Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Tag: NPT

  • Meeting the Russell-Einstein Challenge to Humanity

    Meeting the Russell-Einstein Challenge to Humanity

    “Hope is not prognostication. It is an orientation of the spirit, an orientation of the heart.”

    Vaclav Havel

    On July 9, 1955, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto was issued in London. Its concern was with the new, powerful H-bombs, which the signers of the Manifesto believed placed the human race in jeopardy of annihilation. “Here, then, is the problem,” the Manifesto stated, “which we present to you, stark and dreadful and inescapable: Shall we put an end to the human race; or shall mankind renounce war? People will not face this alternative because it is so difficult to abolish war.”

    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation President David Krieger speaking to Soka Gakai in Hiroshima, Japan.

    Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein were two of the leading intellectual figures of the 20th century. Russell was a philosopher, mathematician and Nobel Laureate in Literature. Einstein was a theoretical physicist, considered the greatest scientist of his time, and a Nobel Laureate in Physics. Both men were tireless advocates for peace throughout their lives.

    Russell was primarily responsible for drafting the Manifesto, but it contained ideas that Einstein often discussed. Einstein signed the document just days before his death. It was his last major act for peace.

    In addition to Russell and Einstein, the Manifesto was signed by nine other scientists: Max Born, Perry W. Bridgman, Leopold Infeld, Frederic Joliot-Curie, Herman J. Muller, Linus Pauling, Cecil F. Powell, Joseph Rotblat and Hideki Yukawa. All of these men either already had received or would receive the Nobel Prize. Linus Pauling, the great American chemist, would receive two Nobel Prizes, one for Chemistry and one for Peace.

    Sir Joseph Rotblat is the only signer of the Manifesto still living, and he is now 96 years old. He is an extraordinary man, who has been a tireless advocate of the Manifesto throughout his long life. He was the only scientist in the Manhattan Project to leave his position when he realized that the Germans would not succeed in developing an atomic weapon. He was the founder of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and served as president of that organization until in recent years his advanced age caused him to step back. In 1995, Professor Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize. When Professor Rotblat turned 90, he announced that he had two remaining goals in life: first, the short-term goal of abolishing nuclear weapons; and, second, the long-term goal of abolishing war.

    The Russell-Einstein Manifesto makes the following points:

    1. Scientists have special responsibilities to awaken the public to the technological threats, particularly nuclear threats, confronting humanity.
    2. Those scientists with the greatest knowledge of the situation appear to be the most concerned.
    3. Nuclear weapons endanger our largest cities and threaten the future of humanity.
    4. In the circumstance of prevailing nuclear threat, humankind must put aside its differences and confront this overriding problem.
    5. The prohibition of modern weapons is not a sufficient solution to the threat; war as an institution must be abolished.
    6. Nonetheless, as a first step the nuclear weapons states should renounce these weapons.
    7. The choice before humanity is to find peaceful means of settling conflicts or to face “universal death.”

    In the end, the signers of the Manifesto believed, that humanity had a choice: “There lies before us, if we choose, continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wisdom. Shall we, instead, choose death, because we cannot forget our quarrels? We appeal as human beings to human beings: Remember your humanity, and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.”

    Nuclear Age Peace Foundation President David Krieger speaking to Soka Gakai in Hiroshima, Japan.

    It has now been nearly 50 years since this Manifesto was made public. On the 40th anniversary of issuing the Manifesto in 1995, Joseph Rotblat concluded his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech by echoing the call: “Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.”

    In 2005, when the Russell-Einstein Manifesto has its 50th anniversary, we will be 60 years into the Nuclear Age and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will commemorate the 35th anniversary of its entry into force. In April 2005, the 189 parties to the NPT will meet at the United Nations in New York for their 7th Review Conference. The meeting promises to be contentious and disappointing.

    In 1995, the parties to the NPT agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely. At the time, the nuclear weapons states had reaffirmed their obligation in Article VI of the Treaty to pursue good faith efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. Five years later, at the year 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties to the Treaty agreed to 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These included early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials, application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament, and an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals..”

    The nuclear weapons states have made virtually no progress on the 13 Practical Steps and little seems likely. The United States has been the worst offender. It has failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opposed creating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that is verifiable, treated nuclear disarmament as completely reversible and, in general, shown no good faith toward its obligations under the Treaty.

    Rather than fulfilling its own obligations, the US has pointed the finger at some potential nuclear proliferators. It initiated an illegal war against Iraq, alleging it possessed or was developing weapons of mass destruction programs, including nuclear programs, which turned out not to exist. It has stated that Iran will not be allowed to obtain nuclear weapons, implicitly threatening to attack Iran as well. After North Korea withdrew from the NPT, the US entered into six party talks with North Korea , but has been only half-hearted in its attempts to meet their concerns by offering security guarantees and development assistance.

    At the same time, the US has never expressed concern that Israel ‘s nuclear weapons pose a threat to Middle Eastern or global stability. When India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998 the US initially expressed concern. But after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US tightened its relations with both of these countries and lifted its sanctions on military materials. Even after the discovery that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan was conducting a global nuclear arms bazaar, the US has maintained its close ties to Pakistan , despite the fact that Pakistani President Musharaf moved quickly to grant Khan a pardon. The US has yet to question Khan with regard to the extent of his nuclear proliferation.

    Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, recently reiterated that forty countries have the potential to become nuclear weapons states. Increased nuclear proliferation could be the ultimate result of the failure of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations for nuclear disarmament. One of these proliferating countries could be Japan , which remains a virtual nuclear weapons power with the technology and nuclear materials to become a nuclear weapons state in a matter of days.

    As we approach this important anniversary year of 2005, there is a failure of governmental leadership toward nuclear disarmament and little cause for hope. The United States , under the Bush administration, has turned the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 into an ongoing war, first in Afghanistan and then Iraq . Neither of these wars is going well. The Bush administration speaks of creating democracy in these two countries, but in fact both countries are now presided over by US-selected former CIA assets.

    If Mr. Bush should be elected to a second term, the American people will have ratified his policies of preventive war, deployment of missile defenses, creation of new nuclear weapons, the undermining of international law and the ravaging of the global environment for the benefit of US global hegemony and corporate profit. This would be a tragedy for the United States and for the rest of the world. This decision will be made on November 2, 2004 in the most important election in our lifetimes. Until this decision is made, we cannot predict the prospects for success at the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. We can project, though, that if Bush is elected, the prospects for the success of the Treaty conference and the future of the NPT will be exceedingly dim.

    The vision of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, and of the two great men who put their names on it, stands in stark contrast to the vision of the leaders of today’s nuclear weapons states and, particularly, the present leadership in the United States . The Russell-Einstein Manifesto calls upon us to remember our humanity, ban nuclear weapons and cease war. Mr. Bush, in contrast, seems incapable of embracing a broader humanity, has shown no leadership toward banning nuclear weapons and has demonstrated his willingness to engage in preventive war on false pretenses.

    The Russell-Einstein Manifesto calls upon humanity to choose dramatically different futures. Since humanity is made up of all of us, we all must choose. And the choice of each of us matters. This great city of Hiroshima , a city that has experienced so much devastation and rebirth, led by its hibakusha , has chosen the path of a nuclear weapons-free future. I am always inspired by the spirit of Hiroshima and its courageous hibakusha , and I stand in solidarity with you on this path.

    One truly hopeful action at this time is the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons. This campaign, led by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, calls for the initiation of negotiations in 2005 and the completion of negotiations in 2010 for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world by the year 2020. This is a great and necessary challenge, one which deserves our collective support. Just a few days ago, on behalf of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, I presented our 2004 World Citizenship Award to the Mayors for Peace for their critical effort on behalf of humanity.

    Our cause is right and it is noble. It seeks, in the spirit of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, to preserve humanity’s future. It calls upon us to raise our voices, to stand our ground, and to never give up. The year 2005 is a critical year, but it is not the only year. Our efforts must be sustained over a long period of time, perhaps longer than our lifetimes. This means we must inspire new generations to act for humanity.

    There will be times when we may be tired and discouraged, but we are not allowed to cease our efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. No matter what obstacles we face in the form of political intransigence or public apathy, we are not allowed to give up hope. This is the price of being fully human in the Nuclear Age. The future demands of us that we keep our hearts strong, our voices firm, and our hope alive.

    David Krieger is a founder and the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org). He is a leader in the global movement to abolish nuclear weapons.

  • The Challenge of Hiroshima: Alternatives to Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defenses, and Space Weaponization in a North East Asian Context

    Conference Statement

    Six non-governmental organizations* brought together experts and activists from nine countries** in Hiroshima, Japan to discuss issues of global and regional peace and security. Almost 60 years after this city suffered the first atomic bombing, we confront new and continuing nuclear dangers in North East Asia and around the world.

