Nuclear Weapons Convention.

    Now is the time to speak together in one voice! Join us in our call for a legal end to the nuclear madness that never went away. Let us focus our efforts, exercise our citizenship muscles, and use every nonviolent means to get rid of the nuclear threat once and for all. Hiroshima and Nagasaki must never happen again! Speak Out! Take action! We cannot do it alone, but together we will succeed!!

    Yours for a sustainable and nuclear-free world,
    The Abolition 2000 Global Council