    An inspiring opening to the conference was provided by Hiroshima Mayor Tadatoshi Akiba, who discussed the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons by 2020. A prominent sentiment that underlay the discussions during the meeting was the suffering experienced by the survivors of the atomic bombing, the hibakusha , and their courage and determination in their efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

    Despite the efforts of the hibakusha and the efforts of millions of other people for more than half a century to eliminate nuclear weapons, over twenty thousand remain deployed worldwide. Under the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to negotiate for the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Unfortunately, there are no such negotiations in progress or even on the horizon for further nuclear reductions. Entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty also remains an unrealized goal, in no small part due to the refusal of the United States to ratify the Treaty.

    North Korea has announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and that it has the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. It justifies this decision in part because the United States government has listed North Korea as a potential nuclear target. North Korea also cites other implied United States threats to use force against it, manifested by the continued deployment of powerful United States military forces in the region.

    The United States and Japan are also proceeding with joint ballistic missile defense research, claiming a need to counter a North Korean missile threat. Missile defense deployment, and the possibility that it could be extended further to Taiwan , is viewed with great concern by China , and by other governments and peace movements throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

    The United States is pursuing ambitious programs for the modernization of its nuclear forces, from its missiles and the warheads they deliver to the systems used to plan and execute nuclear strikes. China and Russia , the major nuclear powers in the region, also continue to modernize some elements of their nuclear arsenals, although at a far slower pace than the United States . In addition, the United States continues to develop new kinds of high technology conventional weapons, including increasingly accurate and long-range conventionally armed missiles. A growing proportion of United States military forces are being deployed in the Pacific region.

    All countries in North East Asia and the surrounding region have a strong interest in a stable and peaceful environment. The development and deployment of dangerous weapons systems in the region undermines this goal.

    After extensive discussions, the conference participants concluded:

    • Every available diplomatic means should be employed to resolve the current standoff between the United States and North Korea , ranging from the existing six-party talks between North Korea , South Korea , Japan , China , Russia and the United States , to bilateral negotiations between North Korea and the United States.
    • Joint ballistic missile defense research by Japan and the United States complicates the relationship between the three major nuclear powers, and furthers proliferation of sophisticated military technologies. Missile defense development will make a regional arms race more likely. Therefore, joint ballistic missile defense development should not proceed, and the United States should not deploy anti-ballistic missile systems in the region.
    • Normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan and between North Korea and the United States should be encouraged.
    • China , Russia , and the United States , the three nuclear weapons states with forces in the region, should actively pursue global negotiations for the elimination of all nuclear arsenals, consistent with their disarmament obligations under the NPT. These negotiations should involve all nuclear weapons states, including those not party to the NPT.

    As a way forward, the conference participants agreed that the six-party talks should be considered a starting point for long-term discussions to address further regional security-enhancing measures, including:

    • the withdrawal of missiles to such locations as would reduce perceived threats to countries in the region;
    • limitations and reductions of missiles in the region;
    • the creation of a North East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone; and
    • the withdrawal of foreign military forces based in the region.

    The conference participants recognized that regional security also depends on the global security environment. They were particularly concerned about the weaponization of space, and wide-ranging United States plans for space dominance and the use of space for war fighting. The conference participants recommended the beginning and early conclusion of negotiations for a treaty banning these developments.

    The participants agreed that the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference will be critical for the future of non-proliferation and disarmament. The cry of the hibakusha – no more Hiroshimas, no more Nagasakis – must be taken up by the people of the world, strongly enough this time that the governments finally must listen and act to fulfill their legal obligations for the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

    *Convened by the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, the Hiroshima Peace Institute, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), Mayors for Peace, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF), and the Peace Depot. This was the fourth in a series of conferences in the project Moving Beyond Missile Defense, sponsored by INESAP and NAPF.

    ** Canada, China, Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.

  • The Nuclear Policy of the Bush Administration

    The euphoria in the West that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union had an amazing effect. The general public came to believe that the end of the Cold War also meant the end of the nuclear peril, and that the nuclear issue can be taken off the agenda of important problems.

    This is seen in a public opinion poll in the UK, in which the question was: what is the most important issue facing Britain. During the Cold War, more than 40 per cent put nuclear weapons as such an issue. Since the end of it, the percentage dropped rapidly, and nowadays it is practically zero. The situation is probably the same in the United States, and it is my opinion that this enabled the hawks to become bolder in their plans, not only to ensure, but to demonstrate to the rest of the world, the overwhelming superiority of the United States. The events of September 11th came as a convenient excuse to put these plans into action.

    The year 2002 was remarkable for the formulation of new policies, starting with the Nuclear Posture Review in January, and ending with the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, released in December.

    This last document starts with: ‘Weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States.’

    And this is the crux of the matter. According to the current counter-proliferation policy, nuclear weapons are bad, but only if in possession of some states or groups. In the possession of the United States they are good, and must be kept for the sake of world security.

    The fact that as a signatory of the NPT, the USA is legally bound to their elimination, is completely ignored. Indeed, nuclear arsenals will have to be retained indefinitely, not just as a weapon of last resort, or as a deterrent against a nuclear attack, but as an ordinary tool in the military armoury, to be used in the resolution of conflicts, as has been practiced in the past, and even in pre-emptive strikes, should political contingencies demand it.

    This is in essence the current US nuclear policy, and I see it as a very dangerous policy.

    Towards its implementation, President Bush has already authorized the development of a new nuclear warhead of low yield, but with a shape that would give it a very high penetrating power into concrete, a ‘bunker-busting mini-nuke’, as it has been named. It is intended to destroy bunkers with thick concrete walls in which public enemies, like Saddam Hussein, may seek shelter.

    To give the military authorities confidence in the performance of the new weapon it will have to be tested.

    If the USA resumed testing, this would be a signal to other nuclear weapon states to do the same. China is almost certain to resume testing. After the US decision to develop ballistic missile defences, China feels vulnerable, and is likely to attempt to reduce its vulnerability by a modernization and build-up of its nuclear arsenal. Other states with nuclear weapons, such as India or Pakistan, may use the window of opportunity opened by the USA to update their arsenals. The danger of a new nuclear arms race is real.

    As mentioned before, the new policy includes pre-emptive acts, and this greatly increases the danger. If the militarily mightiest country declares its readiness to carry out a pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons, others may soon follow. The Kashmir crisis, of May last year, is a stark warning of the reality of the nuclear peril.

    India’s declared policy is not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But if the United States – whose nuclear policies are largely followed by India – makes pre-emptive nuclear attacks part of its doctrine, this would give India the legitimacy to carry out a pre- emptive strike against Pakistan. Even more likely is that Pakistan would carry this out first.

    Taiwan presents another potential cause for a pre- emptive nuclear strike by the United States. Should the Taiwan authorities decide to declare independence, this would inevitably result in an attempted military invasion by mainland China. The USA, which is committed to the defence of the integrity of Taiwan, may then opt for a pre-emptive strike.

    Finally, we have the problem of North Korea, listed by Bush as one of the ‘axis of evil.’ The disclosure that North Korea is already in possession of two nuclear warheads, and the likelihood of its acquiring more of them if the Yongbyon facility is reactivated, are a direct challenge to current US policy. I fear that a campaign to use military force against the regime of Kim Jong Il, similar to that against Saddam Hussein, will ensue.

    How can we prevent such catastrophes? The traditional method of dealing with such situations – by partial agreements, damage-limitation treaties, confidence- building measures – does not seem to work any more. In its determination to maintain world dominance, particularly on the nuclear issue, the present administration will pay no attention to reasoned and sophisticated arguments. Arms control is as good as dead.

    As I see it, the only way is to go back to basics, to put the goal of total nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. The only way to compel the current decision- makers to change their minds is by pressure of public opinion. For this purpose, the public must be awakened to the danger. The general public is not sufficiently informed about the recent changes in military doctrine, and the perils arising from them. We have to convince the public that the continuation of current policies, in which security of the world is maintained by the indefinite retention of nuclear weapons, is not realistic in the long run because it is bound eventually to result in a nuclear holocaust in which the future of the human race would be at stake. We must convince public opinion that the only alternative is the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

    Sir Joseph Rotblat, the 1995 Nobel Peace Laureate, is an member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation’s Advisory Council.

  • Nuclear Disarmament in a Time of Globalization

    Nuclear Disarmament in a Time of Globalization

    Keynote Address to the International Peace Research Association
    Sopron, Hungary

    Nuclear weapons occupy the highest rung on the ladder of military cowardice. They are long-distance devices of mass annihilation. They destroy indiscriminately – men, women and children. They draw no lines between soldiers and civilians. Those who make the weapons, who deploy them, who order their use and who press the buttons to send the missiles on their way have virtually no connection with the victims. They are simply human instruments in a chain of activities leading to massive devastation.

    The only arguably sane use of nuclear weapons is deterrence, and deterrence is largely an unproven theory. General George Lee Butler, a former commander-in-chief of the United States Strategic Command, who was in charge of all US nuclear weapons, has expressed his deep concerns about deterrence. “Nuclear deterrence,” he wrote, “was and remains a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence and fragile human relationships.” When one examines carefully the shortcomings of nuclear deterrence – its requirements of near-perfect communications, rational behavior in a time of crisis and willingness to commit mass murder – it is reasonable to conclude that reliance on nuclear deterrence for security is as insane as the threat to destroy civilization with nuclear weapons.

    In recent times, there has been a high degree of concern for nuclear terrorism, but nuclear terrorism has been practiced by the nuclear weapons states for decades. If terrorism is the threat or use of violence to achieve political goals – especially if it results in injuring or killing innocent people – then the nuclear weapons states are by definition terrorists. It is ironic that nuclear weapons are more potent tools in the hands of non-state actors than in the hands of powerful countries. Non-state actors in possession of a nuclear weapon would not be constrained by threats of retaliation. If terrorists are suicidal and cannot be located anyway, they certainly cannot be deterred from initiating a nuclear attack. In this sense, nuclear weapons are a great equalizer in the hands of extremists, and for this reason it is clear that the nuclear weapons states must do everything in their power to prevent these weapons, or the materials to make them, from falling into the hands of such extremists. The nuclear weapons states, however, appear more committed to maintaining their own nuclear arsenals than to assuring that nuclear weapons do not proliferate to non-state terrorist groups that could cause them irreparable harm.

    The only way to assure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda is to take dramatic steps to reduce nuclear arsenals, dismantle the nuclear weapons, and place the remaining weapons and weapons-grade fissile materials under strict and effective international controls. The nuclear weapons states have not been bold in attempting to control the spread of nuclear weapons; they have acted as though time is on their side rather than on the side of those committed to waging war against them. The irony of this is that the nuclear weapons states, even with arsenals of nuclear weapons that number in the thousands, cannot deter a group such as Al Qaeda from using nuclear weapons against them. Their only hope is to prevent such groups from obtaining these most destructive of all weapons.

    Nuclearism and Globalization

    Nuclearism is one of the early manifestations of globalization. The United States went global with its nuclear threat almost from the day it first created nuclear weapons. Within three weeks of testing the first nuclear weapon on July 16, 1945 , the US used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki . It did so not only to destroy those cities and punish Japan , but also to send a message to the world and particularly to the Soviet Union . The message was, “This is what we are capable of doing and willing to do with our devastating new weapons; don’t cross us or we could use them on you.” It was a powerful message, and also an incentive to nuclear proliferation. It would take the Soviet Union just four years to test its first nuclear device.

    Very early in the Nuclear Age, the US began testing nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, including in the Trust Territories that had been assigned to it by the United Nations. In doing so, it continued the pre-war pattern of colonial dominance. Over the decades of the Nuclear Age, all of the nuclear weapons states have performed their nuclear testing on the lands of indigenous peoples, leaving the hazardous radioactive residue of testing in their backyards.

    Another dimension to the globalization of the nuclear threat was the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), allowing for the destruction of nearly any place on the globe in 30 minutes or many places simultaneously. Even today, the US and Russia each still have some 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Of these, some 2,250 each are on hair-trigger alert, ready to be fired in moments.

    The US and USSR , now Russia , as well as other nuclear weapons states, also appropriated the global commons for their nuclear forces. The nuclear weapons states continue to use the oceans, humankind’s great common heritage, for their submarine-launched nuclear forces. They agreed not to place nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, but with the availability of submarines, the ocean floor is clearly not a necessary or even useful option for them.

    Another aspect of the globalization of nuclearism is the spread of the US nuclear umbrella to its allies throughout the world, particularly in Europe , Asia and the Pacific. By extending its nuclear umbrella, the US has made many more countries complicit in relying upon nuclear weapons for their security, albeit reliant upon US nuclear weapons rather than developing their own.

    Nuclear Proliferation

    Nuclear proliferation is the flip-side of nuclear disarmament. It is also the globalization of nuclear arsenals. The existing nuclear weapons states have nearly all justified their development of nuclear weapons on the basis of nuclear deterrence. The US created nuclear weapons because it was concerned about deterring a possible Nazi nuclear bomb. The Soviet Union developed its nuclear arsenal to deter the US . The UK and France developed their nuclear arsenals to have independent deterrent forces against the Soviet Union . China sought to deter both the Soviet Union and the US . India sought to deter China , and Pakistan sought to deter India . North Korea would undoubtedly justify its nuclear weapons, if indeed it has them, as being necessary to deter the US . South Africa , which faced global hostility due to its policies of Apartheid, developed a nuclear arsenal to deter the US and Russia . It subsequently gave up its nuclear weapons. Israel , which continues to face both regional and global hostility, developed a nuclear arsenal to give it greater degrees of freedom in relation to the US and Russia and well as to deter hostilities by non-nuclear weapons states in its region.

    The US-led war against Iraq was justified initially on the basis that Iraq might be developing a nuclear arsenal and could potentially transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Although it turned out not to be true that Iraq was developing a nuclear arsenal or even that it had links to Al Qaeda, this fear provided the justification for the first counter-proliferation war in history.

    US Double Standards Have Stimulated Proliferation

    From the outset of the Nuclear Age, the US has had a double standard when it comes to nuclear weapons. It has always relied on these weapons for its own security, yet sought to deny these weapons to other states except when it suited its purposes. In the

    late 1960s and early 1970s, Israel developed a nuclear arsenal. At best it can be said that the US turned a blind eye to this development. In sharp contrast to the US attacking and invading Iraq because it might have nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, the US , in line with its geopolitical strategies, has never even criticized Israel for its nuclear proliferation. This double standard has created an impetus to the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the volatile Middle East .

    India ‘s position, for decades, was that it would not develop nuclear weapons if the nuclear weapons states fulfilled their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to achieve nuclear disarmament. India made clear pronouncements that it was not willing to live without nuclear weapons in a world of nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”. Three years after the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 and there was still no significant breakthrough by the nuclear weapons states toward achieving nuclear disarmament, India conducted a series of nuclear weapons tests and announced that it was developing a nuclear arsenal. Pakistan followed immediately in doing the same.

    When Mr. Bush named Iraq , Iran and North Korea as part of an Axis of Evil, he put these states on notice that they were in the sights of the US . When he then went on to attack and invade Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, Bush’s actions sent a message to Iran and North Korea, among others, that they had better consider developing a nuclear deterrent force against the US. They may have already had such thoughts before the Axis of Evil speech, but there can be no doubt that such provocative language, coupled with military action, can only act as a stimulant to develop a strong deterrent force. The Bush posture toward the states designated as an Axis of Evil stands in strong contrast to the manner in which his administration virtually ignored the nuclear proliferation activities of Pakistani nuclear physicist A.Q. Khan. Khan, whose activities have been described as a nuclear Walmart, received only a slap on the wrist from the Pakistani government, allied with the US in the so-called war against terrorism.

    Nuclear Disarmament

    In the post-Cold War period, there has been some progress toward nuclear disarmament, but it has been excruciatingly slow as measured by the need, obligation and opportunity. Current global nuclear stocks are down from a Cold War high of some 70,000 nuclear weapons to approximately 30,000. The vast majority of these, some 97 percent, are in the arsenals of the US and Russia .

    The need to dramatically reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons lies in the danger of these weapons proliferating to other states or falling into the hands of non-state extremist actors. The enormous danger of these weapons in the hands of groups like Al Qaeda should be sufficient to motivate serious efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. So far it has not done so. The need does not exist to maintain large nuclear arsenals or, for that matter, any nuclear weapons in a world where nuclear weapons states are trading with each other rather than threatening war.

    The obligation of the nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament is set forth in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, when the treaty was extended indefinitely, the parties agreed to “systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.” Five years later, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the parties agreed on 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament. These steps included ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, making disarmament measures irreversible, and an “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

    The opportunity to achieve nuclear disarmament in the post-Cold War world has been largely squandered. Bill Clinton was presented with the greatest opportunity of any leader in the post-World War II period to put an end to the dangers of the Nuclear Age. Clinton didn’t seem to grasp the opportunity that had been laid at his feet. He was largely indifferent to the issue, and this resulted in only minimal progress during his eight years in office. He did, however, support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and did hold negotiations with Russia on ST AR T III, but these negotiations did not result in a new treaty.

    If the Clinton approach to nuclear disarmament can be described as benign indifference, the US under the Bush administration can be thought of obstructionist in its approach to nuclear disarmament. It has been an obstacle to virtually all of the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The Bush administration has opposed ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, put up barriers to negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (in order to pursue missile defenses and space weaponization), and entered into an agreement with the Russians that makes nuclear reductions completely reversible. This agreement, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Agreement (SORT), specifies reductions of the US and Russian deployed strategic arsenals from levels of about 6,000 each to between 1,700 and 2,200 each by the year 2012. However, the treaty doesn’t require that the weapons taken off deployed status be irreversibly dismantled. As a result, many US weapons will go into storage and be available for redeployment in the future. It is likely that the Russians will do the same, and these weapons will also be available for possible theft by terrorist groups. The reductions do not have a timeline and only need to be completed by 2012. After that year, the treaty will no longer be in effect. So far as it impacts nuclear disarmament, the treaty is largely fraudulent. It gives the appearance of disarmament, but the substance isn’t there.

    In addition, the Bush administration has been pressing for research on new nuclear weapons that will be more usable, a new bunker busting nuclear weapon (the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator) and mini-nukes (low-yield nuclear weapons) that are about one-third the yield of the Hiroshima bomb. They have also begun deployment of missile defenses that have led Russia to pull out of the ST AR T II agreement. Despite their funding of research on new nuclear weapons and their opposition to the 13 Practical Steps, a US delegate to the 2004 Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, John Bolton, told the assembled parties to the treaty that they shouldn’t focus their attention on Article VI of the treaty with its nuclear disarmament provisions. “We cannot divert attention from the violations we face,” he said, “by focusing on Article VI violations that do not exist.”

    Need for US Leadership

    The world currently faces a tragic dilemma: preventing nuclear terrorism requires significant nuclear disarmament and international control of nuclear weapons and materials, but to achieve this will require US leadership, which is currently non-existent. Since the US continues to rely upon its own arsenal of nuclear weapons for security, it cannot effectively provide leadership toward nuclear disarmament. In the Bush administration’s secret, but leaked, 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, they stated: “Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States , its allies and friends. They provide credible options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and large-scale conventional force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.”

    Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament

    At the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation , we are initiating a campaign to chart a new course in US nuclear policy that we call Turn the Tide. It is an Internet-based campaign that seeks to awaken US citizens to the need to change US nuclear policy and spur them to communicate with their Congressional representatives and candidates as well as the president and presidential candidates and to cast their ballots based on positions on nuclear disarmament issues. The campaign is based on the following call to action:

    1. Stop all efforts to create dangerous new nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
    2. Maintain the current moratorium on nuclear testing and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
    3. Cancel plans to build new nuclear weapons production plants, and close and clean up the toxic contamination at existing plants.
    4. Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No Use of nuclear weapons against any nation or group that does not have nuclear weapons.
    5. Establish and enforce a legally binding US commitment to No First Use of nuclear weapons against other nations possessing nuclear weapons.
    6. Cancel funding for and plans to deploy offensive missile “defense” systems which would ignite a dangerous arms race and offer no security against terrorist weapons of mass destruction.
    7. In order to significantly decrease the threat of accidental launch, together with Russia , take nuclear weapons off high-alert status and do away with the strategy of launch-on-warning.
    8. Together with Russia , implement permanent and verifiable dismantlement of nuclear weapons taken off deployed status through the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).
    9. Demonstrate to other countries US commitment to reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons by removing all US nuclear weapons from foreign soil.
    10. To prevent future proliferation or theft, create and maintain a global inventory of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons materials and place these weapons and materials under strict international safeguards.
    11. Initiate international negotiations to fulfill existing treaty obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the phased and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.
    12. Redirect funding from nuclear weapons programs to dismantling nuclear weapons, safeguarding nuclear materials, cleaning up the toxic legacy of the Nuclear Age and meeting more pressing social needs such as education, health care and social services.

    While this campaign is essential, it is a strategy from within the country. It is also necessary to bring pressure to bear on the US and other nuclear weapons states from the international community. The countries of the New Agenda Coalition ( Brazil , Egypt , Ireland, Mexico , New Zealand , South Africa and Sweden ) have been doing admirable work on this at the United Nations and at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee meetings. These countries were largely responsible for putting forward the 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. I should also mention the Middle Powers Initiative, a coalition of eight international non-governmental organizations, which has provided strong support and encouragement to the New Agenda countries.

    Another important new initiative to move forward the nuclear disarmament agenda is the Emergency Campaign of the Mayors for Peace. Under the leadership of the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki , this campaign has set forth a Vision 2020, calling for the initiation of negotiations for complete nuclear disarmament in 2005, the completion of these negotiations in 2010 and the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2020.

    Breaking the Silence

    Nuclear weapons pose a threat to humanity’s future, and yet most of us are silent in the face of this danger. It would not be possible to research, develop, deploy, threaten and use nuclear weapons if so many were not silent. The threat of nuclear genocide, even omnicide, has become global. Before the spread of the weapons themselves becomes global, we must break the culture of silence and conformity that allows the continuation of the nuclear threat to all humanity.

    In some ways, we have attributed god-like characteristics to nuclear weapons. Their power far exceeds that of ordinary weapons. They are credited in the US with bringing World War II to an end. It is hard to forget the emotional celebrations that took place in the streets in India and Pakistan when they tested nuclear weapons in 1998. Here is a poem in which I have tried to capture the sense of the godliness that has been ascribed to nuclear weapons by many people in the nuclear weapons states.

    WHEN THE BOMB BECAME OUR GOD

    When the bomb became our god
    We loved it far too much,
    Worshipping no other gods before it.

    We thought ourselves great
    And powerful, creators of worlds.

    We turned toward infinity,
    Giving the bomb our very souls.

    We looked to it for comfort,
    To its smooth metallic grace.

    When the bomb became our god
    We lived in a constant state of war
    That we called peace .

    But nuclear weapons certainly are not gods, nor are their possessors. These weapons are false idols, and they threaten their possessors as well as their targets. They may be powerful, but their power is only that of destruction. They have neither the power of creativity nor of construction. They threaten the future of humanity, and they corrode the souls of their possessors.

    We are approaching the 60th anniversary of the creation and first use of nuclear weapons. Time is not on our side, and we can take little comfort in the fact that nuclear weapons have not been dropped on other cities since they were used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki . In this era of globalization, the threat of nuclear annihilation is itself global. To counter this threat, we must globalize prohibitions in law and morality to the possession, threat and use of the nuclear weapons. We must end the double standards that suggest that some may have nuclear weapons while others may not. There are no safe hands in which nuclear weapons may be placed.

    The singular threat that nuclear weapons pose can only be ended by people everywhere breaking the silence and demanding that the nuclear weapons states fulfill their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for the total elimination of these weapons, and persisting in their demands until the goal is achieved.

    David Krieger is the president of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org ). He is the author of many books and articles on peace in the Nuclear Age

  • Kerry Pledges To Give Nuclear Terrorism His Top Priority

    Kerry Pledges To Give Nuclear Terrorism His Top Priority

    In his speech, “New Strategies to Meet New Threats,” delivered in West Palm Beach, Florida on June 1, 2004, John Kerry, the presumptive Democratic Party nominee for President, referred to the possibility of nuclear terrorism as “the greatest threat we face today,” and offered a program to eliminate this threat based on US leadership. Kerry promised to prevent nuclear weapons or materials to create them from falling into the hands of al Qaeda or other extremist organizations. “As President,” he pledged, “my number one security goal will be to prevent the terrorists from gaining weapons of mass murder, and ensure that hostile states disarm.”

    Kerry recognizes that the US cannot accomplish this task by itself and pledged to build and repair coalitions. “We can’t eliminate this threat on our own,” he stated. “We must fight this enemy in the same way we fought in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War, by building and leading strong alliances.”

    In order to confront nuclear terrorism, Kerry offered a four-step plan. His first step called for safeguarding all bomb-making materials worldwide. He called for an approach that would “treat all nuclear materials needed for bombs as if they were bombs,” and pledged to secure all potential bomb material in the former Soviet Union within his first term as president. “For a fraction of what we have already spent in Iraq ,” he pointed out, “we can ensure that every nuclear weapon, and every pound of potential bomb material will be secured and accounted for.”

    Kerry’s second step called for US leadership to verifiably ban the creation of new materials for creating nuclear weapons, including production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. He pointed out that there is strong international support for such a ban, but that the Bush Administration has been “endlessly reviewing the need for such a policy.”

    Kerry’s third step called for reducing excess stocks of nuclear materials and weapons. He recognized the importance of the US adopting policies consistent with what we are asking other countries to do. He asked rhetorically, “If America is asking the world to join our country in a shared mission to reduce this nuclear threat, then why would the world listen to us if our own words do not match our deeds?” In line with this commitment, Kerry promised that as president, he would “stop this administration’s program to develop a whole new generation of bunker-busting nuclear bombs.” He called the bunker-buster “a weapon we don’t need,” one that “undermines our credibility in persuading other nations.”

    The fourth step in Kerry’s plan called for ending the nuclear weapons programs in other countries, such as North Korea and Iran . He called for strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthening enforcement and verification through the International Atomic Energy Agency, and tightening export controls to assure no future black market activities in nuclear materials.

    In order to accomplish these goals, Kerry pledged to appoint a National Coordinator for Nuclear Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation to work with him “to marshal every effort and every ally, to combat an incalculable danger.” Kerry made clear that “preventing nuclear terrorism is our most urgent priority to provide for America ‘s long term security.”

    President Bush has also called for steps to prevent nuclear terrorism, but in a number of respects Kerry’s position on nuclear terrorism is stronger than that of the current administration. First, and most important, Kerry pledges to end the double standard of calling on others not to develop nuclear weapons while the US moves forward with research on new nuclear weapons, such as the bunker buster. Research on the bunker buster, as well as on lower yield, more usable nuclear weapons, has been an important aspect of the Bush Administration’s nuclear policy.

    Second, Kerry pledges to gain control of the nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union at a far more rapid rate than that of the Bush Administration. Third, Kerry promises to appoint a Nuclear Terrorism Coordinator to work with him in the White House in overseeing this effort. Finally, Kerry calls for taking prompt action on a verifiable ban on the creation of new fissile materials for nuclear weapons, a step long supported by the international community and nearly all US allies, but never before acted upon by the US .

    Both Bush and Kerry have called for strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but only in relation to preventing nuclear materials from civilian nuclear reactors from being converted to nuclear weapons. Neither Bush nor Kerry has set forth a plan to fulfill US obligations for nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the treaty. This is a major omission since the nuclear disarmament requirement of the treaty is a foundational element, and without US leadership to achieve this obligation it may be impossible to prevent nuclear terrorism.

    “We must lead this effort not just for our own safety,” Kerry stated, “but for the good of the world.” Kerry is certainly right that the world now needs US leadership on this critical issue. This leadership must include a dramatic reduction in the size of nuclear arsenals on the way to their total elimination, as agreed to by the parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in order to prevent the nuclear warheads from being available to terrorist organizations.

    If any leader of the United States is truly serious about preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, he must realize that nuclear disarmament is an essential element of the equation. Kerry posited the equation: “No material. No bomb. No terrorism.” That equation must be expanded to include: “No material. No bombs – period. Not in anyone’s hands.”

    There are no good or safe hands in which to place nuclear weapons. In the end, to eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism will require more than attempting to prevent nuclear proliferation; it will require the elimination of all nuclear weapons, a goal agreed to by the United States, United Kingdom and former Soviet Union in 1968 when they signed on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (www.wagingpeace.org)

  • Charting a New Course for US Nuclear Policy

    Charting a New Course for US Nuclear Policy

    “Nuclear weapons give no quarter. Their effects transcend time and place, poisoning the Earth and deforming its inhabitants for generation upon generation. They leave us wholly without defense, expunge all hope for survival. They hold in their sway not just the fate of nations but of civilization.”

    –General George Lee Butler (USAF, ret.)

    “See, free societies.don’t develop weapons of mass terror and don’t blackmail the world.”

    –George W. Bush, January 8, 2004

    Among the countries that currently possess nuclear weapons ( China , France , India , Israel , Pakistan , Russia , United Kingdom , United States and possibly North Korea ), the US is the most powerful, economically and militarily. If there is to be movement toward making the world safer from nuclear devastation, the US must lead the way. The US has the power to influence each of these other countries in a way that no other country or international organization could do. US leadership has the potential to bring the threat of future nuclear holocausts under control, and without this leadership the likelihood of future nuclear catastrophes seems virtually assured.

    At the 2004 meeting of the countries that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to plan for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the US exerted its leadership not for working towards far saner and safer nuclear policies, including disarmament, but for creating obstacles to progress on achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as on the other 13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. One analyst, Rebecca Johnson, summarized the meeting in this way: “The United States, actively abetted by France and Britain, with the other nuclear weapon states happy to go along, wanted to rewrite the NPT’s history by sidelining the 2000 Conference commitments, at which they had made an ‘unequivocal undertaking.to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.’ A majority of other states, by contrast, wanted the 2005 Review Conference to build on both the groundbreaking agreements from 2000 and the decisions and resolutions from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.”

    Current US nuclear policy comes down on the side of an indefinite commitment to nuclear weapons, or a policy of “forever nuclear.” Presumably it maintains this policy because its leaders believe that nuclear weapons give the US a military advantage. US leaders are thus placed in the position where they are pursuing policies opposing nuclear weapons for other countries while continuing to rely upon these weapons for themselves. This appears to the world as a “do as I say, not as I do” approach to policy, that is, a policy of nuclear hypocrisy. Such a policy not only makes the United States less secure, but it also undermines respect for the country throughout the world.

    The United States is now engaged in researching new and more usable nuclear weapons, Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators (“bunker busters”) and low-yield nuclear weapons (“mini-nukes”). The US is developing contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against seven countries, at least four of which are non-nuclear weapons states. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to pursue missile defenses and space weaponization. Its most recent treaty with Russia , the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, reduces the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 2,200 by the year 2012, but does not require that any of the weapons taken off deployed status be dismantled. The treaty ends in the year 2012, unless extended. The US is also planning to build a new facility capable of producing some 450 plutonium pits annually for nuclear weapons, or twice that number if the plant is used on a double shift.

    When these activities are combined with the vigorous opposition of the US government to commitments to achieving nuclear arms control and disarmament, this paints a picture for the world that the US is unwilling to change the direction on its policy of indefinite reliance on nuclear arms. For those who follow this issue closely, US nuclear policies are a matter of great concern and discouragement.

    There are three important questions that deserve our foremost attention. First, what perspectives would underpin a new course for US nuclear policy? Second, what would be the basic contours of a new course for US nuclear policy? Third, what would be needed to achieve this change in course? While there is ample room for debate on the responses to these questions, I offer my own views below as a starting point for discussion.

    What perspectives would underpin a new course for US nuclear policy?

    The most basic perspective that would underpin a new course for US nuclear policy is that nuclear weapons lessen rather than increase security. The possession of nuclear weapons virtually assures that a country will be a target of nuclear weapons. Further, the more nuclear weapons that exist in the world, the more likely it is that they will proliferate to both state and non-state actors with unforeseeable consequences that only assure that the world will become more dangerous.

    A second perspective is that nuclear weapons are in a class by themselves in terms of their destructive potential. It is an oversimplification to lump them together with chemical and biological weapons as weapons of mass destruction because their potential for causing widespread death and destruction is so much greater. Additionally, threatening to use nuclear weapons against chemical and biological weapons stores or perpetrators of chemical or biological attacks provides incentive for other states to develop nuclear arsenals.

    A third perspective is that the strengthening of international law and institutions provides a better basis for building security in its many dimensions than the threat of nuclear retaliation. Adherence to international law includes support for: the United Nations and its Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights agreements; the International Court of Justice, which adjudicates between countries; and the International Criminal Court, which holds individuals accountable for serious crimes under international law.

    A fourth perspective relates to the issue of national integrity. The US has made many commitments to fulfill nuclear disarmament obligations, starting with the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and including the 13 Practical Steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The US must give up the idea that it can flout, disregard and discard international agreements and commitments with impunity.

    A fifth perspective is that US leadership is essential to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, and that such a world would be more secure for all states, including the US. This perspective is based upon the understanding that there is no other country that could effectively provide this leadership, and so long as the US does not do so it is unlikely that change will occur.

    A sixth perspective is that the US must stop seeking to impose double standards akin to nuclear apartheid. US leaders must take responsibility for acting themselves as they desire other countries to act. If the US and other nuclear weapons states continue to ignore their obligations for nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, other states will undoubtedly follow their lead.

    Mohamed ElBaredei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency has argued: “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security – and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.” The argument is not for more nuclear weapons states, but for none, and the US must lead in this effort.

    Finally, a sense of urgency must accompany the other perspectives. There must be a sense that this issue demands priority among US security objectives and that a continuation of the status quo will undermine US non-proliferation efforts and US security.

    What would be the basic contours of a new course for US nuclear policy?

    There are many forms and timeframes that a new US nuclear policy could take. Most important, however, must be a commitment to achieve the multilateral phased elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable timeframe and the further commitment to provide leadership toward that goal. The US will have to demonstrate by its actions, not only its words, that it is committed to this goal.

    The US must use its convening power to bring all nuclear weapons states together to the negotiating table to negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This would be consistent with the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.”

    In terms of a timeframe, one proposal, put forward by the Mayors for Peace Emergency Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons, calls for starting negotiations on a treaty to ban nuclear weapons in 2005, the completion of negotiations by 2010, and the elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2020. The exact date of completing the process of nuclear disarmament may be less important than the demonstration of political will to achieve the goal combined with substantial steps toward the goal. It is clear that the world will become far safer from nuclear catastrophe when there are a few tens of nuclear weapons rather than tens of thousands.

    The US must forego provocative policies in nuclear weapons research and development leading to new and more usable nuclear weapons (“bunker busters” and “mini-nukes”). It must also stop working toward reducing the time needed to resume nuclear testing; and cease planning to create a facility to produce plutonium pits for large numbers of new or refurbished nuclear warheads.

    The US will need to reevaluate building defensive missile systems and weaponizing outer space, both projects that stimulate offensive nuclear responses.

    The US will have to make its nuclear reduction commitments irreversible by dismantling the weapons taken off active deployment.

    Finally, the US must give assurances to other countries that it is not relying upon its nuclear weapons for use in warfare. Such assurances could take the form of legally binding negative security assurances (the US will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state) and an agreement to No First Use against other nuclear weapons states, as well as taking its arsenal off hair-trigger alert.

    What would be needed to achieve this change in course in US nuclear policy?

    It is unlikely that US leaders will come to the conclusion of their own accord that it is necessary to chart a new course in US nuclear policy. They need serious prompting, both from American citizens and from the rest of the world. Other countries have been trying to influence the US government on this issue throughout the post-Cold War period to little avail. While other countries should certainly continue in this pursuit, the burden of responsibility for changing the course of US nuclear policy remains primarily with US citizens. It is an awesome responsibility, one on which the future of the world depends.

    A massive education and advocacy program is needed in the United States to mobilize widespread support for a new course in US nuclear policy. It will require resources, professionalism and persistence. The issue must be framed in a way that US citizens can grasp its importance and raise it to a high level in their hierarchy of policy priorities. The messages must be simple, clear and compelling. It is a challenge that demands our best thinking and organized action. It will require the wedding of old fashioned policy promotion with new technologies such as the internet. It will also require greater cooperation among advocacy groups and creativity in expanding the base of involvement by individuals and civil society groups that care not only about peace and disarmament, but also about the environment, human rights, health care and many other issue areas.

    Conclusion

    It would be tragic beyond reckoning for US leaders to arrive at an understanding of the need for a new course in US nuclear policy only after nuclear weapons are again used. The US remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons, a historical occurrence that is largely mythologized as beneficial in the context of ending the war against Japan . We must break through this mythology to realize that, as humans, we are all survivors of past atomic bombings and all potential victims of future atomic bombings.

    We are challenged to do something that has never been fully done before: to eliminate a type of weapon that may appear to its possessors as providing political or military advantage. If we can help citizens and leaders alike to use their imaginations to project the likelihood and consequences of the further use of these weapons, we may be able to navigate a new course in US nuclear policy, leading to the control and elimination of these weapons. We must engage this issue as if our very future and that of our children and grandchildren depended upon it. It does.

  • The Role of the United States in Nuclear Disarmament

    An Address to the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation Symposium
    “Charting a New Course for U.S. Nuclear Policy” Santa Barbara , California

    I approach the subject of the United States’ performance in the nuclear disarmament debate with great respect for the country and a dedication to the facts of nuclear weapons.

    For eight years I lived in this great country and, in fact, three of my children were born here. I have had the opportunity in my professional life of travelling through or visiting all 50 states, and I understand well the energy and creativity of the American people in the arts and sciences, commerce, and outreach to the world. The aspirations for freedom and liberty have been a beacon for the world.

    There are many wonderful things I could say about the United States . But regrettably that is not my task tonight. I have been asked to speak on the United States and nuclear weapons. Here it is not easy to be complimentary.

    Twenty years ago, I was appointed Canada ‘s Ambassador for Disarmament, a job which brought me into close contact with my diplomatic counterparts in many countries, including, of course, a lengthy list of American officials. At various times I chaired the meetings of all Western ambassadors and the U.N. Disarmament Committee. I have written extensively on the 1995 indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the general illegality of nuclear weapons, and the 2000 Review of the NPT, in which all States gave an “unequivocal undertaking” towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons through a program of 13 Practical Steps. I have attended all three meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review of the NPT, the last one concluding six days ago.

    It is clear to me that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, that is to say the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, is in crisis. To examine how the crisis came about and what to do about it, we must look at the role of the U.S. While the other declared Nuclear Weapons States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China are all also in contravention of their responsibilities to the NPT, it is the U.S. that sets the pace. The U.S. is the leading military power in the world by far, the lynchpin of NATO, and the dominant voice at the United Nations. With 31 members, the U.S. delegation was the largest at the recent NPT PrepComm. U.S. views deeply affect the policies of all Western nations and Russia .

    The U.S. astounded many delegations at the PrepComm by disowning its own participation in the 2000 consensus that produced the “unequivocal undertaking.” It refused to allow the 2000 Review to be used as a reference point for the 2005 Review. The result was turmoil and a collapse of the PrepComm.

    The Treaty can certainly survive one bad meeting, but that is not the point. What delegates from around the world are deeply concerned about is the U.S. attempt to change the rules of the game. At least before, there was a recognition that the NPT was obtained in 1970 through a bargain, with the Nuclear Weapons States agreeing to negotiate the elimination of their nuclear weapons in return for the non-nuclear states shunning the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Adherence to that bargain enabled the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 and the 13 Practical Steps of 2000. Now the U.S. is rejecting the commitments of 2000 and premising its aggressive diplomacy on the assertion that the problem of the NPT lies not in the actions of the Nuclear Weapons States but in the lack of compliance by states such as North Korea and Iran .

    The whole international community, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, is concerned about proliferation, but the new attempt by the Nuclear Weapon States to gloss over the discriminatory aspects of the NPT, which are now becoming permanent, has caused the patience of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement to snap. They see a two-class world of nuclear haves and have-nots becoming a permanent feature of the global landscape. In such chaos, the NPT is eroding and the prospect of multiple nuclear weapons states, a fear that caused nations to produce the NPT in the first place, is looming once more.

    That is the real point of the NPT crisis today. The crisis has been building through the two previous PrepComms, in 2002 and 2003, but a weak façade of harmony was maintained. Now the fuse has blown.

    Brazil bluntly warned:

    “The fulfillment of the 13 Steps on nuclear disarmament agreed during the 2000 Review Conference have been significantly – one could even say systematically – challenged by action and omission, and various reservations and selective interpretation by Nuclear Weapon States. Disregard for the provisions of Article VI may ultimately affect the nature of the fundamental bargain on which the Treaty’s legitimacy rests.”

    But the U.S. vigorously defended its policies, giving no ground to its critics. From the opening speech by John R. Bolton, Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. representatives insisted that attention not be diverted from the violations of the NPT by would-be nuclear powers “by focusing on Article VI issues that do not exist.” In fact, Assistant Secretary of State Stephen G. Rademaker stated, “there can be no doubt that the United States is in full compliance with its Article VI obligations.” Over the past 15 years, he said, the U.S. has:

    • Reduced over 10,000 deployed strategic warheads to less than 6,000 by December 5, 2001 as required by the START Treaty.
    • Eliminated nearly 90 percent of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons and reduced the number of types of nuclear systems in Europe from nine in 1991 to just one today.
    • Dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1988.
    • Not produced highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons since 1964 and halted the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in 1988.
    • Not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992.
    • Removed more than 200 tons of fissile material from the military stockpile, enough material for at least 8,000 nuclear weapons.

    These reductions notwithstanding, the U.S. has made clear that nuclear weapons will be maintained to meet “the changing circumstances” in today’s security environment. The Administration is moving ahead with plans to try to convince Congress to approve funding for the development of a new Low-Yield Warhead.

    A March 2004 Report to Congress reveals that the U.S. is employing a double standard concerning compliance with the NPT. Whereas the U.S. wants to move forward into a new generation of nuclear weaponry, it adamantly rejects the attempt of any other state to acquire any sort of nuclear weapon. The U.S. clearly wants to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons; of that there can be no doubt. But it does not want to be questioned on what it regards as its right to maintain enormous stocks (despite numerical reductions) and to keep nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of its military doctrine.

    The U.S. is widely criticized around the world for this double standard. For example, Brazil said at the PrepComm: “One cannot worship at the altar of nuclear weapons and raise heresy charges against those who want to join the sect.” The New Agenda protested imbalanced statements assailing proliferation while remaining mute on the equal responsibility for disarmament by the nuclear powers. South Africa said: “One cannot undermine one part of an agreement and hope that other parts will continue to have the same force, or that others will not in turn attempt to follow the same practice.” New Zealand scorned the present diminishment of the Treaty as a whole and urged the U.S. to at least review its opposition to a nuclear test ban treaty.

    Criticism of U.S. nuclear weapons policies also emanates from important observers within the U.S. A briefing for PrepComm delegates and NGOs was convened by the Friends Committee on National Legislation (Quakers), which stated that, as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many in Congress “are now so consumed by fear of terrorism that they support policies that would have been unfathomable five years ago.” For example, policies of preemptive nuclear strikes, new “usable” nuclear weapons, and resumption of nuclear testing are now openly discussed in Washington . “The United States finds itself at a crossroads; it stands at the point between re-nuclearization and disarmament.” Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, told the briefing that the crisis of the NPT can be attributed to the expanding role of nuclear weapons in U.S. military policy. He said that if Congress does not rein in the Administration, present trend lines will lead to testing of new weapons and re-deployment of 2,400 strategic nuclear weapons after the Moscow Treaty expires in 2012. It was “troubling” that the U.S. contemplated the use of a nuclear weapon in response to a biological or chemical attack.

    A detailed critique of the stand taken by the U.S. at the PrepComm was published in News in Review , a daily record of the PrepComm published by “Reaching Critical Will,” of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Written by Andrew Lichterman and Jacqueline Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation, the document gave several examples to show that the U.S. is not in compliance with the NPT: more than 2,000 U.S. strategic nuclear warheads remain on hair-trigger alert, and U.S. Trident submarines continue to patrol the seas at Cold War levels, ready to fire hundreds of the most destructive and precise weapons ever conceived on 15 minutes’ notice. Answering the U.S. claim that it is not developing any new nuclear weapons, the document said:

    “Fact: The 2005 budget provides for upgrades to every nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile, requests $336 million to manufacture and certify new plutonium pits, the first stage in a nuclear weapon, requests $28 million for 2005 and $485 million over five years to design a “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator,” and requests $30 million for Enhanced Test Readiness to reduce the time needed to prepare for and conduct a full-scale underground nuclear test to 18 months.”

    There is no way to reconcile this resurgence of nuclear weapons development ( Germany called it a nuclear “renaissance”) with disarmament. Even as it says it is adhering to the NPT, the U.S. is flouting it. I have come to the conclusion that only a change in attitude by the U.S. Administration can now save the Treaty.

    Many delegations indicated privately that they are waiting to see the future direction of U.S. policy inasmuch as a Presidential election will occur before the 2005 Review. The positions of John Kerry, the presumptive Democratic nominee are being examined. An analysis of his comments shows that Kerry is opposed to the Bush Administration’s plans to develop new nuclear weapons, which Kerry believes “will make America less secure by setting back our country’s longstanding efforts to lead an international non-proliferation regime. It could set off a dangerous new nuclear arms race, while seriously undermining our ability to work with the international community to address nuclear proliferation threats in places like North Korea and Iran .” Instead, Kerry believes the United States should work for the creation of “a new international accord on nuclear proliferation to make the world itself safer for human survival.”

    In terms of concrete measures to advance non-proliferation and disarmament, Kerry supports the CTBT (having opposed Bush’s decision to withdraw), and advocates greater emphasis on securing nuclear stockpiles around the world by extending ongoing American efforts in the former Soviet Union to other countries to ensure fissile materials do not fall into the hands of terrorists. Kerry recognizes the importance of international cooperation in achieving results in non-proliferation, and promotes a multilateral approach, pointing to the shared global interest in preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons. This approach should extend to U.S. Missile Defence programs, which Kerry supports, but believes should be developed in accordance with American treaty obligations, ensuring that American foreign relations are not damaged in the process.

    The election of the U.S. President is not my business. I must direct my efforts and the policies of the Middle Powers Initiative toward dealing with the governments that are in place around the world. Thus the MPI advocates the formation of a new coalition of States determined to save the NPT in 2005. A working partnership of important non-nuclear States must occupy the centre of the nuclear weapons debate and exert its strength in 2005. The beginning of such a partnership exists in the New Agenda Coalition, which was largely responsible for the success of the 2000 Review Conference. The leading non-nuclear States of NATO, such as Canada , Germany , Norway , Belgium , the Netherlands and Italy , must now work closely with the New Agenda to lead the international community toward a positive, if still modest, success in 2005.

    They must stop being cowed by the all-powerful NWS; they must speak up forcefully, in the name of humanity, to the United States , a country that has done much good for the world in other contexts but whose nuclear weapons doctrine is a threat to civilizations everywhere.

    Speaking up takes courage and leadership. The middle power States, which by and large stayed out of the U.S.-led Iraq war, are not lacking in either. They have to make prudential judgments on when to give voice to their concerns.

    It is paradoxical that just when the voice of the public is most needed to move governments on nuclear disarmament, it is most difficult to awaken the public. The public is by no means uncaring about war; they just do not see the connection between retention of nuclear weapons and the likelihood of mass destruction ahead.

    An awakening of the public is, of course, a profound concern of the NGOs, stalwart in the dedication they showed to the issue, many traveling to the PrepComm at their own expense and continually deprived of funding by foundations which have turned their attention elsewhere.

    An awakening of the public is precisely the strategy of Mayor Akiba of Hiroshima in his Emergency Campaign for Mayors For Peace. If the people in the municipalities around the world make their voices heard, the national politicians and diplomats will be quick to get the message.

    The recent comments by Mikhail Gorbachev are especially practical in this instance. Gorbachev says, referring to the panoply of human security issues besetting the world, that he is convinced the citizens of the world need a reformulated “glasnost” to invigorate, inform and inspire them to put the staggering resources of our planet and our knowledge to use for the benefit of all.

    The empowerment of peoples is needed to address the dominance of short-term interests and lack of transparency where the planet’s fate is being decided by what to do about nuclear weapons.

    Gorbachev says he has faith in humankind. “It is this faith that has allowed me to remain an active optimist.”

  • Nonproliferation Treaty Meeting Collapses Without Decisions

    A meeting of parties to the  Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty  (NPT) collapsed Friday night after the delegates failed to resolve differences on numerous political and procedural issues, notably how to refer to their own consensus decisions of 2000.

    This was the final preparatory meeting before next year’s review conference and delegates hoped that the meeting would produce recommendations for the conference, as preparatory meetings have in the past.  Hours after the meeting was supposed to have ended, the meeting was simply adjourned with a final report containing minimum details.  Breaking its own rules of procedure, the meeting did not even resume in open session to formally close it proceedings.  Most of the meetings in the last week were held behind closed doors.

    The political debate at the heart of all the procedural wrangling was the relative weight that should be given to disarmament and nonproliferation, specifically if the treaty’s priority should be disarmament by the nuclear powers or addressing proliferation threats by countries such as North Korea and Iran.

    The chairman of the meeting, Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadiningrat of Indonesia, issued his own summary of the meeting on Thursday night, which was an attempt to reflect all the divergent positions expressed during the two-week meeting.  As such, there are ideas in it to please and annoy everyone.  There was never a chance that all the states would accept the summary as a consensus document, but it had been expected that the paper would be annexed to the final report under the chairman’s own authority and sent to the review conference.

    But Sudjadnan’s paper was strongly criticized in an all-day closed meeting Friday by most of the nuclear weapon states, led by the United States, that insisted the paper could only be referred to in the list of documents and not annexed to the report.

    A key sticking point was whether to acknowledge the final document of the  2000 review conference.  This seemingly procedural question was a lightning rod for the political divisions among the delegates since the 2000 decision includes what has become known as “the 13 steps” – specific actions the nuclear powers agreed to as part of their disarmament commitments under the NPT.  The 13 steps include “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.”  That undertaking includes signing and ratifying the  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, reduction in tactical nuclear weapons and halting the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.  The United States now opposes many of these steps, most notably its rejection of the test ban treaty.

    Because of this stalemate, the meeting could not even agree to seemingly routine items such as an agenda for the 2005 conference.

    Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil will be the president of the review conference, which will be held in New York May 2-27, 2005.

    Originally published by the UN Wire.

  • Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security

    A Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Panel Discussion

    During the 2004 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee at the United Nations, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation convened a panel discussion entitled “Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and the Quest for Security,” enabling the opportunity to discuss current proliferation trends and recommendations to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

    The panel was moderated by David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and speakers at the event included Canadian Senator and Chair of the Middle Powers Initiative, Douglas Roche OC, Kate Hudson, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation, and Justine Wang, Research and Advocacy Coordinator at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. The resulting discussions were constructive as panelists debated the challenges posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as the responsibility to offer alternative visions of security for a more peaceful world.

    Senator Roche set the tone by addressing the current state of the world today. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, nuclear weapons states have shown scant inclination to abide by their promise of good faith negotiations to achieve nuclear disarmament. Without a serious effort by nuclear weapons states to achieve nuclear disarmament, the NPT will continue to promote double standards that allow some states to continue to expand and improve their nuclear arsenal while denying others of the same rights. In order to meet the challenges of today, the NPT and the non-proliferation regime is in urgent need of reconstruction. In reflecting on the role he played both as a parliamentarian and as a representative of civil society, Senator Roche underlined the importance of the role of civilian grassroots and non-governmental organizations in educating the public and influencing top level policy decisions among different countries.

    Kate Hudson spoke on the subject of the “Special Relationship between the US and UK .” Having summarized the background to the relationship based on the UK ‘s historical economic dependence, Hudson spoke of the problems arising from the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA) between the two countries. This provides the basis for extensive nuclear collaboration, without which it is unlikely that the UK would be able to sustain its possession of nuclear weapons on Trident submarines. According to Hudson , “It is unlikely that the UK could remain a nuclear weapon states without the support of the US .” The MDA is in line for renewal during 2004, which has a strong bearing on the issue of a possible Trident replacement and the potential development of new nuclear weapons.

    Hudson also discussed the UK ‘s strong support for the new framework of the 2001 US Nuclear Posture Review. It was noted that many observers feel that political support for US initiatives is part of the “Special Relationship.” The problem in the UK is that the current British government strongly supports the relationship and backs the full range of US policies, including pre-emptive war and nuclear first strike. CND is currently campaigning against the development of new nuclear weapons; for an immediate parliamentary discussion on MDA; for a rejection of pre-emptive war and nuclear first use policies; in opposition to a Trident replacement; for withdrawal of permission for US use of British bases for Missile Defense; and for withdrawal of US weapons from Lakenheath.

    Jacqueline Cabasso focused on US nuclear weapons policy and underlined the importance of nuclear disarmament as a core issue on the global peace movement’s agenda. According to Cabasso, while the Bush administration is demanding nuclear disarmament from other nations, it continues to upgrade and expand its nuclear arsenal. Cabasso supports this by referring to several US documents, including:

    • The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, which calls for:
      • a variety of nuclear attack options to compliment other US military capabilities;
      • contingency plans for use of nuclear weapons against seven named countries (including non-nuclear weapons states) in “immediate, potential, and unexpected contingencies;” and,
      • a revitalized nuclear weapons research, development and production infrastructure to maintain the existing US nuclear arsenal, develop new nuclear warheads in response to new requirements, and maintain readiness to resume full scale underground nuclear testing.
    • The 2002 US National Security Strategy which highlights the administration’s willingness to engage in pre-emptive war, including the possibility of nuclear first strike by “acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
    • The US Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction which reserves to the US the right to respond with overwhelming force – including using nuclear weapons – to the use of weapons of nuclear, chemical or biological against the US or its allies.

    According to Cabasso, the legitimization of nuclear weapons by the world’s first nuclear weapons state and super power, the US , poses the gravest threat to international security. The US policy of preventive war and its push to modernize its nuclear arsenal provide arguments for other countries to develop nuclear weapons of their own.

    Cabasso challenged that while the security policy of the Bush administration are more extreme than other administrations, they are really a continuation of them. Cabasso continued by pointing out that even if Democratic Presidential Candidate John Kerry (D-MA) succeeds in winning the election in November 2004, the global community must not assume that current US nuclear weapons policy will take a dramatic turn for the better. Reading excerpts from An American Security Strategy, released in July 2003 by the National Security Advisory Group to the Democratic Party, Cabasso revealed that Democratic national security policies are not necessarily opposed to current US nuclear weapons policy. The policy paper only demonstrates a marginal change from the current US stance and endorses the current level of spending on US nuclear weapons and other military programs.

    Current US nuclear policies have made visible the present and very real dangers of nuclear weapon use. Nuclear weapons threaten everyone’s security and Cabasso concluded for the need to redefine security, “throwing out the outdated model completely to replace it with a human security model” based on food, shelter, clean air and water, jobs, healthcare and education for everyone everywhere, without regard to national borders.

    Justine Wang ended the panel discussion by addressing recent calls for countering proliferation and suggesting recommendations for improving the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Wang addressed the recent initiatives proposed by US President George Bush on February 11 2004, IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei and the recently passed US-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While these proposals are constructive and necessary to the extent that they don’t enshrine double standards, they fall seriously short of being able to meet the current global proliferation challenge.

    Wang called for the stemming of nuclear proliferation under a more strict, equitable and effective multilateral framework and shared recommendations of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation to improve the NPT and non-proliferation regime. Recommendations include commencing negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, universal application of the NPT to all states under a strict timetable, entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty , universal and equal application of the Additional Protocol , and the phased elimination of nuclear power.

    Wang reiterated that the continuation of the current NPT regime that ignores existing double standards is destined to result in both further nuclear proliferation and the use of nuclear weapons. Only by embracing significant changes that end existing double standards and elevate nuclear disarmament obligations can the non-proliferation regime succeed.

    Krieger concluded the panel discussion and mentioned that the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is launching an online campaign entitled “Turn the Tide: Charting a New Course for US Nuclear Policy” as an example of a grassroots initiative needed to mobilize the public to alert policy makers on the threat of nuclear weapons on the world’s security.

    Discussions ended with a question and answer session, where many participants engaged in constructive dialogue on facing the challenge of the increasing threat of nuclear weapons and the future of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime.

  • Saving Ourselves From Self-Destruction

    Nuclear proliferation is on the rise. Equipment, material and training were oncelargely inaccessible. Today, however, there is a sophisticated worldwide network that can deliver systems for producing material usable in weapons. The demand clearly exists: countries remain interested in the illicit acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

    If we sit idly by, this trend will continue. Countries that perceive themselves to be vulnerable can be expected to try to redress that vulnerability — and in some cases they will pursue clandestine weapons programs. The supply network will grow, making it easier to acquire nuclear weapon expertise and materials. Eventually, inevitably, terrorists will gain access to such materials and technology, if not actual weapons.

    If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction.

    Common sense and recent experience make clear that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has served us well since 1970, must be tailored to fit 21st-century realities. Without threatening national sovereignty, we can toughen the nonproliferation regime.

    The first step is to tighten controls over the export of nuclear material, a priority President Bush identified yesterday in his speech on nuclear nonproliferation. The current system relies on a gentlemen’s agreement that is not only nonbinding, but also limited in its membership: it does not include many countries with growing industrial capacity. And even some members fail to control the exports of companies unaffiliated with government enterprise.

    We must universalize the export control system, remove these loopholes, and enact binding, treaty-based controls — while preserving the rights of all states to peaceful nuclear technology. We should also criminalize the acts of people who seek to assist others in proliferation.

    In parallel, inspectors must be empowered. Much effort was recently expended — and rightly so — in persuading Iran and Libya to give the International Atomic Energy Agency much broader rights of inspection. But the agency should have the right to conduct such inspections in all countries. Verification of nonproliferation treaty obligations requires more stringent measures, but to date, fewer than 20 percent of the 191 United Nations members have approved a protocol allowing broader inspection rights. Again, as President Bush suggested yesterday, it should be in force for all countries.

    In addition, no country should be allowed to withdraw from the treaty. The treaty now allows any member to do so with three months’ notice. Any nation invoking this escape clause is almost certainly a threat to international peace and security.

    This provision of the treaty should be curtailed. At a minimum, withdrawal should prompt an automatic review by the United Nations Security Council.

    The international community must do a better job of controlling the risks of nuclear proliferation. Sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle — the production of new fuel, the processing of weapon-usable material, the disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste — would be less vulnerable to proliferation if brought under multinational control. Appropriate checks and balances could be used to preserve commercial competitiveness and assure a supply of nuclear material to legitimate would-be users.

    Toward this end, negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty must be revived. The treaty, which would put an end to the production of fissionable material for weapons, has been stalled in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for nearly eight years. For the material that already exists, including in some countries of the former Soviet Union, security measures must be strengthened.

    Of course, a fundamental part of the nonproliferation bargain is the commitment of the five nuclear states recognized under the nonproliferation treaty — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — to move toward disarmament. Recent agreements between Russia and the United States are commendable, but they should be verifiable and irreversible. A clear road map for nuclear disarmament should be established — starting with a major reduction in the 30,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, and bringing into force the long-awaited Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

    If the global community is serious about bringing nuclear proliferation to a halt, these measures and others should be considered at the nonproliferation treaty review conference next year.

    We must also begin to address the root causes of insecurity. In areas of longstanding conflict like the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction — while never justified — can be expected as long as we fail to introduce alternatives that redress the security deficit. We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security — and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use.

    Similarly, we must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries — city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders — an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place.

    *Mohamed ElBaradei is director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This article was originally published in the New York Times on February 12, 2004.